Media Type: Academic article
Song Guoyou, an expert on U.S.-China economic relations at Fudan University, evaluates Beijing’s response so far to de-risking strategies adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations. Song argues that China can limit both the scope and negative impacts of such measures by seeking to maintain stable relations with Europe and U.S. allies more generally, diversifying export markets, publicly contributing to global economic goods through promotion of the BRI and participation in RCEP, and sustaining U.S. business interest in China.
A pair of Chinese economists argue that the U.S. will have a difficult time effectively de-risking from China due to a variety of hurdles, including tensions with allies over the speed and scope of strategies, vested U.S. business interests, and partisan debates about China policy within the United States. To limit the scope and impact of U.S. technology and economic policies, they suggest, Beijing should seek to improve diplomatic relations with U.S. allied and partner nations, expand economic ties with developing countries, remain open to diplomatic engagement with Washington, and invest in China’s science and technology ecosystem to address innovation bottlenecks.
A prominent scholar of China-Africa relations argues that other major powers with a presence in Africa are increasingly wary of China’s activity on the continent. Since continued economic and political engagement in Africa is in China’s interests, Zhang argues, Beijing should maximize its room for maneuver by allaying such concerns. While Beijing should tailor strategies by country, Zhang advocates showing “due consideration” for other countries’ goals in Africa where they do not impinge on China’s core interests, pursuing opportunities for cooperation where they present themselves, and limiting unnecessarily provocative activities.
Researchers at Yunnan University and East China University of Political Science argue China’s aid and investment to Africa are inaccurately portrayed by Western countries as “debt trap diplomacy,” exacerbating sovereign debt risks in African countries and driven primarily by strategic rather than commercial objectives. To rebut and limit the reach of such arguments, the authors suggest Beijing seek ways to diversify Chinese investment and aid across sectors and projects, help Chinese enterprises assess investment risk and follow laws and social norms of host countries, better target aid to national development conditions, and strengthen media engagement in Africa and the West.
A scholar from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies argues that China’s economic engagement in Africa has become more complicated given a mix of external and internal factors – including souring relations between China and Western powers, and the shifting demands and expectations of African countries. As a prognosis, the author suggests that Beijing should enhance the complementarity and tangible impact of its global initiatives, devote greater attention to green development and other emerging development needs in Africa, and develop consultation mechanisms with African countries to address “pain points” as they arise.
Zhang Gaoyuan, a security scholar at Peking University, draws lessons for China amid what she terms the digital transformation of intelligence gathering. Zhang argues dual-use technology such as drones and Starlink satellites, open-source social media information, and efforts by non-combatants have been pivotal in guaranteeing Ukraine a steady flow of battlefield intelligence. As a prognosis for China, she promotes greater research into the opportunities and risks digital technologies present for intelligence acquisition and security.
This piece from the U.S. studies program at Ministry of State Security-linked think tank China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations argues that the Ukraine war heralds the end of the post-Cold War order. The article argues the United States has been the biggest beneficiary of the war so far, leveraging the crisis to strengthen its alliance network and fight a proxy war with Russia. The authors of the report warn countries in Asia to remain vigilant to what they describe as U.S. efforts to preserve and expand its hegemony in ways that might destabilize the region.
Zhou Yu, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, suggests the U.S. will increasingly resort to financial sanctions to pursue its geopolitical goals. Frequent and large-scale deployment of sanctions, Zhou argues, will ultimately undermine their effectiveness by encouraging other states to reduce their dependence on global financial public goods controlled by the U.S., and by dampening enthusiasm for sanctions among other Western powers, which the U.S. relies on to make its actions effective.
A researcher affiliated with the People’s Bank of China examines the nature and effects of a perceived growing U.S. tendency to deploy financial sanctions toward geopolitical objectives. The article outlines an extensive set of recommendations Beijing can take to better prepare for and protect against various sanctions scenarios, including deepening China’s global economic integration, improving diplomatic and trade ties with U.S. allies and partners, and promoting reform of the international monetary order.
Zhang Bei, a senior economist at the People’s Bank of China, warns that risks to China’s financial security are increasing amid an evolving geopolitical environment. Zhang sees sanctions as a double-edged sword, with economic and reputational costs to the sanctioning country—particularly if the sanctioned country is well-integrated with the global economy and financial markets. As a result, Zhang argues that China can reduce the likelihood and impact of potential sanctions by increasing financial openness and integration, diversifying trade and investment relations, and taking a more active role in global economic and monetary governance, including through measured RMB internationalization.