“ 一带一路” 建设与中国破局美国技术遏制 ———以中国与东南亚地区合作为例
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The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Breakthrough of United States Technology Containment – Taking China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia as an Example

“ 一带一路” 建设与中国破局美国技术遏制 ———以中国与东南亚地区合作为例

This article, penned by scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Tongji University, explores how China can use the BRI to navigate U.S. trade and technology controls. Drawing on three case studies of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, the authors suggest Beijing can better insulate itself from the impact of U.S. controls through deepened economic integration with BRI partners. They also argue it will be important to ensure BRI projects benefit partners in areas from technology upgrading to human capital development, to challenge what they see as Western efforts to discredit the BRI among China’s neighboring countries.

Key takeaways
  • Authors from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argue that BRI projects are at increasing risk of becoming casualties in U.S. “containment” of China. They assess growing examples of the U.S. and other Western capitals encouraging BRI countries to exclude China from supply chains.
  • The authors argue the BRI can be a tool in breaking through broader U.S. trade and technology controls on China, drawing on several case studies in Southeast Asia (railway construction in Laos, 5G connectivity in Thailand, and industrial parks in Malaysia).
  • To better leverage the BRI to navigate U.S. controls, the authors suggest Beijing promote the adoption of 5G and other technology standards throughout the region, ensure projects involve transfers of technology or know-how that benefit host countries, invest in the education and training of local populations, and build transportation and communications infrastructure that will ensure Chinese products can be distributed widely.

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I. Introduction


Since its official proposal in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been continuously deepened both in theory and in practice. The Southeast Asia region is not only the overseas starting point for China to implement the BRI but also an important area for China to carry out economic and trade cooperation and technological exchanges with neighboring countries. It is also a region that the United States has focused on managing after its “Pivot to Asia” strategy, especially after Trump took office. With the further deepening of U.S. strategic containment of China and the continuous intensification of the trade and technology war with China, the region has become increasingly apparent as an area in which the United States intends to strategically contain China’s peaceful development.

“ 一带一路” 倡议自2013 年正式提出以来,在理论层面和实践层面不断得到深化。 东南亚地区既是中国践行“ 一带一路” 倡议的海外起点,又是中国同周边国家开展经贸合作、技术交流的重要地区,还是美国在“ 重返亚太” 之后重点经营的地区,特别是在特朗普上台之后,随着美国对华战略遏制的进一步加深以及对华贸易战、科技战的持续深入,该地区被美国打造成遏制中国和平发展 的紧箍咒的战略意图愈发明显。

Since the Obama administration, U.S. policy towards China has evolved from engagement to a parallel development of limited contact and moderate containment, and then to high-intensity containment under strategic competition, with the new competitive and cooperative relationship between China and the United States constantly adjusting and changing. After Trump entered the White House, the U.S. government explicitly identified China as its strategic competitor in the form of a national strategy and used a series of methods in economy, security, and diplomacy to strengthen strategic competition against China.1 In the field of technology, the U.S. attitude towards China has gradually shifted from a willingness to cooperate to actively initiating competitive containment. Since 2018, the administrations of the United States have launched trade protectionist actions against other countries through a series of acts. In cutting-edge technology fields, China’s three major telecommunications operators and communication service providers like Huawei and ZTE have been listed on the U.S. government’s controlled list, and the United States has banned TikTok from operating in its territory on the grounds of national security. Traditional technology fields have also been affected. For example, in the steel sector, the United States set trade barriers on a variety of steel and steel products from East Asia and Europe to protect its domestic companies. Among them, the United States conducted multiple 337 investigations, 232 investigations, and 301 investigations against Chinese steel companies and related industries to impose anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties on Chinese steel products. These actions were seen by academia at the time as key measures in U.S. trade frictions with China.

自奥巴马政府开始,美国对华政策经历了由接触向有限的接触与适度的遏制并行发展,再向战 略竞争下的高强度遏制转变的过程,中美之间的新型竞合关系也正在不断调整变化。特朗普入主白宫以后,美国政府便以国家战略的形式明确将中国归为自己的“ 战略竞争对手”,并运用经济、安全、外交等一系列方式强化对中国的战略竞争。在技术领域,美国对华的态度也逐渐由更乐于合作向主动挑起遏制性竞争转变。 2018 年以后,美国两任政府通过一系列法案开启针对其他国家的贸易保护主义行为。在前沿技术领域,中国三大通信运营商以及华为、中兴等通信服务提供商都被美国政府列入受管制清单,美国还以维护国家安全为由禁止抖音( TikTok) 在其境内运营。同样受到影响的还有传统技术领域。如在钢铁领域,美国以保护本国企业为由,对来自东亚和欧洲的多种钢铁和钢铁制成品设置贸易壁垒。其中,通过对中国钢铁企业及相关产业多次展开 337 调查、232 调查、301 调查等来对中国钢铁产品征收“ 反倾销税” 和“ 反补贴税”。 这一系列操作,在当时的学界看来是美国对华贸易摩擦的关键措施。

In bilateral competition with China, the United States, on the one hand, has set investment barriers, trade barriers, and technology exchange barriers against China, showing signs of decoupling to a certain extent. On the other hand, it has tried to cut off China’s high-tech import sources by building industry and technology alliances with other countries that exclude China. In response to United States technological containment, China, on the one hand, has vigorously developed independent innovation and supported national technology companies to quickly get rid of asymmetric dependence on the West in technology. On the other hand, it seeks consensus on technological cooperation with other developed countries, expands the intersection of interests in technological interactions, and achieves technological exchange with developed countries. Moreover, China has realized the landing of Chinese technology overseas by deepening technological exchanges with many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In this process, the BRI has provided a platform guarantee and guiding ideas for China to carry out technological cooperation with relevant countries. Although the purpose of China’s proposal of the BRI is to create more opportunities for joint development based on the principle of consultation and construction, rather than a competitive mechanism against a third party, it is undeniable that the successful practice of the BRI has a direct and realistic effect on China’s response to United States technological containment.

在双边对华竞争方面,美国一方面通过主动对华设置投资壁垒、贸易壁垒和技术交流壁垒,在 一定程度上与中国呈现出“ 脱钩” 的迹象,另一方面通过与其他国家构建排华性质的产业联盟、技术联盟,试图切断中国的高技术进口源。 面对美国的技术遏制,中国一方面大力发展自主创新、扶持民族科技企业力图尽快摆脱对美西方在技术领域的不对称依赖,另一方面寻求与其他发达国家 在技术合作层面的共识、扩大双方技术互动中的利益交汇点,进而实现与发达国家的技术互鉴。此外,中国还通过深化与亚非拉等众多非发达国家的技术交流实现中国技术在海外落地,在这一过程 中,“ 一带一路” 倡议为中国与相关国家开展技术合作提供了平台保障和指导思路。尽管中国提出“ 一带一路” 倡议的目的是本着共商共建原则,创造更多共同发展的机遇而非是针对第三方的竞争机制,但是不能否认的是,“ 一带一路” 倡议的顺利实践对于中国应对美国的技术遏制具有直接且现实的效果。

II. The Belt and Road Initiative and Responding to United States Technological Containment

二、“ 一带一路” 倡议与应对美国技术遏制

The Southeast Asia region is not only the pioneering area for the construction of the Maritime Silk Road under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also a key region for China to achieve industrial and technological transfer and to break through the strategic containment by the United States.2 The entire Asia-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, is the most active area for global economic development, with an estimated economic growth rate of 4.6% in 2023, contributing to 70% of global economic growth.3 Most ASEAN countries are in the early or middle stages of industrialization, with relatively small economies and immature basic industries, requiring the introduction of foreign capital and technology to develop their national industrial and technological systems. The region has several non-governmental organizations as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, which can provide policy and financing support for technology-advanced countries to transfer technology to technologically lagging countries within the region.

东南亚地区既是中国“ 一带一路” 倡议海上丝绸之路建设的先行地区,又是中国实现产业技术转移,突破美国战略遏制的重点地区。 当前包括东南亚在内的整个亚太地区是全球经济发展最为活跃的地区,2023 年亚太地区经济增速预计为 4.6%,对全球经济增长贡献率将高达 70%。东盟国家多数处于工业化的初期、中期阶段,大部分国家经济规模相对较小,基础工业尚未成熟,需要 引进外来资金和技术发展本国产业技术体系。该地区拥有多个非政府组织以及双边、多边合作机制,可以为技术先发国家向地区内技术落后国家进行技术转移提供政策、融资支持。

During the Obama administration, the U.S. strategy towards China was mainly focused on engagement policies. President Obama pointed out that the was not proposed to target China, and maintaining contact with China was an important pillar for implementing the policy.4 During this period, although the United States government held reservations about participating in the BRI, it did not completely adopt measures to boycott it. After Trump took office, defining China as a strategic competitor, the United States began to adopt tough measures against China in the economic and technological fields, pressing China even at the cost of a zero-sum game and creating mechanisms to counter the BRI in both government and civilian sectors, causing great damage to China-United States relations. Although Biden, Trump’s successor, publicly declared China as the most challenging competitor for the United States,5 changes in the international situation and the dynamics of interaction between China and the United States forced the Biden administration to readjust its competition strategy with China. Specifically, the Biden administration’s macro-level adjustments mainly include three aspects: first, the United States began to focus on enhancing its overall competitiveness; second, it emphasized the role of allies and multilateral mechanisms; and last, it did not exclude cooperation with China in specific areas.6

美国奥巴马政府的对华战略还是以接触政策为主,时任美国总统奥巴马也曾指出,美国的“亚太再平衡” 政策并非为针对中国而提出,而且与中国保持接触是该政策得以实施的重要支柱。这一时期,美国政府尽管对参与“ 一带一路” 倡议持保留意见,但是并没有完全采取抵制措施。特朗普上台之后,将中国定义为战略竞争对手,在经贸领域和技术领域开始对华采取强硬的措施,即使陷入“ 负和博弈” 也要对中国进行打压,对冲“ 一带一路” 倡议的机制在政府和民间层出不穷,对中美关系造成了极大的破坏。 虽然特朗普的继任者拜登公开宣称中国是当前美国最棘手的竞争者,但是国际局势、中美之间的互动态势等因素的变化,迫使拜登政府重新调整对华竞争策略。具体来看,拜登政府在宏观层面的调整主要有3 点:首先是美国开始注重提升自身整体竞争力,其次是注重发挥盟友和多边机制的作用,最后是在特殊领域不排除与中国的合作。

In December 2017, the United States government released the National Security Strategy report, introducing the strategic concept of the “Indo-Pacific region,” pointing out that the United States intends to use political, economic, and security means to diminish China’s increasing influence in the region, thereby maintaining a regional balance favorable to the United States.7 With the intensification of competition against China, the Indo-Pacific Strategy gradually became an important platform for the United States to counter the BRI at the national strategic level.8 Wei Zongyou pointed out that the root of the shift in the United States’ strategy towards China from engagement to containment lies in the United States’ anxiety about its status as the leader of the international system, with concerns about China challenging the United States’ technological advantage being one source of this anxiety.9 Although Trump and Biden belong to the Republican and Democratic parties, respectively, and their strategies on some domestic and foreign policy aspects are not the same or even opposite, the directional strategic level of balancing China and conducting multi-dimensional competition against China has not changed with the change of ruling parties in the United States but has intensified. These strategies against China, although deployed in different fields, echo each other, continuously completing the United States’ strategic competition map against China. Their overall, cross-domain, and interconnected nature is concentrated in countering the BRI. Among them, the Indo-Pacific Strategy is the main means for the United States to counter and hedge against the BRI, with the Southeast Asia region being an important geopolitical direction to implement this goal.10

美国政府于 2017 年 12 月发布《国家安全战略报告》,首提关于“ 印太地区” 的战略构想,指出美国要凭借政治、经济、安全等方式来消弭中国在该地区与日俱增的影响力,从而维护对美国有利 的地区平衡状态。随着美国对华竞争态势的不断加剧,“ 印太战略” 也逐渐成为美国在国家战略层面对抗“ 一带一路” 倡议的重要平台。对此,韦宗友指出美国政府对华战略由接触向遏制调整的根源,在于美国对自己国际体系领导国身份的焦虑,对于中国挑战美国科技优势可能性的担忧是 这种焦虑的一项来源。尽管特朗普和拜登分属美国共和与民主两党,在一些内政外交层面的策略并不相同甚至截然相反,但是制衡中国、对华开展多维度竞争等方向性战略层面,并没有受到美 国国内执政党更迭而出现改变,反而愈演愈烈。 这些对华战略尽管布局在不同领域,但是相互呼应、不断完整美国对华战略竞争的版图,其总体性、跨域性和联动性集中体现在对“ 一带一路” 倡议的制衡当中。其中,“ 印太战略” 是美国反制和对冲“ 一带一路” 倡议的主要抓手,而东南亚地区是实施这一目标的重要地缘方向。

In the specific implementation process by the United States, it mainly presents as a “three-legged support for one cauldron” form. “One cauldron” refers to the Biden administration using multilateral mechanisms as the main unit to balance China, utilizing existing or newly established multilateral mechanisms to align the United States and its allies in technological containment against China. For example, existing international mechanisms led by the United States, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue summit of leaders from the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and the G7 summit. On March 12, 2021, the leaders of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India held a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue summit, declaring their intention to strengthen cooperation in response to COVID-19, climate change, cybersecurity, critical technologies, high-quality infrastructure investment, humanitarian aid, and disaster reduction. The so-called “three legs” are the three main aspects through which the Biden administration balances China at the technological level, which are also multilateral mechanisms and the three pillars on which this “cauldron” stands. In the process of technologically balancing China, the Trump administration focused on digital technology connectivity and cyberspace security, energy cooperation, and infrastructure construction. 11 The Biden administration has continued the previous administration’s competitive stance in the infrastructure field and used new energy technologies as a means to improve its competitiveness, making semiconductor technology a “trump card” to contain China’s development in information communication and related industrial fields.

在美国具体实施过程中主要呈现为“ 三足支撑一鼎” 的形式。“ 一鼎” 是指拜登政府以多边机制为制衡中国的主体单位,借助现有或新建多边机制实现美国与其盟友在对华技术遏制上步调一 致。 例如,现有的美日澳印四国领导人峰会、七国集团领导人峰会等美国主导的国际机制。 2021 年3 月12 日,美日澳印四国举行“ 四方安全对话” 领导人峰会,会议联合宣言表示要在应对新冠疫情、气候变化、网络安全、关键技术、高质量基础设施投资、人道主义救援和减灾等方面强化合作。所谓“ 三足”,则是拜登政府在技术层面制衡中国的3 个主要方面,它们也是多边机制,是这只“ 鼎” 可以立足的3 个支柱。在对中国开展技术制衡的过程中,特朗普政府将针对的重点放在了数字技术联通和网络空间安全、能源合作以及基础设施建设等 3 个方面。拜登政府沿袭了上届政府在基建领域的竞争态势,并且将新能源技术作为提高自身竞争力的抓手,将芯片技术作为遏制中国在 信息通信及相关工业领域发展的“ 撒手锏”。

Due to the relatively wide range of technologies involved in infrastructure and the relatively low technical barriers, coupled with it being a key area for China to implement the BRI in practice with participating countries, it naturally becomes a focal area for the United States to target China. The main mechanisms the United States uses to compete with China in the infrastructure sector include the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Blue Dot Network plan, the Build Back Better World initiative, and the new Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership plan. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a foreign aid agency established by the United States in 2004, aimed at providing time-bound loans to some developing countries to promote economic growth and reduce poverty. These investments are not only intended to help the target countries achieve prosperity and stability but also to enhance the national interests of the United States. In the infrastructure sector, the Millennium Challenge Corporation mainly involves agriculture, energy and power, and transportation infrastructure.12 In April 2021, during a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, President Biden proposed a new global infrastructure investment plan led by what he referred to as “democratic countries,” intended to counter China’s BRI. 13 In June of the same year, the G7 launched the “Build Back Better World” partnership plan, aimed at meeting the infrastructure investment needs of developing economies. A month later, the U.S. government again utilized the platform of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), explicitly stating during an informal meeting that Washington would deeply participate in the economic activities of the Indo-Pacific region through the “Build Back Better World” plan, providing high-standard infrastructure construction projects that meet climate change requirements and transparent financing standards.14 The Biden administration proposed this plan based on both domestic policy and international strategic needs, with countering the BRI as the direct reason and primary goal for proposing the plan.15 The Build Back Better World plan is seen as the first real strategic measure proposed by the U.S. government to counter the BRI,16 but the implementation process of the plan has not been smooth. To reverse this situation and further achieve strategic containment of China, the Biden administration formally launched the Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership plan at the G7 summit in June 2022, also planning in four priority pillar industries including infrastructure adapted to climate change, transition energy technology, and the development of a complete lifecycle of clean energy supply chains, as well as secure information and communication technology networks and infrastructure.17

由于基建领域所包含的技术范围相对广泛、技术门槛相对较低,同时又是中国在推动“一带一路” 倡议向沿线国家实践中重点落地的领域,因此理所当然成为美国针对中国的重点领域。 美国在基础设施领域开展对华技术竞争的主要机制有“ 千禧年挑战公司”、“ 蓝点网络” 计划、“ 重建更美好世界” 计划以及“ 全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系” 的新基建计划。“ 千禧年挑战公司” 是美国在2004 年成立的一个对外援助机构,旨在为一些发展中国家提供有时限要求的贷款,用以促进经济增长、减少贫困等。 这些投资不但要促进目标国家实现繁荣和稳定,而且还要增进美国的国家利益。在基建领域,“ 千禧年挑战公司” 主要涉及农业、能源和电力、交通基础设施等领域。2021 年4月,拜登在会见日本首相菅义伟时提议由所谓的“ 民主国家” 带头落实一个新的全球基础设施投资建设方案,该方案旨在对标中国提出的“ 一带一路” 倡议。 同年 6 月,七国集团推出“ 重建更美好世界” 伙伴关系计划,该计划旨在满足发展中经济体对基础设施领域的投资需求。 一个月后,美国政府再次借助亚太经合组织这一平台,在非正式会议期间明确表示华盛顿将通过“重建更美好世界” 计划,深度参与印太地区的经济活动,为亚太经合组织提供高标准、符合气候变化要求且满足透明融资标准的基础设施建设项目。 拜登政府提出该计划是基于美国国内政策和国际战略双重需求,而对冲“ 一带一路” 倡议是美国提出该计划的直接原因和首要目标。“ 重建更美好世界” 计划被视为美国政府首次真正提出的应对“ 一带一路” 倡议的战略手段,但该计划的推行进程并不顺利。 为了扭转这一局面以及进一步实现对华战略遏制,拜登政府于2022 年6 月正式在七国集团峰会上启动了“ 全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系” 计划,同时在包括适应气候变化的基础设施、转型能源技术和开发完整贯通生命周期的清洁能源供应链、安全的信息和通信技术网络和基础设施 等在内的四项优先支柱产业领域进行布局。

The clean energy sector is one area the Biden administration is focusing on to boost U.S. global technological leadership, combined with China’s strong competitive edge in the new energy domain. Therefore, the U.S. is taking multiple measures to strengthen this effort: domestically, the Biden administration has concentrated on new energy vehicles and clean energy power generation projects, rolling out policies to encourage the localization of electric vehicle production, and in response to the weak state of new energy battery development, enacted policies and regulations such as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the National Lithium Battery Development Blueprint (2021-2030), building a new energy battery industry chain and supply chain led by the United States.18 Internationally, the United States is leveraging existing international mechanisms, focusing on climate issues to forge alliances in the clean energy sector. Particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States is cooperating with countries like Japan, which have advantages in new energy technology, aiming to establish solid cooperation relationships in supply chains and technical standards.

清洁能源领域是拜登政府为了提振美国的全球技术领导力而重点扶植的技术领域之一,加之 中国在新能源领域对美国具备较强的竞争优势,因而,美国多措并举,不断加以强化:在国内层面, 拜登政府聚焦于新能源汽车和清洁能源发电项目,接连出台政策措施鼓励电动汽车生产本地化,同 时针对新能源电池开发领域薄弱的现状,出台了《基础设施投资和就业法》《国家锂电池发展蓝图(2021—2030)》等政策法规,构建由美国主导的新能源电池产业链和供应链。在国际层面,美国借助现有国际机制,以气候问题作为关切点,打造清洁能源领域的技术联盟。 尤其在亚太地区,美国在研发端与日本等新能源技术优势国家开展合作,力图在供应链、技术标准等层面建立稳固的合 作关系。

Solar and wind energy are two key technologies for clean energy development under the Biden administration.19 The United States has introduced legislation to increase investment in clean energy technology research and development and provided tax and financing incentives to encourage domestic companies to develop related technologies. In the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. government is actively building alliances with an anti-China stance through multilateral mechanisms20 and providing policy support to enhance the involvement of Southeast Asian countries in related industries.

太阳能和风能是拜登政府发展清洁能源的两项重点技术。美国先后出台法案,通过增加清洁能源技术研发投入、为相关企业在税收和融资方面提供优惠政策等措施,鼓励本土企业进行相关 技术研发。 在亚太地区,美国政府一方面着力发挥多边机制构建排华性的同盟,另一方面为提高东南亚国家在相关产业关联度提供政策支持。

The semiconductor sector, centered around chip technology, is an area where the United States currently has a technological lead and industrial dominance over China, and it is also one of the sectors where China must directly face U.S. technological blockades. Despite the semiconductor industry’s origins in the U.S., the country is currently facing disadvantages such as a shortage of technological outputs, a relative lack of skilled professionals, and a scarcity of cutting-edge process technologies.21 These issues are exacerbated by mutually beneficial U.S.-China trade actions and China’s accelerated technological catch-up, preventing the United States from fully decoupling from China in the semiconductor field.22 To ensure U.S. leadership in the semiconductor industry and further strategic containment of China, the United States has launched a combination of domestic policy guidance and international mechanisms. Domestically, the United States has introduced policies like the CHIPS and Science Act, increasing investment in and support for the semiconductor industry and enhancing professional talent development; it also encourages foreign advanced manufacturers to start operations in the United States and even persuades companies to relocate their core production departments to the United States. Bilaterally, the United States has intensified semiconductor technology export controls to China under the guise of “security reviews.” Multilaterally, the United States is striving to create anti-China industry alliances, such as the Chip 4 Semiconductor Alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, aiming to exclude China from the East Asian semiconductor production chain.

以芯片技术为核心的半导体领域是目前美国在对华技术遏制中拥有技术领先优势和产业主导 优势的领域,也是中国必须直面美国技术封锁的领域之一。尽管半导体产业发轫于美国,但现阶段美国自身也出现了技术成果产能短缺、专业人才相对不足、尖端制程技术匮乏等不利局面,同时 受到中美在半导体领域贸易互利行为以及中国技术追赶加速等现实因素影响,美国未能在半导体 领域实现对华完全“ 脱钩”。为了确保美国在半导体产业的领导地位以及进一步实现对华的战略遏制,美国打出了国内政策引导与国际机制联合的组合拳。 在国内层面,美国出台《芯片与科学法案》等政策法规,加大对半导体行业的投资与扶持力度、强化专业人才梯队培养;同时鼓励海外先 进制造商来美开工设厂,甚至鼓动有关企业将核心产能部门整体搬迁到美国。在双边层面,美国进一步以“ 安全审查” 为由,强化对华半导体技术出口管制。在多边层面,美国着力打造产业反华联盟,如在亚太地区拜登政府不顾地区合作现实,推动美国、日本、韩国和中国台湾地区组建“ 芯片四方联盟”,从而实现将中国排除出东亚半导体产业链的目的。

Historical experience shows that the key factor determining a country’s position in the international system lies in its ability to attract regional and global capital and to manipulate it according to its own interests and will.23 Currently, China and the United States are respectively the world’s most important trading and financial nations. The essence of China-U.S. technological competition in third countries is to leverage their own technological advantages to capture larger potential markets and achieve greater industrial leadership. Existing research on the BRI has mostly focused on showcasing achievements and U.S. response policies. This paper attempts to explore how China can respond to U.S. technological competition from a current policy and academic focus. It specifically discusses the technological competition between China and the United States in Southeast Asia, examining how China can use the BRI to actively confront the U.S. tech war and trade war.

历史经验表明,决定一国在国际体系地位的关键因素,还在于汲取地区和全球资本并可以按照 自己利益和意愿对其操控的能力,而中美两国目前分别是世界最主要的贸易国家和金融国家。 当前中美在第三方开展技术竞争的根本在于利用自己优势技术获取更大的潜在市场和获得更大的 产业主导地位。现有对于“ 一带一路” 的研究多集中于“ 成果展示”、美国应对政策等方面,本文试图从现阶段政策界与学术界重点关注的领域———中国如何应对美国的技术竞争为出发点,重点讨论中美在东南亚地区的技术竞争中,考察中国如何借助“ 一带一路” 平台、发挥自身能动作用,应对美国对华开展的“ 科技战” 和“ 贸易战”。

“Five Connectivities” is a key focus of the BRI, encompassing transportation, energy, and telecommunications. In transportation, infrastructure technology is exported and integrated to upgrade missing or bottleneck sections, enhancing intra-regional and inter-regional road capacity. In energy, it involves promoting regional power grid upgrades and transnational energy pipeline construction. In telecommunications, the focus is on building communication networks to ensure the smooth flow of the “Information Silk Road.” In trade facilitation, efforts are made to eliminate investment and trade barriers, promoting technological industry cooperation and the circulation of technological achievements, while also encouraging domestic enterprises to participate in infrastructure projects and industrial investments in countries along the Belt and Road. In terms of people-to-people connectivity, training and technological exchanges provide manpower support for the localization of Chinese technology in these countries, with the establishment of technology transfer centers and joint laboratories to jointly tackle technological challenges. By fostering “facility connectivity,” “trade connectivity,” and “people-to-people connectivity,” efforts are made to promote the “hard connectivity” of infrastructure such as rail transport within and among Southeast Asian countries, “soft interoperability” of rules and standards, and “chain connectivity” of industrial structures.

“ 五通” 是“ 一带一路” 倡议的合作重点。 其中,设施联通主要包括交通、能源和通信 3 个方面。在交通方面,通过基建技术的输出和对接,对缺失路段和瓶颈路段进行完善升级,提升地区内、地区 间道路的通行能力;在能源方面,一方面推动区域电网升级合作,另一方面推动跨国的能源管网建 设;在通信方面,主要是通过建设通信网络实现信息丝绸之路的畅通。在贸易畅通中,一方面主要通过消除投资和贸易壁垒等手段,实现双方技术产业合作、推动双方技术成果流通;另一方面鼓励 本国企业参与“ 一带一路” 沿线国家基建工程和产业投资。 在民心相通方面,通过技术人员培训与技术交流,为中国技术在沿线国家落地提供人力资源支撑,通过与相关国家建立技术转移中心、联 合实验室等方式开展技术联合攻关,同时为中国技术在沿线国家本地化发展提供孵化基地。通过开展“ 设施联通”“ 贸易畅通” 和“ 民心相通”,促进中国与东南亚国家、东南亚国家内部轨道交通等基础设施的“ 硬联通”、规则标准的“ 软互通” 以及产业结构的“ 链贯通”。

(i) Infrastructure Technology Hard Connectivity

( 一) 基建技术硬联通

Infrastructure construction is characterized by being both technology-intensive and rule-intensive. For Southeast Asian countries, infrastructure development is not only a crucial path to national development and modernization but also an inevitable journey towards narrowing the development gap between countries and achieving regional integration.24 Currently, there is a huge demand for infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia.25 For external powers, the ability to extend their own infrastructure technology overseas is an important measure of projecting their geopolitical influence and geo-economic impact outward. For China, promoting infrastructure construction in Southeast Asia can enhance strategic alignment and strengthen bilateral political interactions with ASEAN countries.26 Compared to China, the United States does not have an absolute technological advantage and financing advantage in the field of infrastructure technology, including rail transport. Therefore, it mainly restricts China’s expansion in the ASEAN overseas infrastructure market by uniting its allies across various levels, including official governments, private enterprises, and international organizations, to promote mechanisms involving investment and financing, technological cooperation, and standard certification.

基础设施建设具有技术密集型和规则密集型的双重特点。基础设施建设对于东南亚国家而言,既是它们实现国家发展、实现现代化的重要途径,也是缩小国家间发展差距、实现区域一体化的 必然历程。 当前,东南亚国家对基建投资需求巨大。 对于域外强国而言,能否推动自身基建技术在海外落地,是其将自身地缘政治影响力、地缘经济影响力向外投射的重要衡量指标。对于中国而言,在东南亚推动基础设施建设,可以促进中国与东盟国家在战略层面的接轨,强化双边的政治 互动程度。 与中国相比,美国在包括轨道交通在内的基建技术领域并不具备绝对技术优势和融资优势,因此它主要通过联合其盟友在官方政府、私营企业和国际组织等多个层面,推动涉及投融 资、技术合作以及标准认证等机制,限制中国扩展东盟海外基建市场。

The Southeast Asia region is an essential part of the Pan-Asian Railway Network, where conventional and high-speed rail technologies become crucial for China to counter U.S. competition in infrastructure technology in the region. The United States does not have a technological advantage in high-speed rail and lacks the geographical advantage of being connected to the Indochina Peninsula, as China does. Therefore, the United States mainly adopts the following strategies to limit Chinese high-speed rail technology from entering the Southeast Asian market: First, it dilutes China’s market share in Southeast Asian high-speed rail technology through allies possessing high-speed rail technology, such as Japan, South Korea, and the European Union economies, which have competitiveness in the high-speed rail technology field. These countries entering the Southeast Asian market compete with China, slowing China’s expansion in the overseas market and hindering the process of land connectivity between China and Southeast Asian countries. Second, it proposes “infrastructure plans” to counter China’s BRI. Through plans like the Blue Dot Network and Build Back Better World, it sets thresholds for global infrastructure construction, excluding Chinese infrastructure technology from its so-called “technology standards system.”

东南亚地区是泛亚铁路网的重要组成部分,普铁和高铁技术成为中国在该地区应对美国在基 建技术领域竞争的重要抓手。美国并不具备高铁技术优势,同时也没有中国与中南半岛山水相连的地理优势,因此美国在限制中国高铁技术进入东南亚市场时主要采取如下方案:第一,借助拥有 高铁技术的盟友国家,稀释中国高铁技术的东南亚市场份额。 日本、韩国、欧盟经济体在高铁技术领域具有竞争力,上述国家进入东南亚市场与中国构成竞争关系,既可以延缓中国高铁技术在海外 市场的扩张势头,也阻碍了中国与东南亚国家路上联通的进程。第二,提出“ 基建计划” 对抗中国的“ 一带一路” 倡议。通过“ 蓝点网络”“ 重建更美好世界” 计划等,为全球基础设施建设设立门槛, 将中国的基建技术排除出其所谓的“ 技术标准体系” 之外。

In the process of implementing the BRI in Southeast Asia, China combines the actual infrastructure needs of the countries along the route with its technological advantages to promote development in the region. For countries with certain railway technology capabilities, able to undertake high-speed rail construction, and in need of high-speed rail to stimulate domestic circulation, China exports its high-speed rail technology with outbound aspirations to related countries only after multiple on-site inspections and rounds of professional demonstrations. For countries with relatively backward domestic railway technology, a clear lack of professional technical personnel, and an inability to afford the high costs of high-speed rail construction, China prioritizes the deployment of conventional railway technology to these countries, aiming first to achieve internal road connectivity and connectivity with neighboring countries. By building conventional railways, China gradually improves the technical ladder of domestic railway operations in these countries. The Indochina Peninsula region as a whole has huge potential for clean energy development. Therefore, China not only constructs cross-border power grids to supply electricity to countries in the region but also exports its advantageous thermal power, hydropower generation technology, and other clean energy technologies to countries in the region in phases.27 For countries with significant locational advantages and relatively advanced communication technology in the ASEAN region, China also meets the regional digital development needs and collaborates with related countries to build communication infrastructure such as the ASEAN Digital Center.

中国在推动“ 一带一路” 倡议在东南亚地区落地的过程中,将沿线国家的切实基建需求和自身技术优势有机结合起来,推动本地区国家的发展。对于具备一定铁路技术、有能力承担高铁建设并且需要高铁策动国内流通的国家,中国在经过多次实地考察、多轮专业论证之后,才会将自身有出 海诉求的高铁技术出口至相关国家;对于国内铁路技术相对落后,专业技术人才明显匮乏并且无力 承担高昂的高铁建设费用的国家,中国优先考虑将普速铁路技术投放到相关国家,优先实现这些国 家内部的道路畅通和与邻国的道路连通。通过修建普铁,逐步完善其国内铁路运营的技术梯队。中南半岛地区整体而言拥有巨大的清洁能源开发潜力,因此中国不仅通过构建跨境电网向地区内 国家输送电力,而且还分阶段将具有优势的火电、水电发电技术以及其他清洁能源技术出口至地区 内国家。 对于区位优势较为明显且通信技术在东盟地区相对领先的国家,中国同样迎合地区数字化发展需要与相关国家共同建设东盟数字中心等通信基础设施。

Through the construction of rail transport, energy networks, and communication facilities, China effectively resolves the U.S. technological containment in the infrastructure market in neighboring regions, allowing mature Chinese technologies to be orderly transferred to surrounding areas. At the same time, by using infrastructure construction as a carrier, it realizes the gradual implementation of relevant technical standards in the neighboring market countries, achieving a synergistic effect for the diffusion of related technologies.

通过轨道交通、能源网络、通信设施的建设,中国有效化解了美国在周边地区对华在基建市场 的技术遏制,使得中国成熟的技术有序向周边地区转移,同时以基础设施建设为载体,实现了相关 技术标准逐步落地于周边市场国家,为相关技术扩散实现了协同效应。

(ii) Soft Connectivity through Rules and Standards

( 二) 规则标准软互通

“Standards and rules” encompass two meanings. The first layer involves the trade rules for the exchange of technological achievements between countries. By establishing trade rules and mechanisms, China and Southeast Asian countries facilitate trade related to technology itself, technological equipment, and technological achievements. Countries that are latecomers to technology typically have two paths to technological advancement: independent research and innovation of technology or importing technology from more technologically advanced countries. The distribution of technological development levels in the international system features a “core-periphery” pattern. For most Southeast Asian countries, which are on the periphery of global technology distribution, the effectiveness of introducing, digesting, and absorbing technology from closer to the core is higher than completely independent development. The second layer encompasses the technical standards for technology cooperation and the industry standards in industrial docking. For an industry chain, technical standards are at the apex of the product chain pyramid.28 Unifying technical standards not only significantly reduces the communication costs of technological exchange between countries but also lowers the cost of adopting imported technology and technological products.

“ 标准规则” 通常包含两层含义。第一层国家间技术成果交流的经贸规则,通过建立经贸规则和机制,助力中国与东南亚国家开展技术本体、技术设备、技术成果等相关贸易。 技术后发国家实现技术进步的道路通常有两条,一条是自主研发创新技术,另一条是通过技术进口,向技术先发国 家引进先进的技术。技术发展程度在国际体系中呈现出“ 中心—外围” 分布的特点。对于处在全球技术分布外围的多数东南亚国家而言,引进、消化、吸收靠近中心的技术的成效要高于自己完全 独立研发。第二层是技术合作的技术标准以及产业对接中的产业标准,对于产业链而言,技术标准是产业链金字塔的最顶端所在。 通过统一技术标准,不仅可以显著降低国家间技术交流的沟通成本,还可以降低引进技术、技术产品的使用成本。

As an effective way to enhance the level of interconnectedness, deploying China’s mature technical standards and technological achievements to countries along the Belt and Road can bring about three effects: first, enhancing the influence of Chinese enterprises in neighboring countries. Technological products serve as a bridge between the exporting and receiving countries of technology, and the recognition of Chinese technological products by related countries can elevate to recognition of Chinese enterprises. Chinese enterprises going abroad also serve as a calling card for China’s overseas image. Thus, at the micro-level, recognition of Chinese technological products can spill over to the meso-level recognition of Chinese enterprises, further elevating to a high degree of recognition of the Chinese image and Chinese story. Second, promoting the alignment of Chinese technology with other technologies. The development levels of countries along the Belt and Road vary, and the same technology or technological product may have multiple technical standards. Technology-receiving countries, considering equipment and labor costs, are unwilling or prefer to dock different technical standards at a lower cost. Achieving the docking of China’s leading technical standards with the receiving country’s existing technology can enhance the compatibility between China and other standard systems, aiding in the synchronized progress of Chinese technology with countries along the Belt and Road.29 Third, the interoperability of technical standards can also improve the dilemma of Chinese technology exports, reducing the integration difficulty with the existing technology of countries along the route and achieving the expansion of industrial space and the improvement of project quality.30

作为提升互联互通水平的有效方式,将中国成熟的技术标准、技术成果布局到“ 一带一路” 沿线国家,可以带来如下3 个效果:第一,提升中国企业在周边国家的影响力,技术产品是联结技术输出国和技术接受国之间的桥梁,相关国家对中国技术产品的认可可以上升到对中国企业的认可;中 国出海企业也是中国海外形象的一张名片,因此在微观层面认可中国技术产品可以外溢到中观层 面认可中国企业,从而进一步升华到对“ 中国形象” “ 中国故事” 的高度认可。第二,推动中国技术与其他技术接轨。“ 一带一路” 沿线国家发展程度不尽相同,同一类技术、同一种技术产品会存在多种技术标准。技术接受国出于设备及人力成本的考虑,不愿意或者更愿意以较小的代价实现不同技术标准之间的对接,能够实现中国先行优势技术标准与接受国现有技术对接,可以提升中国与 其他标准体系之间的兼容性,助力中国技术与“ 一带一路” 沿线国家技术协同进步。第三,技术标准的互通,也会改善中国技术输出的困境,降低与沿线国家现有技术的集成难度,实现产业空间的 扩展、工程质量的提升。

The United States also adopts containment strategies against China in terms of technical standards, broadly following the main competitive logic of standard development at different stages. In the development phase of technical standards, it mainly suppresses competitors by controlling the right to set standards. In the application phase of technical standards, it mainly consolidates its leadership position by squeezing the market of competitors.31 China, using “rules and standards” as a carrier, has successfully aligned with neighboring countries in technology, stabilizing its technology market at the application level, thus breaking through the containment by the United States from the design and development to application practice stages.

美国在技术标准层面同样对华采取遏制策略,这种遏制大体上遵循了标准发展不同阶段的主 要竞争逻辑。在技术标准的研发阶段,主要通过掌握标准制定的主导权,实现对竞争对手的打压; 在技术标准的应用阶段,主要通过压缩竞争对手的市场,进而确立自身的领导地位。中国以“ 规则标准” 作为载体,成功与周边国家实现技术接轨,在应用层面稳定住了自身技术市场,从而在设计研发到应用实践两个阶段实现了对美国遏制的突围。

(iii) Interconnectivity of Industrial Technology Chains

( 三) 产业技术链贯通

The Asia-Pacific region has already formed a relatively mature and clear industrial division of labor system. Due to differences in technological levels, the distribution of industries also shows regional characteristics. At the mid-to-high technology level, the entire industry chain includes upstream high-tech intensive precision components from Japan and South Korea and knowledge-intensive business services from the United States, midstream medium technology components and services, and downstream labor-intensive processing and assembly in Southeast Asian countries, with the final products flowing back to the United States, China, and other regions. In the low-technology field, the entire industry chain includes upstream high-tech intensive precision components from Japan and South Korea, mid-to-downstream labor-intensive processing and assembly in Southeast Asian countries and China, with the final products sold to the United States, China, and other regions.32 Currently, China faces two main challenges: one is at the upstream knowledge-intensive services and technology-intensive product level, facing various “chokepoint” strategies implemented by the United States and its allies; the other is the “blockage” situation faced after the downstream production phase when exporting to the Western markets of the United States and others. The key to solving the “chokepoint” problem lies in achieving breakthroughs in independent technology, and the sources of technological innovation, besides importing from technologically advanced countries, include independent innovation and technology transfer followed by the return of technology.

当前亚太地区已经形成了相对成熟且明晰的产业分工体系,并且由于技术水平的差异化,产业 分布也呈现出地域化特征。在中高技术层面,整个产业链包括上游的日韩高技术密集型精密零部件和美国知识密集型商业服务、中游的中等技术零部件和服务以及下游的东南亚国家劳动密集型 加工装配,最后生产的产品再回流到美国、中国及其他地区。 在低技术领域,整个产业链包括上游的日韩高技术密集型精密零部件、中下游的东南亚国家和中国的劳动密集型加工装配,最后生产的 产品则会销往美国、中国以及其他地区。 当前,中国所面临的问题主要体现在两个方面:一是在上游知识密集型服务和技术密集型产品层面,面临被美国及其盟友所实施的各种“ 卡脖子” 策略; 二是在下游生产环节之后,存在出口到美西方市场时所面临的“ 堵门子” 现状。 解决“ 卡脖子” 问题的根本在于实现自主技术的突破,而技术创新的来源,除了从技术先发国家进口,还有自主创新和 技术转移后的技术回流。

By establishing industrial parks in Southeast Asian countries, China has achieved the incremental transfer of its existing mature technologies to the Southeast Asian region. For industrial technology, China, by establishing industrial parks, transfers production technologies that are currently in the mid-to-downstream position of the industrial chain to Southeast Asian countries, solving local primary product needs on the one hand, and breaking the export restrictions imposed by the West on related Chinese technologies on the other, providing growth space and funding sources for technological advancement. Through establishing joint laboratories, China disseminates its advantageous scientific and technological advancements to less developed countries in Southeast Asia. On one hand, this allows science and technology to find broader application spaces, and on the other hand, through technological cooperation, ensures China’s dominant position in the development of related technologies, while technology return also promotes further enhancement of China’s domestic technology. By achieving industrial docking with neighboring countries, it counters the United States’ attempt to create a “China-excluding product value chain” and perfects the “China-neighboring industrial system.”

通过在东南亚国家建立产业园,实现了中国现有成熟技术向东南亚地区的梯度转移,对于产业 技术而言,中国通过建立产业园,将现阶段居于产业链中下游位置的生产技术转移到东南亚国家,一方面就地解决了当地的初级产品需求,另一方面打破了美西方对中国相关技术的出口限制,为技 术进步提供了成长空间和资金来源;通过建立联合实验室,将中国优势的科学技术向东南亚非发达 国家扩散,一方面使科学技术得到更广阔的落地空间,另一方面通过技术合作使中国在相关技术发 展中占据上层主导地位,此外技术回流同样可以促进中国本土技术的进一步提升。 通过与周边国家实现产业对接,既对冲了美国试图打造“ 排华产业价值链” 的策略,又完善了“ 中国—周边产业体系” 。

The Chinese government and enterprises, leveraging the platform of the Belt and Road Initiative, have gradually established “hard connectivity of infrastructure,” “soft interoperability of rules and standards,” and “chain connectivity of industrial structure.” This has also led to the enhancement of political relations between China and Southeast Asian countries, optimization of the convenience of business and trade between China and ASEAN, and increased coupling of industrial relations between China and its neighbors, thus mitigating the U.S. technological containment of China at the levels of technological achievement markets and industrial technology leadership.

中国政府和企业借助“ 一带一路” 倡议平台,逐步建立起“ 基础设施的硬联通” “ 规则标准的软互通” 和“ 产业结构的链贯通”,由此也带来中国与东南亚国家政治关系亲密度的提升、中国与东盟商业贸易便利度的优化、中国—周边产业关系耦合度的提高,从而在技术成果市场、产业技术主导 地位等层面缓解美国对华的技术遏制。

Figure 1    Schematic Diagram of China Breaking Through American Technological Containment in Southeast Asia through the BRI

图 1 中国通过“ 一带一路” 倡议破解美国在东南亚对华技术遏制示意图

Source: Compiled by the author

III. The Belt and Road Initiative and Responding to U.S. Technological Competition in Southeast Asia

三、“ 一带一路” 与回应美国在东南亚地区对华技术竞争

As the analysis above shows, the current U.S. government’s implementation of technological containment against China involves direct technological blockades at the bilateral level and technological competition and isolation at the third-party level, with the latter being the main method of containment China faces in Southeast Asia. Although China occupies a central position in the East Asian industrial value chain, it is not entirely at the technological upstream end and the final market end. In this context, how has China managed to break through the United States’ technological containment in the Asia-Pacific region using the Belt and Road platform? This paper selects three cases where China promotes railway and other infrastructure technologies in Laos, aligns with Southeast Asian countries on 5G technology, and builds industrial parks in Malaysia to discuss the points above. These three cases were chosen based on the following four reasons: First, the cases are typical, as the “hard connectivity,” “soft interoperability,” and “chain connectivity” in implementation are interconnected rather than existing independently. The cases selected emphasize the aspect of “connectivity”; Second, the countries chosen for the three cases currently have relatively mature BRI projects on the ground; Third, in terms of selecting countries that rely on breaking through U.S. technological containment, the chosen countries are also representative. Malaysia has a long-term and relatively close cooperation relationship with the U.S. in military and economic fields, Laos is a country in Southeast Asia that has established a comprehensive strategic partnership with China, and Thailand is a country that has successfully managed its relations with China and the U.S.; Fourth, in terms of development level, the selected cases include countries with relatively high levels of modernization in the region, as well as countries with lower levels of development. Such selection demonstrates the broad cooperation space of China’s Belt and Road Initiative for countries along the route with different national conditions.

从上述分析可以看出,美国政府现阶段推行的对华技术遏制,一是在双边层面实施直接技术封 锁,二是在第三方开展技术竞争与技术隔离,中国在东南亚面临的主要遏制手段为后者。虽然中国在东亚产业价值链中居于中心地位,但是并没有完全位于技术上游端和最终市场端。在这种情况下,中国是如何凭借“ 一带一路” 这一平台实现对美国在亚太地区对华技术遏制的突围呢?本文选取中国在老挝推动铁路等基建技术、与东南亚国家实现 5G 技术接轨、在马来西亚构建产业园 3 个案例,对以上观点展开论述。 选择这3 个案例主要基于以下 4 个原因:一是案例具有典型性,本文的“ 硬联通”“ 软互通” 和“ 链贯通” 在实施过程中是彼此关联而非独立存在的,文章选取的案例尽量突出“ 相通” 的层面;二是3 个案例所选取的国家目前都有相对成熟的“ 一带一路” 落地项目;三是就选择突破美国技术遏制所重点依托的国家而言,选取的国家也具有代表性。马来西亚是与美国在军事、经济等领域具有长期且较为紧密合作关系的国家,老挝则是东南亚地区与中国建立全面 战略伙伴关系的国家,泰国则是成功处理对华、对美关系的国家;四是就发展程度而言,文章选取的既有现代化程度在地区内相对较高的国家,也有发展水平较为落后的国家。如此选取,可以充分说明中国“ 一带一路” 倡议对沿线不同国情的国家而言都具有广阔的合作空间。

(i) China-Laos Infrastructure Cooperation: From “Hard Connectivity” and “Chain Connectivity” to Comprehensive Deepening of Cooperation

( 一) 中老基建技术合作:由“ 硬联通”“ 链贯通” 到全面深化合作

Southeast Asia, with its vast territory and numerous countries, exhibits significant disparities in development levels among its nations. Except for Singapore, the rest of the countries in Southeast Asia are developing countries, with Laos, Myanmar, and others still in the process of escaping the “Least Developed Countries” status.33 The proposal and implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative have effectively improved the situation of infrastructure scarcity in developing countries in Southeast Asia. However, the United States views this change through a confrontational lens. Therefore, influenced by both the regional development needs and intensified great power political competition, Southeast Asia has gradually become a focal area of great power infrastructure competition, presenting a complex situation of major technological competition and small country technology dependency.

东南亚地域广阔、国家众多,其域内各国发展水平差距较大。 除新加坡外,东南亚其他国家均属于发展中国家,老挝、缅甸等国尚在摆脱“ 最不发达国家” 状态的进程中。“ 一带一路” 倡议的提出和实践,有效改善了东南亚发展中国家基础设施匮乏的现状。但美国却以对抗性的视角看待这一变化。因此,受地区现实发展需要与大国政治竞争加剧的双重影响,东南亚地区逐渐成为大国基建竞争所关注的重点区域,呈现大国技术竞争与小国技术依赖并存的复杂局面。

Infrastructure construction is fundamental to national economic development and an effective tool that can guide, challenge, or reshape power relations. 34 International infrastructure competition and cooperation also involve complex games among multiple stakeholders. Although the United States initially paid relatively insufficient attention and investment to the Southeast Asia region under Trump’s presidency, with the deepening cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries and the transformation and upgrade of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework gradually targeted Southeast Asian countries as key entities to woo, making Southeast Asia once again a focus area for the United States to counterbalance China. At the G7 summit held in June 2021, Biden administration officials explicitly stated that “Build Back Better World” would not only provide infrastructure projects for developing countries but also “defeat” the BRI by offering high-quality options. In May 2022, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries reiterated their goal of gradually replacing the BRI with “high-quality” and “sustainable” infrastructure investments at the Tokyo summit. Subsequently, the United States invested heavily in infrastructure resources attempting to shape a “free and open Indo-Pacific order,” launching the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Economic Prosperity Network Plan, and Blue Dot Network plan, achieving a series of results, such as the urban railway improvement project in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, renewable energy projects in Indonesia, and coastal disaster reduction facility assistance projects in Southeast Asia. The competition and game between China and the United States in Southeast Asia have expanded from traditional geopolitical fields to various domains including the economy, infrastructure, digital technology, and governance rules.

基础设施建设是国民经济发展的基础,是可以依凭特定方式引导、挑战或重塑权力关系的有效 工具,国际基础设施领域的竞争与合作也是涉及多个利益相关方的复杂博弈。虽然在特朗普上台伊始,美国对东南亚地区的重视与投资相对不足,但伴随着中国与东南亚国家合作的深化与美国 “ 印太战略” 的转型升级,拜登政府推出的“ 印太经济框架” 逐渐将东南亚国家作为重点拉拢对象, 东南亚再度成为了美国制衡中国的重点区域。 在2021 年6 月召开的七国峰会上,拜登政府官员更是明确表示,“ 重建更美好世界” 将不仅仅为发展中国家提供了基建项目,还会通过提供高质量选择的方式,最终“ 打败” “ 一带一路”。 2022 年 5 月,美日澳印四国在东京峰会上再次重申了通过“ 高质量”“ 可持续” 的基础设施投资逐步取代“ 一带一路” 的目标。 而后,美国投入大量基建资源试图塑造“ 自由开放的印太秩序”,并先后推出“ 印太战略” “ 经济繁荣网络计划” 与“ 蓝点网络” 计划,取得了一系列成果,如越南南部城市胡志明市的城市铁路建设改善项目、印尼可再生能源项目 和东南亚地区海岸减灾设施援助项目等。中美在东南亚地区的竞争博弈从传统的地缘政治领域拓展到经济、基础设施、数字技术及治理规则等各领域。

However, geographically distant from Southeast Asia and with limited investment, the United States approaches Southeast Asia with a strong hue of containing China and hegemonic thinking, positioning Southeast Asian countries as followers and participants rather than leaders. Specifically, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Blue Dot Network aim to establish and build a “high-standard” club, attempting to form a new alliance of emerging digital countries in the Indo-Pacific region with “selective” cooperation. This approach somewhat detaches from the reality of large development disparities in the Southeast Asia region. Its advocated “high standards” far exceed the domestic standards of underdeveloped countries, excluding some economically backward countries from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which contradicts the principles of openness, inclusiveness, and mutual benefit followed by regional multilateral mechanisms.35 The U.S. strategy of implementing new digital economic rules and high-standard infrastructure and industrial cooperation in Southeast Asia not only provides limited support and assistance to underdeveloped countries in the region but may further widen the development gap in Southeast Asia, not meeting the urgent needs of several underdeveloped countries in the region to achieve “connectivity.”

但是,美国在地理上与东南亚相距甚远、投入资金有限,在经略东南亚时有着浓重的遏华色彩 与霸权思维,对东南亚国家的角色定位是追随者、参与者而非主导者。 具体地说,美国推出的“ 印太经济框架” 与“ 蓝点网络” 计划,着力建立与打造的是“ 高标准” 俱乐部,是试图在东南亚地区联合数字基础良好国家组成印太新兴数字国家联盟,推行的是一种“ 有选择” 的合作。但此举在一定程度上脱离了东南亚地区发展差距大的现实,其所倡导的“ 高标准” 远超欠发达国家的国内标准,一些经济发展水平落后的国家一直被排除出“ 印太经济框架”,而这些策略与地区多边机制遵循的开放包容、平等互惠的原则背道而驰。 美国在东南亚推行数字经济新规则和基建及产业合作高标准策略,不仅对东南亚欠发达国家的扶持与帮助有限,反而可能会进一步拉大东南亚地区的发展差 距,并不符合该地区多个欠发达国家希望实现“ 互联互通” 的迫切需要。

Infrastructure cooperation is one of the most important areas of cooperation that China has undertaken in Southeast Asia. Compared to the U.S. “high-standard” Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Blue Dot Network in Southeast Asia, China’s BRI brings significant and effective economic development opportunities and contributions to the region, especially to underdeveloped countries like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, elevating China-Southeast Asia infrastructure cooperation to new heights and filling the huge gap in infrastructure financing in developing countries in Southeast Asia to some extent.36 Moreover, since Trump’s presidency, the technological field has become a key area for the United States to “decouple” from China. Forced by the need for political alignment and security pressure imposed by the United States, many countries, represented by Australia, have changed their ways of conducting technological cooperation with China, facing blockades and restrictions imposed by the United States on China’s technology “going out.” Therefore, Southeast Asian countries’ support for Chinese infrastructure projects also provides significant assistance for China to break through the U.S. technological containment and achieve global technological diffusion, making it a rational choice of “win-win” for China and Southeast Asian countries.

基础设施合作是中国在东南亚地区开展的最重要合作领域之一。 相较于美国在东南亚地区推行的“ 高标准”“ 印太经济框架” 与“ 蓝点网络”,中国给东南亚地区,尤其是老挝、缅甸和柬埔寨等欠发达国家带来的经济发展机遇与贡献却是显著且有效的,中国提出的“ 一带一路” 倡议在规模和数量上都将中国与东南亚国家的基础设施合作推向了新高度,在一定程度上填补了东南亚发展中国家在基础设施融资方面的巨大缺口。而且,自特朗普上台后,技术领域就成为了美国对华“ 脱钩” 的重点领域。迫于政治站队的需要与美国施加的安全压力,以澳大利亚为代表的许多国家转变了与中国开展技术合作的方式,中国技术“ 走出去” 的道路面临着美国所施加的封锁限制。 因此,东南亚国家对中国基建项目的支持,也为中国突破美国技术遏制、实现技术全球扩散提供了重 要帮助,是中国与东南亚国家“ 双赢” 的理性选择。

From the outset of the Belt and Road Initiative, China clearly proposed the goal of “strengthening connectivity construction with ASEAN countries,”37 continuously seeking points of mutual interest in bilateral cooperation, and advocating priority for infrastructure project cooperation when collaborating with developing countries in Southeast Asia. For these countries, Chinese infrastructure cooperation and technology transfer are urgent needs to break through development barriers. With Chinese funding, technology, and personnel support, Southeast Asian countries have built a number of major projects beneficial for solving their own energy shortages and promoting economic development. Among them, the China-Laos Railway has become a flagship project of China’s BRI cooperation in the Indochina Peninsula, not only greatly improving Laos’ regional development environment but also becoming an important platform for upgrading bilateral relations between China and Laos, laying a solid foundation for the deepening and development of China-Laos cooperation.38

在“ 一带一路” 倡议设计之初,中国便明确提出“ 加强同东盟国家的互联互通建设” 目标,一直努力找寻双边合作的利益契合点,在与东南亚发展中国家开展合作时主张优先进行基建项目合 作。 对于这些国家而言,中国基建合作与技术转移是其突破发展屏障的迫切需要。在中方资金、技术和人员的支持下,东南亚国家建成了一批有利于解决本国能源短缺、促进经济发展的重大项目。其中,中老铁路成为中国在中南半岛地区开展“ 一带一路” 合作的旗舰项目,不仅极大地改善了老挝的区域发展环境,还成为了中老两国升级双边关系、营造良好外部环境的重要平台,为中老合作 的深化与发展奠定了良好基础。

Laos and China, both socialist countries, are key focus nations under China’s BRI. Since the normalization of Sino-Lao relations in 1989, the two countries have cooperated in various fields such as the economy, politics, culture, and technology, with frequent leadership visits and numerous consensuses reached, leading to the steady development of China-Lao relations. However, as the only landlocked country in northern Indochina, Laos has long been troubled by complex terrain, inconvenient transportation, and weak industrial foundation. To break through the mountainous barriers and facilitate foreign trade, Laos set a national development goal to transform from a landlocked to a land-linked country, effectively aligning with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, further deepening and integrating Sino-Lao cooperation. In 2016, China and Laos signed the “Memorandum of Understanding on Jointly Formulating Plans for Cooperation on the Construction of the Belt and Road” between the People’s Republic of China and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, followed by the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Jointly Promoting the Construction of the China-Laos Economic Corridor in 2017 and 2019, and the Action Plan on Building a Community of Shared Future between the Communist Party of China and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party,39 proposing the idea of “accelerating the alignment of China’s BRI with Laos’ strategy to transform from a landlocked to a land-linked country.”40 Both sides emphasized the necessity of basing cooperation on the construction of the China-Laos Railway, expanding comprehensive, multi-level cooperation, and carrying out economic and trade cooperation with a focus on connectivity and capacity and investment cooperation, further advancing pragmatic cooperation between China and Laos in fields such as transportation, capacity, electricity, minerals, agriculture, tourism, and the digital economy.41

老挝与中国同属社会主义国家,是中国“ 一带一路” 倡议的重点关注国家。 自 1989 年中老关系正常化以后,中老两国就在经济、政治、文化与技术等多方面展开合作,双方领导人互访密切,达 成了诸多共识,中老关系稳步发展。 但是,作为中南半岛北部唯一内陆国,老挝却一直深受地形复杂、交通不便与工业基础薄弱等问题的困扰,为突破重山封锁、便利对外贸易,老挝提出了“ 变陆锁国为陆联国” 的国家发展目标,而这一目标与中国的“ 一带一路” 倡议实现了有效对接,中老合作进一步深化互融。 2016 年,中国和老挝共同签署了《中华人民共和国和老挝人民民主共和国关于编制共同推进“ 一带一路” 建设合作规划纲要的谅解备忘录》,后又在 2017 年和 2019 年签署了《关于共同推进中老经济走廊建设的谅解备忘录》和《中国共产党和老挝人民革命党关于构建中老命运 共同体行动计划》两项重要文件,提出“ 加快中国‘ 一带一路’ 倡议同老挝‘ 变陆锁国为陆联国’ 战略对接” 的构想。中老双方都强调了依据中老铁路建设、拓展全方位、多层次合作的必要性,开展了以互联互通和产能与投资合作为重点的经济贸易合作,进一步推进了中老两国在交通、产能、电 力、矿产、农业、旅游、数字经济等领域务实合作。

Technological progress, while expanding national territories and developing new spaces for international competition, also changes a country’s geostrategic value and national development strategy planning.42 The mountainous and plateau terrain, lack of access to the sea, and backward transportation infrastructure construction have been long-term bottlenecks restricting Laos’s economic growth. Early in the 21st century, Laos proposed cooperating with China to build railways to change its landlocked predicament. 43 Now, with the maturity and upgrading of infrastructure and high-speed railway construction technology, Laos, deeply located in inland Southeast Asia, has a significant opportunity to leverage its geographical advantages and become a hub connecting Southeast Asian countries and countries outside the region. Against this backdrop, China, with sufficient funds, mature technology, and a commitment to “going out,” has become an important aid for Laos to solve its development problems. Therefore, under the high attention and active promotion of the high-level leadership of both countries, the construction of the China-Laos Railway, a typical demonstration of “hard connectivity” under the BRI, has entered the fast track. The China-Laos Railway officially commenced construction in December 2016, achieved full-line operation in December 2021, and began carrying international passengers in April 2023. The railway, built entirely to Chinese management and technical standards, is an important part of the central corridor of the Trans-Asian Railway, marking a leap in Laos’ transportation capacity and the connectivity between China and Laos.44

技术进步在拓展国家疆域、发展国际竞争新空间的同时,也改变着国家的地缘战略价值与国家 发展战略规划。多山地高原的地形、没有出海口的限制与交通设施建设的落后,是长期制约老挝经济增长的瓶颈。 早在21 世纪初,老挝就提出了与中国合作修建铁路、改变老挝“ 陆锁国” 困境的想法。现在,基建与高铁建设技术的成熟与升级,更是使深处于东南亚内陆的老挝有了发挥地缘优势、成为联结东南亚各国及域外国家枢纽的重要机会。 在此背景下,资金充足、技术成熟并致力于“ 走出去” 的中国,成为老挝解决发展难题的重要助力。因此,在中老两国高层的高度重视和积极推动下,标志着“ 一带一路” 硬联通典型示范的中老铁路建设踏入快车道。 2016 年 12 月中老铁路正式开工建设,2021 年12 月中老铁路实现全线通车,2023 年4 月中老铁路国际旅客列车正式运载乘客,该铁路全部采用中国管理标准和技术标准建设,是泛亚铁路中线通道的重要组成部分,标 志着老挝交通运输能力和中老两国互联互通程度的飞跃式提升。

China’s BRI construction in Southeast Asia not only amplifies Laos’s regional cooperation and bilateral advantages but also further narrows the development gap between countries within the region. After the completion of the China-Laos Railway, the goods trade of the railway covered Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Bangladesh, and other countries, establishing a geographical and psychological bidirectional connection in Southeast Asia, bringing multiple development dynamics to Laos, China, and the Southeast Asian region. The China-Laos Railway, along with the existing Kunming-Vientiane Highway, China-Laos Expressway, and China-Laos Mekong River shipping, has generated a resonating effect, greatly improving Laos’ transportation situation and investment environment, strengthening the industrial chain integration between China and Laos,45 and providing Laos with an important opportunity to transform from a “landlocked peripheral country” to a “transit central country.” The introduction and application of new technologies in the construction process have further driven the iterative upgrade of other industrial sectors in Laos.46 The opening of the China-Laos Railway also further promoted Yunnan Province’s opening to the outside world, connectivity with the Southeast Asian region, and the development process of the western region of China. Therefore, for Laos, which urgently needs economic development and industrial upgrading, the infrastructure cooperation and technology transfer provided by China, compared to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, not only meets the strategic needs of underdeveloped countries but is also more conducive to the unity of the Southeast Asian region.

中国在东南亚开展的“ 一带一路” 建设不仅放大了老挝区域合作与双边的高地优势,还进一步缩小域内国家间的发展差距。 在中老铁路建成后,中老铁路货物贸易国覆盖马来西亚、缅甸、泰国、孟加拉国等多个国家,在东南亚地区建立了一种地理与心理上的双向联结,给老挝、中国与东南亚 地区带来了多重发展动力。中老铁路与已有的昆曼公路、中老高速公路、中老湄公河航运产生了共振效果,极大地提升了老挝的交通运输状况和投资环境,加强了中老之间的产业链互嵌,老挝有 了从“ 陆锁边缘国” 向“ 过境中心国” 转变的重要契机,其建设过程中所运用和引进的新技术还进一步带动了老挝其他工业产业的迭代升级。 中老铁路的开通也进一步推动了云南省对外开放与东南亚地区的联通和西部大开发的进程。 因此,对于经济发展落后、亟需产业升级的老挝来说,中国提供的基建合作与技术转移比美国提供的“印太经济框架”,不仅符合欠发达国家战略需要,也更有利于东南亚地区的团结。

The China-Laos Railway project is a prime example of transitioning from “hard connectivity” and “chain connectivity” to comprehensive deepening cooperation. Since Chinese infrastructure technology entered Laos, it has significantly helped improve Laos’ technological level and industrial manufacturing capabilities. It has also provided a platform for the Laotian people to access Chinese culture and understand China’s development, enhancing China’s influence in the Southeast Asian region. This facilitates policy communication and people-to-people bonds between China and Laos.47 As the Belt and Road Initiative and Laos’s strategy to transform from a landlocked to a land-linked country continue to align and expand with ongoing infrastructure project cooperation, China deepens bilateral industrial and capacity cooperation, accelerating the transfer and investment of high and new technology to Laos. Close collaboration with the Lao Ministry of Science and Technology has driven the joint establishment of practical cooperation projects like the China-Laos Renewable Energy Joint Laboratory, the China-Laos Modern Agricultural Science and Technology Park, and the China-Laos Technology Transfer Center. These projects actively support and lead bilateral economic cooperation in high and new technology, enhancing the reliability and sustainability of relations between China and Laos.48 Both countries are also working on developing and implementing the China-Laos High-Tech Industrial Park, where infrastructure cooperation projects and scientific and technological industries from China are continually enhancing Laos’s scientific, technological, and social development levels. In the future, infrastructure and technological industry cooperation between China and Laos is expected to further evolve into “soft connectivity” in rules and standards.49 However, the China-Laos Railway has yet to achieve railway standard connectivity and unification with neighboring countries. The construction of logistics hubs, transshipment stations, and freight stations along the railway requires further improvement. The two countries also face mismatches in trade policy standards and legal rules, and the railway-aligned industries have yet to form a well-coordinated service mechanism. Each logistics company operates independently, unable to undergo unified management and scheduling. Therefore, some studies suggest that with the intensification of China-U.S. competition and the escalation of U.S. interference in Southeast Asia, China should further leverage the cohesive role of infrastructure and technology cooperation projects. It should pay attention to the Southeast Asian developing countries’ desire for industrial structure upgrading and high-tech development, increase investment in old industries, especially light industries, plan appropriate industrial projects for development, enhance inter-industry connectivity between countries, promote the docking and mutual recognition of infrastructure policies, and continuously deepen the industrial chain integration between each other.50 Meanwhile, China should also consider the concerns and sovereignty sensitivities of small and medium-sized countries in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s pursuit of balance, and the interference of external major powers like the U.S. and Japan in China’s infrastructure cooperation in the Southeast Asian region,51 continuously optimizing the content and measures of the BRI.

中老铁路项目是由“ 硬联通”“ 链贯通” 到全面深化合作的典型代表。 中国基建技术在进入老挝以来,不但在较大程度上助力老挝技术水平和产业制造能力的提升,还为老挝民众接触中国文 化、了解中国发展提供了平台,增强了中国在东南亚区域的影响力,有助于中老两国之间的政策沟 通与民心相通的形成。在不断落实“ 一带一路” 倡议与老挝“ 陆锁国变陆联国” 战略对接、持续拓展与进行老挝基建项目合作的同时,中国借此深化了双边产业与产能合作,加快了对老挝高新技术 的转移与投资的步伐,与老挝科技部展开了紧密协作,推动共建了中老可再生能源联合实验室、中 老现代农业科技园和中老技术转移中心等务实合作项目,积极发挥了高新技术对双边经济领域交 流合作的支撑和引领作用,提升了中国与老挝关系的可靠性和持续性。中老双方也努力推进着“ 老中高科技产业园” 的开发与落地,来自中国的基建合作项目与科学技术产业正不断提升老挝的科学技术水平与社会发展水平。 未来,中老两国基础设施与技术产业合作有望继续向规则标准“ 软互通” 升级转化。 但是,中老铁路仍未实现与周边国家的铁路标准对接与统一,铁路沿线物流枢纽、换装站和货运场站等基础设施建设有待进一步完善;两国在贸易政策标准、规则法律等方面 也存在着不匹配,铁路沿线产业也尚未形成完善的协调服务机制,各物流企业各自为战,无法进行 统一的管理与调度。因此,有研究提出,伴随着中美竞争的日趋激烈与美国在东南亚地区的干扰升级,中国应进一步发挥基建与技术合作项目的黏合作用,重视东南亚发展中国家对产业结构升级与 高新技术发展的渴望,加大对老工业尤其是轻工业的投资力度,规划合适产业项目落地发展,提升 国家间产业的互联互通,促进双方基建政策的对接与标准互认,不断深化彼此的产业链互嵌。与此同时,中国也要关注东南亚国家的担忧情绪、中小国家的主权敏感性、东盟的均势追求以及美日 等域外大国介入等因素对中国在东南亚地区开展基建合作的干扰,不断优化“ 一带一路” 倡议的内容与措施。

(ii) Supporting ASEAN’s Digital Construction: Realizing the Soft Connectivity of Rules and Standards for Chinese 5G Technology to Break Through in Southeast Asia

( 二) 助力东盟数字建设:规则标准“ 软互通” 实现中国5G 技术在东南亚突围

Technical standards are consistent specifications for technological products throughout their production process, covering technology and its related infrastructure, equipment, applications, and services. Countries with technological advantages can maintain their leadership in relevant fields through “standard competition” and “standard monopoly”; they can even transform their technological advantages into a competitive edge in their grand strategy through technological competition. With the rapid development of digital technology, technology has increasingly become an important support for the growth of a country’s comprehensive national strength, and the United States has made it a priority to contain the development of Chinese science and technology.52 Economists believe that the infrastructure supporting the development of the digital economy era mainly includes mobile internet, industrial internet, the Internet of Things, and big data centers built on the basis of the fifth generation and more advanced mobile communication technologies, with core technologies including cloud computing, big data analysis, artificial intelligence, blockchain, quantum computing, etc.53 The competition for these disruptive technologies has become a manifestation of U.S. efforts to suppress China’s potential global leadership position in technology.54 5G technology, as a supporting technology for human-machine connectivity and the latest standard for mobile cellular networks, marks China’s transition from a follower to a challenger and then to a leader in this field. Each generation of mobile communication technology carries more data, requiring modems in related network equipment to have stronger computing power. Due to the limited nature of the radio frequency spectrum, chip designers need to optimize semiconductors to transmit more data.55 Therefore, the U.S. containment of Chinese 5G technology is also a suppression of China’s chip technology and fundamental algorithm development.

技术标准是技术生产过程中一以贯之的技术产品规范,主要包括技术及其相关的基础设施、设 备、应用程序以及相关服务等领域。拥有技术优势的国家可以通过“ 标准竞争” 和“ 标准垄断”,来维持自身在相关领域的领导地位;甚至可以通过技术竞争将自己的技术优势转化为大国战略的竞争优势。随着数字技术的飞速发展,科技日益成为国家综合国力增长的重要支撑,美国着力将其作为遏制中国科学技术发展的第一要务。 经济学家认为,支撑数字经济时代发展的基础设施主要包括建立在第五代及更先进的移动通信技术基础上的移动互联网、工业互联网、物联网、大数据信 息中心等,核心技术包括云计算、大数据分析、人工智能、区块链、量子计算等。 对于上述颠覆性技术的争夺,成为美国对华潜在全球科技领导权地位打压的具体表现。5G 技术作为人机互联的支撑技术,是移动蜂窝网络的最新标准,也是中国在该领域实现追随者到追赶者再到领军者三级跳 的标志性技术。每一代移动通信技术都会承载更多的数据,这要求相关网络设备上的调制解调芯片具有更强的运算能力。同时由于无线电波频谱的有限性,需要芯片设计者通过优化半导体来使其可以发送更多的数据。因此,美国对中国5G 技术的遏制,也是对中国芯片技术和基础算法发展的打压。

As a synthesis of various technologies, 5G technology cannot be accomplished by a single company or even a single country alone; its standards include aspects such as coding and air interface protocols. Different working groups research and propose different sub-standards. Due to the differing development situations of countries, the technology standards adopted as priorities also vary. For instance, there are two frequency bands available for 5G: Sub-6Ghz and millimeter wave. China, based on the practical need for low-cost, large-scale deployment of 5G base stations and to better address network signal coverage issues in remote areas, has prioritized the Sub-6Ghz band. In the United States, since the majority of the 3-4Ghz spectrum had already been allocated to the U.S. military, U.S. 5G operators could only begin studying and deploying in the millimeter wave spectrum. The most intense competition in the development of 5G technology was in the channel coding standards. Initially, the low-density parity-check (LDPC) code technology championed by Samsung received support from suppliers such as Qualcomm and Nokia, as well as the United States and Japan, whereas the polar code technology advocated by Huawei was supported by companies like ZTE, Datang, and Xiaomi. After multiple rounds of negotiation, an agreement was reached where LDPC codes became the international standard for data channels, and polar codes for control channels. The depth of the competition in coding standards created the illusion that the U.S.-China 5G rivalry was essentially a coding dispute between Huawei and Qualcomm.

作为多种技术的综合体,5G 技术并不能由一个企业甚至一个国家单独完成,其标准包括编码、空口协议等多个方面。不同的工作组会对不同的子标准进行研究、提案。 同时由于不同国家的发展情况不同,优先采取的技术标准也不尽相同。 比如,5G 的信道有 Sub-6GHz 和毫米波两个频段可以使用:中国基于希望低成本、大规模普及 5G 基站的现实需求,同时为了更好地解决网络信号对偏远地区的覆盖问题,优先采取用了 Sub-6Ghz 的频段;而在美国,因为3-4Ghz 的频段大部分的频谱早已分配给了美国军方,因此美国的5G 运营商只能从毫米波开始研究部署相关设施。 在 5G 技术研发过程中,竞争最为激烈的是信道编码标准。 当初,韩国三星公司主推的低密度奇偶校验码技术受到高通、诺基亚等供应商以及美国、日本的支持,而中国华为公司主推的极化码技术得到中 兴、普天、小米等公司的支持。 经过多轮博弈,最终达成了低密度奇偶校验码作为数据信道的国际标准、极化码作为控制信道的国际标准的协议。 编码标准的竞争影响之深,以至于给人们造成了中美5G 之争就是华为与高通编码之争的错觉。

Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a network is equal to the square of the number of its nodes.56 Similarly, the value of digital technology products lies in whether they have a broad market and user base. Only technology standards accepted by users can survive in competition. The 5G field has already formed a complete industrial chain, where the upstream includes chips and modules, optical devices, RF devices, and optical fibers as transmission media; the midstream includes transmission equipment such as base stations, network devices like routers, and network planning services; and the downstream includes various smart terminals including smartphones, various application scenarios including smart cities, as well as network operations composed of operators and operational services.57 To contain the development of Chinese 5G technology, the United States adopted a strategy of cutting off supply of high-end components upstream and besieging the market downstream. In June 2020, the Trump administration announced the “Clean Network” plan, including the “5G Clean Path,” aiming to contain China’s technology development across all aspects of 5G technology research and application. Additionally, legal regulations such as the Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain were introduced to restrict normal technology exchanges between U.S. companies like Qualcomm and Intel with Chinese entities; leveraging extraterritorial jurisdiction among other means to prevent companies like ASML from exporting advanced semiconductor products to China. China’s high-tech exports are mainly concentrated in the information and communication technology industry. To suppress China’s 5G technology in overseas markets, the U.S. not only competed with China in third-party technology markets in collaboration with allies but also exerted political pressure on third countries under the guise of endangering bilateral security cooperation, attempting to sever China’s connections with overseas markets.

梅特卡夫定律指出,一个网络的价值等于该网络内节点数的平方,且该网络的价值与互联网用 户数的平方成正比。同理,数字技术产品的价值在于是否有广阔的市场和用户群体,只有能被用户接受的技术标准,才能够在竞争中生存下来。 当前5G 领域已经形成了完整的产业链,其中上游主要包括芯片及模组、光器件、射频器件及光纤光缆等传输介质,中游包括基站在内的传输设备、路 由器等在内的网络设备以及网络规划服务,下游包括手机在内的各种智能终端、智慧城市在内的各 种应用场景以及运营商和运营服务所组成的网络运营。美国为了遏制中国5G 技术的发展,对中国采取了价值链上游高端元器件“ 断供” 和下游市场“ 围剿” 的两头堵策略。 2020 年 6 月,特朗普政府公布了包括“5G 清洁路径” 在内的“ 清洁网络” 计划,该计划旨在从 5G 技术的研发、应用等各个环节遏制中国的技术发展。同时又出台《确保信息通信技术和服务供应链安全的行政令》等法律法规,限制美国高通、因特尔等公司与中国相关企业进行正常的科技交流;利用长臂管辖等手段 阻止荷兰阿斯麦( ASML) 等公司向中国出口先进制程的相关半导体产品。当前中国高新技术出口领域主要集中在信息与通信技术产业。 为了打压中国 5G 技术的海外市场,美国一方面联合盟友共同在第三方技术市场与中国展开竞争,另一方面以危害双边安全合作为由对第三国施加政治压 力,试图割裂中国与海外市场的联系。

As one of the regions with the fastest economic growth in the world, Southeast Asian countries have a considerable demand for investment in 5G infrastructure.58 This region not only serves as a natural testing ground for Western 5G technology but also as a frontline battlefield for Chinese 5G technology to go global. To limit Southeast Asian countries’ use of Chinese 5G technology, the United States maintains close commercial and technological ties with these countries on one hand. For example, the technical team and management level of the Thailand Telecommunications Association include members from top U.S. tech companies like Qualcomm and Intel, and the U.S. Department of Commerce once requested the Thailand Telecommunications Association to provide information on Thailand’s 5G development to seek cooperation opportunities.59 On the other hand, using the pretext of “affecting national and ally security,” the U.S. demands Southeast Asian countries to reduce or even abandon the use of communication infrastructure from Chinese vendors.60 Beyond coercing Southeast Asian countries under the guise of ensuring information and supply chain security, the U.S. also attempts to “entice” countries within the region to join its information and communication circle with the slogans of “security” and “openness,” thereby squeezing China’s market space in the region.61

作为目前全球经济增速最快的地区之一,东南亚国家对5G 基础设施投资需求可观。这里既是美西方5G 技术落地的天然试验场,也是中国5G 技术出海的前哨战场。 为了限制东南亚国家使用中国5G技术,美国一方面在商业和技术层面与相关国家保持高度联系,例如泰国电信协会中的技术团队和管理层面有部分成员来自美国的高通、因特尔等头部科技企业,美国商务部一度要求泰 国电信协会提供泰国5G 发展的相关信息以获得合作商机;另一方面借“ 影响国家及盟友安全” 的由头,要求东南亚国家减少甚至放弃使用来自中国设备商的通信设施。 除了以保障信息及供应链安全为借口“ 威逼” 东南亚国家之外,美国还以“ 安全”“ 开放” 为口号,试图“ 利诱” 东南亚域内国家加入其信息通信小圈子,从而压缩中国的在该地区的市场空间。

The construction of the “Digital Silk Road” and the phased achievements it has made aim to assist countries along the BRI in developing digital infrastructure and increasing the level of informatization. However, measures to promote digital technology infrastructure connectivity within the region are also continually reducing the U.S. technological containment of China in the 5G field. As a crucial support of the BRI, the “Digital Silk Road” encompasses numerous technology projects, including the construction of 5G base stations, laying communication optical cables, establishing data centers, and providing technological services.62 In general, the process of “soft connectivity” in technological standards is achieved through a “government sets the stage, enterprises perform” approach. “Government sets the stage” refers to the signing of cooperation agreements between governments at all levels under the Belt and Road Initiative, providing institutional guarantees and necessary financial support for regional and sub-regional technology exchange and cooperation at the macro level. “Enterprises perform” means that digital technology companies play a primary role in technology exchange and cooperation, promoting 5G technology connectivity, sharing, and win-win between bilateral and multilateral parties at the meso and micro levels.

“ 数字丝绸之路” 的建设以及不断取得的阶段性成果,虽然旨在帮助“ 一带一路” 沿线国家推动数字基础设施发展及提高信息化普及程度,但是一系列通过促进区域内数字技术基础设施联通的 举措,也在不断消解美国对中方在5G 领域的技术遏制。作为“ 一带一路” 倡议的重要支撑,“ 数字丝绸之路” 包含大量技术项目,其中不乏建设 5G 基站、铺设通信光缆、成立数据中心、提供技术服务等。 总体而言,技术标准“ 软互通” 的过程是通过“ 政府搭台、企业唱戏” 的方式来实现的。 所谓政府搭台,是指在“ 一带一路” 倡议下各级政府间签订合作协议,在宏观层面为区域、次区域内技术交流与技术合作提供制度保障和必要的资金支持;所谓企业唱戏,指数字技术企业在技术交流、合作中发挥主体能动作用,在中观和微观层面推动 5G 技术在双边、多边之间实现互联互通、共享共赢。

At the intergovernmental level, China and ASEAN initiated the China-ASEAN Information Harbor in 2015, with the main construction goal of building the China-ASEAN information hub and the “Information Silk Road” connecting China and ASEAN. Subsequently, both parties strengthened cooperation in digital technologies like 5G, blockchain, smart city, telemedicine, and e-commerce. A series of cooperation agreements have not only provided a practical approach for integrating China’s 5G technology with Southeast Asian countries but also outlined steps for technological updates and upgrades in the region, offering solutions for how foundational communication technologies like 5G can integrate with regional economic development and support sustainable digital economy growth.

在政府间层面,2015 年中国和东盟启动了以建设中国—东盟信息枢纽和建设连接中国与东盟的“ 信息丝绸之路” 为主体建设目标的中国—东盟信息港,随后双方加强在 5G、区块链等数字技术,智慧城市、远程医疗等应用场景以及电子商务等领域的合作。 一系列的合作协议既给中国 5G 技术如何与东南亚国家互联互通提供了落地实现的抓手,又为区域内相关技术更新迭代升级点出了迭代步骤,更为诸如5G这些基础通信技术如何与区域经济发展融合、助力数字经济可持续发展给出了解决方案。

At the enterprise level, China’s 5G service providers, leveraging platforms such as the Belt and Road and “Digital Silk Road,” collaborate with local countries in Southeast Asia based on their real development situations and actual needs. Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, still primarily relies on a 4G network for its telecommunications backbone. Limited by its unique geographical environment, Indonesia’s current plan is to first complete the connectivity of the entire archipelago with a 4G network, transitioning from analog to digital technology. Thus, promoting 5G applications at the enterprise level and achieving digital transformation in key cities are critical steps for Indonesia’s digital economy development and the practical soil for rooting China’s 5G technology in Indonesia.

在企业层面,中国国内的5G 服务提供商依托“ 一带一路”“ 数字丝绸之路” 等平台,根据东南亚国家的现实发展状况及实际需求,与当地国家开展相关技术合作。印尼是东南亚地区最大的国家, 但是该国目前电信网的骨干仍为 4G 网络。 受限于该国特殊的地理环境,印尼当前的计划是首先实现整个群岛4G 网络的连接建设,完成模拟技术向数字技术的过渡。 因此,率先在企业层面普及5G 应用,实现企业层面的数字化转型与重点城市数字化,是印尼当前发展数字经济的关键步骤,也是中国5G 技术在印尼扎根的现实土壤。

Thailand is among the first countries in Southeast Asia to deploy commercial 5G technology and one of the fastest in the world for 5G construction. The Thai government aims to promote further integration of 5G and other digital technologies with national industries through strengthening collaboration between the public and private sectors, helping Thailand achieve its Industrial 4.0 national strategy goals. Developing Thailand as a regional leader in 5G technology and a data center hub in Southeast Asia has been the Thai government’s vision in recent years.63 In infrastructure, Huawei has enhanced cooperation with the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission of Thailand to build the “Gigabit Thailand” digital infrastructure through constructing fiber broadband infrastructure, expanding broadband coverage, and promoting local digital transformation. In terms of industry applications, taking the medical field as an example, Huawei collaborated with Siriraj Hospital and the National Broadcasting and Communications Commission of Thailand in 2021 to establish the first 5G smart hospital project in ASEAN. This project introduces 5G, artificial intelligence, and other technologies to promote balanced development of medical resources in Thailand and optimize and upgrade the Thai medical industry. Regarding talent cultivation, Huawei trains digital technology talents for Thailand and the ASEAN region through the ASEAN Academy, the Seeds for the Future program, and promotes the localization process of Huawei employees.

泰国是东南亚最先部署商用 5G 技术的国家,也是全球范围内 5G 建设速度最快的国家之一。泰国政府希望通过加强公私部门之间的协同合作促进 5G等数字技术与本国产业进一步融合,助力泰国实现工业4.0 国家战略目标,其中,将泰国发展成为区域内5G 技术的领导者、东南亚数据中心是泰政府近年来的愿景所在。 在基础设施领域,华为与泰国国家广播和电信委员会加强合作, 从建设光纤宽带基础设施、扩大宽带覆盖率、推动当地数字化转型等方面进行“千兆泰国”数字基 础设施建设。在行业应用层面,以医疗领域为例,2021 年华为与泰国诗里拉吉医院、泰国国家广播和通信委员会合作成立东盟首个5G 智慧医院项目,通过引入5G、人工智能等技术促进泰国医疗资源均衡发展,推动泰国医疗产业优化升级。 在人才培养方面,华为通过东盟学院、“ 未来种子” 计划 等形式为泰国及东盟地区培养数字技术人才,并推动华为员工本地化进程。

Leveraging intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, Chinese 5G technology companies are deeply involved in the construction of 5G in Southeast Asian countries. By integrating with local existing communication technologies and cultivating local professional talents, Southeast Asian countries’ acceptance of Chinese 5G technology standards and 5G technology has been improved at various levels from equipment deployment to industry application to industrial ecology. This, in turn, helps Chinese 5G and related technologies expand into the ASEAN market, breaking through the strategic containment of Chinese 5G technology by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and providing a new counter-field to alleviate the continuous technological competition from the United States.64

通过借助政府间合作机制,中国5G 技术企业深度参与到东南亚国家的 5G 建设中。 通过与当地现有通信技术融合,培育当地专业技术人才,提高了东南亚国家在设备部署到行业应用再到产业 生态等多个层面对中国5G 技术标准、5G 技术的接受度,进而助力中国 5G 及相关技术拓展东盟市场,实现了对美国在亚太地区对中国5G技术战略遏制的解围,为化解美国对华持续的技术竞争提供新的对冲场域。

(iii) China-Malaysia Industrial Parks: Breaking Through with “Chain Connectivity” to Realign Industrial Technology

( 三) 中马产业园:通过“ 链贯通” 实现中国产业技术“ 错位破局”

For the United States, the continually developing China represents its greatest strategic threat. From launching a trade war against China to decoupling in technology, a primary goal of the U.S. containment strategy against China is to push China out of the current global supply chains. To this end, the United States has systematically devised a series of plans, including the Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Blue Dot Network, the Build Back Better World, the AUKUS trilateral security pact, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, aimed at curtailing China’s influence in Southeast Asia. Consequently, Southeast Asia has become a converging point for China’s BRI and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.65

对美国而言,不断发展的中国是其最大的战略威胁。 从发动对华贸易战,再到对华技术“ 脱钩”,美国对华遏制的重要目标是将中国挤出当下的全球产业链。为此,美国层层布局,提出了“ 印太战略”“ 蓝点网络”“ 重建更美好世界”“ 美英澳三边安全联盟” 和“ 印太经济框架” 等一揽子计划, 来阻止中国影响力在东南亚地区的扩展,东南亚地区也由此成为了中国“ 一带一路” 倡议与美国“ 印太战略” 的交汇区。

Over the years, the United States and Malaysia have maintained a relatively close economic cooperation relationship, with Malaysia being the second-largest trading partner of the United States in Southeast Asia. The United States has repeatedly attempted to use the South China Sea issue to drive a wedge between China and Malaysia, intending to strengthen U.S.-Malaysia bilateral cooperation within its Indo-Pacific strategy. Although Malaysia is not an ally of the United States, its economic and geopolitical value has made it one of the key nations that the U.S. seeks to court in Southeast Asia.66 In response to the challenges posed by the United States to China-Malaysia bilateral relations, China has delved deeply into the mutual needs of both nations for industrial investment and technological cooperation. It has chosen to expand trade in technological achievements with neighboring countries through “Trade Connectivity,” while achieving “Chain Connectivity” between its own advantageous technological industries and those of neighboring countries through various means of technology diffusion and integration. Under the combined effect of the firm friendship between China and Malaysia and the Belt and Road Initiative, the two countries have maintained close collaboration within the framework of the initiative, sharing a consensus on many international and regional issues. The cooperation between China and Malaysia has continued to deepen across multiple technical fields, including automotive, energy, steel, machinery manufacturing, and industrial parks.

多年来,美马两国保持了较为密切的经济合作关系,马来西亚保持着美国在东南亚第二大贸易 伙伴国的地位。 美国多次试图借南海问题挑拨中马关系,有意在印太布局中强化美马双边合作。虽然,马来西亚并不是美国的盟国,但却因其经济与地缘价值成为了美国在东南亚地区的重点拉拢 国家之一。 为了应对美国给中马双边关系带来的挑战,中国深入挖掘了中马两国对于产业投资和技术合作的深层需求,选择在借助“ 贸易畅通” 扩大与周边技术成果贸易的同时,通过多种途径的技术扩散和技术整合实现本国优势技术产业与周边国家的“ 链贯通” 。 在中马坚固友谊与“ 一带一路” 倡议的复合作用下,中马两国在“ 一带一路” 倡议中保持密切协作,在许多国际和地区问题上保持共识,两国在汽车、能源、钢铁、机械制造、产业园等多层次技术领域的合作也持续深入 发展。

Malaysia has a strong desire to develop industries and introduce technology, and it has a relatively deep history of technological cooperation with China, making it one of the first countries to respond to China’s BRI. The technology transfer from China to Malaysia is mainly conducted through the establishment of industrial parks. By setting up industrial parks in Malaysia related to China’s mature technologies, these technologies can form a clustering effect with upstream and downstream technologies and outputs in spatial terms, shortening the process from technological ideation to outcome transformation, and achieving “chain connectivity” to a greater extent.67 The “China-Malaysia Qinzhou Industrial Park” and the “Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park” are industrial parks jointly established by China and Southeast Asian countries. They serve as pioneering demonstration zones for industrial integration and technological exchange, symbolizing a model for technological collaboration between China and Southeast Asian nations. The Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, in particular, focuses on industries where China holds a technological advantage, including metal smelting, machinery manufacturing, renewable energy, electronic information, and petrochemicals.68 For China, leading its domestic superior technologies abroad not only allows for the transfer of excess production capacity to neighboring countries in need, fostering mutual benefits and collaborative development between the two nations, but also enhances the localization of technology and its outcomes in the host country.69 This approach helps to refine the “China-neighboring” technological ecosystem, facilitating a regional cycle and mitigating the impact of Western technological blockades and supply chain restrictions on China. Taking the steel industry, a key focus of the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, as an example, the mutually beneficial nature of China-Malaysia industrial chain cooperation becomes evident. Malaysia lacks the raw materials for steel smelting and primarily relies on electric arc furnace technology, resulting in low self-sufficiency and capacity utilization rates. Meanwhile, China, despite being the world’s leading steel producer, faces a pressing need to upgrade its technology. Affected by the global “dual carbon” policy environment, the steel produced by China’s mainstream “blast furnace-converter” process is increasingly restricted in overseas markets, especially in the West, leading to obstructed export channels. Conversely, Malaysia is in a rapid urbanization phase with a growing demand for steel. Additionally, as a primary automobile producer in Southeast Asia, the influx of technology empowerment and capital investment from foreign automakers into Malaysia in recent years has revitalized the local automotive technology and industry, thereby significantly boosting the demand for steel. This surge in demand has naturally facilitated the cooperation between China and Malaysia in the steel industry.

马来西亚有着发展工业、引进技术的强烈愿望,与中国也有着较为深厚的技术合作历史,是最 早响应中国“ 一带一路” 倡议的国家之一。 中国向马来西亚进行的技术转移主要是以设立产业园的形式展开,通过在马来西亚设立与中国成熟技术相关的产业园,使得该技术能在空间上与上下游 关联技术及技术产出形成聚集效应,在时间上缩短技术创意孵化、技术成果转化的过程,使相关产 业能在更大程度上实现“ 链贯通”。其中“ 中马钦州产业园区” 和“ 马中关丹产业园” 是中国与东南亚国家相互设立的产业园区,也是实现产业对接与技术交流的先行示范园区,对于中国与东南亚 国家开展技术交流具有示范性意义。马中关丹产业园重点发展的产业包括金属冶炼、机械制造、可再生能源、电子信息、石油化工等中国具备一定程度技术优势的产业。对中国而言,引导国内优势技术走出去,既可以将富余的产能转移到周边需要的国家,实现双边国家的优势互补与协同发 展,也可以更好地推动技术及其成果在东道国实现本地化,完善“ 中国—周边” 技术生态圈,帮助中国搭建区域循环、削弱西方对中国的技术封锁与供应链限制。以马中关丹产业园重点发展的钢铁产业为例,可以较为清晰地看出中马产业链合作的互利共赢性质。马来西亚本国缺乏冶炼钢铁的原料,主要采用电炉炼钢技术,自给率和产能利用率偏低。而中国尽管已经跃居世界第一产钢大国,却也面临着相关技术需要升级的现实需求,受全球“ 双碳” 政策大环境的影响,中国主流的“ 高炉—转炉” 工艺生产的钢铁正逐渐受到海外市场特别是西方市场的制约,对外销售渠道不畅。马来西亚却正处于快速实现城市化的发展期,对于钢材的需求量持续增加。 而且,马来西亚也是东南亚主要的汽车生产国,海外车企近年来对马来西亚的技术赋能和资金注入,带动了当地汽车技术和 汽车工业的复苏,带动了马来西亚钢铁需求的激增,中马钢铁产业合作水到渠成。

In recent years, China’s investment in Malaysian steel technology has begun to bear fruit. The joint venture Alliance Steel Malaysia, funded by China, is the country’s largest steel mill. Its products have entered markets in over 20 countries worldwide, with exports accounting for 70%.70 The rapid development of infrastructure, the automotive industry, and clean energy technology have synergized with China’s steel technology, not only promoting urbanization and industrial development in Malaysia but also helping China further optimize its technological structure with neighboring countries.71 This has led to the regional diffusion of Chinese steel technology, effectively circumventing sanctions and blockades from Western countries to a certain extent, and promoting adjustments in the steel industry order in East Asia. This not only benefits the optimization of bilateral economic and trade structures but also facilitates China’s gradual move towards both ends of the steel technology smile curve.

近年来,中国对于马来西亚钢铁技术投资已经初见成效,由中方出资中马共建的联合钢铁马来 西亚公司是该国最大的钢铁厂,目前该公司的产品已经进入全球 20 多个国家的市场,出口比例高达70%。快速发展的基础设施、汽车工业、清洁能源技术与我国的钢铁技术实现了技术间的协同增益效应,不仅助推了马来西亚的城市化与工业化发展,还助力中国进一步优化与周边国家的技术 结构,实现了中国钢铁技术的周边化扩散,通过“ 借船出海” 的方式在一定程度上避免了美西方国家的制裁与封锁,对东亚的钢铁产业秩序调整起到了推动作用,不但有益于优化双边经贸结构,而 且也推动中国逐步迈向钢铁技术领域微笑曲线的两端。

As a model of China-Malaysia technological industrial park cooperation, the transfer of steel industry technology has been successful in Malaysia. With the concurrent elevation of technological levels in China and Malaysia, Malaysia’s national development needs, and the spread of U.S. technology containment to high-tech fields, China has begun to diffuse more advanced technologies to Malaysia. New energy vehicles are one of China’s breakthrough industries in circumventing Western technological blockades, with brands such as BYD, Geely, Chery, and Great Wall flourishing in overseas markets in ASEAN and the EU, achieving significant success. This is crucial for China, as it faces simple tariffs and anti-dumping measures from the U.S. in lower-tech fields like steel technology. In contrast, in high-tech areas, the U.S. maintains its technological advantage by leading in core algorithms and industrial design, limiting technology exports and industrial migration to constrain China’s technological development in related fields. Hence, improving China’s industrial chain layout overseas and facilitating regional industrial circulation are key to circumventing U.S. technological and industrial blockades in high-tech fields. Given these developments, China views Malaysia not merely as a market for automobile exports but is starting to leverage Malaysia’s existing technological level and development needs to extend the industry chains of its advantageous automobile enterprises into the country, allowing Malaysia to participate in China’s new energy automobile technology industry system more deeply.

作为中马技术产业园合作的典范,钢铁产业的技术转移已经在马来西亚取得了成功,随着中马 两国技术水平的同频提升、马来西亚国家发展客观需要以及美国对华技术遏制层次逐渐向高技术 领域扩散,中国也开始将更多的高新技术向马来西亚进行扩散。新能源汽车是中国在高技术领域突破西方技术封锁“ 拳头产业” 之一,像比亚迪、吉利、奇瑞、长城等多个品牌已经实现了在东盟、欧盟多个海外市场多点开花,并达到了群芳争艳的效果。这对于中国来说意义重大,因为在钢铁技术这类中低技术层面,美国通过简单的加征关税、反倾销等方式压缩中国技术产品海外市场的制裁,中国可以通过开拓海外市场、加强技术产业园合作的方式予以削弱,但是在高技术领域,美国所施 行的通过引领核心算法、工业设计等作为底层支持高新技术发展维持自身的技术优势,以限制技术 出口、产业迁移等方式限制中国在相关领域的技术发展,仍需要中国予以高阶的回应,而完善中国 与海外国家产业链布局,顺畅区域内产业循环,恰恰是中国在高科技领域“ 解围” 美国产业技术封锁的关键所在。正因为如此,在新能源汽车这一高新技术领域,中国已经不仅仅将马来西亚作为汽车出口市场,而是开始试图借助马来西亚现有的技术水平和发展需求,将优势车企的产业链向该国 延伸,使马来西亚可以更加深度参与到中国新能源汽车技术产业体系当中。

Chinese automobiles have gone through a complete landing process in Malaysia, from enterprise acquisition and vehicle export to industry linkage, and then to industrial park construction. This includes long-established enterprises like Changan Automobile as well as pillars of modern Chinese industry like Geely, which grew after the reform and opening up. The process of automobile technology transfer aligns with Malaysia’s automotive development and transformation policies. After experiencing a boom in the 1980s, Malaysia’s automotive industry gradually entered a decline due to the impact of countries like the United States, Japan, and South Korea, along with its own lagging technological development. In 2014, Malaysia introduced a national automotive policy focusing on the use of new energy technologies, aiming to become a production hub for new energy vehicles in the ASEAN region.72 In 2017, China’s Geely Automobile acquired 49.9% of the shares of Proton, Malaysia’s national brand under the diversified resources-heavy industrial holding group DRB-HICOM, marking the beginning of the transfer of Chinese automotive production technology to Malaysia and ushering in a new era for Malaysia’s automotive industry development. From 2018 to 2022, Proton’s sales increased by 118%, ranking second in Malaysia’s domestic market sales and market share for four consecutive years, with the highest overseas export sales. In 2019, Changan Automobile reached an agreement with Malaysia’s Fieldman company, granting it exclusive distribution rights for Changan Automobiles in Malaysia, thereby further entering the Southeast Asian market. In 2020, based on advancements in digital technology, Malaysia proposed a new development plan for next-generation vehicles, mobility as a service, and Industry 4.0.73 In 2022, Fieldman company received an investment of 1 billion Malaysian Ringgit to collaborate with Changan Automobile in building the first electric vehicle assembly plant in the Malacca region.74 In 2023, Geely Holding Group signed a deep cooperation framework agreement with DRB-HICOM to conduct broader cooperation around the construction of Tanjung Malim Automotive High-Tech Valley in Malaysia, aiming to develop this automotive industrial park into a core of R&D and manufacturing for new energy and new technologies in Southeast Asia.75 As a major automotive consumer in the Southeast Asia region, Malaysia’s new energy vehicle market remains a blue ocean, with electric vehicle sales in 2022 increasing by 860% compared to 2021, maintaining a high growth momentum.76

中国汽车在马来西亚经历了由企业收购、整车出口到产业链接,再到产业园区建设的全落地过程,其中既有如长安汽车这样的百年企业,也有吉利这样改革开放之后成长起来的中流砥柱,其汽车技术转移的过程与马来西亚的汽车发展与转型政策相符相合。马来西亚汽车工业经历了 20世纪80 年代的腾飞之后,受到美日韩等国的冲击以及自身技术发展的滞后性逐步进入低谷。2014 年,马来西亚提出了国家汽车政策,开始关注新能源技术的使用,致力于成为东盟地区的新能源汽车生产中心。2017 年, 中国吉利汽车收购了马来西亚民族品牌、多元化资源—重工控股集团( DRB-HICOM,以下简称“ 多元重工集团”) 旗下的宝腾汽车( Proton) 49.9% 的股份,拉开了中国汽车生产技术向马来西亚转移的序幕,也由此开启了马来西亚汽车工业发展的新时代。在2018 年至2022年期间,宝腾汽车销量增长了 118%,连续四年在马来西亚国内市场销量和占有率位列第二, 海外出口销量排名第一。 2019 年,长安汽车与马来西亚菲尔德曼( Fieldman) 公司达成协议,后者获得长安汽车在马来西亚的独家分销权,自此长安汽车进一步走向东南亚市场。2020 年,基于数字技术的进步与发展,马来西亚提出了下一代汽车、出行即服务、工业 4.0在内的新的汽车发展规划。2022 年马来西亚菲尔德曼公司获得了10 亿令吉的投资,准备与长安汽车合作在马六甲地区建设第一家电动汽车组装工厂。2023年,吉利控股集团又与马来西亚多元重工集团签署深化合作框架协议,计划围绕马来西亚丹绒马林汽车高科技谷建设开展更为广泛的合作,力求从产、学、研、城四大维度将该汽车产业园建设成为东南亚新能源和新技术的研发制造核心。作为东南亚地区汽车消费大国,马来西亚的新能源汽车市场仍是一片蓝海,2022 年马来西亚电动汽车销量较2021 年增长了860%,保持着高速增长的势头。

Additionally, the overseas expansion of Chinese automobile companies to Southeast Asia serves as a strategy to counteract the “chip supply cut-off” by the United States and its allies and partners.77 With the automotive industry increasingly recognized as the second largest source of revenue growth by the semiconductor industry due to enhancements in safety performance, infotainment, and electrification levels,78 Malaysia stands as the world’s seventh-largest semiconductor exporter and a major global hub for chip testing and packaging, holding a 13% share of the global market. Automotive collaboration with Malaysia helps China break through the chip blockade. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Malaysia’s semiconductor production reduction caused by the pandemic forced many global mainstream automakers to suspend production lines. Localizing automobile production lines in Malaysia could benefit Chinese new energy vehicle companies in integrating the automotive chip and other industry orders while expanding into the Southeast Asian market. Following the achievements of cooperation in steel and automotive industry parks between China and Malaysia, China further leveraged its integrated advantages in smart cities, promoting technologies like information and communication, artificial intelligence, etc., heavily blocked by the United States, to take root in Malaysia. The cooperation space between the two countries in cross-border e-commerce, traditional enterprise digital transformation, and digital infrastructure further expanded. In May 2019, China’s SenseTime Company signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Malaysia’s G3 Global and China Harbour Engineering Company to jointly build Malaysia’s first artificial intelligence industrial park, which is also the first AI-driven science city in ASEAN. The industrial park is expected to be completed within 5 years, after which it will not only provide Malaysia with talent training in the field of artificial intelligence, technological research, and industrial development to enhance Malaysia’s overall level of artificial intelligence but also explore the development and application of artificial intelligence technology in smart cities and intelligent transportation.79

此外,中国车企出海东南亚也是一项应对美国及其盟友和伙伴对华开展“ 芯片断供” 的应对之策。由于安全性能、信息娱乐和电气化水平的提升,汽车行业已经被半导体业界视为增加收益的第二大驱动力来源。 马来西亚目前不仅是世界第七大半导体出口国,还是全球芯片主要的测试和封装中心之一,占据全球市场份额高达13%,与马来西亚展开汽车合作有利于帮助中国突破“ 芯片” 封锁。 新冠疫情期间,马来西亚受到疫情影响造成芯片减产,使得全球多家主流车企被迫暂停生产线,将汽车生产线本地化迁移到马来西亚,则有利于中国新能源车企在开拓东南亚市场的同时 整合汽车芯片等产业秩序。基于中马两国在钢铁和汽车产业园合作的成果,中国还进一步发挥了自身在智慧城市方面的集成优势,推动信息通信、人工智能等美国重点封锁的技术向马来西亚落地 生根,两国在跨境电子商务、传统企业数字化转型以及数字基础设施等领域的合作空间进一步拓 展。 2019 年5 月,中国商汤科技公司与马来西亚 G3 全球公司( G3 Global) 以及中国港湾工程有限公司签订战略合作协议,共同建设马来西亚第一个人工智能产业园,这也是东盟第一个人工智能驱 动的科技城。 该产业园预计工期为5 年,建成后不仅为马来西亚提供人工智能领域的人才培训、技术研究和产业开发以提高马来西亚整体的人工智能水平,还将探索人工智能技术在智慧城市、智能 出行等方面的发展与应用。

The China-Malaysia industrial parks serve as platforms for technological exchanges and capacity cooperation between China and Malaysia, showing initial success in transitioning from traditional energy and infrastructure to new energy, advanced manufacturing, and high-tech industries. This deepens the level of technological exchange between the two countries, enhancing the coupling of their industrial structures and generating positive external economic benefits in the region. The coordinated and complementary development of different industrial parks, in terms of policy, function, and industry, further connects industrial and supply chains, creating “economic special zones” of technological relevance and forming a “China-Periphery Technology Community.” This achieves a broader integration effect.

当前中国与马来西亚以产业园区为立足点开展的技术交流步伐不断加快,产能合作持续提速, 园区建设已经初见成效,开始从传统能源、基础设施、金属冶炼向新能源、高端制造业和高新产业等 领域布局,中马双方的技术交流层次逐渐加深,双方产业结构耦合度日益提高,在区域内不断产生 正向外部经济效益。 不同产业园间的同频错位发展,在政策、功能、产业层面协调互补,进一步实现了各产业园之间产业链、供应链连接,打造了技术关联的“ 经济特区”,形成了“ 中国—周边技术共同体”,实现了以点穿线、以线织面、以面聚体的效果。

However, there are still risks in China’s industry docking and technological cooperation with Malaysia and other neighboring countries, such as economic risks due to policy differences and insufficient radiative effects of parks, political risks from changes in Malaysia’s ruling party, and cultural risks arising from cultural differences.80 Therefore, China needs to use the Belt and Road Initiative as an opportunity and technology cooperation as an entry point to break through U.S. strategic containment in a misaligned manner, exploring cooperation potentials in new energy, digital infrastructure, 5G, AI, and blockchain that Malaysia is interested in, achieving deep integration of product chains.81 At the same time, China should be aware of the U.S. strategic layout in Southeast Asia, respect and maintain ASEAN’s position in regional affairs to prevent the U.S. from using the South China Sea issue to sow discord between China and Southeast Asian countries, seeking more favorable conditions for developing China-ASEAN and China-Malaysia relations. In the process of technology cooperation and industry docking, with “policy communication” and “people-to-people bonds” as the premise and guarantee, China aims to promote technological communication and industry integration between China and Malaysia.

但是,当前中国与马来西亚等周边国家在进行产业对接、技术合作的过程中仍存在一些需要规 避的风险因素。 例如,由于中马双边政策差异、园区间辐射效应有待加强等原因造成的经济风险, 由于马来西亚执政党更迭导致政策调整带来的政治风险以及中马之间文化差异所引发的文化风 险。因此,中国需要以“ 一带一路” 倡议为契机,以技术合作为切入点,通过“ 链贯通” 实现中国产业技术对美国战略遏制的“ 错位破局”,在马来西亚关注的新能源、数字基建、5G 人工智能、区块链等领域发掘合作潜力,实现产业链深度互嵌。与此同时,中国也应重视美国在东南亚地区的战略布局,在区域事务中,尊重维护东盟的地位,防止美国借助南海问题挑拨中国与东南亚国家的关系, 为发展中国—东盟关系、中马关系争取更有利空间,在技术合作、产业对接的过程中,以“ 政策沟通” 和“ 民心相通” 为前提和保障,推动中马双边实现技术沟通和产业贯通。

IV. Conclusion


From 2013 to 2023, the BRI marked its tenth anniversary. During this period, the United States government’s strategy towards China officially shifted from strategic engagement to strategic competition. The U.S. attitude towards the Belt and Road Initiative changed from initial indifference to tentative engagement and limited resistance, eventually evolving into full-scale opposition. Due to the transition from the Trump to the Biden administration, the U.S. approach to containing China technologically also shifted from unilateralist thoughts of technological and trade wars towards building exclusionary technological alliances based on a “small yard, high fence” model.82 In response to the U.S. technology war, China not only took measures to directly counter U.S. containment strategies but also leveraged the BRI platform to proactively open two “second frontiers.” The first “second frontier” refers to China diffusing its existing mature technologies to third-party countries, gradually establishing a technological interaction system with other countries to provide financial and technological sources for technological autonomy and innovation. The second “second frontier” involves China utilizing its unique geographical advantage in the Asia-Pacific region to establish physical connections in public transportation, information communication, and other dimensions with neighboring countries. These physical connections serve not only as tangible carriers for Chinese technology going overseas but also as physical mediums for technological cooperation with neighboring countries.

2013 年至2023 年,“ 一带一路” 倡议正式提出已满十周年,期间美国政府对华战略也正式由战略接触走向战略竞争,对“ 一带一路” 倡议的态度由最初的“ 不以为意” 调整为试探性接触与有限度抵制,最后发展到全方位抵制。由于特朗普政府与拜登政府政权的更迭,美国对华技术遏制的方式也由以单边主义思维下的科技战、贸易战,转向依托“ 小院高墙” 模式构建排华性技术联盟。中国在应对美国的“ 技术战” 过程中,不但采取措施正面回应美国的遏制策略,而且还依托“ 一带一路” 平台着力发挥自己优势技术和地理位置积极开辟两个“ 第二战场”。第一个“ 第二战场”,是指中国将自己现有的成熟技术向第三方国家扩散,通过技术扩散逐步建立起中国与其他国家的技术互动 体系,为实现技术自主创新提供资金来源和技术来源;第二个“第二战场”,是指中国发挥自身在亚太地区独有的区位优势与周边国家建立公共交通、信息通信等多个维度的物理连接,上述物理连接 既是中国技术出海的有形载体,也是中国与周边国家开展技术合作的实体媒介。

The United States initiated a trade war against China and pursued comprehensive “decoupling” in technology, aiming to squeeze China out of the current global industrial chain. To this end, the United States laid out multiple strategies, including the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Blue Dot Network, Build Back Better World, AUKUS, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, to prevent China’s influence from expanding in Southeast Asia, making the region a convergence zone for China’s BRI and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy.83 Laos serves as the overseas starting point of the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor and plays a crucial role in promoting the “Lancang-Mekong Cooperation” mechanism with the Indochina Peninsula region. Thailand, as the geographical hub of the Indochina Peninsula and the fastest country in Southeast Asia to transform its digital economy, along with Malaysia and Indonesia, are key nodes connecting China with Singapore on the economic corridor and are mature countries in industrial cooperation with China. Although not discussed in this article, other countries, despite different national conditions, share similar demands for technological development and hold the same expectations for the role of the BRI in investment, financing, and technological cooperation. Under the push of the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approved 202 projects from 2016 to 2022, with financing amounting to over $38.8 billion, benefiting 33 countries.84 Leveraging platforms like the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund, China and neighboring countries jointly constructed projects such as the China-Laos Railway, China-Thailand Railway, and Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway, as well as roads, ports, airports, and bridges. These projects not only provided a vast demand space for Chinese technological products in neighboring markets but also drove regional economic cooperation and the integration of industrial technologies within the region.

美国发动对华贸易战,再到中美技术的全面“ 脱钩”,对华遏制的重要目标是将中国挤出当下的全球产业链。 为此,美国层层布局,提出了“ 印太战略” “ 蓝点网络” “ 重建更美好世界” “ 美英澳三边安全联盟” 和“ 印太经济框架” 等一揽子计划,以阻止中国影响力在东南亚地区扩展,东南亚地区也由此成为了中国“ 一带一路” 倡议与美国“ 印太战略” 的交汇区。老挝是中国—中南半岛经济走廊的海外起点,也是中国与中南半岛地区推动“ 澜湄合作” 机制的重要国家;泰国既是中南半岛的地理枢纽国家,也是东南亚数字经济转型最快的国家,马来西亚、印度尼西亚是该经济走廊上 连接中国与新加坡的关键节点,也是中国推动产业合作较为成熟的国家,文中未曾讨论的国家尽管 与上述国家国情不尽相同,但是对于国家技术发展却有相似诉求,对“ 一带一路” 倡议在投资融资、技术合作等领域发挥的作用有相同期待。 在“ 一带一路” 倡议推动下,亚洲基础设施投资银行从2016 年至2022 年共批准项目202 个、融资金额超过 388 亿美元、惠及国家多达 33 个。 依托“ 亚投行”“丝路基金”等平台,中国与周边国家共建的中老铁路、中泰铁路、雅万高铁以及公路、码头、机场、桥梁,为中国相关技术产品进入周边市场提供了广阔的需求空间,同时也带动了区域经济协 同发展与地区内产业技术融合。

At this stage, the U.S. government’s containment strategy towards China is not limited to areas where Chinese technology is mature. The “technological fulcrums” that China seeks to breakthrough U.S. technological containment in neighboring countries, as discussed in this article, are focused on this aspect. How China uses the BRI platform to break through U.S. containment in technological fields where it has not yet gained an advantage is a direction for future research. Additionally, how to involve third-party partners and avoid potential risks in technological cooperation in the surrounding region are also directions for continuous in-depth study.

现阶段美国政府对华开展遏制战略的技术领域并非仅局限于中国技术成熟的领域,而本文所 讨论的中国利用“ 错位竞争” 的方式在周边国家寻求突破美国技术遏制的“ 技术支点” 也正是聚焦于此。 在中国并未取得优势的技术领域,中国如何利用“ 一带一路” 平台实现对美遏制的战略突围,是本课题接下来要研究的方向。 此外,对于如何引入第三方合作伙伴、规避在周边地区技术合作中所出现的各种潜在风险,亦是可以持续深入研究的方向。

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部彦君 (Bu Yanjun), 高程 (Gao Cheng), 薛琳 (Xue Lin). "The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s Breakthrough of United States Technology Containment – Taking China’s Cooperation with Southeast Asia as an Example [“ 一带一路” 建设与中国破局美国技术遏制 ———以中国与东南亚地区合作为例]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in Southeast Asian Affairs [南洋问题研究], September 30, 2023

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