Sino-European relations in 2021 saw collisions and confrontations of sharply contrasting natures. From the harmonious moment when the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was reached at the beginning of the year to the strange atmosphere of mutual maintenance of sanctions that settled in at the end of the year, the changes have been rapid and flabbergasting. In fact, the upward momentum of Sino-European relations had been sudden and powerful thanks to the rising tide of economic globalization and European integration, and then, with the falling tide of the latter, there followed a very rapid downward slide. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 put economic globalization in the fast lane, and Sino-European relations consequently experienced a honeymoon. The international financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis of 2008 and 2009 opened a Pandora’s box, triggering multiple crises in Europe and elsewhere. Frictions gradually arose in Sino-European relations as well. The hostility between China and Europe that had developed by 2021 seemed to complete a 20-year cycle: For the first ten years the roller coaster car kept climbing in high spirits and full of optimism, but in the latter ten years it continually accelerated down the descending track.
2021年的中欧关系经历了冰火两重天的碰撞与交锋。从年初达成《中欧综合投资协定》的融洽时刻,到年末陷入互相维持制裁的诡异氛围,变化之快,令人瞠目。实际上,中欧关系随着经济全球化和欧洲一体化的潮涌而攀升的势头有多猛,随着后者的潮落而下滑的速度就有多快。2001年中国加入世贸组织,推动经济全球化进入快车道,中欧关系也因此进入蜜月期。2008~2009年的国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机开启了“潘多拉魔匣”,引发了欧洲内外多重危机,中欧关系也渐生龃龉。到2021年中欧互怼,似乎完成了20年的一个轮回:前十年如同过山车的持续爬升阶段,高歌猛进,后十年则进入不断加速的下行轨道。
On December 16, 2021, the leaders of the EU member states held a summit meeting at the EU headquarters in Brussels.
2021年12月16日,欧盟成员国领导人在布鲁塞尔欧盟总部举行峰会。
A Year of Accelerating Deterioration in Sino-European Relations
中欧关系加速下滑的一年
The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment could not have been reached in early 2021 without the support of former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. About to step down after having served as chancellor for 16 years, Merkel wished to leave an additional political legacy for subsequent generations and to inject some more vigor into the German economy. Therefore, disregarding warnings from the incoming Biden administration and intense internal European disputes, she strove to bring about this agreement between the EU and China. However, she failed to adequately take into account the shift in mass psychology resulting from social rifts and political polarization within Europe, and she had a powerful obsession with the neoliberal ideas which the European political elites had clung to for 30 years following the Cold War—ideas that favored trade liberalization and rejected geopolitical competition. Therefore, her beautiful vision of leaving a legacy of Sino-European cooperation was put into doubt by sudden changes in the situation.
2021年初《中欧综合投资协定》能够达成,德国前总理默克尔的推动作用功不可没。默克尔担任德国总理16年,临近卸任之际希望为后世多留下一份政治遗产、为德国经济多注入一些动力,因而无视即将上任的拜登政府的警告和欧洲内部的强烈争议,努力推动欧盟与中国达成这一协议。但她对欧洲内部因社会撕裂和政治极化而带来的大众心理的转向缺乏充分的考量,对冷战后30年里欧洲政治精英长期固守的推崇贸易自由化和否定地缘竞争的新自由主义理念抱着强烈的执念,因而为中欧合作留下政治遗产的美好愿望在形势的急剧变化中也出现了变数。
During the ten years following the eruption of the European sovereign debt crisis, multiple crises within European society and elsewhere led to an economic downturn and slower development. China, on the other hand, continued to bound forward. China also kept recording huge surpluses in its long-term trade with Europe. Some production chains within the EU shrank, and the EU’s reliance on China’s production chains intensified. The change in the relative strengths of China and Europe has resulted in an increasingly unbalanced European mentality with regard to Sino-European relations. The outbreak of the Covid pandemic aggravated this imbalance. The enormous influence that China had on the developing nations’ struggle against the pandemic; Europe’s reliance on Chinese medical products; the fact that China maintained its rapid momentum in technological R&D and industrial upgrading in the midst of fighting the pandemic; the continual weakening in Europe of China-bound exports and investments—all of the above caused Europe to experience unprecedented fear. The confusion of European elites over China and their anxious “sense of insecurity” have been growing day by day. As a result, since early 2021, the EU leadership, experts on European strategy, and some politicians in some of the core member states have formed an increasingly negative view of China and have become ever more pessimistic about Sino-European relations. The idea of drawing on the support of the United States to counterbalance China has been growing imperceptibly.
欧洲主权债务危机爆发以来的十年间,欧洲社会的内外多重危机使其经济低迷、发展缓慢。而中国却持续崛起,同时中国对欧贸易长期维持巨额顺差,欧盟内部的一些产业链却出现萎缩,欧盟对中国的产业链依赖在增强。中欧实力对比的变化,使欧洲看待中欧关系的心态越来越失衡。新冠疫情的暴发加剧了这种失衡。中国对发展中国家抗疫的巨大影响力、欧洲对中国医疗产品的依赖、中国在抗疫同时仍然维持的技术研发与产业升级的迅猛势头、欧洲对华出口和投资的持续疲软态势,使欧洲感到前所未有的恐惧。欧洲政治精英对中国的纠结且焦虑的“不安全感”与日俱增,导致2021年初以来欧盟领导层、欧洲战略研究界和一些核心成员国的部分政治家对中国的看法越来越负面,对中欧关系越来越悲观,希望借助美国来制衡中国的想法也在潜滋暗长。
The United States issued the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in early March 2021, and Secretary of State Blinken at the same time gave a speech providing an outline of the Biden administration’s foreign policy. One week later, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrell Fontelles gave a reply, in which he indicated that the EU needed to draw up a more systematic Indo-Pacific strategy as a proper response to China’s “increasingly forceful” attitude. On March 22, using the so-called “Xinjiang issue” as an excuse, the EU announced that it would sanction four Chinese officials, thereby initiating a process of rapid deterioration in Sino-European relations. In the middle of April, the EU issued an internal report which was circulated among high-ranking officials. According to the report, it had already become impossible to separate European commercial interests in China from political assessments of Sino-European relations; Sino-European relations had become “more and more challenging.” The report also proposed joining hands with the United States to cope with China. On April 21, President of the European Commission von der Leyen and High Representative Borrell Fontelles jointly signed a letter to the EU’s supreme authority, the European Council. They clearly stated the following: “The EU and China have fundamental divergences, be it about their economic systems and managing globalization, democracy and human rights, or on how to deal with third countries. These differences are set to remain for the foreseeable future.” On April 30, the European Parliament began discussions on the motion “Concerning a New EU Strategy on China.” This motion was passed by a large margin in the middle of September. On September 16, the European Commission introduced the “The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Sino-European relations kept going downhill.
2021年3月初,美国公布了《国家安全临时战略指导》文件,国务卿布林肯同时发表演讲,阐述了拜登政府的外交政策纲要。一周之后欧盟安全事务与外交政策高级代表博雷利做出回应,表示欧盟需要制订更加系统的印太战略,以妥善应对中国“愈加强势”的态度。3月22日欧盟以所谓“新疆问题”为借口宣布对中国四名官员实施制裁,由此开启了中欧关系急剧恶化的进程。4月中旬,欧盟出台了一份在高层传阅的内部报告,认为现在已经难以将欧盟对华商业利益与对中欧关系的政治考量区分开来,中欧关系变得“越来越具有挑战性”,并提出应联手美国对付中国。4月21日欧委会主席冯德莱恩和博雷利联名致信欧盟最高权力机构——欧洲理事会,明确谈到:“在经济制度、管理全球化的方式、民主与人权和对待第三国的方式等方面,中国与欧盟存在根本性的差别,这些差别在可预见的未来将长期延续。”4月30日,欧洲议会开始讨论《关于新的欧盟对中国的战略》提案。此后这一提案在9月中旬获得高票通过。9月16日欧委会推出了《欧盟印太合作战略》。中欧关系不断跌落。
Conducting Strategic Competition in the Economic Arena
进行经济领域的战略竞争
As European decision-makers became increasingly negative in their assessments and appraisals of Sino-European relations, the EU introduced a series of explicit and implicit policy frameworks directed at China with the intention of using the policy tools of protectionism and economic nationalism to implement stricter regulation over, and stiffer resistance to, products and capital imported into Europe from China. On May 5, the European Commission published a notice, the “Updated 2020 New EU Industrial Strategy,” which emphasized the need to escape from “reliance” on Chinese products. The European Commission also brought out on the same day a draft of control regulations aimed at “foreign subsidies that distort European internal markets.” The draft indicated that they would strengthen monitoring and regulation of “foreign-subsidized” foreign capital and clearly mentioned that support provided under the Made in China 2025 program have a “foreign-subsidized” nature. In addition, the EU on August 30 also issued an annual report on the implementation status of the “two antis and one guarantee” trade protection policy. On September 9, it introduced an unprecedently tough new regulation on export controls and technology transfers. On October 27, it issued a report on the implementation of EU trade agreements, and on November 23 it released the EU’s first ever annual investment review report. In these documents and reports, the EU repeatedly emphasizes that it needs to conduct tit-for-tat countermeasures to the “unfair” practices relating to Chinese products and capital. On December 8, the European Commission introduced the draft of a law for protecting Europe from “third country economic coercion.” The target was still China.
随着欧洲决策层对中欧关系的研判与定位愈加负面,欧盟推出了一系列明里暗里针对中国的政策架构,意在使用保护主义和经济民族主义的政策工具,对中国输入欧洲的产品与资本进行更加严密的监管和强硬的抵制。5月5日欧委会发布《更新2020欧盟新产业战略》通报,强调要摆脱对中国产品的“依赖”。同日欧委会还出台了针对“扭曲欧洲内部市场的外国补贴”的管制规定草案,表示要对获得“外国补贴”的外资强化监控和规制,且明确提到《中国制造2025计划》提供的支持具有“外国补贴”的性质。此外,欧盟还在8月30日出台了关于“两反一保”的贸易保护政策实施情况的年度报告,9月9日出台了空前强硬的关于出口管制和技术转让的新法规,10月27日出台了关于欧盟贸易协议执行情况的报告,11月23日出台了欧盟有史以来第一份投资审查年度报告。在这些文件与报告里,欧盟一再强调要对中国产品和资本的“不公平”的做法开展针锋相对的反制。12月8日欧委会出台了保护欧洲免受“第三国经济强制”的法律草案,其矛头依然指向中国。
At the same time, even when dealing with third parties other than China , Europe is seeking to contest China at every turn, intensifying its fight for leadership and influence over economic cooperation. Because China’s position in the global value chain has gradually risen over the past few years, the technological and industrial development gaps between China and Europe have shrunk. Enterprises from both sides are vying for international market share. They are engaged in an intense rivalry for leadership of cutting-edge technologies and advanced manufacturing in third-party markets such as Russia, Africa, and Latin America. For example, Alstom in France and Siemens in Germany are battling with China’s CRRC Group for the high-speed rail market, and Huawei is in a contest with European enterprises over the communication services market.
与此同时,面对中欧之外的第三方,欧洲也在步步为营地与中国竞争,加紧争夺经济合作的主导权与影响力。过去几年里,由于中国在全球价值链中的位置逐渐升高,中欧在技术与产业发展水平上的差距缩小,双方企业在争夺国际市场份额、取得尖端技术与先进制造业的领先位置方面,在俄罗斯、非洲和拉美等第三方市场开展激烈的角逐,如法国高通公司和德国西门子公司与中国的“中车集团”对高铁市场的争夺、华为公司与欧洲企业对通讯服务市场的争夺,都是例证。
In 2021, Europe pressed ahead with decisions aimed at coping with competitive pressure from China. On July 21, the European Council introduced a policy program, “Globally Connected Europe,” based on the “Connected Eurasia: The Touchstone for Building EU Strategies” document that the European Commission had released in 2018, that put forward a vision for providing large-scale support to developing countries. On December 1, the European Commission launched another policy program, “Global Gateway,” whereby it plans to invest 300 billion euros in developing countries over the next seven years in an effort to help them build infrastructure while also promoting “European values and institutions” to them. A bulletin from the European Parliament pointed out that the objective in putting forward these “European programs” was to replace China’s Belt and Road Initiative while firmly establishing European influence over the world.
为应对中国带来的竞争压力,2021年欧洲加紧决策。7月21日欧洲理事会在欧委会2018年推出的《联通欧亚:建设欧盟战略基石》文件的基础上,出台了《全球联通的欧洲》政策方案,提出关于大规模援助发展中国家的愿景规划。12月1日欧委会又推出了《全球门户》政策方案,打算在未来七年里对发展中国家投资3000亿欧元,帮助建造基础设施,同时也向其推广“欧洲的价值观和制度模式”。欧洲议会的简报明确指出,提出这些“欧洲方案”的目的,就是希望取代中国的“一带一路”倡议,确立欧洲对世界的影响。
Teaming Up with the United States to Take on China
与美国联手对付中国
U.S.-China strategic competition has already become an important factor shaping the evolutionary direction and operating rhythm of the world economy and international strategies. Europe occupies a highly awkward position squeezed between China and the United States. It cannot escape the double strategic pressure arising from Sino-European competition and U.S.-EU contradictions, both of which are intensifying. You might say that the Europeans find themselves in difficult straits and are quite anxious about it. Over the past few years, Europe has continually wavered between China and the United States. It has been hedging its bets by adopting opportunistic and transactional positions and is trying hard to free itself from economic or strategic reliance on either China or the United States. However, since March 2021, Europe has gradually drawn closer to the United States while handling relations with China.
当前中美战略竞争已成为塑造世界经济与国际战略的演变方向与运行节奏的重要因素。在中美之间,欧洲处于非常尴尬的夹缝中的地位,不得不面对中欧竞争与美欧矛盾同时加剧的双重战略压力,可谓左支右绌、心态焦灼。过去几年里,欧洲在中美之间不断摇摆,采取两面下注的机会主义和交易主义立场,力图使自身摆脱对中美任何一方的经济或战略依赖。但2021年3月以来欧洲在处理对华关系时逐渐向美国靠拢。
The United States has always had a major influence on Europe’s understanding of China. U.S. political elites and the U.S. strategic studies community have always exerted a subtle influence over—or have even shaped—the conceptual architecture, discourses, modes of thought, and foci of attention of the European understanding of China. Again and again, the United States will put forward an important assessment or “novel” idea about China, and Europe will then right away blindly follow suit.
在针对中国的认知方面,美国对欧洲一直有着重大的影响。美国政治精英和战略研究界一直在潜移默化地影响乃至塑造着欧洲认知中国的观念建构、话语体系、思维方式与关注焦点。很多时候美国提出关于中国的重大判断或“新颖”概念之后,欧洲就会很快地亦步亦趋地追随其后。
After the Biden administration took power in 2021, Europe and the United States developed closer communication and coordination when handling relations with China. A preliminary mechanism has already formed, and it includes three collaborative structures. First, on September 29, the two sides established the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council stating that they would launch R&D collaboration in cutting-edge technologies, such as AI and information and communications technologies, and that they would communicate and collaborate on important issues involving international strategic competition on the economic level, such as digital service platform management, semiconductor supply chain security, export controls and investment reviews, and global trade competition. There is an obvious intention here of cooperating to compete against China. Second, the EU continues to participate in the mechanism for carrying out tripartite talks among the leading trade officials of the United States, Japan, and Europe. This serves as a platform for discussions and the expression of public opinions, whereby pressure is put on China. This coordination structure appeared in December 2017. On November 30, 2021, using a video format, the three sides held talks for the seventh time and continued to criticize the “non-market economy” practices of China without actually naming China. Third, the EU continues to move forward with a U.S.-EU bilateral, high-level dialogue mechanism concerning Chinese issues. This dialogue platform was established in October 2020. In May 2021, the United States and Europe held their first high-level talks after Biden took office and institutionalized this structure. The United States and Europe again held high-level talks on December 2 in which they communicated on issues concerning Hong Kong, Taiwan, “human rights,” and the maritime rights and interests of the Chinese periphery.
2021年拜登政府上台后,欧洲与美国在处理对华关系时的沟通与协调越来越密切,已形成了初步的机制,包括三项协作架构。其一,9月29日,双方成立“美欧贸易与技术理事会”,表示要在人工智能和信息通讯技术等尖端技术领域开展研发协作,在数字服务平台管理、半导体供应链安全、出口管制与投资审查和全球贸易竞争等涉及经济层面的国际战略竞争的重要问题上沟通协作,明显含有联手与中国展开竞争的意图。其二,欧盟继续参与运作美日欧三方贸易部长会谈机制,以此作为相互磋商和舆论发声的平台,对中国施压。这一协调架构出现于2017年12月。2021年11月30日,三方以视频形式举行第七次会谈,继续不点名地批评中国的“非市场经济”的实践。其三,欧盟继续推进关于中国问题的美欧双边高级别对话机制。这一对话平台在2020年10月建立,2021年5月美欧举行拜登上任后的首次高级别会谈,并将这一架构机制化。12月2日美欧再度举行高级别会谈,在涉港、涉台、“人权”、中国周边海洋权益等问题上进行了沟通。
Future Trends of Sino-European Relations
中欧关系的未来走势
At present, the understanding that the EU and its main member states have of Sino-European relations is still founded in the framework established by the “EU Strategic Outlook on China” document of March 2019. This framework defined three identities for China: Europe’s institutional opponent, economic competitor, and possible partner within specific fields. In other words, the Europeans still regard China as neither friend nor foe; rather, they see it as an entity with which they can have dealings, but which constitutes a challenge and a threat to Europe in certain contexts. Thus, Sino-European relations will inevitably face the following problems in the future:
目前欧盟及其主要成员国对中欧关系的认知,仍建立在2019年3月《欧盟对华战略展望》文件确立的框架内,将中国界定为三重身份:欧洲在制度上的对手、经济上的竞争者和特定领域可以合作的伙伴。换言之,欧洲仍然认为,中国是非敌非友的可以交往的对象,但在某些场合对欧洲构成挑战和威胁。由此,中欧关系未来必然面临这样几个问题:
First of all, the EU will continue to press forward with protectionist and economic nationalist strategies directed at China; it will strengthen cutting-edge technology and advanced industry protections, trade protections, and investment reviews; it will build a tougher and tighter “defensive” policy system against China. Therefore, with regard to issues such as the acquisition of European technology transfers by S&T enterprises, mergers of Chinese-owned enterprises in Europe, and Chinese exports to Europe, the disputes between China and Europe will increase in number, and they may even trigger an intensification of contradictions leading to a further deterioration of Sino-European relations on the strategic level.
首先,欧盟将继续加紧推行针对中国的保护主义和经济民族主义战略,加强尖端技术与前沿产业保护、贸易保护和投资审查,构建更加强硬而严密的对华“防御性”政策体系。因此,在中国科技企业获取欧方技术转让、中资企业在欧并购和中国对欧出口等问题上,中欧之间的争端还会增多,甚至很可能引发矛盾激化,进而导致战略层面的中欧关系进一步恶化。
Secondly, the EU will continue to waver back and forth between China and the United States. In particular, when direct confrontation occurs between China and the United States and the United States adopts a tough attitude towards China, the EU and its member states may hedge their bets and adopt a mindset of seeking to profit from both sides. On the one hand, the EU will stand behind the United States and push it to keep toughening its attitude towards China so as to force China to make concessions with regard to systems and mechanisms or even at the fundamental institutional level. It will let the United States “pull Europe’s chestnuts out of the fire,” that is, do things on behalf of Europe that Europe itself is unable or unwilling to do. On the other hand, it will seek to use the considerable pressure placed on China by the China-U.S. confrontation to force China to make further concessions to the EU.
其次,欧盟将继续在中美之间摇摆和周旋,尤其是在中美出现直接对抗、美国采取对华强硬态度的时候,欧盟及其成员国很可能会以两面下注、两面渔利的心态,一方面站在美国后面,推动美国不断升级对中国的强硬态度,迫使中国做出体制机制乃至根本制度上的让步,让美国为欧洲“火中取栗”,帮欧洲做成欧洲自身没有能力或意愿去做的事;另一方面则借助中美对抗给中国带来的强大压力,迫使中国向欧盟做出更多的让步。
Furthermore, the EU may further intensify its diplomatic activities in the Indo-Pacific region, with the intent of establishing free-trade frameworks and reaching strategic security understandings with some countries on China’s periphery. It may even seek to carry out symbolic security and defensive cooperation with them.
再次,欧盟可能会进一步强化在印太地区的外交活动,意图与中国周边的一些国家建立自由贸易架构,达成战略安全共识,甚至开展象征性的安全与防务合作。
Europe’s China policy will remain opportunistic. While riding a roller coaster, Sino-European relations will await the next spring.
未来欧洲的对华政策仍将保持机会主义做法。在过山车般的起伏中,中欧关系在等待下一个春天。