What is Beijing’s Timeline for “Reunification” with Taiwan?
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What is Beijing’s Timeline for “Reunification” with Taiwan?

This analysis examines all authoritative Chinese Communist Party (CCP) political and strategic documents since 2012 and comparable documents dating back to 1992 that have discussed timelines for “reunifying” Taiwan, in order to better understand what, if any, formal timeline the CCP has outlined for legally and politically absorbing Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China.


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Recently, a growing number of U.S. officials and analysts have stated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping, is speeding up preparations to annex or invade Taiwan—what the CCP describes as “reunification.”1 Indicators cited include classified intelligence,2 economic developments, and trends in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity, such as increased air incursions in the Taiwan Strait, and the PLA’s 2027 modernization benchmark.  

Public statements and documents are also important indicators, representing a vital form of political messaging to the rest of China’s Party-state apparatus. Since leader remarks and a limited set of high-level State Council and Party documents set the parameters for policy action among Party-state officials downstream in China’s chain of command, entities such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office take their cues from these authoritative messages and statements. Such public pronouncements are not, on their own, dispositive, and it is entirely possible that Beijing might publicly claim one thing while privately believing another. But in China’s Leninist and highly centralized political system, such statements play a disproportionate role as instruments of alignment within the CCP and the State Council.

In order to understand what, if any, formal and publicly articulated timeline Beijing has with regards to absorbing or annexing Taiwan and to gauge any changes over time, the CSIS Interpret: China project has analyzed the most authoritative Chinese Party-state statements that deal with time or timelines for “reunification.”3 This collection includes Party Congress reports,4 the 2021 “Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,”5 the State Council’s Taiwan white papers,6 government “work reports,” Central Committee Plenum communiques, speeches by Xi Jinping and former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao addressing Taiwan, and readouts of meetings between Xi and representatives from Taiwan. While the focus is on arguments that relate to time or timelines made in the Xi era (2012-present), the collection also includes pre-Xi Jinping iterations that focus on Taiwan policy to assess change and continuity in top-level statements over time. The goal of this analysis is not to rule-out the salience or importance of other indicators, such as those mentioned above, but rather to clarify what the Party and Party leadership has said on the matter.

A review of this collection suggests that authoritative Party-state documents and statements by Chinese leaders most clearly refer to a timeline for unification with Taiwan by linking “reunification” to the goal of “national rejuvenation,”7 which is to be achieved by 2049. Other temporal references by the Chinese leadership, including by Xi Jinping, are more ambiguous and open to differing interpretations, such as his remark that cross-Strait issues cannot be passed down indefinitely across generations. Taken as a whole, however, the public statements and documents indicate that Beijing is attempting to both signal the overall importance of “reunification” while avoiding an overly rigid or near-term timeline that would limit its flexibility and options. 

Linking “National Reunification” to “National Rejuvenation”  

The most clear and direct articulation of a timeline for national unification with Taiwan is through its direct linkage with “national rejuvenation,” a narrative vision used frequently in Chinese political discourse that refers to the revival of China’s prosperity, national power, and international standing. According to authoritative documents and statements by Chinese leaders, “rejuvenation” should be achieved by 2049, which marks the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s founding. 

“我坚信,中国共产党成立100周年时,全面建成小康社会的目标一定能够实现。我坚信,中华人民共和国成立100周年时,把我国建成富强、民主、文明、和谐的社会主义现代化国家的目标一定会实现。我更坚信,中华民族伟大复兴的梦想一定会实现!”

 “I firmly believe that the goal of bringing about a moderately prosperous society in all respects can be achieved by 2021, when the CCP celebrates its centenary; the goal of building China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious can be achieved by 2049, when the PRC marks its centenary; and the dream of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will then be realized.”

Achieving Rejuvenation Is the Dream of the Chinese People,” speech delivered by Xi Jinping in November 2012

Next, we see that in several documents and speeches, Xi and the Chinese leadership have connected “rejuvenation” to “reunification.”

“实现中华民族伟大复兴,是全体中国人共同的梦想。我们坚信,只要包括港澳台同胞 在内的全体中华儿女顺应历史大势、共担民族大义,把民族命运牢牢掌握在自己手中,就一定能够共创中华民族伟大复兴的美好未来!” 

 “Realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a dream shared by all of us as Chinese. We remain firm in our conviction that, as long as all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, follow the tide of history, work together for the greater national interests, and keep our nation’s destiny firmly in our own hands, we will, without doubt, be able to achieve the great rejuvenation.” 

19th Party Congress Report, delivered by Xi Jinping in October 2017

“解决台湾问题、实现祖国完全统一,是党矢志不渝的历史任务,是全体中华儿女的共同愿望,是实现中华民族伟大复兴的必然要求,”  

 “Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakeable commitment of the Party. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, and it is essential to realizing national rejuvenation.” 

Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,” adopted in November 2021

“国家统一是中华民族走向伟大复兴的历史必然。” 

“National reunification is an essential step towards national rejuvenation.”

State Council white paper: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” published in August 2022

“解决台湾问题、实现祖国完全统一,是党矢志不渝的历史任务,是全体中华儿女的共同愿望,是实现中华民族伟大复兴的必然要求.”  

“Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is, for the Party, a historic mission and an unshakable commitment. It is also a shared aspiration of all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation and a natural requirement for realizing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 

20th Party Congress Report, delivered by Xi Jinping in October 2022 

Xi’s own speeches have also tied “reunification” with “rejuvenation.”

“祖国必须统一,也必然统一。这是70载两岸关系发展历程的历史定论,也是新时代中华民族伟大复兴的必然要求。” 

“Our country must be reunified and will surely be reunified. This is a historical conclusion drawn from the evolution of cross-Strait relations over the past seven decades; it is also critical to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the New Era.”

Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” delivered by Xi Jinping in January 2019  

It is important to note that this direct linkage of “reunification” with “rejuvenation” is not new to Xi. Authoritative Party-state discourse has long framed national unification—i.e. unifying Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan with the mainland—as a critical step to achieve “rejuvenation.” See, for example, the links drawn in Party Congress reports dating back to Jiang Zemin, who was China’s leader from 1989 to 2002.  

“国家要统一,民族要复兴,台湾问题不能无限期地拖延下去。我们坚信,通过全体中华儿女共同努力,祖国的完全统一就一定能够早日实现。” 

 “China will be reunified, and the Chinese nation will be rejuvenated. The Taiwan question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely. We are convinced that with the concerted efforts of all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, the complete reunification of the motherland will be achieved at an early date.” 

16th Party Congress Report, delivered by Jiang Zemin in November 20028

“两岸统一是中华民族走向伟大复兴的历史必然。” 

 “The two sides of the Straits are bound to be reunified in the course of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” 

17th Party Congress Report, delivered by Hu Jintao in November 2007 

“全体中华儿女携手努力,就一定能在同心实现中华民族伟大复兴进程中完成祖国统一大业。” 

 “Working hand in hand, we, the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, will surely accomplish the great cause of China’s reunification in the course of our common endeavor to achieve the great renewal9 of the Chinese nation.” 

18th Party Congress Report, delivered by Hu Jintao in November 2012

Linking Taiwan “reunification” with “rejuvenation” indicates the importance assigned to the task among Beijing’s national priorities, and signals that the CCP is not willing to delay its realization indefinitely. But setting the goalpost so far into the future gives Beijing space to progress toward this goal without having to show near-term results. The fact that Xi is unlikely to be in power in 2049—he would be 96 years old—means that such statements afford him the option of achieving Taiwan’s absorption on his watch, without tying him to a near-term and explicit deadline to do so.

Xi Jinping’s Discussion of Generational Responsibility

Within this broader “rejuvenation” framework, the second clearest articulation of a Taiwan timeline in authoritative Party-state discourse is Xi Jinping’s discussion of generational responsibility for “resolv[ing]” the issue. Xi has used such language twice (in 2013 and 2019), though it has not appeared in recent authoritative documents, such as the 2022 Taiwan white paper.

The first instance was in an October 2013 meeting with former Taiwan vice president Vincent Siew, in Bali, Indonesia, ahead of that year’s annual APEC summit.

“着眼长远,两岸长期存在的政治分歧问题终归要逐步解决,总不能将这些问题一代一代传下去。” 

 “From a long-term point of view, the longstanding political differences between the two sides of the Strait must be resolved one step at a time. We cannot continue passing these problems down from one generation to the next.” 

Xi Jinping’s remarks in a meeting with Vincent Siew, the vice president of Taiwan from 2008-2012 who was then the honorary chairman of the Taiwan Cross-Straits Common Market Foundation, in October 2013

That first reference came about during the tenure of KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, a time when cross-Strait relations were relatively positive, which indicates it was unlikely intended as a threat, but rather an exhortation to continue to improve ties. Six years later in 2019, Xi similarly referenced “generations” in his key speech on the 40th Anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.”10 

“两岸长期存在的政治分歧问题是影响两岸关系行稳致远的总根子,总不能一代一代传下去。两岸双方应该本着对民族、对后世负责的态度,凝聚智慧,发挥创意,聚同化异,争取早日解决政治对立,实现台海持久和平,达成国家统一愿景,让我们的子孙后代在祥和、安宁、繁荣、尊严的共同家园中生活成长。” 

 “The long-standing political differences between the two sides are the root cause that affects the steady growth of cross-Strait relations, but we should not allow this problem to be passed down from one generation to the next. Both sides of the Taiwan Strait must live up to our responsibility to our nation and to future generations; we should put our heads together, show creativity, and reduce difference and seek common ground. Doing so will enable us to resolve the political antagonism at an early date, ensure lasting peace across the Taiwan Strait, and agree on a vision for national reunification, so that our future generations can live and grow up in a shared home with peace, stability, prosperity, and dignity.” 

Speech at the Meeting Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” delivered by Xi Jinping in January 2019  

In twice stating that “reunification” cannot be passed from generation to generation, Xi seems to be conveying his view that the task of unification with Taiwan must reach some terminal resolution. At the same time, his timeline remains imprecise. His comment could be interpreted as indicating that he wants to see unification on his watch—but his statement could also be read as comporting with the above-mentioned goal of unification by 2049.

The CCP Narrative of Historical Progress  

In addition to framing “reunification” as part of “rejuvenation” and referring to generational duty, high-level Party-state rhetoric also speaks to a timeline for “reunification” with Taiwan by invoking more amorphous concepts of history and time. Authoritative statements frequently frame “reunification” as an inevitable historical trend. For example, the 2021 History Resolution, 20th Party Congress Report, and the 2022 white paper all use this type of language.

“祖国完全统一的时和势始终在我们这一边。” 

 “For realizing China’s complete reunification, time and momentum are always on our side.” 

Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,” adopted in November 2021

“祖国统一的历史车轮滚滚向前,任何人任何势力都无法阻挡。” 

 “The wheel of history rolls on towards national reunification, and it will not be stopped by any individual or any force.” 

State Council white paper: “The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,” published in August 2022

“国家统一、民族复兴的历史车轮滚滚向前,祖国完全统一一定要实现,也一定能够实现!” 

 “The wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Complete reunification of our country must be realized, and it can, without doubt, be realized!”  

20th Party Congress report, delivered by Xi Jinping in October 2022

Similar language can be found in Xi’s speeches addressing Taiwan policy. For example, a 2021 speech Xi delivered on an occasion commemorating the anniversary of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution11 demonstrates how Xi invokes the “tide” of history when discussing Taiwan.

“台湾问题因民族弱乱而产生,必将随着民族复兴而解决。这是中华民族历史演进大势所决定的,更是全体中华儿女的共同意志,正像孙中山先生所说:“世界潮流,浩浩荡荡,顺之则昌,逆之则亡”。” 

 “The Taiwan question arose out of the weakness and chaos of our nation, and it will be resolved as national rejuvenation becomes a reality. This is determined by the general trend of Chinese history, but more importantly, it is the common will of all Chinese people. As Dr. Sun [Yat-sen] said, ‘The tide of history is mighty. Those who follow it will prosper, while those who go against it will perish.’” 

Speech at a Meeting Marking the 110th Anniversary of the Revolution of 1911,” delivered by Xi Jinping in October 2021

These statements project confidence that relative power trajectories are on China’s side in the cross-Strait relationship. References to the inevitability of “reunification” in China’s historical trajectory may be intended to wear down the psychological confidence of the Taiwan people by suggesting resistance is futile. But they could also suggest a degree of strategic patience. When Xi suggests that the conditions for unification are improving over time, he arguably builds the case for delaying action on the basis that trends are already moving in Beijing’s favor.

Conclusion  

At the highest level of the Chinese Party-state, statements tying national unification with national revival and rejuvenation have been a mainstay of political discourse since the Deng Xiaoping era.12 Such a framing offers an implicit deadline for PRC absorption of Taiwan by 2049. Xi Jinping has twice mentioned that the Taiwan issue cannot indefinitely be passed on from generation to generation but has not tied responsibility for unification to his current generation. He seems to be saying, in a sense, that Beijing cannot permanently delay achieving its goal, but has left flexibility on precisely how long a solution can be delayed.

Beijing is investing considerably in military capabilities that could be used in a Taiwan context, but in terms of the rhetoric Chinese leaders employ to discuss Taiwan, there is considerable continuity stretching back at least three decades. This does not mean that there is not a near-term risk that Beijing may attempt to achieve annexation by military force if certain conditions are present, or if it feels that the use of force is its only option. But in the realm of official discourse and authoritative statements, including from Xi Jinping, it is clear that Beijing is still trying to project confidence while maintaining flexibility. A firm and clear near-term deadline would shrink its options and room to maneuver.

Full text of cited documents can be found in our Taiwan statements collection

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