Translation Tag: national security
This article was written during the consultation period for new national security legislation through Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Shao Shanbo, previous head of the former Hong Kong Central Policy Unit (a government think tank advising the Chief Executive that was revamped under a new name in 2018), addresses criticism voiced within Hong Kong and by external observers over the bill’s potential breadth. Prominently, he argues that terms such as “incitement” are not vague because they have been clarified by legal precedents within the city’s common law system.
Scholars from Huaqiao University explore the implications of generative AI for China’s prosperity and national security, following the launch of ChatGPT. They emphasize the pivotal role leadership in AI research and applications will play in global power distributions going forward, given implications for standards-setting ability, productivity growth, and information control.
Da Wei, a professor at Tsinghua University, argues the Xi-Biden summit in November 2023 revealed U.S.-China relations have entered a “new normal” characterized by four features: mutual acceptance that tension will continue indefinitely, mutual assessment that full-blown conflict would be unacceptable, mutual understanding that neither country will fulfill its strategic goals completely, and mutual observation that economic and social resilience is possible amidst intense bilateral competition.
Zhao Xiaozhuo, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, explains the trajectory of the Ukraine war in terms of two types of warfare: “mechanized warfare,” centered mostly on large-scale platforms such as aircraft and tanks, and “information warfare,” which more systemically integrates such platforms with other tools, including low-cost, dual-use technologies such as drones and social media. Zhao argues that Ukraine has used the latter to its advantage, which has enabled it to—among other things—take out Russian combat platforms through precision strikes.
Zhang Gaoyuan, a security scholar at Peking University, draws lessons for China amid what she terms the digital transformation of intelligence gathering. Zhang argues dual-use technology such as drones and Starlink satellites, open-source social media information, and efforts by non-combatants have been pivotal in guaranteeing Ukraine a steady flow of battlefield intelligence. As a prognosis for China, she promotes greater research into the opportunities and risks digital technologies present for intelligence acquisition and security.
Huang Bin, a former defense industry executive, draws lessons for Beijing from the Russia-Ukraine war, which he sees as worth attention due to rising turbulence in China’s security environment. Huang argues China should increase its military spending as a share of GDP, invest in systems that enhance battlefield situational awareness, step up the production of equipment for special operations, improve its military logistics capabilities, and leverage patriotic education to expand its counterespionage network.
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 18th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 19th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Xi Jinping), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 19th Central Committee).
Xi Jinping delivered this address to the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC), soon after being appointed for a third term as Chinese Communist Party general secretary at the 20th Party Congress.
Sometimes referred to in shorthand as the “History Resolution” or “Resolution on History,” this document is the Party’s official narrative of its history. The CCP has in total issued three such “resolutions” since its founding in 1921. This resolution follows the 1945 Resolution on Certain Historical Issues [关于若干历史问题的决议] and the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China [关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议].
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 19th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 20th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Xi Jinping), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 20th Central Committee).