Elections for Taiwan’s “Legislative Yuan members” and leader were held on January 13. In an atmosphere that had the majority of public opinion wanting the DPP to be “recalled and held in check,” Lai Ching-te won the “general election” with a plurality of the vote as he reaped the spoils from the “Blue-White split.” But Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost a large number of seats, becoming a “double minority” ruling party with a serious lack of legitimacy in public opinion. The new pattern in the “Legislative Yuan” is one of divided government and “three parties without a (legislative) majority,” increasing the impact on the island’s political landscape and cross-Strait relations.

I. Election Results and Causes

This round of Legislative Yuan elections was conducted amid intense competition between three parties—Blue, Green, and White (the Kuomintang, or KMT, the DPP, and the Taiwan People’s Party, or TPP). The results reveal a new situation characterized by “three parties without a majority,” with “Green down, Blue up, and White rising,” and minor parties fizzling out. Of 113 Legislative Yuan seats, the KMT won 52 (gaining 14 seats), the DPP got 51 seats (a decline of ten seats), the TPP got eight seats (an increase of three seats), and independents (who lean toward the KMT) got two seats. Minor parties were wiped out. Among the 73 district representative (区域立委) seats, the KMT and DPP each won 36 seats, while one seat went to an independent, and the TPP won zero; of the six aboriginal representative (原住民立委) seats, the KMT won three, the DPP won two, and one went to an independent; among the 34 national “representative-at-large” (不分区立委) seats, the KMT and DPP each won 13 seats (with 34.6% and 36.2% of the votes), and the TPP won eight seats (getting 22.1% of the votes).

On the whole, these Legislative Yuan elections were affected by the overall situation in the general election.

First, the DPP’s manipulation of higher-level political issues such as “democracy versus dictatorship” (民主与专制) and “resisting China and protecting Taiwan” showed diminishing marginal returns, causing a return to basics in the Legislative Yuan elections to a greater extent—to the fundamentals of the different parties, their nominees, and election strategies. In particular, the strength of district representative candidates and constituency structures were the main decisive factors, whereas for the “representative-at-large” seats, the vote shares of the political parties were highly correlated with their party images and the merits of their nominees. The KMT’s nominations went more smoothly this time around, and produced a younger and stronger slate with more new faces, especially in the case of the at-large seats; the DPP’s nominations were full of contradictions and had little coherence. Many nominees withdrew due to scandals, and the “at-large” slate of candidates was perceived poorly as “too many old people, and factions dividing the spoils.” Because of the KMT’s skillful positioning, twelve of the 73 district representative seats “switched from Green to Blue.” As for the TPP, due to its weak base, none of its ten district representative nominees won, but it did win representative-at-large seats, mainly by relying on Ko Wen-je to boost the party’s momentum and increase its at-large votes.

Second, given how the three-way Blue, Green, and White game played out for the general election, most of the public on the island saw no hope of unseating the DPP, so they chose to use the Legislative Yuan to hold the DPP in check. Many polls during the election cycle showed that nearly 60 percent of the public hoped for a rotation of parties and looked forward to a “Blue-White coalition,” with a majority not supporting the DPP’s continuing to hold full power. After the “Blue-White coalition” collapsed, the likelihood of a Lai Ching-te victory increased greatly, but the public opinion atmosphere that sought to restrain the DPP continued to simmer, so some voters split their tickets, making cross-party choices for leaders, party [for representatives-at-large], and district representatives. As a result, although Lai Ching-te won, the DPP’s party vote was 600,000 fewer than the votes Lai received, while the KMT’s party vote was 100,000 more than the number received by Hou Yu-ih, and the TPP’s party vote was 650,000 less than the votes received by Ko Wen-je.

Third, the TPP has come to represent a third force, while other small parties have fizzled. In the last election there were 19 political parties, and 153 minor party candidates ran for election. This round, the numbers fell to 16 parties and 98 candidates, mainly because the TPP’s Ko Wen-je temporarily absorbed large numbers of centrist and young voters who had supported small parties in the past. This time, the share of party votes won by “neither Blue nor Green” parties was 29.3% (versus 30.25% last time), with the TPP accounting for 22.07% (compared to 11.22% last time). The vote share of other small parties shrank, so the party vote has shifted from “a hundred schools of thought contending” to the “rule of three.”

II. Main Effects of the Election

(i) In governing, Lai Ching-te will face strong supervision and checks and balances from the Legislative Yuan

Although the DPP has been able to retain power, it will be transformed from total power to that of a “doubly disadvantaged” minority government with a large opposition. The election of the KMT’s Han Kuo-yu and Johnny Chiang as speaker and deputy speaker of the Legislative Yuan has further established the opposition’s strong supervision and checks and balances on the DPP’s administration. According to the island’s relevant constitutional documents, major bills, budgets, policies, and some major personnel decisions require the consent of a majority of the Legislative Yuan members before they can take effect. In the future, therefore, the Lai administration will not be able to view the Legislative Yuan as a “rubber stamp,” nor will it be able to use the preparation of special budgets and the amendment of laws to benefit itself, suppress dissenters, and “rely on the United States to resist China.” Lai’s major administrative and personnel decisions will have to be negotiated with the opposition parties. If he ignores the system and stubbornly clings to ideological governance, he will inevitably encounter strong checks and balances from the opposition parties, leading to fierce fighting between parties and political turmoil. The DPP will also be unable to control the “Executive Yuan” and will become a lame-duck ruling party.

(ii)   Cooperation and competition among the three parties in the Legislative Yuan will be extremely complicated and intense.

Although the KMT has become the largest party in the Legislative Yuan and successfully obtained the speaker and deputy speaker positions, it is still short of a majority, even with the addition of the two pro-Blue independent seats, and must cooperate with the TPP in order to promote effective supervision and checks and balances. The TPP’s eight seats have become a key minority for the KMT and DPP to compete for. From the perspective of the TPP’s main source of votes and future development, in order to prevent it from being reduced to a “small Blue” or “small Green,” subordinate to one of the two major political parties and fading away, and in order to continue to “nibble away” at the Blues and Greens to expand its strength, the TPP will be oriented towards strategic issue cooperation, and will swing between the two major parties to take advantage of opportunities. This kind of unstable cooperation relationship will lead to unprecedented complexity in the combinations and linkages among the three parties in the Legislative Yuan.

(iii)  The new situation in the Legislative Yuan will help reduce risks in the cross-Strait relationship

With “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” Lai Ching-te having won the election, the risks and uncertainties facing the cross-Strait relationship have risen sharply. If the KMT and TPP stick to their positions, in the Legislative Yuan they will be able to play an important role in stabilizing the cross-Strait relationship. According to the island’s relevant constitutional provisions, the threshold for “constitutional amendment” in the Legislative Yuan is three-fourths of the members present and three-fourths agreeing. Since both the KMT and TPP are clearly against “Taiwan independence,” and given their superior number of seats in the Legislative Yuan, they can curb a radical “de jure Taiwan independence” venture by the Lai administration. Both parties oppose “de-Sinicization, hating China, and resisting China,” and advocate cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, and they can restrain the Lai administration’s “progressive Taiwan independence” while promoting policies and regulations conducive to cross-Strait exchanges.