On the premise that China has established the most complete and largest manufacturing economy globally, building a manufacturing power has become the primary focus and mission of future industrial development. China’s manufacturing industry has achieved a significant leap from large to powerful. It serves as a major support for the building of a quality power, aerospace power, cyberpower, transportation power, and ocean power. It is essential for establishing a country rich with talent, S&T, trade, sports, and education. It is the cornerstone of economic construction in building a powerful modern socialist country. The building of a manufacturing power is a complex collective process involving multiple levels such as systems, policies, strategies, and organizations, as well as various entities such as countries, localities, enterprises, scientific research institutions, social organizations, and individuals. A structured understanding of a manufacturing power requires identifying the critical dimensions of the many intricate factors that affect the success or failure of the building of a manufacturing power and then focusing on exploring the strategic points of each dimension.
在中国已经建立起全球体系最为完整、规模最为庞大的制造业经济体的前提下,制造强国建设成为未来工业发展的首要议题和使命。中国制造业实现由大到强的伟大跃迁,是质量强国、航天强国、网络强国、交通强国、海洋强国建设的重要支撑,是人才强国、科技强国、贸易强国、体育强C国、教育强国建设的重要牵引,是社会主义现代化强国建设中经济建设的基石。制造强国建设是一个涉及到制度、政策、战略、组织等多个层面以及国家、地方、企业、科研机构、社会性组织、个人等各类主体的复杂的集体性互动过程。对制造强国的结构化理解,需要在错综复杂的因素中识别出影响制造强国建设成败的关键维度,并聚焦探索每一个维度的战略要点。
1. Three critical dimensions of building a manufacturing power
一、制造强国建设的三个关键维度
The process of leapfrogging beyond and upgrading the industrial capacity of human society is also the process of the emergence and replacement of manufacturing powers. Although these manufacturing powers have possessed different industrial forms and institutional capabilities. They have all been the leaders of dominant technologies and strategic leading industries in each technological wave or industrial revolution. They all have stimulated the emergence of many breakthrough technological innovations with specific institutional structures. At the same time, as each rising manufacturing power has faced different internal and external challenges, the main obstacles to overcome in the process of becoming a manufacturing power and the strategies for overcoming these obstacles (whether these strategies are designed in advance or learned in the process) obtained) must be different. Combining the generalized experiences of developing a manufacturing power and the unique internal and external conditions that China faces in building a manufacturing power, China’s manufacturing power strategy in the future should include technology and market leadership in strategic areas, manufacturing operation security under extreme pressure, and continuous innovation-driven manufacturing as the three critical dimensions for building an endogenous development mechanism. Of these dimensions, technological and market leadership in strategic fields and long-term accumulation of innovation-driven development are typical characteristics of building a manufacturing power. At the same time, the security of manufacturing operations under extreme pressure conditions is a unique constraint faced by China as it builds a manufacturing power in the future.
人类社会工业能力出现非连续性跳跃升级的过程也是制造强国涌现和替代的过程。这些制造强国虽然具有不同的产业形态和制度能力,但都具有某些共同的技术经济特征,如都是每一次科技浪潮或工业革命中主导技术和战略先导产业的领先者,都以特定的制度结构激励了突破性技术创新的大量涌现。与此同时,由于每一个制造强国的崛起都曾面临不同的内外部挑战,其迈向制造强国过程中克服的主要障碍以及克服了这些障碍的战略(无论这些战略是事前设计还是在过程中习得的)又必然具有差异性。综合制造强国发展的一般经验和我国制造强国建设内外部条件的独特性,未来我国制造强国战略应包含战略性领域的技术和市场领先、极端压力情形下的制造业运行安全以及持续创新驱动的制造业内生发展机制建设三个关键维度。其中,战略性领域的技术和市场领先、长期累积的创新驱动发展是制造强国建设的一般性特征,而极端压力情形下的制造业运行安全是未来我国制造强国建设面临的特殊约束。
Forming leading advantages in strategic leading industries, leading a new round of S&T revolution and industrial transformation, and making unique Chinese contributions to cutting-edge technological breakthroughs and business model innovations in human manufacturing are the core facets of China’s building of a manufacturing power. Almost every late-developing manufacturing power has risen through new windows of opportunity opened by a wave of new technology and the resulting industrial revolution. By leading the large-scale assembly-line production method, the United States rose in strategic leading industries such as vehicles and chemicals at that time. Japan became a leader in consumer electronics, home appliances, energy-saving vehicles, and other sectors by pioneering lean production methods, becoming a manufacturing power. When breakthrough innovations in underlying technologies (or root technologies) and general-purpose technologies open up technological opportunities and market space, industrial countries with a certain strength will participate in the torrent of competition in the new industrial revolution based on their respective institutional capabilities and technology roadmaps. Whoever ultimately masters the dominant design and forms a business model compatible with that dominant design will hold the most powerful position and obtain the greatest value in the global value chain of the given strategically leading industry. Through the diffusion and application of general-purpose technology in other sectors, an overall and substantial improvement in economic efficiency and industrial competitiveness will be achieved, ultimately establishing the status of a manufacturing power.
在引领新一轮科技革命和产业变革的战略先导产业形成领先优势,并对人类制造业前沿技术突破和商业模式创新做出独特的中国贡献,是我国制造强国建设的核心。几乎每一个后发的制造强国都是在新科技浪潮和工业革命打开的新机会窗口期崛起的,美国通过引领大规模流水线生产方式在汽车、化工等当时的战略先导产业崛起,日本通过开创精益生产方式成为消费电子、家电、节能汽车等产业的领导者,并跻身制造强国行列。当底层技术(或根技术)和通用目的技术的突破性创新打开技术机会和市场空间的时候,具备一定实力的工业国家都会基于各自的制度能力和技术路线参与到新工业革命的竞争洪流,谁最终掌握了主导设计并形成了与该主导设计相适应的商业模式,谁就能够在战略主导产业的全球价值链中掌握最有力的位置、获得最大的价值,并通过通用目的技术在其他部门的扩散应用实现经济效率和产业竞争力的整体大幅提升,从而最终确立制造强国地位。
In the face of the normalized containment and suppression of China by certain developed countries, ensuring the regular operation of the manufacturing industry in extreme circumstances and forming adequate support for economic, social, and national defense security is the basis for my China’s building of a manufacturing power. Competition between manufacturing powers has occurred with each new industrial revolution, and each revolution has been rife with international plots of repression and defense. For example, to prevent Japan’s integrated circuit industry from overtaking, the United States forced Japan to sign the Japan-US Semiconductor Agreement twice in 1986 and 1991, respectively, to restrict the export of Japanese semiconductors to the United States and expand the market share of American semiconductors in Japan. This directly led to Japanese enterprises losing their advantages in the global semiconductor industry competition after the 1990s. However, since China is a big country with fundamental differences in ideology from the leading countries, in the process of China’s progress from a manufacturing country to a manufacturing power, not only do we face pressure from leading countries under the pretext that the framework for cooperation at the strategic level is basically stable, but we may also face overall containment and extreme suppression that can undermine the general cooperation framework. As such, China’s building of a manufacturing power must promote leadership in strategic fields and ensure the security of strategic industries and even the overall manufacturing economic system.
面对部分发达国家对我国的常态化遏制和打压,确保制造业能够在极端情形下的正常运转,并对经济、社会和国防安全形成有效支撑,是我国制造强国建设的基础。虽然每一轮新工业革命背景下的制造强国竞争,都充满了国家间的抑制和反抑制情节。例如,为遏制日本集成电路产业赶超,美国分别在1986年和1991年两次迫使日本签定以限制日本半导体对美出口和扩大美国半导体在日本市场份额为目的的日美半导体协议,直接导致日本企业在20世纪90年代后的全球半导体产业竞争中丧失优势。然而,由于中国是一个在意识形态方面与领先国家存在根本性差异的大国,中国在制造大国向制造强国迈进的过程中,面临的不仅仅是来自领先国家在战略层面合作框架基本稳定前提下的局部打压,还可能是破坏了总体合作框架的全局性遏制和极端打压。在这种情况下,中国的制造强国建设不仅要推进战略性领域的领先,而且同时要保证战略性产业、甚至整体制造业经济体系的运行安全。
Effectively establishing an innovation-friendly environment at home and an atmosphere abroad that is sufficiently open and cooperative and establishing an endogenous mechanism for China’s manufacturing industry to go from being large to becoming powerful is the premise for China to build a manufacturing power. In the most general sense, building a manufacturing power results from continuous high-intensity innovation and diversified competition among many innovative enterprises. Whether it is the strategic orientation of enterprises or the competitive relationship between enterprises, they are all determined by the incentive structure shaped by the institutional structure of a country. Since China has generally been in a stage of economic catch-up and institutional transformation for the past four decades, the technology learning method based on technology introduction, the surging consumption, and the imperfect market system have all contributed to the large-scale investment-driven manufacturing development model. Although Chinese entrepreneurs too have been full of enterprising spirit since the reform and opening up, the enterprising spirit induced by large-scale market opportunities and low technical barriers is more arbitrage-oriented than innovation-oriented. Although China is the most competitive industrial product market globally, corporate competition is full of undifferentiated and vicious competition. Neither the rules-based competition order of American and European enterprises nor the cooperation-based competitive relationship of Japanese enterprises have yet to form in China. Therefore, it can be said that the process of China’s transition from a manufacturing country to a manufacturing power is essentially a profound change in the competition paradigm of China’s manufacturing micro-entities.
切实建立起“创新友好”的内部环境和足够开放合作的外部氛围,建立我国制造业由大到强的内生机制,是我国制造强国建设的前提。从最一般的意义上讲,制造强国的建设过程是大量的创新型企业持续高强度创新和多样化竞争的结果。而无论是企业的战略导向还是企业间的竞争关系,都是由一国制度结构塑造的激励结构所决定的。由于过去四十年我国总体上处于经济追赶和制度转型阶段,以技术引进为主的技术学习方式,以及潮涌式消费和不完善的市场体制,都促成了大规模投资驱动的制造业发展模式。虽然改革开放以来的中国企业家也饱含企业家精神,但大规模市场机会和低技术壁垒诱致的企业家精神更多是“套利”导向、而不是创新导向的,虽然中国是全球竞争最为激烈的工业品市场,但企业竞争充满了无差异竞争和恶性竞争,美欧企业基于规则的竞争秩序和日本企业基于合作的竞争关系在我国尚未形成。因此,可以说,中国由制造大国向制造强国跃迁的过程,本质上是中国制造业微观主体竞争范式的深刻转变。
2. Strategies and policies for establishing leading advantages in strategic leading industries
二、战略先导产业确立领先优势的战略和政策
If we want to establish a leading position in a strategic leading industry and at the same time deeply integrate with the global manufacturing production system, some things must be done and some things must not be done. We must also focus on areas where China has institutional and capability advantages that open doors left closed to others. Although China has formed certain technological and industrial advantages in 5G, rare earth processing, UHV, and other areas, it would be difficult for these advantages to pose a substantial threat to the core and long-term interests of the United States’ asymmetrical competitive advantage. The fourth wave of industrial revolution of intelligentization, digitization, and networkization provides China an unprecedented window of opportunity to build a manufacturing power. Leading in the strategic leading industries of the new wave of industrial revolution is the micro-foundation for China to overcome the middle-income trap. It is the mission that China must fulfill to become a manufacturing power. Although several outstanding enterprises have emerged in China, as represented by BAT, in the era of the mobile internet, in general, these transaction-oriented platform enterprises are still downstream applications based on American root technology. Only by establishing a leading position in the Internet of Things (IoT), such as in the industrial internet, AI, and the new generation of digital economy root technologies, can China truly become a power that takes the initiative in the industrial competition among countries.
如欲在确立战略先导产业领先地位的同时又与全球制造业生产体系深度融合,就要“有所为、有所不为”地锁定部分我国具有制度和能力优势的领域培育“人无我有”的杀手锏。虽然目前我国在5G、稀土加工、特高压等领域形成了一定的技术和产业优势,但这些优势都难以对美国核心利益和长期利益构成实质性的威胁,因而都不是能够支撑制造强国的“非对称竞争优势”。以智能化、数字化、网络化为核心特征的第四轮产业革命,为我国制造强国建设提供了前所未有的机会窗口。在新一轮产业革命的战略先导产业领域实现领跑,是我国跨越“中等收入陷阱”的微观基础,是我国成为制造强国必须完成的使命。虽然在移动互联网时代,我国涌现出以BAT为代表一批优秀企业,但总体上看这些交易型平台企业仍然是基于美国根技术的下游应用,只有在在工业互联网、人工智能等物联网和新一代数字经济根技术领域确立领先地位,我国才能真正成为在国家间产业竞争中掌握主动性的强国。
(1) Realize leadership in strategic leading industries in the process of building an international community
(一)在构建国际共同体的过程中实现战略先导产业领先
The digital economy is a strategic leading industry for a new wave of industrial revolution, and it is also an important carrier of American technological and industrial competitiveness. To form an effective countermeasure against continued pressure from the United States, it is still necessary to seek breakthroughs in technologies and industries related to the digital economy. The field of competition for the new wave of industrial revolution in the future and the field that China should focus on fostering and promoting as a strategic countermeasure is the industrial internet. This is because, first of all, the industrial internet represents the development direction of the digital economy. It is the most promising strategic area for developing the digital economy in the future. It will be the field of high-density agglomeration and integration of breakthrough technologies in the future. Secondly, the industrial internet is an emerging field undergoing a period of rapid expansion. As no country has yet to form an absolute technological or market monopoly advantage, not only will it be easy to de-Americanize the underlying technology, but there are also opportunities to build asymmetric advantages.
数字经济是新一轮产业革命的战略先导产业,也是美国技术竞争力和产业竞争力的重要载体,要想对美国的持续施压形成有效反制,仍然要从数字经济相关技术和产业寻求突破。未来新一轮产业革命的必争领域,也是我国应作为战略反制加以重点培育推进的领域是工业互联网,这是因为,首先,工业互联网代表了数字经济的发展方向,是未来数字经济发展最有前景的战略性领域,是未来突破性技术高密度集聚融合的领域;其次,工业互联网是处于快速拓展期的新兴领域,各国都未形成绝对的技术或市场垄断优势,不仅易于在底层技术实现“去美国化”,而且存在构筑非对称优势的机会。
Jointly developing new industrial internet architecture and technical standards with Europe, sharing the economic benefits of the vast industrial internet market, and forming an industrial internet technology, market, and industry community is an effective strategy for China to create a leading edge in the industrial internet in the future. The future trend of industrial internet development will be the integration of communication technology and production and operation technology. China has the world’s leading-edge in communication technology, while Germany and other European countries lead the world in production and operation technology. If China and Europe can complement each other and open up cooperation, it will significantly accelerate the process of global industrial internet technology and ecosystem incubation. At present, European countries have a very positive attitude towards developing the digital economy as a whole. European economic strategies such as the Made in Germany: Industrial Strategy 2030 and the Manifesto for a European Industrial Policy Fit for the 21st Century have emphasized changing the backwardness of the European digital economy and realizing an economic revival through the digital economy. Furthermore, European countries do not want to be wholly controlled by the United States in the digital economic ecosystem. If we can promote the integration of the information technology advantages of China’s Huawei, ZTE, and other enterprises with the production and operation advantages of Germany’s Siemens, Bosch, Schneider, and other enterprises, as well as the industrial software advantages of France’s Dassault, Germany’s Siemens, and other enterprises, while also giving other European countries, Japan, South Korea, and the vast majority of developing countries sufficient industrial positions and benefits, it is entirely possible to jointly promote the development of a new industrial internet ecosystem with Europe, Japan, and South Korea. To improve the feasibility of international cooperation on the industrial internet, the dominance of the technical architecture, technical standards, and protocols of the industrial internet can be mastered and promoted by European standards organizations. At the same time, China can achieve technological and market advantages.
与欧洲共同发展新的工业互联网架构和技术标准,共同分享工业互联网巨大市场的经济利益,形成工业互联网的技术、市场和产业共同体,是未来我国形成工业互联网领先优势的有效战略。未来工业互联网发展的趋势是通信技术和生产运营技术的融合,我国在通信技术方面具有全球领先优势,而德国等欧洲国家在生产运营技术方面全球领先,如果中欧能够优势互补地开放合作,将大大加速全球工业互联网技术和生态培育的进程。目前欧洲国家对于发展数字经济的态度整体上是非常积极的,《德国工业战略2030》和《面向21世纪欧洲工业政策宣言》等欧洲经济战略都特别强调要改变欧洲数字经济落后的局面,实现数字经济振兴。进一步地,欧洲国家并不希望在数字经济生态完全受制于美国。如果能够推动我国华为、中兴等企业的信息技术优势与德国西门子、博世、施耐德等企业的生产运营优势、以及法国达索、德国西门子等企业的工业软件优势的融合,同时在新的工业互联网生态中给欧洲其他国家以及日本、韩国和广大发展中国家足够的产业位置和利益,完全可能与欧洲、日、韩共同推动一个全新的工业互联网生态的发展。为了提高工业互联网国际合作的可行性,工业互联网技术架构、技术标准和协议的主导权可以由欧洲的标准组织掌握并推动形成,中国则主要通过对核心技术的掌握和大规模市场应用实现技术和市场领先。
Under the guidance of this strategy, actively incubating platform-based enterprises in the field of the industrial internet should become the focus of China’s industrial policy in the future. Although China has incubated several leading enterprises in search engines, e-commerce, social media, and other transactional platforms in the past two decades, leading Internet platform enterprises such as Alibaba, Baidu, JD.com, Tencent, and NetEase are all transaction-oriented platform enterprises targeting domestic market demand. Innovative platform enterprises that face global market competition and can lead the development of China’s IoT have not yet formed. Although several Chinese manufacturing enterprises such as Huawei, ZTE, Sany Heavy Industry, and Haier have developed unique capacities for digitalization, intelligentization, and networkization in their respective fields, in general, the technology platforms of these enterprises are all private technology platforms and product platforms. There is still a long way to go before they can become leading platform-based enterprises that define industry architecture and standards. In this regard, it is necessary to strengthen the organization, coordination, and top-level design of China’s strategic technologies and industries, to strengthen the horizontal communication and cooperation of various industry management departments, to eliminate the policy blind spots of ecosystem controls and supports for new technology industries, and to resolve the problem of industrial policy fragmentation. Further clarifying the primary rights and persons responsible for the formulation and implementation of significant industrial policies such as major national projects while drawing upon the mission-oriented policy management model of DARPA and other institutions in the United States and introducing mature project management processes will significantly improve the organization and implementation efficiency for significant projects. In terms of industrial deployment, the overall deployment of the digital economy, new infrastructure, and the manufacturing industry should be focused on incubating innovative platform enterprises in China’s industrial internet through cross-industry vertical deployment. Industrial policies should effectively coordinate across industry, academia, and research, guide the industry to develop independent technical standards, open up new technology roadmaps, and promote the integration of China’s technical standards and industrial ecosystem with international technical standards and industrial ecosystems. In terms of cooperating with Europe to promote the development of IoT technologies such as the industrial internet and incubating Chinese IoT innovative platform enterprises, China’s strategies, plans, and policies should focus on contributing China’s unique talents, technologies, and market achievements, highlighting the privacy protection, information security, and fair competition behavior norms of Chinese platform enterprises, rather than benchmarking and catching up with developed market economy countries, thereby elevating the inclusiveness of China’s building of a manufacturing power.
在此战略指导下,积极培育工业互联网领域的平台型企业是应成为未来我国产业政策的重点。虽然过去二十年我国在搜索引擎、电子商务、社交媒体等等交易平台领域培育了一批龙头企业,但阿里巴巴、百度、京东、腾讯、网易等领先互联网平台企业都是针对国内市场需求的交易型平台企业,面向全球市场竞争的、能够引领我国物联网发展的创新型平台企业尚未形成。虽然华为、中兴、三一重工、海尔等一批我国制造业企业已经在各自领域形成了数字化、智能化、网络化的独特能力,但总体上看,这些企业的技术平台都是私有技术平台和产品平台,距离成为定义行业架构和标准的领先平台型企业还有很大差距。对此,应加强我国战略性技术和产业的组织协调和顶层设计,加强各产业管理部门的横向沟通协作,清除新技术产业生态管制和扶持的政策死角,解决产业政策碎片化问题。进一步明确国家重大项目等重大产业政策制定、实施的主要权利人和责任人,同时借鉴美国DARPA等机构的任务导向政策管理模式,通过导入成熟的项目管理流程大幅提升重大项目的组织实施效率。在产业部署方面,对数字经济、新型基础设施和制造业进行统筹部署,聚焦于通过跨产业垂直部署培育中国工业互联网领域的创新型平台企业。产业政策应有效协调产学研各方,引导产业界发展自主技术标准、开辟新的技术路线,推动我国技术标准和产业生态与国际技术标准和产业生态相互嵌入融合。在与欧洲合作推进工业互联网等物联网技术发展以及培育中国物联网创新型平台企业方面,我国的战略、规划和政策应着力突出为推动全球前沿技术和新兴产业发展贡献中国独特的人才、科技和市场贡献,突出中国平台型企业的隐私保护、信息安全和公平竞争行为规范,而不是“对标”和“赶超”发达市场经济国家,从而提高中国制造强国建设的包容性。
(2) Redefine traditional industrial technology based on Chinese demand and leading global markets
(二)基于中国需求和全球领先市场重新定义传统产业技术
In addition to achieving a technological catch-up in strategic leading industries such as the industrial internet, promoting a large number of traditional high-tech and medium-high-tech industries to achieve leaps from technological imitation and catch-ups to technical leadership is also an essential aspect of China’s building of a manufacturing power. The critical points of strategies and policies to promote traditional high-tech and medium-high-tech industries to catch up and surpass leaders are encouraging and supporting local enterprises to make full use of the uniqueness of Chinese market demand and achieve technological leadership by redefining technical standards and products. It is generally believed that technological catching-up results from the interaction between technological opportunities and appropriate catching-up strategies. Industries with short technology cycles (such as communications and electronics) will continue to experience the substitution and replacement of technology roadmaps. It is more conducive for latecomers to catch up by opening up new technology roadmaps (an important reason China may catch up in the field of IoT, such as with the industrial internet, is that the technology roadmaps of these emerging industries have not yet been established). Conversely, latecomers have a harder time catching up in mature industries with long technology cycles. However, economic history shows that latecomers can achieve technological catch-ups in mature industries with long technology cycles. Japan’s automobile, home appliances, and other industries attained the goal of subversive innovation and continuous improvement in the 1960s and 1970s to overtake the United States and Europe. For traditional high-tech or medium-high-tech industries such as vehicles, home appliances, and engineering equipment, architectural innovation is essential for latecomers to achieve technological catch-ups. The core of architectural innovation is to redefine products according to the differences in market demand. China’s market demand is characterized by its ultra-large-scale. According to World Bank statistics, China’s final consumption accounted for about 11.6% of the world’s total in 2018, while China’s final consumption accounted for about 46.9% of upper-middle-income countries as defined by the World Bank; China’s total final consumption was equivalent to about 71.8% of the total of all Eurozone countries. The ultra-large market has created favorable conditions for China to become a manufacturing power. However, from the perspective of technology catch-up, an ultra-large market is not an adequate condition; in other words, an ultra-large market advantage is not adequate for building a manufacturing power. Spain is one of the countries with the longest high-speed rail mileage outside China. However, Spain has never developed the capacity for high-speed rail technology like Germany, France, and Japan. Rather, it is only a user of high-speed rail technology and equipment from other countries. Large-scale market advantages do not necessarily lead to technological catch-ups for late-developing countries. Only by using market demand to grow independent technical capabilities can domestic industries catch up. Only by redefining technology, standards, and products can a nation become the new leader. Taking the example of high-speed rail further, based on technology introduction, imported technology can be improved according to China’s extreme climatic and geographical conditions, such as regions of high cold, high temperature, and complex and diverse geography. Adhering to Chinese market demand for interconnection and interoperability and relying on the development of standard EMUs to form independent intellectual property rights are the fundamental reasons why China’s high-speed rail equipment ultimately completed technological transcendence based on the introduction of technology and through bold design. Therefore, concerning high-tech and medium-high-tech industries with relatively mature technologies, the focus of industrial policy for manufacturing power should be to encourage Chinese enterprises to meet the unique needs of the Chinese market, especially the new market needs to be formed with the intelligentization, digitization, and networkization of these industries. In this way, the country can carry out architectural innovation and even redesign core components and modules to achieve a technological catch-up.
除了在工业互联网等战略先导产业实现技术赶超外,推动大量的传统高技术和中高技术产业实现由技术模仿和追赶到技术领先的跨越,也是中国制造强国建设的重要内容。促进传统高技术和中高技术产业赶超领先的战略和政策要点,一是激励和支持本土企业充分利用中国市场需求的独特性,通过重新定义技术标准和产品实现技术领先。通常认为,技术赶超是技术机会和恰当的赶超战略交互作用的结果,而短技术周期产业(如通信、电子)由于会不断出现技术路线的替代和更迭,更有利于后发企业通过开辟新的技术路线实现赶超(中国可能在工业互联网等物联网领域实现赶超的一个重要原因也正是这些新兴产业的技术路线尚未确立),后发企业在长技术周期的成熟产业实现赶超的难度较大。然而经济史显示,后发企业在长技术周期的成熟产业实现技术赶超也不是全无机会,日本的汽车、家电等产业就是上世纪六七十年代通过“颠覆式创新+持续改进”而实现对美欧赶超的。对于汽车、家电、工程装备等传统高技术或中高技术产业,架构创新是后发企业实现技术赶超的重要方式,而架构创新的核心是根据市场需求的差异性重新定义产品。中国市场需求具有超大规模的特征,根据世界银行统计,2018年中国最终消费占全球的比重为11.6%左右,中国最终消费规模在世行界定的中等偏上收入国家组中的占比高达46.9%左右,中国最终消费总额相当于欧元区国家总水平的71.8%左右。超大规模市场为中国成为制造大国创造了有利条件。但是从技术赶超的角度看,大规模市场并不是技术赶超的充分条件,或者说,超大规模市场优势并不是制造强国建设的充分条件。西班牙是全球除中国外高铁里程最长的国家之一,然而西班牙却始终没有发展起来像德国、法国、日本一样的高铁技术能力,而仅仅是别国高铁技术和装备的用户。大规模市场优势并不必然导致后发国家的技术赶超,只有利用市场需求培育独立的技术能力才能实现本国产业的追赶,只有根据本国市场需求与领先国家的异质性重新定义技术、标准和产品,才能实现对领先者的超越。仍以高铁为例,在技术引进的基础上根据中国高寒、高温、地理条件复杂多样等极端气候地理条件对引进技术进行改进,根据中国互联互通的市场需求依托标准动车组开发形成自主知识产权,才是我国高铁装备在引进和正向设计基础上最终完成技术超越的根本原因。因此,对于总体上技术已经比较成熟的高技术和中高技术产业,面向“制造强国”的产业政策焦点,应是鼓励中国企业根据中国市场需求的独特性、特别是伴随着这些产业的智能化、数字化、网络化形成的新的市场需求,开展架构性创新、甚至核心零部件和模块的重新设计,实现技术赶超。
Another critical point of strategy and policy for spurring China’s traditional high-tech and medium-high-tech industries to catch up and overtake industry leaders is transforming integration into localization as a strategic focus, accelerating the promotion of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, especially leading enterprises, that more directly access leading markets by going global in developed market countries, and integrating and utilizing international high-end elements of innovation. In the past four decades, direct investment by multinational corporations and technology spillovers have been major channels for China’s manufacturing technology learning. However, with the strengthening of supply chain security awareness in the United States and Europe after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global investment layout of multinational enterprises will consider factors that influence production chain security, weakening China’s labor cost advantage. Together with the security-driven adjustments to the supply chain, this will promote a return of manufacturing to developed market economies. To comply with the trend of global investment adjustments while also avoiding tariff and non-tariff barriers caused by rising trade protectionism, the focus of China’s manufacturing opening strategy in the future should gradually shift from attracting inward direct investment from multinational enterprises and encouraging Chinese enterprises to export, supporting outward direct investment by Chinese manufacturing enterprises. This will ensure that China’s manufacturing industry will suffer minimal losses in the process of global supply chain adjustments. From the perspective of technological catch-up, U.S., European, Japanese, and Korean markets are of great value to Chinese enterprises for technical learning and catching-up. First, Chinese enterprises should maintain deep embeddedness in the global innovation network dominated by the United States, Europe, Japan, and South Korea by occupying these leading markets, and by taking advantage of local research universities, public research institutions, and the flow of technical and engineering talents, they can integrate and utilize advanced science, general technology, and engineering technology. Second, through direct competition with global leaders, enterprises can continuously improve operational efficiency and even carry out breakthrough technology and business model innovations. Finally, by meeting the local needs of leading markets, they can form more active user interaction and improve localization and dynamic capabilities. Unlike Germany, Japan, South Korea, and other manufacturing powers that use foreign direct investment to occupy developed economic markets, the catch-up path is different. Due to China’s huge domestic market, the globalization model of most manufacturing enterprises in China is domestic to global, that is, utilizing domestic resources to produce products and then exporting them to meet the needs of the international market. Although more and more leading Chinese enterprises have begun to set up R&D centers in the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and other countries in recent years, using global S&T elements to carry out R&D activities, in general, the scale of direct investment by Chinese enterprises in the international market is still minimal. Even if there are cases such as Geely’s acquisition of Volvo and Midea’s acquisition of Kuka, these reverse acquisitions are more for technology absorption. Chinese enterprises have not yet entered the stage of the global-to-global competition with global production and technological elements directly facing developed markets. In this sense, although China’s automobile, home appliances, construction machinery, and other industries may be better than some European, American, Japanese, and Korean companies in terms of financial performance, there is still a big gap compared to world-class companies in terms of capabilities. Chinese industries must continuously improve their technical and management capabilities through larger-scale foreign direct investment in leading markets to form excellent dynamic capabilities.
促进我国传统高技术和中高技术产业赶超领先的另一个战略和政策要点,以“融入本地化”为战略主线,加快推动中国制造业企业、特别是头部企业通过向发达市场国家“走出去”更直接地接入领先市场,整合利用全球高端创新要素。跨国公司直接投资和技术溢出是过去四十余年我国制造业技术学习的重要渠道。然而,随着新冠疫情过后美欧供应链安全意识的强化,跨国公司的全球投资布局将更多地考虑产业链安全因素,而无人化生产范式的广泛应用,以及我国不断高企的要素成本,都会弱化我国的劳动成本优势,与安全驱动的供应链调整一道促进制造业向发达市场经济的回溯。为了顺应全球投资调整的趋势,同时也为了规避不断抬头的贸易保护主义导致的关税和非关税壁垒,未来我国制造业开放战略的重心应逐步由吸引跨国公司对内直接投资和鼓励中国企业出口转向支持中国制造业企业对外直接投资,确保中国制造业在全球供应链调整过程中损失最小。从技术赶超的角度,美、欧、日、韩市场对于中国企业的技术学习和赶超具有尤为重要的价值,首先,中国企业应通过占领这些领先市场保持深度嵌入美、欧、日、韩主导的全球创新网络,通过利用当地的研究型大学、公共科研机构以及技术、工程人才流动,整合利用先进的科学、共性技术和工程技术;其次,通过与全球领先企业的直接竞争,不断改进运营效率,甚至开展突破性的技术和商业模式创新;最后,通过满足领先市场的本地需求,形成更加积极地用户互动,提升本地化能力和动态能力。与德国、日本、韩国等制造强国更多利用对外直接投资占领发达经济市场的赶超路径不同,由于中国国内市场巨大,中国绝大多数制造业企业的全球化模式是“以国内对全球”,即利用国内资源生产产品、再以出口的方式满足国际市场需求,虽然近年来越来越多的中国领先企业开始在美、欧、日、韩等国家设立研发中心,利用全球科技要素开展研发活动,但总体上看,中国企业在国际市场的直接投资规模还非常有限,即便出现了类似吉利收购沃尔沃、美的收购库卡等案例,但这些逆向收购更多是出于技术吸收的目的,中国企业尚未进入以全球生产和科技要素直接面向发达市场竞争的“以全球对全球”的阶段。从这个意义上看,虽然中国的汽车、家电、工程机械等产业在财务绩效方面可能好于部分欧、美、日、韩同业企业,但在能力方面与世界一流企业仍然存在较大差距,需要通过更大规模的领先市场对外直接投资不断提升自身的技术能力和管理能力,从而形成卓越的动态能力。
3. Strategies and policies to ensure production chain security in extreme circumstances
三、确保极端情形下产业链安全的战略和政策
Ensuring that the manufacturing industry can operate normally under extreme circumstances and that it can still form a strong guarantee for China’s economic, social, and national defense security under extreme circumstances is the basis for building a manufacturing power. In the context of the deep integration of the global innovation system and production network, changes in the international political and economic situation and sudden natural disasters have all posed challenges to national manufacturing system resilience and security. As a new wave of technological revolution and industrial transformation continues to impact global innovation networks and production chains, Chinese enterprises, in particular, have risen to the critical links of advanced manufacturing and high-tech industries. The future building of a manufacturing power faces an entirely different competitive environment from the past building of China as a manufacturing country: In the past four decades, as China, as a whole, has been in a stage where the level of its technology is relatively backward and technological progress is mainly based on technological imitation and introduction, leading countries have spontaneously promoted the process of building China’s manufacturing power through outsourcing and industrial transfer out of industrial and trade interests. In other words, the building of China as a manufacturing country and the technology and industrial output of developed industrial countries were incentivized and compatible. However, as China’s technological capabilities converge towards developed industrial countries, these countries, represented by the United States, continue to strengthen restrictions on the export of critical components, major equipment, core technologies, and essential S&T resources to China, significantly inhibiting the technology acquisition method that manufacturing industry development had relied on in the past. It can be expected that the systematic suppression of core technologies and strategic industries by the United States will be a long-term challenge for the development of China’s manufacturing industry in the future.
确保制造业在极端情形下能够正常运行,在极端情形下仍然能够对我国经济社会和国防安全形成有力保障,是制造强国建设的基础。在全球创新体系和生产网络深度融合的背景下,国际政治、经济局势变化和突发性的自然灾害都对一国制造业体系的韧性和安全性提出了挑战。随着新一轮技术革命和产业变革不断冲击原有的全球创新网络和产业链,特别是我国企业向先进制造业、高技术产业的关键环节攀升,未来的制造强国建设与过去我国制造大国建设面临截然不同的竞争环境:过去四十年,由于我国整体上处于技术水平较为落后、技术进步以技术模仿和引进为主的阶段,领先国家出于产业和贸易利益考虑通过外包和产业转移的方式自发地推动了我国制造大国建设的进程,或者说我国制造大国建设与发达工业国家的技术和产业输出是激励相容的,然而,随着我国技术能力向发达工业国家收敛,以美国为代表的发达工业国家不断加强关键零部件、重大装备、核心技术以及关键科技资源向我国输出的限制,以往制造业发展所依赖的技术获取方式受到了极大抑制。可以预期,美国在核心技术和战略性产业领域的系统性打压,将是未来我国制造业发展必须长期面对的挑战。
(1) Incubate a production chain based on next-generation technology according to the principle of securing the bottom-line
(一)根据“底线安全”原则培育基于次代技术的产业链
In the fields where the leading countries with competitive relationships have mastered monopoly advantages but where China cannot catch up in the short term (such as current integrated circuits and basic software), the principle of securing the bottom-line should be implemented. This means developing and improving the domestic supply chain to replace the previous generation of technology in extreme cases, ensuring that China’s manufacturing industry remains sufficiently resilient and secure in the face of normalized and sudden extreme pressures such as production chain disruptions, wars, and major epidemics. Taking integrated circuits as an example, in the integrated circuit production chain below 14nm (mainly 7nm and 5nm), the United States and its allies have an absolute monopoly in the fields of design software, high-end photolithography and polishing machines, and certain high-end materials (such as high-end photoresist and its raw materials and high-end CMP polishing pads). Because of this, it is difficult for China to incubate a substitutional capacity within a short period. Moreover, it is also challenging to incubate a long-term stable and reliable supply chain from other countries, so there is a significant risk of being throttled by the United States. In fact, the continuous suppression of Huawei by the United States since 2018 has reflected the absolute dominant position and voice of the United States in the industrial system. It has formed a certain restraint on the development momentum of China’s leading enterprises. Given this, China should rely on major S&T projects and other significant endeavors under the framework of the national system to accelerate the formation of technical capabilities in the fields of 28nm integrated circuit design, manufacturing, packaging and testing, equipment, and materials and to incubate a wholly domestic production chain. Similarly, China can use this approach to accelerate the establishment of a research and development system for basic research, common technology, and cutting-edge technology that can support the development of the 28nm integrated circuit production chain, make up for shortcomings and ensure security, and form a guarantee for the secure operation of strategic industries under extreme circumstances.
制造强国的首要内涵是“强”,即在部分我国具有制度优势、市场优势和要素优势的领域形成领先优势,但任何一个制造强国都不可能在所有的战略性领域形成领先,在具有竞争性关系的领先国家已经掌握垄断优势、而我国在短期内又无法赶超的领域(如目前的集成电路、基础软件)应贯彻“底线安全”原则,即以极端情况下的上一代技术可替代为目标发展和完善国内供应链,确保中国制造业在面临产业链断链、战争和重大疫情等常态化和突发性极端压力状况时仍然保持足够的韧性和安全性。以集成电路为例,在14纳米以下(以7纳米、5纳米为主)的集成电路产业链中,美国及其盟国在设计软件、高端光刻机和抛光机整机、部分高端材料(如高端光刻胶及其原材料和高端CMP抛光垫)等领域都具有绝对的垄断地位,我国难以在短期内培育起替代能力,也难以从其他国家培育起长期稳定可靠的供应链,因而被美国卡脖子的风险极大。事实上,2018年以来美国对华为的持续打压已经反映了美国在该产业体系的绝对优势地位和话语权,对我国头部企业的赶超发展势头形成了一定的抑制。鉴于此,我国应依托重大科技专项等举国体制框架下的重大项目,在28纳米集成电路设计、制造、封测、设备、材料等领域加快形成技术能力,培育完整的国内产业链,加快建设能够支撑28纳米集成电路产业链发展的基础研究、共性技术和前沿技术研发体系,解决“补短板、保安全”问题,形成战略性产业在极端情况下的安全运转保障。
Of course, the complete replacement of the production chain based on the previous generation of technology is only a passive guarantee for the security of the production chain. A more resilient and secure manufacturing power also requires the initiative to form an asymmetric competitive advantage in next-generation technologies that others cannot do without, improving China’s say in negotiations and strategic cooperation with other countries while fundamentally avoiding broken chains. Taking the example of integrated circuits further still, if the system-chip-process-equipment and materials production chain of 28nm or 14nm can make up for shortcomings and ensure security, it can also form leading or differentiated advantages in the local fields of the 7nm and 5nm industry chains, it can provide the dual insurance of passive protection and active defense to ensure the security of China’s integrated circuits and the entire electronic information industry.
当然,基于上一代技术的产业链完整替代,仅仅是产业链安全的被动保障,更具韧性和安全性的制造强国还要求在下一代技术上主动形成别人离不开的非对称竞争优势,提升我国与别国战略合作的话语权和谈判力,从根本上避免“断链”。仍以集成电路为例,如果在28纳或14纳米的“系统-芯片-工艺-装备材料”产业链实现“补短板、保安全”的同时,又能够在7纳米和5纳米产业链的局部领域形成领先或差异化优势,就可以为保障我国集成电路以及整个电子信息产业的安全性提供被动保护和主动防御“双保险”。
(2) Accelerate the establishment of a complete national production chain security management system
(二)加快建立完备的国家产业链安全管理体系
The policy orientation of the industrial management system gradually established in China in the past forty years is entirely reliant on import substitution and catching-up, and production chain security management is actually missing in China’s industrial management system. This purely catch-up-oriented industrial management system was applicable when China was in an early stage of economic development and the level of global openness was constantly improving. However, with the rise of the tide of anti-globalization and in the international environment where the improvement of China’s industrial competitiveness has caused developed countries to act vigilant and even curbed, such an industrial management system is not conducive to China’s building of asymmetrical competitive advantages with developed market economy countries. Moreover, it is not conducive to China’s manufacturing industry to win the global multilateral governance system initiative. It is not conducive to the overall planning and coordination of industrial catch-up and production chain security. In recent years, developed countries such as the United States have accelerated the improvement of the top-level design of industrial security management and continuously strengthened the strategic position and administrative functions of industrial security. However, China’s industrial security management system is still lacking a policy framework and decentralized decision-making. In industrial policy and competition policy, production chain security management is marginal at best. Although China’s current industrial management and policy system has partially included the functions and contents of production chain security management, given the low administrative level and high dispersion of various production chain security management authorities within different industrial management authorities, China’s production chain security management is absent from the perspective of a complete organizational management system.
过去四十年我国逐步建立起来的产业管理体系的政策导向是完全进口替代和赶超导向的,产业链安全管理在我国产业管理体系中实际上是缺失的。这种单纯赶超导向的产业管理体系在我国处于经济发展初期、在全球开放水平不断提升的条件下是适用的。但在逆全球化浪潮兴起,在我国产业竞争力提升已经招致发达国家警惕、甚至遏制的国际环境下,这样的产业管理体系却不利于我国构筑与发达市场经济国家“你中有我、我中有你”的“非对称竞争优势”,不利于我国制造业在全球多边治理体系中赢得主动,不利于实现产业赶超和产业链安全的统筹和协调。近年来,美国等发达国家加快完善产业安全管理的顶层设计,不断强化产业安全的战略地位和行政管理职能,然而,我国的产业安全管理体系仍然处于政策框架缺失、决策分散的状态,产业链安全管理在产业政策和竞争政策中处于事实上的边缘状态。虽然目前我国的产业管理和政策体系已经部分地包含了产业链安全管理的职能和内容,但由于负责各类产业链安全管理部门的行政级别较低且高度分散在不同的产业管理部门,因而我国的产业链安全管理从一个完整的组织管理体系的角度看是缺位的。
To improve China’s production chain security management capacity, it is far from enough to rely on patchwork reforms under the existing management system and policy framework. It is necessary to establish a new production chain security management system and workflow according to the task requirements of China’s production chain security management, to fundamentally ensure that the future development of China’s industry can effectively deal with the complex and changing competitive environment and fundamentally ensure the strategy, continuity, and effectiveness of the competitive process. In this regard, the construction of the policy system and governance system of China’s production chain security management should be accelerated, and the production chain security management should be made clear as a prerequisite for China’s industrial policy, S&T policy, competition policy, and trade policy. China’s production chain security legislation should be prepared as soon as possible. In the form of legislation, clarify the primary status of production chain security management in economic policy systems such as industrial policy, competition policy, and trade policy, strengthen the role of production chain security management in guiding and coordinating the formulation and implementation of microeconomic policies such as China’s manufacturing development plans, major S&T projects, and anti-monopoly initiatives. Accelerate the construction of a production chain security organization and management structure with clear rights and responsibilities and close multi-authority collaboration, including the establishment of the National Production Chain Security Committee as a strategic decision-making platform for China’s production chain security management, the establishment of an independent national production chain security management agency, and the strengthening of the administrative power and professional capabilities of production chain security management. Build a professional and independent production chain security analysis and evaluation agency to conduct comprehensive and systematic analysis, evaluation, and dynamic supervision of strategic industries such as 5G, integrated circuits, AI, basic software, medicine, and scarce natural resources.
为提升我国的产业链安全管理能力,靠在既有的管理体系和政策框架下进行修补性的改革已经远远不够,必须根据我国产业链安全管理的任务需求建立全新的产业链安全管理体系和工作流程,从根本上保证未来我国产业发展能够有效应对复杂多变的竞争环境,从根本上保证应对竞争策略的战略性、连续性和有效性。对此,应加快启动我国产业链安全管理的政策体系和治理体系建设工作,明确产业链安全管理作为我国产业政策、科技政策、竞争政策和贸易政策的前置性工作。建议尽快完成我国产业链安全法律法规的编制工作,以法律法规的形式明确产业链安全管理在产业政策、竞争政策和贸易政策等经济政策体系中的基础性地位,加强产业链安全管理对我国制造业发展规划、重大科技专项、反垄断等微观经济政策制定、实施的指导和协调作用。加快构建权责清晰、多部门紧密协作的产业链安全组织管理架构,包括设立作为我国产业链安全管理战略性决策平台的国家产业链安全委员会,设置独立的国家产业链安全管理机构,强化产业链安全管理的行政权力和专业能力。建设专业的、独立的产业链安全分析和评估机构,对5G、集成电路、人工智能、基础软件、医药、稀缺自然资源等战略性产业进行全面系统的分析评估和动态监督。
4. Strategies and policies to consolidate the foundation of manufacturing innovation and development
四、稳固制造业创新发展基础的战略和政策
The transition process of the manufacturing industry from large to powerful is the result of the long-term, high-intensity, innovation-oriented market competition of manufacturing enterprises. The root cause of being big but not strong in China’s manufacturing industry is that most enterprises are imitative and market opportunistic. The building of a manufacturing power requires that the institutional environment and policy environment for developing China’s manufacturing industry should be innovation-friendly, and the opportunistic investment-driven competition paradigm of local governments and enterprises should be replaced by innovation-oriented, especially original innovation-oriented, competition paradigms. In this process, Chinese enterprises should build an internal independent innovation system and more extensively integrate into the global innovation system and integrate and utilize globally-advanced innovation elements. Endogenous innovation is not as binary as independent innovation and closed innovation. Instead, endogenous innovation puts forward higher-level requirements for more open integration into the global innovation network. For this reason, Ren Zhengfei emphasized that self-reliance is possible only in those non-leading and non-frontier fields, and open innovation must be adhered to in leading and cutting-edge technologies in frontier fields. In constructing an open innovation system, a talent network must be built with in-depth cooperation, high-frequency interaction, and a good flow of global leading S&T talents. Therefore, the requirements of innovation and development in the building of a manufacturing power must be realized through three aspects: Strengthening the innovation incentive system, opening up the innovation system, and building a global talent network.
制造业实现由大到强的跃迁过程,是制造业企业长期的、高强度创新导向市场竞争的结果。当前我国制造业“大而不强”的问题根源正在于大多数企业是模仿和市场机会主义的。制造强国建设要求我国制造业发展的制度环境和政策环境应是“创新友好”的,地方政府和企业的机会主义投资驱动竞争范式应当被创新导向、特别是原始创新导向的竞争范式所取代。在这个过程中,我国企业除了要构建内部自主创新体系,还要更广泛地融入全球创新体系,整合利用全球先进创新要素。自主创新不是独立创新和封闭创新,自主创新反而对更开放地融入全球创新网络提出了更高层次的要求。也正以此,任正非强调,只有在那些非引领性、非前沿领域中,自力更生才是可能的,在前沿领域的引领性尖端技术上必须坚持开放创新。在开放创新体系建设方面,构建一个与全球领军科技人才深度合作、高频互动、合理流动的人才网络是关键。因此,制造强国建设内含的创新发展要求必须通过强化创新激励体制、开放创新体制和全球人才网络建设三个方面来实现。
(1) Promoting the formation of an innovation-friendly system and policy environment
(一)推动形成“创新友好”的体制和政策环境
The first is to strengthen the incentive orientation of local governments for innovation and development and the formation of a public resource allocation pattern for innovation-driven development. Unlike other manufacturing countries and manufacturing powers, the local government is an important hub for allocating China’s economic resources and a key node for the innovation and development of China’s manufacturing industry. The transformation of the local government’s development orientation from investment-driven to innovation-driven is the institutional prerequisite for China’s manufacturing sector to achieve innovation-driven development. In this regard, according to the inherent requirements of the innovation-friendly system, the central government should accelerate the adjustment of the performance appraisal standards and methods of local governments at all levels, accelerate the improvement of the tax system and fiscal transfer payments, and encourage local governments at all levels, per their respective resource endowments, to take a differentiated and high-quality development path in inter-regional competition. At the same time, restricting and guiding local governments to focus their industrial policies on technology and product innovation so that the development of China’s advanced manufacturing industry can escape the vicious circle of repeated introduction and overcapacity as soon as possible.
一是强化地方政府创新发展的激励导向,形成创新驱动发展的公共资源配置格局。不同于其他制造大国和制造强国,地方政府是我国经济资源配置的重要枢纽,是我国制造业创新发展的关键节点。地方政府发展导向实现投资驱动向创新驱动的转变,是我国制造业实现创新驱动发展的制度前提。对此,应根据“创新友好”型体制的内在要求,加快调整中央对各级地方政府的政绩考核标准和手段,加快完善税收体制和财政转移支付,激励各级地方政府根据各自的资源禀赋在地区间竞争中走差异化的高质量发展道路。与此同时,约束和引导地方将产业政策聚焦于技术和产品创新,使我国先进制造业发展早日走出“重复引进”和“产能过剩”的怪圈。
The second is to force the innovation-driven development of the manufacturing industry by strengthening intellectual property protection. Improve the efficiency of implementing intellectual property protection legislation, strengthen the administrative status of intellectual property protection organizations and management agencies, and make intellectual property protection and utilization genuinely become the primary means of market competition for enterprises. In the context of the accelerated reframing of global multilateral rules, China should ensure that other countries do not dominate it in adjusting the intensity to protect intellectual property. Instead, we should proceed from the actual needs of China itself as a latecomer to catch up and surpass others. China should actively grasp the strength and flexibility of implementing the intellectual property system on the premise of strengthening the protection of intellectual property rights in general. In addition, according to the differences in the technical level and industrial characteristics of various regions and industries, China must determine protection strength and its policy mix in phases and on a regional basis.
二是通过强化知识产权保护倒逼制造业创新驱动发展。提高知识产权保护法律法规实施的效率,强化知识产权保护组织管理机构的行政地位,使知识产权保护和运用真正成为企业市场竞争的主要手段。在全球多边规则加速重构的背景下,我国的知识产权保护强度调整还应当注意不为别国所主导,而应从我国自身后发赶超的实际需求出发,主动把握好知识产权制度实施的力度和灵活性,在总体上强化知识产权保护力度的前提下,又根据各地区和行业的技术水平、产业特点差异,分阶段、分领域地确定保护力度和政策组合。
The third is to promote the formation of an endogenous mechanism for innovation-driven development by strengthening the fundamental position of competition policy. At the national level, in formulating economic policies and implementing the governance system, improving China’s legislative, judicial, and law enforcement systems will effectively strengthen the authority and independence of competition policy formulation and implementation entities, fundamentally ensuring the authority and stability of competition policy. When structural industrial policy and competition policy conflict in formulation and implementation, ensuring the effectiveness of competition policy becomes the priority principle and common practice. At the enterprise level, further optimizing the layout of the state-owned economy, improving the state-owned capital supervision and management system and the management personnel assessment and evaluation mechanism will ensure fair competition among various ownership systems.
三是通过强化竞争政策基础性地位推动形成创新驱动发展的内生机制。在国家层面,通过完善我国的立法、司法和执法体系,在经济政策的制定和实施治理体系中,切实强化竞争政策制定主体和实施主体的权威性和独立性,从根本上保证竞争政策的权威性和稳定性。当结构性产业政策与竞争政策在制定和实施过程中发生矛盾时,确保竞争政策有效性成为优先原则和通常惯例。在企业层面,通过进一步优化国有经济布局、完善国有资本监督管理体制和管理人员考核评估机制,确保多种所有制公平竞争。
The fourth is to build a manufacturing innovation system with complete functions and efficient operations to improve the capability of manufacturing innovation to drive development. Encourage a shift in public policy resources from granting subsidies to building efficient manufacturing innovation systems consisting of first-class research institutions and major S&T infrastructure, high-level general R&D institutions, national laboratories that can support major national strategic tasks, and technology diffusion service institutions with sufficient public welfare. The orientation of these institutions is as follows: Research institutions and S&T infrastructure are mainly oriented to meet the needs of basic research and endogenous innovation in building a manufacturing power and enhancing the endogenous innovation capabilities of the manufacturing industry. The central positioning of national laboratories is to carry out task-oriented research relying on interdisciplinary collaboration and long-term high-intensity financial support to meet the major strategic needs of a manufacturing power. The function of common technology service centers is to provide the common key technology of industry development and address the bottleneck in the supply of critical technologies that serve as a precondition for an advanced manufacturing industry. The role of public technology diffusion service institutions is mainly to encourage the diffusion and application of advanced and applicable technologies, especially manufacturing technologies and best management practices, amongst enterprises (primarily small and medium-sized enterprises). In addition to making up for the structural deficiencies of China’s manufacturing innovation system, the institutional barriers to interaction and cooperation between various innovation entities should be gradually eliminated, and the institutional barriers that restrict the effective transfer and transformation of S&T achievements in research institutions and general technology R&D institutions should be eliminated.
四是建设功能完备、运行高效的制造业创新体系,提升制造业创新驱动发展的能力。促进公共政策资源更多由补贴向制造业创新体系建设倾斜,建成由一流研究型大学和重大科技基础设施、高水平共性研发机构、能够支撑国家重大战略任务的国家实验室和具有足够公益性的技术扩散服务机构组成的高效运转的制造业创新体系。其中,研究型大学和科技基础设施主要面向满足制造强国建设对基础研究和原始创新的需求,提升制造业的原始创新能力;国家实验室的主要定位是依托跨学科大协作和长期高强度资金支持开展任务导向型研究,以满足制造强国重大战略需求;共性技术服务机构的功能是解决行业发展的共性关键技术,解决先进制造业竞争前技术供给不足的瓶颈;而公共技术扩散服务机构的作用则主要是促进先进适用技术、特别是生产制造技术和最佳管理实践向企业(主要是中小企业)的扩散和应用。除了弥补我国制造业创新体系的结构性缺失,还应逐步消除各类创新主体间互动合作的机制性障碍,消除制约研究型大学和共性技术研发机构的科技成果有效转移转化的体制壁垒。
(2) Continue to deeply integrate into the global innovation system and production networks
(二)继续深度融入全球创新体系和生产网络
Guide and promote the development of multilateral trade and investment systems in a more open, cooperative, and inclusive direction, gradually change the current situation in which China relies too heavily on the United States in the global innovation system, and increase opening up to and cooperation with Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and Nordic countries to diversify China’s technology sources and strive to create a more friendly global innovation environment. Throughout the history of the development of international manufacturing powers, no manufacturing power has ever caught up under closed conditions. This is not only because the formation of a manufacturing power requires the use of the market resources of other countries, but more importantly, key R&D elements and core technological achievements are highly decentralized. Open and integrated innovation has become the dominant technological innovation paradigm today. In integrating into the global innovation chain, making full use of international technological elements and gradually occupying the core position of the global value chain has become the only way to build a manufacturing power.
引导和促进多边贸易和投资体系朝着更加开放、合作、包容的方向发展,逐步改变目前我国在全球创新体系中过度倚重美国的局面,加大对德国、日本、英法、北欧等科技强国的开放和合作,使我国的技术来源更加多元化,努力创造更加友好的全球创新环境。纵观全球制造强国发展的历史,没有一个制造强国是在封闭的条件下实现赶超的,这不仅是因为制造强国的形成要利用别国的市场资源,更重要的,在关键研发要素和核心技术成果高度分散化、开放创新和集成创新已经成为主导技术创新范式的今天,在融入全球创新链的过程中充分利用全球科技要素、进而逐步占据全球价值链的核心位置,已经成为制造强国建设的唯一路径。
In this regard, the construction of an open environment for a manufacturing power should, on the one hand, make full use of the differences in interest demands between the United States and Europe, Japan, South Korea, and other regions and countries. We should try to guide the Sino-US trade war from a game of political ideology and values to a matter of rules, avoiding the trap of politicization of technology and trade issues promoted by the United States. This will ensure that the problem of broken links in the global innovation chain is addressed at the economic and technological levels and ensures that China will continue to be deeply integrated into the global innovation network. On the other hand, it is necessary to speed up strategic design and deployment and play a more active role in reconstructing international multilateral rules. Under the WTO reform requirements and multilateral regulations and standards such as the CPTPP, we should accelerate adjustments in the level of compliance of China’s domestic industrial policies to ensure that China meets the entry conditions for the new wave of multilateral systems. The period from 2020 to 2035 is a period of in-depth adjustment of international multilateral rules. In the future, China should comprehensively use diplomatic, economic, and trade means, maintain the most adequate communication with WTO and CPTPP member states, strive to play a more active role in the WTO, and strive to join the CPTPP multilateral framework at an early date.
对此,制造强国的开放环境建设,一方面要充分利用美国与欧、日、韩等地区和国家的利益诉求差异,极力引导中美贸易战由政治意识形态和价值观层面的博弈向规则层面发展,竭力避免美国推动的科技、贸易问题“政治化”陷阱,确保在经济和技术层面解决全球创新链“断链”问题,确保我国继续深度融入全球创新网络。另一方面要加快战略设计和部署,在全球多边规则重构中发挥更加积极的作用。对照WTO改革要求和CPTPP等多边规则标准,加快我国国内产业政策的合规性调整,确保我国符合新一轮多边体系的进入条件。2020到2035年是国际多边规则深度调整的时期。未来我国应综合运用外交和经贸手段,与WTO和CPTPP成员国保持最充分的沟通,努力在WTO中发挥更加积极的作用,并争取早日加入CPTPP多边框架。
(3) Strengthening the construction of a global talent network
(三)加强全球人才网络建设
Since the reform and opening up, attracting high-tech talents to flow to China has been an important channel and method for China to achieve manufacturing technology learning. Talent flow can help latecomers overcome the barriers of tacit knowledge learning and significantly improve technological catching-up efficiency in late-developing countries. Taking Japan as an example, the secret to the technological catch-up of Japanese companies was the quick identification of critical S&T talents (the know-who) who can solve specific technical problems and their introduction to Japanese companies or their provision of technical consulting for companies, solving the know-how problem faced by cutting-edge technology or product engineering. Considering the strategic significance of the flow of high-tech talents to China’s technological catch-up, the United States has taken the flow of high-tech talents from China as an essential part of its strategic containment. It has adopted a series of policies to restrict the flow of S&T talents, especially those of Chinese descent, to China. In this regard, on the one hand, promoting the formation and development of a more open and inclusive multilateral system of rules should impede the unreasonable restrictions on the flow of talents from the United States; on the other hand, building high-level, world-class research institutes and public research institutions that meet international governance and incentive norms, launching an international S&T talent project that is oriented to the global S&T frontiers and is conducive to mutual benefit and win-win for the participants, thereby attracting and gathering global S&T leaders, and build a talent exchange and gathering platform that is in line with international standards can effectively serve the establishment of China as a manufacturing power.
吸纳高科技人才向我国流动,是改革开放以来我国制造业技术学习的重要渠道和方式。人才流动能够帮助后发赶超企业克服隐含知识学习的壁垒,可以大大提高后发国家技术赶超的效率。以日本为例,通过快速识别能够解决特定技术问题的关键科技人才(know-who),并通过吸引该人才进入日本企业任职或为企业提供技术咨询,从而解决前沿技术或产品工程化中面临的技术诀窍(know-how)难题,是日本企业技术赶超的秘诀。考虑到高科技人才流动对中国技术赶超的战略意义,美国将对华高科技人才流动作为战略遏制的重要内容,采取了一系列政策限制科技人才、特别是华裔科技人才向中国流动的措施。对此,一方面,应通过推动更加开放、包容的多边规则体系的形成和发展,对美国不合理的人才流动限制形成制约;另一方面,通过建设高水平的、面向世界一流、符合国际治理和激励规范的研究型大学和公共科研机构,通过推出面向全球科技前沿、有利于参与方互惠共赢的国际科技人才项目,吸引和集聚全球科技领军人才,搭建既符合国际规范又能够有效服务中国制造强国建设的人才交流、汇聚平台。
5. Conclusion
五、结语
The building of a manufacturing power is a necessary support and traction for establishing a powerful modern socialist country. It is the core issue of industrial development now that China has established a highly integrated industrial system and has become the world’s largest manufacturing economy. The establishment of China as a manufacturing power should conform to the general requirements of a manufacturing power and give deeper connotations to the manufacturing power mission given the unique environment faced by China’s push to become a manufacturing power. Given this, China’s manufacturing power strategy for endogenous development should include three aspects: Technology and market leadership in strategic fields, manufacturing operation security under extreme pressure, and continuous innovation-driven manufacturing. Of these dimensions, technological and market leadership in strategic areas and establishing a mechanism for high-intensity innovation-driven development are the general characteristics of building a manufacturing power. At the same time, the safety of manufacturing operations under extreme pressure conditions is a unique constraint faced by China as it builds a manufacturing power in the future.
制造强国建设是社会主义现代化强国建设的重要支撑和牵引,是中国建立起高度完整的工业体系、成为全球最大制造业经济体之后工业发展的核心议题。中国的制造强国建设既要符合制造强国的一般规定性,又要根据我国制造强国建设面临的特殊环境赋予制造强国使命更加丰富的内涵。基于这样的考虑,我国制造强国战略应包含战略性领域的技术和市场领先、极端压力情形下的制造业运行安全以及持续创新驱动的制造业内生发展机制建设三个方面。其中,战略性领域的技术和市场领先、高强度创新驱动发展机制建设是制造强国建设的一般性特征,而极端压力情形下的制造业运行安全是未来我国制造强国建设面临的特殊约束。
The leading strategy for strategic leading industries should highlight the uniqueness of Chinese market demand to redefine technical standards and products and actively build asymmetric competitive advantages. The strategic points to solve the security problems of China’s production chain are to develop a wholly-domestic production chain based on next-generation technologies (such as the 28nm process of integrated circuits) according to the principle of securing the bottom-line while also striving to form an effective countermeasure in local areas of cutting-edge technologies. The second is to accelerate the construction of a production chain security organization and management system, especially establishing specialized production chain security management authorities. To realize the transformation of China’s manufacturing industry from investment-driven to innovation-driven development through the establishment of innovation-driven internal mechanisms, the key is to establish an innovation-friendly system and policy environment that can truly stimulate the endogenous innovation enthusiasm of local governments, enterprises, and other microeconomic entities with the incentive-compatible realization of the transformation of the competition paradigm of manufacturing micro-entities.
战略先导产业领先战略应突出利用中国市场需求的独特性重新定义技术标准和产品,积极构建非对称竞争优势。解决我国产业链安全问题的战略要点,一是根据“底线安全”原则,打造基于次一代技术(如集成电路28纳米制程)的完整国内产业链,同时努力在前沿技术的局部领域形成能够有效反制对手的“杀手锏”,二是加快产业链安全组织管理体系建设,特别是专门的产业链安全管理部门的建设。通过创新驱动内在机制建设实现我国制造业发展方式由投资驱动向创新驱动转变,关键点是建立起真正能够激发地方政府、企业等微观经济主体内在创新积极性的“创新友好”的体制和政策环境,激励相容地实现制造业微观主体竞争范式的转变。
Finally, it must be emphasized that, in terms of the value orientation of establishing China as a manufacturing power, in addition to focusing on core elements such as strength, innovation, and security, development should also highlight the contribution of China’s unique talents, technology, and market forces to the promotion of global frontier technological breakthroughs and the development of emerging industries while demonstrating inclusiveness that comes with building a manufacturing power.
最后,需要强调的是,在中国制造强国建设的价值取向方面,除了聚焦强大、创新、安全等核心要素外,还应突出为推动全球前沿技术突破和新兴产业发展贡献中国独特的人才、科技和市场力量,彰显制造强国建设的包容性。