俄乌战争深度影响俄罗斯与西方关系 
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Russia-Ukraine War Deeply Affects the Relationship Between Russia and the West

俄乌战争深度影响俄罗斯与西方关系 

The war in Ukraine is a manifestation of the deep divergence in politics and values between Russia and the West, argues an expert in former Soviet states from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.


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Located in the eastern part of the European continent, Ukraine has been contested by different empires throughout history, with Tsarist Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Turks all having ruled this land. Ukraine regained its independence after the Cold War, but was still unable to extricate itself from great power rivalry. The great powers have always been the dominant players in the international order, and are important factors influencing the international landscape and regional situation. Throughout the thirty years since the end of the Cold War, United States-Russian relations have been the most sensitive and fragile element of great power relations. On the morning of February 24, Russia declared war on Ukraine, triggering Europe’s most serious security crisis in the decades since the Cold War. This crisis is a major crisis not only in Russia-Ukraine relations, but also in Russia’s relationship with the West, marking a change in the way Moscow deals with the West, from dialogue in the past to the struggle of the present. The post-Cold War relationship of competition and cooperation between Russia and the West has ended. Multiple structural contradictions have accumulated, making the relationship difficult to reconcile in the short term.

乌克兰位于欧洲大陆的东部,历史上一直被不同的帝国争夺,沙皇俄国、奥匈帝国、奥斯曼土耳其都曾统治过这片土地。冷战后,乌克兰重新获得独立,但仍未能摆脱大国的争夺。大国一直是国际秩序的主导者,也是影响国际格局和地区局势的重要因素。纵观冷战结束的30年,美俄关系是大国关系中最为敏感和脆弱的一环。2月24日上午,俄罗斯对乌克兰宣战,引发了欧洲冷战后数十年来最严重的安全危机。这次危机不仅是俄罗斯与乌克兰关系的重大危机,也是俄罗斯与西方关系的严重危机,标志着莫斯科改变了与西方打交道的方式,从过去的对话改为现在的斗争。冷战后俄罗斯与西方竞争与合作的关系已经结束,积累了多重的结构性矛盾,双方关系在短期内难以调和。

First, the Russia-Ukraine war is a crisis in Russia’s security relations with NATO. Europe’s geo-security environment improved significantly after the Cold War ended, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact allowed Europe to again move toward dialogue and cooperation. However, Russia has never been able to achieve harmonious security relations with the West. Under Yeltsin’s administration, Russia even offered to join NATO. This was dismissed by the West. An offer to join NATO was also made during Putin’s [first] administration, but the United States did not respond. Under Medvedev, Russia also wanted to build a unified European security framework and called for a new European security treaty. “To achieve a breakthrough for the future, and to end almost 20 years of uncertainty and instability, requires collective political will,” he said. Moscow hoped to establish a unified and indivisible political-military security space in North America, Europe, and Central Asia. This reflected Russia’s concerns about its exclusion from the European security framework and its fears about NATO’s eastward expansion. Medvedev’s proposal reflected Russia’s attempt to change the NATO-dominated European security framework. It was an important attempt by Russia to reshape the strategic balance in Europe. However, the West reacted lukewarmly to this Russian initiative.

首先,俄乌战争是俄罗斯与北约安全关系的危机。冷战结束后,欧洲的地缘安全环境明显改善,苏联的解体和华约的解散,让欧洲重新走向对话与合作。但是,俄罗斯始终未能理顺与西方的安全关系,叶利钦执政时期,俄罗斯也曾经提出加入北约,西方对此不置可否。普京执政时期,也曾提出过加入北约,但是美国反应索然。在梅德韦杰夫执政时期,俄罗斯还曾希望构建统一的欧洲安全框架,呼吁缔结新欧洲安全条约。他说:“为实现面向未来的突破,结束近20年来的不确定和不稳定,(这)需要集体政治意愿”。莫斯科希望在北美、欧洲和中亚地区建立一个统一的、不可分割的政治军事安全空间。这反映出俄罗斯对于自己被排除在欧洲安全框架之外的担忧,以及对北约东扩的担心。梅德韦杰夫的提议反映出,俄罗斯试图改变北约主导的欧洲安全框架,这是俄罗斯试图重塑欧洲战略平衡一次重要尝试。但是,西方对这俄罗斯的倡议反应冷淡。

The West does not accept Russia’s participation in the European security-building system, and despite Russia’s opposition, it has continued to expand NATO’s membership, adopting a security policy of unilateral expansion that excludes Russia, expanding NATO’s membership from 16 to 30, gradually expanding its sphere of influence from Western, Southern and Central Europe during the Cold War to Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and extending from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea region, forming a complete strategic encirclement of Russia. While NATO was admitting countries in Central and Eastern Europe, it also set its sights on the “post-Soviet space.” Most of the “post-Soviet states” have joined NATO’s “Partnership for Peace.” The West has taken advantage of those states’ historical grievances and territorial disputes with Russia to actively support their bids to join NATO, with Ukraine and Georgia being the most proactive. After the 2014 Crimea crisis, Ukraine explicitly proposed joining NATO, and NATO accepted Ukraine as an associate member in 2020, granting Ukraine “NATO Capacity Enhancement Partner” status and implementing substantive security cooperation with it. U.S. and British troops are now permanently stationed in Ukraine on a rotating basis, ostensibly for military training missions or exercises.

西方不接纳俄罗斯参与到欧洲安全建设体系之中,而且还不顾俄罗斯的反对,不断扩大北约组织的成员国,采取排除俄罗斯的单边扩张的安全政策,将北约成员国从16个扩大到30个,势力范围从冷战时期的西欧、南欧和中欧地区逐渐扩大到东欧和东南欧,从波罗的海一直延伸到黑海地区,对俄罗斯形成了完整的战略包围圈。北约在吸纳中东欧国家加入的同时,又将目光投向“后苏联空间”。大多数“后苏联国家”成为了北约的“和平伙伴关系”。西方利用他们与俄罗斯的历史积怨和领土争端,积极支持他们加入北约,其中乌克兰和格鲁吉亚最为积极主动。2014年的克里米亚危机后,乌克兰明确提出要加入北约,北约也在2020年接纳其成为北约的准成员国,赋予乌克兰“北约能力增强伙伴国”地位,与其展开了实质性的安全合作。目前,美国和英国军队以军事训练团或演习的名义长期在乌克兰驻扎轮换。

Russia believes that NATO’s substantive cooperation with Ukraine threatens Moscow’s security, and has touched Russia’s “strategic red line.” In his state of the nation address in April 2021, Putin said that Russia has been restrained and modest, that it wants to maintain good relations with all its international partners, and that “we really do not want to burn bridges;” that some countries should not take Russia’s modesty as weakness, and that if anyone dares to cross Russia’s “red lines,” burning or even blowing up bridges, Russia’s response will be “disproportionate, swift and tough.” But diplomatic communication between Putin and Biden has not been smooth, with the United States and NATO rejecting Russia’s core security guarantee demands. In December 2021, Russia publicly proposed a draft Russia-U.S. security guarantee treaty and an agreement on security guarantee measures between Russia and NATO member states, demanding that NATO not be expanded and that Ukraine not join NATO; that Russia and NATO not deploy short- and medium-range missiles in areas where they can strike each other; and that the two sides’ military force deployments return to the positions set out in the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. However, the United States and NATO clearly rejected Russia’s core demands. The West clearly underestimated Russia’s strategic counterattack ability and determination. As we have seen, in the absence of fruitful negotiations between Russia and NATO, Putin abandoned diplomatic efforts, quickly declared recognition of the independence of Ukraine’s Donbas region, and sent troops directly into Ukraine. On the morning of February 24, Russia declared war on Ukraine, taking military measures to reverse NATO’s offensive posture in Ukraine. The Russia-Ukraine war means a complete rupture of Russia-NATO relations and a return to confrontation and an arms race between the two sides.

俄罗斯认为,北约与乌克兰的实质性合作已经威胁到莫斯科的安全,触碰了俄罗斯的“战略红线”。2021年4月,普京在发表国情咨文中说,俄罗斯已经表现得谨慎低调、温文尔雅,俄方希望与所有国际伙伴保持良好关系,“我们真的不想烧毁(连接双方的)桥梁”;一些国家不要把俄罗斯的谦逊当作软弱,如果谁敢越过俄罗斯的“红线”,烧毁甚至炸掉桥梁,俄方的回应将是“不对等、迅速和强硬的”。 但是,普京与拜登之间的外交沟通并不顺利,美国和北约拒绝了俄方的核心安全保障诉求。2021年12月,俄罗斯公开提出俄美安全保障条约草案及俄与北约成员国安全保障措施协议,要求北约不再扩大,乌克兰不能加入北约;俄与北约不在可以打击到对方的区域部署中短程导弹;双方军力部署回到1997年《俄罗斯联邦与北大西洋公约组织相互关系、合作和安全基本文件》规定的位置。但是,美国和北约明确拒绝了俄罗斯的核心诉求,西方显然低估了俄罗斯战略反击的能力和决心。我们看到,在俄与北约谈判无果的情况下,普京放弃外交努力,很快就宣布承认乌克兰顿巴斯独立,直接派兵进入乌克兰。2月24日上午,俄罗斯对乌克兰宣战,采取军事手段逆转北约在乌克兰的进攻态势。俄乌战争意味着俄罗斯与北约关系的彻底破裂,双方将重回对抗和军备竞赛。

Second, the Russia-Ukraine war is a crisis in the development path of Russia’s relationship with the West. Russia’s announcement that it was sending troops to Ukraine not only has security considerations, but also has profound political intentions. As Engels said, “men, consciously or unconsciously, derive their ethical ideas in the last resort from the … economic relations in which they carry on production and exchange.” From a political science perspective, a development path is essentially a value orientation that sums up the essence and purpose of a country’s social development, embodies the profound dialectic between tradition and modernity, democratization and national conditions, and requires the establishment of mechanisms that can ensure the realization of the concept of national development.

其次,俄乌战争是俄罗斯与西方关系中的发展道路危机。俄罗斯宣布出兵乌克兰不仅有安全考虑,还有着深刻的政治意图。如恩格斯所说:“人们自觉地或不自觉地,归根到底总是……从他们进行生产和交换的经济关系中,吸取自己的道德观念。”从政治学视角来看,发展道路从本质上讲是一种价值取向,概括了国家社会发展的本质和目的,体现了传统与现代、民主化与国情的深刻辩证关系,并要求建立可以确保实现国家发展理念的机制。

Since Putin came to power, Russia has moved away from the West’s understanding of the path of national development, and Russian politics has begun to return to conservative politics, abandoning the democratic model marketed to Russia by the West. Putin believes that “as a sovereign country, Russia can and will independently determine for itself the timeframe and the conditions for its advancement along that path [toward democracy],” and that “democratic values must be combined with national interests. The West has criticized Putin’s “sovereign democracy” and “controlled democracy,” and by supporting anti-Putin NGOs, has created a political force in Russia that supports the Western model of democracy. At the same time, the West has shifted the focus of its efforts to promote the Western model of democracy [from Russia] to Russia’s neighboring countries. In 2009, the European Union officially launched the “Eastern Partnership” program to integrate the “post-Soviet states,” using Free Trade Area agreements as bait to bring six neighboring countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine—into the Western economic and political system.

普京执政以来,俄罗斯与西方在国家发展道路上的认识渐行渐远,俄罗斯政治开始回归保守主义政治,抛弃了西方推销给俄罗斯的民主模式。普京认为,“作为一个主权国家,俄罗斯能够也将自主地决定民主道路上的一切时间期限,以及推进民主的条件”,必须使“民主价值观与国家利益相结合”。西方批评普京提出的“主权民主”和“可控民主”,在俄罗斯通过扶持反普京的非政府组织,打造支持西方民主模式的政治力量。与此同时,西方还将推销西方民主模式的工作重心转到了俄罗斯周边国家。2009年,欧盟正式出台了整合“后苏联国家”的“东方伙伴”计划,意图以自贸区协定为诱饵,拉拢俄罗斯周边的阿塞拜疆、亚美尼亚、格鲁吉亚、摩尔多瓦、白俄罗斯、乌克兰等六国加入到西方的经济和政治体系。

In his speech on February 24, Putin clearly announced that Ukraine would be “de-Nazified” through military action. As is well known, it was the United States’ gross interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs in 2014 that led to the demonstrations and protests to turn into “regime change” in Ukraine. Putin’s statements on Ukrainian politics imply opposition to the path of national development given to Ukraine by the West. To quote Putin aide Vladislav Surkov, in his important article Putin’s Long-lasting Empire published in 2019, the “Putinist” political model will be an effective means of Russian national survival and development for the next 100 years. According to Surkov, the “Putin model” will not only be applicable to Russia, but also has “export” potential. Thus, after “de-Nazifying” Ukraine, it seems likely that Putin will replicate the Russian “Putin model” in Ukraine and replace the “Western model” with the “Putin model.”

普京在2月24日的发言明确宣布,通过军事行动来清理乌克兰的“纳粹政治”。众所周知,正是由于美国在2014年对乌克兰内政的粗暴干涉,才导致示威抗议演化为乌克兰政权的“更迭”。普京关于乌克兰政治的发言意味着,要反对西方赋予乌克兰的国家发展道路。引用普京的助理弗拉季斯拉夫·苏尔科夫在2019年发表重要文章《普京的长久帝国》中的话来说,“普京主义”政治模式将是俄罗斯民族未来100年生存和发展的有效手段。苏尔科夫认为,“普京模式”将不仅适用于俄罗斯,也有“出口”潜质。由此看来,在清理乌克兰的“纳粹政治”之后,普京大概率地会在乌克兰复制俄罗斯的“普京模式”,用“普京模式”取代“西方模式”。

Again, the Russia-Ukraine war is a crisis in Russia’s diplomatic relations with the West. Starting with the reforms of Peter I in the 18th century, Russia began to Europeanize in the cultural realm, and after the reforms of Catherine II, Tsarist Russia became a European power for a time. However, Russia was once again marginalized after World War I. During the Soviet era, despite its great economic, military, scientific and diplomatic achievements, Russia remained in a protracted state of confrontation with the Western world, moving from Tsarist Russia’s position on the margins to the opposite side, becoming the Western world’s “East.” After the end of the Cold War, many Russians believed for a time that they could rejoin the Western world, once the differences between political systems and market models were eliminated. But Russia’s re-embrace of the Western world did not work out well, as the West enthusiastically accepted Central and Eastern European countries into its fold, and even considered certain “post-Soviet states” as potential targets. In the eyes of the West, Russia has always been the “other,” and European countries have likened the idea of Russia joining the EU to “an elephant getting in your bathtub.”

再次,俄乌战争是俄罗斯与西方外交关系的危机。从18世纪彼得一世的改革开始,俄罗斯在文化领域开始欧洲化,在经历了叶卡捷琳娜二世改革之后,沙皇俄国一度成为欧洲强国。但在一战以后,俄罗斯再次被边缘化。苏联时期,虽然在经济、军事、科技和外交取得巨大成就,但是与西方世界长期对立的状态,从沙皇俄国的边缘位置走到了对立面,成为西方世界的“东方”。冷战结束后,很多俄罗斯人一度认为,在消除了与西方的政治制度和市场模式的差异后,自己能够回到西方世界里。但俄罗斯重新“拥抱西方世界”的实践并不理想,西方热情地接纳了中东欧国家加入,甚至还把某些“后苏联国家”视为潜在的对象。在西方眼里,俄罗斯始终是“他者”,欧洲国家将俄罗斯加入欧盟的想法比喻成“大象进澡盆”。

Putin attached great importance to the development of relations with the United States after he came to power, and hoped to completely dismantle the “sticking points” in their relations. After the September 11 attacks, Putin called George W. Bush to express his full support for the United States in the fight against terrorism. He unexpectedly opened an air transport corridor to Afghanistan to the United States, and took the initiative in sharing counterterrorism intelligence with the United States. During the Obama administration, the U.S. and Russian leaders made efforts to “reboot” relations after the Russia-Georgia war, and in the face of multiple rounds of U.S. sanctions after the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Putin did not forgo opportunities to improve relations. Russia has also taken great pains in its relations with Europe. During the Yeltsin era, Russia quickly agreed to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe, and it supported the option of Central and Eastern Europe joining the European Union. From the 1990s until the2008 Russia-Georgia War, Russia maintained friendly diplomatic relations and relatively close economic cooperation with Europe. During the administration of Chancellor Schröder in Germany, Russia joined Germany, France, and others in opposing the U.S. war in Iraq. Under Merkel’s administration, despite the impact of sanctions from the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia continued to expand its energy exports to Europe, and completed construction of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline.

普京执政后十分重视发展与美国的关系,曾希望彻底拆除双方关系上的“芥蒂”。“9·11”事件后,普京第一时间给小布什打电话,明确表示全力支持美国反恐,出人意料地向美国开放通往阿富汗的空中运输走廊,并主动与美国分享反恐情报。奥巴马执政时期,在经历了俄格战争之后,美俄领导人仍然努力“重启”关系;在2014年乌克兰危机之后,面对美国的多轮制裁,普京仍然没有放弃改善关系的机会。在对欧关系上,俄罗斯同样费尽心机。叶利钦时代,俄罗斯很快同意从东欧撤出军队,支持中东欧加入欧盟的选择。从20世纪90年代到2008年的俄格战争之前,俄罗斯与欧洲一直保持着友好的外交关系和较为密切的经济合作。在德国总理施罗德执政期间,俄罗斯与德国、法国等一道反对美国发动的伊拉克战争。在默克尔执政时期,尽管有着2014年乌克兰危机的制裁影响,俄罗斯仍然继续扩大了对欧洲的能源输出,建成了北溪二号天然气管线。

Throughout the thirty years since the end of the Cold War, Russia has made improving its relationship with the West one of its diplomatic priorities, and Moscow has maintained a great deal of strategic patience with the West, which once accepted Russia into the G7. However, the West has never really accepted Russia, has always seen Russia as the main security threat, and has continued to encroach upon and encircle Russia’s strategic space. The West has not only integrated former Warsaw Pact members into the Western political, economic and security system, but is also preparing to integrate the “post-Soviet space” into the West. The West has completely ignored Moscow’s desire to integrate into the West, and has exhausted Russia’s strategic patience with the Western world. Since the Biden administration came into office, the United States has reorganized the West’s “united front” against Russia, rebuilding a united diplomatic and military front against Russia. In 2021, the United States and the European Union together introduced several sanctions against Russia and expelled Russian diplomats. These joint actions left Moscow feeling there was almost zero room for improving relations with the West. In early 2022, Washington’s smear campaign against Russia reached an extreme, with the United States and Britain escalating the “Russian threat theory” into a “Russian invasion theory,” and the atmosphere for dialogue with the West was completely lost. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reluctantly compared the dialogue between the Russian and British foreign ministers on Ukraine as “a dialogue between a mute person and a deaf person.”

纵观冷战结束的30年,俄罗斯大部分时间将改善与西方关系作为外交的重心之一,莫斯科始终对西方保持着巨大的战略耐心,西方虽一度接纳俄罗斯加入“七国集团”。但是,西方始终未能真正接纳俄罗斯,始终将俄罗斯视为最主要的安全威胁,且不断地蚕食和围堵俄罗斯的战略空间。西方不仅将吸纳前华约成员国纳入西方的政治经济和安全体系,而且还准备将“后苏联地区”也吸收入西方。西方完全无视莫斯科对融入西方的渴望,将俄罗斯对西方世界的战略耐心消耗殆尽。拜登政府执政以来,美国重整西方对俄的“统一战线”,重建对俄外交和军事联合战线。2021年,美国和欧盟一起出台了多项对俄罗斯的制裁,并驱逐俄罗斯外交官。这些联合行动令莫斯科感到与西方改善关系的空间几乎为零。2022年初,华盛顿对俄罗斯的抹黑达到了极致,美国和英国将“俄罗斯威胁论”升级为“俄罗斯入侵论”,俄与西方对话的氛围完全丧失。俄外长拉夫罗夫无奈地比喻,俄英外长关于乌克兰的对话为“哑巴和聋子的对话”。

The Russia-Ukraine war is an important turning point in Russia’s relations with the West, reflecting the fact that the differences between Russia and the West in terms of security concepts, values and worldview are escalating into a huge “conflict” that is difficult to reconcile. Putin’s actions in Ukraine mark a complete paradigm shift Russia’s dealings with the West. Communication has become very difficult because of the huge differences in perceptions between the two sides, and the differences rapidly escalate into conflicts, which intensify into war. The Russia-Ukraine war is an outbreak of past conflicts between Russia and the West, and a violent “collision” of future pluralism and Western centrism.

俄乌战争是俄罗斯与西方关系的重要转折点,反映了俄罗斯与西方之间在安全观、价值观和世界观的分歧正在升级为难以调和的巨大“矛盾”。普京在乌克兰的行动标志着俄罗斯与西方打交道的模式已经彻底改变。由于双方巨大的观念分歧,沟通变得十分困难,分歧快速升级为矛盾,矛盾激化为战争。俄乌战争是俄罗斯与西方过往矛盾的爆发,也是未来多元思想与西方中心主义思想剧烈“碰撞”。

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张弘 (Zhang Hong). "Russia-Ukraine War Deeply Affects the Relationship Between Russia and the West [俄乌战争深度影响俄罗斯与西方关系 ]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in China Social Sciences Network [中国社会科学网], March 1, 2022

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