I. Strategic Stability in Outer Space: Issues and Research

Strategic stability concerns the global security framework and has long been a critical topic in international security studies. Traditionally, strategic stability is primarily based on strategic nuclear strike capabilities, used to analyze the stability of nuclear forces between the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia). Theoretically, there is an inherent connection between strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. Tracing back to its origins, strategic stability theory emerged during the Cold War, amid the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As their nuclear strategies and arsenals evolved, the theory’s content was continuously enriched.

Entering the 21st century, the development of new technologies has expanded the scope of strategic stability research. With breakthroughs in space, cyber, artificial intelligence, hypersonic vehicles, additive manufacturing, stealth, and precision-guided technologies, the world stands on the verge of a new technological era. ¹ The logic of strategic stability also applies to non-nuclear weapons.² In recent years, the analysis and discussion of new technologies’ impact on global strategic stability have become key theoretical breakthroughs and growth points in international security and strategic studies. The influence of space technology on strategic stability is a significant research direction within this context. Existing research indicates that military space technology can affect global strategic stability in two primary ways.

One is the enabling model, where space technology, as an intrinsic element enhancing national strategic nuclear deterrence, influences different stages of the nuclear strike chain. This could either strengthen one’s own nuclear force’s reconnaissance, early warning, and preemptive strike capabilities or weaken the opponent’s penetration and survival capabilities, thereby leading to nuclear strategic stability or instability. First, space technology can enable nuclear force reconnaissance and early warning, achieving strategic stability by preventing strategic surprise attacks, assessing the opponent’s nuclear capabilities, and monitoring nuclear arms agreements. Some scholars suggest that the advent of reconnaissance satellite mechanisms during the Cold War helped increase the transparency of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms development, thereby enhancing arms race stability.³ Second, space technology can lower strategic stability by enabling attack-related information. Some scholars point out that U.S. use of space technology to empower global rapid strike systems may provoke anxiety among other space-faring nations, leading to asymmetric countermeasures that disrupt existing strategic stability rather than achieving “hegemonic stability.”⁴ Third, space technology’s enabling of defensive information can also lead to strategic instability. Scholars note that empowering ballistic missile defense systems with space technology could increase the willingness for preemptive nuclear strikes, reducing first-strike stability and undermining regional strategic stability.⁵

The other is the substitution model, where, within a new trinity of “nuclear technology-space technology-information (AI) technology,” the subordinate relationship between space technology and strategic forces transforms into a parallel relationship. This examines how space technology can substitute for nuclear technology in exerting relatively independent strategic capabilities and deterrence functions, thereby impacting outer space strategic stability and broader military strategic stability. First, from the perspective of the latest developments in space equipment and weapon systems, it assesses the impact of advanced technologies like space-based laser weapons, space-based missile defense technologies, cyber anti-satellite technologies, and nuclear-powered satellites on global strategic stability. Scholars have analyzed the potential impacts of these new space equipment or weapon concepts on outer space strategic stability.⁶ Second, from the perspective of space equipment or weapon system deployment methods, it analyzes how differences in space force deployment, use, and specific operations impact strategic stability. Some scholars have discussed how the deployment of large satellite constellations reshapes the space offense-defense operational structure and the resulting strategic stability implications.⁷ Third, from the perspective of potential adversaries and their power structures in space confrontation, it reveals how factors like strategic culture, offense-defense preferences, and security interests affect strategic stability. Scholars have noted that asymmetric development of space technology among strategic adversaries could lead to misjudgments, escalations, and strategic instability.⁸

Despite the substantial existing research on space technology and strategic stability, there are still three notable shortcomings. First, regarding research objects, most studies focus on space technologies and equipment with clear military orientations, while they are less sensitive to space technology advancements from the private sector, such as “Starlink.” This oversight neglects the unique characteristics of civilian technology in terms of cost, scale, management models, and diffusion speed, as well as its impact on strategic stability. Second, regarding research perspectives, some studies have the limitation of discussing space in isolation, ignoring the complex entanglement and deep coupling between space technology and nuclear, conventional weapons, and other emerging technology fields like cyber and artificial intelligence. In the current cross-domain deterrence and multi-domain linkage deterrence situation, revealing the composite strategic stability impact of space technology and other technological fields is a pressing issue. Third, in the mechanism analysis of strategic stability impacts, some research remains at the holistic or macro level. While their conclusions hold general reference value, they struggle to evaluate the differential impacts of different types of space equipment and application areas on strategic stability, particularly for multi-functional space equipment like Starlink, which has more complex impacts on strategic stability compared to single-function technology equipment.

Historically, it is often challenging to simply assess the profound impact of any technology on strategic stability. Although Starlink originates from the civilian sector, it is poised to become a critical force for the United States in advancing the militarization and weaponization of outer space. Its influence on the outer space security environment broadly reflects in various aspects such as exacerbating the arms race in space, reshaping the vulnerability of space assets, escalating outer space conflicts, and potentially triggering space wars. Accurately analyzing, evaluating, and assessing the profound impact of Starlink on global strategic stability, and proposing counter-strategies, holds significant theoretical and practical importance. Therefore, this paper first reviews the latest trends in the militarization development of Starlink by the United States. Based on this, it builds a theoretical framework to understand Starlink’s impact on global strategic stability from three aspects: first-strike stability, crisis stability, and arms race stability. Additionally, it attempts to propose preliminary counter-strategy suggestions for addressing these challenges and achieving security governance.

II. Analysis of Starlink’s Militarization Development Trends

Although SpaceX’s initial intent in implementing the Starlink project was primarily commercial, based in the civilian sector, the large-scale satellite constellation system it has constructed has increasingly caught the attention and interest of various governments and military entities for its broad application prospects and potential value in the military field. The successful application of Starlink in the Ukraine crisis further reinforced the U.S. military’s determination to accelerate its militarization process. Starlink’s military applications have increasingly entered the development agenda of various branches of the U.S. armed forces, with its potential military applications mainly reflected in three areas:

(i) Constructing a Multi-Dimensional Battlefield Information Network via Starlink

Starlink possesses advantages such as fast communication speeds, large bandwidth, low latency, and high cost-effectiveness. It is not affected by complex terrains like mountains, oceans, polar regions, adverse weather conditions, or complex electromagnetic environments. It can provide unrestricted satellite network services at any time, place, and environment. This has garnered significant attention from the U.S. Department of Defense, which relies on it to construct a new military communication ecosystem. The aim is to build the next-generation advanced battle management system (ABMS) and joint all-domain command and control system (JADC2), meeting the needs of joint operations across multiple military branches, ensuring real-time coordination of military actions across sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace (see Figure 1).⁹ Simultaneously, various branches of the U.S. military are cooperating with SpaceX to build branch-specific combat networks. For example, in May 2020, the U.S. Army and SpaceX signed a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) to meet the Army’s growing interconnected network needs in command, control, and tactical communications. The U.S. Army, through its Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) C5ISR Center located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, tested the use of Starlink broadband to support military network data transmission.¹⁰ In August 2020, SpaceX collaborated with the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) for the preliminary testing of its “Global Lightning” initiative, integrating Starlink into the Air Force’s emerging next-generation sensor network.¹¹ Additionally, SpaceX collaborated with Ball Aerospace, a major contractor of the U.S. Air Force, to provide satellite communication services for AC-130 gunships, F-35, and F-22 fighter jets.¹² In February 2020, the newly established U.S. Space Force signed the Enterprise Satellite Communications Initiative, enhancing cooperation with private sectors like SpaceX, integrating Starlink into the space equipment communication network as a crucial component.¹³ As a response, SpaceX launched laser communication links specifically for military satellites, incorporating U.S. Space Force satellites into the Starlink constellation communication network, sharing its communication network service resources.¹⁴

Figure 1.    Starlink and the U.S. Military’s Multidimensional Integrated Battlefield Information Network

(ii) Enhancing the Integrated Functionality of the Full Kill Chain through Starlink

Traditional space equipment mainly supports ground information through functions like communication, remote sensing, navigation, positioning, and strategic missile early warning. Starlink, as the new generation space weapon system developed by the U.S. military, has transcended the traditional focus on information services, evolving into a comprehensive space combat platform with integrated offensive and defensive capabilities. In navigation and positioning, SpaceX collaborates with the U.S. Air Force to launch the next-generation GPS III satellites.¹⁵ In detection and early warning, SpaceX secured a $149 million contract to build four customized satellites for the U.S. Department of Defense using wide-field “Overhead Persistent Infrared” (OPIR) sensors to detect adversary-launched strategic missiles.¹⁶ Furthermore, Starlink is involved in the U.S. Space Development Agency’s military satellite constellation plan, developing and launching eight OPIR satellites as part of the “tracking layer” satellite constellation.¹⁷ Collaborating with L3 Harris Technologies, Lockheed Martin, and York Space Systems, SpaceX aims to complete a large missile early warning satellite constellation of 50 advanced military reconnaissance satellites within 28 months, further enhancing U.S. space-based early warning capabilities.¹⁸ For defense, the U.S. military seeks to leverage Starlink’s vast low Earth orbit satellite cluster to improve the defense structure and overall defensive capability of U.S. space assets. The U.S. military believes that large, sophisticated military satellites are vulnerable targets for adversaries. In contrast, large constellations make attacks more challenging; even if some satellites are destroyed, the constellation continues to function, providing deterrence through denial.¹⁹ Therefore, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and SpaceX collaborated on the “Blackjack” program, shaping Starlink into a highly resilient and redundant large military satellite constellation, significantly enhancing U.S. space defense capabilities.²⁰ For offensive capabilities, defense experts believe small satellites can approach and attack adversary spacecraft, potentially serving as anti-satellite weapons to damage or destroy enemy satellites.²¹ To meet the military’s needs for extending Starlink’s offensive capabilities, SpaceX launched the military-upgraded version Starshield in 2022, defining its function as “hosted payload,” providing a flexible spatial functionality platform for government and military customers, capable of carrying offensive weapon payloads.²² Moreover, SpaceX secured a satellite design contract from the military’s space assembly plant, designing customized military satellites equipped with wide-angle infrared missile tracking sensors, enabling Starlink to track and intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles.²³

(iii) Actively Promoting Starlink’s Operational Combat Applications

The U.S. military emphasizes not only the multi-dimensional network connectivity and integrated combat capabilities of Starlink but also accelerates converting Starlink’s combat potential into practical combat capabilities and future strategic advantages by building a three-in-one combat training system: “exercise-training-combat application-future combat concepts.” In terms of exercises and training, in recent years, the U.S. military has actively explored incorporating Starlink into the combat power generation equation through joint military exercises across multiple branches, transforming it into a new growth point for U.S. combat effectiveness. In December 2019, Starlink participated in the advanced battle management system (ABMS) new communication ecosystem test exercise, aiming to achieve joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), allowing real-time coordination of military actions across all domains by the U.S. military and allies.²⁴ In April 2020, SpaceX participated in a large-scale live-fire exercise held by the U.S. Marine Corps, integrating the Starlink system with U.S. ground forces, air forces, submarines, surface ships, and various space assets to enhance the U.S. military’s ability to intercept drones and cruise missiles.²⁵ Regarding combat applications, Starlink provided information support for Ukrainian military operations during the Ukraine crisis. Since the outbreak of the crisis, SpaceX and the U.S. Agency for International Development delivered about 5,000 Starlink terminals to Ukraine, offering “unlimited, unrestricted data connections,” enhancing the Ukrainian military’s information warfare advantage.²⁶ Starlink provided satellite communication services to Ukraine’s GIS artillery units, enabling communication and high-bandwidth data transmission across Russian lines. It also supported Ukraine’s elite drone unit Aerorozvidka in targeting and attacking Russian forces.²⁷ In integrating Starlink into future combat concepts, in 2019, the U.S. military proposed the “Mosaic Warfare” concept, emphasizing seamless integration of sea, land, air, space, electromagnetic, and cyber forces to achieve combat success in surprising new ways.²⁸ Starlink, with its robust network communication and information support capabilities, is considered by the U.S. military to be the communication engine connecting different combat units and driving “Mosaic Warfare.” Additionally, the U.S. military is exploring the potential application of Starlink in future space information warfare.²⁹

III. Impact of Starlink on First-Strike Stability

First-strike stability, also known as preemptive strike stability, is a crucial aspect and guarantee of strategic stability. The theoretical origins can be traced back to Thomas C. Schelling’s concept of “the reciprocal fear of surprise attack” in his book “The Strategy of Conflict,” which posits that the fear that the opponent might launch a surprise attack, believing we are about to strike, motivates us to strike first. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the opponent has the same motivation.³⁰ In 1961, Daniel Ellsberg introduced the concept of “critical risk,” used to quantify the risk of preemptive strikes, defined as the ratio between the opportunity cost of a preemptive strike and the opportunity cost of a retaliatory strike.³¹ Building on this, Glenn A. Kent and David E. Thaler first introduced the concept of “first-strike stability” in 1989, defining it as a state where no superpower believes that the other is incentivized to launch a nuclear first strike in a crisis. They argued that first-strike stability, unlike crisis stability, is more narrowly focused, determined solely by the overall structure of each side’s strategic offensive and defensive forces without involving the political and military context of the decision.³²

Christopher F. Chyba pointed out: “New technologies may influence crisis decision-making in various ways, driving these decisions toward or away from nuclear war. One key factor is whether the technology significantly advances preemptive strike capabilities, making the opponent more likely to strike first or retaliate more quickly upon warning of an attack.”³³ Technological advancements in cyber, space, and artificial intelligence constantly challenge the offensive-defensive balance among global strategic forces established since the Cold War, shifting “first-strike stability” towards “first-strike instability.” The militarization of Starlink enhances the U.S.’s combat capabilities and deterrence advantage from both strategic offensive and defensive dimensions, leading to increased imbalance in the offensive-defensive dynamic, confrontation posture, and power comparison between the United States and its strategic adversaries, potentially significantly impacting first-strike stability (see Figure 2).

Figure 2.    Mechanisms of Starlink’s Impact on First-Strike Stability

(i) Starlink May Strengthen the U.S.’s Preemptive Strategic Strike Capabilities

First, Starlink aids the United States in weakening adversaries’ strategic survivability, thereby undermining first-strike stability based on “mutual assured survival.” During the Cold War, the second-strike capability under “mutual assured survival” was crucial in deterring the superpowers from launching preemptive strikes. The fear that the losses from the opponent’s second strike would far outweigh the gains from the first strike restrained the willingness of both the United States and the Soviet Union to initiate a first strike, thereby achieving first-strike stability. Starlink, with its powerful space-based information support capabilities, poses severe challenges to the “mutual assured survival” model established since the Cold War. Space technology innovations, represented by Starlink, can provide informational advantages for the U.S.’s preemptive nuclear strike capabilities. The 2019 U.S. Missile Defense Review report noted: “Space-based sensors offer significant mobility and are not constrained by geographical factors like ground-based sensors. They provide continuous tracking, offering clear advantages.”³⁴ According to U.S. nuclear strategy experts, mobile launch-based land-based strategic nuclear missiles are critical deterrents against the U.S.’s preemptive nuclear strikes for countries like Russia and China. The mobility of such ballistic missiles makes them difficult to target and destroy, thus representing an important aspect of these countries’ nuclear survivability. The U.S. military, leveraging the massive low Earth orbit satellite constellation constructed by Starlink, possesses reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities to cover any point on Earth hourly with sub-meter resolution, forming an all-encompassing, all-weather monitoring system for mobile ballistic missiles. This diminishes adversaries’ nuclear survivability and reinforces the U.S.’s preemptive strike intentions.³⁵

Second, Starlink improves the efficiency of U.S. preemptive strategic strikes. In the U.S. strategic strike system and kill chain, the continuous dynamic monitoring capability provided by Starlink is not isolated but deeply integrated with artificial intelligence image recognition, big data analysis, and hypersonic weapons. The Starlink monitoring system dynamically monitors the entire relevant road network for land-based mobile ballistic missiles, ensuring unilateral battlefield transparency; AI and big data technologies can analyze, identify, and lock onto targets in real time; hypersonic weapons ensure rapid “find and destroy” strikes. Benefiting from the system’s enabling of the overall nuclear strike chain, Starlink maximizes the informational support advantages, allowing the U.S.’s preemptive strikes to avoid potential second-strike risks swiftly, precisely, and efficiently hitting adversaries’ strategic targets. This incentivizes the U.S. to use strategic weapons preemptively against potential adversaries, fully controlling the use of strategic forces, and thereby reducing first-strike stability.

In summary, Starlink not only strengthens the U.S.’s preemptive strategic offensive capabilities but also leads to a continuous, interactive expectation process of surprise attacks between the United States and its adversaries, thereby continuously reducing first-strike stability.

(ii) Starlink Enhances the Resilience of the U.S. Space Defense System

The development of defensive military capabilities also significantly impacts the offensive-defensive dynamic and first-strike stability. For instance, developing strategic missile defenses by a nation can weaken an opponent’s intercontinental missile offensive capabilities, including both first and second strike capabilities, altering strategic stability. Due to the existence of missile defenses, the losses from a retaliatory strike are further reduced, significantly increasing the net benefits of a preemptive strike.³⁶ Thus, if one side possesses successful missile defenses, their willingness to conduct a preemptive strike increases, damaging first-strike stability.

The military application of Starlink has upended the traditional security paradigm of “offense is easier than defense” in the U.S. outer space security domain. On the offensive side, Starlink further strengthens the preemptive U.S. measures to seek absolute strategic advantage. On the defensive side, leveraging the unique deployment structure of the high-density low Earth orbit satellite cluster, Starlink significantly enhances the resilience and defensive capabilities of the U.S. space-based missile defense system. This ensures the survival of its strategic strike forces while weakening the strike capabilities and deterrent forces of strategic adversaries, achieving a paradigm shift from “offense is easier than defense” to “balanced offense and defense.”

The disruptive impact of Starlink on the U.S. outer space security paradigm is rooted in its unique resilient defensive structure. Historically, space assets have shown inherent vulnerability in national strategic force confrontations due to their defensive, stealth, and mobility shortcomings, making them prime targets for adversarial strategic deterrence. In 2015, Russia demonstrated the capability to attack U.S. low Earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbit (GEO) satellites. In 2016, Russia also demonstrated the ability to rendezvous and conduct close maneuvers with U.S. satellites, explicitly stating its capability and willingness to consider significant strikes on U.S. space assets at the onset of conflict.³⁷ As U.S. dependence on military satellite networks has continued to grow, the United States has been exploring various strategies to mitigate the destabilizing impact of the anti-satellite technology development by Russia and other nations. Starlink, with its highly resilient and redundant mega constellation deployment structure, provides a new path for the defense of space assets. Indian defense experts have pointed out: “Satellite constellations like Starlink, aside from enhancing combat capabilities, may render conventional anti-satellite weapons obsolete due to their complex and massive structure.”³⁸ With the numerical advantage of satellites, conducting an anti-satellite attack on Starlink or paralyzing the entire system is extremely costly and difficult. Even with partial satellite losses, Starlink can continue to perform functions like space awareness, early warning, and interception, helping the U.S. military satellite network avoid catastrophic failure risks when under direct attack.³⁹ If the expected cost of attacking Starlink exceeds the anticipated benefits, the adversary’s willingness to strike and the credibility of deterrence will diminish.

Starlink also enhances the U.S. missile defense system by improving space-based interception capabilities. The space-based missile defense system is a crucial component of the U.S. national missile defense system. Historically, the United States has attempted to use space-based weapons to enhance ballistic missile interception capabilities. In the 1980s, the U.S. proposed the Star Wars plan, centered on developing a space-based missile defense system to automatically identify and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, protecting the United States from massive nuclear attacks by adversaries.⁴⁰ During the George H.W. Bush administration, the U.S. proposed the Global Protection System, aiming to build a space-based kinetic energy intercept system centered around “Brilliant Pebbles.”⁴¹ However, these projects failed due to financial pressures and technological limitations at the time. Starlink, with its low-cost, large-scale low Earth orbit small satellite cluster, large communication bandwidth, low latency, real-time data transmission, visual payloads, and autonomous orbit change capabilities, further enhances the feasibility of kinetic collision-based interception of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In computer algorithm simulations by professional defense research institutions, Starlink conducted on-orbit interception simulations for over 350 intercontinental ballistic missiles, all of which were successful.⁴² Based on the interception capability of large constellations like Starlink against adversarial ballistic missile penetration, the 2019 U.S. Missile Defense Review report noted: “Space-based interceptors can provide significant missile defense advantages, particularly in boost-phase defense. The Department of Defense will identify the most promising technologies and estimate the time, cost, and personnel requirements to build a viable space-based defense layer to achieve early operational capabilities in boost-phase defense.”⁴³

While reliable active defense can generally be viewed as a positive force eliminating instability and enhancing strategic stability, providing a reliable safeguard against deterrence failure in limited conflicts with nuclear powers, technologies like Starlink that can render assured and credible second-strike and countermeasures by Russia and other nations ineffective will weaken the adversary’s strategic deterrent capabilities. This reliable active defense by the United States will further strengthen its preemptive strike willingness, granting the technologically advantaged party the freedom to initiate attacks and increasing the panic among the technologically disadvantaged, ultimately leading to a continuous decline in first-strike stability.

IV. Impact of Starlink on Crisis Stability

As a crucial component of strategic stability theory, crisis stability during the Cold War referred to the absence of mutual escalation to nuclear conflict even in a crisis, specifically discussing how countries comprehensively use political, economic, and military forces in a crisis environment to maximize national interests while avoiding escalation, war, and armed conflict.

In a nuclear crisis environment, achieving crisis stability largely depends on the structural characteristics of “mutual assured destruction” and “mutual assured survival,” leading to the expansion of crisis stability discussions to similar structural characteristics in cyber and space domains. Currently, the militarization of outer space development exhibits similar “mutual vulnerability” to Cold War-era nuclear weapon development. Leading military powers, led by the United States, vigorously promote the militarization and weaponization of space, making their military forces highly dependent on space assets. However, the inherent vulnerability and dependence of space assets in operational defense become a structural contradiction restricting the development of U.S. space deterrence. In recent years, the United States, in constructing and exploring space deterrence theory and practice, has focused on how to deter strategic adversaries from attacking space systems and auxiliary infrastructure. It has proposed responses, including “implementing cost-effective space system protection measures, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on various platforms in different orbits, utilizing distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and developing rapid-response space capabilities.”⁴⁴ However, these responses face bottleneck issues in feasibility, effectiveness, and cost reasonableness, making it difficult to avoid the inherent vulnerability of outer space. The structural feature of “offense is easier than defense” in outer space has, for a long time, given space military competition similar crisis stability to the nuclear arms race. The vulnerability of space assets to attacks makes it difficult for space crises to escalate into large-scale space wars.

The U.S. application of Starlink in the military domain not only further strengthens its significant preemptive strike advantage, reducing first-strike stability, but also to some extent reshapes the outer space offensive-defensive structure, disrupting the structural characteristics that achieve crisis stability in space. Starlink exhibits high resilience and redundancy in responding to space attacks, driving the reshaping of the space offensive-defensive structure and deterrence capabilities. Consequently, the U.S. space crisis stability theory will be reconstructed, altering the transmission of deterrence signals, the setting of deterrence red lines, and the choice of deterrence methods in space crises, which will undoubtedly impact outer space crisis stability, unintentionally breaking the “delicate balance” formed among various national military forces in space and nuclear domains and pushing “crisis stability” towards “crisis instability,” edging closer to space war.

(i) Starlink Increases the Risk of “Accidental War” in Outer Space

“Accidental war” is a significant manifestation of crisis instability. Schelling often referred to accidental war and its role in creating crisis instability. “Accidental war is a war that arises from neglect, panic, misunderstanding, or false alarms rather than deliberate prior planning.”⁴⁵ “The possibility of accidental war increases during a crisis due to both human and mechanical factors.”⁴⁶ “Total war might be inadvertently triggered by some accident, false alarm, or mechanical failure, by someone’s panic, madness, or prank, by misunderstanding the opponent’s intentions, etc.”⁴⁷ According to crisis stability theory, effective crisis management should accurately predict and actively intervene in the inducement, escalation, and deterioration of crises. However, the generation and development of crises is a highly complex and uncertain problem. The enormous complexity of the Starlink satellite system itself, coupled with its complex interactions with military systems, exacerbates the uncertainty factors that could lead to the outbreak of “accidental wars.”

Internally, Starlink is a vast, widespread, and technologically intensive mega-complex system composed of multiple subsystems, including a low-orbit satellite constellation, ground station systems, user terminals, network systems, and communication systems. According to the “normal accident” theory, due to the extremely complex interactions between different subsystems within high-tech equipment systems, when accidents occur, they can rapidly spread from one subsystem to another, with tiny problems potentially expanding rapidly, leading to system collapse. Meanwhile, considering the competitive operational environment, strategic command and control systems tend to pursue faster operational speeds and preemptive time advantages, all of which increase the likelihood of accidental incidents and risk escalation. Therefore, the vulnerability of Starlink to internal accidents leading to crisis events is unavoidable.

Externally, the complexity of the Starlink system combined with the complexity of military systems further increases the likelihood of crisis events. The domain of warfare contains a series of uncertainties that induce crises. Schelling pointed out: “Violence, especially war, is a chaotic and uncertain act, with high unpredictability. It depends on decisions made by imperfect governments composed of fallible people, relies on fallible communication and alarm systems, and untested personnel and equipment.”⁴⁸ The U.S.’s push for the military application of Starlink leads to the interaction of internal uncertainties with external military system uncertainties, increasing the risk of crisis accidents. For instance, as an essential direction of Starlink’s military application, space-based early warning systems are increasingly becoming a crucial means of preventing ballistic missile surprise attacks. Correspondingly, attacking adversary space-based early warning satellites becomes a key step in achieving strategic surprise attack objectives, widely regarded as a signal of war initiation. Specifically, attack methods include laser destruction, laser blinding, electromagnetic interference, kinetic kill, and destruction of space-based components of the nuclear kill chain, with different methods representing and transmitting varying levels of escalation signals. However, given the current large scale of the Starlink constellation and the increasingly crowded outer space environment, some scholars have pointed out: “When satellite failures occur, it is extremely difficult to accurately attribute the failure to natural or accidental causes (such as space weather disasters, space debris impacts), unintended interference, or deliberate aggression.”⁴⁹ Strategic suspicion of potential adversaries will lead to accidental events being misinterpreted as deliberate attacks or low-intensity attacks being perceived as high-intensity, leading to accidental crisis escalation.

Additionally, combining Starlink with AI recognition systems may result in “automation bias,” further increasing the risk of “accidental wars.” “Automation bias” refers to the tendency of operational commanders to over-rely on AI systems and follow their computational results in crisis decision-making processes, faced with vast data information and highly uncertain battlefield environments.⁵⁰ Under the “AI + Starlink” intelligence collection and early warning model, humans lack the overall analysis and comprehensive control capability over vast intelligence information. Human control over intelligent data analysis systems is not proactive intervention based on rational human logic but passive control, even manipulation or coercion, guided step-by-step by AI systems. This prevents true control of crisis decision-making and strategic strike measures from being in human hands. Moreover, relying on machine learning-based intelligent visual target recognition technology, unlike human-based visual recognition, AI improves its ability to recognize images and videos by constructing neural network algorithm models, an immature and uncertain technological field that may show vulnerability in identifying “deceptive images,” leading to misreporting or omission of potential strike targets.⁵¹ Thus, this “automation bias” will exacerbate hostile motivations, judgment errors, and risky behaviors in outer space military crises. If image information collected by Starlink is misidentified as preemptive information by the opponent, it will inevitably lead to a rapid counterstrike by our forces, potentially causing the outbreak of an accidental nuclear war.

(ii)  Countermeasures Against Starlink May Lead to Rapid Crisis Escalation in Outer Space

Crisis escalation results from the complex strategic interactions between conflicting parties. Unilateral actions by one party to gain military advantage at the expense of the other’s security interests will inevitably provoke tit-for-tat countermeasures, driving the spiral increase of risk and tension. During the rapid escalation from controllable to uncontrollable crisis, a “critical point of failure” exists; once military developments surpass this critical point, it leads to deterrence failure and retaliatory attacks by the opponent, potentially sparking nuclear war. Space deterrence, like nuclear deterrence, also has a “critical point of failure”; surpassing this point triggers retaliation, subsequent attacks, and rapid crisis escalation.⁵² The United States pushing for the military application of Starlink can be viewed as an essential cornerstone of enhancing missile defense capabilities, initially aimed at improving space deterrence and forcing the opponent to abandon offensive intentions. However, if Starlink surpasses the “critical point of failure” in offsetting other countries’ retaliatory strike capabilities, it will lead to deterrence failure, forcing adversaries to develop countermeasures against Starlink, enhancing anti-satellite weapons’ soft and hard kill capabilities, which in turn triggers U.S. panic and counter-retaliation measures, accelerating space arms race and nuclear arms race escalation, and continuously degrading strategic stability. As some scholars pointed out: “If a technology can be used to jam, interfere, or incapacitate early warning satellites, intercept, or deceive communications signals from such sensors, affecting operational command and control, thus weakening political leaders’ ability to conduct strategic attacks, these impacts may lead to premature use of nuclear weapons or erroneous escalation.”⁵³

The risk of rapid crisis escalation triggered by Starlink also manifests in the sharp increase of space satellite debris under the “Kessler Syndrome.” U.S. aerospace scientist Donald Kessler noted that when the number of spacecraft in outer space, particularly near-Earth space, reaches a certain threshold, debris from destroyed spacecraft due to military actions or accidents will trigger a domino-like chain reaction of future collisions, generating increasing debris and impacts, creating a debris belt covering outer space and causing permanent pollution. In 2009, a collision between U.S. and Russian communication satellites produced over 2,000 pieces of space debris. With more satellites, the collision frequency will increase further.⁵⁴ Starlink is the most massive and representative mega-constellation to date. On the one hand, the increase in satellite launch activities will increase the density of the near-Earth space debris environment, destabilizing the outer space environment;⁵⁵ on the other hand, the United States pushing for the military application of Starlink enhances preemptive strike advantages and space defense resilience, potentially forcing adversaries to enhance anti-satellite capabilities to maintain strategic force balance, further increasing the possibility of generating space debris. If an attack on Starlink triggers the Kessler Syndrome, it will undoubtedly cause catastrophic consequences such as widespread satellite constellation destruction and the paralysis of space communication and early warning systems.

The Kessler Syndrome triggered by anti-satellite attacks on Starlink poses a deeper challenge to crisis controllability. During nuclear crises in the Cold War, human decision-making served as the last “insurance” to control crisis escalation into nuclear war. If there was a risk of uncontrollable escalation, political leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union had sufficient capability, ample time, and diverse means to terminate the crisis and avoid large-scale humanitarian disasters. However, once an anti-satellite attack on Starlink triggers the Kessler Syndrome, the resulting chain reaction will render crisis termination mechanisms ineffective. Due to the lack of necessary means to halt the chain collision process of debris, spacecraft debris will inevitably spread rapidly throughout the entire low Earth orbit, making it difficult to stop before causing catastrophic consequences.

(iii) Challenge of Starlink to Crisis Stability Spreading from Strategic to Conventional Domains

Firstly, under the “stability-instability paradox,” the technological advantages brought by Starlink might become a catalyst for conventional war. Given the different levels of security threats between nations, the greater the stability at the strategic level (terror balance), the lower the stability at lower levels of violence (i.e., non-strategic or conventional levels).⁵⁶ According to this paradox, Starlink can be applied to enhance the United States’ conventional warfare advantages, increasing the likelihood of low-intensity conflicts when a strategic crisis has not yet been triggered. Constellation projects like Starlink inherently have monopolistic properties, further widening the military power gap between strong and weak nations. Traditional space-based information support methods were limited to strategic and operational levels. Due to its advantage of not being restricted by geographical factors, Starlink allows the U.S. military to extend space-based communication terminals to tactical levels such as squads and platoons, forming a comprehensive battlefield information advantage. Considering that only a few countries can build mega constellation projects like Starlink, other nations will have to operate at a significant information disadvantage.⁵⁷ The information advantage provided by Starlink handsets during the 2022 Ukraine crisis is a typical example. In this polarized scenario of “the strong getting stronger and the weak getting weaker,” the risk of local wars and geopolitical crises will be further amplified.

Secondly, Starlink might provoke asymmetric countermeasures from opponents. Faced with the new “trinity” of national strategic deterrence systems created by the U.S. integrating nuclear technology, space technology, and information (artificial intelligence) technology, relevant nations have had to adopt multi-domain, asymmetric countermeasures.⁵⁸ Countries like Russia are trying to reduce reliance on traditional nuclear deterrence, enhance strategic deterrence capabilities in new technological fields like space, cyber, hypersonics, and artificial intelligence, and actively construct asymmetric multi-domain counterbalance mechanisms against the United States.⁵⁹ This involves flexible combinations and complementary advantages of nuclear deterrence, space deterrence, cyber deterrence, and conventional deterrence methods. Given that Starlink provides the U.S. strategic strike forces with extensive intelligence reconnaissance, surveillance, early warning, and kinetic strike capabilities, opponents find it challenging to maintain strategic equilibrium in a single nuclear capability confrontation.

Cyberspace is considered an important domain for implementing asymmetric balancing measures. Cyberspace inherently has the attribute of being easy to attack but difficult to defend. Compared to the gap in nuclear strike capabilities, which is difficult to close in the short term, the development of cyber capabilities requires fewer resources and can be rapidly advanced, further increasing the feasibility of implementing asymmetric balancing measures.⁶⁰ As the largest mega-constellation system in history, Starlink is highly reliant on the interconnected network to achieve close coupling between the constellation, sensors, ground stations, and user terminals. This also makes cyber attacks an important counterbalancing means for adversaries. Some scholars have pointed out: “Because using physical means to attack a large number of satellites is not economical, as the number of targets increases, the required investment increases proportionally. However, cyber attacks are different; the investment required for one target is almost the same as that for many similar targets. Additionally, cyber attacks can reduce collateral damage and self-injury caused by space debris.”⁶¹ As the military applications of Starlink deepen, the U.S. military’s dependence on space resources provided by commercial sectors increases, highlighting its vulnerability to cyber attacks.

Furthermore, due to potential strategic adversaries relying far less on space assets compared to the U.S., the efficiency of same-domain deterrence is very low. The U.S. can adopt “cross-domain attacks” and “cross-domain deterrence” to counter potential adversaries’ balancing measures against space military assets such as Starlink. Senior U.S. Department of Defense officials have stated: “The U.S. response to anti-space attacks may include necessary and proportionate responses outside the space domain.”⁶² The United States can achieve cross-domain “punitive deterrence” by threatening to attack an adversary’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) links, and by targeting critical infrastructure in the land and cyber domains.⁶³ The United States can also deter through means such as dominating international rule-making, discourse power, or forming interest alliances.⁶⁴ From the perspective of seeking space hegemony and a unilateralist space security view, the U.S. attempts to maximize its own space security interests by dominating the formulation of space policy, the allocation of frequency and orbital resources, and space traffic management mechanisms. However, this inevitably infringes on the security interests of other spacefaring nations such as Russia, leading to disputes and conflicts over space policy-making and resource allocation rights.

Although the United States has clearly stated it will retaliate if its space assets are attacked, and considers cross-domain attacks an important retaliation option, it has not specified the types of cross-domain attacks, the severity of the retaliation, which cross-domain means will be selected, or combinations thereof. It has also not drawn a strong “red line” for attacks against Starlink.⁶⁵ This could further exacerbate the risk of misjudgment and conflict escalation by other countries under crisis conditions.

V. Impact of Starlink on Arms Race Stability

Similar to the concept of crisis stability, arms race stability also originates from the historical process of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms development during the Cold War. It is based on mutual nuclear fear, nuclear confrontation, nuclear deterrence, and mutual vulnerability arrangements to explore how to avoid distorted, supersaturated, and continuously escalating nuclear arms races.

For a long time, arms race stability in the outer space domain has not been discussed as an independent research field. This is due to the development of U.S. space armaments evolving from being subordinate to and serving nuclear deterrence forces to gradually developing independently. Under the new “trinity” strategic deterrence system composed of “nuclear technology-space technology-information (artificial intelligence) technology,” the relationship between space armament forces and nuclear forces has shifted from being subordinate to parallel, highlighting the issue of space arms race stability.

To address the security challenges brought by the militarization of Starlink by the United States, other spacefaring nations will inevitably adopt targeted armament development strategies, leading to a “spiral” arms race and space “security dilemma,” thereby impacting strategic stability in outer space. Unlike strategic weapons like nuclear weapons, Starlink is developed by the private sector and extensively integrated into the U.S. military’s offensive and defensive combat systems, with unique attributes of dual-use and integrated offense-defense. These technological attributes enhance the opacity and unpredictability of the Starlink system, making traditional arms control and verification mechanisms difficult to adapt and confidence-building arms control measures hard to implement. The impact of Starlink on arms race stability is mainly reflected in three aspects (see Figure 3).

Figure 3.    Mechanisms of Starlink’s Impact on Arms Race Stability

(i) The Integrated Offense-Defense Attribute of Starlink Exacerbates the “Security Dilemma” of Armament Development

The core of classic arms control theory is to adjust the armament structure of countries to increase the opportunity cost of waging war, thereby weakening their willingness to initiate conflict. From a technical perspective, some weapons have distinct offensive attributes, while others have clear defensive attributes.⁶⁶ Therefore, an important approach to arms control is to target the offensive and defensive attributes of weapons and adjust the armament structure accordingly. In terms of nuclear arms control, the offensive and defensive attributes of the weapons are generally clear-cut. For example, intercontinental ballistic missiles have obvious offensive attributes, while missile defense systems have clear defensive attributes. Based on this, countries can achieve strategic stability by reducing or limiting the development of offensive weapons. The 1979 U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty was a milestone document in U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament history.

Unlike nuclear weapons, Starlink has both offensive and defensive attributes. Offensively, Starlink provides strong information support for the U.S. military’s long-range precision strikes, forming an all-weather, comprehensive, anti-jamming, low-latency intelligence monitoring and transmission system that creates unilateral battlefield transparency for the U.S. military. It can accurately monitor and identify the movement trajectories of mobile ballistic missiles, weakening the strategic strike forces’ survivability of adversaries and enhancing the U.S. military’s rapid, long-range strike capability and preemptive strike capability. Additionally, Starlink may serve as an offensive weapon in anti-satellite operations. Defensively, Starlink can further enhance the U.S. military’s strategic missile early warning and kinetic interception capabilities. Starlink satellites use omnidirectional beams for remote sensing, telemetry, and tracking of intercontinental ballistic missiles, providing information support for calculating and predicting missile trajectories and intercepting missiles. Furthermore, due to the autonomous orbit-changing and intelligent evasion capabilities of Starlink satellites, the large number of satellites in orbit could directly collide with and kinetically intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles.

For maintaining arms race stability, the dual offensive and defensive attributes of Starlink make its military applications uncertain and full of potential possibilities, easily leading to a “security dilemma” in armament development and reducing the stability of the arms race. The U.S.’s armament actions in promoting the militarization of Starlink, even if initially intended to strengthen ballistic missile defense capabilities, secure space assets, and achieve strategic stability in outer space, have led to anxiety and fear among potential adversaries due to the multifaceted military application capabilities of Starlink, thereby exacerbating the “security dilemma.”

(ii) Dual-Use Nature of Starlink Easily Triggers Technological Proliferation and Arms Race Risks

Another challenge to arms race stability posed by Starlink comes from its dual-use nature. In an arms race, the motivation to compete for advantage and the fear that withdrawing from competition will benefit the opponent are interdependent. The U.S. motivation to militarize Starlink for strategic advantage, intertwined with other spacefaring nations’ fear of lagging, will accelerate the militarization of global civilian satellite constellation projects, collectively fostering a spiral escalation in related fields of arms races.⁶⁷ For a long time, countries like China have adhered to the stance of “non-militarization of outer space,” firmly opposing the weaponization of space and space arms races. In 2022, China announced that its space station would be open to all United Nations member states, creating a “space home” for all humanity, receiving high praise from the international community.⁶⁸ The United States, seeking absolute military advantage in space, has taken the militarization of Starlink as an important measure for implementing space deterrence and shaping the space security environment. Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the United States has openly used Starlink in military operations, drawing strong dissatisfaction from Russia. Russian officials noted: “We should never trust the West in the aerospace field. Starlink was initially declared purely civilian, but during Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, Elon Musk appeared with his Starlink.”⁶⁹ The militarization of Starlink may once again initiate the “action-reaction” cycle of space arms races, forcing other capable nations to follow suit out of fear of falling behind, exacerbating instability in outer space.

The dual-use nature of Starlink also lowers the cost barriers to technological proliferation, leading to rapid transfer and proliferation of technology, further exacerbating arms race instability. In arms control, high R&D costs and complex technical processes have been important factors limiting the proliferation of military technology. Compared to large military satellites carrying numerous complex sensors or payloads, small satellites usually focus on specific payload technologies or applications, significantly reducing R&D costs due to their smaller size and complexity. For example, constructing and launching a 2,500-kilogram Maxar WorldView-4 satellite costs $850 million,⁷⁰ while the total R&D and launch cost of a Starlink satellite is about $1 million.⁷¹ The cost of the Starlink system will exponentially decrease with scale production. This rapid cost reduction and substantial commercial incentives make continuous technology proliferation among major powers seemingly inevitable, making genuine arms control challenging.⁷² As commercial use of space technology activities, represented by Starlink, rapidly increases, the low-cost small satellite constellation technology has already been mastered by the commercial sector. This creates emerging markets and promotes economic prosperity, while also increasing the complexity of the space environment and posing challenges to protecting key technological security and maintaining strategic advantages. For maintaining arms race stability, the reduction in technological costs and barriers, while possibly reducing the monopolistic advantage of potential “first movers,” inevitably leads to widespread global technology proliferation and transfer. Notably, in recent years, companies like Airbus in Europe, Telesat in Canada, and the Anglo-Indian joint venture OneWeb have entered the development and manufacturing of small satellite constellations. As arms race stability is inversely related to the number of entities participating in arms control, the involvement of numerous private companies further increases the uncertainty in advancing the arms control process.

(iii) Opacity and Unpredictability of the Starlink Technology System Make Confidence-Building Measures in Arms Control Difficult to Implement

Confidence-building measures in the field of armaments are essential for mitigating security dilemmas between nations, avoiding the risks of arms races, and achieving strategic stability. These measures usually include two aspects: one is arrangements to enhance information sharing and increase transparency, allowing the other party to understand one’s armament status, thereby reducing suspicion and preventing military escalation;⁷³ the other is to strengthen the predictability of armament development by transforming mutual agreements on arms control issues into soft norms or hard arms control treaties, thus avoiding strategic surprise attacks. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union enhanced the transparency and predictability of nuclear armament actions through information exchange, establishing hotlines, test notifications, observing major military activities, and signing arms control agreements to manage potential risks of nuclear arms races. For current arms control issues triggered by the militarization of Starlink, confidence-building measures face challenges of opacity and unpredictability.

Analyzing the transparency of armament development, there are significant differences between the Starlink technology system and nuclear weapons. On one hand, there is a lack of credible verification technologies and methods to check the militarization of Starlink. During the Cold War, nuclear arms control achieved comprehensive information exchange and detailed verification procedures because the development and deployment of nuclear weapons required large centrifuge equipment, purification plants, reactors, weapons-grade enriched uranium, and necessary tests, all detectable through credible means. For the military application of Starlink, its dual-use nature increases the difficulty of arms verification. For example, Starlink satellites can carry data transmission, network communication, photo shooting, infrared imaging, radar, and other dual-use payloads, making it challenging to verify which satellite payloads are purely for commercial purposes and which have military capabilities.⁷⁴ Moreover, unlike nuclear weapons, the military capability of Starlink is mainly realized through software rather than hardware. For instance, Starlink satellites have an autonomous collision avoidance system that uses artificial intelligence to autonomously avoid spacecraft and other space debris, minimizing the probability of dangerous proximity, ensuring safe operation in a collision-free space environment. However, by modifying software programs and algorithm settings, the autonomous collision avoidance system could also be converted into an autonomous attack system against spacecraft, serving anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile military functions. Since hardware-based information sharing or verification cannot capture the actual status of Starlink’s military applications, traditional means of enhancing armament transparency are ineffective in this area, leading to difficulties in establishing bilateral or multilateral arms trust mechanisms and further reducing the stability of the arms race.

Analyzing the predictability of armament development, the current unbalanced state of outer space armament development reduces the possibility of reaching outer space arms control agreements and the predictability of armament development. Signing treaties to restrict armament development behaviors must be based on relatively balanced military power between parties. In the armament development process, technologically leading nations usually do not seek arms control first; in the absence of competition, they first seek unparalleled superiority, and when facing competition, they seek relative advantages. Only when a power balance appears do they seek stable mutual deterrence and arms control agreements.⁷⁵ Currently, the development of outer space armament is dominated by the United States, which desires to freely use its space hegemony, maintaining the “right to unrestricted access to and operation in space assets,” and is unwilling to relinquish its leading position in the militarization of large low Earth orbit constellations. Therefore, it resists outer space arms control agreements, repeatedly obstructing arms control regulations proposed by China and Russia, such as the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, the No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space initiative, and the Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. Instead, it attempts to dilute and avoid signing outer space arms control agreements by proposing non-binding political norms like “responsible behavior in outer space.” In this context, Chinese disarmament ambassador Li Song stated during a special speech on outer space issues at the First Committee of the 77th UN General Assembly: “If we turn a blind eye to the strategic, policy, and measures of superpowers dominating outer space and only pursue ‘responsible behavior in outer space,’ outer space security will present a situation of ‘U.S.-led, other countries following the rules,’ which clearly does not align with the common interests of the broader international community and does not help maintain common outer space security.”⁷⁶ Given the current ambiguous international regulations on outer space and the unclear global governance paradigm, the international community lacks sufficient public products to constrain the militarization of outer space, with severely insufficient supply capacity. The unpredictability and uncontrollability of Starlink’s future militarization process also increase accordingly.

Conclusion

The United States attempts to eliminate the inherent vulnerability of space assets, enhance outer space deterrence capabilities, and force strategic adversaries to abandon attack intentions through the militarization of Starlink, possibly with the initial intention of maintaining and enhancing strategic stability. However, as the United States integrates Starlink technology into military space assets to gain a strategic advantage over its adversaries, other countries increasingly perceive Starlink as a security threat in nuclear, space, and cyber domains. Consequently, they adopt corresponding technical follow-up or counter-strategy measures, exacerbating the deepening of the outer space arms race and effectively weakening the existing strategic stability framework. The objective existence of the Kessler Syndrome indicates that avoiding the strategic stability risks brought by the competition in Starlink technology and maintaining the shared destiny of outer space aligns with the real interests of all parties. Addressing the governance of outer space security concerning the militarization of Starlink involves multiple stakeholders across various disciplines, including sovereign nations, think tanks, industry, civil organizations, international organizations, and academia, and must be steadily promoted under the coordination of authoritative security institutions. Simultaneously, the militarization of Starlink is closely linked with nuclear security, cyber security, and artificial intelligence security, presenting an interconnected security situation. Given the unpredictability of Starlink’s militarization direction and trends, it is crucial to adhere to sustainable security governance for the future.

First, it is necessary to maintain close communication and cooperation under the United Nations framework to preserve strategic stability in outer space. To break through the unilateral governance framework dominated by a few hegemonic countries in the outer space security agenda, the security governance of outer space militarization should surpass the limitations of national size, military strength, and levels of economic and technological development. Instead, it should continue global dialogue on the demilitarization of outer space and responsible behavior in space in an inclusive manner involving multiple stakeholders. This dialogue should aim to establish principles, norms, and conventions around common and urgent security concerns. At the same time, we need to overcome the current constraints that only sovereign states can act as the main bodies in artificial intelligence security governance.

Second, establishing a multi-domain linkage mechanism for outer space security governance is necessary. Governments, international organizations, and other outer space security actors must examine the complex, closely interconnected security risk challenges with a broad security perspective. It is essential to understand the interaction mechanisms between the militarization of Starlink and cyber security, artificial intelligence security, and nuclear security, and to pay close attention to the potential for military space technology to accelerate and amplify security risks in other emerging and strategic technological fields.

Lastly, shaping a forward-looking, sustainable development trend for outer space security is vital. Enhancing the capability to assess and predict the strategic impact and risks of Starlink’s militarization, closely monitoring the entire process of development, deployment, and use of Starlink in the military field, and anticipating the risks of “accidental wars” caused by advancing the militarization of Starlink without sufficient research, testing, and risk assessment are crucial. Advocating for international society to strengthen experience exchange on risk reduction practices and procedures, predicting the dual-use technology trends that Starlink may lead to, revealing its potential to exacerbate technological proliferation and increase arms control challenges, and focusing on limiting the spread of small civilian satellite constellation technologies with significant military enabling potential to terrorist organizations are essential. Strictly controlling the transfer of core critical data resources, developing monitoring means to prevent and identify the proliferation or misuse of space technology, ensuring the robustness of security risk management to cope with the uncertainties of Starlink’s militarization, achieving sustainable control over outer space arms competition, and maximizing the shaping of the future development trend of outer space security are necessary.