Recently, a growing number of U.S. officials and analysts have stated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping, is speeding up preparations to annex or invade Taiwan—what the CCP describes as “reunification.”¹ Indicators cited include classified intelligence,² economic developments, and trends in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) activity, such as increased air incursions in the Taiwan Strait, and the PLA’s 2027 modernization benchmark.  

Public statements and documents are also important indicators, representing a vital form of political messaging to the rest of China’s Party-state apparatus. Since leader remarks and a limited set of high-level State Council and Party documents set the parameters for policy action among Party-state officials downstream in China’s chain of command, entities such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Taiwan Affairs Office take their cues from these authoritative messages and statements. Such public pronouncements are not, on their own, dispositive, and it is entirely possible that Beijing might publicly claim one thing while privately believing another. But in China’s Leninist and highly centralized political system, such statements play a disproportionate role as instruments of alignment within the CCP and the State Council.

In order to understand what, if any, formal and publicly articulated timeline Beijing has with regards to absorbing or annexing Taiwan and to gauge any changes over time, the CSIS Interpret: China project has analyzed the most authoritative Chinese Party-state statements that deal with time or timelines for “reunification.”³ This collection includes Party Congress reports,⁴ the 2021 “Resolution of the CCP Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,”⁵ the State Council’s Taiwan white papers,⁶ government “work reports,” Central Committee Plenum communiques, speeches by Xi Jinping and former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao addressing Taiwan, and readouts of meetings between Xi and representatives from Taiwan. While the focus is on arguments that relate to time or timelines made in the Xi era (2012-present), the collection also includes pre-Xi Jinping iterations that focus on Taiwan policy to assess change and continuity in top-level statements over time. The goal of this analysis is not to rule-out the salience or importance of other indicators, such as those mentioned above, but rather to clarify what the Party and Party leadership has said on the matter.

A review of this collection suggests that authoritative Party-state documents and statements by Chinese leaders most clearly refer to a timeline for unification with Taiwan by linking “reunification” to the goal of “national rejuvenation,”⁷ which is to be achieved by 2049. Other temporal references by the Chinese leadership, including by Xi Jinping, are more ambiguous and open to differing interpretations, such as his remark that cross-Strait issues cannot be passed down indefinitely across generations. Taken as a whole, however, the public statements and documents indicate that Beijing is attempting to both signal the overall importance of “reunification” while avoiding an overly rigid or near-term timeline that would limit its flexibility and options. 

Linking “National Reunification” to “National Rejuvenation”  

The most clear and direct articulation of a timeline for national unification with Taiwan is through its direct linkage with “national rejuvenation,” a narrative vision used frequently in Chinese political discourse that refers to the revival of China’s prosperity, national power, and international standing. According to authoritative documents and statements by Chinese leaders, “rejuvenation” should be achieved by 2049, which marks the 100^th anniversary of the PRC’s founding. 

Next, we see that in several documents and speeches, Xi and the Chinese leadership have connected “rejuvenation” to “reunification.”

Xi’s own speeches have also tied “reunification” with “rejuvenation.”

It is important to note that this direct linkage of “reunification” with “rejuvenation” is not new to Xi. Authoritative Party-state discourse has long framed national unification—i.e. unifying Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan with the mainland—as a critical step to achieve “rejuvenation.” See, for example, the links drawn in Party Congress reports dating back to Jiang Zemin, who was China’s leader from 1989 to 2002.  

Linking Taiwan “reunification” with “rejuvenation” indicates the importance assigned to the task among Beijing’s national priorities, and signals that the CCP is not willing to delay its realization indefinitely. But setting the goalpost so far into the future gives Beijing space to progress toward this goal without having to show near-term results. The fact that Xi is unlikely to be in power in 2049—he would be 96 years old—means that such statements afford him the option of achieving Taiwan’s absorption on his watch, without tying him to a near-term and explicit deadline to do so.

Xi Jinping’s Discussion of Generational Responsibility

Within this broader “rejuvenation” framework, the second clearest articulation of a Taiwan timeline in authoritative Party-state discourse is Xi Jinping’s discussion of generational responsibility for “resolv[ing]” the issue. Xi has used such language twice (in 2013 and 2019), though it has not appeared in recent authoritative documents, such as the 2022 Taiwan white paper.

The first instance was in an October 2013 meeting with former Taiwan vice president Vincent Siew, in Bali, Indonesia, ahead of that year’s annual APEC summit.

That first reference came about during the tenure of KMT President Ma Ying-jeou, a time when cross-Strait relations were relatively positive, which indicates it was unlikely intended as a threat, but rather an exhortation to continue to improve ties. Six years later in 2019, Xi similarly referenced “generations” in his key speech on the 40^th Anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.”¹⁰ 

In twice stating that “reunification” cannot be passed from generation to generation, Xi seems to be conveying his view that the task of unification with Taiwan must reach some terminal resolution. At the same time, his timeline remains imprecise. His comment could be interpreted as indicating that he wants to see unification on his watch—but his statement could also be read as comporting with the above-mentioned goal of unification by 2049.

The CCP Narrative of Historical Progress  

In addition to framing “reunification” as part of “rejuvenation” and referring to generational duty, high-level Party-state rhetoric also speaks to a timeline for “reunification” with Taiwan by invoking more amorphous concepts of history and time. Authoritative statements frequently frame “reunification” as an inevitable historical trend. For example, the 2021 History Resolution, 20^th Party Congress Report, and the 2022 white paper all use this type of language.

Similar language can be found in Xi’s speeches addressing Taiwan policy. For example, a 2021 speech Xi delivered on an occasion commemorating the anniversary of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution¹¹ demonstrates how Xi invokes the “tide” of history when discussing Taiwan.

These statements project confidence that relative power trajectories are on China’s side in the cross-Strait relationship. References to the inevitability of “reunification” in China’s historical trajectory may be intended to wear down the psychological confidence of the Taiwan people by suggesting resistance is futile. But they could also suggest a degree of strategic patience. When Xi suggests that the conditions for unification are improving over time, he arguably builds the case for delaying action on the basis that trends are already moving in Beijing’s favor.

Conclusion  

At the highest level of the Chinese Party-state, statements tying national unification with national revival and rejuvenation have been a mainstay of political discourse since the Deng Xiaoping era.¹² Such a framing offers an implicit deadline for PRC absorption of Taiwan by 2049. Xi Jinping has twice mentioned that the Taiwan issue cannot indefinitely be passed on from generation to generation but has not tied responsibility for unification to his current generation. He seems to be saying, in a sense, that Beijing cannot permanently delay achieving its goal, but has left flexibility on precisely how long a solution can be delayed.

Beijing is investing considerably in military capabilities that could be used in a Taiwan context, but in terms of the rhetoric Chinese leaders employ to discuss Taiwan, there is considerable continuity stretching back at least three decades. This does not mean that there is not a near-term risk that Beijing may attempt to achieve annexation by military force if certain conditions are present, or if it feels that the use of force is its only option. But in the realm of official discourse and authoritative statements, including from Xi Jinping, it is clear that Beijing is still trying to project confidence while maintaining flexibility. A firm and clear near-term deadline would shrink its options and room to maneuver.

Full text of cited documents can be found in our Taiwan statements collection. 

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