“Peaceful reunification and One Country, Two Systems” are the fundamental principles of the mainland’s policy towards Taiwan. General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed exploring a “One Country, Two Systems” formula for Taiwan (“一国两制”台湾方案) in his speech on the 40th anniversary of the publication of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. According to the conception of the mainland’s “One Country, Two Systems” principle, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy after the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait. 1 Judging from the practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong, the institutional design centered around this high degree of autonomy is undoubtedly a top priority of the Taiwan formula. In order to construct a complete and sound institutional design, a fundamental question that must be answered is this: what is the nature of the autonomy of post-peaceful-reunification Taiwan’s high degree of autonomy? The different answers to this question will directly affect the power relations between the central government and Taiwan after the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait, and directly affect the scope and extent to which the central government can govern Taiwan.
“和平统一、一国两制”是祖国大陆对台政策的根本方针，习近平总书记在《告台湾同胞书》发表40 周年纪念会上的讲话中提出要探索“一国两制”台湾方案。根据大陆“一国两制”方针的构想，两岸实现和平统一后台湾将享有高度自治权。 从“一国两制”方针在香港的实践来看，围绕这种高度自治权的制度设计无疑是台湾方案的重中之重。为建构一个健全完善的制度设计，必须要回答的一个 根本问题是 ：和平统一后的台湾所享有的高度自治权是一种什么性质的自治权？对这一问题的不同回答，将直接影响两岸和平统一后中央与台湾的权力关系，直接影响中央能在多大范围和程度上管治台湾。
I. Two Different Theories
The specific form of implementation of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy for Taiwan after the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait is a major focus and hot topic of current academic research, and many ideas have been put forward. Some scholars have formed two different viewpoints in their discussions of the nature of the autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan after peaceful reunification: delegated autonomy (授权性自治权说) and shared-power autonomy (分权性自治权说) [translator’s note: the latter can also be translated as ‘separation-of-powers autonomy’].
(i) Delegated Autonomy Theory
Mainland scholars seldom explicitly state that the autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan after peaceful reunification will be of the nature of delegated autonomy, but it can be inferred from the relevant discussions that a group of scholars holds the view that Taiwan will enjoy delegated autonomy after peaceful reunification. Most of the institutional design and thinking on the “One Country, Two Systems” model for Taiwan do not deviate from the prototype of the Hong Kong and Macao model, except in that Taiwan enjoys a higher degree of autonomy or administrative status. 2 For example, Yu Keli pointed out that “our policy to solve the Taiwan issue can be more relaxed than the policy to resolve the Hong Kong issue, and the Taiwan model of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ should be better than today’s Hong Kong model.” 3 Su Ge pointed out that “after the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland, Taiwan compatriots will not only enjoy all the political rights and interests provided by the Hong Kong and Macao model, but Taiwanese people can also come to the mainland of the motherland to assume leadership positions in national political institutions.” 4 Wang Weixing also pointed out that “under the conditions of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ although Taiwan is essentially a local government in a unitary state structure, its authority will be greater than that of the provinces on the mainland of the motherland, as well as the authority of the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions.” 5 According to this reasoning, the specific form of implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan is an upgraded or expanded version of the Hong Kong and Macao model, which is a “quantitative” rather than a “qualitative” difference. The autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan, like the autonomy of Hong Kong and Macao, is still a delegated autonomy.
大陆学者较少明确论及和平统一后的台湾所享有的自治权属于授权性自治权性质，但可以从有关论述推断一部分学者持有和平统一后的台湾享有授权性自治权的观点。有关“一国两制”台湾模式的制度设计和构想大都没有脱出港澳模式的原型，只是台湾享有的自治程度或行政地位更高一些而已。例如余克礼指出，“我们解决台湾问题的政策可以比解决香港问题的政策更宽 ,‘一国两制’的台湾模式应更优于今天的香港模式”；苏格指出，“台湾和祖国大陆和平统一之后，台湾同胞不仅将享有港澳模式所提供的一切政治权益，台湾人士也可以到祖国内地担任全国性政治机构的领导职务”；王卫星也指出 ：“在‘一国两制’条件下，台湾虽然在本质上属于单一制国家结构中的地方政府，但其权限将大于祖国大陆各省权限，也大于香港、澳门特别行政区权限”。照此推理，“一国两制”在台湾的具体实现形式是港澳模式的升级版、扩大版，属于“量”的不同，而非“质”的不同 ；台湾所享有的自治权如同港澳自治权，仍属于授权性自治权。
Li Jiaquan previously borrowed from the “grand administrative region” structure implemented in the early days of the People’s Republic of China, whose power was second only to the central government and higher than the provinces and cities under its jurisdiction, and recommended setting up a grand administrative region in Taiwan. 6 This “grand administrative region” concept highlights that after peaceful reunification, Taiwan’s administrative status would be higher than that of the mainland’s ordinary administrative regions and the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions. However, this conception positions Taiwan within the structural form of a unitary system. 7 In other words, the autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan after peaceful reunification would be a delegated autonomy.
However, Ni Yongjie explicitly staked out a position for delegated autonomy. He holds that: “its power is lower than that of the central government, but in some respects it can be higher than the governments of the Hong Kong and Macao SARs. It has some special powers, and even some of the powers of the central government, but its special powers are delegated to it by the central government. … The central government has the highest sovereignty and jurisdiction over the whole of China, while the Taiwan authorities’ jurisdiction over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, and their affiliated islands is delegated by the central government. This is a temporary and limited jurisdiction and must not endanger national sovereignty, security, and development interests.” 8
但倪永杰明确提出了授权性自治权的主张。他认为 ：“其权力低于中央政府，但某些方面可高于港澳特区政府，拥有部分特殊权力，甚至拥有部分中央政府的权力，但其特殊权力来自于中央政府的授权。…… 中央政府对全中国拥有最高主权与管辖权，而台湾当局对台、澎、金、马及其附属岛屿的管辖权来自于中央政府的授权，属于临时、有限管辖，不得危及国家主权、安全及发展利益。”
(ii) Shared-Power Autonomy Theory
Wang Liping, a professor at Peking University, had early on put forward a different view on the delegated autonomy to be enjoyed by post-reunification Taiwan. She pointed out that: “the two systems in ‘One Country, Two Systems’ can also refer to a unitary system and a federal system. As long as there is the practical and theoretical possibility, the principles of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and ‘one China’ do not exclude the realization of national unity through federalism. … In their research on ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ some scholars are often eager to draw a clear dividing line between ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and federalism, and even hastily dismiss federalism. On the one hand, this reflects a misunderstanding of federalism, and on the other hand, it stems from rigid thinking on the form of state structures.” 9 According to Wang Liping’s point of view, the possibility that post-reunification Taiwan could enjoy shared-power autonomy cannot be ruled out.
北京大学教授王丽萍较早地对统一后的台湾所享有的授权性自治权提出了不同看法。她指出：“‘一国两制’中的两制还可指单一制和联邦制。只要存在现实和理论上的可能性，‘一国两制’和‘一个中国’的原则是不排斥以联邦制实现国家统一的。……在有关‘一国两制’的研究中，一些学者往往急于在 ‘一国两制’与联邦制之间划清界线，甚至对联邦制草率地加以否定。这一方面体现了对联邦制的误解， 另一方面则出于在国家结构形式问题上的僵化思维。” 按照王丽萍的观点，不排除统一后的台湾享有分权性自治权。
Professor Wang Yingjin of Renmin University of China may have been the first scholar to explicitly propose the idea of shared-power autonomy. He proposed: “acknowledge or recognize that the power that Taiwan is currently holding and exercising is original power (本源性权力) (that is, the right to exercise sovereignty) inherent in its 23 million people. On this basis, through negotiation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan side hands over to the central government that part of its right to exercise sovereignty which can reflect national unity (such as diplomatic power). The remaining part that has not been handed over will be retained by the Taiwan side as ‘residual power.’ In other words, the ‘sharing of powers’ is implemented between the central government and Taiwan at the level of original power, rather than the ‘delegation of power’ by the central government to Taiwan at the level of derivative power. That is, through some legal method, letting Taiwan enjoy shared-power autonomy rather than the delegated autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong and Macao. After the principle of federal separation of powers is implemented between the central government and the Taiwan Special Administrative Region, the relationship between the central government and the Taiwan Special Administrative Region will no longer be a central-local relationship in the general sense, nor a relationship between a center and another center in the sense of the federation as a whole and its member units, but a relationship between a center and a ‘quasi-center’.” 10
中国人民大学王英津教授可能是最早明确提出分权性自治权观点的学者。他提出 ：“承认或认可台湾方面目前正在掌握和运用的权力是其2300 万人民所固有的本源性权力（即主权行使权）。在此基础上， 两岸通过协商，台湾方面向中央政府交还能体现国家统一的部分主权行使权（如外交权等），其余未交还的部分由台湾方面作为‘剩余权力’予以保留。也就是说，在中央和台湾之间在本源性权力层面上 实行‘分权’，而不再是中央对台湾在派生性权力层面上实行‘授权’。即，通过某种法律方式，让台湾享有分权性自治权，而不是像香港、澳门一样享有授权性自治权。在中央和台湾特别行政区之间实 行联邦分权原则后，中央和台湾特别行政区的关系，不再是一般意义上的中央与地方关系，但也不是 联邦整体与成员单位意义上的中央与中央的关系，而是一种中央与‘准中央’的关系。”
In the book The Taiwan Model of “One Country, Two Systems,” Professor Li Yihu of Peking University and other scholars pointed out that: “it is undoubtedly wrong to simply regard the Taiwan model of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ as an expanded version of the Hong Kong and Macao model of ‘One Country, Two Systems’.” 11 The book further argues that, “under the Hong Kong and Macao model of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ although the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macao have a high degree of autonomy, even higher than the powers possessed by member units in some federal countries, this is only a difference of degree, not of nature. In terms of fundamental nature, the relationship of Hong Kong and Macao with the central government is still within the framework of a unitary system. The amount of power granted by the central government to a special administrative region is entirely at the discretion of the central government, and the central government is fully able to change the power of the special administrative region through unilateral constitutional amendments or legislation, or even to completely change the special administrative region’s system.” “Concerns and fears about this possibility are precisely the root cause of Taiwan resistance to the Hong Kong and Macao model of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and its expanded version.” “The Taiwan model of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ will inevitably introduce some features of federalism.” 12 It can be seen that the above thesis does not accept the view that the autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan after peaceful reunification is a delegated autonomy, but holds that this kind of autonomy should by nature be a shared-power autonomy.
Lin Gang, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, holds a similar view. He believes that: “the power relationship between the central government and the Hong Kong and Macao SAR governments is a derivative delegation of power. Meanwhile, according to the Taiwan model of ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ after reunification, Taiwan will enjoy executive power, legislative power, judicial power, and the power of final judicial adjudication, with a certain coloring of federalism. In the relationship between the central government and the sub-central government (system and sub-system), it is a sharing of original power, rather than the derivative delegation of power. … Taiwan enjoys shared-power autonomy, not delegated autonomy.” 13
In short, the two different viewpoints presented above can be summarized as: with regard to the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula, if the autonomy enjoyed by Taiwan is a delegated autonomy, then the central government and Taiwan are in a relationship of delegator and delegatee. If this autonomy is shared-power autonomy, then the central government and Taiwan are in a separation of powers relationship. The fundamental difference between the two is: in the relationship between delegator and delegatee, the power of the central government is inherent, original, and can be said to be unlimited, and the power of the locality is derived, originates from the delegation of power by the central government, and is limited, with the “residual power” belonging to the central government. A separation of powers relationship is the opposite. Local power is inherent, original, and unlimited. The central government’s power comes from the transfer of local power and is limited, with the “residual power” belonging to the locality. 14
概而言之，以上两种不同观点可以概括为 ：对“一国两制”台湾方案而言，若台湾所享有的自治权是授权性自治权，那么中央与台湾是一种授权与被授权关系 ；若这种自治权是分权性自治权，那么中央与台湾就是一种分权关系。二者的根本区别在于 ：在授权与被授权关系中，中央的权力是固有的、本源的，可以说无限的，地方的权力是派生的，来源于中央授权，是有限的，“剩余权力”归属中央 ；分权关系则相反，地方的权力是固有的、本源的、无限的，中央的权力来自于地方权力的让渡，是有限的， “剩余权力”归属地方。
II. Practical Experience of Delegated Autonomy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
It is unrealistic to enumerate the allocation of central and local powers in a single law. Among the reasons for this is that law itself can, by nature, lag behind whereas practice develops, and as practice develops new power allocations are needed. The fundamental difference between the impact of delegated autonomy and that of shared-power autonomy on central power is: due to the development of practice, when local governments face new situations and legal provisions are unclear or lacking, does the central government have the power to intervene? In short, does the “residual power” belong to the central or the local government? According to the two different theories presented above, if the autonomy enjoyed by the locality is delegated autonomy, then the central government certainly has the right to intervene because the “residual power” belongs to the center. However, if the autonomy enjoyed by the locality is shared-power autonomy, then the center has no power to intervene because the “residual power” belongs to the locality. Then, when the “One Country, Two Systems” policy faces special or emergency situations in the process of its practice in Taiwan, and the legal provisions are unclear or lacking, should the central government’s right to intervene be retained? Here, we may first examine the situation of the practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong.
通过一部法律对中央与地方的权力配置作出详尽的列举是不现实的，其中一个原因便是法律本身 具有滞后性，而实践是发展的，随实践的发展需要有新的权力配置。授权性自治权与分权性自治权对 于中央权力的影响的根本区别在于 ：因实践的发展，地方面临新的事态，而法律规定不明或者缺乏规定时，中央是否有干预的权力？简言之，“剩余权力”究竟归属中央还是地方？依照前述两种不同的学说，如果地方享有的是授权性自治权，那么中央当然有干预的权力，因为“剩余权力”归属中央 ；但如果地方享有的是分权性自治权，那么中央就没有干预的权力，因为“剩余权力”归属地方。那么，当“一国两制”方针在台湾的实践过程中面临特殊或紧急情况，而法律规定不明或者缺乏规定时，究竟应不 应当保留中央干预的权力？在此不妨先检视“一国两制”方针在香港的实践状况。
(i) The High Degree of Autonomy of the Hong Kong SAR Is a Delegated Autonomy
The Hong Kong Basic Law is essentially a law of power delegation. 15 Article 2 of the law clearly states: “The National People’s Congress authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law.” The National People’s Congress is the highest institution of state power, and Article 2 of the Basic Law fully expresses that Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy derives from the delegation of power by the highest institution of state power. This is power delegated by the central government, derivative power, rather than original power.
《香港基本法》本质上是一部授权法。该法第 2 条明确规定 ：“全国人民代表大会授权香港特别行政区依照本法的规定实行高度自治，享有行政管理权、立法权、独立的司法权和终审权。”全国人民代表大会是最高国家权力机关，基本法第 2 条充分表明香港高度自治权来源于最高国家权力机关的授权，是一种中央授权，是派生的、非本源的权力。
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy does not alter China’s unitary state structure. 16 China is a unitary state. This is reflected in Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Constitution, which stipulates: “The division of functions and powers between the central and local state organs is guided by the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.” At the same time, “local state organs” should include the state institutions of special administrative regions. 17 Moreover, Article 12 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a local administrative region of the People’s Republic of China that enjoys a high degree of autonomy and is directly under the Central People’s Government.” It can be seen that Article 12 of the Basic Law and Article 3, paragraph 4 of the Constitution belong consistently to the same line. The central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which is a local administrative region, are in a central-local relationship. Although the high degree of autonomy which Hong Kong has obtained is greater than the autonomy enjoyed by a federal state, this does not change the form of China’s unitary state structure.
香港的高度自治权不改变我国的单一制国家结构形式。我国是单一制国家，体现于《宪法》第3 条第 4 款，该款规定 ：“中央和地方的国家机构职权的划分，遵循在中央的统一领导下，充分发挥地方的主动性、积极性的原则。”同时，“地方的国家机构”理应包括特别行政区的国家机构。并且，《香港基本法》第 12 条确实规定 ：“香港特别行政区是中华人民共和国的一个享有高度自治权的地方行政区域，直辖于中央人民政府。”可见，基本法第 12 条与《宪法》第 3 条第 4 款是一脉相承的，中央政府与作为地方行政区域的香港特别行政区是一种中央与地方的关系，尽管香港获得的高度自治权比联邦制国家的州还要大，但这并不改变我国的单一制国家结构形式。
Therefore, the provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law are explicit and clear as to the fact that the central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are in a relationship of delegator and delegatee, and the high degree of autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a delegated autonomy.
(ii) Practical Experience: The Center Must Possess the Power to Intervene Appropriately
The practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong has not been all smooth sailing, and Hong Kong has repeatedly fallen into political and social chaos. Moreover, every time, fortunately, there was the timely intervention of the central government. It was only this that could bring order to the chaos and put things right. This, on the flip side, proves that it was correct to grant the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region delegated autonomy in the design of the power allocation model.
As early as 1984, when Deng Xiaoping met with a group of Hong Kong and Macao compatriots attending National Day celebrations, he pointed out: “We can’t worry in a general way about intervention; some intervention is necessary. We must look at whether these interventions are beneficial to the interests of the people of Hong Kong, to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, or whether they harm the interests of the people of Hong Kong and the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. … But do not think that there are no destructive forces. Such destructive forces may come from this side or that side. If unrest occurs, the central government will be required to intervene. If it turns chaos into order, should such an intervention be welcomed or rejected? It should be welcomed.” 18 In 1987, when Deng Xiaoping met with members of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law Drafting Committee, he re-emphasized this point: “Don’t ever think that if all Hong Kong’s affairs are administered by the people of Hong Kong while the central government handles nothing at all, all will be well. This would not work—the idea is not realistic. It is true that the center does not intervene in the specific affairs of the special administrative region, nor does it need to intervene. However, will there not be situations in the special administrative region that endanger the fundamental interests of the country? Can we be sure this will not happen? At such a time, should Beijing get involved or not? Is it conceivable that nothing will happen in Hong Kong that harms the fundamental interests of Hong Kong? Can we imagine that there will be no interference and no destructive forces in Hong Kong? I see no basis for such self-comfort. If the center were to abandon any and every power, this could give rise to some confusion and damage Hong Kong’s interests. Therefore, it is in the interests of Hong Kong that the center maintain certain powers.” 19 During the drafting stage of the Hong Kong Basic Law, drafting committee member Martin Lee Chu-ming and others proposed to expressly stipulate in the Basic Law that the powers exercised by the center and the powers other than those enjoyed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, namely the “residual powers,” should be assigned to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 20 This kind of opinion essentially advocates that Hong Kong should enjoy “shared-power autonomy,” but the Basic Law did not adopt this view.
早在 1984 年，邓小平会见港澳同胞国庆观礼团时就指出 ：“不能笼统地担心干预，有些干预是必要的。要看这些干预事有利于香港人的利益，有利于香港的繁荣和稳定，还是损害香港人的利益，损害香港的繁荣和稳定。……但不切不要以为没有破坏力量。这种破坏力量可能来自这个方面，也可能来自那个方面。如果发生动乱，中央政府就要加以干预。由乱变治，这样的干预应该欢迎还是应该拒绝？应该欢迎。”1987 年邓小平在会见香港特别行政区基本法起草委员会委员时再次强调 ：“切不要以为香港的事情全由香港人来管，中央一点都不管，就万事大吉了。这是不行的，这种想法不实际。 中央确实是不干预特别行政区的具体事务的，也不需要干预。但是，特别行政区是不是也会发生危害 国家根本利益的事情呢？难道就不会出现吗？那个时候，北京过问不过问？难道香港就不会出现损害 香港根本利益的事情？能够设想香港就没有干扰，没有破坏力量吗？我看没有这种自我安慰的根据。 如果中央把什么权力都放弃了，就可能会出现一些混乱，损害香港的利益。所以，保持中央的某些权 力，对香港有利无害。” 在香港基本法起草阶段，起草委员李柱铭等人就提出要在基本法里明文规定由中央行使的权力和归香港特区享有的权力之外的权力，亦即“剩余权力”，划归香港特别行政区。这种意见实质上就是主张香港享有“分权性自治权”，但基本法没有采纳这种意见。
Practices after the return of Hong Kong have proved the foresight of Deng Xiaoping’s remarks and the complete correctness of the power allocation model of the Hong Kong Basic Law. Let me illustrate this with some examples.
1. The Struggle for Leadership over Hong Kong’s Political System Development. Political system development is also known as political reform. The Hong Kong Basic Law stipulates the goal of achieving “dual universal suffrage” in the election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. Article 45, paragraph 2, stipulates: “The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” Article 68, paragraph 2 stipulates: “The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.”
1. 香港政制发展的主导权之争。政制发展又称政改，《香港基本法》规定了在香港实现行政长官选举和立法会选举“双普选”的目标，其第 45 条第 2 款规定 ：“行政长官的产生办法根据香港特别行政区的实际情况和循序渐进的原则而规定，最终达至由一个有广泛代表性的提名委员会按民主程序提名后普选产生的目标”，第 68 条第 2 款规定 ：“立法会的产生办法根据香港特别行政区的实际情况和循序渐进的原则而规定，最终达至全部议员由普选产生的目标”。
After the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, disputes surrounding the development of the political system could be described as endless. Every time there is an election, it is certain to become the central issue hyped by various political forces in society. 21 After the return of Hong Kong, the SAR government has three times proposed a political reform plan. It has twice been rejected due to obstruction by the opposition in the Legislative Council. 22 The Hong Kong opposition is particularly dissatisfied with Article 45, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law regarding nominations by the nominating committee, and further proposed that nominations should be made directly by voters or by political parties. In December 2013, the Hong Kong SAR government launched a consultation on the third political reform, but met resistance from the radical opposition. With the encouragement of Benny Tai Yiu-ting and others, this ultimately evolved into the 79-day illegal “Occupy Central” movement, paralyzing traffic in the central district of Hong Kong, closing shops, and causing serious economic losses.
香港特别行政区成立后，围绕政制发展问题之争论，可以说无日无之 ；每逢选举，必定成为社会各种政治势力炒作之中心议题。香港回归后，特区政府三次提出政改方案，两次因立法会中的反对派阻挠而遭否决。香港反对派尤其不满基本法第 45 条第 2 款关于由提名委员会提名的规定，进而提出应由选民直接提名或由政党提名。2013 年 12 月，香港特区政府就第三次政改启动咨询，但遭到激进反对派的抵制，在戴耀廷等人的鼓噪下最终演变成长达 79 天的非法“占中”运动，造成香港中心城区交通瘫痪，商铺关门，经济损失严重。
The essence of the controversy over Hong Kong political reform is the dispute over the authority to govern Hong Kong. Radical opposition forces go beyond the high degree of autonomy stipulated in the Hong Kong Basic Law and try to obstruct and oppose patriots who love the country and love Hong Kong from taking up the post of Chief Executive and administering according to the law. They try to turn the Legislative Council into a base for opposition against the leadership of the executive. They even advocate Hong Kong independence, ultimately targeting the center and its authority to govern Hong Kong. 23 Faced with the actions of the opposition to seize power, the SAR government was no longer able to cope on its own. At that time, the central government had no choice but to intervene; and it had to intervene. In April 2004, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Regarding Annex I (7) and Annex II (III) to the ‘Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,’ which stipulated that Hong Kong’s political reform must go through a “five-step process”: The Chief Executive submits a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on whether amendments are required–The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress makes a decision–The SAR Government proposes an amendment bill to the Legislative Council and the bill is approved through a two-thirds majority of all members of the Legislative Council–The Chief Executive gives consent–The bill is approved or filed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. After that, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress successively passed the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2007 and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2008, the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and On Issues Relating to Universal Suffrage, and the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016 to firmly take leadership authority over Hong Kong’s political reform.
香港政改争议的实质是香港的管治权之争，激进反对势力超出《香港基本法》规定的高度自治范 围，力图阻挠、反对爱国爱港人士出任行政长官、依法行政，力图把立法会变成对抗行政主导的阵地， 甚至鼓吹港独，最终把矛头指向中央及其对香港的管治权。对于反对派的夺权之举，单靠特区政府已经不足以应付，此时中央不得不干预，也必须干预。2004 年 4 月，全国人大常委会通过了《关于〈中华人民共和国香港特别行政区基本法〉附件一第七条和附件二第三条的解释》，规定香港政改必须经由 “五部曲”：行政长官向全国人大常委会提出是否需要修改的报告——全国人大常委会作出决定——特 区政府向立法会提出修改议案并经由立法会全体议员 2/3 通过——行政长官同意——全国人大常委会 批准或备案。之后，全国人大常委会陆续通过了《关于香港特别行政区 2007 年行政长官和 2008 年立法会产生办法有关问题的决定》《关于香港特别行政区 2012 年行政长官和立法会产生办法及有关普选问题的决定》《关于香港特别行政区行政长官普选问题和 2016 年立法会产生办法的决定》等，牢牢掌握了香港政改的主导权。
However, the opposition in Hong Kong was not reconciled and was still waiting for an opportunity. Taking advantage of the “Amendment Bill” turmoil in 2019, they won 388 of the 452 directly-elected seats in the 18 district councils of Hong Kong, and won control over 17 district councils out of the 18 districts. In 2020, Benny Tai Yiu-ting and others insisted on conducting illegal “primary elections,” launched the Legislative Council “35-plus plan,” and set out the “10 steps to laam chau” (真揽炒十步) [“laam chau” is a Cantonese term used to mean “to frustrate”], in an attempt to manipulate the election under the pretext of so-called “public opinion” and seize the authority to govern Hong Kong. In the face of the opposition’s counterattack, the center decisively intervened again: on March 11, 2021, the Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress passed the Decision on Improving the Electoral System of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which directly reformed the Hong Kong electoral system. On March 30, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress revised the Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex I – Method for the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex II – Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures.
但香港反对派并不甘心，仍然伺机而动，其借 2019 年“修例”风波，获得香港十八区区议会 452 个直选议席中的 388 席，夺得十八区中十七区区议会的控制权；2020 年，戴耀廷等人执意开展非法“初选”，推出立法会“35+ 计划”，渲染“真揽炒十步”，企图假借所谓“民意”操控选举，夺取香港管治权。面对反对派的反扑，中央果断再次出手干预：2021 年 3 月 11 日，十三届全国人大第四次会议通过《关 于完善香港特别行政区选举制度的决定》，对香港选举制度直接进行改革 ；3 月 30 日，全国人大常委会修订《香港基本法附件一香港特别行政区行政长官的产生办法》和《香港基本法附件二香港特别行 政区立法会的产生办法和表决程序》。
At the national level, improving Hong Kong’s electoral system by adopting a “decision + law amendment” approach is of great significance. On the one hand, the practices after Hong Kong’s return show symptoms and indications that the operation of Hong Kong’s political system has deviated from, or even damaged the fundamental purpose of, “One Country, Two Systems.” In particular, the anti-China forces for chaos in Hong Kong used loopholes in the electoral system to enter Hong Kong’s government institutions, posing a major and real threat to national sovereignty, security, and development interests.24 On the other hand, the protracted political reform controversy in Hong Kong has become a drain on the energy of the SAR government, and even made it difficult for it to focus on the more urgent issues related to economic development, society and people’s wellbeing. Therefore, only when the central government promptly exercised power, 25 intervened appropriately, and revised and improved Hong Kong’s electoral system, could the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” be brought back to the correct track.
在国家层面、采用“决定 + 修法”的方式完善香港选举制度具有重大意义。一方面，香港回归后的实践表明香港政治体制的运作出现偏离甚至损害“一国两制”根本宗旨的苗头和迹象，特别是反中 乱港势力利用选举制度漏洞进入香港政权机关，对国家主权、安全、发展利益构成了重大现实威胁。另一方面，香港旷日持久的政改争议使特区政府疲于应对，甚难将精力集中于更为迫切的经济发展、 社会民生问题。因此，只有中央及时行使权力、适当干预，修改完善香港选举制度，才能使“一国两制”实践重回正轨。
2. It is Difficult for Hong Kong to Maintain National Security with Local Legislation. Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete national security legislation on its own. In 2003, the Hong Kong SAR government initiated Article 23 legislation, but the opposition instigated a large number of people to protest against it, and the government ultimately withdrew the draft legislation. Since then, due to obstruction by the opposition and the interference of external forces, Hong Kong has so far failed to complete local legislation on national security. The huge loopholes in Hong Kong’s legal system for safeguarding national security and major flaws in its enforcement mechanisms allowed anti-China forces for chaos in Hong Kong and external forces to flagrantly collude with each other and allowed external forces to interfere in Hong Kong affairs at will, seriously undermining the social stability of Hong Kong and the practice of “One Country, Two Systems.”
2、香港维护国家安全本地立法的难作为。《香港基本法》第 23 条规定香港特别行政区应自行完成国家安全立法。2003 年，香港特区政府启动第 23 条立法，但反对派唆使大量民众上街游行反对，政府最终撤回立法草案。此后由于反对派的阻挠和外部势力的干涉，香港迄今未能完成国家安全的本地立法。香港维护国家安全法律制度存在的巨大漏洞和执行机制的重大缺陷，使反中乱港分子与外部势力可以毫无顾忌地相互勾连，使外部势力可以为所欲为地干涉香港事务，严重破坏香港社会稳定和“一国两制”实践。
During the “Amendment Bill” turmoil that occurred in 2019, the black hands of external forces could be seen everywhere. In March 2019, before the outbreak of the “Amendment Bill” turmoil, the U.S. National Security Council invited Anson Chan, Dennis Kwok Wing-hang, and Charles Mok to visit the United States. They were successively received by U.S. Vice President Mike Pence and House Speaker Pelosi. Anson Chan and others publicly requested that the United States interfere in Hong Kong affairs. 26 In May, Martin Lee Chu-ming went to the United States to seek support from Secretary of State Pompeo and Speaker of the House Pelosi. 27 After the “Amendment Bill” turmoil broke out in June, Jimmy Lai Chee-ying visited the United States in July and met with U.S. Vice President Pence, Secretary of State Pompeo, and a number of Republican senators. 28 As the “Amendment Bill” turmoil intensified, officials from the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong met with Anson Chan, Martin Lee Chu-ming, Joshua Wong Chi-fung, and Nathan Law Kwun-chung, giving them advice in person. 29 And this is just the information obtained from public reports.
在 2019 年发生的“修例”风波中，外部势力的黑手随处可见。2019 年 3 月，在“修例”风波爆发前， 美国国家安全委员会便邀请陈方安生、郭荣铿、莫乃光访美，先后受到美国副总统彭斯、众议院议长佩洛西的接见，陈方安生等公开请求美国干预香港事务 ；5 月，李柱铭前往美国，向美国国务卿蓬佩奥，众议院议长佩洛西寻求支持；在“修例”风波于 6 月爆发后，黎智英在 7 月到访美国，与美国副总统彭斯、国务卿蓬佩奥以及多位共和党参议员见面。在“修例”风波愈演愈烈之际，美国驻港领事馆官员先后与陈方安生、李柱铭、黄之锋、罗冠聪等会见，面授机宜。而这些仅仅是从公开报导所获得的信息。
The lack of a legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security in Hong Kong has given “anti-China and chaotic Hong Kong” elements and external forces an opportunity they could use for their purposes. As a result, various activities in Hong Kong that endanger national security have intensified, and national security and Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability have faced serious threats. Therefore, in a situation wherein it was difficult to predict when Hong Kong might complete local legislation on national security, it was imperative and was the only option that the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for Hong Kong to safeguard national security be established and improved at the national level. On May 28, 2020, the Third Plenum of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress voted to pass The Decision of the National People’s Congress on Establishing and Improving the Legal System and Enforcement Mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to Safeguard National Security. On June 30, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which was included in Annex III of the Hong Kong Basic Law and announced and implemented in Hong Kong. In July of the same year, the Central People’s Government established the Office for Safeguarding National Security in Hong Kong. The SAR government has also established the “Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” and the “National Security Department of the Police Force.”
香港维护国家安全法律制度和执行机制的缺失，给了“反中乱港”分子和外部势力可乘之机，致 使发生在香港的各种危害国家安全的活动愈演愈烈，使国家安全和香港的繁荣稳定面临着严重威胁。 因此，在香港何时完成国家安全本地立法难以预测的情况下，必须也只能从国家层面建立健全香港维 护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制。2020 年 5 月 28 日，十三届全人大第三次会议表决通过《关于建 立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制的决定》；6 月 30 日，全国人大常委会通 过《中华人民共和国香港特别行政区维护国家安全法》，并列入《香港基本法》附件三，在香港公布实施。同年 7 月，中央人民政府在香港设立维护国家安全公署。特区政府也成立了“香港特别行政区维护国家安全委员会”和“警务处国家安全处”。
After a legal system that would safeguard national security was formulated for Hong Kong at the national level and corresponding enforcement mechanisms were established, as of July 2021, a total of 132 people has been arrested on suspicion of endangering national security, and 70 people and 3 companies have been prosecuted. Hong Kong has achieved a major transition “from chaos to governance.” 30 In addition to the two typical cases presented above, there have been many other situations in the practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong that were resolved or subsided only after intervention from the center. For example, in 1999, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress first interpreted the relevant provisions of the Hong Kong Basic Law to correct the biased judgment of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal on the “Ng Ka-ling case.”31 In 2017, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress made a decision that the “co-location” arrangement of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link at the West Kowloon Station was in line with the principle of “One Country, Two Systems” and the fundamental purpose of the Hong Kong Basic Law. This resolved the long-standing controversy over “co-location” in Hong Kong society. Examples are aplenty.
自在国家层面为香港制定维护国家安全的法律制度和建立相应的执行机制以后，截至 2021 年 7 月累计以涉嫌危害国家安全拘捕 132 人，已检控 70 人及 3 家公司，香港实现了“由乱到治”的重大转折。除以上两个典型案例以外，“一国两制”方针在香港的实践过程中还出现过其他多个事态，只有在中央出手干预后才得到化解或者平息。例如，全国人大常委会 1999 年首次对《香港基本法》有关条文作出解释，以纠正香港终审法院对“吴嘉玲案”的偏颇判决 ；2017 年全国人大常委会作出决定，认为广深港高铁西九龙站“一地两检”安排符合“一国两制”方针和《香港基本法》根本宗旨，解决了香港社会较长时间以来关于“一地两检”的争议，等等。
III. Taiwan Will Enjoy Delegated Autonomy After Peaceful Reunification
(i) Practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” Policy Will Be More Complicated in Taiwan than in Hong Kong
Practice in the more than 20 years since the return of Hong Kong has proven that the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong has been generally successful: first, it has resolved the territorial issues left over from history by peaceful means and achieved national reunification. Second, it has maintained the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. However, the practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong has also shown that, as something completely new, “One Country, Two Systems,” had no precedent to follow and would inevitably face some deep-seated problems and serious challenges. Looking at the practical experience of Hong Kong, we can imagine that if the autonomy enjoyed by Hong Kong were to have been shared-power autonomy, the power of the center would be limited to a few items explicitly listed in the Hong Kong Basic Law, and at times when new situations arose in Hong Kong which the SAR government could not deal with or resolve by itself, the center would have no right to intervene. The consequences would not only damage Hong Kong’s own prosperity and stability, but also have a negative impact on national sovereignty, security, and development interests.
香港回归二十余年来的实践证明，“一国两制”在香港的实践总体上是成功的 ：一是以和平方式解决了历史遗留的领土问题，实现了国家的统一 ；二是保持了香港的繁荣稳定。但“一国两制”方针在香港的实践同时表明，“一国两制”作为新生事物，没有先例可循，它不可避免地面临着一些深层次问题和严峻挑战。从香港的实践经验来看，试想如果香港享有的是分权性自治权，中央权力仅限于《香 港基本法》明确列举的几项，当香港出现特区政府自身不能应对或解决的新状况时，中央就无权干预， 其后果是不仅损害香港自身的繁荣稳定，也将对国家主权、安全和发展利益造成负面影响。
The current problems in Hong Kong are not problems with the “One Country, Two Systems” policy itself, but to a large extent reflect the fact that the specific institutional design of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy was not sound and complete enough to fully foresee the new developments that Hong Kong might face after its return. “Fortunately” [所幸], what the original institutional designers gave to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was delegated autonomy, maintaining flexibility in the power allocation between the center and the Special Administrative Region. This left room for the center to appropriately intervene and ensured that the practice of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong would always stay on the correct course, without deviation or distortion.
当前香港所出现的问题不是“一国两制”方针本身的问题，在很大程度上反映出“一国两制”方 针的具体制度设计不够健全和完善，未能充分预见香港回归后可能面临的新事态。“所幸”当初的制度设计者赋予香港特别行政区的是授权性自治权，保持了中央与特别行政区权力配置的灵活性，为中央 适当干预留下了空间，确保了“一国两制”方针在香港的实践始终沿着正确的方向，不走样、不变形。
Of course, the Taiwan issue and cross-strait reunification are quite different from Hong Kong’s return to the motherland. The “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula cannot be blindly copied from the Hong Kong formula. The “One Country, Two Systems” policy was proposed to solve the Taiwan issue, but it was first put into practice in Hong Kong. This reflects the nature of the practice in Hong Kong as a “test field.” Comrade Deng Xiaoping once pointed out: “Whether the reunification of the mainland and Taiwan can truly be smoothly achieved depends first on the result of the realization of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Hong Kong, and second on whether our economy can truly develop. The key for China to solve all its problems is that it must rely on its own development.” 32 Therefore, the practical experience of “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong should serve as an important reference for the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula.
当然，台湾问题和两岸统一与香港回归祖国具有较大差异性，“一国两制”台湾方案不能照搬照抄香港方案。“一国两制”方针为解决台湾问题而提出，却在香港最先实践，这反映出在香港的实践本身就具有“试验田”的性质。邓小平同志就曾指出 ：“能否真正顺利地实现大陆和台湾的统一，一要看香港实现‘一国两制’的结果，二要看我们经济能不能真正发展。中国解决所有问题的关键是要靠自己的发展。” 因此，“一国两制”在香港的实践经验理应作为“一国两制”台湾方案的重要参考。
The Taiwan issue and cross-strait reunification are no less complicated than the return of Hong Kong to the motherland. Observing things from the perspective of the current social sentiment and public opinion on the island of Taiwan, the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces have long been tilling the soil in Taiwanese society. Public opinion on the island is deeply influenced by the separatist ideology of “Taiwan independence,” “One Country, Two Systems” has long been stigmatized in Taiwan, and Taiwanese society is quite resistant to “One Country, Two Systems.” Relatively speaking, “Hong Kong independence” has not risen to the same level of popularity in Hong Kong society, and the “One Country, Two Systems” policy is generally accepted by the people of Hong Kong. Moreover, what is fairly certain is that, after the peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait, the “Taiwan independence” forces will not automatically retreat, the consciousness of “Taiwan independence” will not automatically disappear, external forces will not give up on interfering in Taiwan’s affairs, and other unforeseen new developments may occur. From this, it can be further inferred that the comprehensive and accurate implementation of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Taiwan will face a greater number of more complicated and thorny issues than in Hong Kong. For example, how can we dissolve the “Taiwan independence” forces and eliminate the influence of “Taiwan independence” consciousness as quickly as possible? How can we form mainstream public opinion in favor of and supportive of the “One Country, Two Systems” policy as quickly as possible? How can we ensure that the authority to govern Taiwan does not fall into the hands of “Taiwan independence” elements? How can we improve Taiwan compatriots’ national identification with China? And how can we effectively prevent and constrain external forces from interfering in Taiwan affairs? This series of foreseeable problems along with some unforeseeable ones demand that the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula carries out a more finely detailed, more prudent institutional design regarding the power allocation model between the center and Taiwan. While establishing Taiwan’s high degree of autonomy, it must retain flexible space for central power.
台湾问题和两岸统一的复杂性并不比香港回归祖国小。从当前台湾岛内的社情民意来观察，“台独”分裂势力长期耕耘台湾社会，岛内民意深受“台独”分裂思潮影响，“一国两制”在台湾长期被污 名化，台湾社会比较抗拒“一国两制”。相对而言，“港独”在香港社会并不成气候，“一国两制”方针 受到香港民众的普遍接受。并且可以比较确定的是，两岸和平统一后，“台独”势力不会自动退出，“台 独”意识不会自动消亡，外部势力也不会放弃干涉台湾事务，而且还可能出现其他难以预见的新事态。由此可进一步推断要在台湾全面、准确落实“一国两制”方针，将比香港面临更多更复杂的棘手问题， 比如如何尽快瓦解“台独”势力、消除“台独”意识影响，如何尽快形成赞成和支持“一国两制”方 针的主流民意，如何确保台湾管治权不落入“台独”分子之手，如何增进台湾同胞对中国的国家认同， 如何有效防范和遏制外部势力干涉台湾事务，等等。这一系列可以预见和一些难以预见的问题，要求 “一国两制”台湾方案必须对中央与台湾的权力配置模式进行更细致、更谨慎的制度设计，在确立台湾高度自治的同时，为中央权力保留灵活空间。
One of the impacts on central power of a view which advocates that a peacefully reunified Taiwan will enjoy shared-power autonomy is that the limitations on central power are too rigid. This lack of flexibility could result in a situation where Taiwan desperately needs intervention from the center, but the center has no right to intervene. The young scholar Mao Qimeng has raised doubts and concerns about the theory of shared-power autonomy, pointing out: “With regard to the cross-strait political arrangement under the special circumstances pertaining before national reunification or to the ultimate building of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ Taiwan model, a power sharing arrangement based on a separation of powers may still require some debate. Because a ‘separation of powers’ which has the flavor of federalism or confederation provides the Taiwan authorities with the ‘factual’ conditions or even a ‘jurisprudential’ basis for an ‘original separation of powers,’ it is also the core goal of the Taiwan authorities’ pursuit of a long-term ‘form of shared power,’ and on a fundamental level this violates the principle of popular sovereignty under which Taiwan’s future and destiny should be commonly determined by all Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.” 33
主张和平统一后的台湾享有分权性自治权的观点，对中央权力造成的影响之一便是对中央权力的 限制过于僵化，缺少灵活性，可能造成台湾急需中央干预而中央无权干预的情况。青年学者毛启蒙对分权性自治权学说提出了质疑和担忧，指出 ：“对于国家尚未统一特殊情况下两岸政治安排或‘一国两制’台湾模式的最终构建来说，基于权力分立的分权安排，可能有待商榷。因为，具有联邦制或邦联制色彩的‘分权’为台湾当局提供了‘本源性分权’的‘现实’设定甚至‘法理’依据，也是其追求‘分权形态’ 长期化的核心目标，从根本上违背了台湾前途命运由两岸全体中国人民共同决定的人民主权原则。”
However, if a peacefully reunified Taiwan enjoys delegated autonomy, that would enable the retention of relatively great flexibility and elasticity for the power of the center, reserving the basis of authority such that when needed the center can appropriately intervene in the practice of “One Country, Two Systems” in Taiwan. Here we can borrow from the words of Comrade Deng Xiaoping cited above: is it really conceivable that post-peaceful-reunification Taiwan will have no destructive forces? Is it conceivable that nothing will happen to harm the fundamental interests of the nation? Is it conceivable that nothing will happen that harms the fundamental interests of Taiwan? At such time, should Beijing get involved or not? Therefore, it is in the interests of Taiwan that certain powers of the center be maintained.
但如果和平统一后的台湾享有授权性自治权，就可以为中央权力保留较大的灵活性和弹性，为中 央在必要时适当干预“一国两制”在台湾的实践预留权力依据。在此可以借用前述邓小平同志的讲话： 和平统一后的台湾难道就不会有破坏力量，难道就不会有危害国家根本利益的事情，难道就不会有损 害台湾根本利益的事情？那个时候，北京过问不过问？所以，保持中央的某些权力，对台湾有利无害。
(ii) Misunderstandings in the Theory of Shared-Power Autonomy
Based on the practical experience of Hong Kong and the reality of the situation regarding Taiwan, this paper has already proposed that, after peaceful reunification, Taiwan should enjoy delegated autonomy rather than shared-power autonomy. Here, it remains necessary to further discuss and explore the theory of shared-power autonomy from the perspectives of a unitary system and a federal system. The essence of the view that a peacefully reunified Taiwan will enjoy shared-power autonomy is that it advocates the introduction of certain features of federalism into the power allocation model of the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula. This view holds that “due to historical reasons, the Taiwan authorities are exercising some powers that should no longer be exercised by them, which makes it difficult to peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue through a reunification model based on a unitary system.” 34 Therefore, some features of a federal system must be introduced into the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan model. 35 This view further holds that, after the introduction of the features of federalism, Taiwan will transfer some original powers to the center, and the remaining original powers that it has not transferred will belong to Taiwan as “residual power.” 36 In other words, the theory of shared-power autonomy necessarily links federalism with the sharing of power from the local to the center, and the “residual power” belonging to the local government. However, this understanding is one-sided and misunderstands federalism.
前文从香港的实践经验和台湾的现实情况，已经提出和平统一后的台湾应享有授权性自治权，而 不是分权性自治权。在此仍有必要从单一制与联邦制的角度专门对分权性自治权学说做进一步的商榷 与探讨。和平统一后的台湾享有分权性自治权的观点，其要义在于主张在“一国两制”台湾方案的权 力配置模式中引入联邦制的某些特征。这种观点认为“台湾当局却由于历史原因行使着部分本不应再 由其行使的权力，这就造成了以单一制为基础的统一模式和平解决台湾问题的困难”，因此“一国两制”台湾模式中就必须引入联邦制的部分特性。该观点进一步认为，在引入联邦制的特性后，由台湾向中央移交部分本源性权力，其余未移交的本源性权力作为“剩余权力”归属台湾。换言之，分权性自治权学说将联邦制与地方向中央分权、“剩余权力”归属地方必然地联系起来。然而，这种认识是片面的，对联邦制存在误解。
Misunderstanding 1: Federalism Does Not Equate to the “Sharing of Power from the Local to the Center.” In today’s world, there are two main types of states or state forms, unitary states and federal states. Most countries in the world adopt the form of a unitary state. A unitary system refers to a form of state structure where, in the process of the vertical allocation and application of the right to exercise state power, the central government alone enjoys all sovereign powers and regional governments share the right to exercise other state powers. 37 The authority of local government in a unitary state is entrusted to it by the central government, and the local government must obey the leadership of the center and accept its supervision. 38 The fundamental feature of a unitary system is that, whether in terms of authority, public interest, or public finances, the highest and most fundamental decision-making power is put in the hands of the central government, and the powers which local governments share are only subordinate powers underneath these powers.39
Globally, more than 20 countries implement a federal system. 40 Federalism is a form of state structure where the exercise of state power, including sovereign power, is shared by the national government and regional governments according to a constitution. Neither side can unilaterally alter the constitutional power-sharing arrangement. 41 A federal state has both a federal or central government (legislature and executive bodies) and a number of state or local legislative bodies and governments. Both the federal and state governments derive their powers from the federal constitution, and both enjoy supreme authority in specific areas. 42 In terms of legislative power, a federal system is a constitutional regime in which the central legislature and the legislatures of the states or territorial units that make up the federation share legislative power. 43
全世界有 20 多个国家实行联邦制。联邦制是由全国性政府和区域性政府根据宪法分享包括主权权力在内的国家权力行使权，并且不得单方面改变宪定权力分享格局的一种国家结构形式。联邦制国家同时存在着联邦或中央政府（立法机关和行政机关）和若干州或地方的立法机关和政府 ；联邦和州政府都从联邦宪法取得权力，两者在特定领域里都享有最高权威。从立法权来看，联邦制是中央立法机构和组成该联邦的各州或各地域单位的立法机构分享立法权的立宪政体。
The fundamental difference between a unitary system and a federal system is whether sovereign power is exclusively held by the central government or shared by the central government and regional governments. In a unitary system, the central government exclusively holds sovereign power. In a federal system, the central government shares sovereign power with the regional governments. 44 A unitary state does not preclude the possibility of local or other government agencies having powers entrusted or delegated to them by the central government. However, this power must be entrusted or delegated by the central government; it is not allocated. In a strict legal sense, all powers belong to the central government.45
单一制与联邦制的根本区别在于主权权力是由中央政府独占还是由中央政府与区域性政府分享， 由中央政府独占主权权力的是单一制，由中央政府与区域性政府分享主权权力的是联邦制。单一制国家并不排除地方或其他政府机构享有由中央政府委托或授权的权力的可能性。但这种权力须来自中 央政府的委托授权，而不是分配的，而且从严格的法律意义上来说，所有权力都是属于中央政府的。
Sovereign power is clearly a type of original power. In view of the concepts of, and differences between, unitary and federal systems presented above, to whom original power belongs becomes a key factor in distinguishing between unitary and federal systems. However, in terms of the original ownership of original power, which method a federal state adopts is not fixed. That is, federal states do not absolutely implement a “bottom-up” method from the local to the center. In fact, in terms of the original ownership of original power in federal states, there are three forms: the first is that of countries like the United States and Switzerland, where original power originally belongs to the states, and the power of the federation is granted it by the states. In other words, the original power of states is the “source,” and the original power of the federation “flows” to it from this source. This is a type of local to central sharing of power. In the second form, the original power originally belongs to a unified state, and it is only in order to better solve ethnic problems, problems of unbalanced economic development, or other specific problems that the unitary system is abandoned in favor of a federal system. That is, the original power of the federation is the “source,” and the original power of federation member units “flows” from this source. This is central to local sharing of power. The Russian Federation and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are examples of this form. The third form is a hybrid of the first and second forms, such as that of the former Soviet Union; or where the original ownership of the original power is, for various reasons, very hazy, such as in Canada, Australia, India, and Pakistan, where it is difficult to convincingly determine the ownership of original power. 46
Therefore, without discussing whether there is sufficient basis for Taiwan to enjoy original power, the theory of shared-power autonomy simply interprets federalism as “sharing of power from the local to the center.” This is a one-sided and incomplete view.
Misunderstanding 2: Federalism Does Not Equate to “Residual Power” Belonging to the Locality. There is not just one form of federalism. It can be divided into several forms, such as federalism based on the separation of powers and checks and balances, federalism based on democratic centralism, autonomous democratic federalism, centralized federalism, and so on. 47 Federalism based on the separation of powers and checks and balances is a fairly typical federal system. Federalism based on the separation of powers and checks and balances uses horizontal separation of powers (separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers) and vertical separation of powers (separation of powers between the federation and federal member units) to realize checks and balances on power. The separation of powers is the precondition and basis of checks and balances. In the separation of powers between the federation and the federation member units, there are three methods of power separation: the first is to enumerate the powers of the federation in the constitution, with the member units generally retaining other powers, that is, the “residual powers” belong to the member units. Such federal states include the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and Mexico. The second is to enumerate the powers of each party in the constitution, with the powers that are not listed retained by the federation, that is, the “residual powers” belong to the federation. Canada and India have adopted this method. The third method is the type of separation of powers in the Russian Federation. According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the entities that make up the Russian Federation possess the “residual powers” outside of the jurisdiction of the federation and the common jurisdiction of the federation and its entities. However, due to the very broad language used by the Constitution to describe the exclusive powers of the federation and the common jurisdiction of the federation and its entities, there are very few “residual powers” that are actually exclusively held by the entities. 48
2、误区二 ：联邦制不等于“剩余权力”归属地方。联邦制不只有一种形态，其可分为分权制衡联邦制、民主集中联邦制、自治民主联邦制、中央集权联邦制等多种形态。分权制衡联邦制是比较典型的联邦制。分权制衡联邦制通过横向分权（行政、立法、司法三权分立）和纵向分权（联邦和联邦成员单位之间的分权）实现权力制衡。分权是制衡的前提和基础。在联邦与联邦成员单位的分权关系中，有三种分权方法 ：第一种是在宪法中采用列举联邦权力，成员单位概括保留的方式，即“剩余权力”归属成员单位，这类联邦制国家包括美国、瑞士、德国、墨西哥等。第二种是在宪法中分别列举双方的权力，未能列举的权力由联邦保留，即“剩余权力”归属联邦，加拿大、印度就采用了这种方式。第三种是俄罗斯联邦的分权类型，根据俄罗斯联邦宪法，组成俄罗斯联邦的各主体拥有联邦管辖、联邦和各主体共同管辖范围之外的“剩余权力”，但由于宪法对联邦专有权力、联邦和各主体共同管辖事务的用语十分宽泛，导致实际上专属于各主体的“剩余权力”很少。
From the perspective of development trends, even in federal states such as the United States and Australia where “residual powers” belong to local governments, the power of the federal government is constantly expanding and becoming more centralized so that it already violates the traditional division of functions and powers between the central and local governments. 49
In short, in a federal state, “residual power” is not absolutely possessed by localities. Therefore, when the theory of shared-power autonomy argues that the original power that Taiwan has not handed over to the central government belongs to Taiwan as “residual power,” this view is also one-sided and a misunderstanding of federalism.
One of the possible reasons for the aforementioned misunderstandings on the part of the theory of shared-power autonomy lies in the fact that the United States is seen as the typical federal state, which is a great power, whose influence means that many people are familiar with its situation. The long-term persistence of this situation has given rise to this misunderstanding. It is incorrect to think that all federal systems have the characteristics of the United States and always use it as a model when we talk about federalism. 50
The practice since the return of Hong Kong shows that the “One Country, Two Systems” policy does not always go smoothly in practice; it will face various foreseeable and unforeseeable risks and challenges. The institutional design of Hong Kong’s delegated autonomy gives the center the right to intervene in the affairs of the SAR when necessary. This kind of institutional design has proven to be correct and appropriate in subsequent practice.
The Taiwan issue, cross-strait reunification, and the issue of governance in post-reunification Taiwan are more complicated than in Hong Kong. The institutional design of the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula should fully draw on the practical experience from Hong Kong, maintain flexibility in power allocation, and maintain the power of the center to intervene in a timely and appropriate manner. However, the theory of shared-power autonomy is too rigid as regards the institutional design of central government power and lacks flexibility, which may lead to the central government having only extremely limited powers regarding the peacefully reunified Taiwan and make it unable to respond to, and deal with, new situations that may arise promptly and effectively. At the same time, the theory of shared-power autonomy contains misunderstandings about federalism and mechanically takes the federal model of the United States as the universal model of federal states around the world. This deserves discussion and reflection.
In short, in view of China’s national conditions and cultural traditions and in view of the practical experience of Hong Kong and the reality of the situation regarding Taiwanese society, there is no need to rigidly impose federalism in the institutional design of the “One Country, Two Systems” Taiwan formula. Correspondingly, defining Taiwan’s autonomy after peaceful reunification as delegated autonomy may be more conducive to the long-term stability of the two sides of the Strait after reunification and contribute to the prosperity and stability of the country.