Newly translated documents discussed in these analyses include:

1. Central Conference on Work Relating to the Periphery Held in Beijing; Xi Jinping Delivered Important Speech, media readout published by Xinhua News Agency.
2. Deeply Understanding the Concepts and Actions of China’s Work on Periphery Affairs under the New Situation by Li Kaisheng, a research fellow at the Shanghai Academy of International Studies.
3. Building a Community of Common Destiny with the Periphery: Progress, Insights, and Deepening Paths by Wang Junsheng, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and department director for China’s Regional Strategy at CASS.
4. Deeply Advancing the Building of a Community of Common Destiny with the Periphery by Zhai Kun, a professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University.
5. Re-creating China’s Peripheral International Environment by Xing Guangcheng, the director of the Research Center for Chinese Borderland History and Geography at CASS.

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Hoo Tiang Boon | Manoj Kewalramani | Yun Sun

The translated documents offer a glimpse into the priorities and thinking behind the latest iteration of China’s periphery strategy, outlined in the April 2025 Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries. The Xinhua summary presents the official account while the rest of the articles—written by Chinese scholars in a state-controlled system—intellectually decorate the conference’s ideas, particularly in relation to what Xi Jinping said. Although largely propagandistic, the overriding message in these documents is unmistakable: Managing China’s periphery well is fundamental to its rise, and the party will continue to prioritize political attention and resources to its neighboring countries. 

The strategic emphasis on China’s periphery is not new. At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, it was pointed out that China should “cement” ties and build “partnerships” with neighboring countries. And when Xi assumed power, one of the first things he did was to convene a high-level forum specifically on China’s 周边外交 (periphery diplomacy) in 2013. China’s periphery was described as part of four key strategic categories in which “大国是关键, 周边是首要, 发展中国家是基础, 多边是重要舞台” (big powers are the key, peripheries are the priority, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateralism is the important arena). 

In this context, the 2025 conference represents both a stock-take and an update of China’s neighborhood policy. It is born out of a recognition that China’s periphery plans need to better adapt to evolving external circumstances, which are seen as increasingly challenging due to the intensifying U.S.-China competition and other developments.  

This emphasis can be gleaned from the conference’s takeaways, which, among others, stressed the building of “high-quality interconnected networks and strengthening production chain and supply chain cooperation” with neighboring countries. The reference to supply chain security signals that periphery countries can be better tapped to help Beijing offset the impact of U.S. tariffs or trading curbs. Different periphery countries offer opportunities such as (1) manufacturing bases for reconfiguring Chinese production chains; (2) alternative markets for expanding Chinese exports; (3) investment vehicles for Chinese capital, enterprises, and labor; (4) regions with rich raw resources; and (5) constituencies for political support in multilateral forums—and by this logic, could be better leveraged in China’s push-back against U.S. strategic pressure. Take, for example, Chinese electric vehicles: While high tariffs have limited their entry into the U.S. market, they are seeing growing market share in Southeast Asia.  

To be clear, it is not that China is “rediscovering” its neighborhood; rather, its strategic importance to China has further heightened amid the backdrop of the U.S.-China rivalry. Periphery countries have always played an important part in China’s strategic calculus, given the geographical proximity and history, so they are a natural choice for Beijing to double down on engagement. What is noteworthy this time is that Beijing has broadened the bandwidth of its periphery strategy. Zhai Kun’s piece in People’s Daily notes that the old lexicon of “periphery diplomacy work” has been adjusted to “periphery work,” implying that Beijing’s efforts have broadened beyond diplomacy to assume a more comprehensive profile that integrates economic and political aspects, including fostering greater interplay between these external elements and domestic priorities. 

The broader scope of periphery work does not mean, however, that Beijing will compromise on its territorial interests. The conference made clear that, at best, “contradictions and differences” are to be “properly managed”—but not necessarily resolved. In other words, even as Beijing seeks to reinforce relations with neighboring countries, it won’t do so at the expense of its territorial interests, which suggests that there won’t be any shift from its current muscular approach towards territorial disputes in the region.  

Is China’s periphery strategy working? The conference proclaims that China’s periphery relations are “currently in their best period,” while Li Kaisheng’s article points out that China today has a multitude of partnerships with some 28 periphery countries, constituting around 15 percent of global GDP. Separately, a recent Foreign Affairs study analyzing alignment patterns in Southeast Asia finds that Southeast Asia is “starting to choose” China.  

Yet, any gains China may achieve in its region may be less about Chinese strategy and more a symptom of contingent factors that include shifting economic conditions and domestic politics of the neighboring country involved. U.S. actions (or inaction) also matter. India’s recent detente with China is a case in point. While the détente has been at least a year in the making, the Trump administration’s decision to impose 50 percent tariffs (so far) on Indian exports has had consequences on Indian estimations of their relations with China. In Southeast Asia, even as several countries remain wary of Beijing, they are doubling down on economic integration with China in part to buffer against the impact of U.S. tariffs, and also due to lingering concerns over perceived U.S. indifference to the region.  

Finally, the conference reaffirms the trajectory of a more proactive Chinese approach towards periphery relations. Less willing to be a passive actor responding to developments, Beijing seeks to more actively (and if required, assertively) drive change and shape its neighborhood into what Xi calls an “enabling” environment to foster a permissive (i.e., pro-China) regional ecosystem for its rise. Such an ambition could well challenge American economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This behooves Washington, at a minimum, to reflect on how it can better respond to China’s renewed overtures to the region. The worst thing it can do is to sit and watch. 

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The Central Conference on Peripheral Work in April was indicative of a shift in how the Chinese leadership thinks about and approaches neighboring countries. Examining the conference readout and the analytical writings of Chinese scholars brings to light four broad trends. 

First, historically, the peripheral region has been viewed from a defensive national security perspective. The April conference, in contrast, articulated a broader and more proactive vision, which dovetails with Beijing’s global diplomacy. It said that China’s relations with neighboring countries have “entered an important stage of deep interaction between the regional landscape and a changing world.” Chinese scholars such as Li Kaisheng have also underscored this in their assessments. Li has argued that China’s diplomacy has entered “a new phase in which the situations in the periphery are deeply linked to global changes.” 

Second, the writings of Chinese scholars indicate that strategic competition with the United States continues to weigh heavily in terms of China’s engagement with neighboring countries. Wang Junsheng, for instance, views the U.S.-Indo-Pacific Strategy as an “integrated ‘security–economy–diplomacy’ approach to intensify its suppression of China.” This context is crucial to grasp Beijing’s more expansive approach to its periphery, too. Zhai Kun, for example, explains that the shift in language of the conference’s readout from “periphery diplomacy work” to “periphery work” indicates that “periphery affairs have extended beyond the diplomatic realm into a broader scope, becoming comprehensive work that coordinates internal and external matters and addresses economic, political, and diplomatic affairs in a unified manner.”  

In other words, Beijing appears to be responding to integrated containment with an integrated engagement strategy. The goal of this approach appears to be to structurally tie countries closer to China in a more holistic sense, ensuring that they lean towards it in terms of the broader strategic competition with the United States. Li captures this perspective well, arguing that “the linkage between the peripheral region and great power games is a key variable in promoting the equitable and orderly development of a multipolar world.” However, it remains unclear what sort of resources Beijing is willing to bring to bear as part of its proactive peripheral work policy.  

Third, writings by Chinese scholars reference the creation of a new Asian security model. This is an acknowledgement of the need for deeper Chinese security diplomacy to not just counter the United States but also address regional security frictions and deficits, which can hurt Chinese interests. What this model entails, however, is rather vague. China remains cautious when it comes to conflict management and mediation. This was evident from its extremely limited engagement in the brief India-Pakistan war in May 2025. Likewise, its engagement in Afghanistan-Pakistan frictions and mediation during the 2025 Thailand-Cambodia conflict has been limited and low-key. In contrast, what it is likely to pursue is greater engagement in areas of financial security, counterterrorism, dealing with issues such as cross-border crimes, cybersecurity, health security, food, and energy security. 

Finally, the primary, and likely preferred, tool for Beijing continues to be economic diplomacy. This is evident in calls to ensure that Chinese modernization benefits neighboring countries and advances the modernization process of Asia. The vision being articulated by Chinese scholars is one of placing China at the center of the regional economy. Within this context, it is essential to note that some scholars are calling on China to expand economic, developmental, and humanitarian engagement even when it does not seem economically viable. This can also be viewed as a call to the private sector to toe the line on national priorities. Framing this argument within the logic of the principle of justice, Wang, for instance, writes that Beijing has an obligation to assist poor countries within its capacity; and in doing so, one must, at times, jettison the profit motive in favor of justice. 

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Reading Chinese government documents and official statements is always a challenging mental exercise. One has to peel off layers and layers of grandiosity and glorification to tease out what Beijing really means. This is particularly true for China’s foreign policy, where Beijing’s strategic intent and design are not always obvious, especially when people try to match words with acts.  

However, based on the documents and papers on the most recent articulation of China’s approach to its periphery, a few themes are increasingly clear. First, in terms of the strategic framing, the periphery has unequivocally been defined as the priority of China’s foreign policy. Especially in the context of great power competition with the United States, the periphery is defined as “安身立命之本” (foundation of China’s very existence). That has settled the long debate on whether the periphery or the United States should be China’s top priority in its foreign policy.  

Secondly, in terms of scope, China’s definition of its periphery is exceedingly broad, going well beyond the 14 neighbors with which it shares a land border. For China, its periphery includes 28 countries: Russia, 4 countries in Northeast Asia, 8 countries in South Asia (the traditional 6 plus Afghanistan and Bhutan), 11 countries in Southeast Asia (including Timor-Leste), and 5 countries in Central Asia. In this sense, China regards the entirety of Asia plus Russia as the top priority for its national security and foreign engagement. Translating into a sphere of influence, China sees Asia as a natural domain for its regional dominance.  

Third, in terms of the approach, what China has described as a “periphery community of common destiny” (or “a community of shared future for mankind”) is essentially a bundling strategy to absorb these countries into the Chinese orbit and deeply integrate their economy with China through trade, investment, and supply chain. The goal is that these countries will benefit from China’s economic growth, and they will suffer if China stands to falter. The term used in the Chinese policy lexicon is “一损俱损, 一荣俱荣” (China’s loss will be a loss for every country, and China’s gains will be the gains for all countries, too). The best example in this regard is the supply chain shifts and the transshipment of Chinese exports to the United States through Southeast Asia and South Asia. When the trade war escalates, the impact of U.S. restrictions on high-tech exports to China, including the transshipment of Chinese products, will also make China’s regional trading partners feel the pain.  

In this sense, China’s periphery work has surpassed the scope of foreign policy; the essential reason it is now termed “周边工作”(“periphery work”) instead of the “周边外交工作” (“periphery foreign policy work”) back in 2013. Periphery is not just a matter of foreign policy for China, but a comprehensive combination of political, economic, military, security, social, and cultural integration.  

The success of China’s periphery strategy is subject to debate. It is obvious that China still falls short in many categories, especially in local public opinion and dispute resolution. China has not established exclusive dominance in any of the subregions, either. However, in relative terms, compared to 12 years ago when Xi first assumed power, China has certainly strengthened its grip on the region and established a much stronger position within Asia. And this trend is likely to continue and deepen.  

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