The Biden administration will soon complete its first year, and its China policy is already basically clear. Chinese leaders have made many earnest efforts to work on [the relationships with] the United States and have emphasized that the stability and development of Sino-U.S. relations are not an “optional question”, but a “required question” indispensable to the historical trend of peace and prosperity of the two peoples and the world. However, the Biden administration proceeds from the maintenance of the hegemonic position and interests of the United States. Based on the facts of “internal turmoil” (内卷化) such as severe political and social opposition and division, the severe COVID-19 pandemic, and the high inflation rate in the United States, they are trying to use the policy of comprehensive and in-depth confrontation and suppression of China to score a political victory (执政亮点). They also want to restore the central role of the United States in the global high-tech manufacturing production chain and supply chain through a hard-line “decoupling” policy towards China. In doing so, the United States intends to substantially weaken China’s manufacturing upgrade and high-tech progress, in an attempt to reopen the gap in power between the United States and China.

The previous U.S. policy of engagement with China has been replaced by a multi-pronged policy of comprehensively suppressing China’s rise. This is the inevitable choice of the United States to combat China’s rising momentum and increasing power. The high-tech R&D and cutting-edge manufacturing fields have actually become the main battlefields of the United State’s “new containment strategy” against China. In order to achieve this strategic aim, the Biden administration emphasized that the main competition in the world today is the contest between the United States and Western democracies with “heterogeneous” (异质) countries represented by China and Russia. They will not hesitate to “demonize” China so that the United States can win over its allies and partner countries to form an “Anti-China Alliance.” At the same time, Biden has advocated the adoption of a series of legislative measures in the United States to improve infrastructure and increase social spending and calls for plans such as “Build Back Better World” (B3W), paving the way for the “reindustrialization” of the United States.

The Biden administration’s China policy already has the basic characteristics of a coordinated domestic and international initiative to combat and contain China on all sides. This is exactly the meaning of “extreme competition” with China as declared by Biden. In response to this, we need accurate, in-depth, and objective analysis and judgment. Sino-U.S. relations already cannot return to their former state. In response to the United States multi-pronged attack and wide-ranging suppression, China must consider and formulate long-term and strategic response strategies.

I. The Biden Administration’s China Strategy: “Four-Pronged Approach” of Human Rights, Security, Economy, and Technology

Since the end of the Cold War, and even in the era of engagement with China, the China policies of successive U.S. administrations have, without exception, placed equal emphasis on economic cooperation and the national security interest of “marking China” [盯防中国, sports term meaning marking the strongest player out for special attention of the defense]. Even in the 1990s, when Clinton reinstated China’s most-favored-nation status for trade, welcomed China’s “accession to the WTO,” expanded Sino-U.S. economic and trade exchanges, and accepted Chinese investment in the United States, China was always the country with the second-strictest controls in the U.S. export control list. In its engagement with China, the United States’ policy has always been to prohibit the export of military technology and equipment to China, as well as the export of dual-use technologies. In other words, even with the rapid expansion and improvement of Sino-U.S. trade and economic exchanges starting in the late 1990s, China has always been the object of severe scrutiny on the U.S. national security agenda, and restricting the upgrade of China’s armaments and strategic competitiveness has always been a core element of U.S. policy toward China.

In addition to China, by the mid-1990s, two important factors—the threat to national security in international economic competition and the pursuit of U.S. hegemony—have always driven the basic response whereby U.S. policymakers focused on maintaining the U.S.-dominated unipolar structures after the Cold War by integrating economic and security policies. The place of economic security in the national security strategy of the United States has never been overlooked. The Biden administration’s current suppression of China in economics and advanced technology is a unilateral and hegemonic approach aimed at the legitimate commercial competitiveness of the Chinese economy and the unobstructed expansion of “national security” (国家安全化, national securitization) to encompass the economy and technology.

For the United States, as the defending hegemonic power since World War II, economic security has always been the pillar of U.S. national security. Edward Mead Earle pointed out that the relationship between the economy and security “has been the most critical and fascinating issue in statecraft since the rise of nation-states, the expansion of European civilization, the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution, and the steady improvement of military technology.” [Translator’s note: The original source of most quotations from English sources in this document could not be found due to the lack of references. In these cases, the Chinese translation has been translated back into English] With the end of the Cold War, the boundaries between Eastern and Western countries disappeared, globalization accelerated, the degree of interdependence among countries has continued to deepen, and economic security has gradually separated from military security to become a relatively independent field, receiving increasing attention by American policymakers. This is intuitively reflected in the National Security Strategies submitted to Congress by successive U.S. presidents.

The Reagan administration suggested that the United States’ “reliance on foreign supply sources has increased in many key areas, and potential supply chain vulnerabilities are a problem deserving attention.” The Clinton administration gave the connection between the economy and national security greater status, arguing that the United States’ “economic and security interests are inextricably linked. Prosperity at home depends on our leadership in the global economy. The strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military, the attractiveness of our values abroad all depend in part on the strength of our economy.” Although the Obama administration had experienced the impact of the financial crisis, it still emphasized the liberal international order and believed that, “the U.S. economy is not only an engine of global economic growth and a source of stability for the international system, but also a key indicator of our military strength and diplomatic influence. A strong economy combined with the United States’ prominent position in the international financial system will effectively enhance national security.”

The Trump administration, which came to power in 2017, started from a value system of populism, white supremacy, and American exceptionalism on the right wing of the Republican Party and pursued the domestic and foreign policy of “America First.” This had a subversive impact on the traditional liberal internationalist diplomacy of the United States. The Trump administration emphasized: “Economic security is an important part of national security, and economic means have also become an important component of a country’s diplomatic means.” After Biden took office, he emphasized that the United States should return to “world leadership,” and attempted to change the negative impression that the unilateralism and new isolationism in U.S. diplomacy during the Trump administration had on the world. However, the Biden administration inherited the Trump administration’s emphasis that U.S. national security needs to fully return to the “state-centric” mode of struggle in the face of China’s rise. From the very beginning of his presidency, Biden made it clear that economic security is national security and that the “traditional boundaries between domestic and foreign policy and between national security, economic security, health security, and environmental security should be broken down to deal with the current new situation.”

The evolution of the U.S. national security strategy not only shows Washington’s changing perception of its own internal and external situations, but also the centrality of the strategy to maintain U.S. hegemony. Even more, it has determined the United States’ revaluation of Sino-U.S. economic and trade relations—from a ballast stone in bilateral relations, they have become a “direct threat” to U.S. national security. In the face of a powerful rising China, the United States has historically “redefined” China—A China that is starting to become strong is a “heterogeneous” country that “intentionally” challenges the current international order and competes with the United States for dominance in international affairs. Since the late Obama administration, the United States began to domestically question and reconsider its China policy. After Trump took office, he officially characterized China as a “revisionist country” and a primary “strategic competitor.” The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy report states: “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” The Biden administration more explicitly stated that: “China, in particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” “Dealing with China’s challenge” has become the basic consensus of U.S. political and academic circles across the left, center, and right.

The Biden administration’s “Four-Pronged Approach” in its strategic competition with China is precisely the result of the fact that the United States is aware that Sino-U.S. economic and trade relations represent the world’s largest trading partnership and there is currently massive trade dependence on China from East Asia to Europe. It is an attempt to start again from a strategy of prioritizing U.S. national security interests, limit and reduce the commercial dependence of the United States and its European and East Asian allies on China, try to reduce the economic costs of the strategic confrontation with China, and curb the momentum of China’s rise in the industrial and high-tech fields. To this end, the Biden administration’s “strategic competition” with China, on the one hand, draws ideological lines and organizes geopolitical “cliques”. On the other hand, it starts with the simultaneous separation between geoeconomics and geotechnology and creation of confrontation, simultaneously suppresses China from the “four major areas” of human rights, security, economics and trade, and science and technology, and plan a geostrategic layout to allow the United States to continue to isolate and contain China.

The cross-spatial nature of high-tech competition has changed the traditional geopolitical model of great power competition, with the importance of seizing strategic locations dropping significantly and the losses incurred by military occupation of raw material sources increasingly outweighing the gains. Advanced technology has amplified long-range force projection capabilities and long-range military strike capabilities, making territorial competition no longer necessary. The pattern of geographic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World during the Cold War no longer has any meaning in contemporary times. Unlike the competition between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, the current competition between China and the United States must be considered in the context of the “Fourth Industrial Revolution.” Klaus Schwab has pointed out that all the new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, Internet of Things, autonomous driving, 3D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage, and quantum computing that together drive the so-called “Fourth Industrial Revolution” will become key factors in great-power competition in the new era. The current competition between China and the United States is a multi-dimensional and comprehensive competition in the fields of security and economics. As a key link between the two fields of security and economics, advanced technology is becoming the main field of great-power competition between China and the United States, and completion for dominance in the field of advanced technology has become the focus of current Sino-U.S. competition.

First, high-tech and cutting-edge manufacturing has become the core driving force for the strategic capacity building of great powers. Kenneth Waltz has pointed out that the U.S.-Soviet arms race during the Cold War was “the largest-scale use of military technology at the forefront of science and technology to widen the gap with opponents. Moreover, these modern weapon systems raised the threshold for other countries to join the superpower club. Unable to approach the technological R&D level of the United States and the Soviet Union, middle powers will continue to lag behind.” Winning a dominant position in military power by promoting the iterative update of military technology was the internal driving force of U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War. With the decline of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, it no longer had the ability to challenge the United States in the field of science and technology, and Japan, which had the ability to challenge the United States in the field of science and technology, was a staunch ally of the United States and did not pose a security threat. In the 1990s, the prosperity of the Internet economy and the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe objectively promoted the accelerated development of globalization and brought about the global spread of emerging technologies. Assisted by the international trade system and the global division of industrial labor system formed after World War II, emerging technologies have gradually spread to all countries as part of global industrial transfers. This has also profoundly changed the internal driving force of strategic competition among great powers.

The difference between Sino-U.S. great-power competition and U.S.-Soviet competition of hegemony is that competition between China and the United States focuses more on the use of advanced technology to develop their own economies to gain economic power. Rather than a competition for military dominance, it is a competition for economic leadership. At the same time, advanced technology is also constantly promoting the upgrade of military equipment and thus affecting the balance of power between China and the United States. China’s great progress in high-tech fields has not only driven the development of related industries and reduced its gap with the United States, but also allowed China to achieve the modernization and upgrading of military equipment by leveraging its scientific and technological progress, giving it the ability to threaten American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. The dual role of advanced technology in the economic and security fields makes it the core and internal driving force of the strategic power of today’s great powers.

In addition, the policy and strategy elites of the Biden administration are very clear that, without the gradual “de-Sinification” of advanced technology and production chains, the United States will always have to bear a high price in strategic confrontation with China. In the current strategic competition between China and the United States, in addition to the “Three Seas Linkage” (三海联动) tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea and the increased U.S. military pressure on China, the openness and cooperation in the fields of economics and science and technology is still a force fighting against locking-out and decoupling. The Trump administration’s measures to contain China’s rise are mainly manifested in the unilateral reliance of the United States on its dominant position to carry out a hegemonic trade war against China and impose sanctions on Huawei and other Chinese high-tech companies. Ignoring WTO rules and related international norms and restrictions, they attempted to achieve the comprehensive suppression of China in economics and science and technology. However, while adopting a hard-line policy toward China, the Trump administration alienated allies and “withdrew” from international organizations. As a result, they were criticized that their China policy was more of an attitude than a strategy. After Biden took office, the U.S. policy of strategic competition with China positioned the Sino-U.S. relationship as a relationship of “competitive interdependence,” focusing on coordinating and organizing its allies and partner countries to build an “anti-China alliance.” The Biden administration has not only indiscriminately attacked China’s human rights, but also defined China’s policy of economic and trade openness as “aggressive and coercive abuse of economic power” that is a violation of “intellectual property rights and global governance.” At the same time, when it is in the interests of the United States, China is required to strengthen cooperation with the United States on issues such as climate change and nuclear arms control. Biden’s policy of “strategic competition” with China emphasizes “Build Back Better World” plans to spur domestic economic resurgence, such as increasing infrastructure improvements, expanding social spending, and rebuilding the U.S. high-tech industrial economy. This is supplemented by practices such as uniting allies and partners, renewing its role in international organizations, and restoring the U.S. international reputation damaged by Trump. Together, this is an attempt to comprehensively consolidate and expand the strategic advantages of the United States relative to China.

Based on such strategic intentions, the Biden administration, in politics, [seeks to] take ideology as its starting point, build consensus at home to promote the formation of a policy system of “coordination of the government and society” (府会协同), and build an “alliance of democratic countries” abroad to jointly fight against a “heterogeneous” China. Economically, [the administration seeks to] increase investment in domestic infrastructure and key industries to enhance domestic economic competitiveness, increase the protection of core technologies through the approach of “exclusive yards with high walls” [小院高墙, a new term from Xi Jinping’s speech to the World Economic Forum], widen the technological gap with China, and maintain a long-term competitive advantage over China. Militarily, [the administration seeks to] consolidate and expand the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific region, make full use of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea bilateral alliances, upgrade the “quadrilateral mechanism” among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, and activate the intelligence sharing function of the “Five Eyes alliance” to create a wall of encirclement around China. In the field of economy and security, [the administration seeks to] rationalize the legal basis for sanctions imposed by the executive branch, coordinate with Congress to enact legislation, and cut off China’s military-civil fusion development path as a means to hinder China’s military scientific and technological progress and military modernization. In this series of deployments, the comprehensive containment of China in the high-tech field has become the focus of the Biden administration’s China policy.

II. Basic Practices of the Biden Administration’s Policy of Suppressing China

Since the Biden administration came to power, it has continued to implement the strategy of “decoupling” from China in fields that are of core significance to future global industrial development, such as 5G, chips, electric vehicles, renewable energy technologies, and products, using human rights and security as a pretext. This is done to ensure the re-emergence in the United States of the industrial policies and green economy policies pushed by Biden after taking office and to ensure the dominant position of the United States in the global manufacturing landscape. To this end, Biden is trying to build an institutionalized policy system for competition with China through Congress, simultaneously working to unite allies to jointly contain China, and conducting strategic competition with China in the field of science and technology based on the idea of “extreme competition.”

First, they are trying to create a hard-line anti-China legislative system featuring “coordination of the government and society.” Following the tone set by the United States’ smearing of human rights in China, they have continuously launched related projects that restrict or even prohibit normal business, investment, technology, and educational exchanges between the United States and China, and through various legislative measures, the exchanges and connections that have been formed between the two countries have been vigorously reduced within the U.S. government and social system. At present, the Democratic Party has a majority in both the House of Representatives and Senate. Before the 2022 mid-term congressional elections, the Biden administration has a window in which it can continuously obtain legislative approval and support for its policy agenda. The Biden administration is working hard to bring together majorities in both houses of Congress in the form of a bipartisan bill to build an institutional system that suppresses Chinese advanced technology, restricts normal exchanges between the two countries, and carries out excessive “national securitization” in relations with China. The U.S. Senate passed the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021 (USICA) on June 8, 2021, with a vote of 68 to 32. This bill, which is exceptional for its extremely targeted nature, aims to expand investment in industry and science and technology in order to meet the challenge posed by China. Biden praised this as the result of a bipartisan effort. The USICA also includes main elements of his “American Jobs Plan.” On August 10 of the same year, after months of bipartisan negotiations, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act passed the Senate by a vote of 69 to 30. Biden pointed out that, along with his push to “Build Back Better World,” the infrastructure investment plan will create approximately 2 million jobs each year over the next decade. To reduce resistance, Biden did not hesitate to focus the investments in the bill on the core infrastructure areas that Republicans value more, and correspondingly reduce investment in areas of more concern to Democrats such as climate change, racial equality, and health care.

Creating a policy system of “coordination of the government and society” is an important means for the Biden administration to maintain long-term and institutionalized competition with China in science and technology. The infrastructure bills and innovation policies promoted by the Biden administration are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Because the development of manufacturing is inseparable from a sound and developed infrastructure network, innovation policies not only can drive economic development and create jobs, but also help constrain China’s momentum in core science and technology areas. Therefore, in the process of medium and long-term strategic competition, they will continuously improve the inherent competitiveness of U.S. science and technology and industry.

Second, they are trying to form an “alliance of democratic countries” in the field of science and technology in an attempt to unite more countries in the production chain and supply chain to build “exclusive yards with high walls” directly targeting China. Biden appreciates the strategic significance of his system of allies in containing China. He has said that the allies Canada, Mexico, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, NATO, Japan, South Korea, and Australia are “the most important assets of the United States.” At the Munich Security Conference, Biden said that they must prepare for a long-term strategic competition with China. This requires a reliance on the global system that the United States has shaped over the past 70 years with allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. The Biden administration hopes to build a so-called “alliance of democratic countries” against China under the banners of “democracy” and “human rights” while investing heavily in innovation and infrastructure domestically to revitalize key industries. The “Democratic Ten” (D-10) is a typical example: With the G7 as its main entities, it unites the European Union, Australia, and South Korea to form a group of strategically like-minded and globally influential countries to resist the challenges posed by China and Russia. The D-10 forms technology initiatives to develop conventional standards and more resilient supply chains for advanced technologies, provides channels for rebuilding free and fair trade, and proposes climate initiatives to upgrade green technologies. The Biden administration’s promotion of “values diplomacy” (价值观外交) is an important practice of its multilateral diplomacy strategy. In the field of science and technology, they are putting together a so-called “democratic alliance” to fight against “heterogeneous” China. In essence, they are trying to constrict China’s development space in the field of science and technology, widen the technological gap between China and the United States, and contain the momentum of China’s rise in the high-tech sector.

The “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” (Quad) of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia has also added new cooperation topics such as climate change, vaccines, cutting-edge technologies, and infrastructure since the Biden administration took office. This means that the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy not only has a geopolitical alliance posture and a military “anti-China alliance,” but also attempts to build a geoeconomic and geotechnical “anti-China alliance.” On September 24, 2021, the four heads of state of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia held an offline meeting in Washington for the first time. In addition to focusing on traditional topics such as the pandemic, infrastructure, climate, and education, they also expanded the scope of topics to emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and space. Among these topics, with regard to cooperation in the field of technology, it is clearly stated that a joint statement of the four countries will be issued, announcing the establishment of a technical standards liaison group, the launch of semiconductor supply chain initiatives, support for 5G deployment and diversification, and monitoring of biotechnology scanning. The expansion of the functions of the “Quad mechanism” is the result of the Biden administration’s expansion of the boundaries of technological alliances and the formation of a more comprehensive technology and high-tech industry “firewall” against China. It is also a new method in the U.S. science and technology war against China.

On September 29, 2021, the United States and the European Union (EU) announced the establishment of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). This council will set up ten working groups and strengthen U.S.-EU cooperation in areas such as technology standards, clean technology, supply chain security, ICTS competitiveness, data governance and technology platforms, improper use of technology to threaten security and human rights, export controls, investment reviews, facilitating access to digital tools by SMEs, and global trade challenges. Because Trump’s trade war with China has had little effect, the first phase of the Economic and Trade Agreement signed by the two countries has not been properly implemented due to the impact of the epidemic, and France, Germany, and other EU countries have also avoided launching a full-scale “new cold war” with China, the Biden administration and the EU established the TTC with the aim of narrowing the scope of the attack, selecting key fields of strategic significance, and uniting allies to jointly deal with an “unnamed” adversary—China. The United States is not only winning over Europe, but also stirring up trouble in Asia-Pacific. On October 27, 2021, Biden proposed the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” initiative at the East Asia Summit and announced that the United States and its partners would formulate common goals in trade facilitation, digital economy and technology standards, supply chain resilience, low-carbon and clean energy, infrastructure, labor standards, and other areas of mutual interest under the framework. Biden did not elaborate on the specific content and goals of the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” initiative at the East Asia Summit. However, over the next two months, senior officials such as Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Commerce Raimondo occasionally revealed new information about the framework during their visits to Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries. Although the details of the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” initiative have not been fully disclosed, the initiative reveals that the Biden administration’s version of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” has begun to significantly add economic and technological bargaining chips. It is a geoeconomic tactic employed by the United States in an attempt to use its allies and partners to weaken and put pressure on China’s current position in the Asia-Pacific economy.

Third, arbitrarily trampling on international norms, they are relying on domestic U.S. laws to comprehensively escalate the science and technology warfare, corporate warfare, financial warfare, and cultural and educational warfare against China. The basic method of the Biden administration’s “extreme competition” with China in the field of science and technology is the attempt to completely ban previously normal contacts and exchanges between China and the United States in the field of advanced technology and continuing the Trump administration’s model of excessive “security-driven” (安全化) thinking. In particular, they have adopted an insane “exclusion policy” for companies, research institutions, and universities that have ties to or cooperate with the Chinese military. After Biden took office, the authority to formulate the “Military End User” List was transferred from the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense to the Department of the Treasury. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Treasury Department is responsible for the dynamic adjustment of the “Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industry Complex Companies List” (NS-CMIC List). This will help to rationalize the legal basis for the list. Previously, the legal basis for the list was partly derived from executive orders by the President and partly from legislation by Congress, with the issuance of many different directives. Now, it is uniformly enforced by OFAC in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations.

At the same time, the new “Entity List” released by the U.S. Department of Commerce imposes sanctions on Chinese companies on the grounds of so-called human rights issues in the Xinjiang region and “military involvement.” Judging from the dynamics of adjustments to the “Chinese Military-Industrial Complex” list and the “Entity List,” the Biden administration, while continuing the Trump administration’s thinking as regards sanctions against China, is also making efforts to reduce the arbitrariness of the sanctions list, enhance the coherence of policies, find a “just cause” [师出有名, can also mean a plausible pretext], and strengthen the legal basis for the release of the list.

At the same time, the Biden administration has comprehensively obstructed or even cut off scientific, cultural, and educational exchanges between the two countries. On May 29, 2020, the Trump administration issued an executive order suspending the entry of Chinese students and researchers into the United States, giving the justification that Chinese exchange students stole sensitive U.S. technology to promote the Chinese military modernization. At the same time, the “Seven Sons of National Defense” [国防七子, Chinese universities with close ties to the military] were included in the Entity List, and Chinese students and researchers from national defense universities became the “hardest hit area.” The Biden administration has continued this policy and uses it as an important means of restraining China’s scientific and technological development: From May 4 of the year the U.S. embassy restarted the approval of visa applications to mid-June, the student visa applications of more than 500 Chinese students were rejected. By looking at the distribution of the types of students whose visas were blocked, we can see they have the following characteristics: students from a national defense university or funded by the China Scholarship Council with research fields involving advanced and cutting-edge technology fields such as quantum computing, big data, semiconductors, biotechnology, 5G, nuclear technology, aerospace technology, and AI.

Obstructing and comprehensively restricting the normal education and scientific research exchanges between China and the United States in science and engineering majors was one of the important measures in the Trump administration’s science and technology warfare against China. However, due to the obstacle posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the effect of these policies only materialized under the Biden administration. The scientific research levels and training systems of American colleges and universities in the fields of cutting-edge science and technology are the best in the world. Biden’s move is undoubtedly intended to “take the firewood from under the cauldron” [釜底抽薪, solve a problem at its root] by attacking China in the areas of basic scientific research and talent training in order to weaken China’s scientific research potential.

Fourth, the Biden administration is attempting to “marginalize” China and vigorously promoting their global right to formulate technical standards in order to further restrict the development of innovation in China’s high-tech industries. The Trump administration believed that the Chinese government and enterprises cooperated to compete for dominance in the international market and expand their influence in international institutions and industry organizations. Viewing normal market behavior with such a Cold War mentality inevitably led them to take a hostile view of the achievements of Chinese companies in setting technical standards. Huawei represents the technological peak achieved by Chinese companies in the 5G field. In addition to seizing market share from companies in developed countries, more importantly, Huawei has seized the right to formulate some technical standards in this field, which resulted in frantic suppression by the Trump administration. After taking office, in an exclusive interview with CBS, Biden proposed that he would focus on international rules and conduct “extreme competition” with China. In terms of the fight for the right to set international technical standards, the Biden administration, on the one hand, retained the “security list” (安全清单) initiated by Trump and continued to disrupt the global supply chains of Chinese high-tech companies such as Huawei. On the other hand, at the Munich Security Conference, they called for U.S.-EU cooperation in the fields of cyberspace, AI, and biotechnology to jointly shape industry rules for advanced technologies and behavioral norms. At the U.S.-EU summit, Biden made full use of multilateral and bilateral dialogue mechanisms to repair and strengthen transatlantic relations and advocated for the establishment of a high-level U.S.-EU trade and technology council to strengthen coordination on international standard formulation for AI, Internet of Things, and other emerging technologies.

Technical standards are the basic architecture of industry development and directly affect the position of enterprises in the production chain and value chain. To seize the right to formulate international standards is to master the commanding heights of an industry and the right to have an international voice. This is extremely important for economic interests and strategic significance. The Biden administration is uniting its allies to compete for the right to set standards, which will help developed Western countries maintain their status in the global industrial division of labor system. This is done to achieve the strategic aim of confining Chinese high-tech enterprises to the middle and low end of the global value chain and maintain the technological hegemony of the United States.

Fifth, since the Biden administration took office, it has continued to challenge the bottom line of the one-China policy on the Taiwan issue, encouraged NATO countries to intervene in disputes in the South China Sea, and vigorously strengthened its military presence in the Western Pacific. The posture of military deterrence and containment towards China is becoming increasingly obvious. Of particular note is that the United States is constantly using strategic bargaining chips from the period of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and even increasing the geoeconomic implications of the Indo-Pacific strategy to create a dual geopolitical and geoeconomic split in the Asia-Pacific region. This has become an obvious sign that, although the United States says it is currently opposed to a “new Cold War”, the fact is that it is actually preparing to launch a “new Cold War” against China. In September 2021, the United States signed the Trilateral Security Partnership (AUKUS) with Australia and the United Kingdom, committing to build and equip Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet. The significance of AUKUS is that it enhances Australia’s military capabilities to counter the rise of Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific region. The conclusion of the AUKUS agreement is an important sign that the United States views the Asia-Pacific region as the core region for the “new Cold War” with China. During the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the United States established the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) for the purpose of defending against the “communist threat.” The signing of the AUKUS agreement signifies that the United States is trying to regroup its strategic assets from the Cold War to contain China. The Quad mechanism of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia that the Biden administration is striving to promote is an attempt to create an Asian version of NATO in the Asia-Pacific region and expand the U.S.-led bilateral alliance to a so-called system of multilateral military alliances to jointly confront China.

Although the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy report has yet to be released, its Indo-Pacific strategy will naturally be an enhanced version of the Trump-era Indo-Pacific strategy. Its core content is not only the addition of the “Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative” that marks out China as the focus of the global security strategy, but there are also diplomatic and military actions to encourage EU and NATO member states to intervene in regional security hotspots such as the South China Sea. It also has geoeconomic competition tactics that attempt to restore U.S. dominance in commercial and trade relations in the Asia-Pacific region, reduce the economic dependence of countries in the region on China, and force more countries to “choose sides” between the United States and China.

III. Dilemmas Facing the Biden Administration’s China Policy

Compared with that of the Trump administration, the Biden administration’s China policy is long-term, comprehensive, and strategic in nature, and its methods and practices are also more vicious. However, the Biden administration still faces many domestic and international uncertainties if it wants to implement a “new Cold War” against Chinese advanced technology and industry in the short term.

First, after Biden took office, he tried to maintain the unity of the Democratic Party in order to push Congress to pass two important bills, the USICA and the Infrastructure Law, but the Democratic Party was divided over the issue of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan: This led Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez, who is also a Democrat, publicly questioned the Biden administration’s hasty withdrawal of troops. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed publicly condemned the failure of the Democratic and Republican administrations in Afghanistan over the past 20 years and said he would hold a hearing on the matter. Republican lawmakers also questioned the Biden administration’s handling of the Afghan withdrawal.

At the same time as the internal divisions within the Democratic Party, social dissatisfaction in the United States is also rising. According to a Gallup poll, due to the issue of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the satisfaction of the U.S. public with Biden’s administration dropped to 43%, and more than half of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction for the first time, reaching 53%. Together the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the failure of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan have created the current predicament faced by the Biden administration, but domestic social problems obviously have a more serious impact on the Biden administration. In the 2022 congressional midterm elections, it remains to be seen whether the Democratic Party can retain its majority of seats, and the goal of “coordination of the government and society” will test the ability of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Party Whip James Cliburn to keep the members of their own party in line for a relatively long time. However, the more important issue is whether members of Congress and voters will be satisfied with the Biden administration’s achievements in domestic and foreign affairs.

Second, the implementation of various domestic economic agendas in the Biden administration has met strong resistance, and the existing plan to reshape domestic economic competitiveness faces intense opposition from the Republican Party. Significant uncertainty remains as to whether Biden will be able to achieve his high-tech investment and manufacturing center goals during his presidency. If the Biden administration fails to make voters truly appreciate the practical benefits brought about by policies such as the infrastructure bill and innovation bill before the 2022 congressional midterm elections, this together with the impact of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan on the reputation of the Biden administration, will likely cause the Democratic Party to lose control of Congress, thereby impacting the advancement of subsequent Biden administration policies. On October 12, 2021, the House of Representatives passed a bill to raise the debt ceiling by U.S. $480 billion, so the Biden administration was able to avoid a shutdown on October 18. However, with the debt ceiling, it is difficult to support the long-term operation of the government, so this was only a short-term solution. As the “big deadline” approached on December 15th, Democrats passed legislation in the House to provide a “one-time” fast-track for bills raising the debt ceiling—A simple majority in the Senate was needed to pass the bill, allowing Congress to pass a bill that would increase the debt ceiling by U.S. $2.5 trillion and avoid a government shutdown. Whether the Biden administration can properly handle the domestic governance crisis and the crisis of confidence will directly affect whether the Democratic Party can maintain its majority after the 2022 midterm elections. If the Democrats lose their majority in Congress, the Republican-led Congress is bound to frustrate Biden’s efforts for the “coordination of the government and society.” This would also adversely affect plans to rebuild the competitiveness of the domestic economy.

Third, from the Asia-Pacific to Europe, it remains to be seen whether industrialized countries and many developing countries will follow the lead of the United States. As long as China steadily follows its own path, the United States cannot kidnap the hold the world hostage to its hegemonic interests. Biden visited Europe from June 9 to 16, 2021. This was his first trip abroad as president, showing Biden’s emphasis on European allies and his determination to repair transatlantic relations. However, it will be difficult for U.S.-European relations to go back to their previous state. Since the pandemic, the United States and major European countries face the risk of political polarization and social disunity. The increasing inward focus of the various countries has hindered the introduction of foreign policy, the investment of resources, and the implementation of concrete actions. The coordination of U.S. and European interests is confronted with structural contradictions. The room for maneuver and sustainability of U.S. concessions to Europe are uncertain, and it will be difficult to maintain the U.S.-European diplomatic alignment over the long term. The “Quad Mechanism” is trying to become an “Asian version of NATO” to contain China, but U.S. experts have also commented that the “Quad Mechanism” looks more like a loose organization such as the “BRICs” that have trouble working together. Biden wants to build an anti-China alliance. On December 9-10, 2021, the U.S. government held a farcical online “Democracy Summit” attended by more than 110 countries and regions from around the world. Even the U.S. media was full of complaints about the summit, pointing out that, given the tarnished state of America’s own democracy and the world’s still-difficult task of fighting the pandemic, it was a completely inappropriate moment to hold a “Democracy Summit” along ideological lines. The Chinese government firmly pointed out that such a loose “Democracy Summit” aimed at China and Russia was more of a geopolitical farce. The series of unilateral foreign policies such as Trump’s “withdrawal of international organizations” and “broken treaties” has shaken the foundation of the U.S. alliance system and its control over international mechanisms to a certain extent. This makes it actually difficult to simultaneously achieve the strategic intents of restoring U.S. influence and building a values-based alliance system to contain China. The United States wants to force more countries to side with it in the Sino-U.S. strategic competition, which is even more damaging to world stability and prosperity. On December 26, 2021, Chey Tae-won, Chairman of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Chairman of SK Group, loudly accused the United States of suppressing China in the high-tech field in the Korean media, claiming they were trying to bring a “new Cold War” to the global supply chain.

Fourth, a “complete decoupling” from China’s economy and technology would be difficult to achieve. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic wreaking havoc around the world, it is not realistically practical to exclude China from the world supply chain system. According to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of China, in the first half of 2021, the total import and export value of China’s trade in goods was CNY 18.07 trillion, a year-on-year increase of 27.1%. Specifically, exports were CNY 9.85 trillion, an increase of 28.1%; and imports were CNY 8.22 trillion, an increase of 25.9%. Compared with the same period in 2019, combined imports and exports, exports, and imports increased by 22.8%, 23.8%, and 21.7% respectively. Specifically, imports and exports to China’s top three trading partners, ASEAN, the EU, and the United States were CNY 2.66 trillion, CNY 2.52 trillion, and CNY 2.21 trillion, an increase of 27.8%, 26.7%, and 34.6% respectively. Imports and exports to Japan were CNY 1.18 trillion, an increase of 14.5%. These data points show that third-party countries other than China and the United States have difficulty choosing between “values diplomacy” and economic reality. China is one of the few countries that has effectively controlled the domestic epidemic and restored production in an orderly manner. The majority of world countries will not truly “decouple” from China, the country most comprehensively and closely connected to the global production chain, supply chain, and value chain system, because of pressure and instigation by the United States.

Fifth, the Chinese government has actively responded to the hostile practices of the Biden administration that risk bringing a “new Cold War” to Sino-U.S. relations. China not only emphasizes that they have the courage to fight and daring to fight, but also starts from the concept of building a “community with a shared future for mankind” and still strives to get the relationship between the two countries back on its normal track of cooperation and controllable relations. In addition to unilaterally spoiling for a fight, imposing restrictions, and creating obstructions, the China policy pursued by the Biden administration for nearly a year has actually been lackluster. On March 19, 2021, representatives of China and the United States held a high-level strategic dialogue in Anchorage, the first face-to-face meeting between high-level Chinese and U.S. diplomats since Biden took office. U.S. Secretary of State Blinken pointed out that the Sino-U.S. relationship will be “competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be” to ensure a “rules-based international order.” In response, Chinese representative Yang Jiechi responded: “The vast majority of countries in the world do not recognize the universal values advocated by the United States, do not recognize the opinions of the United States as representative of international public opinion, and do not recognize the rules made by a few people as constituting the foundation of the international order,” and that the United States is also not qualified to “talk to China from a position of strength.” On July 26 of the same year, when Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Sherman in Tianjin, he proposed three bottom lines for how to effectively manage differences and prevent Sino-U.S. relations from spiraling out of control: (1) The United States shall not challenge, slander, or even attempt to subvert the path and system of socialism with Chinese characteristics; (2) The United States must not try to obstruct or even interrupt China’s development process; and (3) The United States must not violate China’s national sovereignty, much less compromise China’s territorial integrity. In addition, during the talks, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xie Feng also put forward two lists: one was a list of errors for the United States to correct and the other was a list of key cases that China was concerned about. The United States, for its part, continues to attack China on human rights issues, cybersecurity issues, Taiwan issues, and South China Sea issues. However, in Biden’s first year in office, his bullying posture against China simply hit the wall in front of China.

In the face of China’s resolute counterattack, the Biden administration had to draw back and adjust. During the Tianjin talks in July 2021, the U.S. representatives proposed to set up a “guardrail” in Sino-U.S. relations. On October 4 of the same year, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai delivered a speech at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she used the steel and photovoltaic industries as examples to prove the adverse impact of Chinese industrial policies on the development of related industries in other countries. She went on to point out that Chinese policy in the semiconductor industry will also be a “zero-sum game,” causing massive damage to market-based economies including the United States. This was used to justify the science and technology warfare launched by the United States. At the same time, she pointed out that the executive branch will adjust its trade policy with China. On the basis of evaluating the results of China’s implementation of Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement, they will launch targeted tariff exclusion processes and continue to pay attention to issues such as state-centered, non-market-oriented trade practices that did not appear in Phase One of the Economic and Trade Agreement. This is a veiled admission by the Biden administration that the comprehensive “decoupling” policy towards China is not only unrealistic, but also directly damages major interests of the United States. Katherine Tai’s proposal of Sino-U.S. economic “recoupling” not only shows the Biden administration’s helpless acquiescence to the reality that the total trade volume between China and the United States has risen sharply since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and that the “decoupling” of the U.S. and Chinese economies has failed, but also shows that the Biden administration’s economic and trade policies towards China cannot achieve a comprehensive and rapid economic “decoupling.”

Since Biden took office, the Chinese government has, from good intentions, tenaciously insisted that the relationship between the two countries return to the track of normalization, forcing the Biden administration to rethink and adjust its approach to dialogue with China. On September 10, 2021, the heads of state of China and the United States held a scheduled phone conversation for the purpose of strategic communication and exchange on Sino-U.S. relations and related issues between the two sides. Both sides agreed that in-depth communication between the leaders of China and the United States on Sino-U.S. relations and major international issues was very important in guiding the correct development of Sino-U.S. relations. They agreed to continue to maintain regular contact through various means and that they would instruct the working levels (工作层, the levels of government engaged in the practical work) of both sides to step up their work and conduct extensive dialogue so as to create conditions for the development of Sino-U.S. relations. On October 6, Yang Jiechi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CCP Central Committee, met with Jake Sullivan, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in Zurich, Switzerland. This was a new move by the two countries to implement the spirit of the call between the two heads of state on September 10 and make joint efforts to put Sino-U.S. relations back on the right track of healthy and stable development. On October 9, Liu He, member of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and head Chinese representative for Sino-U.S. Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, held a video call with U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, and the two sides had a pragmatic, candid, and constructive exchange. On November 16, the top leaders of China and the United States, Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, held a video meeting. Xi Jinping pointed out three principles that should be upheld in friendly relations between China and the United States: first, mutual respect, second, peaceful coexistence, and third, mutually beneficial cooperation. Biden emphasized the importance of responsibly managing competition and advocated for ensuring that the relationship between the two countries does not devolve into conflict and for ensuring unimpeded exchanges. The two sides conducted a full and in-depth conversation and exchange on strategic, overall, and fundamental issues related to the development of Sino-U.S. relations as well as important issues of mutual concern. The Sino-U.S. dialogue during the one-year-old Biden presidency shows that there is still hope for exploring and working towards the establishment of a rational, controllable, and fair competition model for the relationship between the two countries.

IV. Conclusion

The “Four-Pronged Approach” of strategic suppression of China by the Biden administration is not only determined by the strategic culture for maintaining U.S. hegemony and the belief in the superiority of U.S.-style democracy. Even more, it is determined by the current political and social divisions and oppositions in the United States as well as the “internal turmoil” caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, inflation, and racism. The more turbulent and tarnished the U.S. internal situation becomes, the greater the urgency in U.S. political and strategic circles to suppress China and prevent China from catching up to the United States. The “strategic competition with China” announced by the Biden administration is, in fact, a strategic offensive launched by the United States in an attempt to maintain its hegemonic superiority and reopen the gap in power between China and itself. Sino-U.S. relations are still far from entering a “strategic stalemate.”

Although the Biden administration’s China policy has been adjusted and they have proposed suggestions such as Sino-U.S. economic “recoupling” and expanding and continuing dialogue channels between the two countries, the Biden administration’s “Four-Pronged Approach” and attempts to suppress China will be part of the policy of strategic competition with China for the long term. We must have no illusions about this. Of course, the relationship between China and the United States, as the relationship between the world’s largest economy and the second-largest economy, does not have the nature of a “zero-sum game.” The common hope of the international community is that China and the United States will manage and control their competition through dialogue and achieve a relationship of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation. The long-term stability of Sino-U.S. relations requires the Biden administration to substantively adjust the comprehensive policy of suppressing and containing China in the economic and security fields across multiple dimensions. Recent adjustments of Biden’s policies focus more on effectively allocating domestic resources, alleviating high inflation, and integrating alliances. In key high-tech fields, they are attempting to form a situation of comprehensive containment against China, prevent China’s industrial upgrade, and confine China to the middle and low end of the global value chain so as to achieve the comprehensive suppression of China’s economic development and military technology over a longer term. Such U.S. policy toward China will be continued over the long term. The challenge that the Biden administration poses to China in the high-tech field is bound to be more threatening and long-term, and the competition between the great powers will be sharp and complex. This requires and pushes China to strengthen its determination, vision, and capabilities in order to deal with challenges as never before.

First, China must strengthen the construction of its domestic legislative system and promote the process of rule of law construction for national security in the fields of commerce and trade. Since Biden took power, he has worked hard to create “coordination of the government and society” measures to restrict China’s economic, trade, science and technology, and cultural exchanges. China also needs to promote relevant national capacity building in this field. The adoption of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s Republic of China at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on June 10, 2021 provides a vivid example. The strategic competition between China and the United States will continue for a long time. Building a complete legal system is not only necessary to counter U.S. sanctions and safeguard national interests. Even more so, it also addresses the long-term strategic competition between China and the United States and the need to improve China’s own domestic governance capabilities.

In addition, China must optimize industrial policies and enhance innovation capabilities to deal with technological blockades. The infrastructure bill and innovation bill have been the focus of efforts to revive domestic economic competitiveness under Biden’s presidency. The implementation of innovation in the high-tech industry must be undertaken with a complete supply chain network and also relies on developed infrastructure to provide channels for sales to the world. In contrast, China’s rapid development in the field of infrastructure construction has laid a solid material foundation for future strategic competition with the United States, and industrial policy, as an important means of China’s economic rise, should also play a more active role in the era of great-power competition: China must devote more resources in the field of science and technology to support key industries such as 5G, chips, new energy, and electric vehicles, to form international comparative advantages, to build a complete production chain, and to achieve technological independence and control; while creating new growth points for economic development, China must strengthen international cooperation in the field of science and technology, promote the sustainable and healthy development of the high-tech industry, optimize and transform the domestic economic structure, and improve the quality and efficiency of economic development; using new infrastructure construction and dual circulation as opportunities, China must compensate for industry shortcomings and accelerate industrial agglomeration and production chain integration in order to better safeguard national economic security.

Furthermore, China must further deepen reform and opening up and prepare for a “Second WTO Accession” so as to connect the commerce, society, and personnel of China and the world in a closer, more pragmatically, and more efficient manner. China officially completed the approval process for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on April 15, 2021 and formally submitted its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on September 16. This is the only way to deal with the “extreme competition” of the United States given the new situation—promote development through reform and seize opportunities through opening up: China must optimize its business environment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and enhance China’s attractiveness to overseas capital in order to form stronger economic ties; China must strengthen cooperation in the field of climate with countries along the “Belt and Road” and among China, the United States, and Europe, strengthen international cooperation in clean technology, green energy, green finance, and carbon neutrality and carbon peaking across the global production chain, and strive to achieve strategic mutual trust with the United States on climate issues in order to build a global green economic governance system. By promoting regional economic integration and negotiating and signing free trade arrangements and other flexible means, strengthening economic and trade ties with various economies, making every effort to increase the costs of the forcible “decoupling” between the United States and China, China can resist the tide of de-globalization with a more active and open posture.