On May 20, Lai Ching-te will take office as the leader of Taiwan. His propositions for cross-Strait policy are important factors that affect the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. Lai Ching-te calls himself a “pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence” and is called the “golden grandson of Taiwan independence” by the outside world. He believes that “the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country” and claims that he maintains the “status quo in the Taiwan Strait” through the “four pillars of peaceful protection of Taiwan” and enhances substantive relations with the United States, Japan, and other countries through “democracy and freedom.” Specifically, his cross-Strait policies differ based on his different identities and in different time periods and different fields, which this article summarizes as the “Three 3s.”

1. “Three Lai Ching-tes”

When assuming different identities and positions, the same actor often makes different decisions. As the saying goes, “where you sit determines where you stand.” Lai Ching-te has three identities: one is the chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the second is the leader-elect of Taiwan, and the third is a possible candidate for the 2028 general election.

As the chairman of the DPP, Lai Ching-te wants to promote “Taiwan independence” based on the party’s “Taiwan independence” platform. Therefore, they clamor that “Taiwan, Republic of China is a sovereign and independent country,” “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other,” “Taiwan’s sovereignty must not be violated,” and “only the 23.5 million Taiwanese people have the right to decide Taiwan’s future.” These are the basic propositions of the Green camp and Lai will certainly adhere to them in his cross-Strait policy.

As the next leader of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te claims he wants to “maintain the status quo.” Although Lai believes that “the Constitution of the Republic of China brought disaster”, as the leader of Taiwan, he must swear an oath to abide by the constitutional provisions of Taiwan, while his “self-disciplined and pragmatic” personality, is different from the fickleness of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. At the same time, Lai’s cross-Strait policies are constrained by structural factors. The mainstream public opinion on the island is that “we want peace and development,” the political structure on the island is “the government is the minority and the opposition is the majority,” the United States adheres to the policy of “not supporting Taiwan independence,” and the mainland strongly curbs “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. Therefore, at the post-election press conference, he claimed that, “in accordance with the constitutional system of the Republic of China, we will be neither humble nor arrogant, maintain the status quo, and on the premise of equal dignity, replace containment with exchanges, and confrontation with dialogue. We will confidently engage in exchanges and cooperation with China, enhance the well-being of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and achieve the goal of peaceful coexistence and prosperity.” As a possible candidate in Taiwan’s 2028 general election, Lai Ching-te must prevent cross-Strait relations from becoming an obstacle to his re-election. Although “resistance to China and rejection of unification” and stubborn adherence to “Taiwan independence” can rally supporters of the Green camp, they also have side effects. In the 2024 election, Lai put forward the theory of “peaceful protection of Taiwan,” claiming that “if elected president, the name of the Republic of China will remain, the national flag will still fly in the wind, and the probability of war between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be the lowest.” He did this in order to reduce the impact of the claim that the election was a choice between “war and peace.” In 2028, Lai will still face this difficult problem, so his cross-Strait policies after taking office will likely try to avoid the issue becoming a factor that will impact his 2028 election.

Therefore, Lai’s cross-Strait policy should toe the “pragmatic Taiwan independence” line. On the one hand, he will loudly advocate “Taiwan independence” to appease the “Taiwan independence” fundamentalists, and continue to promote “hidden Taiwan independence” such as “cultural Taiwan independence” and “de-Sinicization.” On the other hand, he will also be constrained by structural factors and have to pave the way for his re-election in 2028, so his actions will be more covert and his methods more deceptive.

2. “Three major time periods”

Summarizing the cross-Strait policies of Taiwan leaders such as Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, Ma Ying-jeou, and Tsai Ing-wen, we can see significant differences in cross-Strait policies in different time periods. Generally speaking, the policies of a leader before being elected are different from the ones after being elected, and the policies of the first term are different from the second term.

Before being elected, the focus is on consolidating the votes of supporters, so leaders play to their own party and base. Lai called himself a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and was regarded as the “golden grandson of Taiwan independence,” which was based on this logic. During their first term, factors such as unfamiliarity with power, considerations for re-election, and internal and external pressure often cause Taiwan’s leaders to temporarily conceal their real views. At the beginning of their tenures, Lee Teng-hui formulated the “National Unification Guidelines,” Chen Shui-bian proposed the “Four No’s and One Without,” Tsai Ing-wen declared that cross-Strait relations would be handled in accordance with the “Constitution of the Republic of China” and the “Regulations on Cross-Strait Relations,” and Ma Ying-jeou appointed the Green-leaning Lai Hsing-yuan as the chairman of the “Mainland Affairs Council.” On some level, all of these measures were intended to limit the backlash of the “other side.” It is not clear whether Lai Ching-te will make similar remarks before and after his inauguration on May 20, but it is highly likely that he will soften his “stubborn Taiwan independence” stance. During their second term, leaders of the Taiwan region often “become themselves again” and push for the implementation of policy proposals that have long been “harbored deep in their hearts.” Lee Teng-hui put forward the “Two-state theory” in 1999, Chen Shui-bian promoted “legal Taiwan independence” during his second term, Tsai Ing-wen put forward the “mutual non-subordination” in 2021, and Ma Ying-jeou met with General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2015, all of which show that the leaders of the Taiwan region will choose to “do big things” during their second terms. Therefore, Lai Ching-te’s cross-Strait policy during his second term (if he is re-elected) may involve major provocative actions.

3. “Three fields of the game”

Due to the different audiences they are appealing to, the cross-Strait policy propositions of the leaders of the Taiwan authorities have always differed depending on the venue: among people on the island, between the two sides of the Strait, and in foreign relations. Lai’s cross-Strait policy propositions will basically conform to this pattern.

On the island, he emphasizes the “legitimacy” of his cross-Strait policy to suppress political opponents. Cross-Strait policies are an important indicator for distinguishing political forces on the island and an important area of contest between competing forces. The basic logic is to emphasize that one’s own cross-Strait policy represents the “mainstream public opinion” on the island and brings the greatest benefits to Taiwan. Therefore, Lai Ching-te claimed that “Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to all the people, and any changes must be agreed upon by the people of Taiwan,” and “the Lai-Hsiao ticket received the most support and represents the country on its road of struggle.” At the same time, he attacked the Kuomintang (KMT) and other parties for being “pro-China and selling out Taiwan” and advocating a “false peace on the path towards unification” in order to continuously cultivate a generation who sees Taiwan as “naturally independent.”

In cross-Strait interactions, they avoid touching the bottom lines and red lines of the mainland and set up obstacles to cross-Strait consultations and negotiations. Lai declared that “there is no roadmap for Taiwan independence” and “there is no need for any separate declaration of independence,” and claimed that “he hopes to be friends with China and does not want to be enemies,” which seems to be an act of granting “assurances” to the mainland. At the same time, he refuses to recognize the “1992 Consensus,” rejects the “Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement” or any “peace agreement,” and even wants to enact a “Foreign Agents Law” against the mainland.

Internationally, cross-Strait relations and foreign relations are mutually “instrumentalized” to each other. Lai will continue Tsai Ing-wen’s “internationalization of the Taiwan issue” policy, using “democracy against authoritarianism,” supply chains such as chips, and the underdog card [弱者对抗强权] as a means to enhance substantive relations with the United States, Japan, Europe, and other countries in order to cover up its failure and loss of points in cross-Strait relations. At the same time, he blames the reduction of Taiwan’s “international space” on “suppression” by the mainland and uses this as a reason to pursue a more stubborn cross-Strait policy.