做最坏的打算,中国如何应对极端关税政策?
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Preparing for the Worst, How China Should Respond to Extreme Tariff Policies

做最坏的打算,中国如何应对极端关税政策?

Three Chinese economists from JD.com lay out potential impacts of tariffs that U.S. President Donald Trump vowed to impose on China, arguing that U.S. domestic concerns will most likely reduce the duration and magnitude of such measures, thereby minimizing their impacts on the Chinese economy. They argue that regardless of the scale of Trump’s trade actions, Beijing should seek to bolster its national strength through proactive international trade integration with other countries.

Key takeaways
  • Three JD.com economists contend that several “internal contradictions” could hold back Trump’s extreme tariffs, including supply chain disruptions, inflation, and U.S. national debt. For this reason, they surmise that Trump may not fully implement tariffs as high as the threatened 60% on all Chinese products and that the two countries will most likely resolve their differences through trade negotiations.
  • The authors further suggest that even if Trump fully implements extreme tariffs on Chinese imports, the medium- and long-term impacts will not be as profound as the numbers might imply. Considering the export sector is what they call China’s “most flexible and market-oriented" sector, they maintain that Beijing can and has already responded to potential U.S.-China trade frictions in various ways, such as expanding its trade and investment in ASEAN countries, industrial upgrading, and re-exporting. 
  • To counter potential tariffs from the second Trump administration, the authors propose Beijing pursue numerous policy actions. These include promoting trade between China and other countries, beyond the United States; supporting Chinese companies in overseas expansion; actively participating in the negotiation of new trade agreements such as the CPTPP; and strengthening social safety nets and boosting domestic demand.


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In what can be called a strong comeback, U.S. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has won the U.S. election in a landslide and helped the Republican Party win both houses of Congress. The financial markets have also reacted to the many policy proposals Trump made during his campaign, such as imposing sweeping tariffs and further cutting taxes.

美国共和党总统候选人特朗普以压倒性优势赢得美国大选并且帮助共和党同时拿下参众两院,可谓强势归来。金融市场对特朗普在竞选期间提出的多项政策主张,如大范围加征关税、进一步减税等也有所反应。

After the election results came out, the U.S. dollar index rose to its highest level in more than a year, the RMB exchange rate faced downward pressure, and China’s stock market rebound was also suppressed. Facing the return of Trump, how should China respond?

大选结果出炉之后,美元指数创出一年多以来新高,人民币汇率则承压下行,中国股票市场的反弹也受到压制。面对特朗普回归,中国应该如何应对?

Considerable uncertainty remains over tariff policy

关税政策仍有较大不确定性

In a previous article, we pointed out that Trump’s policy proposals have five major internal contradictions: Tariffs disrupting the supply chain and not helping to boost the U.S. manufacturing industry; tariffs, tax cuts, and other policies triggering inflation; deficit expansion potentially affecting U.S. macroeconomic stability; America First weakening the United States’ international leadership; and deportation of immigrants widening divisions in the United States.

笔者在此前的文章中指出,特朗普的政策主张存在五大内生矛盾,包括加征关税扰乱供应链,不利于提振美国制造业;关税、减税等政策引发通胀上行;赤字扩张可能影响美国宏观稳定;美国优先削弱美国的国际领导地位;驱逐移民扩大美国分裂。

Under these circumstances, we believe that some of Trump’s extreme policies towards China, such as the policy of imposing a 60% tariff on all Chinese products, may not be fully implemented. Under conditions of highly integrated global supply chains, a substantial increase in tariffs would impact the manufacturing industry in the United States. In addition, inflationary pressures in the United States will also restrict the Trump administration’s policy space.

在这种情况下,笔者以为特朗普对中国的一些极端政策,例如对所有中国产品加征60%关税的政策未必能够完全落地。如前文所述,在全球供应链高度一体化的情况下,大幅加征关税会冲击美国本土制造业。此外,美国的通胀压力也会制约特朗普政府的政策空间。

A more likely scenario is that China and the United States will bridge their differences through trade negotiations. Even if Trump imposes tariffs, their timing is likely to be later, and the scope and rates of the tariffs will be significantly less than those advocated during the campaign.

更有可能的场景是中美通过贸易谈判来弥合双方的分歧。即使特朗普加征关税,时间节点也可能偏晚,加征的范围与税率都明显低于竞选时期的主张。

During Trump’s 2016 campaign, he claimed he would impose a 45% tariff on Chinese products, but the final average tariff level was 15.5%, and some products continued to maintain a zero-tariff rate. Trump also threatened in 2017 to impose tariffs of 35% on German and Japanese car companies that were manufacturing in Mexico but targeting the U.S. market, but this was ultimately not implemented.

实际上,2016年特朗普竞选时期就宣称对中国产品加征45%的关税,但是最终落地平均关税水平是15.5%,有一些产品继续维持了零税率。特朗普2017年还威胁对墨西哥制造但是瞄准美国市场的德国和日本汽车公司加征35%的关税,最后也没有落地。

Impact of an extreme scenario on China

极端情况对中国的影响

In an extreme scenario, Trump’s tariff policies and cancellation of “permanent normal trade relations” could have a considerable impact on China’s aggregate demand in the short term. Even so, in the medium term, with the flexible adjustment of China’s export sector, the impact would be significantly weakened.

当然,在极端情况下,特朗普的关税政策和取消“永久正常贸易关系”等措施短期对中国的总需求可能有相当冲击;即使如此,从中期而言,伴随着中国出口部门的灵活调整,冲击影响会明显弱化。

Trump’s extreme proposals include imposing tariffs of up to 60% on all Chinese exports, canceling China’s “permanent normal trade relations treatment,” and gradually ceasing to import necessities from China. He also plans to prevent China from buying U.S. real estate and various industries. Even Chinese automakers producing cars in Mexico for export to the United States would be subject to high tariffs.

特朗普的极端主张包括对中国所有出口产品征收高达60%的关税,取消中国“永久正常贸易关系待遇”,并逐步停止从中国进口必需品。此外,他还计划阻止中国购买美国房产和各类产业;即使是中国汽车制造商在墨西哥生产并出口到美国的汽车,也要征收高额关税。

If re-exports from Hong Kong, China, are included, China’s exports to the United States accounted for about 3.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023. Taking into account the impact of multiple factors including the simultaneous reduction of processing trade imports, hedging against exchange rate depreciation, and spillover effects, we estimate that if U.S. tariffs are fully implemented or the “permanent normal trade relationship treatment” is canceled, the impact on China’s aggregate demand may exceed the level of 2018.

如果包含从中国香港的转口,2023年中国对美国出口占GDP(国内生产总值)比重约3.2%;综合考虑加工贸易进口同步减少、汇率贬值对冲,以及溢出效应等多方面因素的影响,笔者估计如果美国关税完全落地或取消“永久正常贸易关系待遇”,对中国总需求的冲击可能超出2018年的水平。

In 2018, when the United States only imposed relatively mild tariffs on some Chinese products, China’s export growth rate rapidly fell from over 10% in the first three quarters of 2018 to near-zero growth in 2019. At the same time, the U.S. share of China’s exports also fell sharply from 19.2% in 2018 to 16.8% in 2019. In fact, partly due to the impact of China-U.S. trade friction, China’s GDP growth rate, which remained at 6.9% in the first half of 2018, fell to 5.9% in the second half of 2019, a decline of one percentage point.

2018年,在美国仅仅对部分中国产品加征相对温和的关税的情况下,中国出口增速从2018年前三季度的10%以上迅速降至2019年的零增长附近。与此同时,美国占中国出口比重也从2018年的19.2%大幅降至2019年的16.8%。实际上,部分受到中美贸易摩擦的影响,2018年上半年中国GDP增速保持在6.9%,2019年下半年则降至5.9%,回落幅度达到1个百分点。

In the medium to long term, however, administrative measures are no match for market forces. The export sector is China’s most flexible and market-oriented sector and can respond to tariff barriers in a number of ways.

不过,从中长期看,行政手段相对市场力量的较量并不占优;出口部门是中国最具灵活性、市场化程度最高的部门,可以通过多种方式应对关税壁垒。

On one hand, with the support of policies, Chinese companies have increased their efforts to go global, achieving a global presence and bypassing U.S. barriers. For example, China’s direct investment in ASEAN has risen markedly in recent years. In 2023, China’s direct investment in ASEAN reached a record high of U.S. $25.12 billion. Vietnam’s performance is particularly notable. China-U.S. trade and the COVID-19 pandemic have strengthened the trend of continued foreign investment inflows into Vietnam, with registered foreign direct investment (FDI) in Vietnam reaching a record U.S. $18.5 billion in 2023. In addition to Japanese and Korean investment, many Chinese manufacturing companies have also made Vietnam their first choice for avoiding U.S. tariffs and transferring production. In terms of export product structure, the share of intermediate products in Chinese export continues to rise, which also reflects to some extent the effects of Chinese enterprises’ globalized layouts.

一方面,在政策的支持下,中国企业加大出海力度,实现全球布局,绕开美国壁垒。例如,近些年中国对东盟的直接投资显著上升。2023年中国对东盟的直接投资高达251.2亿美元,达到历史新高。越南的表现尤其引人瞩目。中美贸易和新冠疫情强化了外商投资持续流入越南的趋势,2023年越南FDI(跨境直接投资)注册资本为185亿美元,创历史最高水平。除了日韩投资之外;中国诸多制造业企业也将越南作为躲避美国关税、转移生产的首选目的地。从出口产品结构来看,中国中间产品的出口份额持续上升,也在一定程度上反映出中国企业全球化布局的影响。

On the other hand, Chinese exporting enterprises have also continued to maintain their market share through methods such as industrial upgrading and OEM re-exporting. We note that the share in Chinese exports of labor-intensive products, which are considered to be the easiest to achieve production chain transfer, has not declined significantly. Feedback from the front lines shows that even in traditional industries such as clothing and shoes, the value added of individual products is rising significantly.

另一方面,中国出口企业也通过产业升级、贴牌转口等方式继续维持自身的市场份额。笔者注意到,被认为最容易实现产业链转移的劳动密集型产品,在中国的出口份额中也并未明显下滑。一线的反馈显示,即使是服装、鞋子等传统行业,单个产品的附加值都在明显上升。

Looking at longer-term data, the openness of the Chinese economy has not declined due to the impact of U.S. tariffs. In 2023, China’s exports of goods and services as a share of GDP was even higher than in 2018. China’s share of the global export market has also increased compared to 2018, showing that the export sector has maintained strong competitiveness. In terms of export structure, ASEAN has replaced the United States and the EU as China’s largest trading partner. Even in terms of China-U.S. trade, while the share of Chinese goods in the U.S. import market in 2023 had indeed declined compared to 2018, the absolute size was still higher than the 2018 level. In terms of China’s trade surplus with the United States, the 2023 figure of U.S. $336.1 billion was also higher than the U.S. $323.3 billion in 2018.

从较长期的数据来看,中国经济的开放度并未因为美国关税的影响而下降;2023年中国货物和服务出口占GDP的比重甚至高于2018年。中国商品在全球出口市场的份额也同样较2018年有所增长,反映出口部门保持了强劲竞争力。从出口结构看,东盟替代美国和欧盟成为中国第一大贸易伙伴。即使从中美贸易来看,2023年中国商品占美国进口市场的份额较2018年确实有所下降,但绝对规模仍然超出2018年的水平;从中国对美国的贸易顺差来看,2023年的3361亿美元也高于2018年的3233亿美元。

Effects of other policies on China

其他政策对中国的影响

Apart from tariff policies, Trump’s tax cut and energy policies, and the possible continuation of the technology blockade, may also have certain impacts on China, but to relatively mild degrees.

除了关税政策,特朗普的减税、能源政策和可能继续持续的科技封锁也可能对中国造成一定影响,但程度相对温和。

First, Trump’s tax cut policy may boost the U.S. dollar in the short term, which will to some extent result in depreciation of China’s currency and pressure on capital outflows, affecting investment and consumption.

首先,特朗普的减税政策可能在短期提振美元,可能在一定程度上造成中国本币贬值和资本外流的压力,影响投资和消费。

Capital outflows and a decline in risk appetite may lead to pressure on prices of assets such as domestic stocks and real estate, which would restrict consumption growth through the wealth effect. However, rising real interest rates in the United States may attract more capital, and the trends of declining FDI in China and rising outward FDI may be strengthened.

资金流出和风险偏好下降可能导致国内股票、地产等资产价格等承压,通过财富效应制约消费增长;而美国真实利率上行可能吸引更多资本,中国外商直接投资下降、对外直接投资上升的趋势可能有所强化。

Second, Trump advocates speeding up the process of U.S. oil and gas extraction and eliminating the Biden administration’s subsidies for clean energy, which may lower crude oil prices and put downward pressure on China’s consumer price index (CPI).

其次,特朗普主张加快美国石油天然气开采进程并取消拜登政府对清洁能源的补贴,可能降低原油价格,压低中国CPI(消费者价格指数)。

Trump believes that U.S. inflation is mainly affected by energy prices, so he wants to expand domestic energy production, encourage the use of fossil fuels, and achieve a fall in U.S. inflation. Considering that after the “shale oil revolution,” the United States has become the world’s largest producer of crude oil, the effect of Trump’s policies on the global crude oil market cannot be ignored. For China, crude oil is, after food, the commodity with the single greatest impact on the CPI. If the price of crude oil falls, not only will the CPI sub-items of transportation and communication related to crude oil come under downward pressure, but oil prices will also affect prices in China’s core CPI through input-output relationships and inflation expectations.

特朗普认为美国通胀主要受到能源价格的影响,因而要扩大国内能源生产,鼓励化石燃料使用,并实现美国通胀回落。考虑到“页岩油革命”之后,美国已经是世界最大的原油生产国,特朗普政策对全球原油市场的影响不容忽视。对中国的CPI而言,原油是除了食品之外对CPI影响最大的单一商品。如果原油价格下跌,不仅仅与原油相关的CPI交通、通讯分项会有下行压力,油价还会通过投入产出关系和通胀预期影响中国核心CPI的价格。

Finally, Trump may continue to implement the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” strategy, restricting the flow of high-tech products and technologies from the United States to China, which would not be conducive to China’s industrial upgrading.

最后,特朗普可能会继续推行拜登政府的“小院高墙”战略,限制美国的高科技产品和技术流入中国,不利于中国的产业升级。

There had been a clear tightening of controls on China’s high-tech products and technologies in Trump’s first term. In 2018, the United States amended the Export Control Reform Act, further strengthening the authority of the U.S. Department of Commerce to impose controls on U.S. exports in the name of “security.” The Department of Commerce has accordingly added more Chinese technology companies to the Entity List and strengthened reviews of exports of technology products and technologies. In May 2020, the United States introduced the Foreign Direct Product Rules, which directly target semiconductor companies in countries and regions other than the United States, prohibiting those companies from using equipment and products derived from 16 categories of U.S.-origin technology and software and exporting them to enterprises on the Entity List. The “small yard, high fence” strategy proposed by the Biden administration is a further optimization and strengthening of Trump’s policies.

实际上,在特朗普第一任期上,对中国的高科技产品和技术的管制就已经明显加强。例如,2018年,美国就修订了《出口管制改革法案》,进一步强化了美国商务部以“安全”名义对美国出口实施管制的权限,美国商务部据此将更多中国科技企业纳入“实体清单”,强化对科技产品和技术出口的审查力度。2020年5月美国出台“外国直接产品”规则,直接指向美国之外的其他国家和地区的半导体公司,禁止这些公司利用源自美国的十六类技术及软件的设备和产品,出口给“实体清单”上的企业。拜登政府提出的“小院高墙”战略实际上是对特朗普政策的进一步优化和加强。

Considering the broader context of China-U.S. strategic competition, the Trump administration may well continue policies inherited from the Biden administration. Moreover, the possibility of a further expansion of the scope of control cannot be ruled out.

考虑到中美战略竞争的大背景,特朗普政府可能继续继承拜登政府的政策。而且,不排除管制范围进一步扩大的可能。

How should China respond?

中国如何应对

In our view, in the face of the short-term impact on China of the return of the Trump administration, on one hand, China should increase imports from the United States appropriately and strive to resolve differences between the two sides through trade negotiations; on the other hand, China needs to step up counter-cyclical adjustments, and in particular increase fiscal stimulus to stabilize aggregate demand. In the medium to long term, China needs to concentrate on doing its own things well, expand opening-up, promote reform, and enhance its overall national strength. This is the best response to Trump’s return.

笔者以为,面对特朗普政府归来对中国的短期冲击,一方面中国应该适当增加从美国的进口,争取贸易谈判化解双方分歧;另一方面,中国需要加大逆周期调节力度,特别是加大财政刺激力度稳定总需求。中长期而言,中国更需要集中精力做好自己的事情,扩大开放,推动改革,提升综合国力。这才是对于特朗普归来的最好回应。

In the Phase One trade deal between China and the United States, China agreed to increase imports of agricultural products, energy, and manufactured goods from the United States, but afterwards the deal was not effectively implemented due to the impact of the pandemic. China can use state-owned enterprises to increase purchases from the United States, for example, thereby increasing imports from the United States and easing China-U.S. trade imbalance pressure. At the same time, China should strive to negotiate with the United States to resolve trade differences and minimize the scope and magnitude of U.S. tariffs.

在中美第一阶段贸易协议中,中方同意从美国增加农产品、能源和制成品的进口,后来因为疫情冲击,协议并未有效执行。中方可以通过国有企业增加对美采购等方式,增加对美国的进口,缓解中美贸易不平衡的压力。与此同时,中国应该争取与美国谈判解决贸易方面的分歧,最大程度降低美国加征关税的范围和幅度。

In addition, external uncertainties and deflationary pressures also mean that domestic countercyclical policies still need to be strengthened. Considering that exchange rate depreciation has restricted the room for monetary policy easing, fiscal policy must play a greater role in maintaining steady growth. The RMB 12 trillion local government debt swap program already launched has achieved good results. Not only have financial and government fiscal risks decreased, but the improvement in local government cash flow can also improve the operating conditions of enterprises and the disposable income of residents by repaying debts to enterprises and making up back pay of civil servants, promoting a recovery in demand and improving market confidence as well.

此外,外部的不确定性和通缩压力也意味着国内逆周期调剂的政策仍需加强。考虑到汇率贬值已经约束货币政策放松的空间,财政政策需要在稳增长中发挥更大的作用。已经推出的总额12万亿元地方债务置换安排取得了良好的效果,不仅仅金融和财政风险下降,地方政府现金流改善还可以通过偿还企业欠款和补发公务员工资的方式改善企业的经营状况和居民的可支配收入,推动需求回升,市场信心也有所改善。

However, current fiscal stimulus efforts are still insufficient. It is still necessary to further expand the general public budget deficit and expand the scale of special bond and special treasury bond issuance in 2025. In addition, the direction of fiscal stimulus may be more important than its scale. Continued expansion of “trade-ins” to support the upgrading of consumer goods and equipment, greater efforts to enhance subsidies for low-income people, and even wide distribution of consumption vouchers to directly stimulate consumption—all these should be backup options for responding to the Trump impact.

但是当下财政刺激的力度仍有不足,2025年一般公共预算进一步扩大赤字、扩大专项债和特别国债的发行规模仍然是必要的。此外,与财政刺激的规模相比,财政刺激的投向可能更加重要,除了继续扩大“以旧换新”支持消费品和设备更新,更大力度提升低收入人群补贴,乃至大范围发放消费券直接刺激消费,都应该是应对特朗普冲击的后备选项。

In the medium term, China can respond to external pressure on four levels:

中期而言,面对外部压力,中国可以在四个层次上加以应对:

First, it should adhere to a free trade orientation, continue to promote economic and trade exchanges between China and other countries, and create more favorable conditions for the adjustment of the export sector after its space in the U.S. market shrinks. For some of the risks that Chinese exporting enterprises may face in exploring new markets, government fiscal departments can appropriately help enterprises share costs by implementing measures such as subsidies for export credit insurance, as long as they comply with international rules.

首先,应该坚持自由贸易的取向,继续推动中国和其他国家的经贸往来,为美国市场空间缩小之后出口部门的调整创造便利条件。对中国出口企业开拓新市场可能面对的一些风险,财政部门可以在符合国际规则的情况下,通过对出口信保实施补贴等措施适当帮助企业分担成本。

Second, support for the global layout efforts of Chinese enterprises should continue to be increased. Even in the event that the United States takes extreme measures against China, it is relatively unlikely that the United States will simultaneously impose tariffs on products from all countries. Overseas layouts help Chinese enterprises reduce risks. A noteworthy issue is the need to reform the mechanism for assessing local governments, shifting from GDP to GNP (gross national product). Returns on Chinese overseas investments and the wages of Chinese citizens on overseas assignments are counted toward GNP, but not GDP.

其次,应该继续加大支持中国企业全球布局。即使在美国对华采取极端措施的情况下,美国对所有国家产品同时加征关税的可能性也比较低。海外布局有利于中国企业降低风险。一个值得关注的问题是需要改革对地方政府的考核机制,从GDP转向GNP(国民生产总值)。中国海外投资的回报和外派中国公民的工资都算作GNP,而不算作GDP。

Third, given that the focus of global trade liberalization is shifting from goods to services, investment, and digital trade, and from “border measures” such as tariffs to “domestic institutional requirements” such as fair competition, China should actively participate in the negotiation of a new generation of economic and trade agreements (such as the CPTPP), and use opening-up to promote reform. It should promote domestic institutional reforms such as expanded investment access, increased opening-up of the service industry, and competitive neutrality across types of ownership, and accelerate the development of the digital economy. Progress in these reforms will not only allow the trade sector to better participate in the international division of labor, but also enhance China’s overall economic competitiveness.

第三,鉴于全球贸易自由化的重点正在从货物转向服务和投资和数字贸易、从关税等“边境措施”转向公平竞争等“境内制度要求”,中国应该积极参与新一代经贸协定(如CPTPP)的谈判,以开放促改革,推动国内扩大投资准入、增加服务业开放、所有制竞争中性等体制改革,并加快发展数字经济。这些改革的进展,不仅会使得贸易部门更好地参与国际分工,也会提升中国整体经济竞争力。

Finally, with China’s trade surplus set to reach a record high and the trade surplus as a share of GDP set to rebound in 2024, China also needs to promote income distribution reform, refine the social security system, boost domestic demand and consumption, and reduce excess savings. After the real estate sector has undergone in-depth adjustment, finding new economic engines will benefit China’s economic growth and help China’s economy achieve external “rebalancing.”

最后,在2024年中国货物贸易盈余即将创出历史新高、贸易盈余占GDP比重反弹之际,中国还需要推动收入分配改革、完善社保制度、提振内需和消费、降低过剩储蓄。在房地产部门经历深度调整之后、找到经济新引擎既有利于中国经济增长,也有利于中国经济实现对外部的“再平衡”。

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Cite This Page

樊磊 (Fan Lei), 姜传钺 (Jiang Chuanyue), 沈建光 (Shen Jianguang). "Preparing for the Worst, How China Should Respond to Extreme Tariff Policies [做最坏的打算,中国如何应对极端关税政策?]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in Caijing [财经], November 26, 2024

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