A pair of Chinese economists argue that the U.S. will have a difficult time effectively de-risking from China due to a variety of hurdles, including tensions with allies over the speed and scope of strategies, vested U.S. business interests, and partisan debates about China policy within the United States. To limit the scope and impact of U.S. technology and economic policies, they suggest, Beijing should seek to improve diplomatic relations with U.S. allied and partner nations, expand economic ties with developing countries, remain open to diplomatic engagement with Washington, and invest in China’s science and technology ecosystem to address innovation bottlenecks.
Wu Riqiang, a senior security expert from Renmin University, argues that Cold War arms control negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet Union showcase the importance of regular bilateral dialogue and transparency in military modernization to build confidence and avoid miscalculations between nuclear superpowers. As China’s security environment sours and tensions with the United States rise, Wu proposes that Beijing draw lessons from this historical example to develop an arms control approach that best safeguards national interests and security.
In this roundtable, scholars from Fudan University and several invited guests debate the degree of convergence between U.S. and EU outlooks on China, the likely trajectory of EU trade and investment ties with China, and what type of role the EU should play in China’s international strategy going forward. Most of the scholars argue that Europe-China relations have deteriorated over the past years. However, many appear optimistic that there is considerable room for EU-China cooperation going forward, on matters from the green energy transition, to supporting developing countries weather shocks from COVID-19, to the Ukraine war. On the Russia-Ukraine war, one scholar suggests that a “substantial push by China to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict would help greatly to improve China-EU relations,” while others suggest that the degree to which the EU leads a resolution will be a “weathervane of its strategic autonomy” and determine whether the EU can avoid being marginalized in China’s foreign strategy.
Researchers at the PLA’s National University of Defense Technology examine the U.S. strategy of deterrence by denial against China since 2017, tracing developments across the Trump and Biden administrations and assessing likely impacts on China’s efforts to shape its regional security environment. The authors argue that while these strategies have “achieved some of the expected effects,” they will be constrained abroad by the security interests of regional U.S. partners and allies and domestically through disagreement among U.S. political parties and U.S. military branches about how to approach building denial capabilities.
Emphasis added throughout text by editors.
A chapter covering “strategic deterrence” from the revised textbook by the PLA’s National Defense University (NDU), which serves as an authoritative study reference for senior PLA officers on military doctrine and strategy. This chapter offers insights into the evolution of PLA missions and thinking about how modern technology, military and dual use capabilities, as well as domestic and international developments have shaped the theory and practice of strategic deterrence.