China is a developing country with global influence, and Latin America and the Caribbean (here collectively called “Latin America”) is the region with the highest concentration of middle- and high-income emerging economies in the world. Latin America consists of 33 countries and 12 independent territories, with a population of over 640 million and a total area of over 20.7 million square kilometers. It accounts for about 13.8% of the world’s land area, including about 1/3 of the world’s total arable land and 23% of the world’s total forest cover. It has the largest reserves of more than 20 basic mineral resources required by modern industry, as well as abundant oil and gas resources.¹ Latin America’s geographical space, natural resource endowments, and cultural openness provide strategic support for its sustainable development. Since the beginning of the 21st century, after more than ten years of preliminary development that laid the foundation, China–Latin America relations are moving towards a new stage of putting down roots and developing in a sustainable manner. The establishment of the China–CELAC Forum mechanism in 2015 marked a major transformation in China–Latin America relations from “going with the flow” to “active planning.” Driven by high-level interactions, major breakthroughs were made in the construction of an overall China–Latin America cooperation mechanism, and the comprehensive cooperative relationship between the two sides has become increasingly close. Amid major adjustments and changes in the global pattern, China–Latin America relations are also undergoing a strategic transformation. The internal and external environment for the development of China–Latin America relations is undergoing complex and profound changes, and the two sides have experienced major changes in their strategic goals, strategic paths, cooperation concepts, and development drivers. Given that the statuses and roles of China and Latin America in the world are on the rise, China–Latin America relations are becoming increasingly global in nature. A deep understanding of the characteristics, motivations, and challenges in the transformation of China–Latin America relations will help the two sides further tap into each other’s strengths and promote the ongoing positive development of bilateral relations.

I. The transformation of China–Latin America Relations and its Characteristics

Since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, it has been unwavering in its active participation in the process of economic globalization. China’s exchanges and interactions with various regions of the world have deepened to an unprecedented level, and the integration of Chinese interests with those of other regions has become increasingly close. Against this grand historical background, Latin America, located far away in the Western Hemisphere, has become China’s “new frontier” for exploring global markets, absorbing world resources, and exporting foreign investment. The development of China–Latin America relations has also entered a new stage of development, shifting over to the “fast lane.”² Stimulated by the “super boom cycle” in commodities, China and Latin America have moved closer to each other based on their own development interests. In the decade from 2003 to 2013, Latin America became the fastest-growing region in China’s foreign trade and investment, and practical cooperation in economics and trade cooperation has achieved “leapfrog” development.

Since the 1990s, China has gradually established communication mechanisms with some countries in Latin America, but the development of bilateral relations has mainly proceeded from an economic perspective, focusing on traditional economic and trade areas, while the political agenda has been left far behind. There are two main reasons for this: First, the integration process in Latin America has been slow, the regional pattern of political “fragmentation” is more prominent, there is a lack of unified coordination organizations at the regional level, and China–Latin America structured dialogue lacks a supporting platform. Second, the United States has always regarded Latin America as its “geopolitical backyard.” In the context of the interventions that have come under the “shadow of U.S. rule,” Latin American countries generally have great doubts about China.³

Entering the second decade of the 21st century, with the acceleration of globalization and regional integration in Latin America, the above obstacles are gradually being removed. On the one hand, the awakening of a consciousness of unity and self-reliance among Latin American countries in 2011 led to the birth of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). This organization is the largest regional integration organization in the Western Hemisphere, covering all countries in the Americas except the United States and Canada. It has broad regional representation and political independence and laid the foundation that has allowed China’s new leadership to conduct comprehensive multilateral diplomacy. The establishment of the CELAC will not only reshape the relationship between Latin America and the United States but will also prompt Latin American countries to strengthen their ties with countries outside the region (especially China). On the other hand, China’s GDP ranks second in the world, its influence in global and regional affairs has increased significantly, and it has made historic progress in its relations with developed countries, neighboring countries, and developing countries. Based on their own development interests, more and more Latin American countries have begun to consider the “China factor” when formulating foreign policies. In this context, Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first foreign visit to three Latin American countries in 2013, laying the foundation for the launch of the China–Latin America cooperation mechanism. In January 2014, the CELAC Summit adopted the Special Statement on Supporting the Establishment of the China–CELAC Forum. In July of the same year, during President Xi Jinping’s attendance at the BRICS Meeting in Brazil, China and Latin America jointly announced the establishment of the China–CELAC Forum mechanism. At the time, this marked a historic breakthrough in the development of China–Latin America relations.

In early 2015, the first ministerial meeting of the China–CELAC Forum was successfully held in Beijing, marking a new stage in which bilateral cooperation and overall cooperation between China and Latin America would go hand in hand and mutually encourage each other, and opening a new chapter in China–Latin America cooperation. With the establishment of the China–CELAC Forum mechanism in 2015 marking a milestone, China–Latin America cooperation has entered a period of strategic transformation, achieving a shift from “going with the flow” to “active planning.” “Seeking cooperation, promoting development, and seeking mutually beneficial results” has become the main theme of the development of China–Latin America relations. Driven by China’s vigorous diplomatic practice and relying on the China–CELAC Forum mechanism platform, China–Latin America relations have achieved a strategic transformation from “spontaneous reaction development” to “autonomous construction development.”⁴ Overall cooperation between China and Latin America has been steadily advancing in all fields, a mutually beneficial development pattern is gradually taking shape, and China–Latin America cooperation is entering a new era. The “Pacific consciousness” of Latin American countries and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are moving in the same direction. By building consensus around ideas and development, the top-level planning and implementation of both sides are mutually reinforcing, forming an organically connected chain from “strategic goals” to “strategic paths,” from “cooperation concepts” to “development drivers,” with the aim of achieving shared development results through the alignment of development strategies. The main characteristics of the transformation of China–Latin America relations are as follows:

First, using the Belt and Road Initiative as a means to build a “China–Latin America community of common destiny” is the “strategic goal” of comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech entitled Striving to Build a Community of Common Destiny for Humanity at the China–Latin America and the Caribbean Leaders’ Meeting held in Brazil, proposing the development vision of building a “China–Latin America Community of Common Destiny” and clarifying for the first time the ultimate goal of China–Latin America cooperation. In January 2018, the Second Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum adopted the Special Declaration on the Belt and Road Initiative. This was the first time that China and Latin America made it clear in an official document that Latin American and Caribbean countries are a “natural extension” of the Maritime Silk Road and indispensable participants in Belt and Road international cooperation. This symbolized that Latin America had officially joined the “big family” of the Belt and Road Initiative. At present, 16 Latin American countries have signed memorandums of understanding with China on jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt and Road Initiative provides a new opportunity for China and Latin America to jointly create a new landscape of China–Latin America cooperation with a wider scope, better structure, stronger momentum, and higher quality.⁵

Second, insisting on the parallel and mutual promotion of overall cooperation and bilateral relations is the “strategic path” for implementing comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America. Comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America is carried out at three levels: regional cooperation, sub-regional cooperation, and bilateral cooperation. At the regional cooperation level, China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean issued in November 2016 is a programmatic document guiding the comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America in the context of the new situation. The document clearly points out that the China–CELAC Forum mechanism should be used as a platform to promote multilateral cooperation between China and Latin American and Caribbean countries and build a comprehensive and balanced overall cooperation network for China and Latin America. At the sub-regional level, there are more than a dozen sub-regional integration organizations in Latin America with varying degrees of integration, such as the Southern Common Market, the Andean Community, the Caribbean Community, the Union of South American Nations, and the Pacific Alliance. In one respect, different sub-regional organizations communicate with each other through the overlaps of their member states. In another respect, institutional arrangements among Latin American countries link different sub-regional integration organizations, so that sub-regional cooperation and overall cooperation can proceed in parallel.⁶ At the bilateral cooperation level, China, based on consolidating existing bilateral cooperation, actively promotes practical bilateral economic and trade cooperation by signing bilateral free trade agreements or economic complementarity agreements. Currently, China has signed free trade agreements with Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile, and is negotiating free trade agreements with Colombia and other countries.

Third, mutual benefit and refraining from targeting any third party are the “cooperation concepts” of China–Latin America comprehensive cooperation. China–Latin America relations are built on the foundation of “South-South cooperation” and are guided by the principles of mutual respect, equality, sincere cooperation, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit, which are fundamentally different from “North-South relations.”⁷ “North-South relations” refer to the relationships between developing countries and developed countries. These relations are full of contradictions and confrontations, as well as interdependence and cooperation. Their essence is to break the control and exploitation of developed countries over developing countries. “South-South cooperation” refers to cooperation among developing countries, most of which are located in the southern hemisphere. It aims to achieve common development goals through sharing knowledge, skills, expertise, and resources. It is an important way for developing countries to become self-reliant and seek progress. China and Latin American countries are all developing countries. They stand at similar stages of development and shoulder the same development tasks. Establishing a new type of economic cooperation relationship on the basis of equality and mutual benefit will help China and Latin America to deeply integrate into the world economic system, enhance each other’s status and role in global governance, and fully implement the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁸ China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean states: “The China–Latin America comprehensive cooperative partnership is based on equality and mutual benefit, with common development as its goal. It does not target or exclude any third party.”⁹ The development of China’s foreign relations is a comprehensive project. Friendly cooperation between China and Latin America is an organic part of China’s comprehensive diplomacy and will not supersede the existing exchanges and cooperation between the two sides with other countries and regions.

Fourth, trade, investment, finance, and production capacity cooperation are the “driving forces for development” of comprehensive cooperation between China and Latin America. Since 2013, Chinese leaders have proposed a series of major initiatives and measures to strengthen China–Latin America relations and cooperation in various fields, giving new impetus to the development of China–Latin America relations. In January 2015, China proposed to jointly build a new “1+3+6” framework for China–Latin America cooperation. “1” refers to “one plan,” namely the China–Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (2015–2019); “3” refers to “three major engines”, namely, using trade, investment, and financial cooperation as the driving forces to promote the comprehensive development of practical cooperation between China and Latin America, and striving to achieve a trade volume of U.S. $500 billion and raise the stock of Chinese investment in Latin America to U.S. $250 billion within ten years; and “6” refers to “six major areas”, namely, focusing on energy resources, infrastructure construction, agriculture, manufacturing, scientific and technological (S&T) innovation, and information technology to promote the alignment of China and Latin America industries.¹⁰ Within the framework of jointly building the Belt and Road, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed a new model of China–Latin America “3×3” production capacity cooperation when in Brazil in 2015. Namely, he proposed to use joint construction of three major channels in Latin America—logistics, electricity, and information—to achieve a virtuous interaction among enterprises, society, and government, and to expand the three financing channels of funds, credit, and insurance.¹¹ Production capacity cooperation is a new breakthrough point in China–Latin America economic and trade cooperation. It not only meets the needs of Latin American countries for developing industry and infrastructure but will also promote the transformation and upgrade of China’s economic structure. It is also conducive to achieving developmental alignment between China and Latin America at a higher level.

II. Motivations for the transformation of China–Latin America relations

At present, China–Latin America relations have taken shape as an all-around, multi-level, and wide-ranging development layout bringing together both the government and private sector. The integration of China and Latin America’s interests has reached an unprecedented depth, bilateral relations have reached an unprecedented height, and bilateral relations are in their best period in history. In terms of development motivations, the progressive development of economic and trade cooperation, political mutual trust, summit diplomacy, and people-to-people exchanges is the endogenous driving force for the transformation of China–Latin America relations, while the changing era of global politics is the exogenous driving force for the transformation of China–Latin America relations.

First, economic ties are the catalyst driving the transformation of China–Latin America relations. Trade, investment, and financial cooperation are the three major engines driving China–Latin America economic integration and symbiosis. First of all, the complementary advantages of their respective trade structures have driven the continued flourishing of China–Latin America trade. China’s huge demand for food, energy, metals, and minerals has benefited Latin American countries that export these products, as reflected in the continued rise in commodity prices and rapid export growth. According to statistics from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), from 2001 to 2010, Latin America’s average annual growth rate in commodity exports was 10.8%, with the price effect accounting for 5.5% and increased export volume accounting for 5.3%. Some scholars call this China–driven commodity price increase and export boom the “China effect.”¹² In 2000, the volume of China–Latin America trade was only U.S. $12.6 billion. By 2011, it exceeded U.S. $200 billion, reached nearly U.S. $270 billion in 2017, and exceeded U.S. $300 billion in 2018, reaching a historic high.¹³ At present, China is Latin America’s second-largest trading partner after the United States, and the largest trading partner of several individual South American countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru. In addition, China’s investment in Latin America is trending upward. Currently, Latin America is the second largest destination for China’s overseas investment after Asia. As of the end of 2017, China’s investment stock in Latin America stood at U.S. $386.9 billion, accounting for 21.4% of total Chinese overseas investments.¹⁴ China’s investment structure in Latin America is becoming increasingly diversified. In addition to investment in the traditional infrastructure, energy, and mining sectors, it is also expanding into fields such as finance, agriculture, manufacturing, IT, services, e-commerce, and air transportation. Finally, financial cooperation has become a new driver that is further promoting the development of economic and trade cooperation. Data released by Inter-American Dialogue (IAD) and Boston University’s China–Latin America Finance Database (CLAF) show that from 2005 to 2017, Chinese policy banks provided more than U.S. $150 billion in development financing to Latin America, exceeding the combined total of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).¹⁵ Compared with Western multilateral financial institutions, China’s financing is not subject to policy conditions and combines a long-term strategic nature and strategic flexibility. Nearly 80% of China’s loans are used for infrastructure construction, which not only benefits Latin American countries in general, but also corrects the problem of insufficient infrastructure investment caused by market failures.¹⁶ This shows us that the common demand for economic growth has become an important catalyst for the rapid warming of China–Latin America relations.

Second, political mutual trust is the ballast for the promotion of the transformation of China–Latin America relations. There are no territorial disputes or ideological disagreements between China and Latin America, and there are no fundamental contradictions or conflicts of interest. Since 1949, the development of China–Latin America relations have gone from non-existent to existent and then from small-scale, low-level exchanges to large-scale, high-level advancement. The political mutual trust and recognition of values formed through years of slow and steady friendly cooperation are the foundation for the rapid advance of the development of China–Latin America relations in the new century.¹⁷ Political mutual trust between China and Latin America is reflected at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. At the level of bilateral diplomacy, China has established “strategic partnerships” with 10 countries: Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), Argentina (2004), Peru (2008), Chile (2012), Costa Rica (2015), Ecuador (2015), Uruguay (2016), and Bolivia (2018). Latin American countries are indispensable participants in China’s “global partnership network.” Currently, the number of Latin American countries that have established diplomatic relations with China has increased to 24. After Panama established diplomatic relations with China in 2017, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador also established diplomatic relations with China in 2018. China’s “circle of friends” in Latin America continues to expand. At the level of multilateral diplomacy, China and Latin America have maintained close cooperation within multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, the G20, and the BRICS, and have done a good job in communication and coordination on major issues such as UN reform, the international financial crisis, climate change, and food security.¹⁸ In 2016, Brazil joined the China–initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and became a founding member. In 2017, Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Ecuador also announced that they would join the bank. The deepening political mutual trust between China and Latin America has become ballast for the continued positive development of China–Latin America relations.

Third, summit diplomacy is the top-level driving force for the transformation of China–Latin America relations. Summit diplomacy generally refers to a high-level diplomatic method in which the head of state or head of government who holds the highest authority in a country directly participates in and handles foreign affairs in various ways.¹⁹ Compared with traditional diplomatic methods, summit diplomacy has the characteristics of special status, direct effect, and rapidity and timeliness.²⁰ In recent years, with the gradual strengthening of China–Latin America economic and trade cooperation, the heat and intensity of China–Latin America summit diplomacy have been increasing. This intensive summit diplomacy, in turn, has continuously driven the high-level operation of bilateral relations, thus forming a virtuous self-reinforcing cycle. Since 2013, President Xi Jinping has attached great importance to high-level exchanges between countries. In the past six years, he has visited Latin America four times, visiting more than a dozen Latin American countries, including major South American countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, and Peru, as well as smaller Central American and Caribbean countries such as Panama, Costa Rica, and Trinidad and Tobago. President Xi Jinping personally practices summit diplomacy, plans bilateral cooperation from a strategic perspective, and through intensive meetings with heads of state and government of Latin American countries, provides a “top-level driving force” that pushes China and Latin America to directly transform their mutual development needs into tangible results.

Fourth, people-to-people and cultural exchanges are the public opinion foundation for promoting the transformation of China–Latin America relations. The key to people-to-people bonds is mutual understanding. People-to-people connectivity is not only an important part of the Belt and Road Initiative, but also the fundamental pillar for consolidating the “China–Latin America Community of Common Destiny.” Cultural exchanges and mutual learning about each other’s civilizations between China and Latin America have enhanced mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of China and Latin America, built a bridge of “heart-to-heart communication,” and are the support and guarantee for the long-term steady development of China–Latin America relations. Since the launch of the China–CELAC Forum in 2015, China and Latin America have established dialogue and cooperation platforms covering fields such as political parties, infrastructure, agriculture, enterprises, S&T innovation, youth, think tanks, law, environment, local government cooperation, and people-to-people friendship. More than 20,000 people have directly participated in these activities, providing a mechanism to ensure the implementation of the development consensus and cooperation plans of both sides. At the same time, from 2015 to 2018, China invited more than 1,000 Latin American party leaders to visit China and more than 4,000 Latin American talents to study in China. In addition, Latin America has become the global region where Confucius Institutes are growing most rapidly. China has established 39 Confucius Institutes and 20 Confucius Classrooms in Latin America, and more and more Latin American people are interested in learning about Chinese culture. The “China–Latin America Cultural Exchange Year” established in 2016 has extended to many provinces and cities in China and nearly 30 Latin American and Caribbean countries. It is the largest cultural event jointly held by China and Latin America to date, bringing the two sides closer together.²¹ Although Chinese civilization and Latin American civilization are independent systems with their own distinctive characteristics, they both contain common ideas and pursuits that are the cumulative result of human development and progress, and both attach importance to values such as moderation, peace, diversity, openness, loyalty, forgiveness, and tolerance. The Chinese and Latin American people have discovered more shared values by coming to learn more about each other, which has ultimately produced a convergence effect, giving people in China and Latin America a fuller and more nuanced understanding of the other side.

Fifth, global political changes are the external driving force for the transformation of China–Latin America relations. The world is in a critical period of and the collective rise of emerging countries is reshaping the global political and economic landscape. The transformation of China–Latin America relations is consistent with the changing times in global politics. On the one hand, the status of the countries of the Global South in the world economy has seen an unprecedented rise, and the original “center-periphery” economic structure is being reshaped. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) believes that in the coming 20 years, the focus of the world economy will shift from OECD countries to emerging economies, a phenomenon known as the “global wealth transfer.”²² In terms of trade and investment structure, in 1970, the countries of the Global South accounted for only 24% of global trade and 18% of global investment. By 2012, these shares had risen to 51% and 50%, respectively. In terms of GDP structure, in 1970 the total GDP of Global South accounted for only 20% of the world’s total. By 2012, it had risen to 40%, and is expected to reach 55% by 2025.²³ On the other hand, the status of the Global South in world politics has rapidly increased, and global governance has transitioned from the “North-dominated” stage to a stage of “North-South co-governance.” The change in the comparative allocation of economic power in the “North-South structure” has prompted the countries of the Global South to begin to join the ranks of the core countries of global governance. The idea that global governance does not mean governance by major powers, much less governance by Western powers, is gaining increased popularity and becoming a consensus in the international community.²⁴ Although China’s status as a developing country has not changed, its own strength and external environment have undergone tremendous changes. China’s own policy orientation and development path have a more profound impact on the outside world and have taken their place at the center of the world stage. As the region with the highest concentration of developing countries, Latin America’s status in the world’s political and economic landscape has been on the rise, and it has become an indispensable force in global governance. Changes in the external environment have made China–Latin America relations increasingly global in nature. China and Latin America are working together and moving toward each other in global affairs, which has become an external driving force for the transformation of China–Latin America relations.

III. Challenges facing China–Latin America relations

In their cooperation and development, China and Latin America need each other, have complementary advantages, and present each other with opportunities. Since Latin America is geographically the farthest region from China, it has become the “final frontier” for China’s trade and investment. The rapid development of China–Latin America economic and trade relations shows that China has become a global trading and investment country.²⁵ At present, Latin American diplomacy is an important part of China’s overall diplomacy and a touchstone against which China can measure the advance of its diplomacy as a global power. With the growth of China’s national strength and the advancement of the “Belt and Road” Initiative, Latin America has become a priority direction for China’s major power diplomacy. However, the “deep integration” in China–Latin America relations also faces a series of challenges.

First, in terms of Latin America, changes to the regional situation pose challenges to the development of China–Latin America relations. Latin America is currently undergoing its most drastic political, economic, and diplomatic changes in more than a decade. The main reasons are as follows. One, the political structure is “suppression of the left and promotion of the right.” In the first 15 years of the 21st century, left-wing parties came to power in more than a dozen countries in Latin America. This phenomenon of the rise of the left was called the “pink wave.” However, due to the improper policies of left-wing parties and the global economic recession, the political ecosystem in Latin America has shown a trend toward “suppression of the left and promotion of the right” since 2015, with right-wing parties in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and other countries coming to power through elections. This trend has gained further strength in 2018, an election year in Latin America, with 10 countries holding general elections. In countries such as Brazil, Paraguay, and Colombia, right-wing opposition and anti-establishment parties gained power, while left-wing parties have fallen into decline. In terms of time, the rapid development of China–Latin America relations overlapped with the “pink wave” in Latin America. Although the rapprochement between China and Latin America is based on the strategic needs of both sides rather than ideological similarities, right-wing parties will inevitably adjust their economic policies, which will indirectly affect the development of China–Latin America relations. Two, the economic recovery has been sluggish. Affected by the Argentine financial crisis, the economic downturn in Brazil, and the turmoil in Venezuela, Latin America’s economic growth rate in 2018 was 0.6%, lower than the average growth rate of the global economy in the same year (3.3%). The World Bank predicts an economic growth rate of 1.6% for Latin America in 2019.²⁶ Although the high level of international commodity prices helped spur Latin America’s economic growth, the “spillover risks” of Sino–U.S. trade frictions have made Latin America’s economic recovery more “fragile.” Slow economic growth in Latin America has put forward higher requirements for the “quality improvement and upgrade” of China–Latin America economic cooperation. Three, diplomatic differences have intensified. The profound changes in Latin America’s political landscape have brought about a split in diplomatic stances. In April 2018, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru announced that they would indefinitely suspend their participation in the activities of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). In May of the same year, the 13 Latin American member states of the Lima Group announced that they would not recognize the results of the Venezuelan presidential election and the legitimacy of the Maduro government. In August, Colombia withdrew from the Union of South American Nations and Ecuador withdrew from the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). The rift in diplomatic relations between Latin American countries has weakened the level of solidarity and cooperation among Latin American countries and also requires China to be more tactful and careful in attempting to strike a good balance when managing relations with individuals and groups. Four, there is insufficient internal development momentum within CELAC. The establishment of CELAC was a beneficial attempt to promote Latin American regional integration. It aimed to strengthen political coordination among countries in the region, reduce U.S. interference in Latin American affairs, and promote the diversified development of foreign relations. However, as a political entity, the development of CELAC is constrained by two regional powers: Brazil and Mexico. Brazil is the largest country in South America and hopes to reshape its “absolute leadership” in South America through CELAC. Mexico, which is geographically close to North America, hopes to strengthen its political identity in South America and reverse its declining regional influence.²⁷ In addition, CELAC does not have a secretariat or a financial budget to support its policy agenda. The lack of these mechanisms will also limit its coordination capabilities. The China–CELAC Forum mechanism is a multilateral cooperation mechanism established based on the CELAC. In the future, the limited development prospects of CELAC will also affect the overall cooperation between China and Latin America.

Second, in terms of China, the imbalance in the economic and trade structure between China and Latin America and China’s insufficient understanding of Latin America restrict the development of bilateral relations. Reason one, the trade structure between China and Latin America is unbalanced. China’s strong demand for primary commodities has driven an export boom in Latin American countries. However, the commodities China imports from Latin America are mainly primary products such as soybeans, iron ore, crude oil, and copper. This trade model has given rise to concerns about “deindustrialization” among Latin American countries.²⁸ According to data released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, from 2011 to 2016, in Latin America’s global export structure, primary product exports accounted for 50% and manufactured product exports accounted for 48.4%, respectively. In Latin America’s export structure to China, primary product exports accounted for 87.2%, while industrial manufactured products accounted for only 12.7%.²⁹ As the prices of primary products entered a downward cycle from 2013 to 2016, the total value of Latin American exports to China fell by 25%. In 2017, the value of exports increased by 16% due to the rebound in primary product prices.³⁰ The structure of Latin America’s exports to China is highly concentrated in natural resource products, making Latin America highly sensitive to fluctuations of the commodity boom and bust cycle. Reason two, China’s investment and financing in Latin America are unevenly distributed. China’s investment areas in Latin America continue to expand. In 2003, Chinese investment coverage in Latin America was 49%, which increased to 67.4% in 2017. In 2008, China had only 600 overseas enterprises in Latin America. By 2017, the number had grown to 2,200, an average annual growth rate of nearly 20%. However, in 2017, the global coverage of China’s overseas investment reached 81%, which is significantly higher than China’s investment coverage in Latin America.³¹ In terms of regional distribution, China’s investments in Latin America are overly concentrated in specific countries or regions, such as the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Ecuador, which account for more than 90% of China’s investment stock in Latin America. Financial cooperation is a new engine driving the rapid development of China–Latin America economic and trade relations. However, relying on the “loan-for-oil” model, more than half of China’s financial loans to Latin America are concentrated in Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Argentina.³² Reason three, China’s understanding of Latin America needs to deepen further. Latin American culture is deeply influenced by European Christian culture and also integrates Indigenous American culture and Black African culture. It is a rich, layered, diverse, and complex culture,³³ which is quite different from Chinese culture in terms of language, institutions, values, and behavioral habits. As China–Latin America relations deepen, China’s understanding of Latin America is constantly evolving. Overall, however, Chinese research on Latin America is still in the exploratory stage. In the study of Latin America, “abstract concepts outnumber concrete knowledge, and vague impressions outnumber specific experiences.”³⁴ As a global power, China should deepen its understanding and perception of Latin American culture and civilization in order to raise China–Latin America relations to a higher level of development.

Third, in terms of the United States, increased U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs will restrict the development of China–Latin America relations. Given Latin America’s geostrategic value as the U.S. “backyard” and the United States’ tradition of the “Monroe Doctrine,” Latin America has always occupied an important position in the global strategic deployment of the United States. Over the past few centuries, the fate of Latin America has largely “depended on its relationship with international power centers,” and the infiltration of external forces—especially the United States—has undermined Latin America’s independence. Due to the absolute advantage of the United States in comprehensive national strength and geopolitical position, Latin America has always been “independent but dependent, autonomous but subordinate.”³⁵ Although the influence of the United States in Latin America has declined in recent years, the United States remains Latin America’s most important trading partner and investor, and its hegemonic position has not been fundamentally shaken. Since the Trump administration came to power in the United States, it has increased its intervention in the affairs of Latin America, mainly in the issues of Venezuela and Cuba. According to the New York Times, after Trump took office, the White House Security Council began to draft a gradually escalating “intervention roadmap” targeting Venezuela, which set out the circumstances under which the United States would militarily intervene in Venezuela, with the ultimate goal of overthrowing the left-wing government led by President Maduro.³⁶ Since 2016, the United States has repeatedly imposed economic and financial sanctions on Venezuelan politicians and business people, including the Venezuelan president, worsening Venezuela’s economic difficulties and attempting to force President Maduro to step down through “economic strangulation.” On the issue of Cuba, the Trump administration reversed the policy of U.S.-Cuba reconciliation pursued by the Obama administration, and bilateral relations deteriorated sharply. After nearly 60 years of hostility, the United States and Cuba restored diplomatic relations in July 2015. After taking office, Trump condemned Cuba for its “dictatorship,” re-imposed travel and trade restrictions on Cuba, and imposed economic and commercial sanctions on 26 Cuban entities. U.S.-Cuba relations were once again “frozen.” In addition, the United States has also worked to suppress left-wing governments such as those in Bolivia and Nicaragua. As Latin American politics shifts to the right, the United States has tried to convince some right-wing countries to “take sides” and use issues such as Venezuela and Cuba to create regional divisions, thereby producing a negative impact on the unity of Latin American countries and the project of regional integration. The United States’ increased involvement in Latin American affairs has directly affected the political and social stability of the region and has also had a certain negative impact on cooperation between China and Latin America.

Fourth, looking at the development trend of Sino–U.S. relations, the intensification of Sino–U.S. strategic competition has prompted the United States to increase its containment of China in Latin America. After the Trump administration came to power, it viewed Sino-U.S. relations with a Cold War mentality of “zero-sum competition,” believing that China’s rise would challenge the foundation of U.S. hegemony. At the level of strategy and security, the U.S. National Security Strategy released by the Trump administration in December 2017 clearly positioned China as a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist country,” viewing China as a political, economic, and security threat to the United States.³⁷ As the strategic competition between China and the United States intensifies, some contradictions are directly reflected in economic, trade, and investment policies related to China, while others are transformed into policy-based containment and blockade in the political and diplomatic fields. The research report At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing Worldreleased by the U.S. RAND Corporation in October 2018 stated that China’s focus on developing countries reached its peak in the Belt and Road Initiative. Developing countries provide support for China’s continued growth in economic power and global influence. China aims to “seize” geopolitical advantages in order to balance the United States in their global competition.³⁸ Specifically in terms of China–Latin America relations, the United States is afraid that the “mutual rapprochement” between China and Latin America will lead to “mutual alienation” between the United States and Latin America, and that China’s political, economic, and diplomatic presence in Latin America will weaken the United States’ control over the geopolitical order in the Western Hemisphere.³⁹ In February 2018, then-U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson visited five Latin American countries and accused China of using its economic clout to bring Latin America into its “sphere of influence.” He criticized China as a “new imperial power” seeking to expand its regional influence in Latin America. He said the United States has always been Latin America’s “most stable, strongest, and most enduring partner” and tried to make Latin America submit to U.S.-led hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁰ In October 2018, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) of the United States published a report titled The Future of Latin America and the Caribbean in the Context of the Rise of China, which provided a forecast for China–Latin America relations in 2050. The report stated that by 2050, China’s arms sales and military presence in Latin America will have increased significantly in scale, quality, and scope, posing a critical threat to the U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.⁴¹ In terms of policy practice, Trump pursues the policy concept of “America First.” On the one hand, he wants to build a “border wall” on the U.S.–Mexico border and has a “zero tolerance” policy towards Latin American immigrants. On the other hand, he is putting pressure on Mexico and Canada to revise the North American Free Trade Agreement. In November 2018, the new version of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was officially signed. In it, the United States deliberately included a “poison pill clause” targeting China, requiring Mexico and Canada to inform the United States three months in advance when negotiating with “non-market economies.” This was done with the intention of prohibiting the two countries from signing free trade agreements with China and seeking to establish an anti-China sphere of influence in the global trade system.⁴² In addition, after Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador established diplomatic relations with China, the United States recalled its ambassadors or acting ambassadors stationed in the three countries in September 2018, and U.S. Vice President Pence said that China’s actions “threaten the stability of the Taiwan Strait region.” It is evident that the strategic competition between China and the United States will “spill over” to Latin America, and thereby directly affect the development of China–Latin America relations.

IV. Conclusion

Although China and Latin American countries are far apart geographically, they are all developing countries. They share common ideas and demands in the international community and have strong economic complementarity, making them natural partners. Over more than a decade, China and Latin America have leveraged their respective strengths, actively carried out pragmatic cooperation, and formed a new situation of cooperation based on mutual assistance and mutual benefit. China has always viewed China–Latin America relations from a strategic and long-term perspective. In the context of the deepening the construction of the Belt and Road and improving the strategic layout of opening up to the outside world, China has proposed the strategic vision of building a “China–Latin America Community of Common Destiny.” The “Pacific consciousness” of Latin American countries echoes China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Latin American countries have actively responded to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and aligned their development strategies with China in order to meet the needs of the upward movement of production chains and value chains in Latin America. As the center of world economic growth shifts from the “Atlantic” to the “Pacific,” the status of both China and Latin America in the global political and economic landscape is on the rise. Therefore, China–Latin America relations are increasingly breaking out of their subordinate position under the old pattern. Their growing independence promotes the extension of this relationship to the broader field of international governance, giving it increasing global significance.