In September 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited Russia for the second time since taking office. During the visit, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un not only held a six-hour meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome, but Kim Jong Un also visited and attended talks in many places in Russia’s Far East. Since then, Russian officials have repeatedly defined Russo-North Korean bilateral relations as “comprehensive.” Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov also said that Russo-North Korean “comprehensive” relations include military and technical cooperation and exchanges of views on security issues, as well as cooperation in sensitive areas.1 Although the two heads of state did not sign any documents after the talks and Russia also stressed that the Russian-North Korean relationship is not directed against any third party, some people believe that this is a landmark event in the “reconstruction of an alliance” between Russia and North Korea.2
2023年9月,朝鲜领导人金正恩上任以来第二次出访俄罗斯。访问期间,俄罗斯总统普京和金正恩不但在俄东方航天发射场举行长达6小时的会谈,金正恩还到访俄远东多地进行参观会谈。此后,俄罗斯官方多次以“全方位”的表述来定义俄朝双边关系。俄总统新闻秘书佩斯科夫还表示,俄朝的“全方位”关系既包括军事技术合作和安全问题的意见交流,也包括敏感领域协作。虽然俄朝两国元首在会谈后并未签署任何文件,俄罗斯也强调俄朝关系并不针对任何第三方,但有观点认为,这是俄朝“重构联盟”关系的标志性事件。
Overall, with the Ukraine crisis as a catalyst, the international and regional order is in a stage of adjustment and reconstruction. The North Korean leader’s visit to Russia may usher in a new stage in the development of Russo-North Korean relations, which will have an important impact on the situation in neighboring countries and Northeast Asia. Therefore, how we understand the driving logic behind the development of a “comprehensive” relationship and the possible spillover effects of close interactions between Russia and North Korea, and the practical shortcomings faced in deepening the “comprehensive” relationship has important academic value and practical significance.
综合来看,在乌克兰危机的催化下,国际和地区秩序正处于调整重构阶段,朝鲜领导人此次访俄可能开启俄朝关系发展的全新阶段,将对周边国家和东北亚地区局势产生重要影响。因此,如何理解俄朝发展“全方位”关系的驱动逻辑,俄朝密切互动可能产生的外溢效应以及深化“全方位”关系面临的现实短板,具有重要的学术价值和现实意义。
I. The historical context of the development of relations between Russia (the Soviet Union) and North Korea
一、俄(苏)朝关系发展的历史脉络
To analyze the driving logic of the Russo-North Korean “comprehensive” relationship, we need to start by understanding the historical context of its development. In different historical periods such as the Cold War, the post-Cold War, and in the 21st century, the relations between Russia (or the Soviet Union) and North Korea have shown completely different development tones, interactive characteristics, and evolutionary trajectories under the influence of the international and regional environment. Factors such as ideology, strategic environment, and development needs have become important factors in shaping the relations between Russia (the Soviet Union) and North Korea in different historical periods.
分析俄朝“全方位”关系的驱动逻辑,需要从其发展的历史脉络入手。在冷战、后冷战、21世纪以来等不同的历史时期,俄(苏)朝关系在国际和地区环境的传导影响下,呈现出截然不同的发展基调、互动特征和演进轨迹,而意识形态、战略环境、发展需求等因素在不同的历史时期,成为塑造俄(苏)朝关系的重要因素。
(i) Cold War period: Non-dependent Alliance
(一)冷战时期:非依附型同盟
Just as World War II was ending, based on consultations among the anti-fascist allies, the southern and northern parts of the Korean Peninsula established national regimes in accordance with the political systems and organizational models of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively. For the Soviet Union, North Korea was the strategic fulcrum of the socialist camp in Northeast Asia. Therefore, after the war, the Soviet Union sent a large number of technical experts and advisers to North Korea to assist it in building a socialist system. In March 1949, the Soviet Union and North Korea signed the first Soviet-North Korean Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement. From 1955, the two countries signed a number of Soviet-North Korean Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreements to ensure that the Soviet Union would provide North Korea with loans, experts, and technical assistance, as well as aid in the construction of metal, energy, and petrochemical enterprises and projects. In 1961, the two countries signed the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was a formal military alliance, completing the gradual upgrading of relations from initial contact to the establishment of economic and trade ties to an alliance. During this period, the Soviet Union also influenced the course of the Korean War through military assistance, political and diplomatic support, the secret dispatch of air force support, and logistical support. It provided long-term assistance to lay the foundation for North Korea’s industrial and agricultural foundation and international status. In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union’s share in North Korea’s foreign trade rose as high as 85%, making it North Korea’s most important ally. Furthermore, North Korea was one of the most successful countries at obtaining foreign aid during the post-war reconstruction period. According to Soviet calculations, as of April 1, 1960, North Korea had received 5.5 billion rubles in free aid from socialist countries, of which 1.3 billion rubles came from the Soviet Union.3
二战结束前夕,根据反法西斯同盟国的协商,朝鲜半岛的南部和北部分别按照美国和苏联的政治制度和组织模式建立国家政权。对苏联而言,朝鲜是社会主义阵营在东北亚地区的战略支点。因此,苏联在战后向朝鲜派遣大量的技术专家和顾问,协助其建设社会主义制度。1949年3月,苏联和朝鲜签署了首份《苏朝经济文化合作协议》。1955年起,两国签署多份《苏朝经济技术合作协定》,确保苏联为朝鲜提供贷款、专家和技术援助,以及援建金属、能源、石油化工企业和项目。1961年,两国签署具有正式军事同盟性质的《苏朝友好合作互助条约》,完成了从初步接触、建立经贸联系到同盟关系的逐步升级。在此期间,苏联还通过军事援助、政治外交支持、秘密派遣空军支援和后勤保障等措施影响朝鲜战争进程,并借助长期援助奠定了朝鲜的工农业基础和国际地位。20世纪50年代初期,苏联在朝鲜对外贸易中的比例一度高达85%,成为朝鲜最为重要的盟国。此外,朝鲜是在战后重建时期在获取外援方面最成功的国家之一。按照苏联的计算,截至1960年4月1日,朝鲜得到的来自社会主义国家的无偿援助共55亿卢布,其中苏联援助13亿卢布。
Although support from the Soviet Union was indispensable to the establishment and consolidation of the regime, North Korea has always pursued an independent development path. For example, North Korea refused to join the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a member state, refused to accept the industrial division of labor within the socialist camp under the Soviet leadership, and emphasized the necessity of self-reliance. At the time, North Korea hoped to adjust its industrial layout according to its own needs, which was openly criticized by the Soviet Union. However, this did not weaken its strategic orientation of not wanting to become a “vassal” of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the importance of Soviet economic aid to North Korea’s GDP growth and trade with the Soviet Union as a proportion of North Korea’s foreign trade gradually declined. In foreign affairs, the differences between North Korea and the Soviet Union also gradually increased. In 1962, North Korea’s criticism of the Soviet Union’s “concession” during the Cuban Missile Crisis led Khrushchev to suspend economic and military aid to North Korea. The Soviet Union only resumed aid to North Korea when Brezhnev came to power.4 Some scholars also believe that the dramatic ups and downs in Sino-Soviet relations forced North Korea to pay a certain price, but North Korea had little trouble maintaining friendly relations with both countries.5 In general, although the Soviet Union and North Korea established an alliance based on a common ideology during the Cold War, this relationship did not show North Korea’s dependence on the Soviet Union. Instead, it fluctuated frequently due to the Soviet Union’s dissatisfaction with “returns for its aid” and North Korea’s demands for “independence.”
虽然政权的建立巩固离不开苏联支持,但朝鲜始终追求独立自主的发展道路。例如,朝鲜拒绝作为成员国参加苏联主导的经济互助委员会,拒绝接受苏联主导下社会主义阵营内部的产业分工,并强调自力更生的必要性。朝鲜曾希望根据自身需要调整工业布局,遭到苏联的公开批评,但其不希望成为苏联“附庸”的战略导向并未因此减弱。随后,苏联经济援助对朝鲜国内生产总值(GDP)增长的重要性以及对苏贸易额在朝鲜对外贸易中所占的比例逐步下降。在对外事务方面,朝鲜与苏联的分歧也逐渐增多。1962年,朝鲜对于苏联在古巴导弹危机中“退让”的批评,导致赫鲁晓夫暂缓对朝经济和军事援助。直至勃列日涅夫执政后,苏联恢复对朝援助。还有学者认为,中苏关系的巨大起伏曾使朝鲜付出一定代价,但朝鲜游刃有余地保持与上述两国间的友好关系。总体来看,虽然苏联和朝鲜在冷战期间基于共同的意识形态建立同盟关系,但这种关系并未呈现出朝鲜对苏联的依附性,而是因苏联对于“援助回报”的不满和朝鲜的“独立自主”诉求频繁波动。
(ii) Post-Cold War period: De-ideologization
(二)后冷战时期:去意识形态化
At the end of the Cold War, changes in the international environment inevitably weakened North Korea’s international standing.6 In the 1980s, the international context of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and the domestic process of the Soviet Union’s “New Thinking” reform led to the Soviet Union’s Korean peninsula policy showing signs of “favoring South Korea over North Korea.” At the same time, the severe political and economic crisis within the Soviet Union seriously weakened its ability to provide assistance to North Korea. As the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with South Korea despite North Korea’s strong opposition, North Korea became increasingly dissatisfied with the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, and relations between the two countries entered a period of volatility. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia completely abandoned the Cold War paradigm of the “Russo-North Korean alliance” and strengthened the de-ideologization of its bilateral relations. Not only did Russian President Boris Yeltsin fail to renew the Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance after its expiration, but he also gradually cut off Russo-North Korean aid-based bilateral cooperation. Some scholars believe that in order to win economic assistance from Western countries through de-ideologization, Russia completely “abandoned” North Korea, its traditional ally.7 As a result, North Korea lost access to Russia’s cheap energy supply and massive volumes of aid, and its domestic economic situation deteriorated rapidly. Data shows that North Korea’s GDP fell from U.S. $20.9 billion in 1992 to U.S. $10.6 billion in 1996, a drop of 49.2%.8
冷战末期,国际环境变化不可避免地导致朝鲜的地位被削弱。20世纪80年代,美苏缓和的国际背景和苏联“新思维”改革的国内进程,导致苏联的半岛政策出现“重韩轻朝”的苗头。同时,苏联内部严峻的政治和经济危机,严重削弱其对朝援助能力。随着苏联不顾朝鲜的强烈反对与韩国建立外交关系,朝鲜对苏联的外交政策也愈加不满,两国关系进入波动期。伴随着苏联的解体,俄罗斯彻底抛弃“俄朝同盟”的冷战范式,加强双边关系的去意识形态化改造。俄罗斯总统叶利钦不但没有在《苏朝友好合作互助条约》到期后续约,还逐步切断基于援助方式的俄朝双边合作。有学者认为,为了通过去意识形态化争取西方国家的经济援助,俄罗斯彻底“抛弃”了朝鲜这一传统盟友。因此,朝鲜失去俄罗斯廉价的能源供应和大量援助,国内经济状况迅速恶化。数据显示,朝鲜GDP自1992年的209亿美元降至1996年的106亿美元,降幅高达49.2%。
Against this backdrop, North Korea began to engage with Western countries, including low-level dialogue with the United States, in an effort to attract foreign investment and technical assistance and alleviate its domestic economic difficulties. At the same time, due to a strong sense of insecurity, North Korea has embarked on the path of independently developing nuclear weapons, using this as a trump card to maintain its national security and prevent external interference, and using the abandonment of its nuclear program as a bargaining chip that it can exchange for Western economic assistance. In 1994, North Korea and the United States signed the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in Geneva. Since 1995, the United States has provided food and energy aid to North Korea.9 Compared with the Cold War era, the foundation of the partnership between Russia and North Korea, which was previously based on common ideology and aid, was further weakened. In the later period of Yeltsin’s rule, Russia gradually abandoned its peninsula policy of “favoring South Korea over North Korea” and prevented the decline in its influence on the peninsula issue and the Northeast Asian regional agenda through limited energy, industrial, and military-technical cooperation with North Korea.
在此背景下,朝鲜开始与西方国家接触,包括与美国进行低级别对话,旨在吸引外国投资和技术援助,缓解国内经济困难的局面。同时,由于强烈的不安全感,朝鲜走上自主发展核武器道路,将其作为维护国家安全和防止外部干涉的底牌,并以放弃核计划作为交换手段,换取西方的经济援助。1994年,朝美双方在日内瓦签署《朝美核框架协议》,从1995年起美国向朝鲜提供粮食和能源援助。相较于冷战时期,俄朝间基于共同意识形态以援助为纽带的伙伴关系基础进一步弱化。在叶利钦执政后期,俄罗斯逐步放弃“重韩轻朝”的半岛政策,通过对朝有限的能源、工业和军事技术合作,避免在半岛问题和东北亚地区议程中的影响力下降。
(iii) Since the 21st century: Pragmatism takes precedence
(三)21世纪以来:实用主义优先
Since the 21st century, Russia has attempted to reposition its bilateral relations with North Korea and deepen mutual political trust through a series of high-level visits. In 2000, Russia and North Korea signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness, and Cooperation, proposing to strengthen traditional friendly and good-neighborly relations and declaring the complete end of the military alliance relationship that began in the Soviet era. In the same year, Putin visited Pyongyang, the first Russian leader to do so since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was seen as an important sign of Russia’s adjustment of its policy toward North Korea. In 2001, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made his first visit to Russia, and had an in-depth exchange of views with Putin on issues such as bilateral relations between North Korea and Russia, peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, anti-missile defenses and international strategic stability, and jointly issued the Russia-DPRK Moscow Declaration.10 During this period, Russian cooperation with North Korea focused on economic projects that could produce practical results, rather than empty political gestures or unilateral Soviet-era aid. The volume of Russo-North Korean trade increased from U.S. $105 million in 2000 to U.S. $233 million in 2005.11 It can be said that, at this stage, Russia’s policy towards North Korea completely abandoned any ideological color and emphasized the principle of interaction based on pragmatism above all else.12
21世纪以来,俄罗斯试图重新定位俄朝双边关系,并通过一系列的高级别互访深化政治互信。2000年,俄朝两国签署《俄朝友好睦邻与合作条约》,提出加强传统友谊和睦邻关系,宣告始于苏联时期的军事同盟关系彻底终结。同年,普京作为苏联解体后的首位俄罗斯领导人访问平壤,被视为俄对朝鲜政策调整的重要标志。2001年,朝鲜领导人金正日也实现首次访俄,与普京就朝俄双边关系、朝鲜半岛和平统一、反导和国际战略稳定等问题深入交换看法,还共同发表《朝俄莫斯科宣言》。在此期间,俄罗斯对朝合作重点聚焦于能够带来实际效果的经济项目,而不是空洞的政治姿态或苏联时代的单方面援助。俄朝贸易额由2000年的1.05亿美元增至2005年的2.33亿美元。可以说,此阶段俄罗斯的对朝政策彻底抛弃意识形态色彩,强调实用主义优先的互动原则。
During this period, the North Korean nuclear issue was a factor in Russo-North Korean relations. On the one hand, as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, Russia participates in and abides by the resolutions on sanctions against North Korea. The relevant sanctions have greatly restricted Russo-North Korean economic and technological cooperation, leading to a significant decline in Russo-North Korean trade. In 2018, the volume of Russo-North Korean bilateral trade shrank to U.S. $34 million, an 85% drop from its peak of U.S. $233 million in 2005. On the other hand, Russia stressed that isolating North Korea would not help solve the problem, and it tried to engage with Pyongyang in economic areas that were not related to North Korea’s military plans. As the situation on the peninsula has undergone major changes since 2018, especially the “denuclearization” process and the repeated meetings between the leaders of North Korea and South Korea and North Korea and the United States, Russia has once again increased its engagement in peninsula affairs. In 2019, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was invited to visit Russia’s Far East and held a summit meeting with Putin. Although no agreement or joint statement was signed, the fact that the two countries held a summit meeting and reaffirmed their common interests in relevant issues can be seen as the two sides having achieved their basic goals.13 Guided by the principle of pragmatism first, Russia maintains its influence over North Korea by maintaining close high-level exchanges and cooperation on major infrastructure projects such as railways, power networks, and ports.
在此期间,朝核问题是影响俄朝关系的一个因素。一方面,作为联合国安理会常任理事国之一,俄罗斯参与和遵守对朝制裁的决议,而相关制裁极大限制了俄朝经济和技术合作,导致俄朝贸易出现明显倒退。2018年,俄朝双边贸易额萎缩至3400万美元,相较于2005年的峰值2.33亿美元下降85%。另一方面,俄强调孤立朝鲜无助于解决问题,并努力在与朝鲜军事计划无关的经济领域与平壤进行接触。随着半岛形势在2018年以后出现重大变化,特别是“无核化”进程和朝韩、朝美领导人的多次会晤,俄罗斯再次加大对半岛事务的投入力度。2019年,朝鲜领导人金正恩受邀访问俄罗斯远东地区,并与普京举行首脑会谈。尽管没有签署任何协议或联合声明,但仅仅朝俄举行首脑会晤并在相关问题上再次确认了双方共同利益这一事实本身,就可以看作双方已经达到了各自的基本目的。在实用主义优先原则的指导下,俄通过保持密切的高层往来以及铁路、电力网络、港口等基础设施大项目合作,保持对朝鲜的影响力。
Looking at the history of the development of Russian (Soviet)-North Korean relations after World War II, we can see that the two countries have experienced multiple rounds of adjustments marked by the exploration of alliance relations, de-ideologization, and prioritization of pragmatism. The changes are not only closely related to the respective strategic positioning, mutual understanding, and interest assessment of the two countries, but also inseparable from the overall framework of the evolution of the international order and regional pattern. Amid the changes in the international and regional situation triggered by the Ukraine crisis, Russo-North Korean relations are entering a new stage of development.
纵观二战后俄(苏)朝关系发展史,两国先后经历以同盟关系探索、去意识形态化改造和实用主义优先为标志的多轮调整,其变化不但与各自战略定位、相互认知、利益评估息息相关,更离不开国际秩序和地区格局演进的大框架。在乌克兰危机催化下的国际和地区局势变动中,俄朝关系正进入全新的发展阶段。
II. The driving logic of Russo-North Korean interaction in the context of the Ukraine crisis
二、乌克兰危机背景下俄朝互动的驱动逻辑
After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022, Western countries not only isolated Russia politically and diplomatically, but also tried to completely cut off economic, trade, scientific, and cultural ties with Russia. North Korea became one of the few countries to give clear support to Russia. It not only took the lead in recognizing the independence of the two “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, but also demonstrated its position through its voting in international venues such as the United Nations. Russia once again invited Kim Jong Un to visit Russia to focus on discussing cooperation in military security, agriculture, satellites, transportation, infrastructure construction, and other areas. Overall, similar perceptions of the international order, consistent strategic orientation, and complementary role positioning constitute the main driving force behind this round of adjustments in Russo-North Korean relations.
2022年乌克兰危机爆发后,西方国家不但在政治和外交上对俄进行孤立,还尝试全面切断与俄罗斯的经贸、科技和人文联系,朝鲜成为少数立场鲜明支持俄罗斯的国家之一,不仅率先承认顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克两个“共和国”独立,还在联合国等国际场合通过投票展现其立场。俄罗斯也再次邀请金正恩访俄,重点讨论军事安全、农业、卫星、交通运输、基础设施建设等合作。总体来看,相似的秩序认知、契合的战略导向和互补的角色定位,构成此轮俄朝关系调整的主要驱动力。
(i) The logic of international order perceptions
(一)秩序认同逻辑
A common perception of the international and regional order, and especially of the external environment, is one part of the inherent logic behind the development of Russo-North Korean relations. Faced with the “camp-based” division in the international community and the Western narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism,” safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and the right to independent development and opposing external interference and illegal sanctions have become the basis for Russia and North Korea’s common perception of the international order. Specifically, this perception mainly includes two aspects: environment perception and threat perception.
对国际和地区秩序,尤其是外部环境的共同认知,是俄朝关系发展的内在逻辑之一。面对国际社会出现“阵营化”的分裂状态以及西方国家煽动“民主对抗威权”的叙事,维护国家主权安全和自主发展权,反对外部干涉和非法制裁成为俄朝两国的秩序认同基础。具体来看,主要包括环境感知和威胁感知两个方面。
On the one hand, both countries face similar isolated environments. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the United States cut off Russia’s ties with the world through political, diplomatic, and financial means, and “punished” Russia through comprehensive isolation. First, at the United Nations level, on March 2, 2022, the UN General Assembly voted on a draft resolution “demanding Russia immediately cease fire, withdraw all troops, and protect all civilians,” with 141 countries voting in favor. On February 24, 2023, the UN General Assembly voted again on the situation in Ukraine and passed a draft resolution on the “peace formula” with 141 votes in favor, demanding that Russia withdraw its troops immediately. Russian diplomats are facing unprecedented exclusion in international and multilateral forums. North Korea is also facing the extension of sanctions and multiple accusations from the United Nations on its human rights situation and other matters. Second, at the international level, as of February 2023, Russian individuals and entities have been subject to 14,081 sanctions, making it the most-sanctioned country in the world, while North Korea has long been among the top three most-sanctioned countries, with a total of 2,133 sanctions.14 Third, at the diplomatic level, due to the threat of sanctions from Western countries and the “warrant” issued by the International Criminal Court, the space for Russian leaders to conduct head-of-state diplomacy has been greatly compressed. In the nearly two years since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russian President Vladimir Putin has only visited nine countries, most of which are Central Asian countries. In 2019, Putin visited 23 countries.15 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made four visits abroad in 2019 and held talks with U.S. President Trump twice, but with the breakdown of U.S.-North Korea negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue, North Korea’s space for interaction with the outside world (especially Western countries) has shrunk significantly. Their relative isolation in the international environment has become an important background conducive to the strengthening of bilateral exchanges between Russia and North Korea. In addition to Kim Jong Un’s state visit to Russia after a lapse of four years, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu visited North Korea in July 2023 to participate in the celebration of North Korea’s “Victory Day of the Fatherland Liberation War.” In October, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited North Korea again and actively planned Putin’s official visit to North Korea. In other words, frequent high-level interactions between Russia and North Korea are becoming an important option for both countries to break out of their diplomatic isolation.
一方面,面临相似的孤立环境。乌克兰危机爆发后,美国通过政治、外交、金融等手段切断俄罗斯与世界的联系,通过全方位孤立对俄进行“惩罚”。第一,在联合国层面,2022年3月2日,联合国大会对“要求俄罗斯立即停火,撤出所有军队,保护所有平民”的决议草案进行表决,141个国家投票赞成。2023年2月24日,联大再次就乌克兰局势问题投票,以141票赞成通过“和平公式”的决议草案,要求俄罗斯立即撤军。俄罗斯外交官在国际和多边场合,受到前所未有的排斥。朝鲜也同样面临联合国延长制裁、人权状况等的多重指责。第二,在国际层面,截至2023年2月,俄罗斯个人和各类实体共遭受14081项制裁,成为全世界遭到制裁最多的国家,而朝鲜长期位列被制裁国家的前三名,共遭受2133项制裁。第三,在外交层面,受西方国家的制裁威胁和国际刑事法院的“通缉令”影响,俄罗斯领导人开展元首外交的空间被极大压缩。乌克兰危机爆发以来的近2年时间内,俄总统普京仅出访9个国家,其中绝大多数为中亚国家,而2019年普京曾访问23个国家。朝鲜领导人金正恩在2019年曾4次出访,并两度与美国总统特朗普举行会谈,但随着美朝关于朝核问题的谈判破裂,朝鲜与外界(尤其是西方国家)的互动空间也大幅缩水。相对孤立的国际环境,成为俄朝加强双边往来的重要背景。除了金正恩时隔4年再次对俄罗斯进行国事访问外,2023年7月俄罗斯国防部长绍伊古访问朝鲜,参与庆祝朝鲜“祖国解放战争胜利纪念日”;10月,俄罗斯外交部长拉夫罗夫再次访朝,并积极筹划普京对朝的正式访问。也就是说,俄朝间频繁开展高层互动,正在成为两国各自突破外交孤立局面的重要选项。
On the other hand, they have a similar perception of threats. This round of the Ukraine crisis not only impacted the post-war international order, but also profoundly changed the regional security landscape faced by Russia and North Korea. The United States emphasizes building the capacity to maintain its hegemony through the alliance system and seeks absolute security for itself at the expense of the insecurity of other countries. While Europe is expanding its military and preparing for war, it is relying more heavily on transatlantic security ties to strengthen containment and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank. At the western end of the Eurasian continent, NATO’s “northward expansion” constitutes the offensive and defensive frontier between Europe and Russia from the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea to the Arctic. On the eastern end of the Eurasian continent, NATO’s institution building and practice called the “Pivot to Asia” is accelerating, using the so-called “lessons of Ukraine” to accelerate institutional cooperation with Asian countries and regions, as well as the actions and practices of member states. With the announcement of the establishment of the “Australia-UK-U.S. Trilateral Security Partnership” (AUKUS), the release of the “Spirit of Camp David” joint statement by the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and the continuous improvements to the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” (QUAD) between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, Russia and North Korea’s perception of security threats has also changed.
另一方面,存在相近的威胁感知。此轮乌克兰危机不但冲击战后国际秩序,也深刻改变俄罗斯和朝鲜面临的地区安全格局。美国强调通过盟伴体系维系霸权的能力建设,以“他国的不安全”为代价实现自我安全绝对化。欧洲在扩军备战的同时,更加依赖跨大西洋关系的安全纽带,强化北约东翼的遏制和威慑力。在亚欧大陆西端,北约“北扩”构成欧洲与俄罗斯自黑海、波罗的海至北极海域的攻防前沿。在亚欧大陆东端,北约“亚太转向”的制度建设和实践加速推进,借助所谓“乌克兰教训”加速推进与亚洲国家和地区的制度化合作,以及成员国的行动实践。随着“美英澳三边安全伙伴关系”(AUKUS)宣告建立,美日韩发布“戴维营精神”联合声明,美日印澳“四方安全对话”(QUAD)不断提升,俄罗斯和朝鲜对安全威胁的感知也发生变化。
Russia opposes the Western-led international order. Its international position has changed from a shaper to a challenger, which is most evident in the field of geo-security.16 The 2021 edition of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation clearly states that “geopolitical instability, the growth of regional conflicts, and the intensification of international conflicts have led to an increasing threat of the use of force against Russia.”17 Faced with ever-increasing deterrence on its frontiers, Russia has accelerated the military integration of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus for the first time. A regional security landscape based on high-intensity confrontation has taken shape. From North Korea’s perspective, after the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea not only frequently engaged in “strategic alignment” at multilateral occasions such as the NATO summit, the G7 summit, and the G20 summit, but also comprehensively strengthened institutionalized security cooperation against North Korea and held joint anti-missile drills in the waters around North Korea. The continuously strengthening military deterrence by the United States, Japan, and South Korea has significantly increased North Korea’s sense of “insecurity” and also prompted Russia and North Korea to strengthen their willingness to provide strategic support to each other through deepening cooperation in the face of similar threat perceptions.
俄罗斯反对西方主导的国际秩序,其国际定位从塑造者到挑战者,最明显地表现在地缘安全领域。2021年版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》明确指出,“地缘政治的不稳定、地区冲突的增长以及国际矛盾的加剧导致俄罗斯受到的武力威胁在增加”。面对步步紧逼的前沿威慑,俄加速推进俄白联盟国家的军事一体化,首次在白俄罗斯境内部署战术核武器,基于高强度对抗的地区安全格局业已成型。而在朝鲜看来,乌克兰危机爆发后,美日韩三国领导人不但先后借助北约峰会、七国集团峰会、二十国集团峰会等多边场合频繁进行“战略对表”,还全面提升针对朝鲜的机制化安全协作,并在朝鲜周边海域举行联合反导演习等。美日韩不断强化的军事威慑显著增强了朝鲜的“不安全感”,也促使俄朝增强了在面对相近威胁感知的前提下,通过深化合作互为战略支撑的意愿。
(ii) Strategic alignment logic
(二)战略契合逻辑
After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the Biden administration seized the opportunity presented by the diplomatic shift of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration in South Korea to hold a U.S.-Japan-ROK summit at Camp David and issue a joint statement titled “The Spirit of Camp David.” This statement defined countries such as Russia and North Korea as “revisionist countries” and accused them of challenging the rules-based order led by the United States. It also proposed to work with “like-minded” countries to meet the challenge.18
乌克兰危机爆发后,拜登政府抓住韩国尹锡悦政府外交转向之机,在戴维营举行美日韩峰会,发表名为《戴维营精神》的联合声明,将俄罗斯和朝鲜等国定义为“修正主义国家”,指责其挑战美国领导的基于规则的秩序,还提出将与“志同道合”的国家一道应对挑战。
For a long time after Putin came to power, Russia followed the strategic orientation of a “return to Europe.” Although during Putin’s third term, Russia and the West had increasing differences on issues such as the international order, regional security, and democratic system, the general tone of pragmatic cooperation was still maintained. The Crimean incident in 2014 not only caused a major setback to Russia’s process of “integration into the West,” but also triggered the intensification of conflict between Russia and the West, with both sides viewing each other as the main security threat. The 2021 edition of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation upgrades the positioning of Western countries from “potential threats” to “real challenges.”19 The outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022 has further expanded Russia’s strategic awareness of “turning to the East” to an “eastward and southward” strategic layout. A Russian poll in July 2023 showed that 67% of respondents supported the country’s foreign policy shift to the East, while only 11% did not support it. Most respondents believed that the relationship between Russia and the West has always been based on mutual distrust.20 The 2023 edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation puts Europe, the U.S., and Anglo-Saxon countries at the bottom of its list of diplomatic priorities for the first time, above only Antarctica. Based on the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Russia plans to establish a broad Greater Eurasian Partnership integration framework and promote alignment and cooperation with the Belt and Road Initiative by combining the potential of all countries, regional organizations, and alliances on the Eurasian continent.21 By cooperating with Asian countries and regions to strengthen its land power and expanding the depth of its security strategy and space for economic cooperation, Russia seeks to hedge against threats and challenges from Europe, using diplomatic progress in Asia to drive diplomatic breakthroughs in Europe.22 Russia strives to maintain its influence in its traditional areas of interest through multilateral institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which it leads, as well as bilateral channels.23 To some extent, Russia’s “eastward and southward” strategic layout is aligned with North Korea’s policy trajectory in its struggle against hegemony and interference.
在普京执政后的较长时间内,俄罗斯遵循“回归欧洲”的战略导向。虽然在普京的第三任期,俄罗斯与西方在国际秩序、地区安全、民主体制等多个问题上的分歧增多,但依旧保持了务实合作的总基调。2014年的克里米亚事件,不但导致俄罗斯追求的“融入西方”进程受到重大挫折,还引发俄罗斯与西方矛盾激化,双方互相视对方为最主要的安全威胁。2021年版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》把西方国家的定位从“潜在威胁”上升为“现实挑战”。2022年乌克兰危机的爆发,使俄罗斯“转向东方”的战略意识进一步拓展至“东向南下”的战略布局。2023年7月俄罗斯的民调显示,67%的受访者支持国家外交政策转向东方,不支持者仅为11%,多数受访者认为俄罗斯与西方的关系始终建立在互不信任的基础上。2023年版《俄罗斯联邦外交政策构想》首次把欧美和盎格鲁-萨克逊国家置于外交优先排序的末尾位置,仅位于南极洲之前,并计划在欧亚经济联盟、上海合作组织和东南亚国家联盟的基础上,通过联合欧亚大陆所有国家、区域组织和联盟的潜力,建立广泛的大欧亚伙伴关系一体化框架,并推动“一带一盟”对接合作。通过与亚洲国家和地区合作加强陆权力量,扩大安全战略纵深和经济合作空间,以此对冲来自欧洲方向的威胁与挑战,以亚洲方向的外交进展带动欧洲方向的外交突破。力图通过其主导的欧亚经济联盟、集体安全条约组织等多边机构以及双边渠道维系在传统利益空间的影响力⑤。从某种程度看,俄罗斯“东向南下”战略布局与朝鲜反霸权、反干涉斗争的政策轨迹相契合。
North Korea has long regarded the United States as its most important hostile force and security threat, as well as the culprit responsible for the division of the Korean Peninsula. In 2018, as the United States under the Trump Administration adjusted its policy toward North Korea, the Korean Peninsula issue took a sudden turn. North Korea and the United States held their first summit in Singapore and issued a joint statement, proposing to reach a principled consensus on seeking to establish a new type of diplomatic relations and a peace mechanism for the peninsula. The leaders of North and South Korea also held three summits that year and signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, proposing to eliminate hostile relations, build a nuclear-free zone, and gradually resume the Kaesong Industrial Park and Mount Kumgang tourism projects. However, with the failure of the Hanoi talks between the North Korean and U.S. leaders in 2019, the confrontational aspect of North Korea’s foreign policy once again strengthened, emphasizing the long-term nature of the confrontation between North Korea and the United States. In 2021, the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea continued to hold a grim assessment of the external security environment, emphasized the importance of nuclear weapons, and reiterated its position of possessing nuclear weapons and strengthening the military.24
长期以来,朝鲜视美国为最重要的敌对势力和安全威胁以及造成朝鲜半岛分裂的罪魁祸首。2018年,随着美国特朗普政府的对朝政策调整,半岛问题呈现峰回路转的态势。朝美在新加坡举行首次峰会并发表共同声明,提出就寻求建立新型外交关系和半岛和平机制达成原则性共识。朝韩首脑也在年内举行三次峰会并签署《9月平壤共同宣言》,提出消除敌对关系、建设无核地区、逐步恢复开城工业园和金刚山旅游项目等。但随着2019年朝美元首河内会谈的失败,朝鲜对外政策的对抗性一面再度强化,强调朝美对峙的长期性。2021年,朝鲜劳动党“八大”延续对外部安全环境的严峻判断,强调核武重要性并重申拥核强军立场。
Some people believe that the U.S. Asia-Pacific alliance system is changing from a “hub-and-spoke” structure based on traditional bilateral alliances to a grid-based composite structure with nested circles. Judging from the current state of Japan-ROK relations and the content and level of trilateral cooperation, the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship seems to be a “quasi-alliance.”25 Therefore, North Korea has returned to its policy track of developing nuclear weapons to fight against hegemony and interference, and has adopted military deterrence, diplomatic division, and seeking external support to hedge against the threat of the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance. In September 2022, the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea passed a decree entitled “Nuclear Force Policy,” which includes 11 items including the mission, composition, command and control of nuclear forces, the execution of decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, the principles and conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, regular mobilization posture, security maintenance management and protection, and the qualitative and quantitative strengthening and updating of nuclear forces.26 For the first time, this document clearly defined North Korea’s “national nuclear force policy” in law. In 2023, the 9th Session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea reviewed and passed a supplementary bill concerning a constitutional amendment, officially incorporating the nuclear force policy into the Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. This emphasized the implementation of advanced nuclear weapons development in order to ensure the country’s right to survival and development, curb the threat of war, and maintain regional and world peace and stability. North Korea’s top leader Kim Jong Un also condemned the United States for constantly revising its position on an aggressive war aimed at achieving “regime change” in North Korea and stressed the need to flexibly carry out foreign affairs and further strengthen solidarity with countries that oppose the hegemonic strategies of the United States and other Western countries.27
有观点认为,美国的亚太同盟体系正由以传统双边同盟为基础的“轴辐”结构向网格化、圈层嵌套的复合结构转变,从日韩关系现状以及三国合作的内容和水平看,美日韩三边关系符合“准同盟”的定位。因此,朝鲜重回发展核武器进行反霸权、反干涉斗争的政策轨迹,采取军事威慑、外交分化、寻求外部支持的手段对冲美日韩同盟的威胁。2022年9月,朝鲜第十四届最高人民会议通过名为“核武力政策”的法令,内容包括核武力的使命、组成、指挥控制,核武器使用决定的执行,使用原则和条件,经常性动员态势、安全维持管理及保护、核武力从质量上和数量上的加强和更新等11项内容,首次从法律上明确“国家核武力政策”。2023年,朝鲜第十四届最高人民会议第九次会议审议并通过宪法修改补充案,将核武力政策正式写入《朝鲜民主主义人民共和国社会主义宪法》,强调实现核武器发展高度化,以保证国家生存权和发展权,遏制战争,维护地区和世界和平与稳定。朝鲜最高领导人金正恩还谴责美国不断修改旨在实现朝鲜“政权终结”的侵略战争脚本,强调要灵活开展对外工作,同反对美国等西方霸权战略的国家进一步加强团结。
(iii) Role positioning logic
(三)角色定位逻辑
It is generally believed that the identity of a country can change due to interactions between countries or internal changes.28 The Ukraine crisis has profoundly changed the international and regional security order. Based on similarities in their perceptions of the international order and strategic orientations, the complementarity of the roles of Russia and North Korea has become more prominent, mainly including three aspects: mutual support, security coordination, and interlocking needs.
一般认为,国家的角色身份可因国家间的相互作用或内部剧变而改变。乌克兰危机深刻改变了国际和地区安全秩序,在相似的秩序认同和战略导向基础上,俄罗斯和朝鲜相互间的角色互补更加突出,主要包括互为支点、安全协同、需求互嵌三个层面。
First, at the level of mutual support: Russia and North Korea have a 15-kilometer border. Changes in the situation in Northeast Asia are closely related to Russia’s overall geopolitical security environment. The North Korean nuclear issue is also a key tool that Russia can use to highlight its agenda-setting capabilities and influence in the game between major powers. Therefore, whether it is promoting the “denuclearization” process on the peninsula or building a security mechanism in Northeast Asia, Russia has seized the strategic initiative to ensure that the relevant processes are in line with the development track of its own geopolitical security interests. Russia hopes to enhance its influence in Northeast Asia and even the Asia-Pacific region as a whole by strengthening cooperation with North Korea, intervening in the peninsula issue, and thereby achieving the goal of balancing or regulating relations with neighboring parties. For Russia, its geo-economic interests on the Korean Peninsula have become more important as it shifts the focus of its national development strategy to the East and launches a new round of Far East development due to its deteriorating relations with the West. Given the important geostrategic value of the Korean Peninsula and the fact that the Korean Peninsula issue concerns the core security interests of all neighboring parties, Russia plays a role in Korean Peninsula affairs in order to pursue its geopolitical interests. Similarly, Russia is one of the external supports that North Korea uses to cope with containment by the United States, Japan, and South Korea, hedge against security threats, and maintain a balance of power with South Korea as regards the peninsula issue. As North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui noted, if the U.S.-led trilateral military alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea jeopardizes regional security, North Korea’s relationship with Russia will become a powerful “strategic element.”29 During his visit to North Korea, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also stressed that “the relationship between Russia and North Korea has reached a new strategic level.”30
第一,在互为支点层面。俄罗斯和朝鲜拥有15千米的边界线,东北亚局势变动与俄整体地缘安全环境相互关联,朝核问题也是俄罗斯在大国博弈中凸显议题设置能力和影响力的关键抓手。因此,不论是推动半岛“无核化”进程,还是东北亚安全机制的构建,俄罗斯都抢抓战略主动权,使相关进程符合自身地缘安全利益的发展轨道。俄罗斯希望通过强化对朝合作和半岛问题的介入,提升其在东北亚乃至亚太地区的影响力,从而达到平衡或调控与周边各方关系的目的。对俄罗斯而言,朝鲜半岛的地缘经济利益在其与西方交恶而将国家发展战略重心转向东方,并启动新一轮远东开发的背景下变得更加重要。鉴于朝鲜半岛重要的地缘战略价值以及朝鲜半岛问题又事关周边各方的核心安全利益,俄罗斯在朝鲜半岛事务上发挥作用还有谋取地缘政治利益的考虑。同样,俄罗斯是朝鲜应对美日韩围堵,对冲安全威胁,在半岛问题上与韩国维持力量平衡的外部依托对象之一。正如朝鲜外务相崔善姬指出,如果美国领导的美日韩三边军事联盟危及地区安全,朝鲜与俄罗斯的关系将成为强大的“战略要素”。俄罗斯外长拉夫罗夫在访朝期间也强调,“俄罗斯和朝鲜之间的关系已达到新的战略水平”。
Second, at the level of security coordination: As the Ukrainian crisis persists, ammunition production capacity has become a major test for the arms industries of Russia, the United States, and Europe. A report released by the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies pointed out that, according to satellite images of the Korea–Russia Friendship Bridge over the Tumen River in North Korea taken on October 5, 2023, there has been an unprecedented increase in freight rail transportation between Russia and North Korea (about 73 parked freight cars), far higher than the average level of the past five years. The report said: “The dramatic increase in rail traffic likely indicates North Korea’s supply of arms and munitions to Russia”.31 Although both Russian and North Korean officials have denied this speculation, theoretically speaking, North Korea’s defense industry system is derived from the Soviet Union and has relative production capacity advantages in some military fields. It could indeed become an important supplement that would allow Russia to address its battlefield ammunition consumption. In return, Russia could provide North Korea with specific economic and technical support, especially in fields such as aerospace and equipment manufacturing. During Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to North Korea, Kim Jong-un and Shoigu visited the “Arms and Equipment Exhibition-2023” hosted by the North Korean Ministry of Defense. They viewed North Korea’s new weapons and equipment and expressed their willingness to achieve security coordination through military cooperation.
第二,在安全协同层面。乌克兰危机持久化,弹药生产能力成为俄罗斯和美欧军工产业的重大考验。美国国际问题研究中心发布报告指出,根据2023年10月5日拍摄的朝鲜图们江铁路卫星图像,俄朝之间的货运铁路运输出现空前增长(停靠约73辆货运车厢),远高于过去5年的平均水平。报告认为,“货运列车流量的增加表明朝鲜可能向俄罗斯供应武器和弹药”。虽然俄朝官方都对此猜测予以否认,但理论上讲,朝鲜的国防工业体系师承于苏联,并在部分军工领域具有相对的产能优势,的确能够成为俄罗斯应对战场弹药消耗的重要补充。作为回报,俄罗斯可向朝鲜提供特定的经济和技术支持,尤其是航空航天、装备制造等领域。俄国防部长绍伊古访朝期间,金正恩和绍伊古一同参观了朝鲜国防省主办的“武器装备展览会-2023”以及朝鲜的新型武器装备,并表明通过军事合作实现安全协同的意愿。
Third, at the level of interlocking needs: Due to its unique geographical location, North Korea plays a key role in Russia’s “eastward and southward” strategy and is of great significance in many areas of cooperation, such as energy channels and transportation. In addition, North Korean labor is also an important source of labor for the development of Russia’s Far East. According to statistics, North Korean workers work in more than 40 countries and regions around the world, and Russia was once the country that received the largest number of North Korean workers, with nearly 40,000 workers at the peak, mainly employed in fields such as construction, agriculture, and fishery processing. In 2018, in order to implement the UN resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue, Russia repatriated all North Korean workers. With the dramatic changes in Russia’s relations with the West following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, labor cooperation between Russia and North Korea is no longer a forbidden area. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora has publicly stated that there are broad prospects for cooperation between North Korea and the Donbas region, especially in that North Korea has highly qualified, hard-working construction workers who are willing to work under difficult conditions, which will provide important assistance for the reconstruction of the Donbas region.32 In addition, the two countries’ cooperation in areas such as food, metallurgy, and geology is also highly complementary. On November 15, 2023, Russia and North Korea held the tenth meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Trade and Scientific and Technological Cooperation in Pyongyang, focusing on the trade of flour, corn, soybean oil, and meat products and discussing joint geological exploration of gold, iron, and rare earth metal mines, student exchange programs, intergovernmental agreements on mutual recognition of academic qualifications and degrees, and engagement in the fields of sports and culture. Both Russia and North Korea regard each other as important bargaining chips in their game with the West. Russia hopes to maintain its role in Northeast Asian security affairs through cooperation with North Korea and to make use of North Korea’s comparative advantages in specific areas to compensate for its own shortcomings. North Korea hopes to strengthen cooperation with Russia economicallyand in military technology to ease the pressure of sanctions imposed on it by the international community.
第三,在需求互嵌层面。朝鲜因其独特的地理位置是俄罗斯“东向南下”战略的关键角色,在能源通道、交通运输等多个合作领域具有重要意义。此外,朝鲜劳务也是俄远东开发劳动力的重要来源。据统计,朝鲜劳务人员在全球40多个国家和地区工作,而俄罗斯曾是接收朝鲜劳动力最多的国家,高峰时期近4万人,主要在建筑施工、农业、渔业加工等领域就业。2018年,为执行联合国涉朝核问题决议,俄罗斯全面遣返朝鲜劳务人员。随着乌克兰危机爆发后俄罗斯与西方关系的剧烈变化,劳务合作不再成为俄朝之间的禁区。俄罗斯驻朝鲜大使亚历山大·马采戈拉曾公开表示,朝鲜和顿巴斯地区之间的合作前景广阔,特别是朝鲜具有高素质、工作勤奋,且愿意在艰苦条件下工作的建筑工人,这将为顿巴斯地区的重建提供重要帮助。此外,两国在粮食、冶金、地质等领域的合作也具有较强的互补性。2023年11月15日,俄罗斯和朝鲜在平壤举行政府间经贸和科技合作委员会第十次会议,重点讨论面粉、玉米、豆油、肉制品贸易,并围绕金矿、铁矿和稀土金属矿的联合地质勘探,学生交换项目,互认学历学位的政府间协议,体育和文化领域的互动进行商议。俄朝都将对方作为与西方博弈的重要筹码。俄希望通过对朝合作保持自身在东北亚安全事务中的角色,并利用朝鲜在特定领域的比较优势弥补自身短板;朝鲜则希望加强与俄罗斯在经济和军事技术方面的合作,缓解国际社会对其实施的制裁压力。
III. The impact of Russia and North Korea building a “comprehensive” relationship on the situation in Northeast Asia
三、俄朝构筑“全方位”关系对东北亚局势的影响
For some time, the United States has adhered to its Cold War mentality and ideological bias. It has introduced the “new Cold War” mentality into the Asia-Pacific region and attempted to reconstruct the post-war regional order and governance structure based on its regional alliance system and the “Indo-Pacific” strategy. At the same time, the Ukraine crisis has promoted the reshaping of the security order in Northeast Asia, showing the alternation of features between the old and new order.33 Against this background, Russia and North Korea’s close interactions in various fields and attempts to build a “comprehensive” relationship may intensify the complexity of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia, accelerate the return of the “Cold War narrative,” and increase the complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue.
一段时间以来,美坚持冷战思维和意识形态偏见,将“新冷战”思维引入亚太地区,试图以地区盟伴体系为依托,以“印太”战略为基石重构战后地区秩序和治理架构。同时,乌克兰危机推进了东北亚安全秩序重塑,呈现新旧秩序交替特征。在此背景下,俄朝密切开展各领域互动,构筑“全方位”关系的尝试,可能强化东北亚地区安全困境的复合性,导致“冷战叙事”加速回归并增加朝核问题的复杂性。
(i) Intensifying the complexity of regional security dilemmas
(一)强化地区安全困境的复合性
The security situation in Northeast Asia is complex and sensitive. Shaped by historical and contemporary reasons, the region has formed a confrontational pattern with China, Russia, and North Korea (in the form of bilateral friendship treaties) on one side and the United States, Japan, and South Korea (in the form of bilateral military alliances and stationed U.S. troops) on the other side.34 Mutual distrust and a lack of understanding of security concerns have made it impossible to resolve the regional security dilemma. Since the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis, some Western media have been hotly discussing theories such as “the rapprochement among China, Russia, and North Korea has led to a new Cold War pattern on the Korean Peninsula” and “this is the darkest moment since the end of the Korean War.” Catalyzed by such narratives, the “security panic” and response measures of relevant countries have exacerbated the post-Cold War security dilemma in the region. In December 2022, Japan officially adopted three new security strategy documents, namely the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program, proposing that Japan would possess “counterstrike capabilities” to directly attack enemy bases and would significantly increase its defense budget and take a number of new measures to strengthen its defense capabilities. Japan has completely abandoned the principle of “exclusive self-defense” stipulated in its peace constitution, creating great instability for the security of Northeast Asia.35 The United States and South Korea also announced the restart of the high-level “extended deterrence” strategic consultation mechanism. By issuing the Washington Declaration, they agreed that the United States would provide a “nuclear umbrella” to South Korea. The United States also plans to increase its deployment of strategic assets around the peninsula, including strategic nuclear submarines.
东北亚地区安全局势复杂而敏感,在历史经纬和现实原因的塑造下,该地区形成了以中俄朝三国(以双边友好条约形式)为一方、以美日韩三国(以双边军事同盟和美国驻军形式)为另一方的对峙体制。相互之间的不信任和对安全关切的缺乏理解,导致地区安全困境始终无法消解。乌克兰危机爆发以来,部分西方媒体对“中俄朝三国走近导致朝鲜半岛呈现新冷战格局”“朝鲜战争结束之后的最严峻时刻”等论调进行热议。在此种叙事的催化下,相关国家的“安全恐慌”和应对措施,加剧着本地区的后冷战安全困境。2022年12月,日本正式通过新版安保战略三文件,即《国家安全保障战略》《国家防卫战略》《防卫力整备计划》,提出日本将拥有对敌方基地直接攻击的“反击能力”,并将大幅提升防卫预算,采取多项新举措强化防卫能力。日本完全抛弃和平宪法中规定的“专属防卫”原则,给东北亚安全带来极大的不稳定因素。美韩也宣布重启高级别“延伸威慑”战略磋商机制,通过发表《华盛顿宣言》约定美对韩提供“核保护伞”,美国还计划增加半岛周边包括战略核潜艇在内的战略资产部署。
In the future, the deepening of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea driven by the strategy of common pressure and mutual support, especially discussions that Russia could provide North Korea with sensitive technologies including satellite technology, missile solid fuel, and submarines, is bound to strike a nerve with countries in the region and outside the region, intensifying strategic suspicion and distrust among countries. In response, the United States may seize on this as an excuse to increase its military investment in Northeast Asia and deepen the current “trilateral quasi-alliance” relationship based on the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK bilateral alliances by making it compulsory and institutionalized. This, in turn, will stimulate Russia and North Korea to further bind themselves together on military security issues, leading to a continued deterioration of the security dilemma in Northeast Asia.
未来,俄朝在共同承压和互为支撑战略驱动下军事合作的深化,特别是俄罗斯可能为朝鲜提供包括卫星技术、导弹固体燃料、潜艇等敏感技术的讨论,势必触动本地区和域外国家的紧张神经,增强国家间的战略猜疑和不信任。作为回应,美国可能以此为借口加大在东北亚的军事投入,将当前基于美日、美韩双边同盟的“准三边同盟”关系,使具有强制力和机制化的三边军事安全合作向纵深发展,而这又将刺激俄朝在军事安全问题上进一步绑定,从而导致东北亚地区的安全困境持续恶化。
(ii) Accelerating the return of the “Cold War narrative”
(二)导致“冷战叙事”加速回归
During the Cold War, Northeast Asia was the frontier area of confrontation between the two main camps of the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflicts and confrontations between the “six countries and two parties” led to complex territorial disputes, ethnic divisions, and other issues that remain as a “Cold War legacy” to this day and have become the main obstacles to mutual trust and cooperation among the countries. Against the backdrop of intensifying competition among major powers and geopolitical conflicts, the United States is promoting the integration of alliance mechanisms and pushing NATO to move into the Asia-Pacific region as soon as possible in terms of institutions and actions, in order to further strengthen NATO’s momentum of “Asia-Pacificization.”36 On the other hand, in U.S. public opinion, there is often a clamor for a “new Cold War pattern” in Northeast Asia. This uses the atmosphere of intensified competition among major powers to awaken the Cold War memories of the Korean War among neighboring parties, forcing countries and regions to alleviate their own insecurity by choosing sides. Against this background, Russia and North Korea’s building of a “comprehensive” relationship that includes military technology and security cooperation may further stimulate Cold War memories among regional parties and lead to an accelerated return to the Cold War mentality.
冷战时期,东北亚地区是美苏两大阵营对峙的前沿地带,曾经的“六国两方”冲突和对抗,导致复杂的领土争端、民族分裂等问题作为“冷战遗产”残留至今,成为影响国家间互信与合作的主要障碍。在大国竞争和地缘冲突日益加剧的背景下,美国一方面推动联盟机制融通一体化,推动北约从制度与行动上尽快移入亚太,以进一步强化北约“亚太化”的势头,另一方面还时常在舆论上鼓噪东北亚“新冷战格局”,利用大国竞争加剧的氛围唤醒周边各方对于朝鲜战争的冷战记忆,迫使各国和地区通过选边站队缓解自身的不安全感。在此背景下,俄朝构建包括军事技术和安全合作的“全方位”关系,又可能进一步刺激地区各方的冷战记忆,导致冷战思维的加速回归。
There is widespread discussion about the reappearance of a “new Cold War” pattern in East Asia. Some people believe that a new iron curtain divides Western countries such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea on one side from so-called “authoritarian countries” such as Russia and North Korea on the other side.37 This fundamental ideological opposition has determined the formation of two opposing camps in Northeast Asia.38 In the view of various parties in the region, the Soviet Union and North Korea belonged to the same socialist camp during the Cold War. Although the Soviet Union has disintegrated, Russia and North Korea have a resonance in historical memory. Currently, both countries are suffering under unprecedented isolation and economic sanctions from Western countries, making them more dependent on each other’s support. For Russia and North Korea, although the construction of a “comprehensive” relationship and deepening of strategic cooperation between the two countries is a natural choice due to their similar isolated environments, threat perceptions, strategic alignment, and complementary advantages, and the fundamental goal of this behavior is to respond to the isolation, containment, and encirclement of Western countries, their practices to this end have indeed stimulated the negative Cold War memories of various parties in the region, deepened the security concerns of Japan, South Korea, and other countries, and forced them to integrate more deeply into the trilateral alliance system of the United States, Japan, and South Korea and respond through military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and other means. They go so far as to forcibly construe the bilateral exchanges between China and Russia, China and North Korea, and Russia and North Korea into a China-Russia-North Korea trilateral linkage, replicating the confrontation between the “Northern Triangle” (China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea) and the “Southern Triangle” (the United States, Japan, and South Korea) in Northeast Asia during the Cold War.
关于东亚地区重现“新冷战”格局的讨论甚嚣尘上。有观点认为,新的铁幕一边是日本、澳大利亚和韩国等西方国家,另一边是俄罗斯、朝鲜等所谓“威权国家”。意识形态的根本对立决定了东北亚地区两大对立阵营的形成。在地区各方看来,苏联和朝鲜在冷战时期同属社会主义阵营,虽然苏联已经解体,但俄朝在历史记忆上存在共鸣。目前两国又都在遭受西方国家的空前孤立和经济制裁,使其更加依赖于彼此的支持。对于俄朝而言,虽然两国构筑“全方位”关系与深化战略合作是相似孤立环境、威胁感知、战略契合与优势互补的自然选择,其根本目标是应对西方国家的孤立、遏制和围堵,但相关实践确实激发了地区各方的负面冷战记忆,加深日韩等的安全忧虑,迫使其更深度融入美日韩三边同盟体系,通过军事合作、情报共享等手段回应;甚至将中俄、中朝、俄朝之间的双边往来,强行嵌入中俄朝三方联动的话语逻辑之中,复制冷战时期东北亚地区“北三角”(中国、苏联、朝鲜)与“南三角”(美国、日本、韩国)的对立格局。
(iii) Increasing the complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue
(三)增加朝核问题的复杂性
In 2018, the North Korean nuclear issue eased for a time. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged to promote the denuclearization of the peninsula, and the leaders of North and South Korea held a meeting and reached the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula. 39 However, the United States did not respond positively to North Korea’s requests for security in exchange for denuclearization. Instead, it cooperated with South Korea to increase pressure on North Korea, resulting in a lost opportunity for the denuclearization of the peninsula. As South Korea’s Yoon Suk Yeol government has adopted a policy of seeking peace through military deterrence, the North Korean nuclear issue has once again reached a dead end. At the same time, although investment in nuclear deterrence has been continuing in Northeast Asia, judging from the perceptions and behavior of the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the one hand and North Korea, China, and Russia on the other, a trend of “weakening nuclear deterrence effect” is emerging, characterized by the weakening of nuclear deterrence and nuclear protection and increase in nuclear proliferation.40
2018年,朝核问题曾一度得到缓和,朝鲜领导人金正恩承诺推动半岛无核化,朝韩领导人也举行会晤并达成《为实现朝鲜半岛和平、繁荣与统一的板门店宣言》,但美国随后未对朝鲜弃核换安全的诉求做出积极回应,反而协同韩国加强对朝施压,导致半岛无核化的机遇稍纵即逝。随着韩国尹锡悦政府采取以武力威慑寻求和平的政策,朝核问题再次进入死胡同。与此同时,在东北亚地区,尽管核威慑的投入一直在持续,但是从美国、日本、韩国以及朝鲜、中国、俄罗斯的认知与行为来看,以核阻止与核保护弱化、核扩散强化为表象的“核威慑效应弱化”趋势正在出现。
As a permanent member of the Security Council, Russia has voted in favor of several resolutions related to the North Korean nuclear issue and fulfilled its relevant obligations, including restricting military and technological cooperation with North Korea. However, on February 24, 2022, the Ukraine crisis escalated, relations between Russia and the West deteriorated across the board, and it seemed natural to relax restrictions on all aspects of cooperation with North Korea. In September 2023, the delegation accompanying the North Korean supreme leader on his visit to Russia included many senior military generals. The delegation also visited a Russian space launch site and some advanced military equipment. The two countries’ deepening discussions and cooperation on military and technological issues have aroused concern from the outside world. In the future, if Russo-North Korean military and security cooperation involves sensitive technologies, it may stimulate Japan and South Korea to seek production under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, making the denuclearization process on the peninsula nothing but empty talk. Even if Russia does not break the relevant UN resolutions to help North Korea improve its nuclear deterrence, the close political, economic, and security interactions between Russia and North Korea will lead to an upward spiral of threat perception and lack of mutual trust, seriously limiting the effectiveness of major powers in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and consultation.
俄罗斯作为安理会常任理事国,曾投票支持涉朝核问题的多项决议并履行相关义务,包括限制对朝鲜的军事技术合作。然而2022年2月24日乌克兰危机升级,俄罗斯与西方关系全面恶化,放松对朝各方面合作限制似乎顺理成章。2023年9月,朝鲜最高领导人访俄的随团成员包括诸多高级军事将领,访问行程也涵盖俄航天发射场和部分先进军事装备,两国深化军事技术议题的讨论与合作引发外界担忧。未来,如果俄朝军事安全合作涉及敏感技术,可能刺激日韩向美国寻求核保护伞,导致半岛无核化进程成为空谈。即便俄罗斯不突破联合国相关决议帮助朝鲜提升核威慑水平,俄朝密切的政治、经济和安全互动,也将导致螺旋上升式的威胁感知和互信缺失,严重限制大国通过对话协商解决朝核问题的有效性。
IV. Structural shortcomings in the development of a “comprehensive” relationship between Russia and North Korea
四、俄朝发展“全方位”关系的结构短板
Although Russia and North Korea’s political propaganda and related practices for building a “comprehensive” relationship are accelerating, the two countries’ strategic choices are more a matter of expediency based on short-term geopolitical interests and mutual convenience. They lack substantive and permanent interlocking interests, and even more so, lack institutional safeguards. Therefore, the deepening of Russia and North Korea’s “comprehensive” relations still faces many uncertainties and structural shortcomings.
虽然俄朝关于构建“全方位”关系的政治宣传和相关实践加速推进,但两国的战略选择更像是基于短期地缘政治利益、各取所需的权宜之计,缺乏实质性、不可替代的利益互嵌,更加缺乏机制性的保障措施。因此,俄朝“全方位”关系的深化发展仍面临诸多不确定性和结构短板。
(i) The fragility of mutually beneficial relationships
(一)互惠关系的脆弱性
At present, Russia and North Korea do have complementary needs in the areas of diplomacy, security, and economy, and this strategic and reciprocal relationship can remain stable in the short term. However, the ups and downs of Russo-North Korean relations are often closely related to changes in the international and regional situation, and external factors are the dominant variables in their bilateral interactions. Therefore, the reciprocity of Russia and North Korea’s “comprehensive” relationship depends not only on the two countries’ own resource endowments, industrial structures, or military-industrial capabilities, but also on their assessments of their respective external environments and strategic focuses. In the future, as a war situation develops and the internal political affairs of the parties concerned change, if dialogue and negotiation resume in the Ukraine crisis or the crisis enters an “intermission” of partial ceasefire, Russia’s willingness and ability to intervene in Northeast Asian affairs will be limited. Unlike North Korea, which needs to maintain national security, ensure regime stability, and develop relations with neighboring countries, Russia is not willing to become a “regional power” and will continue to strive to participate in global agenda-setting and various international and regional affairs. Therefore, Russia takes a comprehensive view when deciding on its allocation of relevant resources.
目前,俄朝两国的确具有外交、安全、经济上的互补需求,此种战略互惠关系在短期内可以保持稳定。但俄朝关系的起伏往往与国际和地区局势变化密不可分,外部因素是双边互动的主导性变量。因此,俄朝“全方位”关系的互惠性不仅取决于两国自身的资源禀赋、产业结构或军工能力,更关乎如何评估各自所处的外部环境与战略重心。未来,如果随着战局发展和当事方的内政变化,乌克兰危机恢复对话谈判,甚至是进入局部停火的“间歇期”,俄罗斯对于东北亚事务的介入意愿和能力都将受到限制。相较于朝鲜维护国家安全、确保政权稳定和发展邻国关系的需求,俄罗斯并不甘心沦为“地区性大国”,仍将努力参与全球议程设置和各类国际与地区事务,相关资源的调配需要综合考虑。
Assuming that Russia and North Korea’s “comprehensive” relationship is promoted according to the logic of “support for aid, ammunition for technology” as the West sees it, the two countries’ dynamic assessment of the costs incurred and the actual benefits may also lead to rifts when they fail to meet expectations. For example, as early as 2014, North Korea was one of the few countries that recognized the results of Crimea’s “referendum to join Russia,” hoping to obtain economic incentives from Russia for its political support. However, these expectations were ultimately dashed. There were no signs that North Korea received any reward for its stance in support of Russia.41 Therefore, although Russia and North Korea have made firm political gestures towards building a “comprehensive” relationship, the fragility of reciprocity may affect the resilience of their interactions. In addition, for North Korea, Russia’s policy of “favoring the South over the North” in the early days after the end of the Cold War certainly cast a shadow on North Korea’s impression of Russia, but what worries it most is Russia’s attitude on the issue of North-South reunification.42 The progression of the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea’s attitude towards military aid to Ukraine, and many other factors also affect the reciprocity of Russo-North Korean relations.
假设俄朝“全方位”关系按照西方所称的“立场换援助、弹药换技术”逻辑推进,两国对于所付成本与实际收益的动态评估,也可能因未达预期而产生隔阂。例如,早在2014年,朝鲜就是少数承认克里米亚“公投入俄”结果的国家之一,并希望通过政治上的支持得到俄罗斯的经济激励。但是,这种期待最终落空,没有迹象表明朝鲜因此立场获得任何回报。因此,虽然俄朝两国对于构建“全方位”关系做出了坚定的政治姿态,但脆弱的互惠性可能影响双方互动的韧性。此外,对于朝鲜来说,俄罗斯在冷战结束初期“重南轻北”的政策固然给朝鲜留下了严重的阴影,但最令它感到担忧的还是俄罗斯在南北统一问题上的态度。朝核问题的发展进程,韩国对于军援乌克兰的态度等诸多因素,也是影响俄朝关系互惠性的因素之一。
(ii) Singleness of common interests
(二)利益纽带的单一性
Overall, Russia and North Korea’s “comprehensive” relationship is mainly based on common geopolitical and security interests, and is characterized by a focus on political security with little attention to economic development. In 2020, the bilateral trade volume between Russia and North Korea was only U.S. $42 million, and North Korea ranked only 139th among Russia’s trading partners. Due to the long-term UN sanctions against North Korea, many normal goods are subject to trade restrictions.43 In terms of certain specific industries, such as energy and military industry trade, labor export, and transportation channel construction, Russia and North Korea do have a certain degree of complementarity. However, given the structural transformation of the Russian economy under sanctions, it will be difficult for North Korea to become an import substitute source for key raw materials and equipment that Russia urgently needs, such as electronic components, electromechanical products, automotive and transportation equipment, and chemical products. It will also be difficult for North Korea to become a recipient of Russian energy cooperation in the Asia-Pacific market. Russia’s military and technological cooperation with North Korea will also be difficult as it will easily cross the red lines of sanctions in relevant UN resolutions. Russia wants to use North Korea as a connection point to open up energy and transportation channels in Northeast Asia, which will help the long-term development of Russia’s Far East region. However, there is no actionable external environment in the short term. In addition, the production capacity of the North Korean military-industrial complex may not be able to meet the combat needs of the Russian army.44 The economic structures of Russia and North Korea determine that mutually beneficial cooperation can only focus on limited issues and is more about maintaining consistency in political interests. Therefore, since the ties of common interests holding together Russia and North Korea are not varied or diverse, this will greatly limit the sustainability and positive spillover effects of the “comprehensive” relationship between Russia and North Korea.
总体来看,俄朝“全方位”关系主要建立在共同的地缘政治和安全利益之上,具有“重政治安全,轻经济发展”的特征。2020年,俄朝双边贸易额仅为4200万美元,朝鲜在俄罗斯的贸易伙伴中排名只占到第139位。由于联合国长期对朝制裁,许多正常的贸易也受到限制。就特定产业而言,俄朝的确存在一定的互补性,包括能源和军工贸易、劳务输出、运输通道建设等。然而,随着俄罗斯经济在制裁条件下的结构性转型,朝鲜很难成为俄急需的电子元器件、机电产品、汽车和运输设备、化工产品等关键原材料和设备的进口替代方,无法成为俄罗斯能源合作转向亚太市场的承接方,俄对朝的军事技术合作也很难轻易突破联合国相关决议的制裁红线。俄罗斯以朝鲜为连接点打通东北亚能源和运输通道,助力俄远东地区开发的远期规划,短期内也不具备可供操作的外部环境。此外,朝鲜军工联合体的产能恐无法满足俄罗斯军队的作战需求。俄朝两国的经济结构决定了互利合作只能聚焦有限议题,更多是在政治利益上保持一致。因此,由于维系俄朝共同利益的纽带较为单一,这将极大限制俄朝“全方位”关系的可持续性和正面外溢效应。
(iii) The trap of pursuing “triangular linkage”
(三)追求“三角联动”的路径陷阱
As the relationship between Russia and North Korea continues to deepen, the West is trying to fabricate an “axis of evil” composed of China, Russia, and North Korea and regards these three countries as a new triangle of “imperialism.” 45 At the same time, although Russia opposes interpreting the “comprehensive” relationship between Russia and North Korea based on the Cold War mentality, it does not reject the framework of trilateral cooperation among Russia, China, and North Korea. During his visit to North Korea, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu also proposed that China, Russia, and North Korea hold joint maritime military exercises. It is undeniable that in the face of the growing hegemonism, unilateralism, and power politics in the region, China, Russia, and North Korea do share a basic consensus on opposing the Cold War mentality, the confrontation between blocs, and the formation of “small circles” targeting specific countries. However, the “alliance security” model guided by binary “us-versus-them” thinking is not in line with the Global Security Initiative advocated by China. In particular, it is contrary to the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security. The development of the three sets of bilateral relations between China and Russia, China and North Korea, and North Korea and Russia are all based on equality and mutual benefit. There is neither mutual linkage nor dependence between any pair, nor confrontation or aggression against any third party. Therefore, if the goal is to achieve a “triangular linkage” between China, Russia, and North Korea in Northeast Asia, especially if a replication of the confrontation pattern of the “North and South Triangles” as a response to the “quasi-alliance relationship” between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is the strategic orientation of the “comprehensive” relationship between Russia and North Korea, it will face many internal and external obstacles. Moreover, this view will undoubtedly exacerbate the security and governance difficulties in Northeast Asia.
在俄朝关系不断深化之际,西方试图将中俄朝捏造为“邪恶轴心”,将三国视为“帝国主义”的新三角关系。同时,虽然俄罗斯反对基于冷战思维解读俄朝“全方位”关系,但对于俄中朝的三边合作框架并不排斥。俄国防部长绍伊古在访朝期间,还曾提议中俄朝三国举行海上联合军事演习。不可否认,面对本地区不断强化的霸权主义、单边主义、强权政治行径,中俄朝三国的确存在反对冷战思维、阵营对抗,反对搞针对特定国家“小圈子”的基本共识,但以二元对立“敌我思维”为指导的“同盟安全”模式,不符合中国倡导的“全球安全倡议”,尤其是与共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观相悖。中俄、中朝、朝俄三组双边关系的发展都建立在平等互利的基础上,既不存在相互间的联动性、依附性,也不具备针对第三方的对抗性和侵略性。因此,如果将实现中俄朝在东北亚的“三角联动”作为目标,特别是以复刻“南北三角”的对峙格局,应对美日韩“准同盟关系”作为俄朝“全方位”关系的战略取向,将面临诸多的内外阻碍。而且此种观点无疑还将加剧东北亚地区的安全困境和治理困境。
V. Conclusion
五、结语
Looking back at the history of post-war Russian/Soviet-North Korean relations, we can see that the perception of each other’s strategic environment and identity, as well as the evolutionary characteristics of the international and regional order, are important factors influencing the development of relations between the two countries. Currently, based on similar environmental perceptions, interest perceptions, and strategic needs, Russia and North Korea are trying to deepen cooperation in multiple areas, such as politics, diplomacy, economics, and military security, and have proposed the idea of building a “comprehensive” relationship. However, essentially, there are significant differences between the two countries in terms of global and regional agendas, comprehensive strength, and intervention capabilities. Although due to the influence of the special variable of the Ukrainian crisis, the two countries’ perception of the international order, strategic alignment, and cooperation complementarity have become the main driving forces for deepening cooperation, there is still great uncertainty as to whether they can overcome the fragility of their reciprocal relations and the singleness of their common interests. It also remains to be seen whether the Ukrainian crisis will become a key juncture that shifts the two countries’ foreign strategies. It should be noted that, with the deepening development of the “comprehensive” relationship between Russia and North Korea, Russia may use this as a path to strengthen its geopolitical role and security interests, while North Korea may use this as a lever to reshape the regional balance of power. The United States and other countries from outside the region will also take this opportunity to strengthen the security narrative of the “resurgence of the Cold War” and replicate the “North and South Triangles” confrontation pattern. We will gradually come to see the spillover effects of these actions on the security of Northeast Asia and the game between major powers.
回顾战后俄(苏)朝关系的历史可以看到,对于各自的战略环境感知和身份定位以及国际和地区秩序的演进特征,是两国关系发展的重要影响因子。目前,俄罗斯与朝鲜基于相似的环境感知、利益认知和战略需求,尝试在政治、外交、经济和军事安全等多个领域深化合作,并提出构建“全方位”关系的构想。但从本质上看,两国在全球和地区议程、综合实力和介入能力方面存在较大差异性。虽然在乌克兰危机这一特殊变量影响下,两国的秩序认同度、战略契合度与合作互补性成为深化合作的主要驱动力,但是否能够超越互惠关系的脆弱性和利益纽带的单一性仍存在较大不确定性,乌克兰危机是否成为两国对外战略转向的关键节点也有待观察。需要看到的是,随着俄朝“全方位”关系的深入发展,俄罗斯可能以此为路径强化自身的地缘政治角色和安全利益,朝鲜可能以此为杠杆重塑地区力量平衡,美国等域外国家也将顺势强化“冷战回潮”的安全叙事,复刻“南北三角”式的对峙格局,上述种种对于东北亚地区安全和大国博弈态势的溢出效应将逐步显现。