Following the incident, it has been widely believed that the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela was driven by oil, or that oil was one of the most important motivations behind Trump’s decision to act. Many article headlines have included phrases such as “coveting Venezuela’s oil resources,” “monopolizing Venezuela’s resources,” “openly seizing oil,” and “controlling Venezuela’s oil.” Protest demonstrations against the U.S. military action in various locations have featured slogans such as “No Blood for Oil,” and media and online programs have also included considerable satire about Trump openly talking about oil. 

At the press conference following the U.S. military’s capture of Maduro, Trump mentioned “oil” nearly twice as often as he mentioned drugs or drug trafficking. The oil motive is therefore an important issue that cannot be avoided when analyzing U.S. military intervention in Venezuela and assessing future developments. It cannot be denied that oil constitutes an important “piece of the puzzle” and one of the primary driving factors behind Trump’s intervention in Venezuela and the broader Latin American situation. However, compared with ultimate objectives such as the seizure of resources, the oil motive is more of a medium and a means, serving as an indispensable instrument through which Trump seeks to realize his political, security, diplomatic, and even economic interests. The United States does not truly need Venezuela’s oil, but controlling its oil industry is currently the most effective means of controlling the country.¹

I. Is the United States Acting “for Oil”?

The first question that needs to be addressed is whether the United States seeks to control—and is capable of controlling—Venezuela’s oil resources. To begin with, “for oil” is a relatively vague or subjective judgment, whereas the view that U.S. military action is related to oil is more accurate and objective in both logical and factual terms. In a literal sense, both the Chinese term “为了” and the English “for” tend to imply that oil constitutes the ultimate objective or end target of U.S. military action—that is, to obtain Venezuelan oil for U.S. consumption or use. In reality, however, in recent years, following the success of the U.S. shale revolution, oil production has risen sharply, and the United States has become one of the world’s leading oil producers and exporters. After returning to office, Trump has further promoted the extraction and export of fossil fuels vigorously. Therefore, from the general perspective of consumption or imports, U.S. oil production capacity is effectively “in surplus,” and the United States no longer has a strong need to import or consume large quantities of Venezuelan oil. Second, rather than seeking to control Venezuela’s oil resources per se, the United States is better understood as seeking to obtain related “oil interests.” From the perspective of ownership or sovereignty, the only way to control another country’s resources would be to annex its territory and thereby appropriate the resources within it—something that has been extremely difficult to achieve in the post–World War II era. Of course, whether and how current U.S. intentions regarding Greenland might play out remains to be seen. The closest historical case to this was the U.S. military occupation of Iraq in 2003, where international opinion widely held that the United States intended to take control of Iraq’s oil resources. However, subsequent developments have shown that not only did sovereignty over Iraq’s oil resources remain with the Iraqi people, but the United States also did not obtain preferential access to Iraq’s oil resources or imports. As for oil and gas development investment, U.S. oil companies did not gain any special advantages or preferential treatment. For commercial and economic reasons, U.S. oil companies were not particularly active in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction; the number of projects they secured was limited, and their returns were poor. Such limited oil-related benefits are far from sufficient to explain the trillions of dollars invested by the U.S. military in the Iraq War.

II. What Kind of “Oil Interests”? 

The next question, then, is what kind of oil-related interests the Trump administration seeks to obtain. Trump has stated that this time it should not be like the Iraq War, but rather that they must “keep the oil.” Although the United States does not, in fact, need Venezuelan oil to meet domestic consumption demand or ensure energy security, oil revenues are of critical importance to Venezuela. Oil can therefore serve as an important lever and instrument for Trump to advance a range of political, security, and diplomatic interests. By intervening in Venezuela’s oil development and partially controlling its oil export revenues, the United States can not only obtain some immediate tangible benefits, but also strike at competitors in the international energy market, deter and constrain its strategic rivals, and thereby advance national security strategies such as the so-called “Donroe Doctrine.” Specifically, the first objective is to realize Trump’s “energy dream.” Factors such as his business background, Republican Party affiliation, and long-term influence and lobbying by major oil interests have given Trump a deep fixation on oil. He views oil as synonymous with wealth and believes that a strong oil industry underpins national strength. At the start of his second term, Trump introduced Energy and Environmental Policy 2.0, vigorously promoting the extraction and export of fossil fuels such as oil and gas, while intensifying pressure and sanctions on countries such as Russia and Iran in an effort to consolidate the United States’ “energy dominance” globally. Some analyses suggest that Trump has chosen to forgo sectors such as new energy, where China’s advantage is increasingly pronounced”:, and instead leverage the United States’ strengths in fossil fuels to expand global “energy hegemony.” One of the aims is to counter China’s challenge by using fossil energy advantages to compete against China’s strengths in new energy and electricity—employing “oil hegemony” or “oil power” to counter China’s “electricity superpower” or “electrical power.” Under the influence of this strategic fixation, Trump is attempting to extend U.S. “energy dominance” to Venezuela and even across the Western Hemisphere, with the aim of achieving comprehensive control over the Americas’ resource and energy base and ultimately building a “resource empire.” 

The second objective is to reward domestic oil interest groups. Republican administrations in the United States have traditionally maintainedclose ties with fossil fuel interest groups. Trump’s return to power depended in no small part on strong support from domestic oil interests, and the introduction of his Energy and Environmental Policy 2.0 has likewise significantly benefited the domestic fossil fuel industry. Following the U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, international opinion has generally held that the U.S. energy sector stands to be one of the primary beneficiaries. Trump has required Venezuela to hand over 30–50 million barrels of oil to be sold by the United States, with part of the revenues subject to U.S. control, a move that benefits certain oil-related enterprises. Some U.S. refineries will benefit from importing Venezuelan heavy crude at relatively low cost. The Trump administration’s call to enter Venezuela’s oil sector has been responded to by Chevron, which has long operated in Venezuela, as well as by some smaller firms. In the medium to long term, as conditions improve, not only are U.S. oil companies such as Chevron expected to benefit from future oil development in Venezuela, but companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips may also be able to recover billions of dollars in outstanding loans and compensation claims in Venezuela. 

The third objective is to deter and strike out at international competitors. In the near term, the blockade and crackdown on Venezuela-related “shadow fleets” will directly undermine efforts by countries such as Russia and Iran to circumvent U.S. energy sanctions, and will significantly reduce China’s imports of low-cost Venezuelan heavy crude. Trump has also threatened to cut off Venezuela’s oil supplies and financial flows to Cuba, which will inevitably exacerbate Cuba’s livelihood crisis and increase both domestic and external pressures on its government. In the medium to long term, the deepening of U.S. involvement in and influence over Venezuela’s oil sector will not only help enhance the United States’ influence and competitiveness in the global oil market, but will also impact a wide range of market competitors. Canadian oil will face greater pressure on export prices and market share; the ability of OPEC countries such as Saudi Arabia to influence the international oil market will be weakened; the entry of Venezuelan oil into the market, lowering oil prices, will pose a threat to Russia’s fiscal revenues and economic stability; and China’s oil investments in Venezuela will encounter greater obstacles. In addition, the European Union’s already sharply increased dependence on U.S. energy following the Russia–Ukraine conflict is likely to deepen further. 

The fourth objective is to reap domestic political gains and support the Republican Party in the midterm elections. Recently, as polling support has declined ahead of the midterms, Trump has shown a strong sense of crisis regarding the electoral outlook, even stating that “if the midterms are lost, impeachment may follow.” To this end, Trump has been increasingly active on the international stage, actions that can to some extent be explained from the perspective of domestic politics. With respect to intervention in Venezuela’s oil sector, whether through direct or indirect benefits to domestic energy companies, through deterring and striking out at competitors such as OPEC, Cuba, Russia, and Iran, or through the anticipated reduction of oil prices to appease domestic consumers, all of these measures can, to a certain extent, help Trump secure more support from voters in the midterm elections. Trump has long regarded increasing production and lowering oil prices as good economic news, and has listed them among the priorities of his second term. As voters continue to express concern over the cost of living, expanding the slogan and policy of “drill, baby, drill” to Venezuela and Latin America has become increasingly urgent for the Trump administration. 

III. Can the United States Control Venezuela’s Oil? 

The third question of concern is the extent to which the United States can control Venezuela’s energy lifeline. Trump harbors ambitious plans for Venezuela’s oil sector and has taken frequent actions both domestically and internationally, attempting to achieve multiple objectives by “controlling Venezuela’s fiscal and energy lifelines.” Relatively speaking, major U.S. oil companies possess a deep operational foundation and experience in Venezuela’s oil sector. If the United States lifts sanctions and a new Venezuelan government provides certain facilitation measures, the likelihood of increased U.S. investment in Venezuela will rise significantly—at least higher than during the Maduro period and the post–Iraq War period. However, due to uncertainties surrounding Venezuela’s future situation and various political and economic constraints, significant obstacles remain to the realization of Trump’s “energy ambition.” 

Trump’s short-term objectives may be partially achieved. Prior to U.S. military intervention, key factors affecting Venezuela’s oil production capacity and exports were U.S. oil sanctions and the blockade of shadow fleet. At present, the initiative to lift sanctions and remove the blockade lies in the hands of the Trump administration. Moreover, compared with the period following the 2003 Iraq War, the United States currently has stronger economic incentives to import Venezuela’s heavy crude oil. With Venezuelan oil being successfully transported to the United States for sale, the U.S. government’s aim of partially controlling and influencing Venezuela’s oil revenues will gain a new starting point. If subsequentnegotiations and transactions between Trump and a Venezuelan transitional government proceed smoothly, U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil are likely to increase significantly, and other oil companies will become more willing to invest in Venezuela. Ali Moshiri, former head of Chevron’s Latin America business, has stated that the company is raising $2 billion to invest in identified Venezuelan oil assets, with part of the capital already deployed in advance. Some analyses suggest that, if the political transition proceeds smoothly and U.S. sanctions and blockades are lifted, production capacity could recover within a few months, with Venezuela’s oil output expected to reach 1.2 million barrels per day by the end of 2026. Clayton Seigle, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), has noted that if sanctions are lifted and the necessary political, legal, and financial conditions are met, Venezuela’s oil production could even rebound to 1.5 million barrels per day by 2028.²

However, in the medium to long term, the pace and extent of the recovery of Venezuela’s oil production capacity are likely to fall far short of the Trump administration’s expectations. Compared with Trump’s persistent pursuit of “energy dominance,” U.S. oil companies are more concerned with “energy dividends” and commercial returns. In November 2025, U.S. domestic oil production increased by only 3 percent compared with December 2024, and this growth was mainly due to improvements in field efficiency rather than Trump’s energy policy initiatives. In Venezuela, Trump has claimed that substantial investment will be made to restore the country’s oil infrastructure, but major oil companies have responded coolly. On January 9, 2026, when Trump convened oil executives at the White House to discuss investment in Venezuela, ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods stated bluntly that Venezuela’s oil industry currently “does not have investment value.” 

There are many obstacles affecting the recovery of Venezuela’s oil production capacity and the large-scale entry of U.S. companies, mainly including the following: First, weak commercial viability. Venezuelan crude is predominantly heavy crude oil, which is difficult and costly to develop, making it unattractive to oil companies when global oil prices are relatively low. Oversupply in the international oil market may push oil prices below $50 per barrel over the next one to two years, falling below the breakeven point for most existing Venezuelan oil fields. At present, U.S. oil companies’ investment focus is primarily on domestic projects and low-cost offshore oil and gas resources in South America, such as those in Guyana. Second, high political risk. Many industry insiders have noted that oil companies will not make substantive commitments until the political situation has largely stabilized. U.S. oil companies emphasize that Venezuela must undertake major reforms before they will make large-scale investments in its oil sector. Third, high investment costs. Aging drilling platforms, pipelines, ports, and other infrastructure, combined with neglect and mismanagement, have left Venezuela’s oil facilities in far worse condition than expected. Restoring existing infrastructure alone would require investments on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars. In addition, Venezuela’s oil sector faces numerous challenges in areas such as talent reserves, power supply, and supporting infrastructure, making large-scale recovery of production capacity a long and difficult task.

IV. Will China–Venezuela Cooperation Be Affected? 

The final question concerns China—namely, whether China–Venezuela energy cooperation still has prospects. On the one hand, U.S. intervention has a relatively limited impact on China’s oil imports. China was once a major buyer of Venezuelan crude oil, but with declining production and China’s efforts to diversify its oil import sources, the share of Venezuelan oil in China’s imports has declined significantly in recent years. In 2024, China imported 1.49 million tons of crude oil from Venezuela, accounting for approximately 0.27% of its total imports. Following Trump’s return to office and the continued strengthening of sanctions and blockades on Venezuelan oil, China’s imports from Venezuela fell further to 0.07% of total imports during January–November 2025. Under the constraints of oil sanctions and blockades, some Chinese refineries have shifted to importing from countries such as Iran and Canada. Although costs have increased significantly, the impact on China’s overall oil consumption has been limited. Regarding Venezuela’s oil exports, although Trump has sought to exclude China from investment in Venezuela’s oil sector, he has publicly stated that he hopes oil produced by U.S. companies in Venezuela will be sold to China. If Venezuela’s oil production returns to a relatively high level, the United States’ own relatively limited demand will be insufficient to absorb it all, and China would be an ideal target market. Moreover, U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil would necessarily mean reducing imports of similar-grade oil from Canada, which would lead to more Canadian oil exports flowing to China. Beyond Venezuela, China has many options for oil imports. Following U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, Brazil has already indicated that it will expand oil exports to China. 

On the other hand, opportunities for Chinese oil companies to invest in Venezuela still exist. China’s investment in Venezuela is mainly concentrated in oil and mineral extraction and manufacturing, and its stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined significantly in recent years due to U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan oil, falling from $3.5 billion in 2018 to $318 million in 2024.³ In the short term, China’s oil-related investments and debts in Venezuela face increased risks and uncertainties. However, in the medium to long term, there are still opportunities for Chinese investment in Venezuela’s oil sector. Western oil companies are relatively more sensitive to profit returns and are more likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach or withdraw from countries with poor business environments. By contrast, Chinese oil companies have gone through years of hard-earned experience overseas and possess more extensive experience operating under difficult and complex conditions, as well as stronger survival capacity and resilience. For example, in the initial bidding for oil projects after the 2003 Iraq War, U.S. companies hesitated and waited. Although some entered later, some projects performed poorly, and certain assets were transferred to Chinese oil companies. In Venezuela, Chinese companies have operated for a long time, have extensive experience in developing heavy crude, and possess clear cost and technological advantages. They are not only strong competitors for related projects in the future recovery of Venezuela’s oil production capacity, but also indispensable partners for U.S. and Western oil companies.