In 2019, China’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded U.S. $10,000, which is already significantly higher than the average level of upper-middle-income countries. For some time to come, China will be in a critical stage in its transition to a high-income country. Looking at the development experience of various countries, the crucial importance of this stage of development can be recognized from several aspects.
2019年,中国人均GDP(国内生产总值)超过10000美元,已经显著高于中等偏上收入国家的平均水平。在未来的一段时间里,中国将处于向高收入国家迈进的关键阶段。根据各国发展经验,这个发展阶段的至关重要性可以从几个方面认识。
First, although the World Bank sets a per capita GNI (or GDP) standard for high-income countries (currently $12,235 and above), when determining whether a country has qualitatively entered a stage of development that differs in both quantity and quality, it is not enough to measure only by economic indicators such as per capita GDP. In addition, many indicators, especially social development indicators, are more important because such indicators not only reflect the purpose of economic development itself but are also the sources of sustainable growth in higher stages of development.
第一,虽然世界银行为高收入国家设定了一个人均GNI(或GDP)标准(目前为12235美元及以上),但是,一个国家是否从性质上进入一个数量和质量都不同的发展阶段,仅仅以人均GDP这样的经济指标衡量是不够的。在此之外的诸多标识上,特别是社会发展指标更为重要,因为这类指标不仅体现经济发展目的本身,而且也是在更高发展阶段增长可持续性的源泉。
Second, the experience of various countries shows that the closer you approach the high-income threshold from the upper end of the middle-income range, the more the economic growth of most countries shows a deceleration trend, and the economic performance between countries tends to diverge. Those countries that fail to cope with the challenge of slowing growth and that perform poorly in social development are often caught in a vicious cycle of stagnant economic growth and widening income gaps, preventing them from actually entering the ranks of high-income countries for a long time. Economists call this state the “middle-income trap.”
第二,各国经验表明,在中等偏上收入的基础上越是临近高收入门槛,多数国家的经济增长越是表现出减速的趋势,国家之间的经济表现趋于分化。那些未能成功应对增长减速的挑战,并且社会发展表现较差的国家,常常陷入经济增长停滞和收入差距扩大的恶性循环,以致长期不能实质性跨入高收入国家行列。这样一种状态被经济学家称为“中等收入陷阱”。
Third, with the weakening growth momentum from “low-hanging fruit” and narrowing space for reforms of a Pareto-improving nature, not only is it more difficult to maintain a reasonable rate of economic growth, but this also has an adverse effect on social mobility. This poses a challenge to the continuous improvement of the level of social development. To deal with these challenges, we must break down the obstacles of vested interests and promote continued reforms in order to better obtain economic growth momentum based on innovation and rationally enhance the government’s redistributive policies.
第三,在“低垂的果子”般的增长动能减弱,以及具有帕累托改进性质的改革空间收窄的情况下,不仅保持合理经济增长速度面临更大的难度,也产生不利于社会流动的效果,对社会发展水平的持续提高提出挑战。应对这些挑战,需要打破既得利益的阻碍推动继续改革,以便获得基于创新的经济增长动能,并合理加大政府再分配政策力度。
In 2010, China’s per capita GDP exceeded U.S. $4,000, making it an upper-middle-income country. At the same time, fundamental changes have taken place in the population transition stage. The working-age population aged 15-59 is now in a stage of negative growth, and the corresponding population dependency ratio is increasing rapidly. Correspondingly, labor shortages, slower improvements in human capital, lower returns on capital, less room for labor reallocation, and the resulting slower rate of productivity gains, have resulted in a decline in potential growth rates and slower real growth rates.
2010年,中国人均GDP超过4000美元,进入中等偏上收入国家的行列。与此同时,人口转变阶段发生了根本性的变化,15—59岁劳动年龄人口转入负增长,相应的人口抚养比迅速提高。与此相应,劳动力短缺、人力资本改善放慢、资本回报率下降、劳动力重新配置空间收窄以及由此所致的生产率提高速度减慢,导致潜在增长率下降以及实际增长速度放慢。
Sharing in the gains of economic development not only depends on the speed at which the pie grows, but also on the mechanism for dividing the pie. If the distribution pattern of the pie remains unchanged, the slowdown in the expansion of the pie means that sharing is weakened. China’s reality already displays this tendency. For example, since 2009, the Gini coefficient of resident income has seen several years of decline, from 0.491 in 2008 to 0.462 in 2015, before it began to increase again.
经济发展的分享性既取决于做大蛋糕的速度,也取决于分好蛋糕的机制。在蛋糕分配格局不变的情况下,做大蛋糕的速度放缓则意味着分享性减弱。中国现实中已经表现出这种倾向。例如,居民收入基尼系数从2009年开始,曾经经历若干年的下降,从2008年的0.491降低到2015年的0.462,而此后则再次提高。
In fact, the middle-income trap refers to the fact that in the upper-middle-income stage, countries face both the challenge of maintaining a reasonable economic growth rate to make the pie bigger and the challenge of maintaining sufficient social mobility in order to correctly divide the pie.
实际上,所谓中等收入陷阱是指在中等偏上收入阶段,国家既面临如何保持合理的经济增长速度从而做大蛋糕的挑战,又面临如何保持充分的社会流动性从而分好蛋糕的挑战。
Traditional growth theory usually regards economic development as a homogeneous process, with each country achieving an expansion in the total economy and an increase in per capita income according to certain general laws. The convergence or conditional convergence hypothesis of neoclassical growth theory links the initial per capita income level to economic growth performance. It expects that, once the necessary endowments, institutions, infrastructure, and other conditions are in place, it will be possible for those countries at a lower stage of economic development to achieve faster economic growth than countries at a higher stage of development. In this way, convergence occurs between countries. However, such research does not pay particular attention to the differences in the growth patterns that countries at different stages of development follow to achieve economic growth. It is precisely these types of differences that drive growth performance at different stages of development and the social development performance associated with it.
传统增长理论通常把经济发展视为匀质的过程,各国按照某种一般规律实现经济总量的扩大和人均收入的提高。新古典增长理论的趋同或条件趋同假说把初始人均收入水平与经济增长表现相联系,并预期那些处于经济发展较低阶段的国家,一旦具备必要的禀赋、体制、基础设施等条件,可以比处于更高发展阶段的国家实现更快的经济增长,因而国家之间发生趋同。但是,这类研究并没有特别关注处于不同发展阶段的国家实现经济增长遵循的增长模式有其不同之处。而恰恰是这种差异,导致不同发展阶段的增长表现以及与之关联的社会发展表现。
Many low- and lower-middle-income countries are still trapped in the low-level equilibrium trap, lacking the most basic critical conditions for an economic takeoff. As a result, there are many countries stacked up around the lower-middle income threshold and just below the upper-middle income threshold. However, at such stages, the rate of growth varies greatly between countries. There are not only some fast-growing stars but also many failed cases of stagnant growth.
许多低收入和中等偏下收入国家仍然处于低水平均衡陷阱,缺乏经济起飞最基本的临界条件,所以有大量国家堆积在中等偏下收入门槛前后以及中等偏上收入门槛之前的位置。但是,在这样一些阶段,国家之间的增长速度具有很大的差异性,既包括一些高速赶超的明星,也有诸多陷入停滞的失败案例。
Relatively speaking, after entering the upper-middle income stage, countries enter onto a normal growth track. Such countries and those with low-income starting points and string growth performance usually experience Lewis-style dual-sector economic development. Thanks to low-hanging fruit sources of growth such as demographic dividends, their economic growth is able to catch up. However, based on the meaning of convergence, these countries show a moderate deceleration trend starting from this stage.
进入中等偏上收入阶段后,相对来说就进入了正常增长轨道。这类国家与低收入起点国家中增长表现良好的那部分国家,通常经历了一个刘易斯式的二元经济发展,得益于诸如人口红利等低垂果子般的增长源泉,实现了经济增长的赶超。但是,按照趋同的含义,国家从这个阶段开始呈现适度的减速趋势。
When a country is in the late upper-middle-income stage, especially when it is approaching the high-income threshold, growth sources, such as the driving force of production factors, the effect of resource reallocation, and late-mover advantages in technology that these countries have relied on in the past, have declined or even disappeared. These countries generally experience slowdowns, and divergences among countries due to the appropriateness of policy responses reemerge. It is from here that individual countries either enter the ranks of high-income countries or fall into the middle-income trap.
至于在中等偏上收入阶段后期,特别是临近高收入门槛的时候,由于这些国家以往仰仗的生产要素驱动、资源重新配置效应以及技术上的后发优势等增长源泉式微乃至消失,一般来说国家会遭遇减速,并且由于应对政策的恰当与否,在国家之间再次出现分化趋势。正是由此开始,单个国家要么迈入高收入国家行列,要么落入中等收入陷阱。
At a specific stage of development (here, we mainly refer to the period after entering the upper-middle-income stage), redistribution policies need to intervene in the income distribution process and the supply of basic public services. In the upper-middle-income stage or even when approaching the high-income threshold, the decline of traditional sources of growth leads to a serious decline in return on capital. Under normal circumstances, a country’s economic growth rate will accelerate the pace of its regression to the mean. When the speed at which the pie expands slows down, it becomes more important to divide the pie correctly. However, the very same reasons for the slowdown in growth also lead to the failure of the labor market’s primary distribution function and a decline in social mobility. At the same time, imperfect redistributive policies make this stage vulnerable to widening income gaps.
在特定的发展阶段(这里主要指进入中等偏上收入阶段之后),再分配政策需要介入收入分配过程和基本公共服务供给领域。在中等偏上收入阶段乃至临近高收入门槛时,传统增长源泉式微导致资本报酬递减现象严重化,正常情况下,一国的经济增长速度会加快其回归均值的节奏。做大蛋糕的速度放慢时,分好蛋糕愈显重要。然而,恰是造成增长减速的同样一些原因,也导致劳动力市场初次分配功能失灵,社会流动性下降,同时再分配政策尚未完善,使这个阶段易于受到收入差距扩大的困扰。
The truth is that the redistributive tendencies and actual policy measures seen at this stage of development are not necessarily intended to truly improve income distribution. In fact, when the pie is no longer growing, the practice of redistributing the pie is often affected by vested interests and the relative policy negotiating power of each group. The result of this game further widens the income gap in some countries. However, this phenomenon also shows that this is a stage of development where we must pay attention to redistributive policies themselves and the appropriate choice of redistributive methods.
诚然,这个发展阶段显现的再分配倾向和实际政策措施,并不注定是沿着真正改善收入分配状况的方向。实际上,在蛋糕不再做大的情况下,重新分配蛋糕的做法往往还会受到既得利益和各群体相对政策谈判力的影响,在某些国家的博弈结果反而是进一步扩大了收入差距。然而,这个现象同样说明,这是一个必须重视再分配政策本身和恰当选择再分配方式的发展阶段。
Since reform and opening up, the achievements of China’s rapid economic growth have been widely shared, mainly through the mechanism of the labor market. The shared nature of this development and the mechanisms that made it possible are closely related to the specific development stage and type of development.
改革开放以来,中国经济高速增长的成果,主要通过劳动力市场机制得到了广泛的分享。这种发展的分享性质及其实现机制,与特定发展阶段和发展类型密切相关。
As China’s 30-year demographic window of opportunity (1980-2010) rapidly closed, the most significant feature of the dual economic development stage, the infinite supply of labor, also seems to be disappearing. Specifically, as the transfer of surplus agricultural labor slows down, the expansion of urban and rural employment and the reallocation of resources are no longer proceeding at the same pace as before. China’s comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing has also weakened rapidly, and the feature of its international trade where it mainly targeted developed countries is also becoming weaker.
随着中国延续30年(1980—2010年)的人口机会窗口迅速关闭,二元经济发展阶段最显著的劳动力无限供给特征也趋于消失。具体表现为,随着农业剩余劳动力转移速度减慢,城乡就业扩大和资源重新配置都不再按以往的节奏进行,劳动密集型制造业的比较优势也加速减弱,国际贸易以发达国家为主要对象的特点也趋于弱化。
These changes are also reflected in the field of social development, where not only has the rate of improvement in income distribution slowed, but social mobility is decreasing. We can observe social mobility and its changing trends from both horizontal and vertical perspectives. Social mobility is a complex issue concerning changes in the social identities of various groups and involving the social class structure, residents’ well-being and recognition of social justice, and whether society is cohesive. Usually, through the choice of migration space by workers in the labor market, i.e., horizontal mobility, individuals, and families realize vertical mobility in themselves, between population cohorts, and through intergenerational occupational changes.
这些变化也反映在社会发展领域,不仅收入分配的改善速度减慢,社会流动性也趋于降低。我们可以从横向和纵向两个视角观察社会流动性及其变化趋势。社会流动性是一个有关各群体社会身份变化的复杂问题,涉及社会阶层结构格局、居民幸福感和对社会公正的认同,以及社会是否具有凝聚力等。通常,通过劳动者在劳动力市场上选择迁移空间即横向流动,个人和家庭实现自身、人口队列之间以及代际职业变化等纵向流动。
Since reform and opening up, China has experienced a Lewis-style dual-sector economic development process, mainly manifested in large-scale population flows centered on the transfer of agricultural surplus labor. This resulted in great changes to industrial structures and regional patterns. From 1978 to 2018, the proportion of the agricultural labor force fell from 70.5 percent to 26.1 percent, and the urbanization rate increased from 17.9 percent to 59.6 percent. However, as a result of large-scale labor transfers and demographic changes, the rate of this labor transfer has already entered a period of significant slowdown in recent years. The deceleration of the horizontal mobility of labor across urban and rural areas, regions, and sectors will inevitably have an adverse impact on vertical social mobility as manifested in terms of occupation, income status, and social identity.
改革开放以来,中国经历的刘易斯式二元经济发展过程,主要表现是以农业剩余劳动力转移为核心的大规模人口流动,由此导致产业结构和区域格局的巨大变化。1978—2018年,农业劳动力比重从70.5%下降到26.1%,城市化率从17.9%提高到59.6%。然而,作为劳动力大规模转移以及人口变化的结果,近年来这个劳动力转移速度已经进入显著减慢的阶段。劳动力跨城乡、跨地区和跨部门横向流动速度的放慢,必然对职业、收入地位和社会身份方面表现出的社会纵向流动产生不利影响。
Generally speaking, in a development stage of high-speed economic growth, rapid changes in the industrial structure, substantial improvement in education level, and large-scale and wide-range horizontal flow of labor, the occupational structure tends to improve to a higher level of human capital content and social status. The corresponding changes are also relatively rapid, so the mobility of the whole society is relatively strong. At the same time, while society creates more opportunities for upward mobility, there is not the same probability that another part of the population will be pulled downward (that is, there is more upward mobility than downward mobility). This means that economic development is shared, while social mobility is of a Pareto-improving nature.
一般来说,在一个经济高速增长、产业结构迅速变化、教育水平大幅提高,以及劳动力大规模、大范围横向流动的发展阶段,职业结构趋于向人力资本含量和社会地位更高的水平提升,与此相应的变化也比较迅速,因而整个社会的流动性较强。同时,社会在创造更多向上流动机会的同时,并不以相同的概率使另一部分人向下流动(即向上流动多而向下流动),这意味着经济发展具有分享性,而社会流动具有帕累托改进的性质。
We can grasp two important factors that affect the change in occupational structure and use them to observe the trend of social mobility: The first is the upgrade and optimization of the industrial structure, which is a demand-side factor in the change in occupational structure. The second is the increase in the educational level of the working-age population, which is a supply-side factor in the change in the occupational structure. The rapid improvement of these two factors promoted the transition of the occupational structure to a higher level and, accordingly, led to the enhancement of vertical mobility in society.
我们可以抓住影响职业结构变化的两个重要因素,对社会流动变化趋势进行观察:一是产业结构升级优化,这是职业结构变化的需求侧因素;二是劳动年龄人口受教育程度提高,这是职业结构变化的供给侧因素。两者呈现较快的改善则促进了职业结构的高度化,相应导致社会纵向流动性的增强。
Generally, based on the stage of development or environment a society is in, social mobility can be divided into two types by its nature. First, in the process of rapid growth and structural change, social mobility occurs as a positive-sum game (so it is Pareto-improving). During the period of reform and opening up, Chinese urban and rural residents shared the fruits of development. To date, this has been the main method of social mobility. Second, under the condition of a relatively static total economic size and industrial structure, higher-level occupational positions become increasingly limited. The upward mobility of some groups along the social ladder can lead to a decline in the social position of others. Upward and downward movement are the two sides of the coin of social mobility and occur with equal probability.
通常,根据一个社会所处的发展阶段或环境,社会流动就其性质来说有两种。其一,在高速成长和结构变化过程中,社会流动以正和博弈(从而帕累托改进)的方式发生。改革开放时期中国城乡居民对发展成果的分享,迄今为止主要以这种社会流动的方式进行。其二,在经济总量和产业结构都处于相对静态的条件下,更为高度化的职业位置日益变得有限,一些群体沿着社会阶梯的向上流动可能导致另一些群体社会位置的下滑,向上与向下成为社会流动性变化这枚硬币的两面,以相同的概率发生。
Social mobility is close to a zero-sum game, and in response, a “synthesis paradox” (合成悖论) of social mobility arises. That is to say, when every person and family is striving to come out on top, we see the following situation: The efforts of the groups at the lower end of the social mobility ladder to break the existing pattern and the efforts of the groups at the upper end of the social mobility ladder to maintain their vested interests act in opposite directions, creating conflicts and reducing social cohesion and harmony. In turn, this synthesis paradox strengthens the zero-sum nature of social mobility, resulting in the deterioration of the income distribution situation and the solidification of the current pattern and leading to a lack of a sense of gain or security among all social classes.
社会流动接近于以零和博弈的方式进行,相应则会产生一个社会流动的“合成悖论”。也就是说,每个人和家庭都力争上游就形成这样一个局面:处于社会流动阶梯下端的群体力图打破既有格局的努力,与处于社会流动阶梯上端的群体力图维护既得利益的努力,在方向上相背而行,产生冲突,造成社会凝聚力与和谐性的降低。这种合成悖论反过来强化社会流动的零和博弈性质,造成收入分配状况恶化和格局固化,引起社会各阶层或缺乏获得感,或缺乏安全感。
Rapid population expansion, economic growth, and changes in the industrial structure are phenomena that are only observed at a specific stage of development, but social mobility must be maintained in all eras. Therefore, the method to maintain and improve social mobility should not remain unchanged but needs to evolve with the times. While it is true that development is the fundamental way to solve problems in development and it is undoubtedly correct to try to maintain the continued growth of the pie in response to the problem of economic slowdown, at the same time, as we will see later, the removal of various existing institutional obstacles in China through reforms can significantly improve social mobility and distribute the pie more rationally.
人口规模扩大、经济增长和产业结构变化的高速进行,都只是特定发展阶段的现象,而社会流动是任何时代都必须保持的。因此,保持和提高社会流动性的途径不应该是唯一的,而是需要与时俱进。诚然,发展是解决发展中问题的根本办法,应对经济减速的问题,保持蛋糕继续做大无疑是正确的;同时,我们随后将看到,通过改革消除中国现存的各种体制性障碍,可以显著提高社会流动性,更合理地分配蛋糕。
A lack of social mobility is not only the fundamental reason for the continued widening of income gaps but also allows this gap to be passed on from generation to generation. This results in the solidification of social stratification, which in turn leads to a decline in social cohesion. Therefore, government policy efforts aimed at reducing income disparities should include both implementing redistribution systems such as progressive taxation and transfers, as well as broader social policies that facilitate the promotion of social mobility. In China at present, the biggest institutional obstacle to social mobility is the difference in the enjoyment of basic public services between urban and rural areas, between regions, and between groups. The root cause of this systematic difference remains the current household registration system.
社会流动性缺乏,不仅是收入差距持续扩大的根本原因,而且会使这种差距在代际传递,造成社会分层的固化,进而导致社会凝聚力的下降。因此,政府旨在缩小收入差距的政策努力,既包括实施累进税收和转移支付等再分配制度,也应包括有利于促进社会流动的更广泛的社会政策。在目前中国,阻碍社会流动的最大体制障碍是城乡间、地区间、群体间享受基本公共服务供给的差异,而造成这个系统化差异的根本症结仍然是现行的户籍制度。
China established the household registration system in the early days of the planned economic system. It was originally intended to prevent rural-to-urban and cross-regional population flows through the strict registration of population residence locations and the provision of segmented and exclusive basic public services. After the official introduction of the household registration system in 1958, apart from limited opportunities such as attending university, joining the army, and planned worker recruitment, there were very few other channels that allowed residents to migrate across regions, and the restrictions on migration between urban and rural areas were particularly strict. The blockage of career change channels and the urban-rural income gap formed by the system made China have extremely low social mobility in the planned economy period.
中国在形成计划经济体制初期建立的户籍制度,初衷是通过严格的人口居住地登记和分割性、排他性的基本公共服务供给,阻止人口的跨城乡和跨地区流动。在1958年户籍制度正式出台以后,除了上大学、参军和计划招工等有限机会外,居民极少有其他渠道跨地区迁移,其中城乡之间的迁移限制尤其严格。职业变更通道被阻断以及体制形成的城乡收入差距,使得计划经济时期的中国具有社会流动性极低的特征。
Since the mid-1980s, with the advancement of reforms and the acceleration of economic growth, controls on the flow of labor across urban and rural areas and different regions have been gradually relaxed, and these flows have continued to expand in degree and scope. However, although the original intention of the household registration system to restrict population migration and labor mobility has broken down, no fundamental breakthroughs have been made in the system that originally served this purpose and divided the supply of basic public services. This continues to retain the dual social structure formed over a long period, which not only hinders the thoroughness of horizontal population flows but also creates a special population group, solidifies the structure of interests, and has the effect of inhibiting social mobility. This special group is the migrant workers who live and work in cities but have not obtained urban residence permits (户口, hukous). In 2018, a total of 173 million migrant workers left the towns and villages where they had residence permits, and the vast majority when to work and live in cities. However, this group still fails to enjoy equal treatment in the labor market and equal access to basic public services.
20世纪80年代中期以后,随着改革的推进和经济增长加速,劳动力跨城乡、跨地区流动得到逐步放松,并在程度上和范围上不断扩大。但是,在户籍制度限制人口迁移和劳动力流动的初衷已被突破的情况下,原来服务于这个目的的那种割裂基本公共服务供给的体制,仍未实现根本性的突破,长期以来形成的二元社会结构也得以保留,不仅阻碍人口横向流动的彻底性,更由于造就了一个特殊的人口群体,固化了利益结构,产生抑制社会流动的效应。这个特殊群体就是在城市居住和就业,却没有获得城市户口的农民工。2018年,全国共有1.73亿离开户籍登记地所在乡镇的农民工,其中绝大多数在城市务工和居住。但是,这个群体仍然未能享受到平等的劳动力市场待遇和均等的基本公共服务。
Just as we can still achieve a relatively slow but still reasonable rate of sustainable growth through a shift in the growth model despite the deceleration at higher stages of development by reasonably regulating the initial distribution process and following the principle of “do your best with what you have” in the same way, starting from the equalization of access to basic public services to implement a redistributive policy with Chinese characteristics, we can also maintain social mobility and expand the sharing of economic development in order to continuously improve the well-being of residents. The special challenge facing China is that the more ample mobility and integration of labor are hampered by the delay in the reform of the household registration system.
正如在较高的发展阶段虽然发生减速现象,仍然可以通过增长模式的转变实现相对缓慢却仍然合理的可持续增长速度一样,合理规范初次分配过程,以“尽力而为、量力而行”的原则,从基本公共服务均等化入手实施具有中国特色的再分配政策,也可以保持社会流动性,扩大经济发展的分享性,从而不断提高居民福祉。中国面对的特殊挑战,是劳动力更充分流动和融合受到了户籍制度改革滞后的羁绊。
First, we must enhance the inclusiveness of the supply of basic public services, gradually stripping and then completely cutting off the connection between the household registration system and the supply of public services. Changing the method where the supply of public goods treated people differently based on household registration status will help break down the systemic barriers that hinder social mobility.
首先,增强基本公共服务供给的普惠性,逐步剥离及至彻底割断户籍制度与公共服务供给的关联。改变以户籍身份区分待遇的公共品供给方式,有利于打破阻碍社会流动的系统性障碍。
Second, we must strengthen the central government’s responsibility for expenditures related to the reform of the household registration system and improve the compatibility of incentives between the central and local governments in promoting reform. In view of the huge positive externalities that the reform of the household registration system would bring to China’s economic development, the central government’s payment of the bill is the key to breaking the deadlock. This is also in line with the internal logic of policy formulation and institutional arrangements.
其次,强化中央政府对户籍制度改革相关成本的支出责任,提高中央与地方在改革推动上的激励相容性。鉴于户籍制度改革对中国经济发展的巨大正外部性,中央政府买单是打破僵局的关键,也符合政策制定和制度安排的内在逻辑。
Finally, we must improve the public finance system and transform the motivation of local governments to promote economic development into incentives to promote social development. We must reasonably delineate the functions and boundaries of public finance and improve the division of government financial resources and expenditure responsibilities between the central and local governments as well as give local governments the necessary abilities, responsibilities, and autonomy to provide public services, while also avoiding profit-seeking and malicious competition in the supply of local public goods.
最后,完善公共财政体系,把地方政府推动经济发展的动机转化为促进社会发展的激励。合理界定公共财政的功能及其界限、完善政府财力和支出责任在中央和地方之间划分,使地方有必要的提供公共服务的能力、责任和自主权,同时又能避免地方公共品供给中的逐利性和恶意竞争。