The world today is undergoing changes unseen in a century. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered a critical stage and an important period of opportunity, while at the same time facing the severe challenge of negative shifts in the international environment, such as the United States comprehensively advancing its strategy of containing China at multiple levels globally and in China’s periphery. Firmly seizing opportunities for development and properly responding to the challenges brought by changes in the international environment are essential prerequisites for steadily advancing Chinese modernization. Therefore, in the present and for a considerable period to come, China must re-create its international environment, particularly its peripheral international environment.

China possesses the foundation and conditions for re-creating its peripheral international environment. Periphery diplomacy has always been one of the key areas of China’s diplomacy, and to date it has accumulated many successful experiences and achieved important results. In the face of new challenges arising from changes in the international environment, China not only needs to continue carrying forward the fine traditions of its past periphery diplomacy, but also needs to gather new strategic wisdom and adopt new strategic measures in light of the new characteristics of changes in the peripheral international environment, in order to improve the overall strategic framework of its diplomacy.

Based on the above understanding, this paper intends to offer an overall assessment of the international environment, put forward a strategic approach whereby China, in the face of the United States’ all-encompassing strategy of containment, must re-create the current and future international environment, analyze the foundations of China’s re-creation of the peripheral international environment and its peripheral diplomatic thinking, and go on to present the author’s own views on the goals, practical platforms, and pathways for re-creating the peripheral international environment.

I. New challenges brought by changes in the international environment

Since the 2010s, in order to maintain its hegemonic position, the United States has abandoned the “engagement + containment” policy toward China implemented after the Cold War, discarding “engagement” entirely and shifting fully to “containment.” It has also rallied certain countries to promote the establishment of bilateral and multilateral containment mechanisms in China’s periphery. Against this backdrop, China faces the severe challenge of unfavorable trends emerging in its peripheral international environment.

(i) Overall assessment of the international environment

Today, the international environment is witnessing a series of new situations and new problems. Global factors of instability, uncertainty, and even danger are steadily increasing, and humanity is confronted with an endless stream of severe challenges. Among these, one very important factor is that the United States is making every effort to promote hegemonism worldwide, seeking to construct an international order “under U.S. rule,” while joining with Western countries to advance its values and institutional models. This has led to economic, political, cultural, and other frictions of varying scales in some regions of the world, and even to localized armed conflicts and hot wars, gravely threatening world peace and development.¹ The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022 brought the security situation across the Eurasian continent to a state of acute tension. In late October, NATO and Russia simultaneously conducted nuclear military exercises with characteristics of nuclear confrontation and nuclear coercion, making the entire world feel that the nuclear threat facing humanity was imminent. At the same time, the United States’ “de-globalization” policy has made global development even more unbalanced, increased various destabilizing factors in the world economy, and gravely threatens the sustainable development of the world economy.

In his report to the 20th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping, from the grand perspective of both the domestic and international overall situations, offered a penetrating assessment of the current circumstances. On the one hand, the global changes unseen in a century are accelerating, a new round of scientific and technological (S&T) revolution and industrial transformation is advancing in an in-depth manner, the international balance of power is undergoing profound adjustment, and “China’s development faces new strategic opportunities.” On the other hand, the impact of the once-in-a-century pandemic has been far-reaching, the “de-globalization” trend is in the ascendant, unilateralism and protectionism are markedly on the rise, the world economy is struggling to recover, local conflicts and turbulence are occurring frequently, global issues are intensifying, and “the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation.” At the same time, China’s reform, development, and stability are confronted with many deep-seated contradictions that cannot be avoided or bypassed, and “external suppression and containment may escalate at any time.”² The report to the 20th Party Congress further pointed out that “China’s development has entered a period in which strategic opportunities and risks and challenges coexist, with increasing uncertainty and unforeseeable factors,” and that various “black swan” and “gray rhino” events may occur at any time. Therefore, China must maintain an awareness of adversity, adhere to a bottom-line mindset, and prepare to undergo the major tests of turbulent waters and even raging waves.³

At the same time, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the report to the 20th Party Congress that “we are closer, more confident, and more capable than at any time in history of realizing the goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Therefore, it is necessary to “proactively recognize changes, adapt to changes, and seek changes,” and to “proactively guard against and resolve risks.”⁴

(ii) The challenge of U.S. strategic containment of China

As China has continued its rapid rise, the United States has exhibited profound psychological discomfort and strategic anxiety. Its policy toward China has shifted from the post–Cold War framework of “engagement + containment” to comprehensive competition, containment, and confrontation.

In May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated very clearly in a speech at George Washington University: “Today, China is a global power with a broad sphere of influence, extraordinary impact, and tremendous ambition. China is the world’s second-largest economy, with world-class cities and public transportation networks. China is home to some of the world’s largest technology companies and seeks to dominate the technologies and industries of the future. China has rapidly modernized its military and intends to make it a first-rate fighting force with global power projection capabilities. China has also declared its ambition to establish a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific region and to become the world’s leading power.” In Blinken’s view, China’s rise was due more to “the stability and opportunities provided by the international order,” yet China is “undermining them.” He groundlessly accused China of “advancing unlawful maritime sovereignty claims,” “undermining peace, security, freedom of navigation, and commerce,” “skirting or breaking trade rules,” and “harming U.S. workers and companies as well as those of all other countries.”⁵

In October of the same year, the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy Report further stated that in the competition between the United States and China, “China still has the intention of reshaping the international order, and is increasingly capable of doing so, advocating the establishment of an international order that shapes the global competitive environment in its favor.” The report also noted: “China is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and the growing economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.”⁶

The United States believes that the coming decade will be a critical period for U.S.–China strategic competition. President Biden stated: “We are now at the beginning of a decisive decade for America and the world, during which the terms of geopolitical competition among major powers will be set.” “The world is now at an inflection point. This decade will be decisive. It will determine the outcome of our competition with China, how we respond to the grave threat posed by Russia, and how we pursue efforts to address common challenges, especially climate change, pandemics, and economic turmoil. If we do not act with urgency and creativity, the window of opportunity to shape the future of the international order and to tackle common challenges will close.”⁷

In response to the above U.S. strategic adjustments, President Putin stated in October 2022: “We are standing at a historical turning point, on the verge of what may be the most dangerous, unpredictable, and at the same time most important decade since the end of the Second World War.”⁸

What is meant by the “coming decade”? From now until 2035 is precisely the first step of our “two-step” strategy. Namely, in this period, China seeks to basically build itself into a modernized socialist superpower. Viewed from this perspective, the United States will not allow China to achieve Chinese modernization easily. To date, the United States has carried out containment of China on three levels. The first is the global level. The United States attaches greater importance to the geostrategy of the Eurasian continent. Zbigniew Brzezinski once described three conditions of the geopolitical situation of world affairs as “unprecedented” and appearing for the first time in history: “(1) this country is truly a global power; (2) a non-Eurasian country is the only nation with a preeminent position in the world; and (3) the Eurasian continent, the central stage of the world, is dominated by a non-Eurasian power.”⁹ The second is the periphery level. The United States is seeking to carry out encirclement in China’s periphery, laying out various traps to set up points, lines, planes, and belts of strategic containment. By combining points and planes, it aims to realize an all-encompassing and multi-dimensional strategic containment of China. The third is the domestic level. The United States deeply interferes in China’s internal affairs, intruding into sensitive matters concerning China’s land borders, maritime boundaries, and other critical areas, thereby seriously undermining China’s sovereignty and core national interests.

The concepts, methods, and measures of the United States’ strategic containment and encirclement of China, from the “Return to the Asia-Pacific” to the “Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy” and now the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, all have the same purpose: to prevent China’s rise, to impede the historical process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and to maintain its hegemonic position globally and in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the strong interference by the United States, unfavorable trends have emerged in China’s peripheral environment.

Blinken explicitly put forward the United States’ future strategy toward China, namely that the United States “will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.”¹⁰ As to how this “strategic environment” targeting China is to be “shaped,” Blinken used three key words: investment, alignment, and competition. While the words seemed neutral, they in fact concealed sharp intent. He further explained that the Biden administration is committed to “re-energizing America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships and to re-engage in international institutions. We’re encouraging partners to work with each other, and through regional and global organizations. And we’re standing up new coalitions to deliver for our people and meet the tests of the century ahead.” Blinken went on to speak of a set of “moves” for carrying out encirclement around China, such as deepening the vital alliances with Japan and South Korea; launching the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; strengthening the Quad mechanism; enhancing U.S.–Japan–India–Australia coordination; advancing the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness; strengthening cooperation with ASEAN by convening a U.S.–ASEAN summit and inviting seven ASEAN countries to become founding members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; inviting Asian allies to attend the NATO summit in Madrid; establishing the AUKUS trilateral security partnership; and introducing NATO’s influence into Asia.¹¹ In response, we must be fully prepared psychologically and maintain sufficient strategic resolve.

II. China’s foreign policy and the concept of re-creating the peripheral international environment

China’s rise is the greatest comprehensive variable in today’s world, eliciting a wide range of reactions from countries across the globe. Therefore, China’s diplomacy must put forward new strategies and put them into practice in response to the new circumstances and new problems emerging in the international environment. Confronted with the United States’ all-encompassing strategy of containment, how should we respond? A very important strategic approach is that China needs to re-create the current and future international environment.

(i) China’s foreign policy aims and the building of a community of common destiny for mankind

The 20th Party Congress put forward a series of new ideas for major diplomatic strategies and policies. Among them, the most important strategic objective is: to take safeguarding world peace and promoting common development as the aims of China’s foreign policy, and to be committed to advancing the building of a community of common destiny for mankind.

Its fundamental elements are: firmly pursuing an independent and autonomous foreign policy of peace; firmly safeguarding an international system with the United Nations at its core, an international order based on international law, and the basic norms of international relations founded on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; opposing all forms of hegemonism and power politics; adhering to a defensive national defense policy; promoting the building of a new type of international relations; deepening and expanding global partnerships that are equal, open, and cooperative with a commitment to enlarging the convergence of interests with all countries; promoting coordination and positive interaction among major powers, and fostering a major-power relationship framework characterized by peaceful coexistence, overall stability, and balanced development; following the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness and the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with developing countries and safeguard their common interests; upholding the basic national policy of opening to the outside world and resolutely pursuing a mutually beneficial strategy of opening up; promoting trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and jointly fostering new drivers of global development; opposing protectionism, the “building of walls and barriers,” “decoupling and supply chain disruption,” unilateral sanctions, and maximum pressure; actively participating in the reform and construction of the global governance system; practicing a vision of global governance based on extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits; adhering to true multilateralism and opposing all forms of unilateralism, as well as bloc politics and exclusive cliques targeting specific countries; putting forward the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative; working to build a world of lasting peace, universal security, common prosperity, openness and inclusiveness, and cleanliness and beauty; promoting the common values of humanity: peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom; and respecting the diversity of world civilizations.¹² The key points of China’s foreign policy fully embody China’s fundamental vision and framework for re-creating the international environment under the new circumstances.

Amid changes unseen in a century, there have arisen the “questions of the world” and the “questions of the times,” the “changes of the world,” the “changes of the times,” and the “changes of history.” What is to be done with the world? What are we to do? While globalization has advanced and benefited countries around the world, the United States has engaged in “de-globalization,” unilateralism, “long-arm jurisdiction,” and hegemonism, throwing the world into turmoil. In response, China has put forward the initiative of building a “community of common destiny for mankind.” “As the term implies, a community of common destiny for mankind means that the future and destiny of all peoples and all countries are closely linked together, and that we should stand together through storm and stress, sharing weal and woe, striving to turn this planet where we were born and raised into a harmonious global family, and to realize the aspiration of the peoples of all countries for a better life.”¹³ Building a community of common destiny for mankind is an original concept contributed by China to the world, and it also demonstrates China’s responsible attitude toward humanity and toward the world.

(ii) The conceptual significance of re-creating China’s peripheral international environment

Confronted with the complex international situation and the challenge of U.S. strategic containment of China, it is necessary for China to re-create its international environment. And in re-creating our international environment, the starting point must be the re-creation of the peripheral international environment, or more precisely, making the re-creation of China’s peripheral international environment a priority in China’s overall diplomatic strategy and foreign policy.

The concept of re-creating China’s peripheral international environment is an upgraded version of the approach to shaping the peripheral international environment pursued since the founding of the People’s Republic, and especially since reform and opening up. Its specific significance should include at least the following aspects.

First, for the re-creation of the peripheral international environment, China, which is already the world’s second-largest economy, needs to make eliminating doubts in countries in our periphery about China’s rise an important task. Will China’s development follow the old path of colonial expansion taken by established imperialist powers? General Secretary Xi Jinping gave a clear answer to this question in the report to the 20th Party Congress: “Chinese modernization is modernization pursued along the path of peaceful development.” “Our country will not take the old path taken by some countries of modernization through war, colonization, and plunder. This path of harming others for one’s own gain, steeped in bloodshed and crimes, has brought profound suffering to the peoples of many developing countries. We stand firmly on the right side of history and on the side of human progress, holding high the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit. While firmly safeguarding world peace and development in the course of seeking our own development, we will also use our own development to better safeguard world peace and development.”¹⁴

Second, for the re-creation of the peripheral international environment, China must place strong emphasis on the prefix “re-” and develop new strategic approaches to periphery diplomacy. The achievements and experience in periphery diplomacy accumulated since the founding of the People’s Republic, and especially over the more than forty years of reform and opening up, should be carefully summarized and carried forward. In light of the profound changes in both China’s own conditions and the external environment, China should, on the basis of past successful experience, formulate and implement new strategies and new policies for periphery diplomacy suited to the new era and new tasks.

Third, for the re-creation of the peripheral international environment, China needs to actively and vigorously advance periphery diplomacy so that it not only truly embodies the idea of “re-,” but also genuinely reflects the notion of “creation.” “Creation” refers to diplomatic actions that proactively influence and transform the peripheral international environment. “Re-creation” means taking the initiative in a situation where certain unfavorable trends have already emerged in the international environment for China, with the aim of reversing these trends and reshaping the peripheral international environment in a direction conducive to China’s sustained and healthy development.

III. The foundations for China’s shaping of the peripheral international environment and its thinking on periphery diplomacy

China’s efforts to shape the peripheral international environment did not begin for no reason. Rather, it came out of an accumulated series of experiences and achievements, including not only objectives but also approaches, platforms, and mechanisms. To date, China’s development has benefited from a favorable peripheral international environment. In the course of future development, China needs to carefully summarize its past successful experiences and, under the new circumstances, re-create its peripheral international environment.

(i) The three generations of leadership actively fostered a favorable international environment

One of the greatest events of the latter half of the 20th century was China’s rise. China’s successful rise to this point has been inseparable from the active efforts by three generations of leadership to create a favorable international environment.

In the 1970s, the first generation of Chinese leadership successfully achieved the goal of restoring China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations. Relying on the remarkable achievements of periphery diplomacy and diplomacy with the Third World, it also successfully achieved the normalization of relations with Western countries.

Since the late 1970s, the second generation of Chinese leadership formulated and implemented a modernization strategy centered on economic development and pursued through reform and opening up, making the active creation of a favorable international environment for economic development the central task of China’s diplomatic strategy.¹⁵ In 1978, when China embarked on reform and opening up, the international landscape was still locked in the Cold War, and the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union remained unchanged. In contemporary international relations scholarship, there is a view that the end of the Cold War was the result of U.S. and Soviet initiative. In fact, in the later stage of the Cold War, a strategic “great triangle” emerged among China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, in which China played a very important role in world peace and in shaping the peripheral international environment. By proposing and implementing the strategy of reform and opening up, and proactively opening to the world—particularly to countries and regions in China’s periphery—China unquestionably undertook an extraordinarily important initiative that broke through the barriers and mindset of the Cold War. It can be said that China contributed to the end of the Cold War and made a contribution to human peace and progress.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, during a difficult period when China experienced domestic political turmoil and Western countries led by the United States seized the opportunity to impose sanctions on China, Chinese leaders put forward a diplomatic strategy centered on the principle of “hide your strength, bide your time.”¹⁶ The second and third generations of leadership successfully broke through the sanctions imposed by the United States and Western countries, ensuring the smooth advancement of reform and opening up.

Since the 1990s, China has successfully achieved the transformation from a planned economy to a market economy, attained the goal of accession to the World Trade Organization, actively practiced multilateralism centered on the United Nations, and put forward the concept and goal of building a “community of common destiny for mankind.” China is now closer than ever to the center of the world stage, and by using the Belt and Road Initiative as a practical platform, China is contributing wisdom and strength to enable countries along its routes to share in the dividends of development.

After the normalization of China–Soviet relations, the two sides initiated border negotiations. However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union after the Cold War, China’s counterpart in the border negotiations multiplied from one to four: Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Confronted with this new reality, China adopted the “4+1” model: Russia together with the three Central Asian states bordering China on one side, and China on the other. In the history of international relations, border negotiations are especially prone to sparks, disagreements, and even military conflict. However, the border negotiations between China and these four countries not only avoided conflict, but also fostered goodwill, produced the “Shanghai Five” mechanism, and resulted in agreements on military confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions. On the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) came into being. This represented a major effort and contribution by China and the relevant countries to the peace and stability of the peripheral international environment. The prerequisite for achieving these outcomes was adherence to mutual benefit and win–win results, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, with trust-building as the foundation of cooperative mutually beneficial outcomes.

China has made tremendous efforts to safeguard peace, prosperity, and stability in the peripheral international environment. More than forty years of sustained development show that China’s reform and opening up and the peripheral international environment have formed a generally positive interaction. On the one hand, countries in our periphery have benefited from China’s reform and opening up. On the other hand, a crucial prerequisite for the remarkable success of China’s reform and opening up has been our pursuit and creation of a favorable international environment, especially a good and consistently favorable peripheral environment, while also accumulating a wealth of experience in achieving positive interaction. This experience must be carefully summarized.¹⁷

Since the 2010s, China’s sustained and rapid rise has triggered strategic anxiety in the United States, a status quo hegemon, and in Western countries seeking to maintain global dominance, with their strategic posture toward China escalating from competition to containment.¹⁸ New circumstances, new questions, and new challenges have also emerged across regions such as the Asia-Pacific and Eurasia. The Ukraine crisis has comprehensively reflected the structural changes in the international environment and is delivering a fierce and lasting impact on the entire world. The international situation in China’s periphery is likewise undergoing increasingly complex changes, with factors of uncertainty mounting.

In the face of the current new circumstances, new questions, and new challenges, and especially the grave challenge posed by U.S. containment policy toward China, China needs to revisit the successful experience of more than forty years of reform and opening up and re-create its peripheral international environment. China must further develop friendly and cooperative relations with countries in its periphery, enhance their trust in us, eliminate strategic doubts, and narrow the space for U.S. attempts at sowing discord. This way, Washington’s scheme of increasing its investment and interference in our periphery to pressure countries in China’s periphery into “taking sides” with the United States will find no market. Creating an upgraded favorable peripheral international environment will become both an important external condition for achieving China’s grand modernization goals and an effective means of breaking through U.S. strategic encirclement.

(ii) Theoretical and practical innovation in China’s periphery diplomacy

In fact, China had already placed the issue of re-creating its peripheral international environment on the diplomatic strategic agenda a decade ago, undertaking strategic arrangements for periphery diplomacy and launching the process of re-creating China’s peripheral international environment. Continuous innovation in the theory and practice of periphery diplomacy has become an important component of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. Since the 18th Party Congress, China’s diplomacy has attached great importance to the status and role of the peripheral international environment in the overall context of national development and diplomacy. This was most clearly reflected at the Symposium on Periphery Diplomacy held in 2013. At the symposium, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: The main tasks of this meeting are to summarize experience, assess the situation, unify thinking, and chart the course ahead; to determine the strategic objectives, fundamental principles, and overall layout of periphery diplomacy for the next five to ten years; and to clarify the work approaches and implementation plans for addressing major issues facing periphery diplomacy.¹⁹

For China, the importance of periphery diplomacy is concentrated in two main aspects: First, “whether from the perspective of geography, natural environment, or mutual relations, our periphery has extremely important strategic significance for our country.”²⁰ “China has always placed the periphery in the foremost position in its overall diplomacy, taking as its responsibility the promotion of peace, stability, and development in the periphery. China’s efforts to advance the global governance system toward greater fairness and reason, to promote the democratization of international relations, to foster a new type of international relations with mutually beneficial cooperation at its core, and to build a community of common destiny for mankind all begin with the periphery as the starting point.”²¹ Second, this is because the peripheral environment has undergone significant changes. China’s economic and trade ties with countries in its periphery have grown ever closer, with interaction reaching an unprecedented level. This objectively requires that China’s periphery diplomatic strategy and work keep pace with the times and become more proactive. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that our periphery is full of vitality, with clear development advantages and potential. Overall, our peripheral environment is stable, and good-neighborliness, friendship, and mutually beneficial cooperation represent the mainstream of relations between China and countries in our periphery. We must take a broad view, stress strategy, and emphasize planning, so as to carry out our periphery diplomacy even more effectively.²²

China’s rise requires a favorable peripheral international environment and sustained, in-depth, positive interaction with that environment. A very important aspect of developing relations with countries in China’s periphery is to identify the points of common, compatible, and converging interests between China and countries in its periphery. Therefore, in considering periphery issues and conducting periphery diplomacy, it is necessary to adopt a three-dimensional, diverse, and cross-temporal perspective.²³ The Symposium on Periphery Diplomacy set forth the fundamental guidelines for China’s diplomacy with countries in its periphery: to treat neighbors with goodwill and regard them as partners; to uphold the principles of fostering good neighborliness, ensuring security for neighbors, promoting prosperity to neighbors; and to give prominence to the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness.²⁴ Taking the path of peaceful development is a strategic choice made by our Party in line with the trend of the times and China’s fundamental interests, and safeguarding peace and stability in the periphery is an important goal of periphery diplomacy. To carry out periphery diplomacy effectively under the new circumstances, efforts must focus on four key “requirements”: to analyze and address issues from a strategic perspective and advance periphery diplomacy in a comprehensive manner; to work on deepening the pattern of mutual benefit and win–win outcomes; to advance regional security cooperation; and to strengthen propaganda efforts directed toward countries in our periphery. The 20th Party Congress set forth clear approaches for re-creating China’s peripheral international environment, namely, adhering to the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, following the guideline of treating neighbors with goodwill and regarding them as partners, and deepening friendship, mutual trust, and the integration of interests with countries in our periphery.²⁵

Actively carrying out periphery diplomacy is also an important link in China’s proactive expansion of its all-around diplomatic framework, an integral component of China’s deeper participation in global governance, an effective means of building a community of common destiny for mankind, an important arena and domain for advancing the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, and a vital aspect of safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

Today, China’s periphery diplomacy is directly confronting the grave challenges brought about by changes in the international environment. It is imperative for China to break through U.S. containment and encirclement, and the most important strategic breakthrough must first be achieved in the peripheral region. So long as China succeeds to a considerable extent in shaping a favorable peripheral international environment, the overall process and external conditions for Chinese-style modernization will improve significantly. Therefore, the re-creation of China’s peripheral international environment is not only highly necessary but also urgent. Proactively fostering a peripheral international environment conducive to China’s peaceful development alongside other countries is a necessary condition for China’s continued rise.

The strategic objectives of China’s periphery diplomacy complement its domestic development goals. Fully developing relations with countries in our periphery helps maintain a favorable state of peace and stability in the periphery, safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and provide a sound peripheral international environment for achieving the strategic goal of building a modern socialist superpower. Therefore, China needs to promote cooperation with peripheral regions on levels including civilization, institutions, mechanisms, and policies and its efforts to build friendly relations with countries in our periphery should emphasize comprehensive, multidimensional, and systemic efforts. This means developing friendly political and diplomatic relations, advancing economic and regional cooperation, promoting security cooperation, enhancing trust, strengthening people-to-people ties, and reinforcing inclusiveness and mutual learning among civilizations. As a major country in Asia, China should continuously enhance its soft power in its periphery, focusing on affinity, appeal, and influence, while increasing the degree of interest convergence and compatibility with countries in the periphery. By pursuing reciprocity and mutual benefit, China and countries in its periphery can all gain from sustained cooperation.

IV. The objectives and practical platform for re-creating China’s peripheral international environment

The central objective of re-creating China’s peripheral international environment is to build a community of common destiny with our periphery. To this end, achieving “people-to-people connectivity” between China and countries in our periphery must be given a highly important place in periphery diplomacy, while the Belt and Road Initiative must serve as the practical platform through which China advances common development with countries in our periphery and shares the fruits of development.

(i) Taking the building of a community of common destiny with our periphery as our objective

The realization of a community of common destiny for mankind is a long-term overarching goal. Within this framework, a phased objective must be put forward—the building of a community of common destiny with our periphery. This constitutes an important goal in the re-creation of China’s peripheral international environment. In October 2013, at the Symposium on Periphery Diplomacy, General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly proposed that we “let the awareness of a community of common destiny take root in countries in our periphery,” thereby clearly introducing the concept of a community of common destiny with our periphery.²⁶ In November 2014, at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, he stressed: “We must effectively carry out periphery diplomacy work and build a community of common destiny with our periphery.”²⁷ Building such a community is both the goal and the approach for re-creating China’s peripheral international environment. Under the broader vision of constructing a community of common destiny with our periphery, China must work to re-create an even more favorable peripheral international environment.

To contain China, the United States has been forming cliques around China’s periphery, creating multiple “small circles” in an attempt to draw countries in China’s periphery into an anti-China camp. In contrast, China rejects “small circles” and clique politics, and instead seeks to achieve common development and a common destiny with countries in its periphery through building a community of common destiny with the countries. China enjoys significant political advantages, advantages in economic cooperation, and geographical advantages. Historically, since modern times, the vast majority of Asian countries have shared a common fate of invasion, bullying, and oppression, so most countries in China’s periphery have had similar historical experiences as China. Today, China and these countries also face shared development destiny, mission, and tasks. China’s peaceful development begins in Asia, relies on Asia, and benefits Asia. China has already become an important force for safeguarding Asia’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. As President Xi Jinping has pointed out: “We all live together in the big Asian family; our interests are intertwined, our security is shared, and we are increasingly becoming a community of common destiny in which all prosper together and all suffer together.”²⁸ This forms the foundation and prerequisite for China and countries in its periphery to build a community of common destiny together.

(ii) Implementing the concept of periphery diplomacy through achieving “people-to-people connectivity”

The vast majority of countries in China’s periphery are developing countries. China places particular emphasis on adhering to the principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness and the principle of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with developing countries and safeguard their common interests. It is undeniable that with China’s rapid rise, certain countries in China’s periphery have developed some doubts and feelings of insecurity toward China. Coupled with the United States’ continued propagation of the “China threat theory” in China’s periphery, this has intensified the strategic anxieties of some countries toward China. To address this, in advancing its new periphery diplomacy strategy, China should place greater emphasis on adopting a comprehensive approach from the perspectives of “soft power” and “people-to-people connectivity.” It should employ various means to disseminate the idea, stressed in the report to the 20th Party Congress, that “Chinese modernization is modernization through a path of peace,” thereby narrowing the space for negative public opinion. Only in this way can China deepen friendship and mutual trust with countries in its periphery. It is necessary to “consolidate the cultural foundation for building a community of common destiny in Asia and for humanity as a whole.”²⁹ Chinese civilization is an important part of Asian civilization, and historically it has developed into a relatively open system of civilization through continuous exchanges and mutual learning with other civilizations. In building a community of common destiny with our periphery and a community of common destiny in Asia, emphasis must be placed on the concept of nurturing (润). “Nurturing Asia through culture” (文化润亚) is the fundamental path to building a community of shared culture in Asia.

In the process of building a community of common destiny with our periphery, China has advocated the “Asian security concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security”: “Common” means respecting and safeguarding the security of every country; “Comprehensive” means maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional fields in a coordinated manner; “Cooperative” means promoting the security of all countries and the region through dialogue and cooperation; and “Sustainable” means giving equal emphasis to development and security in order to achieve lasting security.³⁰ This shows that the Asian security concept focuses on the broader landscape of security and stability in Asia and represents a philosophy for safeguarding Asia’s peace and stability.

Since China is a rising major power in Asia with broad influence across the continent and the world, it should disseminate the fine traditional concepts of the Chinese nation. “The Chinese nation has always valued fostering amity and good-neighborliness; cultivating trust, promoting harmony, and seeking concord among all nations has been China’s consistent diplomatic philosophy. China regards its periphery as the place on which it depends for survival and the foundation for its development and prosperity. We have put forward the periphery diplomacy principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness with the aim of engaging sincerely with our neighbors, pursuing development wholeheartedly together, working hand in hand to expand the pie of cooperation, and sharing the fruits of development.”³¹

(iii) Taking the Belt and Road Initiative as the practical platform

“By jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we are committed to promoting connectivity across the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa and the adjacent seas; establishing and strengthening connectivity partnerships among participating countries; building an all-round, multi-tiered, and composite connectivity network; and achieving diversified, independent, balanced, and sustainable development for countries along the routes.”³² Although documents related to the BRI define its scope of cooperation as global, its key areas and focal points in practice lie in China’s periphery. To implement the BRI, priority must be given to aligning China’s development strategies with those of countries in its periphery, accelerating infrastructure connectivity, tapping into the enormous market potential of the peripheral region, promoting investment and consumption, creating demand and employment opportunities for China and its peripheral regions, advancing people-to-people exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations between China and countries in its periphery, and thereby fostering a new pattern of economic integration between China and its peripheral regions.

After years of effort, the BRI has made tremendous progress. It has gained the support and endorsement of the vast majority of countries worldwide, particularly those in China’s periphery, creating strong convergence of interests and finding common points for cooperation. Through the BRI, China and countries in its periphery have established a network-type model of cooperation. The BRI serves as a practical platform and vehicle for building both “a community of common destiny for mankind” and “a community of common destiny with our periphery.” The six economic corridors of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the various routes of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road all pass through China’s land and maritime neighbors, forming key cooperative channels for achieving the “five connectivities” (五通). “The core of the BRI is connectivity, while its essence lies in ‘jointness’ (共).”³³ Therefore, China should regard countries in its periphery as vital partners in the implementation of the BRI and carry out in-depth, pragmatic cooperation based on the principle of joint consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.

The year 2023 marked the 10th anniversary of the BRI. It is necessary to summarize the experience of cooperation with countries in our periphery under the BRI platform, continue to explore new spaces and fields for further cooperation, tap deeper into cooperative potential, and achieve greater convergence of interests with countries in our periphery. It is under this philosophy that the re-creation of China’s peripheral international environment is being carried out.

Within the field of vision of the community of common destiny with the periphery and the BRI platform, China and countries in its periphery have already achieved many gratifying results. The China–Laos Railway has opened, and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor has made tremendous progress. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway project, which had been under discussion for more than 20 years, has finally commenced construction. China is jointly building infrastructure with Nepal and deepening energy cooperation with Central Asia and Russia, all of which reflect the concept of mutual benefit and win–win outcomes in the community of common destiny with countries in its periphery. Amid the ongoing Ukraine crisis, Russia has come under the West’s “harsh sanctions,” and its strategic focus is shifting eastward, with the large-scale development of Siberia and the Russian Far East and cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries and regions becoming a major trend. Of course, we must also recognize that Russia harbors psychological ambivalence when it comes to choosing between Europe and the “East.”³⁴

It must be emphasized that when discussing the opportunities and potential of China’s international cooperation with countries in its periphery from the perspective of the BRI, we must not ignore its risks and uncertainties. For example, Central Asia is an important region for cooperation in the Silk Road Economic Belt, but uncertainties exist in the course of Central Asian countries’ transformation and development, and such transformations have posed certain challenges to advancing the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt.³⁵ Some countries, such as India, have taken a negative attitude toward China’s promotion of the BRI. India’s negative stance toward the BRI has multiple causes, among which the role of the United States deserves attention.³⁶ When addressing the doubts and concerns of countries in our periphery during the advancement of the BRI, greater emphasis should be placed on resolving issues at the level of “people-to-people connectivity.” “Upholding the principle of justice while pursuing shared interests is the guiding direction for BRI construction.”³⁷

V. The basic pathways for re-creating China’s peripheral international environment

The basic pathways for re-creating China’s peripheral international environment should include the following aspects: first, giving full play to the role of peripheral international organizations as “levers”; second, striving to expand important spaces for cooperation in the peripheral region and vigorously strengthening cooperation with countries in our periphery and regional organizations; third, properly managing and controlling contradictions and differences with certain countries.

(i) The “lever” role of international organizations in the peripheral region

In re-creating China’s peripheral international environment, it is necessary to make full use of the platform provided by international organizations in the peripheral region.³⁸ Among these, particular emphasis should be placed on the in-depth utilization of intergovernmental organizations and international cooperation mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the China–Russia–India cooperation mechanism, and ASEAN.

Over the past 20 years, despite the shifting international situation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has stood the test of history. It has not only become an important constructive force in the Eurasian region, but has also played a significant role in global affairs, serving as a model for a new type of international relations. The SCO has adopted a series of programmatic documents such as the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation of the SCO Member States. As a new type of regional international organization formed after the end of the Cold War, it has made tremendous efforts and contributions to peace, prosperity, and development in the Eurasian region. Looking ahead, the SCO will still face many risks and challenges in international affairs that must be jointly confronted by all its member states.

In November 2020, at the 20th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, President Xi Jinping proposed the building of a health community, a security community, a development community, and a cultural community.³⁹ At the 21st Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, he further emphasized the need to “build a closer SCO community of common destiny” and to make greater contributions to lasting world peace and common prosperity: to follow the path of solidarity and cooperation, the path of sharing weal and woe, the path of openness and connectivity, the path of mutual learning, and the path of fairness and justice.⁴⁰ The idea that the SCO should build a community of common destiny is a concept of great practical significance.

To give full play to the “lever” role of peripheral international organizations, it is also necessary for member states to pool their wisdom and strength, to share security and risk together, and to face challenges jointly.

1. The challenge of secondary economic crises

The prolonged spread of COVID-19 has brought tremendous shocks to global economic development. Global industrial, supply, and value chains have suffered varying degrees of disruption and damage. Added to this, the United States’ pursuit of “de-globalization” policies has further exacerbated these risks. Against this global backdrop, the SCO has also inevitably been subject to corresponding shocks, with regional economic circulation experiencing varying degrees of obstruction and risks of secondary economic crises emerging. Building a “community of development” is an effective path for the SCO to avoid serious economic crises. Efforts must continue to promote deep alignment of the BRI with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, with Kazakhstan’s “Bright Road” initiative, and with the development strategies of other member states; to implement “fast-track channels” and “green channels” for cargo transportation; to accelerate work resumption and production recovery; to further implement opening-up policies and expand mutual investment; to seize the opportunities of the new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation to strengthen cooperation in areas such as the digital economy, e-commerce, and artificial intelligence; and to make full use of the SCO joint working group on poverty reduction. In 2021, China proposed the goal of achieving a cumulative trade volume of U.S. $2.3 trillion with SCO countries over the next five years, with priority support for projects such as modernized connectivity, infrastructure construction, and green, low-carbon, sustainable development. In the next three years, China will provide 1,000 poverty-alleviation training places to SCO countries, establish 10 Luban Workshops, and carry out 30 cooperative projects in areas such as health and wellness, poverty alleviation and disaster relief, and cultural and educational exchanges.⁴¹

2. The new threat of the “Three Evils”

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political situation in the country has become extremely complex, with a very clear trend of the Three Evils (三股势力) of terrorism, separatism, and extremism gaining strength. In addition, there are signs of a resurgence in drug proliferation in Central and South Asia, while extremist ideologies are increasingly spreading through the Internet. These factors pose significant real threats to Central and South Asia, and bring greater risks in the field of non-traditional security to both Russia and China. Particular attention should be paid to the growing activity of the Three Evils in Central and South Asia. The fight against terrorism should be combined with efforts to help member states overcome economic crises and social instability in order to maintain regional security and stability. The trend of drug proliferation must be curbed, and the spread of extremist ideologies through the Internet must be prevented. We must support the building of a peaceful, responsible, and secure online environment, and implement the 2020 SCO Heads of State Council declaration on combating the spread of terrorist, separatist, and extremist ideologies through the Internet and other channels. Special attention must be paid to the negative impact on the political situation in Afghanistan caused by the U.S. withdrawal, as well as the complex situation it has created, and efforts should be made at the international level to help Afghanistan achieve peaceful reconstruction.

3. The new dangers of the “Clash of Civilizations” theory

The instability of today’s international order has become increasingly pronounced, with the United States and Western countries continuously promoting the “Clash of Civilizations” theory and forcibly imposing “Western values” and “views on human rights” on the international community, thereby aggravating global conflicts and local wars. The United States has also attempted to influence international organizations to serve its strategic purposes, further challenging the international system with the United Nations at its core. All of this runs counter to the “Shanghai Spirit.”⁴² Therefore, we must vigorously promote the “Shanghai Spirit,” making clear to the world that civilizations differ only in their characteristics, not in superiority or inferiority; further advocate the principle of “emphasizing diverse civilizations” on the international stage to promote mutual learning and mutual understanding among civilizations; and take measures to enhance good-neighborly relations among peoples and continuously consolidate the foundation of public opinion for long-term development.

(ii) Expanding important areas of cooperation in peripheral regions

Identify the strategic convergence points for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation with countries in our periphery, actively participate in regional cooperation, build a new pattern of regional economic integration, accelerate the opening up of border areas, and deepen the building of a community of common destiny with countries in our periphery. On October 3, 2013, in his speech at the Indonesian Parliament, President Xi Jinping stated: “The China–ASEAN community of common destiny conforms to the trend of the times for peace, development, cooperation, and mutually beneficial outcomes, serves the common interests of Asian countries and people across the world, and has broad development prospects and huge potential.” President Xi proposed the basic approach to building such a community, namely adhering to good faith and morality, upholding mutually beneficial cooperation, standing together through thick and thin, fostering mutual understanding, and embracing openness and inclusiveness.⁴³

In November 2020, China signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which became the most important achievement in the construction of East Asian economic integration, and also one of the symbols of building an East Asian community of common destiny. In particular, China and ASEAN have fully implemented the “China–ASEAN Public Health Cooperation Initiative” and jointly established the “10+3” Emergency Medical Supplies Reserve Center and the China–ASEAN Public Health Emergency Liaison Mechanism.⁴⁴ China advocates the spirit of a community of common destiny of mutual support and shared weal and woe, expanding the space for international cooperation, and gradually extending it to cover areas such as politics, economy, culture, and security cooperation. In January 2022, at the video summit of China and the five Central Asian countries, President Xi Jinping also proposed the building of a “China–Central Asia community of common destiny,”⁴⁵ which carries profound significance.

(iii) Properly managing and handling crises and differences in the periphery

This area mainly involves issues at three levels.

1. Effectively managing conflicts with the United States in China’s periphery and maritime areas involving China

China has absolutely no room for concession when it comes to safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. We must firmly counter the various destructive moves by the United States regarding Xinjiang, Tibet, maritime issues, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and break through a series of containment schemes originating from the U.S. in China’s peripheral areas. However, in the struggle with the United States, what is even more necessary is sophisticated skill in the art of struggle, as well as the capacity and ability to handle issues. In the process of containment and counter-containment, and in the course of strategic gamesmanship, China must gradually accumulate strategic advantages.

2. Properly resolving contradictions with countries in our periphery

We must properly resolve contradictions and differences with certain countries in our periphery so that these contradictions and differences do not impact the overall situation, further eliminate unfavorable factors, and enhance the “cohesion” of China’s relations with countries in our periphery. In resolving relevant disputes, China and some Southeast Asian countries need to seek peaceful and proper solutions to differences and disputes concerning territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, while maintaining overall regional security and stability through equal dialogue and friendly consultation. China also needs to pay special attention to the development of its land and maritime borders, turning these border areas into regions of security, stability, and prosperity, and thereby exerting a sustained positive influence on the peripheral international environment and continuously deepening cooperation between China’s border regions and countries and regions in its periphery.

3. Working together to address hotspot issues in peripheral regions

In China’s periphery, there are two world-class regional hotspot issues: the Korean Peninsula issue and the Afghanistan issue. These two issues are highly relevant to China, and their future direction will exert a major impact on China. However, they are also not issues that China can resolve solely by its own strength, but require joint resolution with multiple international political forces. Yet the various international political forces carry different political goals and expectations, and even include completely opposing political goals from confronting sides. This requires advancing the resolution of these issues through multilateral platforms. China cannot remain indifferent to or bypass these issues, but should, together with relevant countries, continuously put forward constructive solutions, manage risks in these two regions, and prevent them from evolving into large-scale crises that would in turn threaten the overall stability of China’s peripheral region. In short, China should grasp the strategic initiative in planning for peripheral security.

VI. Conclusion

To realize the grand ideal of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, a favorable international environment is necessary. For this reason, it is essential to continuously cultivate and maintain a good, peaceful, and stable peripheral international environment. Under the broad vision of building a community of common destiny with countries in our periphery, China should make good use of the foundation and experience of its past efforts in cultivating the peripheral international environment, as well as new practical platforms, continuously innovate in the theory and practice of periphery diplomacy, and achieve the goal of re-creating the peripheral international environment.

China must work together with countries in its periphery to address new issues in the periphery, focusing on eliminating unfavorable factors that affect the development of relations with countries in our periphery, enhancing the “cohesion” of these relationships, consolidating the foundation of friendly cooperation, and fostering a momentum of shared destiny and the idea that we are all in the same boat. China and countries in its periphery should handle existing contradictions and problems with wisdom, effectively manage differences, and leave no openings for ill-intentioned interference by the United States.

The path of Chinese-style modernization will not be smooth. Internationally, countries and forces that do not wish to see China’s development will continue to use various platforms and adopt various means to contain China’s rise. Therefore, China should properly handle its relations with the world’s major powers, gradually accumulate strategic advantages in the process of containment and counter-containment and in the course of strategic gamesmanship, strengthen the forces of international cooperation, and expand the space for international cooperation.

China also needs to pay special attention to the development of its land borders and maritime borders, turning these border areas into regions of security, stability, and prosperity. Through secure, stable, and prosperous border areas, China can exert a sustained positive influence on the peripheral international environment, continuously intensify cooperation with countries and regions in its periphery, and form a community of common destiny.