Translation Tag: cross-Strait relations
In this press conference, representatives from the Taiwan Affairs Office and top judicial and public security bodies in Beijing answer media questions about newly-issued guidelines regarding the prosecution of “secession” crimes by proponents of “Taiwan independence.”
In this short piece, researchers at the Cross-Strait Institute of Urban Planning at Xiamen University lay out recommendations for Beijing on how to prepare for post-“reunification” governance of Taiwan. The unnamed authors of a now-deleted article recommend Beijing create a “shadow government” that will be ready to take over in Taipei in the case of “reunification,” and prepare policies for education, military, trade, and other issues today so planned “regime change” can be quick and efficient.
An expert on Taiwan and cross-Strait relations delves deep into the concept of public opinion and its role in Taiwan’s political system. The author seeks to discredit public opinion trends in Taiwan through a variety of arguments, such as by suggesting they are manipulated through strategic question design and often purely a reflection of elite opinion.
Wu Yi, a Taiwan scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, provides an in-depth analysis of the January 2024 legislative and executive elections in Taiwan. Wu suggests Lai Ching-te’s poor performance relative to Tsai Ing-wen in 2020 and gains for the opposition in the legislature foreshadow growing political polarization in Taiwan and uncertainties for cross-Strait relations going forward.
Wu Yi, the director of the political economy research department at the Taiwan Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, analyzes Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) elections, which took place in January 2024. Wu argues that the strong performance of the KMT (Beijing’s preferred party) and TPP in the elections mean the LY will serve as a stabilizing force for cross-Strait relations going forward, given the support in both parties for greater cross-Strait engagement and shared opposition to what Wu frames as the “independence” leanings of Lai Ching-te, then the president-elect from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
Zhang Hua, a leading scholar on Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, analyzes the likely cross-Strait policies of Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s newly elected president. Zhang suggests that Lai has and is likely to tailor his cross-Strait approach based on the audiences he is addressing and his various roles—as president, as leader of the Democratic Progressive Party, and as a potential presidential candidate for 2028. Zhang also suggests that Lai’s cross-Strait policy is likely to become sharper-edged in a second term.
Jie Dalei, an expert on Taiwan and U.S.-China relations, analyzes the results of the 2024 elections in Taiwan in this piece published by the Institute of International and Strategic Studies. He seeks to explain the failure of the Kuomintang (KMT) to secure the presidency, considers the future of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and assesses implications of the president-elect Lai Ching-te administration for cross-Strait and U.S.-China relations.
This speech by Xi Jinping reflects on the legacy of Sun Yat-sen, the first provisional president of the Republic of China. In the speech, Xi suggests that challenges lie ahead in pursuit of “national rejuvenation,” and emphasizes the importance of patriotism and perseverance toward this goal.
This is an official readout from a June 2013 meeting between Xi Jinping and Wu Poh-hsiung, honorary chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), who was then leading a delegation of KMT members to Beijing. Here, Xi outlines a four-point framework for deepening the development of cross-Strait relations.
Xi Jinping delivered this speech to a delegation to Beijing led by Lien Chan, honorary chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) and former vice president of Taiwan. In this speech, Xi emphasizes shared history and culture across the Taiwan Strait, calling for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations on of the basis of “adhering to the ‘1992 Consensus’ and opposing ‘Taiwan Independence.’”