Translation Tag: economic cooperation
Zhou Zhiwei, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, traces the evolution of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine and examines its implications for contemporary China-Latin America relations. He argues that while the doctrine initially emphasized mutual non-interference, it has evolved into a tool of U.S. hegemony centered on security, dominance, and alliance building in the Western Hemisphere. He contends that in his second term, Trump has employed a coercive, securitized application of the doctrine, increasing pressure on Latin America and seeking to constrain China-Latin America cooperation. Despite these challenges, Zhou concludes that China-Latin America cooperation will continue to expand due to Latin America’s growing autonomy, economic complementarity with China, and the shared interests of the Global South.
This is one of five pieces published by the Journal of Latin American Studies as part of a compendium titled “The ‘New Monroe Doctrine’ and China-U.S.-Latin America Relations.” The other four pieces are also available on the Interpret: China platform.
Two researchers at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) argue that recent discussions of China-Latin America relations in U.S. academic and strategic communities have increasingly promoted negative narratives related to China. The authors claim that countering China has become “the starting point” for U.S. policymaking in Latin America, as evidenced by a flurry of official statements, legislative activities, resource reallocation, and broad-based government initiatives. They conclude China-Latin America relations face growing uncertainty due to U.S. efforts to exclude China from the region, which they say could harm the interests of the United States, China, and Latin America alike.
Xie Wenze, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), argues that a key component of President Trump’s “New Monroe Doctrine” is constraining China-Latin America economic and trade cooperation. Xie proposes an updated framework of what he calls the “two-ring strategy,” in which the United States relies on expanded control of the Western Hemisphere and dollar dominance to maintain its strategic advantage. He concludes by offering a roadmap for deepening China-Latin America ties to counteract the growing U.S. regional influence, including the periodic deployment of Chinese military ships to Latin America.
This is one of five pieces published by the Journal of Latin American Studies as part of a compendium titled “The ‘New Monroe Doctrine’ and China-U.S.-Latin America Relations.” The other four pieces are also available on the Interpret: China platform.
Song Junying, a researcher at the China Institute of International Studies, examines the evolution and resurgence of the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, arguing that U.S. policy toward Latin America has consistently been characterized by a logic of exclusionism and interventionism. Song describes six historical stages of the doctrine, from its “emerging assertiveness” in the 18th century to a “forceful return” as the “New Monroe Doctrine” under President Trump. He observes that the New Monroe Doctrine prioritizes migration enforcement, security intervention, tariff coercion, ideological division, expansionist ambitions, and suppression of China’s presence in the region. However, Song argues that the “New Monroe Doctrine” will create only limited disruptions for China-Latin America relations and that the strong driving force of China’s bilateral relationships with countries in the region will persist.
This is one of five pieces published by the Journal of Latin American Studies as part of a compendium titled “The ‘New Monroe Doctrine’ and China-U.S.-Latin America Relations.” The other four pieces are also available on the Interpret: China platform.
The CCP Politburo holds “collective study sessions” on a semi-regular basis, in which an outside academic or government expert leads a discussion on a selected topic. Such sessions can signal which issues the senior leadership considers to be important. On January 30, 2026, Xi Jinping presided over the 24th collective study session of the 20th Central Committee. Xi delivered a speech emphasizing the need to leverage China’s competitive advantages to drive breakthroughs in future industries.
Three Chinese state-affiliated researchers Jiang Zhao, Dong Chao, and Fu Jiang assess the impact of Trump 2.0 on the global economy and U.S.-China trade relations. They foresee Trump’s policies as harmful to multilateral economic cooperation, but they believe the impact on China will be limited. They also propose a slate of countermeasures for Beijing, which include further diversifying export markets and trade cooperation with emerging economies, optimizing China’s ability to attract foreign investment, accelerating RMB internationalization, and “telling China’s economic development story well” to influence global public opinion.
Yang Guoliang, a professor at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing, frames U.S. pursuit of strategic competition with China as a reemergence of Western imperialism. He suggests the relative shift in economic power away from the West in past decades, toward the rest of the world, has led Washington to characterize globalization as “out-of-control” and introduce its own set of restrictions on international commercial engagement. While reiterating the need for continued reform and opening up, he underscores the need for China to set its own limits on commercial openness — particularly in the realm of inbound foreign investment from the West — in order to safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests.
Lou Yu, a scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), traces opportunities and challenges for continued development of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and broader regional engagement in Latin America. Lou is relatively sober on prospects for bilateral ties, pointing to the geopolitical situation in Latin America (specifically, growing U.S. and European interests in the region), substantial crime rates and associated security challenges to Chinese investment, and political instability in many Latin American countries. Nevertheless, Lou suggests that political trends in the region – including a resurgence of left-leaning governments – may result in greater openness to BRI engagement going forward.
This article, penned by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Tongji University, explores how China can use the BRI to navigate U.S. trade and technology controls. Drawing on three case studies of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, the authors suggest Beijing can better insulate itself from the impact of U.S. controls through deepened economic integration with BRI partners. They also argue it will be important to ensure BRI projects benefit partners in areas from technology upgrading to human capital development, to challenge what they see as Western efforts to discredit the BRI among China’s neighboring countries.
In this lengthy article, a BRI researcher at China Development Institute, a Shenzhen-based think tank, outlines perceived challenges to the Belt and Road Initiative around its 10th anniversary. These include geopolitical risks from competition with the United States, political and financial instability within partner countries, weak economic growth, and ill-defined goals and poor marketing. The author recommends Beijing improve risk monitoring and project oversight to manage financial and economic risks, and improve the BRI’s reputation across the globe by deepening diplomatic cooperation with a wide array of countries.