Lu Feng, a Peking University professor, argues a closed-loop domestic integrated circuit (IC) supply chain is urgently needed in the face of U.S. and allied technology controls. He suggests Beijing advance this goal by encouraging Chinese enterprises in the field to buy from and sell to each other – decisions that, Lu argues, will be made easier by U.S. technology controls. Lu also suggests China play to its strengths and use its expansive market as a source of leverage to influence the scope of such controls.
Jian Junbo, a Europe scholar at Fudan University, argues the term “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” does not represent a substantive shift in European technology and economic policy toward China. In fact, Jian argues, the term may be more dangerous for China because it rhetorically legitimizes technology and economic controls on the basis of responding to “risks,” appeals to stakeholders with varying threat perceptions of China, and paves the way for greater transatlantic coordination.
Song Guoyou, an expert on U.S.-China economic relations at Fudan University, evaluates Beijing’s response so far to de-risking strategies adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations. Song argues that China can limit both the scope and negative impacts of such measures by seeking to maintain stable relations with Europe and U.S. allies more generally, diversifying export markets, publicly contributing to global economic goods through promotion of the BRI and participation in RCEP, and sustaining U.S. business interest in China.
A pair of Chinese economists argue that the U.S. will have a difficult time effectively de-risking from China due to a variety of hurdles, including tensions with allies over the speed and scope of strategies, vested U.S. business interests, and partisan debates about China policy within the United States. To limit the scope and impact of U.S. technology and economic policies, they suggest, Beijing should seek to improve diplomatic relations with U.S. allied and partner nations, expand economic ties with developing countries, remain open to diplomatic engagement with Washington, and invest in China’s science and technology ecosystem to address innovation bottlenecks.
The CCP Politburo holds “collective study sessions” on a semi-regular basis, in which an outside academic or government expert leads a discussion on a selected topic. Such sessions are important signals as to what issues the senior leadership finds important. The fifth study session of the 20th Central Committee Politburo was held on May 29, 2023 and was presided over by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. At this session, Xi urged Party cadres to improve the quality and coverage of China’s education ecosystem, in part given its centrality to greater science and technology “self-sufficiency.”
The CCP Politburo holds “study sessions” on a semi-regular basis, in which an outside academic or government expert leads a discussion on a selected topic. Such sessions are important signals as to what issues the senior leadership finds important. The third study session of the 20th Central Committee Politburo was held on February 21, 2023 and was presided over by Xi Jinping. The session focused on themes related to China’s bid for technological self-reliance and emphasized the need to strengthen basic scientific research.
In this 2012 article, senior military scholar Ni Lexiong analyzes the historical course of China’s military modernization efforts, and argues that Beijing should invest in a strong blue-water navy to secure its expanding overseas economic interests and deter the formation of a U.S.-led maritime alliance designed to contain China. Ni also cautions that China should approach this process carefully, in order to avoid triggering security concerns among its maritime neighbors that could provoke to a regional arms race.
The CCP Politburo holds “study sessions” on a semi-regular basis, in which an outside academic or government expert leads a discussion on a selected topic. Such sessions are important signals as to what issues the senior leadership finds important. The second study session of the 20th Central Committee Politburo was held on January 31, 2023, and was presided over by Xi Jinping. The session focused on themes related to China’s economic development, such as dual circulation, economic security and self-reliance, and rural-urban divides.
Zuo Xiying, one of China’s top experts on international security, examines evolving U.S. deterrence strategies in light of rising strategic competition with China. He argues that the gap in conventional deterrence capabilities between China and the U.S. is rapidly narrowing owing to China’s technological and military advances and what he sees as the decline of the U.S. industrial base. As a “stress reaction” to this perceived decline, Zuo argues U.S. policymakers have begun to discuss declining American conventional deterrence capabilities vis-a-vis China more frequently. Zuo warns that Beijing should approach shifts in relative capabilities cautiously, and recognize that the U.S. is expanding its “toolbox” of mechanisms that can be leveraged flexibly to deter China, particularly in the case of heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
An unnamed researcher at the National Development and Reform Commission’s Academy of Macroeconomic Research lays out six areas where China must find “key breakthroughs” to become a high-income country. In addition to domestic reforms, the author calls for the creation of an international environment “conducive to crossing over the middle-income stage.”