“印太”地区安全秩序纷争与中国的地区秩序愿景
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Disputes About the “Indo-Pacific” Regional Security Order and China’s Vision of Regional Order

“印太”地区安全秩序纷争与中国的地区秩序愿景

A researcher at the PLA’s National University of Defense Technology provides a lengthy analysis of the changing security order in the Indo-Pacific.


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Represented by China and India, the economic power of emerging economies in Asia has risen rapidly, so that the vast area from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean presents a clear upward trend in geopolitico-economics (地缘政治经济). This has been accompanied by the emergence of the “Indo-Pacific” concept, and the “Indo-Pacific” region has thus become an emerging geopolitical region that is the subject of intense debates in international politics academic circles. Some countries in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the United States and Europe have launched successive Indo-Pacific strategies, which not only reflects the keen interest of the international community in the Indo-Pacific region, but also shows that the development of the Indo-Pacific region certainly has significant international political, economic, and security implications. In the words of an Australian scholar, “the traditional Asia-Pacific era has come to an end, and the world has entered the Indo-Pacific era.” 1 However, as “Indo-Pacific” is a relatively new geopolitical construction in international politics, the reason why it was able to quickly enter the strategic agenda of major countries around the world is the fact that, to a large extent, it embodies the geopolitical intentions and practices of the United States and reflects the fierce strategic competition and confrontation of the United States with China. It is precisely the negative impact of this confrontational strategic agenda that initially led to the formation of the “Indo-Pacific” concept and faced the so-called “Indo-Pacific” region with the basic need to establish a peaceful and stable regional order. Without a peaceful and stable regional order, a shadow will inevitably be cast over the development prospects of this region. Therefore, this has given discussions of the issue of security and order in the “Indo-Pacific” region a particular urgency.

以中国和印度为代表,亚洲地区新兴经济体的经济力量迅速崛起,使得从太平洋到印度洋的广大地区在地缘政治经济上呈现出明显的上升趋势,“印太”概念随之兴起,“印太”地区也因此成为国际政治学界热议的一个新兴地缘政治区域。一些亚太地区和美欧国家纷纷推出印太战略,既反映了国际社会关注印太地区的热度,也说明印太地区发展确实蕴含着明显的国际政治、经济与安全含义。如澳大利亚学者所言,“传统的亚太时代已经终结,世界已经进入了印太时代。” 不过,“印太”地区作为国际政治中一个较新的地缘政治塑造物,之所以能够快速进入世界主要国家的战略议程,确实在很大程度上体现了美国的地缘政治意图及其实践,透射出其激烈的对华战略竞争和对抗意涵。正是这种对抗性战略议程带来的负面影响,使得“印太”概念一开始形成,所谓“印太”地区就面临建立一个和平稳定的地区秩序的基本需求。没有和平稳定的地区秩序,这一地区的发展前景必将蒙上阴影,因此,研讨“印太”地区安全秩序问题显得特别紧要迫切。

I. Theoretical Path of Research on the Regional Security Order

一、地区安全秩序研究的理论路径

There are different opinions concerning research on the regional security order. These mainly include the ideas of “porous regional orders” proposed by Peter Kazanstein, the “regional security complexes (RSCs)” proposed by Barry Buzan, and the “regional security communities” explained by Amitav Acharya using ASEAN as an example. The “porous regional order” described by Kazanstein refers to the regional order in Europe and Asia established under the influence of the “imperial power” of the United States and led by regional central countries. 2 Obviously, from a realist perspective, a regional order is defined as a political and economic process associated with great power relations or hegemony. This sort of power politics path must be strongly rejected in the construction of the security order in the Indo-Pacific region because the current U.S. thinking on strategic competition with China has put the region in a predicament of extreme insecurity. Acharya’s “regional security community” is established based on the most fundamental, consistent, and long-term convergence of interests among actors in order to avoid war. This is what Karl Deutsch calls a “non-war community.” 3 Obviously, this is not in line with the reality of the construction of the Indo-Pacific regional security order. After all, the Indo-Pacific regional security order is far from reaching the point where all countries in the region jointly renounce armed confrontation. Buzan’s theory of RSCs holds up the regional level as the appropriate level for conducting many applied security analyses. It aims to provide a simplified analytical framework for predicting and interpreting developments within a region. An RSC refers to such a regional level—countries or other units are closely linked to each other to the extent that their security cannot be considered separately from each other. Geographical boundaries, anarchic structures, polarities (material structures), and friendly-hostile patterns (social structures) are the four major variables that define the structure of RSCs. 4 An RSC is a relatively distinguishable, operable, inclusive, and abstract concept. It provides, in the words of Buzan and Ole Wæver, “a framework that is sufficiently open and abstract that it allows for far-reaching differentiation to develop among regions, while maintaining a general set of categories with which to describe this.” 5 This is what makes it a convenient analytical framework that we can use to analyze the security order in the Indo-Pacific region. Interestingly, in a 2003 work in which Buzan and Wæver proposed the RSC theory, they also proposed an “Asian supercomplex” encompassing East Asia, South Asia, and Australia. This was a sort of anticipation of today’s “Indo-Pacific” geopolitical region. 6

关于地区安全秩序的研究可谓众说纷纭,主要有彼得·卡赞斯坦提出的“多孔化地区秩序”、巴里·布赞提出的“地区安全复合体”以及阿米塔·阿查亚以东盟为案例阐释的“地区安全共同体”等。卡赞斯坦描述的“多孔化地区秩序”,指的是美国“帝权”影响下由地区中心国家主导建立的欧洲与亚洲的地区秩序。显然这是依据现实主义视角,将地区秩序界定为与大国关系或霸权相关联的政治和经济过程。这种强权路径肯定是在印太地区安全秩序构建中需要极力排斥的,因为当前美国对华战略竞争思维已经使该地区陷入极不安全的困境。阿查亚的“地区安全共同体”,则是建立在行为体避免战争这一最根本的、一致的和长期利益汇合点的基础之上,即多伊奇所说的“非战争共同体”。显然,这不符合印太地区安全秩序构建的现实,毕竟印太地区安全秩序还远未达到地区各国共同放弃武力对抗的地步。布赞的地区安全复合体理论提倡把地区层次作为从事大量应用性安全分析的恰当层次,旨在为预测和解释地区内的发展情况提供一种简化的分析框架。所谓地区安全复合体,是指这样一个地区层次——国家或其他单位相互之间足够紧密地联系在一起,以至于不能把它们的安全彼此分割开来进行思考。地理边界、无政府结构、极性(物质结构)、友善—敌意模式(社会结构)是界定地区安全复合体结构的四大变量。地区安全复合体作为一个相对具有可分辨性、可操作性、较好包容性与抽象性的概念,提供了“一个足够开放和抽象的框架”,正如布赞和维夫所说,“使我们可以对不同地区进行意义深远的区分,同时坚持使用一套描述这种区分的一般范畴。” 这正好给我们分析印太地区安全秩序提供了一个便利的分析框架。有意思的是,正是在2003年布赞和维夫提出地区安全复合体理论的著作中,他们提出了一个涵括东亚、南亚和澳洲的“亚洲超级复合体”,而这正是对当今“印太”地缘政治区域的某种预见。

The RSC theory provides an analytical framework and predicts the emergence of an Asian supercomplex similar to the Indo-Pacific geographic concept. However, how the internal material power relations of such an Asian supercomplex will evolve and how its social relations will develop are our real concerns. The RSC theory provides an open analytical framework and, in a general sense, focuses on the possibility of developing a “regional security continuum” in a general sense. This means that, as the internal structure of a security complex changes, its social structure can evolve from a conflict format to a security community through security mechanisms. 7 However, out of a certain Western-centrism, the ideological bias of the so-called “democratic peace theory,” an infatuation with U.S. hegemony, and a suspicion and fear of different civilizations and the rise of China, Buzan and Wæver negatively hold that the potential social structures of the Asian supercomplex can be reduced to an extremely narrow range, saying “The East Asian RSC seems almost certain to end up either towards the milder end of the conflict formation scenario or somewhere near the weak end of the regional security regime.” They see China as a “belligerent” and the United States as a proponent of the balance of power that is reluctant to get involved in Asia. 8 In fact, the current geopolitical confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region stems from the realist power politics manipulation by the United States in this region as foreseen or hoped for by Buzan and Wæver. The ideological biases of the authors and their fascination with U.S. hegemony obviously limit the theory’s explanatory power for the current Indo-Pacific regional security order—after all, the United States, a force from outside the region, cannot function as an endogenous driving force for regional security construction. For this reason, the United States cannot provide a benign and rational solution to solve the dilemmas of this RSC.

地区安全复合体理论提供了一种分析框架,并预计会出现一个和印太地理概念相近的亚洲超级复合体。但是,这样一个亚洲超级复合体,其内部的物质权力关系如何演化、其社会关系如何发展,是我们真正关心的问题。地区安全复合体理论虽然提供了一个开放性的分析框架,并且在一般意义上关注到某种“区域安全连续统一体”发展的可能性,即随着安全复合体内部结构的变化,其社会结构可以从冲突形态经由安全机制演进为安全共同体。但是,出于某种西方中心观、所谓“民主和平论”的意识形态偏见、对美国霸权的迷恋,以及对异质文明和中国崛起的疑惧,布赞和维夫消极地认为,亚洲超级复合体的社会结构前景可以被简化到一个极其狭小的区间。“几乎可以肯定的是,东亚地区安全复合体要么走向冲突形态中较为温和的一端,要么靠近地区安全机制的弱端”,认为中国是一个“好斗者”,美国则是一个不大情愿卷入亚洲的均势支撑者。其实,当前印太地区呈现的地缘政治对抗,正是源于布赞和维夫所预见或期待的美国在这一地区的现实主义强权政治操弄。作者的意识形态偏见和对美国霸权的迷恋,显然限制了该理论在当前印太地区安全秩序上的解释力——毕竟美国这个域外力量是无法作为地区安全构建的内生动力发挥作用的,因而无法提供一种使该地区安全复合体走出困境的良性合理方案。

However, the pursuit of a path out of the security confrontation predicament is the primary concern of scholars of this region in their research on the regional order, and it is also the theoretical and practical aim of this paper. As the Chinese scholar Zheng Xianwu said, if the East Asia region does not want to carry on the growth and spread of hostility and other factors of insecurity that lead to turbulent situations such as crises and conflicts, there is only one choice. This is to create a stable and lasting regional security order by actively developing security regionalism (安全区域主义) on the basis of existing security regionalization (安全区域化). 9 In view of the fact that, in the current Indo-Pacific region, it is difficult to say that there is some dominant concept of security regionalism with the objective of a friendly regional security order. Moreover, taking a long view, the Indo-Pacific region has no clear prospect of developing a regional security mechanism, to say nothing of the possibility of forming some kind of Indo-Pacific regional security community. Based on this situation, this paper invokes another more fundamental concept—regionness (地区性), to provide the possibility of theoretical discussion about the construction of a security order in the Indo-Pacific region. The concept of “regionness” was proposed by Swedish scholars Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum and others, and Chinese scholars Pang Zhongying discussed the issue of regionness construction in East Asia from the three dimensions of politics, economy, and culture. Qin Yaqing, Geng Xiefeng, Zheng Xianwu, and others have also given theoretical explanations of Asian regionness issues such as the East Asian model, Asian concepts, and Asian methods. 10

但是,对走出安全对抗困境道路的寻求,正是该地区学者开展秩序研究的首要关注,也正是本文讨论的理论和现实旨趣。如国内学者郑先武所说,东亚区域如果不想因敌意和其他不安全因素的继续滋长和扩散致使危机、冲突等动乱局面出现,那就只有一种选择,即在现有安全区域化的基础上通过积极开展安全区域主义创造稳定而持久的区域安全秩序。鉴于现有的印太地区还难说存在某种以友善的地区安全秩序为目标的安全区域主义主导性观念,而且长远来说印太地区也还没有发展出全地区性安全机制的明显前景,更不用说形成某种印太区域安全共同体的可能性。基于这种情形,本文援用另一个更为基础性的概念——地区性,为印太地区安全秩序构建提供一种理论探讨的可能性。

Regionness is a concept or idea used to express the degree and level of regionalization development and emphasizes the constructedness of regions. It emphasizes that regions are always in the process of construction, and the enhancement of regionness promotes an increased level of regionalization, which indicates better chances for success in the process of regional construction. The weakening of regionness leads to a decline in the level of regionalization, which means that the process of regional construction has failed or is moving towards failure. Thus, regionness connotes a gradual and dynamic construction process. 11 It can be said that regionness, used at a lower level, can provide a conceptual basis for discussing the construction of a security order in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, it is not necessary to cover all the following aspects and follow some kind of gradual historical process and cognitive process: Geographically, regionness embodies a geopolitico-economic space with specific distinguishable geographic boundaries; economically, regionness is the source of common markets, capital (financial), and knowledge (conceptual) for the countries concerned; culturally, regionness embodies the harmonious coexistence of multiple cultures; politically, regionness embodies a certain collective political will and political commitment to jointly build a regional order. 12

“地区性”这一概念由瑞典学者赫特和桑德鲍尔等人提出,国内学者庞中英从政治、经济和文化三个维度探讨了东亚地区性构建的问题,秦亚青、耿协峰、郑先武等也围绕东亚模式、亚洲观念和亚洲方式等亚洲地区性问题进行了理论阐释。地区性是一个用来表示地区化发展程度和水平的、强调地区建构性的概念或观念,它强调地区总是处于建构过程中,地区性的增强推动地区化水平提升,意味着这一地区建构过程的成功可能性增大。地区性的减弱导致地区化水平下降,意味着这一地区建构过程的失败或者趋于失败的可能。地区性内涵因此呈现出一个逐渐递进的动态构建过程。可以说,在较低层次上使用的地区性,可以用来作为探讨印太地区安全秩序构建的概念基础,而且它并不要求全部涵括以下各个方面并遵循某种循序渐进的历史过程和认识进程:从地理上来说,地区性体现为一种有着特定可分辨地理界限的地缘政治经济空间;在经济上,地区性是相关国家的共同市场、资本(金融)与知识(观念)的来源;在文化上,地区性体现为多种文化的和谐共处;在政治上,地区性体现为某种合力构建地区秩序的集体政治意愿、政治承诺。

As a region whose security relations can be discussed distinctly from other regions, because the Indo-Pacific region possesses lower-level regionness such as occupying a certain geographical space and having close regional economic ties, this provides a theoretical basis for discussing the issue of the security order in the Indo-Pacific region. Of course, we must point out that various countries currently have different views as to the geographic scope of the “Indo-Pacific” region. In the broad definition adopted by Japan, it is a broad area extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and the east coast of Africa. In the narrow definition adopted by the U.S. strategic community, it refers to the area of the eastern Indian Ocean extending from the east coast of the Pacific Ocean [太平洋东岸, i.e. the west coast of the Americas] to the west coast of India. These differences in the definition of the geographic scope of the Indo-Pacific conceal differences in the strategic propositions and interests of the Indo-Pacific countries. However, for a scientific discussion of the regional security order, we must proceed from a general consensus on the geographic definition. As mentioned above, from the perspective of the regional security order, the definition of the geographic space of the Indo-Pacific region must be considered from at least the following two aspects: The first is that the region must feature convenient geographical transportation, moderate distances, and close economic ties, with the material reality or potential of regionness; the second is that the region must be closely connected in a certain security relationship, be clearly distinguishable from other surrounding areas, and possess a certain uniqueness as regards regional security. Therefore, an overly broad definition of the geographic scope of the Indo-Pacific region obviously does not meet our expectations for a “region”. A relatively clear and limited geographic framework is the condition for the Indo-Pacific to be a valid “region” in international politics. In fact, if we include the complete patchwork of regions from the Pacific Ocean to the peripheries of the Indian Ocean, with their very different geopolitico-economic and security characteristics, it can never constitute a “region.” Therefore, this paper adopts a relatively narrow perspective to define the Indo-Pacific region. That is to say, in geographic terms, the vast coastal and marine areas from the Western Pacific Ocean through Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean include several sub-regions, such as the Western Pacific, East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania, and the East Indian Ocean. The southern part of the Asian continent, which consists of East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, is the geopolitical center of the Indo-Pacific region. This definition largely coincides geographically with the Asian supercomplex proposed by Buzan.

作为一个在安全关系上可以和其他区域明显区别开来讨论的印太区域,由于具备了一定的地理空间、密切的地区性经济联系等较低层次的地区性,印太地区安全秩序问题因此具备了学理讨论的基础。当然需要指出的是,目前各国对“印太”地区的地理范围说法各异,日本采纳的广义界定是从太平洋一直延伸到印度洋和非洲东海岸的广大地区,美国战略界采纳的狭义界定是指从太平洋东岸延伸到印度西岸的东印度洋这一区域。印太地理范围界定上的歧异掩盖了各国印太战略主张及其利益诉求的差异,但作为地区安全秩序这样一种学理性讨论,必然需要建基于大致的地理界定共识之上。如上所述,从地区安全秩序这一角度出发,印太地区地理空间范围的界定至少要从以下两个方面来考虑:一是地理交通上的便利、距离上的适中与经济联系的紧密,具备地区性的物质现实或潜在可能;二是形成某种安全关系上的密切联系,并能够与周围其他地区较明显地区别开来,具备某种地区安全上的独特性。那么,过大地界定印太地区的地理范围显然不符合我们对“地区”的期待,一个相对明确受限的地理框架是其作为“地区”在国际政治中生效的条件。事实上,如果把从太平洋到印度洋周边有着迥然不同地缘政治经济与安全特征的各个地域完全拼凑囊括到一起,那也绝不可能构成一个“地区”。因此,本文从一种相对狭义的角度来界定印太地区,即从西太平洋经亚洲到东印度洋的广大濒海与海洋区域,在地理上主要包括西太平洋、东亚、东南亚、南亚、大洋洲、东印度洋等几个次区域。而由东亚、东南亚、南亚构成的亚洲大陆南部向海区域则是这一印太地区的地缘政治重心,这一界定在很大程度上正好与布赞提出的亚洲超级复合体在地理上相吻合。

II. The Evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Security Order Propositions

二、美国印太战略演进及其安全秩序主张

The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic plan originated from the late Bush administration and Obama administration and was established during the Trump administration. Since the Obama administration put forward the “Pivot to Asia” and “Rebalancing Toward Asia-Pacific” strategy, the United States began to substantively discuss how to deal with the rise of China. Its fundamental intention is to ensure U.S. maritime hegemony and its dominance over the Indo-Pacific region, guard against challenges from China, and build a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific region that relies on U.S. power and constrains China’s influence.

美国印太战略谋划源于小布什政府末期和奥巴马政府时期,确立于特朗普政府时期。从奥巴马政府提出“转向亚洲”和“亚太再平衡”战略开始,美国即开始实质性探讨如何应对中国崛起。其根本意图是确保美国海洋霸权及对印太地区的主导权,防范中国挑战,在印太地区构建一种倚重美国权势、抑制中国影响的地区安全秩序。

(i) The Obama administration conceived an Indo-Pacific strategy to create a regional security order that addresses diverse security challenges
(一) 奥巴马政府构想印太战略,打造应对多元化安全挑战的地区安全秩序

In 2007, the United States released a new global maritime strategy report, which shifted the focus of U.S. Navy deployments from the traditional Atlantic and Pacific regions to the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. After the Obama administration took office, as the United States committed to ending the war on terror in the Middle East, Central and South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan) and other places, the emerging momentum in the Asia-Pacific region increasingly drew the attention of the United States and the world. The United States turned the focus of its strategic energy to Asia, so that Asia-Pacific became the priority direction of the attention of U.S. foreign strategy. However, while giving priority to Asia and the Western Pacific, the United States still had to take into account the security situation in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, South Asia, and the northern Indian Ocean. Therefore, it was strategically necessary to create a more inclusive geospatial concept and create a power situation that could simultaneously deal with non-traditional security threats such as counter-terrorism and the needs of strategic competition among major powers. As stated in the Obama Administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy Report, “we must balance and integrate all elements of American power and update our national security capacity for the 21st century. We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats.” 13 The shaping of the new strategy entails deepening cooperation with 21st-century centers of influence such as China, India, and Russia, as well as diplomatic and economic development cooperation with emerging partners from the Americas to Africa, from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. 14 It can be said that the geopolitical concept of “Indian Ocean–Pacific Ocean” (“Indo-Pacific” for short) originally launched by the Abe administration in Japan is in line with the strategic needs of the United States in terms of the two priorities of the Obama administration: economy and security. On October 28, 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clearly put forward the “Indo-Pacific” concept in her speech in Hawaii, illustrating the changes in the geographical significance of the new U.S. policy in Asia. 15 In January 2012, in its defense strategy guide, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century, the United States implicitly proposed a new “Indo-Pacific” strategy using the wording “the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia.” 16 However, the Obama administration’s new foreign strategy design contained a massive contradiction, namely, that the United States must economically rely on emerging powers including China, but in terms of security, China is increasingly viewed as a strategic opponent. This irreconcilable contradiction eventually lead the latter view of China to dominate the former. In the process of implementing the strategy, the Obama administration was committed to attempting to turn the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP) into some kind of economic bloc that excluded China. In terms of security, they increasing strengthened alliance updates and deployments of forces aimed at resisting and suppressing China. As a result, this strategic design, which had some inclusive characteristics, increasingly became a strategic practice of comprehensive confrontation.

2007年美国发布新全球海洋战略报告,将美国海军部署的重点由传统的大西洋和太平洋地区转移到太平洋和印度洋地区。奥巴马政府上台后,随着美国致力于结束在中东、中南亚(阿富汗、巴基斯坦)等地的反恐战争,亚太地区的新兴发展势头日益引起美国和世界的关注,美国将主要战略精力转向亚洲,亚太成为美国对外战略关注的优先方向。但在优先关注亚洲、西太平洋地区的同时,美国仍要顾及中东波斯湾、中亚、南亚及印度洋北部地区的安全态势,因此塑造一种涵括性更强的地理空间概念、营造能够同时应对反恐等非传统安全威胁和大国战略竞争需要的力量态势就有了战略上的必要。正如2010年奥巴马政府《国家安全战略报告》所说,“必须对美国力量的所有要素进行平衡和综合考虑,更新美国应对21世纪的国家安全能力。既要维持美军常规军事优势,又要增强其打败非对称威胁的能力。” 新的战略塑造既要深化与中国、印度和俄罗斯等21世纪影响力中心的合作,又要与从美洲到非洲、从中东到东南亚的新兴崛起伙伴开展外交和经济发展合作。可以说,在奥巴马政府尤为关心的经济与安全两大优先事务层面,原先由日本安倍政府推出的“印度洋—太平洋”(简称“印太”)这一地缘政治概念都符合美国的战略需要。2010年10月28日,美国时任国务卿希拉里在夏威夷的讲话明确提出了“印太”概念,用以说明美国亚洲新政策的地理内涵变化。(15)2012年1月,美国在其防务战略指南《维持美国的世界领导地位:21世纪美国防务政策的优先方向》中,以“从西太平洋和东亚到印度洋和南亚的弧形地带”的说法,隐晦地提出了新的“印度洋—太平洋”战略。不过,奥巴马政府这一新型对外战略设计内含一个巨大矛盾,即在经济上需要依靠包括中国在内的新兴力量,但在安全上又日益以中国为战略对手,彼此不可调和的矛盾性最终导致后者主导前者。在战略实施过程中,奥巴马政府致力于把推进“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”(TPP)变成排斥中国的某种经济集团谋划,在安全上也日益强化以抗华压华为目标的联盟更新和力量部署,结果使这一本来带有某种包容性特点的战略设计日益走向了全面对抗的战略实践。

(ii) The Trump administration vigorously pursued the Indo-Pacific strategy, shaping a polarized regional security order with strong constraints on China
(二) 特朗普政府大力推行印太战略,塑成强力遏华的两极化地区安全秩序

After the Trump administration came to power in 2017, it clearly viewed China as its primary strategic competitor and put forward three priorities in its National Security Strategy, political, economic, and military and security. The administration adopted a set of Indo-Pacific strategic designs with the construction of the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral mechanism (Quad) as the main path and an emphasis on strategic competition with China as the main direction. On January 5, 2021, the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific declassified by the U.S. National Security Council in advance revealed the basic logic, strategic goals, and specific actions of this U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Its basic strategic logic was actually a simple “syllogistic” reasoning: the Indo-Pacific region will become the engine of U.S., regional, and even global economic growth; U.S. security and prosperity depend on access to the Indo-Pacific; therefore loss of primacy in the Indo-Pacific will undermine the ability of the United States to achieve its global interests. According to the document, one of the top interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region is to “Preserve U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military access to the most populous region of the world and more than one-third of the global economy.” The document then emphasized the so-called “China threat”, claiming that “Strategic competition between the United States and China will persist, owing to the divergent nature and goals of our political and economic systems. China will circumvent international rules and norms to gain an advantage. China aims to dissolve U.S. alliances and partnerships in the region. Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military influence will continue to increase in the near-term and challenge the U.S. ability to achieve its national interests in the Indo-Pacific region.” Therefore, the United States should work to promote the so-called “liberal economic order” in the Indo-Pacific region and prevent China from establishing a “new illiberal” influence. 17

2017年特朗普政府执政后,明确以中国为首要战略竞争对手,在其《国家安全战略》中提出了包括政治、经济、军事与安全三个方面的优先事项,以构建美日澳印四边机制为主要路径、强调对华战略竞争为主要指向的一整套印太战略设计。2021年1月5日,美国国家安全委员会提前解密的《美国印太战略框架》揭示了美国这一印太战略的基本逻辑、战略目标及具体行动。其基本战略逻辑实际上是一个“三段论式”的简单推理:印太地区将成为美国、地区甚至全球经济增长的引擎,美国的安全和繁荣依赖于对印太地区的进入权,丧失在印太地区的首要地位,将会削弱美国实现其全球利益的能力。文件称,美国在印太地区的最高利益之一,就是“保持美国在经济、外交、军事上能够进入这个世界上人口最多、在全球经济中占比超过1/3的地区”。文件随即强调所谓“中国威胁”,声称“中美之间的战略竞争将会持续下去,由于中国政治、经济制度的不同性质和目标,中国会绕开国际规则和规范以获得优势地位,中国会致力于削弱美国在该地区的联盟和伙伴关系,中国在该地区的经济、外资和军事影响会持续增长并挑战美国在印太地区实现国家利益的能力”。因此,美国要在印太地区致力于促进所谓“自由经济秩序”,防止中国建立一种“新的非自由主义”的影响。

In terms of concrete practices at the politico-security level, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy seeks to strengthen U.S. security commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, strengthen the capabilities and willingness of its allies in the region, and promote U.S. security leadership in the region. In December 2018, the U.S. Congress passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which confirmed the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy in the form of legislation. On June 1, 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense released the public version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which, in terms of defense, emphasized that the United States should pursue “Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” to implement its lasting commitments in the Indo-Pacific. Its essence is to build a regional security relationship network with the Quad mechanism of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India as the core support, anti-China as the basic concept, and the fundamental purpose of ensuring the dominant security position of the United States. On November 4, 2019, the U.S. State Department issued another report titled A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision. From the overall level of diplomacy, it emphasizes the need to strengthen and deepen partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, ASEAN, and India, and even instigates the use of Taiwan to contain China. It advances a government-wide strategic approach, attempts to build a politico-security order that strengthens U.S. partnerships and jointly contains China, and creates a regionally polarized order in which China and the United States move towards comprehensive strategic competition.

在政治—安全层面的具体实践,美国印太战略就是要强化其对印太地区的安全承诺,加强该地区盟友的能力和意愿,促进美国在该地区的安全领导权。2018年12月,美国国会通过《亚洲再保证倡议法》,以立法的形式确证了印太战略的实施。2019年6月1日,美国国防部发表公开版的《印太战略报告》,从防务层面强调美国要通过追求“准备性、伙伴关系,以及促进一个网络化的地区”,实现其在印太地区的持久承诺。其实质是致力于营造以美日澳印四国机制为核心支撑、以反华为基本理念,以确保美国安全主导地位为根本目的的地区安全关系网络。2019年11月4日,美国国务院又发表了题为《一个自由和开放的印太:促进共同观念》的报告,从外交的总体层面强调要加强和深化与澳、日、韩、菲、泰、东盟、印度等印太地区国家之间的伙伴关系,甚至策动以台制华,推行一种全政府战略路径,试图构建一种强化美国伙伴关系、共同遏制中国的政治—安全秩序,打造中美走向全面战略竞争的地区两极化秩序。

At the economic level, through the implementation of the Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States wants to ensure the dominance of the free market in Asia. The Trump administration even hopes to completely block the influence of China’s economic development path and cut it off from external markets and technology sources through an anti-globalization approach, so as to ensure that the exclusive economic position of the United States is not challenged. U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy documents emphasize that China’s different political and economic systems and China’s construction of a “new, illiberal sphere of interest” in the Indo-Pacific region challenge the liberal economic order represented by the United States. China is seeking dominance in cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence and biogenetics, and its dominance in such technologies will pose a fundamental challenge to free society in the United States. In terms of specific actions, the Trump administration has formulated the so-called Strategic Framework for Resisting China’s Economic Aggression [not the actual document title, probably refers to “United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific”], which seeks to increase technical assistance, development assistance and humanitarian assistance to Indo-Pacific countries and constrain the influence of China’s “Belt and Road” initiative; promote domestic economic reform in India, promote energy cooperation and technical cooperation between the United States and India, diversify India’s energy sources and supplies, strengthen investment in connectivity projects between India and other countries in the region, and accelerate the development of India’s national power; block China’s industrial policies and so-called “unfair trade practices” and strive to build a so-called “consensus that China’s industrial policies and unfair trade practices harm the global trading system;” maintain the innovative superiority of U.S. industries, promote the growth of critical U.S. technologies, work with allies to prevent China from acquiring strategic capabilities, and expand scrutiny of Chinese investments; and so on in the same vein. 18 Obviously, through its national protectionist perspective, the Trump administration has raised Sino-U.S. economic competition to the level of confrontation between countries and constructed its grand strategy of “economic-political-security” integration.

在经济层面,通过印太战略的实施,美国要确保自由市场在亚洲的主导地位。特朗普政府甚至希望通过一种反全球化方式,彻底封阻中国经济发展道路影响及其外部市场和技术来源,确保美国独占性经济地位不受挑战。美国印太战略文件强调,中国不同的政治经济制度、中国在印太地区构建一种“新的、非自由主义的利益范围”,挑战了美国代表的自由经济秩序。中国在尖端技术方面正在寻求主导地位,包括人工智能、生物基因技术,这种技术上的主导地位将对美国自由社会构成根本挑战。在具体行动方面,特朗普政府专门制订了所谓“抵制中国经济侵略的战略框架”文件,增加对印太地区国家的技术援助、发展援助和人道主义援助,抵制中国“一带一路”倡议的影响;推动印度国内的经济改革,促进美印之间的能源合作、技术合作,使印度能源来源和供应多元化,加强对印度和区内其他国家之间联通性项目的投资,提升印度的国力发展速度;阻止中国的产业政策和所谓“不公平贸易做法”,致力于建立所谓“中国产业政策和不公平贸易做法危害全球贸易体系的共识”;维持美国产业的创新性优势,促进美国关键技术的增长,与盟友一起阻止中国获取战略性能力,扩大对中国投资的审查范围;等等。(18)显然,特朗普政府通过一种民族保护主义的视角,将中美经济竞争上升到国家间对抗的高度,并构筑其“经济—政治—安全”一体化的大战略。

(iii) The Biden administration fine-tuned the Indo-Pacific strategy, and strategic competition between China and the United States remains the core variable of the regional security order
(三) 拜登政府微调印太战略,中美战略竞争仍是地区安全秩序核心变量

The Trump administration’s China policy of comprehensive confrontation with China was ultimately not worth the price. The chaos in U.S. domestic and foreign policies, the sharp decline in its international status, and widespread criticism from allies and the international community, in addition to factors such as the out-of-control epidemic, were also largely related to the Trump administration’s increasing focus on pursuing a Cold War-style policy agenda with the central mission of confronting China. After the Biden administration took office in early 2021, it fine-tuned the U.S. view of the Indo-Pacific region’s politico-security order, emphasizing uniting allies and partners, intervening in an ideologically based multilateral manner, and striving to restore the United States’ advantageous position in its power competition with China. Although the methods have changed, the dominant tone of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has not changed. In his phone call with President Xi Jinping on February 10, President Biden continued to use the phrase “maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific,” calling it one of the United States’ policy priorities. 19 In March 2021, the Biden administration issued the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which still clearly regards China as the primary strategic competitor of the United States. 20 After the Anchorage strategic dialogue, a new situation emerged in the strategic competition between China and the United States. International cooperation on specific issues such as climate change needs to be promoted, and the strategic competition pattern will become a core variable affecting the regional security order for a long time to come.

特朗普政府推行完全与中国对抗的对华政策终究得不偿失,其内外政策的混乱与美国国际地位的急剧下降、盟友和国际社会的广泛批评,除了疫情失控等因素外,也在很大程度上和特朗普政府愈益聚焦推行以反华为中心任务的冷战式政策议程不无关联。2021年初拜登政府上台后,对美国印太地区政治—安全秩序观进行了微调,更强调团结盟友和伙伴,以基于意识形态的多边方式介入,着力恢复美国在与中国力量竞争中的优势地位。虽然方式有变,但美国印太战略的主基调未变,在2月10日与习近平主席的通话中,拜登总统仍旧沿用了“维持一个自由开放的印太”这一说法,并称之为美国政策优先事项之一。2021年3月拜登政府出台《临时国家安全战略指南》,仍然明确将中国视为美国的首要战略竞争者。(20)安克雷奇战略对话后,中美战略性竞争出现新的态势,围绕气候变化等具体议题的国际合作有待推进,战略竞争格局将在很长时间内成为影响地区安全秩序的核心变量。

Ideological values, regulatory power, and material power (primarily military power) constitute the three major power bases that the U.S. Biden administration relies on in its attempt to deal with China and dominate the regional security order “based on confidence and power status.” The Biden administration has placed great emphasis on addressing Chinese and Russian challenges by strengthening the unity of “democratic” countries and bringing ideological values to bear. Rule shaping includes international economic rules, trade rules, legal rules, and environmental standards. It is an important means for the United States to focus on regulating China. A strong forward military deployment and presence is still the fundamental support of the U.S. government’s foreign policy. The Biden administration will even take a broader geopolitical or global perspective to deal with the Sino-U.S. strategic competition centered on the Indo-Pacific region. By strengthening the multilateralism of broader alliances and pursuing a certain “carrot and stick” negotiating strategy with China, they seek to build a security order in the Indo-Pacific region that is supported by the U.S. military’s powerful position, aimed at regulating and transforming adversaries, and realizes the United States’ own economic gains and politico-security interests.

意识形态价值观、规则性权力和以军事力量为首要的物质性权力,构成了美国拜登政府试图“基于信心和实力地位”应对中国和主导地区安全秩序的三大权力基础。拜登政府极为强调通过加强“民主”国家团结、发挥意识形态价值观作用来应对中俄挑战。规则塑造则包括国际经济规则、贸易规则、法律规则、环境标准等等,是美国着力规制中国的重要手段。强有力的前沿军事部署和存在态势仍然是美国政府对外政策的基本依靠。拜登政府甚至还会以某种更为广泛的地缘视角或全球视角来应对以印太地区为重点的中美战略竞争,通过强化更广泛盟友关系的多边主义、奉行某种“胡萝卜+大棒”式的对华谈判策略,构筑以美国军事强力地位为支撑、以规范和改变对手为目的、实现自身经济赢利与政治—安全收益的印太地区安全秩序。

III. Regional Security Order Disputes Driven by U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy

三、美国印太战略驱动下的地区安全秩序纷争

The structural shift of the global economic center of gravity and geopolitical center to the Indo-Pacific region has become an important geopolitico-economic trend. The United States actively carries out Indo-Pacific geostrategic planning and implements strategic operations with political, economic, and military initiatives. It intends to firmly seize the huge opportunities brought by the economic and political development of the Indo-Pacific region and ensure the regional and world leadership of the United States. However, the quiet change in the balance of power between China and the United States makes it increasingly difficult for the United States to constrain China in services to its own regional influence and status. Due to the constraints of its own resources, the United States increasingly needs to rely on its allies for support and seek the cooperation of allies to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy. The practices of the Indo-Pacific strategy by the past three U.S. presidents are no exception. Mobilizing the enthusiasm of allies may allow the United States to concentrate relatively more resources in the near future. However, as the United States increasingly lacks effective strategic control mechanisms, this will inevitably stimulate the strategic independence and agency of countries in the Indo-Pacific region and will also induce more countries outside the region to increase their strategic attention and investment in the Indo-Pacific region. This will result in more complex changes in the regional power balance structure.

全球经济重心和地缘政治中心向印太地区的结构性转变,已成为重要的地缘政治经济趋势。美国积极进行印太地缘战略谋划,实施具有政治经济军事主动性的战略运作,意图紧紧掌握印太地区经济政治发展带来的巨大机会,确保美国的地区和世界领导地位。但中美力量对比悄然发生的变化,使得美国越来越难以仅凭自身之力压制中国获得地区影响和地位,美国自身资源的制约性使其越来越需要依靠盟友予以支撑、寻求盟友配合来推进其印太战略,近三任美国总统的印太战略实践莫不如此。调动盟友积极性,近期内可能会使美国凝聚相对较多的资源,但在美国愈益缺乏有效的战略管控机制的情势下,也必然激发印太地区国家的战略自主性与能动性,还会诱使更多区外国家纷纷加大对印太地区的战略性关注和投入,导致地区权力平衡结构出现更复杂的变化态势。

(i) The effect of strategic agency of countries in the region
(一) 地区内国家的战略能动性效应

The strategic agency of countries in the Indo-Pacific region is illustrated in the competition among countries to propose their own Indo-Pacific strategic ideas. Japan took the lead in promoting “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” launched the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategic concept, and advocated for the “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.” In its Defence White Paper 2013, Australia officially defined the region where it is located as the “Indo-Pacific”. The Defence White Paper 2017 more clearly defined the geographic scope of “Indo-Pacific” and discussed Australia’s commitment to a secure, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific at length. India emphasizes building a strategic vision “rooted in the Indian Ocean and facing the Indo-Pacific” and is actively enhancing its visibility and voice in Indo-Pacific security affairs. Prime Minister Modi systematically explained India’s “Indo-Pacific Vision” at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, emphasizing the inclusiveness and openness of the Indo-Pacific and the central role of ASEAN.

印太地区国家的战略能动性,一是表现为各国竞相提出自身的印太战略构想。日本率先推动“亚洲的民主安全菱形”,推出“自由开放的印太”战略构想,倡导“亚非发展走廊计划”。澳大利亚在2013年《国防白皮书》中就正式将澳大利亚所处地区界定为“印太”,2017年《国防白皮书》进一步清晰界定了“印太”的地理范畴,并大篇幅论述澳大利亚如何致力于实现一个安全、开放和繁荣的印太。印度强调构建“立足印度洋、面向印太”的战略视野,积极提升在印太安全事务中的能见度和话语权。莫迪总理在2018年6月香格里拉对话会上系统阐释了印度的“印太构想”,强调印太的包容、开放性以及东盟的中心作用。

Second, various countries have successively put forward aggressive grand strategies in service of their own ambitions of national prosperity. Under the banner of “Proactive Pacifism,” Japan seeks to normalize “national defense” and strengthen its independent defense capabilities. At the same time, with the parallel situations of “fulcrum construction” and “perimeter layout”, Japan is committed to using the core structure composed of Japan, the United States, India, and Australia (its “Democratic Security Diamond” concept) as the “fulcrum” and using a kind of grand strategic structure that connects key countries along the route from Southeast Asia, Oceania, South Asia, and the Middle East to Africa (its “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept) as the “perimeter”. 21 By acting as the global “deputy sheriff” of the United States, Australia is striving to improve its international status and strengthen its own capacity building. Important documents such as the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan declared that Australia must be able to “respond with credible military force, when required.” 22 India emphasizes building a “strong and inclusive new India” to make India a major global political, economic, and military power. It is committed to developing its own defense capabilities, vigorously upgrading its equipment, and further promoting the implementation of its Act East policy. South Korea proposed a new southward-oriented policy to vigorously strengthen relations with ASEAN countries and India. Countries in the region all show a relatively common tendency toward strategic agency. They have invested heavily in building up their respective militaries and actively pursue strategic agendas to enhance their own strength and influence.

二是各国纷纷提出以国家兴盛为抱负的进取性大战略。日本在“积极和平主义”旗帜下寻求“国防正常”化,强化自主防卫能力,同时以“支轴构建”加“周线布局”的并行态势,致力于“民主安全菱形”构想下以日美印澳四方组成的核心架构为“支轴”,以及“自由与繁荣之弧”构想下以东南亚、大洋洲、南亚、中东到非洲沿线关键国家依次联结为“周线”的某种宏大战略架构。澳大利亚借由充当美国的全球“副警长”而着力提升国际地位,加强自身能力建设,在2020年《新版国防战略》和《军事力量编成规划》等重要文件中宣称“在情况需要时,澳大利亚要有可靠的军事力量来进行应对”。印度强调建设“强大和包容的新印度”,要使印度成为世界政治大国、经济强国、军事强国,致力于发展自身防务能力,大力提升装备水平,进一步推动东进政策实施。韩国提出新南向政策,大力加强和东盟国家与印度之间的关系。地区国家均体现出某种较为普遍的战略能动性倾向,大力投入各自军备建设,积极推行提升自身实力和影响力的战略议程。

Third, various formal and informal politico-security mechanisms have been formed in the region. Countries such as Japan, Australia, and India, in addition to establishing various bilateral mechanisms with the United States, such as “2+2” talks, logistics and material exchange agreements, joint exercises and training, and joint situational awareness, are also actively expanding bilateral mechanisms to trilateral or even quadrilateral and “quadlateral+”, forming various exclusive small multilateral security mechanisms. Small multilateral mechanisms with the U.S.-Japan relationship a the core and adopting the “U.S.-Japan+” model have been widely constructed, and the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India quadrilateral mechanism has been continuously promoted. Japan, Australia, India, and other countries are trying to promote strategies of alliances between middle powers to a certain extent, and they have formed a number of “quasi-alliance” agreements and mechanisms with each other.

三是体现为地区内各种正式和非正式政治—安全机制的形成。日本、澳大利亚、印度等国除了与美国建立以“2+2”会谈、后勤物资交换协议、联演联训、联合态势感知等各种双边机制外,还积极将双边机制向三边甚至四边、“四边+”拓展,形成各种排他性的小多边安全机制。以美日关系为核心、“美日+”为模式的小多边机制得以广泛建构,美日澳印四边机制得到不断推进。日、澳、印等国在一定程度上试图推进中等国家联合的战略,其相互之间形成多个“准同盟关系”协议和机制。

Fourth, strategic agency is manifested in high-profile shows of strength by various countries in regional hotspot issues related to China, but their attitudes towards China are not consistent. Australia has intervened in South China Sea disputes in a high-profile manner and has continuously made statements that are not favorable to China. During the pandemic, it also tried to cooperate with some Western to carry out so-called pandemic diplomacy, using this as an opportunity to highlight Australia’s international status. Japan is actively wooing Southeast Asian countries, opportunistically hypes disputes in the South China Sea, and aggravates incidents related to the Diaoyu Islands issue with the support of the United States. Through the Quad mechanism of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia and other mechanisms, India has frequently voiced its opinion and participated in regional hotspot affairs, strengthening its participation and intervention in affairs in Southeast Asia, East Asia, the South China Sea, and Western Pacific. However, the various countries differ in their attitudes towards China. India clearly emphasizes the inclusiveness of its Indo-Pacific Vision and demonstrates its strategic independence, while Australia firmly stands by the United States. Since 2017, Japan improved its relations with China and pursued a line of coordination with China for a time, but in 2020, after the new administration of Yoshihide Suga came to power, it has once again strengthened relations with the United States. The complex autonomous strategies and policies of the above countries obviously add to the complexity of demands for a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific.

四是表现为各国在地区涉华热点问题上高调展现自身力量存在,但对华态度并不一致。澳大利亚高调介入南海争端,不断做出不利于中国的表态,疫情期间还试图联合美欧一些国家开展所谓疫情外交,借机显示澳大利亚的国际地位。日本积极拉拢东南亚国家,趁机炒作南海争端,在钓鱼岛问题上借助美国支持激化事端。印度借由印美日澳四国机制等在地区热点事务上频频发声和参与行动,加强对东南亚、东亚、南海、西太平洋事务的参与和干预力度。但各国对华态度也呈现出差异性。印度明确强调印太构想的包容性,显示出自身的战略独立性,澳大利亚则坚定与美为伍,日本2017年后一度改善对华关系并执行对华协调路线,但2020年菅义伟新政府上台后对美关系又有强化趋势。以上各国纷繁复杂的能动性战略与政策,显然进一步加剧了印太地区安全秩序诉求的复杂性。

(ii) Shows of power and presence by outside countries in the Indo-Pacific
(二) 域外国家在印太地区显示力量存在

The strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region has attracted the involvement of many European countries from outside the region. European countries have always been highly sensitive to changes in international political power and they worry that changes in the power structure of the Indo-Pacific region will affect the interests of European countries. They have formed close economic and political ties with the Indo-Pacific region and are deeply afraid of missing out on the opportunities brought by the economic development of the Indo-Pacific region. In particular, France, the U.K., and Germany have proposed and outlined Indo-Pacific strategies, hoping to participate deeply in Indo-Pacific affairs. The European Union (EU) first proposed the concept of the Indo-Pacific as early as in its new security strategy released in June 2016, stating that it would expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific, the Indo-Pacific, and the world and actively adopt policy proposals to this end. In September 2018, the EU formulated its “Connectivity Strategy,” proposing a sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based approach to connectivity and committing to strengthening the connectivity between Europe and Asia by building transport, energy, digital, and people connectivity, building international partnerships for sustainable connectivity based on bilateral, regional, and international cooperation, and making more and better investments in sustainable connectivity. 23

印太地区的战略图景吸引了域外欧洲国家纷纷介入。欧洲国家对国际政治权势变动向来高度敏感,担心印太地区权势格局的变化会影响欧洲国家的利益。它们和印太地区形成了紧密的经济政治联系,也深恐失去印太地区经济发展带来的机会。特别是法、英、德等国,纷纷提出和勾画印太战略,希望深入参与印太地区事务。早在2016年6月出台的新安全战略中,欧盟便首次提出印太概念,表示要在亚太、印太和全球扩大影响力,积极采取有所作为的政策主张。2018年9月,欧盟制定“连通战略”,提出以可持续、全面和基于规则的连通方式,构建交通、能源、数字和人员连通,基于双边、地区和国际合作建设可持续连通的国际伙伴关系,更多更好地投资于可持续性连通等方面,致力于加强欧亚之间的互联互通。

France is striving to create an Indo-Pacific strategy of “Indo-Pacificization.” With its overseas territories spread across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, France claims to be an Indo-Pacific state and strives to maintain its capabilities and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. In May 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron stated France’s Indo-Pacific strategic ambitions in his speech in Australia, stating the intent to strengthen France’s Indo-Pacific influence to support its economic and political activities. In May 2019, the French Ministry of Defense released the “French Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy”, which analyzed the basic security landscape of Sino-U.S. competition in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasized that France has broad security interests in the Indo-Pacific region, including sovereign territorial security, national security, exclusive economic zone security, and strategic supply security, and proposed to ensure France’s sovereign interests in the region, promote the regional security environment through military and security cooperation, and help maintain strategic stability and balance. 24 In August 2019, the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs released For an Inclusive Indo-Pacific: France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. From the overall diplomatic level, this paper expounds the strategic thinking that France should use its soft power as a mediating, inclusive, and stable country in the Indo-Pacific region. The document proposes four pillars for France’s Indo-Pacific strategy: First, enhance France’s role in regional crisis resolution; second, strengthen regional partnerships with major middle power such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and Japan, while deepening cooperation with China; third, deepen cooperation with regional organizations; and fourth, firmly promote the improvement of global public goods such as climate, environment, biodiversity, health, education, digital technology, and high-quality infrastructure. 25 In general, although France emphasizes the need to promote the regional security environment through a multilateral approach, its main emphasis is still on maintaining security cooperation with the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and other Western partners which clearly shows France’s Western standpoint.

法国极力打造“印太化”的印太战略。凭借其在印太两洋散布的海外领土,法国宣称自己是一个印太国家,着力维持其在印太地区的能力和影响。2018年5月,法国总统马克龙在澳洲讲话中陈述了法国的印太战略抱负,意图强化其印太影响以支撑其经济和政治活动。2019年5月,法国国防部发布《法国印太防务战略》,分析了印太地区中美竞争的基本安全图景,强调法国在印太地区存在主权领土安全、国民安全、专属经济区安全、战略供应安全等广泛的安全利益,提出要确保法国在该地区的主权利益,通过军事与安全合作促进地区安全环境,帮助维持战略稳定与平衡。2019年8月,法国欧洲与外交事务部发布《为了一个包容的印太:法国的印太战略》,从总体外交层面阐述了法国要在印太地区作为一种调解性、包容性、稳定性国家发挥软权力作用的战略思想。文件提出了法国印太战略的四个支柱:一是提升法国在地区危机解决中的作用;二是加强与澳大利亚、印度、印尼、日本等主要中等国家的地区伙伴关系,同时深化与中国的合作;三是深化与地区组织的合作;四是坚定促进气候、环境、生物多样性、健康、教育、数字技术和高质量基础设施等全球性公共产品的改善。总体上来说,虽然法国强调要通过一种多边方式促进地区安全环境,但主要强调的仍然是维持同美日澳印等西方伙伴的安全合作,清晰地显示出其西方立场。

Germany has formed an Indo-Pacific strategy strongly colored by multilateralism. In August 2020, the German government released the policy guidelines document Germany-Europe-Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes the establishment of an alliance based on multilateralism, the formation of a rules-based order, the maintenance of the international order centered on the UN Charter, and opposition to the formation of new confrontational groups that require countries to choose sides. The main priorities of the German government’s Indo-Pacific policy include strengthening the construction of multilateral mechanisms, addressing climate change and protecting the environment, strengthening peace, security, and stability, promoting human rights and the rule of law, emphasizing rules-based, fair, and sustainable free trade, and advancing rules-based networking and digital transformation. German policy guidelines focus on advocating multilateralism, emphasizing the EU’s cooperation with ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN “Defense Ministers Plus” meeting, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asian Development Bank, the AIIB, and other Indo-Pacific regional mechanisms as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting mechanism. 26 Subsequently, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs said: “In the decades to come, Germany’s prosperity and geopolitical influence will depend on the way Germany cooperates with the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. More than any other region, the Indo-Pacific will shape how the future rules-based international order is shaped. We want to help shape this order so that it is based on rules and international cooperation, not the law of the strongest.” 27

德国形成了多边主义色彩较为浓厚的印太战略。2020年8月,德国政府发布了印太地区政策指针文件《德国—欧洲—亚洲:共同塑造21世纪》,提出建立基于多边主义的联盟,形成基于规则的秩序,维护以联合国宪章为核心的国际秩序,反对形成新的对抗性的、需要选边站的集团等理念。德国政府提出其印太政策的主要优先事项,分别是强化多边主义机制建设,应对气候变化和保护环境,加强和平、安全与稳定,促进人权和法治,强调基于规则、公平、可持续的自由贸易,以及推进基于规则的网络化和数字转型等等。政策指针注重倡导多边主义,强调欧盟同东盟、东亚峰会、东盟“国防部长+”会议、东盟地区论坛、亚洲发展银行、亚投行等印太地区机制以及在亚欧峰会机制中的合作。随后德国外长表示:“在接下来的数十年中,德国的繁荣与地缘政治影响都有赖于德国与印太地区国家合作共事的方式。印太地区比任何其他地区,都将更加影响到未来基于规则的国际秩序的形成方式。我们想要帮助形成这一秩序,以使其建立在规则和国际合作的基础上,而非基于强者的法则。”

The Indo-Pacific strategies of France and Germany both emphasize inclusiveness and multilateralism, but the two countries have different policy positions with respect to the Indo-Pacific region. France considers itself an Indo-Pacific country, emphasizing that it has overseas territories and residents in the Indo-Pacific region, and its Indo-Pacific strategy focuses on strengthening bilateral and trilateral relations with Australia, India, and Japan. France is attentive to the issue of maritime order based on maritime law and its main aim is to keep its maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific region unchallenged. Germany views the Indo-Pacific region from a broader perspective, emphasizing the diversification of partnerships. It advocates a more balanced multilateralist security order. 28 Based, to a large extent, on a compromise between the positions of France and Germany, the EU launched an Indo-Pacific strategy document in April 2021, focusing on the areas of non-traditional security governance and connectivity areas, highlighting the path of multilateral cooperation, and attempting to promote EU economic interests and strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. 29

法德两国的印太战略都强调包容性和多边主义,但两国对印太地区的政策立场有所不同。法国自认为是一个印太国家,强调在印太地区拥有海外领土和居民,其印太战略着重加强和澳大利亚、印度、日本的双边与三边关系,关注基于海洋法的海上秩序问题,主要目的是维护其在印太地区的海洋利益不受挑战。德国则从更广泛的视角来看待印太地区,强调伙伴关系的多样化,其主张的多边主义安全秩序更具平衡性。很大程度上,基于法德立场的某种折中,2021年4月欧盟推出了一份印太战略文件,聚焦非传统安全治理和连通领域,突出多边合作路径,试图促进欧盟在印太地区的经济利益和战略影响。

Post-Brexit, the UK has deliberately adopted a more assertive Indo-Pacific strategy. In January 2017, then-British Prime Minister Theresa May formally proposed the diplomatic concept of “Global Britain.” The Indo-Pacific region became one of the three key areas of future British foreign policy, with increasing attention to Indo-Pacific affairs becoming an important part of the UK’s new diplomacy. To this end, the UK has vigorously strengthened its diplomatic ties with Japan and other Indo-Pacific countries, and regularly holds “2+2” talks with Japan, attended by the foreign minister and defense minister. It holds joint military training and defense and security exchanges with Japan and the United States, and frequently dispatched warships to the Indo-Pacific region, following the lead of the United States in “freedom of navigation” initiatives. In December 2018, then-British Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson also claimed to be looking to establish new military bases in Southeast Asia. In January 2019, the British and Japanese heads of government issued a Joint Statement, which detailed the content of cooperation between the two countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including third-party market cooperation, strengthening bilateral maritime security assurance cooperation, and promoting third-party maritime security assurance cooperation between Japan and the UK in Southeast Asia and other regions. 30 From its insistence on the close alliance between the UK and the United States and attempts to intervene in the Hong Kong issue and maintain its traditional geographical influence, the foreign policy of the Johnson government in the UK clearly more closely follows the U.S. in containing China than France and Germany. After the fall of the Trump administration, they even became a sort of successor to the Trump-style line. The UK is also trying to resort to some kind of hard-line policy towards China to maintain what is left of the influence of the “British Empire” in the Indo-Pacific region. It has taken on the role of the “deputy leader” of the hardline forces arrayed against China in an attempt to find some kind of geopolitical compensation outside Europe to make up for the UK’s loss of European influence following Brexit.

脱欧后的英国有意采取更为激进的印太战略。2017年1月,时任英国首相特蕾莎·梅正式提出“全球英国”外交构想,印太地区成为英国未来外交政策的三大重点地区之一,加大对印太地区事务的关注成为其新外交的重要内涵。为此,英国大力加强和日本等印太国家的外交联系,与日本定期举行外交大臣加国防大臣参加的“2+2”会谈,与日美等举行联合军事训练、防务安全交流,频繁派遣军舰到印太地区追随美国搞“自由航行”行动。2018年12月,时任英国国防大臣加文·威廉姆森还声称准备在东南亚地区寻求建立新的军事基地。2019年1月,英日政府首脑会谈发表《共同声明》,详细规划了双方在印太地区的合作内容,包括第三方市场合作、强化双边海洋安全保障合作、促进日英在东南亚等地区第三方的海洋安全保障合作等。出于坚持英美紧密同盟关系以及试图干预香港问题、维持传统地缘影响等原因,英国约翰逊政府远比法国和德国显示出更多追随美国的制华外交色彩,甚至在特朗普政府下台后成为特朗普式路线的某种继承者。英国还试图诉诸某种强硬对华政策路线,在印太地区维持“大英帝国”的残余影响,担当对华强硬势力的“副领导”角色,找到英国因脱欧在欧洲影响下跌后在欧洲以外地区某种地缘政治上的弥补。

(iii) The reduced role of ASEAN has led to the restructuring of leading forces in the regional security order
(三) 东盟作用降低使地区安全秩序的牵头力量面临重构

Traditionally, several security orders have existed in the Asian region. The first is the U.S.-led security order that has evolved from a hub-and-spoke pattern to a network-like system. After the start of the Cold War, the United States led the construction of a “hub-and-spoke” Asia-Pacific security system, with the United States as the hub and Asian allies as the spokes. After the Cold War, this basic form of security relations was consolidated and expanded for a time. At the beginning of the 21st century, after the United States proposed “Rebalancing Toward Asia-Pacific” and then the Indo-Pacific strategy, they made attempts to update this hub-and-spoke security system into a U.S.-led network-like system, with the cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Australia as the backbone and numerous small multilateral mechanisms jointly formed by the United States and its allies as the main forms. The second is the regional security order that gradually formed after the Cold War, with ASEAN as the center and “ASEAN+” as the model. Focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, ASEAN established a multilateral security dialogue mechanism that includes the major forces in the region, leading to the gradual development of security mechanisms such as ASEAN and China, ASEAN Plus Three (with China, Japan, and South Korea), and the East Asia Summit. The third is the bilateral and multilateral regional security cooperation mechanisms jointly advocated by China and developing Asian countries and based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), strategic partnerships, the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs (WMCC), Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea consultation process, and the creation of a “Community with a Shared Future.” However, it must be noted that, due to natural concerns about the power of major powers, small and medium-sized countries tend to adopt foreign strategies that balance major powers and avoid one-sided participation in a security order dominated by one major power. This international political reality made the ASEAN-led regional security order more popular in the Asia-Pacific region. Major countries in the region such as China, Japan, and South Korea and extra-regional powers such as the United States successively joined this order. Therefore, ASEAN occupied the central role in the construction of the Asia-Pacific security order after the Cold War. As Wei Ling pointed out, from the perspective of the participation of various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region in regional processes, the regional consensus formed an “ASEAN-centric” path dependence. 31

传统上,亚洲地区本来存在几种安全秩序。一是美国主导、由轮辐式向网络状演进的安全秩序。冷战开始后,美国主导构建了“轮辐式”亚太安全体系,以美国为轴心、以亚洲盟友为辐轴,这一基本安全关系形态在冷战后一度得到巩固与扩张。21世纪初美国提出“亚太再平衡”继而印太战略之后,试图将这一轮辐式安全体系更新为美国主导的网络式安全体系,以美日澳合作为基干,美国与盟友共同构成的众多小多边机制是其主要形态。二是冷战后逐渐形成的以东盟为中心、以“东盟+”为模式的地区安全秩序。以东盟地区论坛、东盟防长扩大会为重点,东盟构建了囊括地区主要力量的多边安全对话机制,东盟与中国、东盟与中日韩、东亚峰会等安全机制日渐发展。三是中国与亚洲发展中国家共同倡导的、以和平共处五项原则为基本理念的双多边地区安全合作机制,包括上海合作组织、亚信会议、战略伙伴关系、中印边界磋商、南海行为准则磋商、打造“命运共同体”等等。不过需要指出的是,出于对大国权势的天然担忧,中小国家往往倾向于采取大国平衡的对外战略,避免一边倒式加入某个大国主导的安全秩序。这一国际政治现实使得东盟主导的地区安全秩序在亚太地区较受欢迎,中日韩等地区主要国家与美国等域外强国也纷纷加入其中,东盟因此成为冷战后亚太安全秩序构建的中心角色。如魏玲指出,从印太地区各利益攸关方参与地区进程的实践来看,地区协商共识已经形成对“东盟中心”的路径依赖。

Looking at the Indo-Pacific strategies recently proposed by various countries, India still emphasizes maintaining the centrality of ASEAN in the construction of the regional security order to a certain extent, and has even pushed the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India Quad mechanism to support ASEAN’s centrality to some extent. However, the Indo-Pacific strategy promoted by the United States is actually not conducive to ASEAN’s leading role in the construction of the regional security order. The specific reasons are that: First, the Trump administration viewed the Quad mechanism of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India as the core, while the Biden administration may view the relationship between the United States and its allies as the core. These positions are, in fact, not conducive to the centrality of ASEAN. Second, the inclusion of the Indian Ocean in the Indo-Pacific strategy of various countries, following the lead of the United States, greatly expands the geographical scope of the Asia-Pacific and gives Australia and India a strategic position and role in the Indo-Pacific security framework. This naturally weakens ASEAN’s status in security affairs and faces ASEAN’s original East Asian-centered framework for the Asian security order framework with a complete restructuring. Third, the Trump administration promoted the construction of a polarized order based on Sino-U.S. strategic competition and even confrontation, which directly constricted the operational space for the construction of the ASEAN security order based on the guiding ideology of the balancing of great powers.

在各国新近提出的印太战略中,印度仍然在一定程度上强调维系东盟在地区安全秩序构建中的中心地位,甚至还促使美日澳印四边机制在某种程度上表态支持东盟的中心地位。但是,美国推动的印太战略实质上不利于东盟在地区安全秩序构建中发挥牵头作用。具体缘由,一是特朗普政府以美日澳印四国机制为核心,拜登政府或以美国与盟友关系为核心,这些均在事实上不利于东盟中心地位的发挥;二是以美国为首的各国印太战略将印度洋纳入其中,大大扩充了亚太的地缘范围,并赋予澳大利亚、印度在印太安全框架中以战略性地位和作用,这自然使东盟的安全地位遭到弱化,东盟原先建构的以东亚为主体的亚洲安全秩序框架也面临全新重构;三是特朗普政府推动构建以中美战略竞争甚至对抗为基调的两极化秩序,直接破坏了以大国平衡为基本指导思想的东盟安全秩序构建的运作空间。

Of course, the increasing complexity of the regional security order also encourages ASEAN countries to use their own experience and agency to promote the establishment of a stable Indo-Pacific security order. As a major country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s foreign policy tradition is accustomed to adopt an Indian and Pacific Ocean perspective due to its status as an archipelago spanning the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In May 2013, at a conference on Indonesia held by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, Indonesia’s then-foreign minister Mardi Natalegawa proposed the idea of signing an Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The proposal involved three major concerns of regional diplomacy: the crisis of confidence, unresolved territorial disputes, and managing regional change. This is consistent with ASEAN’s current regional security construction style, which advocates confidence building, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and security and echoes the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. To a certain extent, this proposal reflected the original intention of major ASEAN countries to shape the Indo-Pacific security order in the ASEAN way in the face of geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific region. As ASEAN’s largest economy, Indonesia’s regional political ambitions mean it does not want to see great power competition weaken ASEAN’s status as the “primary driver” in regional security. Its non-aligned policy tradition also makes it reluctant to become overly involved in security cooperation with the United States. After President Joko Widodo took office in 2014, he once again clearly put forward the two-ocean strategy, seeking to make Indonesia a “fulcrum country” in the Indo-Pacific region and thereby shaping the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region and promoting regional and international cooperation. Led by Indonesia, ASEAN has gradually formed a unified position. 32

当然,地区安全秩序复杂性加剧,也激发东盟国家发挥自身经验和能动性作用,推动构建某种稳定的印太安全秩序。作为东南亚地区的主要国家,印度尼西亚由于其跨越太平洋和印度洋的群岛国家身份,传统上就有从印度洋和太平洋两洋视角思考外交政策的传统。2013年5月,在华盛顿国际战略研究中心举办的一次印尼问题会议上,印尼时任外长马尔迪·纳塔勒加瓦提出签署一份《印太友好合作条约》的想法。该建议包括地区外交的三大关注:信任危机、未解决领土争端、管理地区变化。这与东盟现行的地区安全建构样式相一致,即提倡信任建设、和平解决冲突与安全,与1976年《东南亚友好合作条约》相呼应,在一定程度上反映了东盟主要国家面对印太地缘政治变动仍然追求以东盟方式塑造印太安全秩序的初衷。作为东盟最大经济体,印尼的地区政治抱负令其不愿看到大国权势竞争弱化东盟在地区安全上的“主驾驶”地位,其持有的不结盟政策传统也使其不愿过度卷入与美国的安全合作关系。2014年佐科总统上任后,再次明确提出两洋战略,要使印尼成为印太地区的“支点国家”,进而塑造印太地区的海洋秩序,促成区域和国际合作。在印尼推动下,东盟逐渐形成统一立场。

ASEAN does not want to stand to one side in the various proposals for the Indo-Pacific regional order that have successively emerged as this will substantially damage the existing “ASEAN-centric” status in the development of Asian multilateralism mechanisms. At the ASEAN Summit in June 2019, ASEAN adopted the “Indo-Pacific” concept for the first time. ASEAN countries emphasized that the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region are closely integrated and interrelated regions, in which ASEAN plays a central role, and that the Indo-Pacific region is a region of dialogue and cooperation rather than competition and a region where everyone can achieve development and prosperity. The summit formed the ASEAN version of an “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” namely the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which aims to promote the process of building an ASEAN community featuring the principles of cooperation, inclusiveness, common development, and ASEAN neutrality. ASEAN pointed out that there are four main areas of cooperation between Indo-Pacific countries—maritime cooperation, connectivity, the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and cooperation in economic and other areas, such as trade facilitation, digital economy, SMEs, climate change, and disaster prevention and management. 33 ASEAN’s strategic outlook for the Indo-Pacific proposes an inclusive route that promotes dialogue and cooperation, in stark contrast to the confrontational strategy of the Trump administration. They hope to redefine ASEAN’s role in shaping Indo-Pacific diplomatic, security, and economic arrangements and protect and promote the interests of ASEAN as a whole and individual ASEAN countries.

东盟不希望在纷纷出现的各种印太地区秩序提议中靠边站,使亚洲多边主义机制发展中既有的“东盟中心”地位受到实质性损害。在2019年6月的东盟峰会上,东盟首次采用“印太”这一概念。东盟国家强调,亚太与印度洋地区是紧密融合并相互关联的地区,东盟在其中发挥中心作用,印太地区是对话合作而非竞争的地区,是所有人都能够实现发展和繁荣的地区。这次峰会形成了东盟版“印太战略”,即《东盟印太展望》,旨在以合作包容、共同发展及东盟中立原则为主要内容,推动东盟共同体建设进程。东盟指出,印太国家合作有四大主要领域——海洋合作、互联互通、联合国2030年可持续发展目标以及包括贸易便利化、数字经济、中小企业、气候变化、灾害预防管理等在内的经济和其他合作领域。东盟的印太战略观提出了一条与特朗普政府对抗战略迥然不同的、促进对话和合作的包容性路线,希望重新界定东盟在塑造印太外交、安全、经济安排中的地位,保护和促进东盟整体与各东盟国家自身的利益。

However, the building of a more influential security order in the Indo-Pacific region has certainly aroused competition from parties both inside and outside the Indo-Pacific region. Perhaps the option to form the greatest consensus of countries inside and outside the region would be to form a new multilateralist consortium by uniting ASEAN with China, Japan, India, South Korea, and other countries so that they can jointly play a leading role in building a security order in the Indo-Pacific region.

但是,构建一种更有影响力的印太地区安全秩序,确实激起了印太地区内外各方的竞逐。由东盟联合中日印韩等国形成某种新的多边主义联合体,共同发挥构建印太地区安全秩序的牵头作用,或许是区内外各国形成最大共识的一种选项。

IV. Conceptual Logic and Basic Appeals for Building a Regional Security Order in the Indo-Pacific

四、构建印太地区安全秩序的理念逻辑与基本诉求

As a newly-shaped region, an effective regional security order for the Indo-Pacific must be formed through repeated conflicts among major countries in the region. Just as various countries are putting forward successive Indo-Pacific strategies, all parties will try to exert influence on the emerging regional security order and even the political and economic order. However, a truly effective regional security order must be able to promote or maintain regional stability, peace, and security, promote more sustainable development in the region, and promote regional culture, regional values, and regional influence, laying the foundation for the formation of a broader regional order.

作为全新塑造的印太地区,要形成有效的地区安全秩序,必定要经过地区各主要国家之间的反复折冲。正如当前各国纷纷提出印太战略一样,各方都会试图对这一形成中的地区安全秩序甚至政治经济秩序施加影响。但一种真正有效的地区安全秩序,要能促进或维持地区的稳定、和平与安全,促进地区更可持续发展,促进地区性文化、地区性价值、地区性影响,为更广泛地区秩序的形成奠定基础。

(i) Seeking the broadest consensus of regional security demands
(一) 寻求地区安全诉求的最大共识

Geographical proximity determines mutual interests in regional security. Due to the complexity of the regional security situation and the instability it generates, forming a collective political will to jointly build a regional security order is a priority that needs to be considered in the process of building regionness. The Indo-Pacific region faces increasingly serious regional security issues. First, security tensions between countries are increasing rather than decreasing. Many countries in the region have increased their levels of defense spending, and some have adopted a more outward-looking defense strategy. The substantial increase in arms imports in the Asia-Pacific region, and even a relatively widespread situation of arms competition, is closely related to the return of the United States to the strategy of great power confrontation and the strengthening of its presence and military deployments in the Indo-Pacific. The United States has deployed its superior naval and air forces along with the most advanced combat platforms and weapon systems in the Indo-Pacific region, which has contributed to the military buildup of countries in the region. The U.S. uses the territorial and territorial water disputes between China and neighboring countries to “stir the pot” and play up the threat posed by China, emphasizing the need to enhance the capabilities of allies and partners and increase their coordination and military integration with the United States. All these factors have driven countries in the region, and especially the United States allies and strategic partners, to compete with each other for the purchase of U.S.-style advanced weapons. This upgrade of armaments will inevitably have a transmission effect between neighboring countries in the region, resulting in extensive arms competition in the region. U.S. strategies and policies have also increased the complexity of maritime disputes in the region and made them harder to resolve. The Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands is further complicated by the interventions and statements of the United States. In April 2014, President Obama publicly stated that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands. After the Biden administration came to power, it once again explicitly intervened in the Diaoyu Islands issue. In the South China Sea dispute, the United States deliberately exaggerates the “China threat”, frequently launches “freedom of navigation” operations, maintains close strategic ties with relevant countries in Southeast Asia, and increased its strategic containment of China, further aggravating the situation in the South China Sea.

地理上的相互邻近决定了地区安全上的休戚相关。由于地区安全局势复杂性及其带来的非稳定性,形成合力构建地区安全秩序的集体政治意愿,甚至是地区性构建进程中需要考虑的优先事项。印太地区面临日趋严重的地区安全问题。一是国家之间的安全紧张关系有增无减。许多地区国家提高了国防开支水平,一些国家采取了更为外向的防务战略。亚太地区武器进口大幅增长,甚至出现某种较普遍的军备竞争局面,这与美国重回大国对抗战略、强化印太军事力量存在和部署态势紧密相关。美国将优势的海空军力量以及最先进的作战平台和武器系统都部署到印太地区,对地区内国家军备建设起到了推波助澜的作用。美国借中国与周边国家的领土领海争端“挑事”,渲染中国威胁,强调要增强盟国和伙伴的能力,提升与美国的协同性和军事一体化。这些都推动地区国家特别是美国的盟友和战略伙伴竞相购买美式先进武器。而军备升级在地区相邻国家间必然产生传导效应,造成地区内广泛的军备竞争。美国的战略与政策也加大了区域内海上争端的复杂性和解决难度。在中日钓鱼岛争端上,美国的介入和表态使其进一步复杂化。2014年4月,奥巴马总统公开声称《美日安保条约》适用于钓鱼岛。拜登政府上台后,再次明确介入钓鱼岛问题。在南海争端上,美国刻意渲染“中国威胁”,频频发起“自由航行”行动,密切与东南亚有关国家的战略联系,加大对中国的战略牵制,使南海地区局势进一步激化。

Second, disputes between countries exacerbate non-traditional security issues in regional societies. Small and medium-sized countries and developing countries in the region have invested resources in military and security construction, resulting in a general decline in the resources they can use for economic and social development. Under the influence of the pandemic, the economic situation has become more difficult, which has adversely affected the development of individual countries and the region as a whole and generated more social problems. This, combined with specific social soil (社会土壤, the unique social conditions of countries), provides inducements to various non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, drug problems, and transnational crimes. In fact, the security situation in the peripheral areas of the Indo-Pacific is fragile. There are many hot-button “issues,” such as ethnic and religious conflicts, transnational crime, drug smuggling, hunger and poverty, epidemic diseases, government incompetence, environmental degradation, refugees and their resettlement, and other widespread problems that have long been concerns of the region and the international community. The northern coast of the Indian Ocean is a fringe area in global politics and more likely to induce various factors of instability and spread them to Central and South Asia and Southeast Asia. In South Asia and Southeast Asia, regional conflicts caused by ethnic and religious issues as well as terrorism and extremism still pose challenges to regional security and endanger the regional security order.

二是国家间争端加剧地区社会非传统安全问题。地区各中小国家、发展中国家将资源投入军事与安全建设,造成各自可用于经济社会发展的资源投入普遍下降,在疫情影响下经济形势更显困难,对各国以及地区整体发展造成不利影响,引发更多的社会问题,而这与特定的社会土壤结合,则易于诱发恐怖主义、毒品问题、跨国犯罪等各种非传统安全威胁。实际上,印太周边地区安全局势脆弱,热点“问题”众多,种族和宗教矛盾、跨国犯罪、毒品走私、饥饿贫穷、流行疾病、政府失能、环境恶化、难民及其安置等广泛存在的问题,长期以来牵扯着地区与国际社会的关切。印度洋北岸地区处于全球政治的边缘地带,更易于诱发各种不稳定因素并向中南亚和东南亚等地扩散。在南亚和东南亚地区,民族、宗教问题引发的地区冲突以及恐怖主义和极端主义仍然对地区安全构成挑战,危害地区安全秩序。

In order to promote the formation of collective political will, as a regional public good, the construction of a regional security order should focus on the security demands of countries in the region and try to build a consensus on the security demands of all countries. Generally speaking, countries in the region are more interested in building a peaceful and stable local security environment than countries outside the region. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific emphasizes that “the rise of material powers, i.e. economic and military, requires avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game.” “It is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the shaping of their economic and security architecture and ensure that such dynamics will continue to bring about peace, security, stability and prosperity for the peoples in Southeast Asia as well as in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions or the Indo-Pacific.” 34 Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision likewise emphasizes the importance of regional peace and stability. As an island nation, Japan is very poor in resources and energy and highly dependent on foreign countries. It has a critical need for smooth and safe sea lines of communication. Therefore, it regards measures such as improving maritime law enforcement capabilities as one of the three pillars of its Indo-Pacific strategy and emphasizes international cooperation as one of the basic principles of its Indo-Pacific strategy. 35 India’s Indo-Pacific vision also stems from its changing national security environment and growing national security needs. For countries in the region, because of their basic need to seek a stable security environment, more emphasis is placed on dialogue and cooperation as opposed to conflict and confrontation. In its ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, ASEAN pointed out that one of the key factors in how it views the Indo-Pacific region is its view of the Indo-Pacific region as a region of dialogue and cooperation rather than confrontation. 36

为促进集体政治意愿的形成,作为地区公共产品,地区安全秩序构建要重视区内国家的安全诉求,尽力构筑各国安全诉求的共识。一般而言,区内国家比域外国家更为关注构建和平稳定的本地安全环境。《东盟印太展望》强调,“经济和军事等物质权力的增长,要避免不信任加深、错误计算以及基于零和博弈的行为模式。”“东盟的利益在于,领导塑造该地区的经济与安全架构,确保该地区的活力为东南亚以及更广泛的亚太和印度洋地区或者印太地区带来和平、安全、稳定与繁荣。” 日本的印太构想同样强调地区和平稳定的重要。作为岛国,日本资源、能源十分贫乏,对外依赖度高,迫切需要海上交通线的顺畅与安全,遂将提高海上执法能力等举措作为其印太战略的三大支柱之一,强调将国际合作作为印太战略的基本原则之一。印度的印太构想首先也源于其面临的国家安全环境变化和日益增长的国家安全需求。对于区内国家来说,出于寻求一个稳定的安全环境的基本需要,更多强调对话合作而非冲突对抗。东盟在其《印太展望》中指出,其看待印太地区的关键因素之一就是将印太地区看作对话合作的地区而非对抗的地区。

The construction of a regional security order should properly handle the relationships between large countries and small countries, strong countries and weak countries, and give priority to the security interests of weak and small countries in the region. Strong and large countries naturally have more means and resources to use to achieve national security than weak and small countries. Weak and small countries are naturally more anxious about national security than strong and large ones, and they are also more interested in the construction of a reasonable regional security order. For weak and small countries, it is difficult to have a real regional strategy. They have to seek a balance among powerful countries in order to ensure their own sovereign independence and seek to maximize the attainment of their economic and political interests. Facing an Indo-Pacific regional environment with strategic competition between China and the United States, the weak and small countries in the region do not actually want to see the intensification of competition and confrontation between the great powers of China and the United States as this would gradually diminish their room for maneuverer in pursuing a between the great powers, leaving them no choice can but to reluctantly pursue a hedging strategy. The weak and small countries in the region want to see that economic development and connectivity infrastructure construction in the Indo-Pacific region benefit themselves, but they are not willing to choose sides between China and the United States because they cannot afford the cost of confrontation with any great power. They prefer to de-securitize regional construction and development issues and see cooperation and dialogue between major powers so as to form a multilateral consensus around the path and mechanisms of regional construction and development. In addition, weak and small countries are more attentive to the challenges posed by some non-traditional security affairs to national security. For example, Sri Lanka, ASEAN island nations, and other coastal and island nations pay more attention to counter-terrorism and maritime security issues that threaten national security, such as piracy and armed smuggling at sea, illegal exploitation and utilization of marine resources, climate change and sea level rise, severe weather, and natural disasters, and urgently require the adoption of a collective and cooperative response. 37 In short, small and weak countries in the region are more concerned about the peace, stability, and development facilitation brought about by the regional security order and coping with specific security threats and challenges. A fair and reasonable regional security order must consider the security and development demands of small and weak countries in the region.

地区安全秩序构建应处理好大国与小国、强国与弱国的关系,优先考虑地区内弱小国家的安全利益。强国比弱国、大国比小国必然拥有也会投入更多实现国家安全的手段和资源,弱国比强国、小国比大国必然更担忧国家安全,也更为关注合理的地区安全秩序构建。对于弱小国家而言,很难有真正的地区战略,不得不在强国中寻求平衡,从而确保自身的主权独立,尽可能谋取自身最大的经济政治利益。面临中美战略竞争的印太地区大环境,地区弱小国家实际上并不希望看到中美大国竞争对抗性加剧,令它们逐渐丧失追求大国平衡的空间,只能勉为其难地追求对冲战略。地区弱小国家希望看到印太地区经济发展和联通性基础设施建设惠及自身,但并不愿意在中美之间选边站,因为难以承受与任何一个大国交恶对抗的成本。它们更希望地区建设和发展议题去安全化,看到大国之间的合作对话,就地区建设和发展路径、机制形成多边共识。此外,弱国小国更加关注一些非传统安全事务对国家安全的挑战,如斯里兰卡、东盟海岛国家等濒海国家、岛屿国家更关注反恐问题、海上安全问题,包括海盗和海上武装走私、海洋资源非法开采利用、气候变化与海平面上升、恶劣天气与自然灾难等对国家安全的威胁,迫切要求采取集体和合作性的应对路径。总之,地区小国弱国更关心地区安全秩序带来的和平稳定与发展便利,应对具体的安全威胁和挑战。公正合理的地区安全秩序必然要顾及地区小国弱国的安全与发展诉求。

It must be noted that, unlike the Trump administration in the United States, which placed too much emphasis on weaving a network of security relations through the presence of military forces and strengthening strategic confrontation with China, most of the propositions on the Indo-Pacific order put forward by other countries around the world, including European countries, are inclusive in nature, and more non-U.S. forces inside and outside the region advocate maintaining or increasing cooperative relations with China. ASEAN places special emphasis on the inclusiveness of the Indo-Pacific order. From early on, Indonesia has explicitly supported the term “inclusive Indo-Pacific”. India has gradually made it clear that the Indo-Pacific region needs to emphasize inclusiveness. Japan’s position has also shifted from a “free and open Indo-Pacific” to a “free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.”

需要指出的是,与美国特朗普政府过于偏重通过军事力量存在、强化对华战略对抗来编织安全关系网络不同,包括欧洲国家在内的世界各国提出的印太秩序主张本质上大多是包容性的,域内外非美力量更多主张维持或加大与中国的合作关系。东盟尤其强调印太秩序的包容性。印尼早就明确支持“包容的印太”这一说法。印度逐渐明确印太地区需要强调包容性。日本立场也从“自由开放的印太”转向“自由开放包容的印太”。

(ii) A sustainable process for promoting regional development
(二) 促进地区发展的可持续进程

“Regionness” implies material ties from close economic exchanges within the region as well as the mutual recognition that the various countries are committed to promoting regional development. Looking at the Indo-Pacific strategies of various parties, whether or not they can seize the opportunities presented by the economic rise and significant development of the Indo-Pacific region and achieve or maintain their own economic prosperity, this is indeed one of the most basic goals pursued by all countries and one of the driving forces behind the construction of the Indo-Pacific order. Some scholars have pointed out that, for East Asian countries, security intrinsically has deep-rooted economic attributes. “Development is the essence of security” (安全以发展为要义) is the conception that serves as the backdrop for the practice of East Asian regionalism. An important background for the construction of the Indo-Pacific order is the rapid development and economic integration of East Asia in the past 30 years. In this process, unique models of practice for developing regionalism, represented by the ASEAN Plus Three cooperation mechanism, have been formed. The rise of China’s economy and the promotion of international cooperation in the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” further illustrate that China is playing an increasingly important role in the process of developing regionalism. The construction of the Indo-Pacific region with East Asia as its core region cannot be separated from the practical background of the development of regionalism in East Asia and the influence of China. 38 In fact, Democratic Party governments in the United States have long accepted the proposition that development issues are security issues. The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance states that global development is the best means to express and embody American values while pursuing U.S. national security interests. 39

“地区性”内含地区内密切经济往来的物质联系,以及各国致力于促进地区发展的相同认知。对各方印太战略而言,能否抓住印太地区经济崛起和大发展的机遇,实现或维系自身的经济繁荣,确实是各国追求的最基本目标之一,也是印太秩序构建的原动力之一。有学者指出,对于东亚国家来说,安全在本体上具有根深蒂固的经济属性,“安全以发展为要义”是东亚地区主义实践的背景知识,印太秩序构建的一个重要背景就是东亚地区近30年的快速发展和经济一体化,在这一过程中,以东盟和中日韩合作机制为代表形成了独具特色的发展地区主义实践模式。中国经济的崛起和共建“一带一路”国际合作的推进,更说明中国在发展地区主义进程中发挥着越来越重要的作用,以东亚为核心区域的印太地区构建无法脱离东亚发展地区主义的实践背景和中国影响。事实上,美国民主党政府也早已接受发展问题即安全问题的主张。拜登政府《临时国家安全战略指南》指出,全球发展是表达和体现美国价值观同时又追求美国国家安全利益的最好手段。

In recent years, countries around the world have been hotly discussing the issue of infrastructure construction in the Indo-Pacific region. This shows that one of the key driving factors that has made the Indo-Pacific geospace a region of international attention is its huge demand for connectivity construction and the investment prospects and opportunities for economic profits this brings. Looking only at the growth of Chinese and U.S. foreign direct investment (stock) in 2019, the total annual growth of U.S. investments was U.S. $158.567 billion, of which growth in the Asia-Pacific region accounted for U.S. $67.23 billion, or 42% of total growth. The total annual growth of Chinese investments was U.S. $216.615 billion, of which the growth in the Asia-Pacific region was U.S. $183.589 billion, accounting for 85% of total growth. In the economic cooperation between China and the United States and the Indo-Pacific countries, infrastructure construction such as transportation accounts for a considerable proportion. Judging from the turnover data of China’s foreign contracted projects in 2019, China’s turnover in India, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Australia was 2.54 billion, 8.7 billion, 3.55 billion, 2.87 billion, 3.94 billion, and 3.92 billion USD respectively. Among U.S. investments in the Asia-Pacific region in 2019, investment in manufacturing industries such as computers and electronic products, transportation equipment, and electrical equipment components alone reached U.S. $83.576 billion. 40 Infrastructure construction also has a necessary and important significance. The construction of regionness must be based on the establishment of infrastructure that facilitates communication and exchanges within the region. This is also the basic requirement for the region to maintain a sustainable development process. In fact, from the first, the emergence of the concept of “Indo-Pacific” reflected the idea of economic connectivity between the two oceans. Economic connectivity also has important significance for the geopolitico-economic space of the Indo-Pacific. The Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are important transportation routes for the global transport of commodities and raw materials. About two-thirds of global oil transportation and one-third of cargo transportation pass through trade routes in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The Indo-Pacific region has clearly become a hub connecting East Asian production centers with key energy sources along the Indian Ocean coast. 41

近年世界各国热议印太地区基础设施建设问题,说明印太地缘空间成为国际关注焦点地区的一个关键驱动因素,是其巨大的联通性建设需求及由此带来的投资前景和经济获利机会。仅以2019年中美对外直接投资(存量)增长来看,美国年度总投资增长量1585.67亿美元,其中亚太地区增长672.3亿美元,亚太地区增长量占总增长比重为42%。中国年度投资总增长量2166.15亿美元,其中亚太地区增长量达1835.89亿美元,占总增长比重高达85%。在中美与印太各国的经济合作中,运输等基础设施建设均占相当比重。从中国2019年对外承包工程完成营业额数据来看,中国在印度、印尼、新加坡、泰国、越南、澳大利亚分别完成营业额25.4亿、87亿、35.5亿、28.7亿、39.4亿、39.2亿美元。美国2019年在亚太地区投资中,仅计算机和电子产品、运输设备、电器设备部件等制造业投资就达到835.76亿美元。基础设施建设也确有其必要和重要意义。地区性的构建必然以在地区内建立便利联系交流的基础设施为基础,这也是该地区维持可持续发展进程的基本要求。事实上,“印太”概念的出现从一开始就体现出两洋经济联通的思想,经济联通也即构成印太地缘政治经济空间的重要内涵。印度洋和太平洋是商品和原材料全球运输的重要交通线路,世界上约三分之二的石油运输、三分之一的货物运输要通过印度洋和太平洋的贸易航线,印太海上区域显然已成为东亚生产中心与印度洋沿岸关键能源的连接枢纽。

It is precisely based on the growing contradiction between the current level of connectivity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region and its massive connectivity status and demand in the world economy that the issue of connectivity infrastructure construction has been quickly put on the agenda of Indo-Pacific countries since the beginning of the 21st century. Transportation infrastructure remains the focus of cooperation among all parties, and transportation infrastructure projects represented by modern railway networks, highway networks, automated ports, and airports are key areas receiving support and attention from all parties. In October 2010, ASEAN announced its Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, which proposed an ASEAN connectivity plan including infrastructure. In September and October 2013, China proposed the “Belt and Road” initiative, a significantly more ambitious interconnected infrastructure project focused on the Indo-Pacific region. China has also proposed the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is committed to promoting infrastructure construction and connectivity in Asia. Around 2012, several senior officials of the U.S. State Department, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, also proposed the idea of building an “Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor,” hoping to establish a South Asia-Southeast Asia economic connectivity network with India at the core. In 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama and the Indian government jointly issued the Joint Strategic Vision, emphasizing the importance of political and infrastructure connectivity: “To support regional economic integration, we will promote accelerated infrastructure connectivity and economic development in a manner that links South, Southeast and Central Asia.” 42 The U.S. National Security Strategy document released in December 2017 repeatedly emphasized the importance of infrastructure, mentioning infrastructure in 42 places. The document states that, in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States encourages regional cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes to maintain free and open waterways, transparent infrastructure financing activities, and unhindered trade. It emphasizes cooperation with allies on high-quality infrastructure construction. 43 In 2019, the U.S. State Department published the document A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which mentions infrastructure in 37 places. 44 At the end of July 2018, the United States also established a trilateral partnership framework with Australia and Japan to jointly build an investment framework for infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region and jointly mobilize investment in infrastructure. 45

正是基于印太地区联通性基础设施现有水平与其在世界经济上巨大的联通性地位和需求之间越来越大的矛盾,联通性基础设施建设问题自21世纪初迅即被提上印太各国的日程。交通基础设施目前仍然是各方合作的重点,以现代化铁路网、高速公路网、自动化港口和机场为代表的交通类基础设施项目是各方支持和关注的重点领域。2010年10月,东盟公布了《东盟互联互通总体规划》,提出了包括基础设施在内的东盟互联互通规划。2013年9月和10月,中国提出“一带一路”倡议,这是一项以印太地区为主、但显然更为宏大的联通性基础设施建设工程。中国还倡议成立了亚洲基础设施投资银行,致力于推动亚洲地区基础设施建设和互联互通。2012年前后,包括时任国务卿希拉里在内的美国国务院多名高官也提出建设“印太经济走廊”的构想,希望建立以印度为核心的南亚—东南亚经济联通网络。2015年美国总统奥巴马与印度政府联合发表《联合战略愿景》,强调政治和基础设施联通的重要性:“为了支持地区经济一体化,我们会通过连接南亚、东南亚和中亚的方式,加速基础设施联通性,促进经济发展。” 2017年12月出台的美国国家安全战略文件反复强调基础设施的重要性,其中42处提到了基础设施。文件指出,在印太地区,美国鼓励地区合作,和平解决争端,以维持自由和开放的水路、透明基础设施融资活动、不受阻碍的贸易,强调要与盟友一起在高质量基础设施建设方面进行合作。2019年美国国务院发表《一个自由和开放的印太》文件,又有37处提到基础设施。2018年7月底,美国还与澳大利亚、日本建立了一个三边伙伴关系框架,共建印太地区基础设施发展投资框架,共同动员投资基础设施。

Connectivity construction and infrastructure construction in the Indo-Pacific region have also attracted the attention of major international organizations. The 2014 G20 Summit in Brisbane specifically supported public and private investment in global infrastructure through the Global Infrastructure Initiative and established the Global Infrastructure Hub in Sydney. Since then, the issue of infrastructure construction and investment quality has received sustained attention from international organizations such as the G20, G7, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and East Asia Summit. The G7 Ise-Shima Summit held in Japan in May 2016 also proposed five principles for promoting high-quality infrastructure investment, including effective management, promotion of local employment and capacity building, addressing social and environmental consequences, coordinating economic and development strategies, and improving the efficiency of resource use. 46 In September of the same year, the communique of the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China further emphasized that investment in high-quality infrastructure is based on a combination of lifecycle costs, safety, resilience to natural disasters, job creation, capacity building, and the transfer of knowledge and expertise on mutually agreed terms so as to ensure economic efficiency while addressing the social and environmental impacts of projects and aligning them with economic and development strategies. 47 On September 6, 2016, ASEAN adopted a new version of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 document in Vientiane, Laos, focusing on five strategic areas including sustainable infrastructure construction, digital innovation, logistics, import and export management, and human mobility. The plan states that, for sustainable infrastructure construction, ASEAN needs at least U.S. $110 billion in infrastructure investment annually to support future growth.

印太地区的联通性建设、基础设施建设问题也受到各大国际组织关注。2014年布里斯班G20峰会专门通过全球基础设施倡议,支持对全球基础设施的公私投资,并在悉尼成立全球基础设施中心。此后,基础设施建设及其投资质量问题受到G20、G7、亚太经合组织、东亚峰会等国际组织的持续关注。2016年5月在日本召开的G7伊势志摩峰会还提出了促进高质量基础设施投资的五项原则,包括有效管理、促进当地就业和能力建设、处理社会和环境后果、与经济和发展战略相协调、提升资源运用效率。同年9月,中国杭州G20峰会公报进一步强调,高质量基础设施投资要在综合考虑生命周期成本、安全性、抗自然灾害的韧性、创造就业机会、能力建设,以及在根据共同同意的条件转移知识和专业技能的基础上,确保经济效率,同时处理好项目的社会和环境影响,并与经济和发展战略相一致。2016年9月6日,东盟在老挝万象通过了新版《东盟互联互通总体规划2025》文件,主要关注可持续基础设施建设、数字创新、物流、进出口管理和人员流动等五个战略领域。规划指出,在可持续基础设施建设方面,东盟每年至少需要1100亿美元的基础设施投资以支持未来增长。

(iii) Constantly looking for “regionness” beliefs
(三) 不断寻找“地区性”信念

The concept of region in international politics constitutes a kind of social existence in international politics. Its formation and establishment depend on the intertwined common beliefs held by international actors. The construction of a regional order is a negotiation process in which a regional community of practice forms shared beliefs, concepts, and norms through practices based on shared background knowledge. This is embodied in a process of constantly seeking and constructing “regionness.” Just as the regional concepts of “Europe,” “the Americas,” “Africa,” “East Asia,” and “Asia-Pacific,” all contain certain characteristic regional beliefs, regional cultures, and regional governance mechanisms, “Indo-Pacific,” as a regional construction, must not be an exception if it is to have long-term prospects. As a new structure, “Indo-Pacific” may not have manifested such things in an obvious way, but the existence of this new structure must have a material basis on which it is built. 48Otherwise, it will be difficult for this new structure to stand the test posed by time and space. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept reflects the increasingly close and inseparable economic and political ties between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean regions, and the increasingly close economic and political connection between the South Asia-Indian Ocean region and East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific region. Geographically, it connects the two strategic regions of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and constitutes a strategic channel with great geostrategic value. It can be said that it is the deepening economic and political relationships between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean that constitute the cognitive basis and material foundation for the creation of the Indo-Pacific concept.

国际政治中的地区概念,即构成国际政治中的一种社会存在,其形成和确立依赖于国际行为体持有的相互交错的某种共有信念。地区秩序构建是地区实践共同体基于共同背景知识通过实践形成共有信念、观念和规范的协商过程,体现为一个不断寻找构建“地区性”的进程。恰如“欧洲”、“美洲”、“非洲”、“东亚”、“亚太”这些地区概念的背后都内含某种特点的地区信念、地区文化、地区治理机制一样,“印太”作为一种地区构造物就其远景来说自然也不应例外。作为一个新构物,“印太”可能没有很明显的表现形态,但新构物之所以存在,必然有其赖以构建的物质基础,否则,这一新构物就很难经得起时空的检验。印太概念的出现反映了印度洋和太平洋地区越来越紧密、不可分割的经济政治联系,反映了南亚—印度洋地区在经济政治上日益与东亚、东南亚和西太平洋地区紧密联通的状态,它从地缘上把印度洋和太平洋两大战略区域连接起来,构成了一个具有重大地缘战略价值的战略通道。可以说,正是印度洋和太平洋之间日益加深的经济政治关系,构成了印太概念赖以生成的认识依据和物质基础。

However, now that the “Indo-Pacific” region has been recognized in international politics, in addition to signifying huge opportunities for economic benefits, more attention should be paid to the regional culture, mechanisms, and order associated with this emerging “region.” The shaping of the “Indo-Pacific region” and the construction of a regional security order must conform to the basic attributes and historical logic connoted by the “regional” order. Taking a long-term view, this includes a set of security mechanisms and security culture dedicated to regional dispute settlement and regional integrity construction, a set of security concepts conducive to regional development and security cooperation, and a set of security governance mechanisms that help resolve regional issues. In fact, the tributary system that China once created in East Asia and its long-term peaceful exchanges with neighboring peoples, the long-standing cultural exchanges between China and South Asia and China and India along with the joint advocacy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by China, India, Myanmar, and other countries, and the series of cooperation mechanisms and frameworks among developing countries in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region all constitute the historical accumulation and practical basis for the construction of the Indo-Pacific order. Major border incidents such as the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley conflict in June 2020 almost led to conflict between China and India. However, China and India finally relieved the situation through bilateral political negotiations, commander-level talks, and other mechanisms, and the consensus reached by the leaders of the two sides to resolve the border issue peacefully once again withstood a test. To a certain extent, this illustrated the concept of peaceful negotiation and the historical and endogenous nature of the culture of peaceful coexistence among countries in the Indo-Pacific region. It also demonstrates the necessity of constructing a certain Indo-Pacific security order based on this security culture.

不过,“印太”地区既然得到国际政治认可,就不仅仅意味着巨大的经济利益机会,与这一新兴“地区”相联系的某种地区性文化、机制与秩序也理应受到更大关注。“印太地区”的形塑及其地区安全秩序构建,必然需要符合“地区”秩序内涵的基本属性和历史逻辑。从长远来看,包括致力于地区争端解决和地区整体性建设的一整套安全机制与安全文化、有利于地区发展与安全合作的一整套安全理念、有助于地区性问题解决的一整套安全治理机制。事实上,中国在东亚地区曾经缔造的朝贡体系及其与周边民族的长期和平交往,中国和南亚、中印之间悠久的文化往来以及中印缅等国对和平共处五项原则的共同倡导,印度洋与太平洋地区发展中国家间的系列合作机制框架,都是印太秩序构建的历史积淀与现实基础。2017年洞朗对峙事件、2020年6月加勒万河谷冲突等重大边界事件,险些导致中印双方冲突,但中印双方终究通过双边政治谈判、军长级会谈等机制实现了缓解,双方领导人达成的和平解决边界问题的共识再次经受住了考验。这在一定程度上说明了印太地区各国的和平协商理念、和平共处文化的历史性、内生性,也说明基于此种安全文化构建某种印太安全秩序的必要性。

(iv) Possessing a sort of universal significance
(四) 具有某种普遍性意义

As “region” is a unit level in international politics, its security order construction must conform to a certain trend in international politics and possess certain “normative” connotations. The most important situation facing the construction of a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific today is the management of the competition between the great powers of China and the United States. In the context of the basic situation of great power competition and even confrontation, how to examine and deal with the relationship between the two major regional propositions, namely, security and development, is a historic problem. Obviously, the question is not whether to give priority to security or development because the mandatory option of countries is to prioritize security. Without security, we cannot talk about development, so the development agenda is built upon the assurance of security. Therefore, the real question is, given the premise of prioritizing security, how should countries balance security and development?

“地区”作为国际政治的一种单元层次,其安全秩序构建必须符合国际政治的某种趋势,具备一定的“应然”意涵。当今印太地区安全秩序构建面临的最主要情势就是管理中美大国竞争。在大国竞争甚至对抗的基本情势下,如何审视处理地区两大元命题即安全与发展之间的关系,是一个历史性难题。显然,问题不是安全优先还是发展优先,因为安全优先是国家面临的强制性选项,没有安全何谈发展,而发展议程又建基于安全保障之上。因此真正的问题是,在安全优先的前提下,如何兼顾安全与发展间的平衡?

Further complicating the issue, the establishment of a security order in the Indo-Pacific region involves many countries outside the region. There are naturally differences between the concerns of countries in the region and countries outside the region. Generally speaking, the first thing countries outside the region see is the economic and political rise of the Indo-Pacific region and how this presents opportunities or harm to their own interests. Their primary concern is the positive or negative effect on their own interests, and their policy operations are inherently self-interested and quite speculative. For countries in the region, the regional security order is a basic and necessary public good. It is a combination of self-interest and altruism, with more emphasis on cooperation, common advantage, and mutual benefit. However, whether in terms of power structure or interest structure, the construction of a regional security order for the Indo-Pacific cannot completely exclude the views and demands of countries outside the region. The Indo-Pacific region maintains extreme openness in terms of both geopolitical reality and historical characteristics. 49 Of course, for the countries in the region, guiding the countries from outside the region to exert influence in a way that conforms to the consensus of the countries in the region is particularly important. This, in turn, depends on the formation of unity and consensus in terms of demands by countries in the region. The establishment of a security order in the Indo-Pacific region is in fact the act of solving the problem of the relationship between regional security and development through an open international approach.

令问题更加复杂的是,印太地区安全秩序构建涉及众多域外国家。域内国家和区外国家的关注点天然存在差异性。一般来说,域外国家首先看到的是印太地区的经济政治崛起及其对自身利益带来的机会和损害,优先关注的是其自身利益得失问题,其政策操作带有天然的自利性和相当的投机性。而对于地区内国家来说,地区安全秩序是一种基本必需的公共产品,是自利性和利他性的统一,更强调合作性、共利性、多赢性。但无论是从权力格局还是从利益格局来看,印太地区安全秩序的构建不可能完全排除域外国家的观点和诉求,印太地区无论是从地缘政治现实还是从历史特性着眼都维持着极大的开放性。当然对于区内国家来说,如何引导域外国家以符合地区国家共识的方式发挥影响显得尤其重要,而这又有赖于地区国家在诉求方面形成团结与共识。印太地区安全秩序构建,实际上是要通过一种开放性国际路径来解决一种地区性安全与发展关系的难题。

V. China’s Vision for the Indo-Pacific Regional Order

五、中国的印太地区秩序愿景

Chinese officials are skeptical of the “Indo-Pacific” concept and do not advocate or even oppose the use of the Indo-Pacific concept. This reflects China’s political prudence in handling foreign and security affairs. However, this does not mean that China does not participate in the construction of the regional security order. China already participates in and influences the political, economic, and security order development of the Indo-Pacific region by actively creating regional security “relationship networks” and promoting the construction of the “Belt and Road” and “Community with a Shared Future.”

中国官方对“印太”概念持怀疑态度,不主张甚至反对使用印太概念,这反映了中国处理外交和安全事务的政治审慎,但这并不意味着中国不参与地区安全秩序的构建。中国通过积极营造地区安全“关系网”,推动“一带一路”与“命运共同体”建设,已然参与和影响印太地区的政治、经济与安全秩序发展。

(i) Make great efforts to build an inclusive and cooperative regional security “relationship network”
(一) 努力营造包容合作的地区安全“关系网”

There are two very different security views in the Indo-Pacific region. One emphasizes power politics, such as hegemonic security and alliance security, which is essentially a self-interested and exclusive security order. The other emphasizes cooperative development, such as cooperative security and development security, and pursues an open security order. The regional security view that China upholds obviously belongs to the latter. As a regional economic power, China craves regional security. This determines that China can only pursue the latter’s essential attributes. To a large extent, the two aforementioned security views also reflect the different sociocultural conceptual structures of the international community. Alexander Wendt defined three international social structures with different cultural ideas, namely the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of anarchy. 50 The Hobbesian culture is a culture that emphasizes struggle and confrontation, the Lockean culture implies the pursuit of a certain cooperative social relationship, and the Kantian culture hopes to achieve a permanent peace, a peaceful alliance that ends all wars. 51 In fact, because the East Asian region has inherited a cultural tradition of harmony guided by Chinese culture, it has formed a harmonious culture that emphasizes cooperation rather than confrontation. This is a shared cultural structure located between the Lockean and Kantian cultures. “In Chinese culture, the practical activities of farming society are the life foundation of this cultural body. As a result, more emphasis is placed on groups, more emphasis is placed on the relationships between group members, and more emphasis is placed on harmony between people and between people and nature, so that relationships becomes the core concept.” 52The core content of the ASEAN approach is also consensus, emphasis on national comfort, and non-interference in internal affairs. 53 Qin Yaqing pointed out that “‘Comfort’ is a unique norm for cooperation in East Asia. It serves as a key glue throughout the entire process of cooperation, preventing a relationship breakdown between the participating parties. Even in the most difficult times of cooperation, at the minimum, it allows the relationship to be maintained so that the cooperation process can continue into the future.” 54

印太地区存在两种迥异的安全观,一种强调权力政治,如霸权安全、结盟安全,本质上是一种自利性、排他性的安全秩序,另一种强调合作发展,如合作安全、发展安全,追求的是一种开放性的安全秩序。中国秉持的地区安全观显然属于后者。中国作为地区经济大国对地区安全的渴求,注定了中国只能追求后者的本质属性。在很大程度上,以上两种安全观也反映了国际社会的不同社会文化观念结构。温特界定了三种具有不同文化理念的国际社会结构,即霍布斯式、洛克式和康德式三种无政府文化。霍布斯式文化是一种强调斗争对抗的文化,洛克式文化蕴含着对某种合作性社会关系的追求,康德式文化希望实现的是一种永久和平,是结束一切战争的和平联盟。实际上,东亚地区因袭中华文化主导的和合文化传统,形成了一种强调合作而非对抗的和合性文化,这是一种介于洛克式文化和康德式文化之间的共有文化结构。“在中华文化中,农耕社会的实践活动是这一文化体的生命基础,所以更强调群体,更强调群体成员之间的关系,更强调人与人、人与自然之间的和谐,关系便成为核心概念。” 东盟方式的核心内容也是协商一致、重视国家舒适度、不干涉内政。秦亚青指出,“‘舒适度’是东亚地区合作的独特规范,在整个合作过程中,作为一种关键的黏合剂,防止参与各方发生关系破裂的情景,即便在合作最困难的时期,也可以使各方关系得以最低程度的维持,使合作进程能够持续以待未来发展。”

In the regional security order, as represented by China, this sort of sociocultural structure that values harmony naturally leads to a cooperative security view, which opposes hegemony and the willful use of force in confrontation, opposes realist power security, group-based security, and geopolitical confrontation, and even opposes polarization. It supports collaboration and coordination among major powers, emphasizing mutual respect, mutual trust, equal treatment, and mutual benefit among countries. At the practical level, China has always shown an inclusive attitude, and does not oppose but instead welcomes foreign countries to participate in the construction of the regional security order. Moreover, in line with the position of seeking common ground while shelving differences, and enhancing trust, and dispelling doubts, China is committed to resolving confrontational intentions with an inclusive attitude, so as to achieve the goals of harmonious efforts and common development.

在地区安全秩序上,以中国为代表,这种重视和合的社会文化结构自然导致一种合作型安全观,反对霸权和动辄使用武力对抗,反对现实主义的权势安全、集团化的阵营安全和地缘政治对抗,更反对两极化,支持大国协,调,强调国家之间相互尊重、相互信任、平等相待、互利共赢。在具体实践层面,中国始终表现出包容性的态度,不反对甚至欢迎域外国家参与地区安全秩序构建,而且本着求同存异、增信释疑的立场,致力于以包容性态度化解对抗性意图,达到和衷共济、共同发展的目的。

Adhering to the basic concept of harmonious cooperation, China is committed to building various “relationship networks” with rich significance with many countries from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has successively proposed friendly neighbor relations with surrounding countries based on “good neighborliness, security, and prosperity”; a “new type of major-country relationship” of “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation” and “Community of Common Destiny” relationship (Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar); “a comprehensive partnership that keeps pace with the times” (Singapore); “a closer development partnership” (India); “a comprehensive partnership of good-neighborliness, mutual trust, and mutual benefit” (Timor-Leste); a “sincere mutual aid and friendship from generation to generation strategic partnership” (Sri Lanka); “strategic partnership for peace and development and friendship from generation to generation” (Nepal); a partnership for “common development, commitment to regional peace, joint revitalization of Asia, and promotion of world prosperity” (Korea); as well as comprehensive strategic partnerships with Vietnam and Thailand, comprehensive strategic partnerships with Malaysia and Indonesia, and strategic partnerships with Bangladesh and Brunei. China co-founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and actively participated in regional security organizations such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the CICA, the Asian Cooperation Dialogue, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, constructing an operation mode of security relations with bilateral strategic partnerships as the mainstay, supplemented by multilateral mechanisms, and with unique Chinese cultural characteristics. As the central country in East Asia, China maintains peripheral security, promotes regional peace, actively advocates regional security cooperation and peaceful development, and is committed to repairing the nearly broken great power relationship between China and the United States. All of this demonstrates China’s unremitting efforts to build a regional security order.

秉持和谐合作的基本理念,中国致力于与从太平洋到印度洋的广大国家建立具有生动内涵的各种“关系网”。21世纪初以来,中国相继提出“睦邻、安邻、富邻”的周边友邻关系,“不冲突、不对抗、相互尊重、合作共赢”的“新型大国关系”,“命运共同体”关系(老挝、柬埔寨、缅甸),“与时俱进的全方位合作伙伴关系”(新加坡),“更加紧密的发展伙伴关系”(印度),“睦邻友好、互信互利的全面合作伙伴关系”(东帝汶),“真诚互助、世代友好的战略合作伙伴关系”(斯里兰卡),“面向和平与发展的世代友好的战略合作伙伴关系”(尼泊尔),“实现共同发展、致力地区和平、携手振兴亚洲、促进世界繁荣”的伙伴关系(韩国),以及与越南、泰国的全面战略合作伙伴关系,与马来西亚、印尼的全面战略伙伴关系,与孟加拉国和文莱的战略合作伙伴关系等等。中国共同创建上海合作组织,积极参与东亚峰会、东盟地区论坛、亚信会议、亚洲合作对话、环印度洋联盟、南亚区域合作联盟等地区安全组织,构成了以双边战略伙伴关系为主、以多边机制为辅、独具中国文化特色的安全关系运作模式。中国作为东亚中心国家维护周边安全,促进地区和平,积极倡导地区安全合作与和平发展,致力于修复几近破裂的中美大国关系,都说明中国为地区安全秩序构建所做出的不懈努力。

(ii) Strive to build a community with a shared future that is conducive to sustainable regional development
(二) 致力于构建有利于地区可持续发展的命运共同体

China believes that common development is the fundamental way to resolve regional security issues. The 2017 Chinese government white paper pointed out that expanding the integration of economic interests is an important foundation for relations between countries, and achieving common development is the fundamental assurance for maintaining peace and stability. It is the “master key” for solving various security issues. 55 The current political and security order in the Indo-Pacific region is in the process of repeated confrontations of various political positions and views. The United States’ promotion of strategic competition with China has led to intensified disputes over the regional security order in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has seriously damaged the economic development of various countries. The methods by which to restore economic growth as soon as possible, relieve difficulties, resolve confrontation, and seek to strengthen multilateral cooperation have become the priorities of governments and people in the region, including China.

中国认为,共同发展是解决地区安全问题的根本路径。2017年中国政府白皮书指出,扩大经济利益融合是国家间关系的重要基础,实现共同发展是维护和平稳定的根本保障,是解决各类安全问题的“总钥匙”。当前印太地区的政治与安全秩序处于各种政治立场观点反复较量交锋的过程中。美国推动对华战略竞争导致印太地区安全秩序纷争加剧,加之新冠肺炎疫情,严重损害了各国的经济发展。如何尽快恢复经济增长,纾困解难、化解对抗,寻求加强多边主义合作,已成为包括中国在内的地区各国政府和民众关注的优先事项。

Chinese leaders have openly advocated “to create a security pattern that is fair and just, with joint construction and sharing,” “to promote the simultaneous advance of international cooperation in the economic and social fields, coordinate responses to traditional and non-traditional security threats, and prevent the scourge of war before it occurs.” 56 An important historical lesson of China’s economic development and rise is to strive to create a stable domestic social and political environment as well as a favorable surrounding and international environment. At the same time, economic and social development feeds back to promote domestic security and peripheral security. China insists on resolving domestic social conflicts through development. In dealing with some peripheral sovereignty disputes, such as the Diaoyu Islands issue and the South China Sea dispute, China also adheres to the policy of shelving disputes and pursuing joint development. The preference for development in China’s domestic and foreign policies has become the basic path and method for China to participate in world affairs and to build and promote peripheral security, regional security, and international security.

中国领导人公开倡导,“要营造公道正义、共建共享的安全格局”,“要推动经济和社会领域的国际合作齐头并进,统筹应对传统和非传统安全威胁,防战争祸患于未然。” 中国经济发展和崛起的一条重要历史经验,就是努力营造稳定的国内社会政治环境以及良好的周边和国际环境。同时,经济社会发展又反哺促进国内安全和周边安全。中国坚持通过发展去解决处理国内社会矛盾,在处理周边一些主权争端议题上,如钓鱼岛问题、南海争端,中国也秉持搁置争议、共同开发的方针。中国内外政策上对发展的偏爱,成为中国参与世界事务,构建和推进周边安全、地区安全、国际安全的基本路径与方式。

China is committed to combining this development security view with regional security governance and jointly exploring a regional order with the goal of good governance. Whether in terms of influence or strength, China, as the primary representative of emerging economies in the Indo-Pacific region, has always been a model for implementing the cooperative development security view. China advocates that, under the framework of comprehensive cooperation and through open cooperation, collaborative development, and comprehensive policy implementation, we should explore the construction of regional or sub-regional mechanisms with unique characteristics and jointly find effective models and methods of good governance. At first, the “Belt and Road” initiated by China, the AIIB, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, and the China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum give the idea of mechanism construction in an economic sense, but their more far-reaching significance lies in their use of investment in infrastructure construction and economic development in developing Asian countries to improve the level of local development, resolve regional economic and security dilemmas, improve the level of regional governance, and promote the formation of a benign political and security order that can ensure long-term stability in the region. For example, under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework, the six countries of China, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam have carried out a series of project cooperations to vigorously promote the economic and social development of Lancang-Mekong countries and accelerate interconnection. At the same time, they have strengthened cooperation in non-traditional security affairs such as disaster management, infectious disease prevention and control, combating illegal drug trafficking, terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking, smuggling, and trafficking of firearms and ammunition, and border security management. China is committed to transforming the fruits of economic development into security outcomes shared with neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. 57 Driven by China’s “Belt and Road” and other development projects, countries in the region have successively issued their own economic development strategies, such as Pakistan’s New Pakistan, Laos’ Land-locked to Land-linked, and the Philippines’ Build! Build! Build!, promoting the overall development of the region. China is committed to implementing development strategy alignment and complementarity of advantages with countries along the route, transforming advantages such as mutual political trust, geographical proximity, and economic complementarity into practical cooperation and continuously increasing advantages. China emphasizes that the “Belt and Road” will first build a road to peace and then a road to prosperity. 58 This fully reflects the desire and path of promoting security cooperation and mutual political trust through development cooperation.

中国致力于将发展安全观与地区安全治理结合在一起,共同探讨以善治为目标的地区秩序。无论是在影响力还是在实力方面,中国作为印太区域新兴经济体的首要代表,一直是力行合作发展安全观的典范。中国主张在全面合作的框架下通过开放合作、协作发展、综合施策,探索构建各具特色的区域或次区域机制,共同寻找有效的良治善治模式和方式。中国倡导成立的“一带一路”、亚投行、中国—中南半岛经济走廊、孟中印缅经济走廊、澜湄合作、中国—太平洋岛国经济发展合作论坛等等,首先呈现出来的是一种经济意义上的机制构建,但更深远的意义还在于通过对亚洲发展中国家的基础设施建设和经济发展投资,改善当地发展水平,化解地区经济与安全困境,提升地区治理水平,推动形成一种良性的、可使地区长治久安的政治与安全秩序。例如,在澜湄合作框架下,中国和老挝、柬埔寨、缅甸、泰国、越南等东南亚六国开展系列项目合作,大力促进澜湄各国经济社会发展,加快互联互通,同时加强灾害管理、传染病防控、打击非法贩毒、恐怖主义、网络犯罪、贩卖人口、走私贩运枪支弹药等非传统安全事务和边境安全管理方面的合作,致力于将经济发展成果转化为与东南亚邻国共享的安全成果。在中国“一带一路”等发展项目的带动下,地区各国纷纷出台自身的经济发展战略,如巴基斯坦的“新巴基斯坦”、老挝“变陆锁国为陆联国”、菲律宾“大建特建”等等,推动了地区整体发展。中国致力于与沿线国家实现发展战略对接、优势互补,将政治互信、地缘毗邻、经济互补等优势转化为务实合作、持续增大优势,强调“一带一路”首先是打造和平之路,然后才是繁荣之路,充分体现了以发展合作促安全合作与政治互信的愿望和路径。

(iii) Gradually promote the construction of a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific
(三) 渐进推动印太地区安全秩序构建

China believes that the construction of a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific is a prudent and step-by-step historical process. Undoubtedly, China’s continued adherence to the basic national policy of reform and opening up and its resulting continuous rise will become one of the decisive factors for the final formation of the Indo-Pacific security order. However, China’s contemporary rise has taken a soft approach in stark contrast to the rise of Western powers. Namely, China has become one of the leaders of the region and the world through the power projection and model influence of economic development. In terms of both psychology and policy, this is unacceptable to Western powers that are used to confrontation with hard power and they will inevitably resist this in their actions. However, in the history of Asia, China once held a dominant position of power for a long time, 59 and it possesses a natural psychological advantage and civilized self-confidence for dealing with and counteracting external forces.

中国认为,印太地区安全秩序的构建是一种审慎的、循序渐进的历史进程。毫无疑问,中国继续坚持改革开放的基本国策以及由此呈现出的持续崛起进程,将成为印太安全秩序最终形成的决定性因素之一。但是,当代中国崛起采取了一种与西方强权崛起完全不同的软性方式,即通过经济发展的力量投射和模式影响来成为地区和世界的领导者之一,这对于习惯硬力量对抗的西方强权在心理上、政策上是难以接受的,也必然会在行动上予以抗拒。但是在亚洲的历史上,中国曾经长期据有力量主导性地位,拥有一种天然的心理优势和文明自信去应对和反制外力阻击。

The introverted and introspective spirit inherited from China’s thousands of years of civilization is the cultural origin of China’s prudent proposition to build a regional security order in the Indo-Pacific. The Analects of Confucius says: “The man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others.” Mencius said: “If a man to rule others, and his government is unsuccessful, let him turn inwards and examine his wisdom. When a man’s person is correct, the whole kingdom will turn to him with recognition and submission.” At present, facing the complex regional security situation, China instinctively tends towards a regional strategy that is restrained, prudent, and not overly eager for success. In terms of development cooperation policies, China advocates doing what it can and doing its best, emphasizing the fulfillment of international obligations commensurate with its national strength. Within the framework of South-South cooperation, China will provide assistance to other developing countries within its capacity, will not do anything beyond the development stage of our partners that is not in line with their actual needs, and will not make “empty promises (空头支票, literally “write bad checks”). 60China maintains that the key to the process of building a regional order is to continuously promote the building of mutual trust in regional security through a series of specific measures for mutual learning between civilizations, economic exchanges, and people-to-people exchanges with people-to-people bonds as the core.

中华文明数千年传承的内敛反省精神,是中国构建印太地区安全秩序审慎主张的文化渊源。论语曰:“夫仁者,己欲立而立人,己欲达而达人。”孟子曰:“行有不得者皆反求诸己,其身正而天下归之。”当前,面临复杂的地区安全形势,中国本能地趋向一种内敛、审慎、不急于求成的地区性战略。在发展合作政策上,中国主张量力而行,尽力而为,强调履行与国力相匹配的国际义务,在南南合作框架内向其他发展中国家提供力所能及的援助,不做超越合作伙伴发展阶段、不符合其实际需要的事,不开“空头支票”。中国主张,地区秩序构建进程的关键,在于通过一系列文明互鉴、经济往来、人文交流的具体举措,以民心相通为核心持续推进地区安全上的互信建设。

China’s prudence in building a regional security order is also due to the fact that its own national reunification has not been completed, and issues of sovereignty and territorial security have not been comprehensively maintained and consolidated. Regional security is built on the security of every country in the region, to say nothing of a major power in the region like China. While Western countries frequently smear and slander China’s political system and launch public opinion attacks and there are frequent incidents and interference in China’s territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights and interests, such as in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, the Diaoyu Islands, and the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, China’s maintenance of its own national security has also become an important part of regional security. The maintenance and assurance of China’s own national security is obviously the basic significance and unavoidable issue of the regional security order. In this regard, regional security can be fundamentally guaranteed only if all countries inside and outside the region participating in the establishment of the regional security order in the Indo-Pacific recognize that respecting the sovereignty and national security interests of other countries is a necessary precondition.

中国对于地区安全秩序构建的审慎,还在于自身的国家统一尚未完成,主权与领土安全问题并未得到全面维护和巩固。地区安全建立于地区内每个国家的安全之上,何况是中国这样一个地区主要大国。当西方国家对中国的政治制度频频抹黑诋毁、发动舆论攻击,在香港、台湾、新疆以及钓鱼岛、南海岛礁等中国领土主权和主权权益问题上频频制造事端、强加干涉时,中国维护自身国家安全问题也成为地区安全的重要一环。中国自身国家安全的维护和保障显然是地区安全秩序的基本内涵和绕不开的议题。就此而言,只有参与印太地区安全秩序构建的区内外各国都认识到尊重别国主权和国家安全利益是必要的前提条件,地区安全才能得到根本保证。

On the premise of ensuring national security resources, China can also exert its own influence in the construction of the regional security order. That is, through investment in domestic sustainable development, China is committed to creating regional and global “demonstration projects” (示范工程). China’s demonstrative role is reflected in two aspects: (1) the country’s governance capacity and mechanisms, and (2) its sustainable economic and social development. Since 2020, the Chinese government has vigorously promoted the construction of “new infrastructure,” promoted the digital transformation, intelligent upgrade, integration, and innovation of the infrastructure system as well as in-depth integration with 5G, blockchain, artificial intelligence, and other technologies, and successively implemented “new infrastructure” projects represented by smart transportation and smart cities. It is predictable that infrastructure projects empowered by technology will inject new impetus into the development of the “Belt and Road” countries, and the depth and breadth of infrastructure cooperation between China and the Indo-Pacific region are expected to expand further. 61 Although China’s own development is not aimed at becoming a regional and world leader, its demonstrative effect will be increasingly strengthened and, unable to be resisted by Western ideological prejudice, its influence will eventually radiate to the region and the world.

在确保国家安全资源的前提下,中国还可发挥自身在地区安全秩序构建上的影响力,即通过对国内可持续发展的投入,致力于打造地区性和世界性的“示范工程”。中国的这种示范作用体现在两个方面:一是国家治理能力和机制,二是经济社会可持续发展。2020年以来,中国政府大力推动“新型基础设施”建设,促进基础设施体系数字转型、智能升级、融合创新,与5G、区块链、人工智能等技术深度融合,以智慧交通、智慧城市为代表的“新基建”项目相继落地,可以预见技术赋能的基础设施项目将为“一带一路”国家发展注入全新动力,中国与印太地区基础设施合作的深度和广度有望得到进一步拓展。尽管中国自身发展并不以成为地区性和世界性领导者为目标,但其示范性效应将日益增强,并且最终会以西方意识形态偏见所无法抗拒的影响力向地区和世界辐射。

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Cite This Page

葛腾飞 (Ge Tengfei) (2022). "Disputes About the “Indo-Pacific” Regional Security Order and China’s Vision of Regional Order [“印太”地区安全秩序纷争与中国的地区秩序愿景]". Interpret: China, Original work published May 3, 2021, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/disputes-about-the-indo-pacific-regional-security-order-and-chinas-vision-of-regional-order/

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