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U.S. Technology Competition with China and China’s Countermeasures from the Perspective of Technology Power


A pair of Chinese economists argue that the U.S. will have a difficult time effectively de-risking from China due to a variety of hurdles, including tensions with allies over the speed and scope of strategies, vested U.S. business interests, and partisan debates about China policy within the United States. To limit the scope and impact of U.S. technology and economic policies, they suggest, Beijing should seek to improve diplomatic relations with U.S. allied and partner nations, expand economic ties with developing countries, remain open to diplomatic engagement with Washington, and invest in China’s science and technology ecosystem to address innovation bottlenecks.

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I.  Introduction

一、 引言

The U.S. government has already characterized China as a “strategic competitor,” and has taken technology competition with China as one of the key means for breaking the deadlock. Strategic competition among great powers has now entered an “era of all-element confrontation” (Zhang Cheng et al., 2021) and an “era of techno-politics” (Huang Rihan et al., 2022), and China and the United States are more inclined to comprehensively mobilize of all kinds of policy instruments to fight for “technology power” (Zhang Qianyu, 2020). Such “technology power” can be further interpreted as the combination of technological power, institutional power, and interpretative power (Ren Lin, 2013; Huang Rihan et al., 2022). Technological power reflects a country’s technological comparative advantage. In an era where science and technology are attached with political and security-related importance, a country can rely on its monopolistic power in advanced technologies to not only achieve military deterrence, but also gain the initiative for developing its economy by leveraging its central position in the global supply chain and international division of labor system. Institutional power is reflected most prominently in a country’s discourse power [话语权 (voice, influence)] within the international system, e.g., whether it can lead the negotiating agenda, or dominate the formulation of technical standards and international rules. Institutional power may benefit a country in terms of predicting and understanding different countries’ actions within important international mechanisms and institutions, reducing its external transaction costs, which helps to create an external environment favorable for its development. Interpretative power translates into the “legitimacy” of a country’s actions and mindsets of its international engagement and reflects a country’s ability to shape and disseminate specific values. In trade activities, such legitimacy usually appears in the form of concepts about trade, such as “free trade,” “competitive neutrality,” “fair trade,” and so on. Technological power is the foundation for the existence of institutional power and interpretative power, and institutional power provides the space for the maintenance and development of technological power, while interpretative power “endorses” the first two. The three influence each other, and all are indispensable. Based on the above theory, this paper intends to elucidate U.S. science and technology policies toward China through the three dimensions of “competition over power,” “competition over order,” and “competition over values,” and specifically explores the obstacles and challenges faced by the United States in the process of policy implementation, thereby proposing policy countermeasures for China.

美国政府已经将中国定性为“ 战略竞争对手”, 并将对华技术竞争作为破局关键之一。 当前, 大国战略竞争进入“全要素对抗时代”(张程等, 2021)和“技术政治时代”(黄日涵等,  2022),  中美两国更倾向于综合性地运用各类政策手段争夺“技术权力”(张倩雨, 2020)。 这种“技术权力” 可被进一步解读为技术性权力、 制度性权力和解释性权力(任琳, 2013; 黄日涵等, 2022)。 技术性权力反映了一国的技术比较优势。在科技政治化和安全化的时代, 凭借对先进技术的垄断, 一国不仅能获得军事震慑能力, 也能通过其在全球供应链和国际分工体系中的核心地位, 获得发展经济的主动权。 制度性权力集中体现了一国在国际制度体系中的话语权。 例如, 能否引领谈判议程, 主导技术标准和国际规则的制定。 制度性权力有助于一国预测和把握各国在重要国际机制和机构中的行为, 减少对外交易成本, 创造有利于本国发展的外部环境。 解释性权力映射了一国在国际事务互动中行为和观念的 “正当性”, 体现了一国对特定价值观塑造、 传播的能力。 在贸易活动中, 这种正当性通常以贸易理念的形式出现, 如“自由贸易”“竞争中立”“公平贸易” 等等。其中, 技术性权力是制度性权力和解释性权力存在的根基, 制度性权力为技术性权力提供存续和发展的空间, 而解释性权力为前两者“ 背书”, 三者互相影响, 缺一不可。 依托上述理论, 本文通过“实力竞争”“ 秩序竞争”“价值观竞争”三个层面厘清美国对华科技政 策, 具体探究美国在政策推行过程中面临的阻碍和挑战, 并据此提出中国应对的政策建议。

II. The Three Aspects of U.S. Technology Competition with China

二、 美国对华技术竞争的三个层面

Technological competition initiated by the United States against China up to the present can be categorized into three aspects: competition over power, with the main goal of seizing technological power; competition over order, with the goal of obtaining institutional power; and competition over values, with the goal of winning interpretative power.

迄今为止, 美国发动的对华技术竞争可划分为三个层面: 以夺取技术性权力为主要目标的实力竞争, 以获得制度性权力为目的的秩序竞争、 以及争夺解释性权力的价值观竞争。

(i) Competition over Power: Promoting a “Small Yard, High Fence” form of “Decoupling” and Fostering Industrial Competitiveness

(一) 实力竞争: 推进“ 小院高墙” 式“ 脱钩”, 培育产业竞争力

1. Main Initiatives for the Competition over Power

  1. 实力竞争的主要举措

According to their characteristics, policies launched by the United States at the power competition level mainly consist of “defensive policies,” for which the exclusive controls of technologies are the mainstay, and “offensive policies,” for which constructive industrial policies are the mainstay. The former is aimed at inhibiting technology diffusion and increasing the cost of innovation and development for China, and serves as a direct means of vying for technological power; the latter focuses on fostering industrial competitiveness and high-quality human resources, and is an endogenous driving force that facilitates the competition over technological power.

依据政策特征, 美方在实力层面发动的竞争主要有以排他性的技术管制为主体的“ 防御型政策”, 以及以建设性的产业政策为主体的“ 进攻型政策”。前者意在抑制技术扩散, 增加中国的创新和发展成本, 是争夺技术性权力的直接手段; 后者专注于培育产业竞争力和高质量人才, 是争夺技术性权力的内生驱动力。

With regard to “defensive policies” mainly based on technology controls, such a category can be further subdivided into import controls, export controls, investment controls, and talent controls according to the differences in the fields and items of control. Tariff remains the main means of the U.S. when it comes to restricting imports. Technology-intensive products such as medical devices, biopharmaceuticals, and new materials are the areas “hardest hit” by U.S.-imposed tariffs, with the restrictions focusing on the industries involved in “Made in China 2025.” In addition, a series of tariffs imposed by the United States against China on the basis of “Section 301” investigations also aroused concerns. In terms of export controls, the United States mainly focuses on export regulation and export enforcement of military-civil dual-use and militarily sensitive items. It has set up specific review bodies to comprehensively coordinate the regulation, enforcement, and licensing of civilian and military goods exports. For example, for the export control of military-civil dual-use items, agencies such as the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under the United States Department of Commerce are responsible, under the authority of the law, for technical control measures such as control lists and export licensing. For investment controls, the Foreign Investment Security Review System (FISRS) is a typical measure for this end. The FISRS is chaired by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which carries out the review work. Once a security threat [in a merger] is identified, the CFIUS will recommend the involved enterprise to take “mitigation measures,” or withdraw the merger application. In addition, talents, as one of the most important elements of production, are also subject to special attention. For China, the U.S. has been strictly managing and monitoring the flow of talent by restricting the entry of talent, adding extra conditions on financial assistance, and implementing the principle of “deemed export,” etc.

对于以技术管制为主体的“ 防御型政策”, 依据管制领域和物项的差异, 可进一步细分为进口管制、出口管制、 投资管制和人才管制。 关税是美国主要的进口限制手段, 医疗器械、 生物制药和新材料等技术密集型产品是美国加征关税的“重灾区”, 且限制范围集中于《中国制造 2025》 所涉及的产业。 除此之外, 美国基于“301 条款”调查对中国采取的一系列加征关税措施也一度引发关注。 在出口管制方面, 美国主要聚焦于包括军民两用物项和军用敏感物项的出口监管和出口执法, 并设立专门的审查机构全面对接民用和军用品出口的监管、 执法和许可工作。 例如, 在两用物项的出口管制方面, 美国商务部工业与安全局(BIS)等机构在法律的授权下负责管制清单和出口许 可证等技术管制措施。 在投资管制方面, 则以外国投资安全审查制度为典型代表, 该审查制度由美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)主持并开展审查工作。 一旦被认定存在安全威胁, CFIUS 将建议并购企业采取“ 缓解措施”, 或者撤回企业的并购申请。 除此之外, 人才作为最重要的生产要素之一, 亦受到特别关注: 针对中国, 美方主要采取限制入境、 增加资助条件和实行“ 视同出口” 原则等手段,   对人才的引进和输出进行严格的管理和监控。

With regard to “offensive policies” that are mainly pillared by industrial policies, these can be subdivided according to functional differences into industrial technology policy, industrial organization policy, and other industrial policies. Zhou Jianjun (2017) points out that industrial technology policies will directly affect the scientific and technological R&D sectors through, e.g., R&D subsidies, venture capital, credit incentives, infrastructure building, and other aspects; industrial organization policies focus on optimizing the market structure and improving the competitiveness of enterprises, and mainly concern antitrust policies and related laws to maintain market competition and industrial rationalization. In addition, there are also some industrial policies aimed at promoting or improving the economic operating environment, such as the U.S. government’s series of investment policies based on the .

对于以产业政策为主体的“ 进攻型政策”, 依据功能差异, 可细分为产业技术政策、 产业组织政策和其他产业政策。  周建军(2017) 指出, 产业技术政策直接作用于科技研发部门, 例如研发补贴、 风险投资、 信贷优惠和基础设施建设等; 产业组织政策以优化市场结构、 改善企业竞争力为核心, 主要包括各项维护市场竞争和产业合理化的反垄断政策及相关法案。 除此之外, 还存在一些旨在推动或改善经济运行环境的产业政策, 例如美国政府基于《道路交通修缮法案》的一系列投资政策。

2. Main Features of the Competition over Power

  1. 实力竞争的主要特征

(1) As the U.S. is shifting from single to “multi-pronged” sanctions in recent years, the U.S. measures for technology controls and sanctions have shown a tendency to be coordinated and synchronized. For example, with regard to investment in critical technologies and infrastructure, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) stand for a dual review system, with the “critical technologies” areas reviewed under the former being consistent with the ECRA’s scope of jurisdiction concerning “emerging and basic technologies”, thereby ensuring the comprehensiveness of the technological blockade (Liu et al., 2020). In addition, in the communications industry, government agencies will participate in the enforcement of sanctions together with independent agencies authorized by them. Since 2021, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in cooperation with the U.S. government, has repeatedly cracked down on Chinese entities on grounds of maintaining national security, and has set up a blacklist since the Chinese entities pose “an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”1 As of October 2022, there were nine Chinese companies and one Russian company on the list, including three major Chinese telecommunications carriers and leading Chinese technology companies such as Huawei and ZTE.

其一, 由“单一制裁” 转向“多管齐下”。 近年来, 美国的技术管制和制裁手段呈现协同联动的趋向。 如针对关键技术和基础设施的投资, 《外国投资风险评估现代化法案》( FIRRMA) 与《出口管制改革法案》(ECRA)形成了双重审查体系, 前者所审查的“关键技术”领域与 ECRA 所管辖的“新兴与基础技术” 范围一致, 确保了技术封锁的完备程度(刘瑛等, 2020 )。 此外, 在通信行业, 政府部门与其授权的独立机构共同参与实施制裁。 自 2021 年后, 美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)配合美国政府, 以国家安全为由多次打击中国实体, 并以“对美国国家安全或公民安全构成不可接受的风险”的名义设置黑名单。 截至 2022 年 10 月, 该名单共有 9 家中国企业和 1 家俄罗斯企业, 其中包括三大中国电信运营商和以华为、 中兴为首的中国龙头科技企业。

(2) There is a shift from “full decoupling” to “small yard, high fence.” Unlike the Trump administration with its policy tilting towards “full decoupling,” the Biden administration has shifted to a policy of “small yard, high fence” since it took office, framing the “small yard” as technologies related to national security, while the “high fence” refers to the strategic measures necessary to safeguard the core technologies within the “small yard.” Sacks (2019) argues that the screened-out national security-related technologies should meet the following three characteristics: They are closely related to the military field; they are relatively scarce in China; and the United States is at the cutting edge of the field. Although the definition of “small yard” remains controversial, the Biden administration has been gradually delimiting the scope of the “small yard” through the “100-Day Report” supply chain security assessments2 and the screening measures under the Critical and Emerging Technologies List (CETL).3

其二, 由“ 全面脱钩” 转向“ 小院高墙”。 不同于特朗普政府时期“ 全面脱钩” 的政策倾向, 拜登政府自上任后转向“ 小院高墙” 政策, 将“ 小院” 框定为与国家安全相关的技术, “ 高墙” 则是指维护“ 小院” 内的核心技术所采取的必要战略措施。 Sacks(2019) 认为, 被筛选出来的与国家安全相关的技术应当符合以下三个特征: 与军事密切相关、 中国相对匮乏和美国处于前沿。 尽管对“ 小院” 如何定义依旧存在争议, 但通过“ 百日报告” 的供应链安全评估, 以及《关键和新兴技术清单》的筛查, 拜登政府已经逐步框定了“ 小院” 的囊括范围。

(3) “Defensive” and “offensive” policies are being combined. Since the Biden administration took office, it has pushed a number of innovation-related bills, especially for the semiconductor industry. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 signed in August 20224 will provide the U.S. semiconductor industry with 52.7 billion U.S. dollars in funding over a five-year period, while also offering tax credits and other policy incentives. It specifically states that enterprises receiving subsidies under the Act will be prohibited for ten years from achieving any major deal with China that might enhance China’s semiconductor manufacturing ability. 5 As one can see, the U.S. government is seeking a combination of technological regulation and industrial policy, forcing multinational enterprises to choose between two countries to ensure that the United States will stay ahead of China in the competition for technological power.

其三, “ 防御型政策” 和“ 进攻型政策” 相结合。拜登政府上台后, 接连推出多项创新相关法案, 尤其针对半导体产业。 2022 年 8 月签署的《2022 年芯片和科学法案》将在 5 年内为美国半导体行业提供527 亿美元资金, 同时提供税收抵免等政策优惠。该法案特别提出, 接受该法案补贴的企业将被禁止在 10 年内与中国达成任何可能提升中国半导体制造能力的重大交易。 如此可见, 美国政府正谋求技术管制和产业政策的结合, 强制跨国企业在两个国家之间做出选择, 以确保美国在技术性权力的竞争中领先中国。

(ii) Competition over Order: Adopting “Double Standards” and Building Alliances

(二) 秩序竞争: 采取“双重标准”, 构建联盟关系

1. Main Initiatives for the Competition over Order

  1. 秩序竞争的主要举措

(1) Fighting for the right to set technology standards. This is mainly reflected in its participation in and infiltration of international standardization activities. The first measure includes actively sending domestic talents to international standardization organizations, and undertaking and leading more secretariat work of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC); the second involves using ISO as a platform to promote the United States’ paradigms and principles (Han Kewei, 2006); and the third includes reaching bilateral technology cooperation agreements through the channel of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and other national standards assessment agencies, thereby forming a “global radiation” of U.S. standards.

其一, 争夺技术标准制定权。 主要体现为对国际标准化活动的参与和渗透。 一是积极向国际性标准化组织输送国内人才, 承担并主导更多的国际标准化组织(ISO)、 国际电工委员会(IEC)的秘书处工作; 二是以国际标准化组织为平台, 推广美国的范式和原则(韩可卫, 2006); 三是通过美国国家标准学会(ANSI) 与各国标准评定机构的对接, 达成双边技术合作协议, 形成美国标准的“全球辐射”。

(2) Fighting for the rule-making power. On the one hand, the “U.S.-style template” has been promoted globally through bilateral and regional agreements. For example, in the digital trade area, the U.S. has been trying to include the principle of free flow of cross-border data in trade agreements, with the aim of leveraging its technology power in the digital economy field to establish a vertical international division of labor system in the digital economy, thereby obtaining institutional power and consolidating its position at the top of the global value chain (Lan Qingxin et al., 2019). On the other hand, it utilizes divisive issues to divide the interests of China and those of other countries or regions, dominate the negotiation agenda, and force China, which has been isolated from other countries, to accept the negotiation outcomes, or keep China outside of the negotiation framework. Examples include adding a “poison pill” clause to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, issuing the “Seventh Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States, and the European Union” on WTO subsidies rules, and so on.

其二, 争夺规则制定主导权。 一方面, 通过双边和区域协定向全球推广“ 美式模板”。 例如, 在数字贸易领域, 美方一直试图在贸易协定中加入跨境数据自由流动原则, 目的是依托数字经济领域的技术性权力建立垂直型数字经济国际分工格局, 获取制度性权力, 巩固其在全球价值链顶端的地位( 蓝庆新等, 2019)。 另一方面, 利用具有分歧性的议题分割中国与其他国家或地区的利益, 主导谈判议程, 迫使被孤立的中国被动接受谈判结果, 或者将中国隔离在谈判框架之外。 例如, 在《美墨加三国协议》中加入“ 毒丸条款”, 针对 WTO 补贴规则发布《美欧日第七份三方联合声明》等等。

(3) Building alliance relationships. Alliance relationship building by the United States is manifested in the use of discriminatory preferential policies, technical standards, and trade concepts, as ways to win allies and jointly exert pressure and restrictions on emerging countries with technological power. “Technology alliances,” “supply chain alliances,” and “values alliances” are common forms of alliances. Technology alliances usually appear in emerging technology fields, both in the form of national-level alliances represented by the Global Partnership for Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) and enterprise-level alliances represented by the Semiconductor Industry Alliance of America (SIAC). Supply chain alliances are usually embedded in international mechanisms established through high-level strategic dialogues, such as the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council established at the U.S.-EU Summit, the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership established at the U.S.-Japan Summit, and the U.S.-South Korea Joint Working Group established at the U.S.-South Korea Summit. Values alliances are based on a common philosophy and usually work in concert with supply chain alliances and technology alliances.

其三, 构建联盟关系。 美国所构建的联盟关系体现为通过歧视性的优惠政策、 技术标准和贸易理念等方式争取盟友, 共同对技术崛起国施加压力和限制。 “ 技术联盟” “供应链联盟”“价值观联盟” 是常见的联盟形式。 其中, “技术联盟”通常出现在新兴技术领域, 既存在以人工智能全球合作伙伴关系(GPAI) 为代表的国家层面的联盟形式, 也存在以美国半导体联盟(SIAC)为代表的企业层面的联盟组织。 “供应链联盟”通常被内嵌于通过高级别战略对话所构建的国际机制当中, 例如, 美欧峰会所成立的美欧贸易和技术委员会, 美日峰会成立的竞争力与弹性伙伴关系, 美韩峰会成立的美韩联合工作组等。 “价值观联盟”则以共同的理念作为纽带, 通常与“供应链联盟” 和“技术联盟”协同发挥作用。

2. Main Features of the Competition over Order

  1. 秩序竞争的主要特

(1) Double standards are applied. First, the United States applies a double standard separately to its strong and weak industries. On the one hand, the United States will raise the standards on intellectual property rights, labor rights, environmental standards, and other societal rules based on U.S. domestic laws, areas in which the United States has a comparative advantage, and “strictly guards against technology spillovers.” On the other hand, it is relatively passive when it comes to the agricultural and traditional manufacturing sectors. It also attempts to delay WTO dispute settlement mechanism negotiations, and obstruct the adoption of measures on relevant issues. Secondly, it applies a double standard to developed and developing countries. It has no rules to promote technology transfers to developing countries, but only rules to protect the intellectual property rights of developed countries, and for developing countries that have intellectual property rights with comparative advantages, its standards for their protection are extremely low. Thirdly, it applies a double standard to U.S. transnational corporations and Chinese enterprises. For example, in the field of trade and investment, the United States calls for “behind-the-border measures” that would cede part of nations’ sovereignty and constrain the Chinese government’s support for local enterprises, but never mentions the policy support for multinational corporations and high, government-funded subsidies for high-tech industries.

其一, 实行双重标准。 一是对自身优势产业和弱势产业实行双重标准。 美国一方面在具备比较优势的知识产权、 劳工权益、 环境标准等基于美国国内法的社会性条款上提高标准, 对技术外溢加以“ 严防死守”; 另一方面, 对农业和传统制造业领域的议题较为消极, 拖延 WTO 争端解决机制的谈判, 阻挠相关议题的通过。 二是对发达国家和发展中国家实行双重标准。 没有促进对发展中国家进行技术转让的规则, 只有保护发达国家知识产权的规则,且针对发展中国家具有比较优势的知识产权保护标准极低。 三是对美国跨国公司和中国企业实行双重标准。 例如在贸易和投资领域,   美国要求推动“ 边境后措施” 让渡部分国家主权, 约束中国政府对本地企业的支持行为, 但绝口不提美国联邦政府给予跨国公司的政策支持和高科技产业的高额补贴。

(2) Pushing international adoption of its domestic rules. Ever since the United States formulated its national standardization strategy in 1998, making international standards reflect American technologies’ criteria has been the core of its strategy (Han, 2006). This strategic style of “internationalization of U.S. standards” is also reflected in trade, investment, and other fields. The original WTO provisions have also originated from U.S. domestic legislation and bilateral trade agreements signed by the United States (Li Wei et al., 2019). In recent years, the United States has been actively participating in the formulation of international standards and rules for emerging technologies such as the digital economy, leveraging its mature domestic legislative practice. Although these provisions partly reflect the objective needs of technological and social progress, they mainly serve the national interests of the United States and are not applicable to all countries.

其二, 国内立法国际化。 自 1998 年美国制定国家标准化战略以来, 使国际标准反映美国技术就是其战略核心( 韩可卫, 2006)。 这种“ 美国标准国际化” 的战略风格也反映在贸易、 投资等多个领域, 最初的WTO 条款也来源于美国国内立法和其所签署的双边贸易协定( 李巍等, 2019)。 近年来, 美国以国内成熟的立法为基础, 积极参与数字经济等新兴技术的国际标准和规则的制定。 尽管这些条款部分反映了技术和社会进步的客观需要, 但主要服务于美国的国家利益, 并非适用于所有国家。

(iii) Competition over Values: Seeking Conceptual Identification and Promoting U.S.-Style Values

(三) 价值观竞争: 寻求理念认同,宣扬美式价值观

1. Main Initiatives for Competition over Values

  1. 价值观竞争的主要举措

(1) Building alliances based on values barriers. The competition over values initiated by the U.S. tends to provide rational defenses of policy ideas through value guidance and public opinion management, so as to demonstrate the legitimacy of its economic and political activities. These “values alliances” often work in tandem with “supply chain alliances” and “technology alliances.” For example, the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy released by the White House in February 2022 seeks to establish exclusive partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region for the digital economy, supply chain security, and fair trade based on identification with the values of “democracy,” “openness,” and “interconnectedness.”6

其一, 打造基于价值观壁垒的联盟。 美方发动的价值观竞争倾向于通过价值观引导和舆论宣传, 为政策主张提供合理的辩护, 以此彰显经济和政治活动的正义性。 这一“ 价值观联盟” 通常与“ 供应链联盟” 和“技术联盟” 协同发挥作用。 如 2022 年 2 月, 美国白宫发布的《美国印太战略》正是以“ 民主”“ 开放”“ 互联”等价值观认同为基础, 在印太地区建立排他性的数字经济、 供应链安全和公平贸易等合作关系。

(2) Attempting to use economic sanctions as a way to address value issues. In recent years, U.S. economic sanctions against China have gradually been extended to values issues such as “democracy,” “human rights” and “fairness.” For example, since 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has actively responded to the U.S. federal government’s public opinion guidance and issued a number of Withhold Release Orders (WRO) against Chinese products such as cotton fabrics, computer parts, and solar panels. As of September 2022, CBP had 54 products on its WRO list, of which 35 come from China. 7

其二, 将价值观议题延伸至经济制裁的适用范围。 近年来, 美国针对中国的经济制裁逐渐向“民主” “人权”“公平” 等价值观议题延伸。 例如, 自 2018 年以来, 美国海关和边境保护局(CBP) 积极响应美国联邦政府的舆论引导, 针对中国的棉织品、 计算机零部件、 太阳能电池板等产品发布数项暂扣令。 截至 2022 年 9 月, CBP 的暂扣令列表共有 54 项产品, 其中来自中国的产品就有 35 项

2. Main Features of the Competition over Values

  1. 价值观竞争的主要特征

(1) Policies related to competition over values are carried out in a continuous manner. A policy regime using “democratic” identification as a link to unite allies through non-military means has been visible since the Trump era. The “National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technology” released by the Trump administration in October 2020 proposed the development of “worldwide technology norms, standards, and governance models that reflect democratic values and interests.” In April 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also put forward the “5G Clean Path,” proclaiming that an alliance would be built in the field of 5G with “democracy” as its bond, and he urged allies to abandon the equipment of Chinese IT suppliers represented by Huawei and ZTE. The Biden administration has continued this policy trend, mobilizing domestic and international support through various sectors, including government, think tanks, and the media, to build a “technology alliance” based on “democratic” values.

其一, 具有政策延续性。以“民主” 认同为纽带, 借助非军事化手段联合盟友的政策布局在特朗普时期就可见端倪。2020 年10 月, 特朗普政府颁布的《关键与新兴技术国家战略》就曾提出将建设“世界范围的、能反映民主价值和利益的技术规范、标准和治理模式”。2020 年4 月, 美国国务卿蓬佩奥也曾提出“5G 清洁路径”(5G Clean Path), 宣称要在5G 领域构建以“民主”为纽带的联盟, 并督促其盟友放弃以华为和中兴为代表的中国IT 供应商的设备。拜登政府延续了这一政策趋向, 通过政府、智库和媒体等各部门在国内外广泛动员, 构建基于“民主”价值观的“技术联盟”。

(2) The U.S. government’s guidance of public opinion on U.S.-China relations is characterized by partisan influences. Compared with the Republican Party, the Biden administration is more inclined to describe China-U.S. relations in terms of “competition” rather than a zero-sum game of a “hostile” relationship. According to a survey conducted in the United States by the Pew Research Center in March 2021, 80% of Democratic respondents did not believe that the China-U.S. relationship was a “hostile” one, while more than half of the Republican respondents held the opposing view.8 Since the Biden administration took office, the proportion of U.S. (survey) respondents who believe that China and the United States have a “competitive” rather than “hostile” relationship has risen from 54% in 2021 to 62% by March 2022 (Huang et al., 2022). This suggests that the public opinion guidance of the U.S. political parties has a certain degree of influence over the personal perceptions of the U.S. public. The U.S. government’s “characterization” of the U.S.-China relationship will also affect the economic and trade engagement and technology exchanges between the United States and China to a certain extent.

其二 , 美国政府对中美关系的舆论引导存在党派特征。相比共和党执政时期, 拜登政府更倾向于以“竞争”描述中美关系, 而非零和博弈的“敌对”关系。皮尤研究中心在2021 年3 月于美国做的抽样问卷调查结果显示, 80%的民主党受访者并不认为中美两国是“敌对”关系, 而持反对意见的共和党受访者则超过半数。 自拜登政府执政后, 截至2022 年3 月, 认为中美两国是“竞争”而非“敌对”关系的美国(问卷)受访者比例由2021 年的54%上升到62%(Huang et al. , 2022), 这表明美国政党的舆论引导对美国民众的个人观念也存在一定程度的影响。美国政府对中美关系的“定性”, 也将在一定程度上影响中美民间的经贸互动和技术交流。

Generally speaking, the United States’ initiatives at the level of competition over power, are based mainly on targeted and linked domestic institutional systems; at the level of competition over order, they are more focused on reflecting the United States’ national interests in the international institutional environment; and at the level of competition over values, they are focused on achieving the “universalization” of American values. Table 1 summarizes the main initiatives, characteristics, and representative measures of U.S. technological competition with China at the above three levels.

总体而言, 美国在实力竞争层面的举措以具有针对性和联动性的国内制度体系为主, 在秩序竞争层面更侧重于在国际制度环境中体现美国的国家利益, 而在价值观竞争层面则着重于确立美式价值观的“普世化”。表1 总结了美国在以上三个层面采取的对华技术竞争的主要举措、特征和代表性措施。

III. The Dilemma Facing U.S. Technology Competition with China

三、 美国对华技术竞争面临的困境

It is only by relying on the long-standing accumulation of technological and economic advantages, as well as the current deficit of emerging technology governance and rules (Huang Rihan et al., 2022), that the United States has been able to launch technology competition with China along the above three dimensions. However, it may not be able to achieve the expected results due to constraints caused by internal and external situations.

依托美国长期以来积累的技术和经济优势, 以及新兴技术领域治理赤字和规则缺位的现状( 黄日涵等,  2022),  美国才得以从以上三个层面发动对华技术竞争, 但因受内外形势的制约, 未必能达到其预期效果。

(i) Difficulties in Reconciling Domestic Interests in the United States

(一) 美国国内利益分歧难以调解

(1) The redundancy in its bureaucratic system negatively affects the efficiency of policy implementation by government agencies. Due to overlapping responsibilities, the work coordination problem has been an issue in the U.S. executive branch characterized by constant relapse (Wilson, 2019). Since the Biden administration took office, it has established several new executive departments. The functional responsibilities of different agencies have become less distinct, making friction over work an unavoidable possibility. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 proposes that the Department of Defense should establish a CHIPS Program Office and CHIPS Research and Development Office in the National Institute of Standards and Technology. As the new department needs to coordinate closely with the Office of the Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Homeland Security, it is less efficient in terms of policy implementation.

其一, 冗杂的官僚体系影响政府部门政策执行效率。由于分管事项的重叠, 美国行政部门不时出现工作协调的问题(威尔逊, 2019)。拜登政府上台后, 新设数个行政部门, 各机构的职能范围更加模糊, 工作摩擦难以避免。如《2022 年芯片和科学法案》提出: 由国防部推动在美国国家标准技术研究院新设芯片计划办公室和研发办公室, 而新设部门需要与贸易代表办公室、商务部、国防部、能源部和国土安全部等部门紧密协调, 政策执行效率下降。

(2) Bills become stalled due to internal partisan divisions. Since the Biden administration came to power, factional divisions within the Democratic Party have reappeared. The more radical progressives and the far left opposed the moderates on the issue of budget and its allocation, which led to the repeated shelving of the Endless Frontier Act. The CHIPS and Science Act, passed in August 2022, was precisely the result of numerous games and negotiations.

其二, 政党内部分裂导致法案搁浅。 随着拜登政府上台,  民主党内部的派系分裂再次显现。 较为激进的进步派和极左派在预算的投入和分配议题上与温和派对立, 导致《 无尽前沿法案》 一再搁浅。2022 年 8 月通过的《2022 年芯片和科学法案》 正是数次博弈和谈判后妥协的结果。

(3) Interest group conflicts have limited the implementation of policies. The U.S. science and technology industry is not a monolithic whole. Conflicts arise even among different companies in the same industry due to the uneven distribution of preferential industrial policies, resulting in the halted progress of related policies and legislation design. The “restraining order” on Huawei’s sales has triggered opposition from multinational enterprises such as Qualcomm and AMD, which are important suppliers of chips, as well as defiance from the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, and disagreements have even appeared within government agencies (Davis, 2020). On the eve of the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, companies such as NVIDIA, Qualcomm, and AMD also considered opposing the bill because it favored chipmakers led by Intel Corporation and had little policy support for chip designers.

其三, 利益集团的博弈限制政策推行。 美国科技行业内部并非铁板一块, 即使同一行业的不同企业也会因产业政策优惠的分配不均而产生冲突, 导致相关政策和法案进展停滞。 对华为的销售“ 限制令”就曾引发作为芯片重要供应商的美国高通、AMD 等跨国企业及美国半导体行业协会的反对, 甚至在政府机构内部也出现了分歧意见(Davis, 2020)。在《2022 年芯片和科学法案》通过前夕, 英伟达、高通和AMD 等企业考虑反对该议案, 因为该法案偏袒以英特尔公司为首的芯片制造商, 而少有对芯片设计商的政策支持。

Source: Compiled based on relevant information

(ii) A “Hard Decoupling” for U.S. Technology Would be Difficult to Achieve

(二) 美国技术“ 硬脱钩” 难以实现

(1) A “hard decoupling” would lead to massive business and job losses. The Boston Consulting Group has estimated that a complete ban on U.S. semiconductor firms from selling chips to China would cost U.S. firms 18 percent of their market share, 37 percent of their revenues, and about 15,000 to 40,000 jobs (Varas et al., 2020).

其一, “ 硬脱钩” 将导致巨大的商业损失和就业流失。 据波士顿咨询公司估计, 若完全禁止美国半导体企业向中国出售芯片, 美国企业将损失市场份额的 18%,  收入将下降 37%,  还将损失约 1. 5 万到 4 万个就业岗位( Varas et al. , 2020)。

(2) A “hard decoupling” would raise science and technology R&D costs. After the Chinese market and investment from China are stripped away, it would be difficult to support the financial needs of U.S. universities and research institutes solely through subsidies from the U.S. federal government. This could ultimately lead to increased R&D costs and slow down the progress of technology marketization.

其二, “ 硬脱钩” 提升了科技研发成本。 在剥离了中国市场和来自中国的投资后, 仅凭来自美国联邦政府的补贴政策难以支撑美国高校和科研机构的资金需求, 最终可能导致研发成本增加, 延缓市场化进度。

(3) [The prospect of] a “hard decoupling” has strengthened China’s determination to achieve industrial autonomy. In October 2020, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP proposed “adhering to the core position of innovation in China’s progress of modernization.” At the end of the same year, the Central Economic Work Conference for the first time put forward the concept of “autonomous and controllable” production chains and supply chains as one of the eight key tasks. These policies show that China has not changed its strategic direction because of the United States’ “decoupling” policy, which demonstrates that the strategic goal of the United States has not been achieved.

其三, “ 硬脱钩” 坚定了中国推动产业自主化的决心。 2020 年 10 月, 十九届五中全会提出将“ 坚持创新在我国现代化建设全局中的核心地位”。 同年年底, 中央经济工作会议首次提出了产业链和供应链“ 自主可控” 的概念,   并将其作为八项重点任务之一。 这些政策的提出表明中国并未因美国的“ 脱钩” 政策而转变战略方向, 美国的战略目的并未实现。

(iii) Limited Effectiveness of U.S. Industrial Policy Support

(三) 美国产业政策扶持效果有限

(1) The industrial policies implemented by the United States have not been effective in restricting enterprises’ investment behavior in the pursuit of their shareholders’ interests. On the one hand, enterprises may take advantage of government subsidies to obtain short-term gains through stock buybacks rather than productive investments. SIAC members spent a total of $633 billion on stock buybacks between 2011 and 2020 (Lazonick and Hopkins, 2021), more than twelve times the total amount of subsidies promised to the U.S. semiconductor industry in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. On the other hand, multinational enterprises are not willing to abandon the Chinese market entirely. Once the subsidy fund is depleted, these enterprises will still have the possibility of turning to the Chinese market.

其一, 美国现已实行的产业政策并未有效限制企业以追求股东利益为目的的投资行为。 一方面, 企业可能利用政府补贴, 通过股票回购而非生产型投资来获取短期收益。 SIAC 成员在 2011 年到 2020 年间, 总共花费 6330 亿美元用于股票回购(Lazonick and Hopkins,  2021),  是《2022 年芯片和科学法案》所承诺给予美国半导体产业补贴总额的 12 倍以上。 另一方面, 跨国企业并不希望完全放弃中国市场。 一旦补贴资金断裂, 这些企业依然存在转向中国市场的可能性。

(2) Financial support will constrain industrial policy delivery. On the one hand, it would be difficult for the subsidies provided by the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 to fully support the establishment of a completely self-sufficient local supply chain in the United States, and the amount of talent, energy, materials, and other supporting factors required during the industrial transfer back to the U.S. has also been underestimated. On the other hand, establishing additional plants and production lines involves high fixed costs and does not yield returns in the short term, but does require continuous and massive investment. In the semiconductor industry, for example, Intel plans to build a giant megafab in Ohio that is not expected to start producing chips until 2025 (Robinson, 2022). If the government subsidies fail to promptly materialize as promised, the investment plan will be at risk of being called off.

其二, 资金支持是产业政策实施的掣肘。 一方面, 《2022 年芯片和科学法案》所提供的补贴难以支撑美国建立完全自给自足的本土供应链, 也低估了行业转移所需要的人才、 能源、 材料等支撑因素; 另一方面, 增设厂房和生产线有较高的固定成本, 无法在短期内产生回报, 但却需要大量的资金持续不断投入。 以半导体行业为例, 英特尔公司计划在俄亥俄州建造的巨型晶圆厂预计要到 2025 年才能开始生产芯片( Robinson,  2022),  一旦政府补贴无法如实兑现, 投资计划将有流产风险。

(3) The “supply chain security problem” is difficult to address. Take the semiconductor industry for example. The existing U.S. science and technology subsidy policy that “puts a heavy emphasis on research and development” and “pays little attention to production”, has led to the premature elimination of a large amount of older chip production capacity. This caused a serious gap between semiconductor supply and demand, and ultimately there was no choice but to ease the “chip shortage” problem through imports. Therefore, the impact of the new industrial policy on U.S. domestic manufacturing capacity and supply chain resilience remains to be seen.

其三, “ 供应链安全问题” 难以根除。 以半导体行业为例, 美国现有的科技补贴政策“ 重研发” “ 轻生产” 的取向导致企业过早淘汰大量旧型芯片产能, 使半导体供给与需求严重脱节, 最终不得不通过进口缓解“ 芯片荒” 问题。 因此, 新的产业政策对美国国内制造业生产能力和供应链韧性的作用效果仍然是未知的。

(iv)  The Interests of Allied Groups Do Not Coincide

(四) 盟友集团利益不一致

(1) The exclusive “technology alliances” promoted by the United States will harm the economic interests of its allies. For example, the introduction of the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 has undermined Samsung’s and TSMC’s production expansion plans in mainland China. In fact, the multinational enterprises of U.S. allies also have competitive relationships with U.S. enterprises as substitutes, and they have not been compensated accordingly. Business interest losses have dampened the enthusiasm of the allies to coordinate with the United States.

其一, 美国提倡的排外的“ 技术联盟” 损害了盟友的经济利益。 例如, 《2022 年芯片和科学法案》的出台就使三星和台积电在中国大陆的扩产计划受阻。事实上, 盟友的跨国企业与美国企业同样存在竞争替代关系, 且并未得到相应补偿。 商业利益的损失打击了盟友响应美国的积极性。

(2) The United States’ “alliance credibility” has been overstretched. On the one hand, the U.S. federal government’s limited fiscal revenue cannot support the cost of maintaining its hegemonic position, therefore its commitments to allies may look like some kind of “lip service that belies reality,” therefore making it difficult to attract France, Germany, and other peripheral allies over the long term. On the other hand, the unstable political situation makes allies skeptical of the consistency of its policies. Allies will usually leave some leeway in their cooperation with the United States in order to avoid political and economic losses and not lose China’s market and opportunities completely (Ma, 2021).

其二, 美国的“ 联盟信誉” 正在被透支。 一方面, 美国联邦政府拮据的财政收入无法支撑其维持霸权地位的成本, 使得美国对盟友的承诺呈现一种“ 口惠而实不至” 的境地, 难以长期吸引法国、 德国等外围盟友; 另一方面, 不稳定的政治局势使盟友对其政策的连贯性持怀疑态度。 盟友为避免政治和经济损失, 也不希望完全失去中国的市场和机遇( 马骦,  2021),  对与美国的合作通常留有余地。

(3) The “America First” policy has led to dissatisfaction among allies. In September 2021, for example, under the slogan of responding to the global chip crisis, the U.S. Department of Commerce forced Samsung and other allied enterprises to disclose confidential data,9 and said it would use its policy toolbox against uncooperative enterprises. Such a policy approach, which prioritizes U.S. national interests, has threatened the stability of the technology alliance.

其三, “ 美国优先” 的政策方针招致盟友的不满。  例如, 2021 年 9 月美国商务部以应对全球芯片危机为口号, 强制三星等盟友企业披露机密数据, 并称将对不合作的企业动用政策工具箱。 这类以美国国家利益优先的政策方针动摇了“ 技术联盟” 的 稳定性。

IV. China’s Countermeasures Against U.S. Technology Competition

四、 中国应对美国技术竞争的对策

The more we are subjected to blockades and suppression, the less we can afford to wall ourselves off or self-isolate. Instead, we should pursue a strategy aimed at international science and technology cooperation featuring greater openness, inclusion, and shared benefits. This is also the basic strategy of China’s response to U.S. technology competition.

越是面临封锁打压, 越不能搞自我封闭、 自我隔绝, 而是要实施更加开放包容、 互惠共享的国际科技合作战略。 这也是中国应对美国技术竞争的基本思路。

(i) Adhere to the Principle of Mutual Respect and Avoid A “Full Decoupling”

(一) 秉持相互尊重原则, 避免“ 全面脱钩”

As it would be difficult, in a short period of time, to change the positions of China and the United States in the global value chain and manufacturing system, achieving cooperation, coexistence, and win-win outcomes would be far better than a full decoupling. On the one hand, China should avoid a comprehensive “hard decoupling” and seek opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. On the other hand, it should also be alert to the United States’ targeted strikes in the field of science and technology innovation. It cannot be blindly optimistic and give concessions in exchange for cooperation, which will force China into a weak position in a “game of chicken” (Zhang Jie, 2020). In the manufacturing field, the United States’ infrastructure construction plans have offered opportunities for China-U.S. cooperation in transportation, energy, and other areas, and consumer demand from China can also alleviate the impact on the U.S. manufacturing industry. At the bilateral cooperation level, opportunities should be sought to resume strategic and economic dialogues and jointly maintain the stability of the international order and interaction. In negotiations, we should firmly adhere to the policy position of developing countries, clarify the necessity and rationality of industrial policies for both China and the United States, define the compliance standards of industrial policies through consultation, and jointly improve subsidization methods. It should be noted that the prerequisite for smooth negotiations is that both sides uphold the principle of mutual respect, and to make this condition possible, the U.S. side must have a clear understanding of the bottom lines and principles with regard to China’s national interests and sovereignty. Therefore, it is necessary to pay high political costs to send signals of strategic determination to the United States, so that China-U.S. relations can return to a “manageable and orderly state.” In terms of regional cooperation, China should respond to the United States’ return to the CPTPP or its accession to regional cooperation agreements such as the RCEP with an open mind, try to rebuild a relationship of trust between the two countries, show China’s positive attitude toward multilateralism and global governance, and respond to international public opinion and skepticism with a firm position.

由于中美两国在全球价值链和制造业体系的地 位在短时间内都难以撼动, 合作共存和互利共赢将远胜于全面脱钩。 中国一方面应避免全方位的“ 硬脱钩”, 寻求互惠互利的合作空间, 另一方面也应当警惕美国对科技创新领域针对性的打击,     不能乐观盲目地以让步换合作,    导致中国在“ 胆小鬼博弈” 中落入弱势( 张杰, 2020)。 在制造业领域, 美国在交通、 能源等领域的基础设施建设计划为中美合作提供了机会, 来自中国的消费需求也可缓解美国制造业的冲击。 在双边合作层面, 应寻求恢复战略与经济对话的机会, 共同维护国际秩序互动的稳定。在谈判时, 应坚定发展中国家的政策立场, 阐明产业政策对中美双方的必要性和合理性, 通过磋商对产业政策的合规性做出界定, 共同改善补贴方式。需要注意的是, 谈判顺利进行的前提是双方秉持相互尊重的原则,  而要达成这一条件,  必须令美方对中方在国家利益和主权方面的底线和原则有清晰的认知, 因此,  需要花费较高的政治成本向美方投送战略决心信号, 使中美关系回到“ 可管理的有序状态”。 在区域合作方面, 以开放的态度应对美国返回 CPTPP 或加入 RCEP 等区域合作协定, 努力重建两国之间的信任关系, 展现中国对待多边主义和全球治理的积极态度, 以坚定立场应对国际舆论和质疑。

(ii) Create Platforms for Technology Cooperation and Clear the “Roadblocks” of Technological Breakthroughs

(二) 打造技术合作平台, 疏通技术突破的“ 堵点”

Making breakthroughs in “chokepoint technology” is still the basis for developing reciprocal and cooperative relations with other countries. On the one hand, with the successful experience of BeiDou-1 system research as a reference, we should emphasize the importance of major science and technology projects under the new nationwide resource mobilization mechanism, in terms of its guiding and organizing capabilities for downstream technological actors, such as enterprises, scientific research institutes, and industry associations (Song Lifeng et al., 2022). On the other hand, we should take the initiative to further open up and improve the cooperation ecosystem for science and technology. First of all, efforts should be made to build domestic-international technology exchange platforms. We should take the initiative in constructing and building high-standard technological exchange platforms by, for example, leveraging major science and technology projects, international import expositions, free trade zones, free trade ports, and other strategies and platforms, participating in international conferences, establishing bilateral and multilateral research associations and research foundations, and actively promoting science and technology project cooperation in key technological fields. Secondly, we should make full use of civic and industrial organizations, guide social organizations to play an active role in transnational technology cooperation, promote the exchange of talents, strengthen the cultivation of talents, hold more innovation seminars and science and technology competitions, provide demonstration platforms for excellent technical talents, and optimize the resource distribution of universities and scientific research institutions. Thirdly, enterprises should be encouraged to adopt a strategy of “competition and cooperation,” seek appropriate overseas partners, establish a learning mechanism of win-win cooperation, and improve their knowledge absorption capacity and level of learning. Finally, opportunities should be sought for cooperation with non-competitive organizations outside China, such as upstream and downstream enterprises, cross-industry enterprises, higher education institutions, and research institutes, etc., since when it comes to enhancing technology innovation capability, non-competitors outside China also have their own strengths to offer (Frame et al., 1979).

解决“ 卡脖子” 技术问题仍是与他国发展对等合作关系的基础。 一方面, 参考北斗一号系统研究的成功案例, 应重视新型举国体制和重大科技工程对企业、 科研院所、  行业协会等下游技术力量的引导和组织作用( 宋立丰等, 2022); 另一方面, 应主动扩大开放, 改善科技合作生态。 首先, 着力打造国内—国际技术交流平台。 如依托重大科技工程、 国际进口博览会、 自贸区、 自贸港等战略和平台, 对接国际会议, 建立双边、 多边形式的研究协会和研究基金会, 积极推动关键技术领域的科技项目合作, 主动构建和打造高标准的技术交流平台。 其次, 应充分利用民间和行业组织的功能, 引导社会组织在跨国技术合作中发挥积极作用, 注重人才交流, 强化人才培育, 积极举办创新研讨会和科技竞赛, 为优秀的技术性人才提供展示的平台, 优化高校和科研机构的资源。 再次, 鼓励企业采取“ 竞合” 战略, 寻找适当的境外合作伙伴, 建立合作共赢的学习机制, 加强自身的知识吸收能力和学习水平。 最后, 应寻求与境外非竞争机构的合作机会, 如上下游企业、 跨行业企业、 高等院校和研究机构等等, 在提升技术创新能力方面, 境外非竞争者同样具有优势( Frame et al. , 1979)。

(iii) Firmly Uphold Multilateralism and Promote Consensus-Building on National Interests

(三) 坚定维护多边主义, 推进达成利益共识

Given the credibility overdraft of U.S. hegemony and the persisting economic problems caused by the Russia-Ukraine War, U.S. allies have to deal with the accumulating political and economic pressures in their countries, and other economies are also seeking opportunities for strategic cooperation. Against this backdrop, China should seize the chance and seek to reach a consensus that maximizes its interests. First, China should flexibly handle its own position in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the “allies” that the United States has won over, leverage its trade strengths to seek strategic support, and send “cooperation signals” at a proper time. For example, China and Europe have the potential for cooperation on issues such as the digital economy, the green economy, cybersecurity, safeguarding multilateralism, and third-party markets, and for Japan and South Korea, the ASEAN-China-Japan-Korea (10+3) Industrial Chain Supply Chain Cooperation initiative has strategic appeal. Second, we should actively unite with developing countries to explore the applicability and compliance of economic and technological sanctions under the WTO framework, cooperate on anti-intervention, and establish an anti-intervention alliance, thereby increasing the overall bargaining power of developing countries in multilateral economic negotiations. Third, we should continue to deepen exchanges and cooperation with developing countries in the field of public health, adhere to the argument that COVID-19 vaccines are international public goods, and strengthen international collaboration through the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) program and other channels.

在美国霸权信誉透支以及俄乌局势造成的经济 问题难以疏解的情况下, 美国的盟友不得不应对其国内积攒的政治和经济压力,     其他经济体也在寻求战略合作机遇。 在此背景下, 中国应把握时机, 寻求达成最大利益共识。 第一, 对美国拉拢的“ 盟友”, 中国应在双边和多边交涉中灵活处理自身立场, 借助贸易地位寻求战略支持, 及时发送“ 合作信号”。 例如, 中欧在数字经济、 绿色经济、 网络安全、 维护多边主义和第三方市场等议题上存在合作潜力, 对于日本和韩国,  “ 东盟+中日韩产业链供应链合作倡议” 具备战略吸引力。 第二, 积极团结发展中国家, 合作探讨在WTO 框架下实行经济和技术制裁的适用性和合规性, 开展反干预合作, 建立反干预联盟, 增加发展中国家在多边经济谈判中的整体议价能力。 第三, 继续深化与发展中国家在公共卫生领域的交流与合作, 坚持新冠肺炎疫苗的国际公共产品性质, 通过新冠肺炎疫苗实施计划( COVAX) 等方式加强国际协作。

(iv) Jointly Maintain the International Order and Actively Participate in Global Technology Governance

(四) 共同维护国际秩序, 积极参与全球技术治理

It is in the common interest of China and the United States to maintain the stability of the international order. It is necessary for China to join hands with other economies, the United States included, to improve the benefit-sharing and compensation mechanisms of the international order, so as to avoid competition for limited resources, shirking of responsibilities, and unfair market competition. Market access and subsidy mechanisms should be carried out under the framework of the multilateral trading system to ensure the transparency and fairness of procedures and mechanisms. Specifically, under multilateral frameworks, China can participate in the discussion of global governance issues through high-level dialogue mechanisms such as the G20, the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. It can strengthen collaboration with emerging economies, demonstrate its concern for the least developed countries, and unite stakeholder countries, so as to avoid being besieged by the United States’ “circle of friends.” In terms of rule-making, on the one hand, China should understand the intentions and national conditions of participating members, emphasize the application of informal institutional arrangements, take inclusive growth as its basic goal, seek mutual benefits and win-win outcomes, and promote the building of a “community of a shared future for mankind” and a “community of human health.” It should properly handle conflicts between international and extraterritorial jurisdiction, instead of unilaterally “liberalizing,” “legalizing,” and “instrumentalizing” trade and forcing members to accept a “package of commitments,” which may cause a serious impact on the more vulnerable emerging industries of developing countries. On the other hand, it should urge developed countries to undertake technology transfer obligations, materialize the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, and mend the WTO’s loopholes in the dispute settlement mechanism and the compliance of trade remedies, so as to prevent developed countries from protecting their domestic industries through repeated trade remedy investigations and temporary tariffs.

维护国际秩序稳定是中美两国的共同利益所在。中国有必要联合包括美国在内的经济体, 完善国际秩序的利益分享和补偿机制, 避免出现相互争夺有限资源、 推卸责任和不正当市场竞争的情况。 针对市场准入和补贴机制问题, 要在多边贸易体制的框架下进行, 确保流程机制的透明和公平。 具体来说, 在多边框架下, 中国可通过 G20、  中美商贸联委会、中美战略与经济对话等高层对话机制参与全球治理议题的讨论, 加强与新兴经济体的协作, 关切最不发达国家,  团结利益攸关国家,  避免出现被美国的“ 好友圈” 围攻的局面。 在规则建设上, 一方面中国应了解各参与成员的意愿和国情, 重视非正式制度安排的应用, 以包容性增长作为基本目标, 寻求互利共赢, 推动构建“ 人类命运共同体” “ 人类卫生健康共同体”, 妥善处理国际管辖权和域外管辖权的冲突, 而不是单方面地将贸易“ 自由化” “ 法制化” “ 工具化”, 强迫参与成员接受“ 一揽子承诺”, 从而对发展中国家较为脆弱的幼稚产业造成严重冲击; 另一方面, 应督促发达国家承担技术转让的义务, 并贯彻落实透明度原则和非歧视性原则, 填补 WTO 在争端解决机制和贸易救济合规性方面的漏洞, 避免发达国家通过不断发起贸易救济调查、 使用临时性关税保护国内产业。

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Cite This Page

顾学明 (Gu Xueming)刘一鸣 (Liu Yiming) (2023). "U.S. Technology Competition with China and China’s Countermeasures from the Perspective of Technology Power [技术权力视角下美国对华技术竞争及中国应对]". Interpret: China, Original work published November 17, 2022, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/u-s-technology-competition-with-china-and-chinas-countermeasures-from-the-perspective-of-technology-power/

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