“The periphery is where China establishes itself and makes its living, and the foundation for its development and prosperity.”¹ In the new era, China took the lead in promoting the building of a community of common destiny with our periphery. At the Symposium on Periphery Diplomacy in 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping stressed the need to “let the awareness of a community of common destiny take root in countries in China’s periphery.”² At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping formally proposed the concept of a community of common destiny with our periphery.³ The proposal of a community of common destiny with our periphery has provided conceptual support and directional guidance for China’s periphery diplomacy, driving continuous new achievements in periphery diplomacy. A careful assessment of the progress and experience achieved in building a community of common destiny with our periphery, and clarifying the opportunities and challenges faced in this effort, will help in better planning the future of China’s periphery diplomacy.

I. Major achievements in building a community of common destiny with our periphery

Since the 18th Party Congress, the building of a community of common destiny with countries in the periphery has achieved major accomplishments in the political, economic, cultural, and security spheres.

(1) China’s political and diplomatic relations with countries in its periphery have become more solid

As of the end of 2023, China and 14 countries in its periphery, including Pakistan and Laos, as well as two regional organizations, had announced the building of a community of common destiny. In terms of relationship positioning, China has established “strategic relations” with 18 countries in its periphery, among which the strategic relations with the 14 countries excluding Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and Vietnam were established since the 18th Party Congress. At the same time, in the seven years from the convening of the 18th Party Congress to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were 218 mutual visits between the heads of state of China and countries in its periphery, averaging as many as 31 per year. Of these, 163 visits were by heads of state from countries in China’s periphery to China, accounting for 75% of the total. China’s leaders attach great importance to strategic interactions with countries in its periphery. President Xi Jinping’s first overseas visits after the 18th, 19th, and 20th Party Congresses were all to countries in China’s periphery, after the 18th Party Congress to Russia, after the 19th Party Congress to Vietnam and Laos, and after the 20th Party Congress to Indonesia and Thailand. In July 2024, Xi Jinping attended the first “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus” (SCO+) Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, and held meetings with leaders of SCO member and observer states.

At the onset of the COVID-19 outbreak, the presidents of Mongolia and Pakistan visited China in succession. In February 2022, against the backdrop of the pandemic’s spread and resistance from the United States and the West, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as the president of Singapore, attended the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics. In October 2023, at the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, major leaders from countries in China’s periphery including Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, and Vietnam were all in attendance. In 2024, interactions between China and countries in its periphery became even more frequent. As multiple countries in China’s periphery underwent changes of government, China saw a surge in visits. Indonesia’s president-elect Prabowo Subianto made his first visit to China just ten days after winning the election, and after formally taking office as president, again chose China as the destination for his first visit. After being elected general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, To Lam also chose China as the first country to visit. The positioning of China’s relations with countries in its periphery, along with the frequency of interactions, shows that the concept of a community of common destiny with our periphery and the related policies have been widely welcomed by countries in China’s periphery.

(2) China’s economic ties with countries in its periphery have grown closer

At present, there are 14 multilateral mechanisms in the Asian region, four of which have been newly established since 2013. All of these were initiated by China. Except for a few countries such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, Brunei, Laos, and Nepal, China is the largest trading partner of all other countries in its periphery. The total value of China’s trade with countries in its periphery accounts for more than one-third of China’s total foreign trade. The Lancang-Mekong Cooperation and the China–Central Asia cooperation mechanism have effectively promoted economic and trade cooperation between China and subregions in its periphery, while the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have directly contributed to integrated economic and trade cooperation between China and its periphery. In June 2015, when meeting with heads of delegations attending the signing ceremony of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank agreement, President Xi Jinping stated that China’s proposal of the BRI and the AIIB initiative was in keeping with the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness in periphery diplomacy and reflected a commitment to working together with Asian countries to address the practical problems facing the region and to pursue common development. At present, China has signed Belt and Road cooperation documents with 25 countries in its periphery. As the main framework for jointly building the Belt and Road, a connectivity structure of “six corridors, six routes, multiple countries, and multiple ports,” involving early cooperation countries and multiple ports, has already begun to take shape. The “six corridors” refer to the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor, the China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, the China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. The “six routes” refer to railways, highways, shipping lines, flight routes, pipelines, and a space-based integrated information network. China also attaches great importance to East Asia cooperation mechanisms centered on ASEAN and to China–Japan–ROK cooperation mechanisms. China has taken the lead in ratifying the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and has promoted its entry into force and implementation.

In 2012, China’s gross domestic product was U.S. $8.53 trillion; in 2023, China’s GDP was approximately U.S. $17.79 trillion, more than doubling over this period. In November 2015, in a speech at the National University of Singapore, President Xi Jinping emphasized that China is willing to link its own development more closely with that of countries in our periphery, so that the fruits of China’s development will benefit its periphery more and enable everyone to live a better life together. Over the past decade, China and countries in our periphery have successfully built a number of landmark projects. For example, the Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway, which began official operations in October 2023, has given Indonesia, and indeed all of Southeast Asia, its first high-speed rail line, with a total length of 142.3 kilometers. The China–Central Asia Gas Pipeline is China’s first transnational gas pipeline, with a total length of 1,833 kilometers and an annual transmission capacity of 60 billion cubic meters. Since it began operation, the natural gas it has transported has benefited more than 500 million people along the route. Laos, one of the world’s least developed countries and the only landlocked country in Southeast Asia, previously had extremely poor transportation, with a total national railway length of less than 4 kilometers. The China–Laos Railway, invested in and constructed by China, runs 1,035 kilometers and was fully opened to traffic in December 2021. Since then, Laos has suddenly entered the era of high-speed rail, becoming a “land-linked country.” This has not only greatly boosted tourist arrivals to Laos, but has also significantly increased its imports and exports. Since 2023, the railway has carried a total freight volume of 11.1 million tons, a year-on-year increase of 94.7%. China’s emphasis on both multilateral and bilateral cooperation mechanisms in its peripheral regions, along with its deep economic and trade cooperation with countries there, has become a solid foundation for building a community of common destiny with our periphery.

(3) People-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and countries in our periphery have become closer

In the new era, China and countries in our periphery have successively established a series of people-to-people and cultural exchange cooperation mechanisms, including the China–Russia Committee of Education, Culture, Health and Sports Cooperation; the China–Indonesia People-to-People Exchange Mechanism; the Subcommittee on Cultural and People-to-People Cooperation under the China–Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee; the Subcommittee on People-to-People Cooperation under the China–Turkmenistan Intergovernmental Committee; the Subcommittee on People-to-People Cooperation under the China–Uzbekistan Intergovernmental Committee; the “China–ASEAN Year of People-to-People Exchanges”; and the China–Japan High-Level People-to-People Exchange Forum, among others. In May 2019, China promoted the convening of the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations, aimed at strengthening exchanges among various sectors in Asian countries, including youth, non-governmental organizations, local communities, and the media. China and countries in our periphery have also co-produced a series of films and television dramas, such as Hanoi, Hanoi with Vietnam, Love in Thailand with Thailand, The Legend of Dancing Prince with Myanmar, Dawn of the Sacred Land with Cambodia, Champa Flower with Laos, and The Composer with Kazakhstan. In 2014, the transnational joint application by China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan for “Silk Roads: the Routes Network of Chang’an–Tianshan Corridor” was inscribed on the World Heritage List at the 38th session of the World Heritage Committee. After the outbreak of COVID-19, China took the initiative to extend a helping hand to countries in our periphery, standing together with them through thick and thin, sharing weal and woe, and using concrete actions to illustrate the rich significance of a community of common destiny with our periphery. China’s pandemic assistance covered all countries in our periphery, with free aid of anti-epidemic supplies concentrated in March, April, and May 2020—when countries in our periphery were experiencing the greatest difficulties in epidemic prevention and control. This assistance was truly a timely help in their hour of need. This formed a sharp contrast with certain Western countries at the time, which were hoarding supplies and engaging in profiteering. As of the end of November 2021, China had donated vaccines to almost all Asian countries. The purpose of people-to-people and cultural exchanges is to promote mutual understanding between peoples. From the second half of 2023 to November 2024, China expanded the number of countries eligible for visa-free entry to 38, including countries in our periphery such as the Republic of Korea, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Thailand.

The achievements in people-to-people and cultural exchanges between China and countries in our periphery are inseparable from the personal promotion by President Xi Jinping. When visiting countries in our periphery, President Xi often says things like “drop by the neighbors’ house to visit friends” and “it’s just like visiting the homes of relatives and neighbors,” words filled with warmth and affection. President Xi places particular emphasis on engaging with the youth of countries in China’s periphery. According to partial statistics, President Xi Jinping has delivered speeches at institutions including the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in Russia, Seoul National University in the Republic of Korea, the National University of Singapore, and Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, in which he emphasized to young students the importance of China’s cooperation with countries in its periphery and outlined a beautiful vision for a community of common destiny with our periphery. China’s emphasis on people-to-people and cultural exchanges with countries in our periphery, as well as the current state of such exchanges, demonstrates the unique advantages of geographic proximity, cultural affinity, and close kinship between China and countries in our periphery, which has already become an effective pathway for building a community of common destiny with our periphery.

(4) China’s security proposals have gained increasing recognition from countries in its periphery

Since the 18th Party Congress, China has actively taken responsibility in security affairs in its periphery, creating favorable conditions for resolving relevant issues. On the Korean Peninsula issue, China has successively proposed the “dual suspension” initiative and the “dual-track approach.” Among the relevant countries, China has put forward the greatest number of proposed solutions, and facts have shown that the proposals it made were the most aligned with viable pathways to resolution. An important prerequisite for the historic summit between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was the suspension of U.S.–ROK joint military exercises and the suspension by the DPRK of the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. On the Afghanistan issue, China not only appointed a special envoy, but also, in March 2022, proposed the Tunxi Initiative to help Afghanistan with reconstruction and development. Subsequently, in April 2023, China issued the document China’s Position on the Afghan Issue, providing a comprehensive and systematic elaboration of China’s impartial position on the matter. China’s plan for supporting Afghanistan’s reconstruction has been recognized by Afghanistan and countries in the region. In the face of the intertwined and volatile security situation in Central Asia, China proposed convening the first China–Central Asia Summit. Central Asian countries have supported China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), jointly upholding multilateralism and firmly supporting each other on issues concerning their respective core interests. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, although the conflict took place mainly in Europe, in view of its impact on Asia and the world, China not only appointed a special envoy to carry out mediation and coordination, but also, in February 2023, issued the document China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, which received positive responses from the United Nations as well as from the parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine. China’s high level of attention to and proactive engagement in addressing security issues in neighboring regions demonstrates its commitment to following the path of peaceful development and to deepening friendly cooperation with countries in its periphery, and has already become an important guarantee for building a community of common destiny with countries in the periphery.

II. Fundamental reasons for the achievements in building a community of common destiny with our periphery

The fundamental reason for the major achievements in building a community of common destiny with our periphery lies in the advanced nature of China’s periphery diplomacy concepts and the successful implementation of relevant cooperation initiatives in countries in our periphery.

The important concept of a community of common destiny for mankind goes beyond Western theories of international relations, indicating a direction for interaction among states in an anarchic international system. Based on their own historical experience in international relations, Western theories generally hold that relations among states are inevitably a zero-sum game driven by self-interest, that the establishment and development of the international order are dominated by major powers, and that they influence other countries’ domestic and foreign policies on the basis of asymmetries in power. Among such theories, realism holds that relations among states are a contest of power; neoliberal institutionalism, while acknowledging the possibility of cooperation between states, offers little in the way of persuasive arguments for the pathways and prospects for such cooperation; constructivism views anarchy as socially constructed, and posits the Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures of international society, yet leaves it to states themselves to determine how to transition to the Kantian culture of perpetual peace, providing little clarity on how states should specifically “construct” it. It is thus evident that Western experience and theory in international relations cannot envision a bright future for relations among states, instead regarding history as a “pendulum” swinging between peace and conflict against a backdrop of power struggles. In this view, small and medium-sized countries have almost no control over their own destinies, and even major powers often find themselves in a state of insecurity. The concept of a community of common destiny for mankind downplays the element of power competition among states, taking cooperation as the foundation for interaction between them, and pursues the realization of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and a clean and beautiful world. Its advanced nature is particularly reflected in a series of specific diplomatic principles, including amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests, the new security concept, and the new type of international relations.

General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly put forward the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness at the Symposium on Periphery Diplomacy. Since the 18th Party Congress, the basic policy of China’s periphery diplomacy has been to be amicable to neighbors and to treat them as partners, to foster good neighborliness, ensure security for neighbors, promote prosperity to neighbors, and to give prominence to the principles of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. The report to the 20th Party Congress explicitly stated that, with regard to periphery diplomacy, China should uphold the guidelines of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, as well as being amicable to neighbors and treating them as partners, and deepen friendship, mutual trust, and the integration of interests with countries in our periphery. Outlook on China’s Periphery Diplomacy in the New Era emphasizes the need to uphold amity and kindness toward neighbors, honor trust and cultivate harmony; to treat others with sincerity and help each other through mutual watchfulness and assistance; to pursue mutual benefit and win–win cooperation; and to remain inclusive and learn from each other while seeking common ground and setting differences to one side. In October 2023, President Xi Jinping further pointed out the relationship between [the principle of] amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness and Chinese-style modernization: “We will promote the new development of the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, to allow Chinese-style modernization to better benefit the periphery, jointly advance the modernization process of Asia, and enable China’s high-quality development and a good surrounding environment to reinforce and complement each other.” The principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness is a new model of international relations and regional cooperation advocated by China in the new era. Through strategic dialogue, economic and trade cooperation, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges, it aims to promote Asian values centered on peace, cooperation, inclusiveness, and integration, representing a transcendence of the narrow-minded practices of Western major powers that pursued self-interest at the expense of their neighbors during their rise. China and countries in its periphery enjoy geographical proximity, close personal bonds, and cultural affinity, and since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, have consistently upheld mutual respect and equality among all countries. These conditions provide a broad foundation for implementing the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.

In the realm of periphery diplomacy, President Xi Jinping has also put forward the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests. “When working with countries in our periphery and developing countries, it is essential to adhere to upholding justice while pursuing shared interests. Only by upholding this principle can we do our work well and truly reach people’s hearts.” The principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests embodies the idea of putting justice first. President Xi has clearly stated, “We have an obligation to provide assistance within our capacity to poor countries, and at times we must give precedence to justice over profit, even sacrifice profit for justice. We must never be solely profit-driven or overly concerned with petty gains and losses.” In August 2014, during a visit to Mongolia, President Xi remarked, “We welcome everyone to board the train of China’s development, whether it is the fast train or the free ride, we welcome both. As the saying goes, ‘If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together.’“ In December 2023, during a visit to Vietnam, President Xi stated, “Asia is our common home, and the periphery are neighbors who cannot be moved away. Helping our neighbors succeed is helping ourselves.” After China’s development, the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests is the guiding principle for China as it actively shoulders the responsibilities of a major country, carries forward the tradition of internationalism, and handles its relations with countries in our periphery and developing countries. Since ancient times, China has revered maxims such as “sacrifice one’s life for righteousness” and “those who put justice before profit are honored, while those who put profit before justice are disgraced.” Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country has accumulated rich diplomatic practices in putting justice before profit, providing a value foundation for implementing the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests in periphery diplomacy.

In the realm of periphery diplomacy, President Xi Jinping has also put forward the new security concept, emphasizing the need to “uphold a new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination” in periphery diplomacy. Taking into account Asia’s own characteristics, he has refined the new security concept into an Asian New Security Concept that advocates common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and sustainable security. Historically, the rise of major powers has always had a direct impact on countries in their periphery, with cases of resorting to war being far from rare. For example, during its rise, Britain adopted “offshore balancing” and frequently intervened in wars on the European continent, while the United States, during its rise, launched the Spanish–American War. In the face of such historical cases and the vigorous promotion of the “China Threat Theory” by certain extra regional powers, President Xi has made it clear: “We will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development.” In April 2022, while attending the Boao Forum for Asia, President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Security Initiative (GSI), in which he specifically pointed out that “humanity is an indivisible security community.” The new security concept emphasizes that the security of one country should not be built on the insecurity of others, upholds the principle of indivisible security, and stresses cooperative security. It represents a transcendence of Western countries’ pursuit of unilateral security and absolute security. China and countries in its periphery have a long-standing tradition of peaceful coexistence. Since ancient times, China has upheld principles such as “a gentleman seeks harmony but not uniformity” and “do not impose on others what you do not desire yourself.” Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China has peacefully resolved territorial disputes with multiple countries through consultation, providing a historical foundation for implementing the new security concept with countries in our periphery.

President Xi Jinping has also explicitly stated his commitment to building a new type of international relations. In March 2013, at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in Russia, Xi emphasized the need to establish a new type of international relations with mutually beneficial cooperation at its core. Subsequently, in his address during the general debate of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Xi clearly stated: “We must uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, build a new type of international relations with mutually beneficial cooperation at its core, and foster a community of common destiny for mankind.” This not only further clarified that mutually beneficial cooperation is the central essence of the new type of international relations, but also identified it as the only path toward building a community of common destiny for mankind. In October 2017, the report to the 19th Party Congress explicitly stated the need to build a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness and justice, and mutually beneficial cooperation. In October 2022, the report to the 20th Party Congress stated that China adheres to developing friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and promotes the building of a new type of international relations. The concept of a new type of international relations aims to promote mutually beneficial cooperation among all countries in the context of globalization, providing a clear direction for China in developing its relations with countries in our periphery, and representing a transcendence of the Western approach to international relations that often draws lines along ideological boundaries, engages in power politics, and pursues bloc confrontation. Many of countries in China’s periphery were reduced to colonies or semi-colonies of Western powers in modern times, giving them a strong demand for mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. Since ancient times, China has upheld principles such as “treat others as equals” and “harmony and coexistence.” Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China has consistently practiced the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and it shares with countries in its periphery a common aspiration to build a new type of international relations.

In addition to advanced concepts in periphery diplomacy, China’s achievements in building a community of common destiny with the periphery are also inseparable from the successful implementation of relevant cooperation initiatives in those countries. The first is the leading role of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). President Xi Jinping first proposed the BRI in two countries in China’s periphery, Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Starting from China, the BRI extends to and connects many countries and regions in the periphery. Over more than a decade of development, it has transformed from an initiative into action, and from a vision for economic development into a reality of economic growth. Many countries in China’s periphery have signed Belt and Road cooperation documents with China and have achieved many substantive results. Cooperation between China and developing countries in the periphery within the framework of the BRI has increasingly made this region a demonstration zone for the initiative.

The second is the regional implementation of the three major global initiatives. In the face of a continually widening deficit in global governance, President Xi Jinping has successively proposed the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These three global initiatives embody China’s policy practice and experience in addressing global governance challenges, and they have been welcomed by the vast majority of countries around the world. The Global Development Partnership stresses that “no country or person should be left behind.” In the Joint Statement of the ASEAN-China Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, the Joint Statement Between Leaders of China and the Five Central Asian Countries on the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Ties, and the Xi’an Declaration of the China–Central Asia Summit, the ten ASEAN countries and the five Central Asian countries all expressed their active participation in the “Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative.” Today, the world is in a new period of turbulence and transformation, with conflicts in the Middle East continuing and the Ukraine crisis dragging on, posing threats to global peace and development. The GSI responds to the urgent need of the international community to safeguard world peace and prevent conflicts and wars, offering a new direction for eliminating the root causes of international conflicts, addressing global security challenges, and achieving world peace and development. China’s periphery is an area where major power competition is intense and security issues are prominent. The proposal of the GSI has been welcomed by most countries in China’s periphery and has become an important pillar for building a community of common destiny with the periphery. Most countries in Southeast Asia and the countries of Central Asia recognize and support the GSI put forward by China. Regarding the GCI, President Xi Jinping stated that the purpose of proposing the initiative is to encourage the international community to address the imbalance between material and spiritual development and to jointly promote the continuous progress of human civilization. The GCI provides both conceptual guidance and an institutional platform for cultural exchanges among countries and peoples around the world. China’s periphery, with its cultural diversity and civilizational variety, has already become an important practice area for the GCI. Countries in China’s periphery have actively responded to the initiative, engaging in civilizational exchange and mutual learning. Region in China’s periphery is becoming a pilot zone for the GDI, a testing ground for the GSI, and a model area for the GCI.

The third is the gradual implementation of regional mechanisms for multilateral cooperation. Since the United States initiated strategic competition with China, it has sought to build a series of exclusionary mechanisms in China’s periphery in an attempt to contain China and divide the region. Nevertheless, regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms in Asia have made positive progress through the joint efforts of China and countries in its periphery. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has expanded from six member states at its founding in 2001 to ten member states in 2024. In addition, it has two observer states, Afghanistan and Mongolia, and fourteen dialogue partners, including Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, with its influence growing steadily. In 2014, China proposed and promoted the establishment of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) mechanism, whose members include China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. After lengthy negotiations, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was finally concluded at the end of 2020 and entered into force on January 1, 2022. It has already become an important platform for regional multilateral cooperation between China and countries in its periphery. China has also actively promoted regional cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN–China “10+1” Leaders’ Meeting, the ASEAN–China, Japan, and ROK “10+3” Leaders’ Meeting, and the China–Japan–ROK Leaders’ Meeting, and is actively applying to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), accelerating the development of free trade zones as well as alignment in rules, regulations, and standards. Regional mechanisms for multilateral cooperation have already become important platforms for advancing economic cooperation between China and countries in its periphery, and the periphery has also become a focal area for China’s promotion of regional multilateral cooperation.

III. New situation and paths for deepening the building of a community of common destiny with the periphery

The building of a community of common destiny with the periphery concerns the overall landscape of China’s diplomacy. At present, the changes unseen in a century are accelerating, and in the face of the constant emergence of various “black swan” and “grey rhino” events in international relations, and especially the uncertainty in the foreign policies of certain countries, the greatest characteristic of China’s diplomacy is precisely its certainty. China will continue to uphold the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests, and the New Security Concept, and will remain committed to building a new type of international relations. This will continue to provide predictable conceptual and policy support for China and countries in our periphery to work together toward building a community of common destiny. At the symposium commemorating the 10th anniversary of the concept of periphery diplomacy, Foreign Minister Wang Yi explicitly proposed four directions for continued efforts: “Work together to build a Belt and Road demonstration zone, work together to build a pilot zone for the GDI, work together to build a testing ground for the GSI, and work together to build a model area for the GCI.” “A better world makes China better; a better China makes the world better.” Against the backdrop of the BRI, the three major global initiatives, and regional multilateral cooperation mechanisms taking root and flourishing in China’s periphery, China’s development will continue to benefit countries in its periphery first. According to the China Import Development Report, China’s goods import volume has shown continuous growth, rising from U.S. $243.553 billion in 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organization, to U.S. $2.715999 trillion in 2022, an average annual growth rate of 12.17%. This made it the fastest-growing country in the world, far exceeding the average annual global goods import growth rate of 6.83% over the same period. In 2001, China’s share of global goods imports was only 3.8%; by 2022, this figure had reached 10.58%, just 2.6 percentage points lower than that of the United States. In November 2018, China held the China International Import Expo (CIIE) for the first time, an innovative initiative to proactively open China’s market to other countries. It is also the world’s first national-level expo with the theme of imports and has been held six times to date. Among China’s import sources, countries in its periphery are not only the most important region of origin but have also seen their share grow. Between 2001 and 2022, imports from countries in China’s periphery accounted for around 50% of China’s total imports from the world. In 2001, imports from countries in China’s periphery accounted for 47.94% of China’s total global imports; by 2022, this share had risen to 51.53%. At the same time, as China’s market size has expanded, its imports from countries in its periphery have grown rapidly, from U.S. $116.766 billion in 2001 to U.S. $1.3996 trillion in 2022, about 12 times the 2001 figure.

Entering a new period of turbulence and transformation, the building of a community of common destiny with the periphery also faces certain challenges, mainly reflected in the United States increasing its involvement in affairs in China’s periphery, as well as subtle changes in the attitudes of a very small number of countries in China’s periphery toward China. On one hand, the United States has adopted an integrated “security–economy–diplomacy” approach to intensify its suppression of China. In the security domain, it hypes up the “China Threat Theory” to intimidate countries in China’s periphery, and seeks to create an absolute advantage over China by providing security products, forming alliance and partnership systems, and other means. In the economic domain, it talks down China and, under the pretext of economic security, pushes countries in China’s periphery toward “decoupling and breaking supply chains” with China. In the diplomatic domain, the United States uses so-called values-based diplomacy as a pretext and small multilateral mechanisms as tools to mislead international public opinion, demonize China’s political system, accentuate differences between Chinese and Western values, spread Cold War thinking, and promote bloc confrontation, in an attempt to isolate China. The United States’ motive lies in its attempt to block the path of national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by reshaping China’s peripheral environment. On the other hand, the attitudes of a very small number of countries in China’s periphery toward China have also undergone subtle changes. In Northeast Asia, Japan has repeatedly conducted targeted joint military exercises with U.S. forces stationed in Japan and has on multiple occasions invited the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia, and other countries to participate in joint exercises. In Southeast Asia, calls by certain countries for China to comply with the “South China Sea arbitration ruling” have been on the rise, and some have shown hesitation in the consultations on the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”. In South Asia in recent years, India has not only held joint military exercises with the United States near the China–India border, but has also strengthened dialogue with NATO and allowed NATO to probe into the China–India boundary issue. The underlying motives behind the changes in attitude of this very small number of countries in China’s periphery toward China are highly complex: some have territorial disputes with China and hope to use the United States to make unreasonable demands on China; some view China as a competitor and attempt to use the United States to contain the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; and some are driven by motives related to values-based diplomacy and talking down China.

Looking ahead, the period of turbulence and transformation will continue. In the face of challenges to building a community of common destiny with the periphery, China needs to further deepen the pathways for building such a community under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.

First, China should consolidate and expand consensus with countries in its periphery. President Xi Jinping has noted that the peoples of Asia are increasingly realizing that only by jointly practicing the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, and by promoting the Asian values of peace, cooperation, inclusiveness, and integration, can they become part of the global trend toward peace, development, and progress. Affected by sluggish global economic growth in the post-pandemic era, intensified anti-globalization trends and global trade protectionism, as well as the spillover effects of regional conflicts, the economic development of all countries in China’s periphery has encountered certain difficulties and connectivity has been hindered. In December 2023, the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs stressed the need to firmly oppose anti-globalization and pan-securitization [泛安全化, treating all issues as security issues], oppose all forms of unilateralism and protectionism, resolutely promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, address structural problems that hinder the healthy development of the world economy, and steer economic globalization to develop in the direction of greater openness, inclusiveness, universality, and balance. Regional cooperation in China’s periphery is an important means for overcoming structural obstacles to economic development in the region, and is crucial for the economic recovery and growth of all countries in the region. At the same time, judging from the U.S. involvement in China’s periphery, its underlying logic lies in attempting to divide the region, pursue a divide-and-rule approach, and dominate the process and direction of order-building in China’s periphery. In promoting regional cooperation, China should adopt a mutually beneficial regionalism to offset the disruptions caused by unilateralism. China should adopt a clear and firm stance to promote regional cooperation in the periphery based on the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits; actively explore new topics and new platforms conducive to regional cooperation; and make good use of, fully leverage, and strengthen mechanisms such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the “10+1” and “10+3” frameworks, the China–Japan–ROK Leaders’ Meeting, the BRI, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and Lancang-Mekong Cooperation.

Second, China should coordinate development and security and enhance the security trust of countries in its periphery toward China. The report to the 20th Party Congress clearly stated that China has put forward the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and is willing to work with the international community to implement them. While continuing to consolidate the foundation of economic cooperation and people-to-people and cultural exchanges with countries in its periphery, China should further expand security cooperation. To make Asia a testing ground for the GSI, China should adhere to the path of peaceful development; prudently resolve territorial disputes such as the China–India boundary issue and the China–Japan Diaoyu Islands dispute; expand bilateral military security cooperation and exchanges; establish mechanisms for timely communication between the two militaries on important developments; actively advance the building of a security order in the periphery, such as by using consultations on the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” as a basis to explore the establishment of a security cooperation mechanism among South China Sea littoral states; and increase cooperation with countries in China’s periphery in non-traditional security areas such as combating crime, cybersecurity, earthquake relief and disaster prevention, and epidemic prevention and control.

Third, China should intensify the construction of its external communication discourse system to shape correct and objective perceptions of China among countries in its periphery. The United States, in its strategic suppression of China in the peripheral region, increasingly relies on ideological and values-based narratives in an attempt to isolate China. On the basis of refuting the main narratives used by the United States to interfere in China’s peripheral region, China should take the initiative to explain to countries in its periphery the core significance of concepts such as the community of common destiny for mankind, the common values of humanity, the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests, the New Security Concept, and the new type of international relations. China should further strengthen people-to-people and cultural bonds with neighboring countries, especially by drawing on cultural and historical traditions to engage in in-depth discussions with them on the “commonalities in values” between the two sides.

IV. Conclusion

As the concept and concrete policies of building a community of common destiny with the periphery take deeper root, the building of such a community will welcome more opportunities. At the same time, it also faces some challenges that cannot be ignored, especially the United States’ strategic suppression of China. China must work to eliminate this interference in order to continue advancing the building of a community of common destiny with its periphery. The traditional major-power competition perspective cannot explain the differences and changes in the strategies of countries in China’s periphery toward China. It largely overlooks the strategic autonomy of the countries in China’s periphery and cannot truly address their individualized needs. The building of a community of common destiny with countries in China’s periphery must, in particular, fully leverage the initiative of periphery diplomacy and the autonomy of countries in the periphery. China’s promotion of such a community must be based on the reality that countries in its periphery are neighbors who cannot be moved away, with whom China shares a common destiny. This is fundamentally different from the United States’ view of countries in China’s periphery—as tools to contain China. This difference is precisely the fundamental reason why the building of a community of common destiny with the periphery has achieved such great accomplishments since the 18th Party Congress, and it is also the source of China’s confidence and resolve in continuing to build this community.