Since taking office, Biden himself and senior officials in his administration have emphasized on several occasions that the United States will adhere to the one-China policy and maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy is based on the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the “Taiwan Relations Act,” and the “Six Assurances,” and is unlikely to break with the one-China principle. Most in the domestic academic community tend to believe that the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy is beginning to return to a more rational and predictable approach compared to the Trump administration’s aggressive and adventuristic style. However, Biden has inherited Trump’s strategic thinking of “controlling China with Taiwan” and has played the “Taiwan card” with undiminished intensity, differing from Trump only in terms of means and methods. Although the Biden administration claims it is not breaking the one-China principle, its actions have constantly challenged the bottom line of the one-China principle, focusing on substantially elevating U.S.-Taiwan relations. For the Biden administration, “using Taiwan to control China” has become an important element of its Indo-Pacific strategy, and serves the United States’ grand strategy of containing China. This article considers the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy as a tactical “re-ambiguation,” from which one can perceive how the Biden administration treats the “Taiwan card” and considers how to gain more benefits by playing it. This reflects the interest-oriented pragmatism in U.S. diplomacy. In order to analyze the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy, it is necessary to understand the nature, manifestations and underlying causes of the “re-ambiguation.” We must also forecast the future trends of the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy.

I.   Three dimensions of the Biden administration’s policy framework toward China: strategic competition, dialogue and cooperation, and managing differences

After more than a year since Biden took office, the outlines of the administration’s policy framework toward China can be traced by combing through relevant policy documents, official statements, and information from high-level meetings. These can be summarized along three dimensions: strategic competition, dialogue and cooperation, and managing differences.

First, there is the strategic competition dimension. The Interim National Security Guidance issued on March 3, 2021 shortly after Biden took office stated that “China is the only potential competitor capable of combining economic, diplomatic, military, and technological forces to pose a lasting challenge to a stable and open international system.” ¹ On April 21, 2021, the U.S. Congress passed the Strategic Competition Act of 2021. The China-related section emphasizes the need to increase research investment and infrastructure development to meet the China challenge, while re-examining commitments to allies and partners and reestablishing U.S. leadership. It indicates that the United States will mobilize all strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to counter China in an attempt to make the U.S.-China relationship develop in the direction of outright competition and full confrontation. ² On February 11, 2022, the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States noted that “The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. China’s behavior is undermining freedom of navigation and other principles of international law, which undermines the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.”^{3 4} On March 28, 2022, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted a classified version of the 2022 National Defense Strategy to Congress, which for the first time examines the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review in a comprehensive and integrated manner. It says that China is the most important “strategic competitor” of the United States, posing a threat to the United States in multiple areas, and that the key for U.S. defense is to prioritize the Chinese challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen deterrence against China. ⁵ On May 26, 2022, Secretary of State Blinken delivered a lengthy speech on China policy in which he stated that the United States has extremely limited ability to directly influence China’s strategic direction, and will therefore turn to building a “strategic environment” against China, and strongly advocated building a coalition to “contain China.”⁶ This shows that Biden has continued Trump’s positioning of China as a “strategic competitor” and his posture of strategic competition toward China.

The second dimension is dialog and cooperation. Since Biden took office, there have been several high-level dialogues between the United States and China, showing that Biden does not want the strategic competition between the United States and China to evolve into a full-blown vicious competition, and is trying to avoid sliding into a “new Cold War” of full-fledged confrontation between the two countries. Biden has said that the two sides should improve their understanding of each other’s intentions through open and frank dialogue to ensure that the competition between the two countries is fair and healthy and does not evolve into conflict.⁷ Although Biden has also positioned China as a “strategic competitor” just as Trump did, he has singled out areas of common interest and is “prepared to work with China where it is consistent with U.S. interests.⁸ Because the United States cannot afford full-scale competition and “decoupling” from China, the United States needs China’s cooperation in areas such as dealing with COVID-19 and climate change. During video meetings between President Xi Jinping and Biden in November 2021 and March 2022, Biden emphasized that the United States does not seek to fight a “new Cold War” with China, change China’s institutions, or oppose China by strengthening alliances; the United States does not support “Taiwan independence,” nor does it intend to create any conflict with China. The U.S. side is willing to engage in frank dialogue with China and strengthen cooperation.⁹ One can see that the Biden administration’s policy toward China demonstrates a considerable degree of willingness for dialogue and cooperation.

The third dimension is that of managing differences. In the March 18, 2022 meeting between the United States and China, both Biden and President Xi Jinping talked about their differences, which shows that both the United States and China have the willingness to manage their differences and intend to search for “guardrails” in the U.S.-China relationship. The purpose of managing differences is to have a stable U.S.-China relationship. This is in line with the interests of both countries, which have mutual strategic requirements, and it is the consensus of the two countries. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has caused a sudden change in the international situation, and impacted the overall geopolitical landscape and relationships between the major powers. At this time, both China and the United States both believe that the relationship is important, that they should face up to and manage their differences and rivalries, and that conflict need not break out. In his May 26, 2022 speech on China policy, Blinken repeatedly emphasized that the United States hopes to avoid conflict with China and to build a so-called “open and inclusive international system.”¹⁰ As is well known, the biggest difference between China and the United States is the Taiwan issue. Looking back over the history since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, whenever the one-China policy of the United States is implemented and the U.S. side fully respect China’s core interests and China’s territorial sovereignty and integrity on the Taiwan issue, Sino-U.S. relations can develop smoothly. But when the United States assails the one-China bottom line and framework of the Taiwan issue, and when the Taiwan issue is used by the United States to play the Taiwan card, to “use Taiwan to control China,” and to elevate Taiwan’s strategic pawn status, U.S.-China relations will be turbulent.¹¹ Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is in the interest of both countries, and China and the United States worked together to contain Chen Shui-bian’s “legal Taiwan independence” in the Taiwan Strait. Biden has told President Xi Jinping that the United States adheres to the one-China policy, and does not support “Taiwan independence.” It is willing to effectively manage competition and differences, has no intention of clashing with China, and promotes the stable development of relations between the two countries.

II.   The Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy: a tactical “re-ambiguation”

The United States’ Taiwan Strait policy is subordinate to its China policy and is governed by the general framework of U.S.-China relations. It is clear from the previous analysis that the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy will definitely conform to the three dimensions of strategic competition, dialogue and cooperation, and managing differences within the overall framework of U.S.-China relations. First, the Biden administration will continue to play the “Taiwan card” and “use Taiwan to control China.” This conforms to the strategic competition dimension. The Biden administration will not go to extremes in playing the “Taiwan card” and will not engage in full-fledged conflict with China over Taiwan because the United States needs China’s cooperation in areas where the United States and China have common interests. This conforms to the dialogue and cooperation dimension. The Biden administration will only “re-ambiguate” its security commitments to Taiwan and will not explicitly give Taiwan any kind of security guarantees, at the same time also appropriately “browbeating” the DPP authorities for their “Taiwan independence” moves that provoke the mainland. In particular, at this sensitive time of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the United States fears that it will be “dragged under” by Taiwan to the detriment of its interests. This conforms to the managing differences dimension. On April 15, 2022, a bipartisan group of six U.S. lawmakers visited Taipei and met with Tsai Ing-wen, saying that the United States’ so-called “support” for Taiwan included two key points, namely that “the United States does not seek conflict with China” and that “Taiwan cannot provoke.”¹²

After clarifying the overall framework of U.S.-China relations, it is easy to understand that the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy is a tactical “re-ambiguation.” That is, while adhering to the one-China policy, it keeps giving signals of “support” for Taiwan, attempting to disrupt the situation in the Taiwan Strait in order to maintain the United States’ strategic initiative there. From another perspective, this reflects the current strategic dilemma faced by the United States. First, at the global level: The United States’ declining relative national strength is no longer able to support an expansive global strategy, and the United States is unable to simultaneously invest enough resources in the key regions of Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific to maintain its strategic advantage. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has been putting its strategic focus on the European region in an all-out response to the biggest geopolitical crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This objectively requires the United States to carry out “strategic contraction” in other regions. Second, at the level of U.S.-China relations: Now that the rise of China has become a fact, the United States needs to contain China, out of a hegemonic power’s defense against rising powers. Although Biden has stressed the need to engage in “the most intense strategic competition” with China, he has also recognized that China and the United States have many common interests, and that the United States needs China’s cooperation in these areas. Without China’s help, there will be many problems that the United States will be unable to solve, ultimately harming the interests of the United States. This shows that the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy is in line with the current overall framework of U.S.-China relations and is a tactical rather than a strategic adjustment.

In short, the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy is superficially a “fight without breaking” approach to playing the “Taiwan card,” but is essentially intended to contain China. In international relations, constructivism holds that “identity determines interests, and interests determine behavior.”¹³Given its identity as a world hegemonic power, the United States is destined to maintain hegemony as its core interest, and the means adopted to maintain that interest are influenced by power. The United States sees the rise of China as a challenge to U.S. hegemony, and playing the “Taiwan card” to contain China has become an important tool for the United States. At present, the power gap between China and the United States is narrowing further, and the United States is no longer able to gain an absolute power advantage in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the United States must pay attention to China’s position and concerns on the Taiwan issue when playing the “Taiwan card,” avoid irritating China, and avoid triggering a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This objectively requires that U.S. Taiwan Strait policy return to “strategic ambiguity,” which reflects a kind of American style of pragmatic diplomatic thinking.

III.   Manifestations of the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy

The Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive core issue in China-U.S. relations, and it is also a structural contradiction between China and the United States. The May 2021 cover article of The Economist, entitled “The Most Dangerous Place on Earth,” describes Taiwan as “the most dangerous place in the world,” saying that if the Taiwan issue is not handled properly, it may lead to the disastrous consequence of armed conflict between two nuclear powers, China and the United States.¹⁴On March 18, 2022, President Xi Jinping and Biden also pointed out during their video meeting that if the Taiwan issue is not handled properly, it will have a disruptive impact on the bilateral relationship. ¹⁵ Therefore, after carefully balancing risks and benefits, “re-ambiguation” has become the strategic choice of the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy, mainly manifested in the release of “re-ambiguation” signals, hedging on written commitments, and obvious inconsistencies between statements and actions, as Biden attempts to “fight without breaking,” fully utilize Taiwan’s containment role, and maximize U.S. interests.

(1) Giving multiple “re-ambiguation” signals

The United States has long pursued an ambiguous one-China policy, which ensures that the United States can achieve “dual deterrence” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and maintain the so-called “status quo in the Taiwan Strait” while also avoiding the perception of “choosing sides,” thereby allowing the United States to achieve interest maximization in the Taiwan Strait. “Strategic ambiguity” is a typical low-cost, high-yield policy. Although U.S. Taiwan Strait policy tended to shift from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity” during the Trump era, Biden stopped this trend after taking office and “re-ambiguated” Taiwan Strait policy. While emphasizing his commitment to the one-China policy and to maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Biden has repeatedly stressed that “the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid.” This contradictory stance reflects a certain degree of strategic dilemma for the United States. That is, the United States wants to maintain its relationship with China, and it cannot let a full-scale conflict with China occur due to “using Taiwan to control China,” which would harm U.S. interests. Therefore, it must play the “Taiwan card” in a “fight without breaking” manner. In early May 2022, the U.S. State Department updated the “U.S.-Taiwan relations” statement on its official website, removing two important phrases: “The United States does not support ‘Taiwan independence'” and “Taiwan is part of China.” Some mainland scholars say this is a “regression” in the U.S. position on Taiwan and proof that the United States continues to “hollow out” the one-China policy.¹⁶ Biden has also repeatedly made “defend Taiwan” statements, telling the media twice in August and October 2021 that the United States would “defend Taiwan” if the mainland “attacked” it. ¹⁷ Most recently, on May 23, 2022, during a visit to Japan, Biden told the media that “if mainland China launches an attack, the United States would take military measures to protect Taiwan.” ¹⁸ Biden’s “defend Taiwan” statement momentarily had the outside world thinking that the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy was shifting to “strategic clarity,” but then the White House rushed to “put out fires,” saying that this was a “slip of the tongue,” and that the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy had not changed. On October 27, 2021, Tsai Ing-wen admitted in an interview with CNN that there were U.S. military personnel in Taiwan. Biden did not respond to this.¹⁹ Biden belongs to the traditional American establishment, which wants to maintain a state of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” in the Taiwan Strait. ²⁰ Only in this state can the U.S. gain the maximum benefit in the Taiwan Strait. Because of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue, the United States will merely increase risks by giving “re-ambiguation” signals. As President Xi Jinping emphasized during his video meeting with Biden, it is very dangerous for some people in the United States to send wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” forces.²¹

(2) Using “one Act and six assurances” to hedge the “Three Communiqués”

The three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués are important historical documents guiding U.S.-China relations and the Taiwan issue, the core of which is the one-China principle. However, since coming to power, Biden has intentionally highlighted the importance of the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the so-called “six assurances” to the Taiwan authorities, elevating the “one act and six assurances” to the same level as the Three Communiqués or even higher. In a video meeting with President Xi Jinping on November 16, 2021, Biden emphasized the United States’ continued commitment to the one-China policy, guided by the “Taiwan Relations Act,” the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, and the six assurances. ²² The statement released by the White House places the “Taiwan Relations Act,” a domestic law of the United States, ahead of the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués. On February 11, 2022, the Biden administration released its first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which made several references to Taiwan, but placed the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués after the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the six assurances, despite emphasizing that the United States will adhere to the one-China policy. The State Department recently listed on its official website that the United States will “develop its relationship with Taiwan based on the longstanding one-China policy of the “Taiwan Relations Act,” the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, and the six assurances.” ²³ One can see that the Biden administration has prioritized the “Taiwan Relations Act” for guiding the Taiwan issue, indicating that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is higher than the U.S. commitment to the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués.²⁴ On one hand, this reflects the greater importance the United States attaches to domestic politics than to international politics, and on the other hand, it shows the Biden administration’s bias in favor of Taiwan. Biden is well aware of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue in U.S.-China relations, and therefore intends to hedge the “Three Communiqués” with the “one act and six assurances.” This is an attempt to throw off the shackles of the one-China principle and provide room in which to play the “Taiwan card” in a “fighting without breaking” fashion.

(3) Statements and actions are clearly inconsistent

When the United States adheres to the one-China policy, there are safety “guardrails” to a certain extent on the competition and differences between China and the United States. But once the U.S. side does not adhere to the one-China policy, the “guardrail” edges will be breached, making it difficult to have a stable Sino-U.S. relationship. ²⁵ Hence, while the Biden administration has many times verbally emphasized adherence to the one-China policy, such statements are more about symbolism. In terms of actions, Biden has been the same as Trump in pursuing a kind of hollowed-out one-China policy, that is, elevating the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Since Biden came into office, statements on the Taiwan issue have generally led the outside world to believe that Biden is more rational and predictable than Trump, and the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait has fallen. However, Biden has positioned China as “the most serious competitor,”²⁶ and in this context, Biden has played the “Taiwan card” to “use Taiwan to control China” with a forcefulness which has even surpassed Trump. On January 20, 2021, Taiwan’s “Representative to the United States,” Bi-khim Hsiao, was invited to Biden’s inauguration, breaking more than 40 years of practice in normalizing Sino-U.S. relations. Tsai Ing-wen claimed that “this fully demonstrated the improvement in Taiwan-U.S. relations.” In February 2021, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Sun Yong Kim met with Bi-khim Hsiao at the U.S. State Department, which also broke the “taboo” against Taiwanese officials entering the State Department, instead only operating outside the State Department.²⁷ In June 2021, three U.S. Senators arrived in Taiwan aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 transport plane to donate vaccines to the Taiwanese authorities on behalf of the U.S. government. In November 2021, four U.S. Senators and two U.S. Representatives again arrived on a U.S. Navy C-40A to meet with Tsai Ing-wen and entered Taiwan’s Department of Defense for the first time, strengthening U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges. In the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Biden has repeatedly sent delegations to Taiwan to demonstrate his so-called “support” for Taiwan. In addition, Biden approved three arms sales to Taiwan in August 2021, February 2022, and March 2022, worth $750 million, $100 million, and $250 million, respectively, for a total of more than $1 billion. On a fourth occasion in June 2022, Biden again approved $120 million in arms sales to Taiwan. This indicates that the Biden administration is stepping up the arming of Taiwan. The above actions by the Biden administration clearly violate its commitment to abide by the one-China principle, and they send the wrong signal to the Taiwan authorities. On March 15, 2022, Yang Jiechi, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission General Office, met with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Rome, where Yang Jiechi emphasized that the U.S. side clearly has recognized that there is only one China in all three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués. The one-China principle was the prerequisite for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, and it is the political foundation of China-U.S. relations. On the Taiwan issue, the current U.S. administration has made a commitment to uphold the one-China policy and to not support “Taiwan independence,” but its actions are clearly inconsistent with its statements. ²⁸

IV.   Underlying causes of the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy

The underlying causes of the “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy are mainly the domestic political situation, the “strategic value” of Taiwan, the pressure on U.S. hegemony, and the practical need for cooperation between the United States and China.

(1) The domestic political situation in the United States

Against the background of the intensified strategic game between China and the United States, a consensus on the Taiwan issue has formed between the two U.S. political parties regarding “using Taiwan to control China,” but there are differences between the two parties in terms of how to implement “using Taiwan to control China” and thereby achieve U.S. interests. Under Trump, the United States took a simple and truculent approach to containing China, such as launching trade and technology wars against China and suddenly announcing the closure of Chinese consulates. On the Taiwan issue, Trump went from a phone call with Tsai Ing-wen right after he was elected, questioning the one-China principle, to announcing “the lifting of all restrictions on dealings with Taiwan” before he left office. On one hand, this stemmed from Trump’s character trait of personal recklessness; on the other hand, it reflects the Republican Party’s unilateralism and conservatism. However, this series of actions by the Trump administration had little effect and did not bring China to its knees, which prompted the United States to change its strategy and seek a more pragmatic policy toward China and the Taiwan Strait. Biden came to power as a Democratic president, and his foreign policy has distinctly Democratic undertones, namely its emphasis on values, ideology, and multilateralism. Biden has repeatedly expressed his intention to “deepen relations with ‘democratic Taiwan,'” and has clearly favored Taiwan in the chain of logic on high-level issues such as democratic values and “international rules.” ²⁹ In addition, Biden is also facing pressure from the 2022 midterm elections, and playing the “Taiwan card” has always been an important means for both U.S. parties to boost their popularity during elections. On March 1, 2022, Biden sent a so-called “high-powered delegation” consisting of five former top military and national security officials to Taiwan to allay the uneasiness of the DPP authorities in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on one hand, and more importantly, to show “support for Taiwan” to domestic voters in the United States. The nuance here is that former Trump administration Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a Republican, also visited Taiwan later, showing that the two U.S. parties are competing in the election to play the “Taiwan card” in order to reap political benefits.

(2) The “strategic opportunities” presented by playing the “Taiwan card”

From the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, one can see that the Taiwan Strait is the key direction of the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy provides a “helping hand” and an “implementation opportunity” for the United States to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region. In recent testimony before Congress, a senior Biden administration official described Taiwan as a “strategic asset” for the United States that is “critically important to defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.” Moreover, the U.S. Congress increasingly agrees with this view. ³⁰ The sensitivity of the Taiwan issue dictates that the United States must calculate the risks and benefits cautiously when formulating its Taiwan Strait policy. As former U.S. Ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy has said, there is a real risk of a nuclear war between the United States and China over the Taiwan issue, and the U.S. government should handle the Taiwan issue cautiously to prevent a slide into disorder and war. ³¹ When formulating Taiwan Strait policy, the United States wants to avoid conflict on one hand and maximize its benefits on the other, so “strategic ambiguity” has become the guiding principle of the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy. Biden is well aware of the important role of the “Taiwan card” in containing China, and the “Taiwan card” is the least costly and most strategically beneficial “card” the United States has for containing China. Therefore, Biden must seize the “strategic opportunities” presented by the “Taiwan card,” and play the “Taiwan card” in various practical ways to contain China. The Taiwan Strait is a core interest of China, a matter of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and without a solution to the Taiwan issue, one cannot talk of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The Taiwan Strait does not constitute a core interest of the United States, and in the Taiwan Strait, the strategic pressure on the United States to “use Taiwan to control China” is much less than China’s strategic pressure. Relatively speaking, the United States is in a detached position in the Taiwan Strait, and by putting the “Taiwan card” to good use, the United States guarantees its strategic interests and strategic advantages. The United States can use the “Taiwan card” to restrain China’s development, deplete China’s strategic resources, and contain China’s rise.

(3) Pressures facing U.S. hegemony

Since the beginning of the 21st century, faced with the fact of China’s continuous rise, the United States has felt profoundly ill at ease, fearing that a rising China will challenge U.S. hegemony. In 2021, China’s economy will exceed 110 trillion yuan, ³² representing about 75% of the U.S. economy. This is the first time in history that any country’s economy has reached such a high proportion of the U.S. economy. The power gap between China and the United States is further narrowing. The power shift theory maintains that when a rising power reaches 80% of the dominant power, a “power parity” stage is entered in which a war for hegemony is most likely to occur, bringing a shift in power.³³ China’s economy is moving steadily forward and is rapidly approaching the 80 percent mark, and this has heightened the anxiety of the U.S. strategic community, which has long held a realist view of power politics. How to handle relations with China, and what ways should be used to preserve the U.S. hegemonic position, have become a focus of discussion within the United States. A report released by the RAND Corporation on January 21, 2021—Implementing Restraint: Changes in U.S. Regional Security Policies to Operationalize a Realist Grand Strategy of Restraint— argues that China’s growing power and uncertain future intentions make it a major challenge to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific. The current U.S. domestic and foreign environment has changed. The United States is not strong enough to support a global expansion strategy and needs to engage in “strategic contraction,” and maintain U.S. hegemony using a less costly strategy of restraint from the perspectives of realism and pragmatism.³⁴ The “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy exactly meets the requirements of the U.S. restraint strategy, which emphasizes the role of Taiwan as a “pawn” on the condition of “maintaining the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, so while the United States is helping Taiwan to improve its military capabilities, at the same time it is blurring its security commitments to Taiwan to avoid irritating China. The “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy is a pragmatic way of “using Taiwan to control China” that helps ease the pressure on the United States to maintain hegemony.

(4) Practical need for China-U.S. cooperation

Although the Biden administration has continued the Trump administration’s approach of strategic competition with China, at the same time Biden has not ruled out the possibility of China-U.S. cooperation. In fact, there are many areas in which China and the United States have common interests, such as dealing with COVID-19, climate change, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation. In the current U.S.-China climate, cooperation is just what the Biden administration urgently needs to promote. Addressing climate change was one of Biden’s priorities when he took office, and Biden has called climate change an “existential threat” to human civilization. He said during his campaign that he would “rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement on the administration’s first day,” and would “make large-scale, urgent investments domestically to put the United States on track to having a clean energy economy—achieving net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.” According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China and the United States together accounted for more than 40 percent of global carbon emissions in 2019. ³⁵ For addressing climate change, China is a natural partner for the United States. The Chinese government has also proposed peak carbon and carbon neutrality targets. China is now a world leader in clean energy development, and is strong in green energy technologies such as solar panels. To reduce carbon emissions, the United States must quickly shift to clean energy sources such as solar power, and the cheapest place to get solar cells is China. If Biden really believes that climate change is an “existential threat” and that the United States “must lead the world,” he should turn his attention to China and seek China’s help. He should stop the slide toward a “new Cold War” with China, and instead accelerate the transition to a green energy economy focused on ensuring global compliance with the Paris Climate Agreement. ³⁶ The two visits to China in April and September 2021 by Biden’s Special Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, are evidence of the Biden administration’s efforts to promote U.S.-China climate cooperation.

V.   Trends in the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy

First, the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy will continue to oscillate between “ambiguity” and “clarity. Biden’s previous “slip of the tongue” incident with regard to “defending Taiwan” reflects the subtlety of U.S. Taiwan Strait policy. It is foreseeable that the Biden administration’s Taiwan Strait policy will continue to be “ambiguous” and oscillate further between “ambiguity” and “clarity.” One cannot rule out that Biden will give similar signals on “defending Taiwan” in the future, to deliberately make the situation in the Taiwan Strait more confusing, and thereby maximize benefits for the United States. The Biden administration’s current team of senior officials has not achieved complete unanimity on China policy. Treasury Secretary Yellen, Commerce Secretary Raimondo, Trade Representative Tai, and Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry can be regarded as the cooperation faction, advocating, from a pragmatic view of long-term interests, for a cooperative attitude in relations with China. Secretary of State Blinken, National Security Adviser Sullivan, and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Campbell belong to the containment faction, which advocates a hardline containment policy toward China. From a long-term perspective, there are clear differences in the China policies of the two factions. In September 2021, U.S. Commerce Secretary Raimondo said “it makes no sense to talk about decoupling the United States and China,” and as a result was attacked in an article by Republican Senator Tom Cotton for “appeasement” of China and being “hooked on Chinese capital and cheap labor.” In February 2021, Biden was accused by American conservatives of “surrendering to China” when he expressed some goodwill toward China in an interview. So Biden’s “defending Taiwan ” statement in a sense comes from a balancing of internal political considerations.

Second, Biden will adhere to a pragmatic approach to the “Taiwan card.” The Trump administration saw Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” in the strategic game between China and the United States, an obvious deal, and Trump hoped that playing the “Taiwan card” would force China into making concessions in areas such as trade and exchange rates, allowing the United States to reap benefits. Trump has said that “everything is under negotiation, including one China,” and that “the United States will not necessarily pursue a one-China policy, unless China makes concessions on currency and trade issues.” ³⁷ Trump’s questioning of the one-China principle shook the foundations of U.S.-China relations, sparking great concern. Biden is representative of the traditional U.S. political elite, and he understands the sensitivity and importance of the one-China principle in U.S.-China relations. The Biden administration has already shifted from “extreme competition” during the Trump years to seeking “guardrails” for U.S.-China relations, and Biden does not approve of Trump’s anti-establishment, transactional approach to the “Taiwan card.” But Biden also sees Taiwan as an important U.S. “strategic asset,” the value of which will be “extracted” as much as possible without crossing red lines. Therefore, Biden will adhere to a pragmatic approach to the “Taiwan card” and rationally calculate the costs and benefits.

Third, Biden will step up his efforts to “internationalize” the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan issue is ultimately a U.S. factor. The United States has now realized that, as China and the United States grow closer in strength, it is becoming clear that the United States does not have strength desired to face China alone in the Taiwan Strait. This, coupled with Biden’s foreign policy preference for multilateralism, has prompted the Biden administration to step up its efforts to “internationalize” the Taiwan issue. In March 2022, the Biden administration signed into law the “FY 2022 Omnibus Spending Act,” which stipulates that “any map produced, procured, or displayed at the expense of the United States Government shall not treat the island of Taiwan as a territory of mainland China, and shall not use the same color to designate the island of Taiwan and mainland China.”³⁸ This is intended to deliberately separate the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, to create the illusion of “separation” between Taiwan and China among the American public and the international community, and to create an “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue. In addition, the Biden administration has spared no effort to support Taiwan’s expansion of its so-called “international space.” Besides trying to “stabilize” Taiwan’s “diplomatic relations,” the United States has mentioned Taiwan in several joint statements with the EU, Japan, South Korea, and the G7, expressing “concern for peace in the Taiwan Strait.” At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 11, 2022, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin emphasized that the United States will strengthen its relationships with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including its traditional alliances with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as its relationships with ASEAN members and members of the Quadripartite Security Dialogue.³⁹ The implication is that the United States will bring these nations together to intervene in the Taiwan Strait. Blinken even issued a statement supporting Taiwan’s “active and meaningful participation in the United Nations system.” ⁴⁰ This is an attempt to make the Taiwan issue more international and to manufacture obstacles to China’s reunification.

Fourth, Biden will continue to strengthen Taiwan’s role in the “alliance of democracies” strategy. Biden’s foreign policy has a strong ideological and values-based overtones, dividing the world into the so-called “democracy” and “dictatorship” camps. Biden, who waves the “freedom and democracy” banner, believes that Taiwan is a like-minded “democratic partner” and always been viewed by the United States as a “beacon of democracy” in Asia, on the front lines of the fight against “autocracy and authoritarianism.” In the Biden administration’s “alliance of democracies” strategy, Taiwan can be compared to traditional U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. The DPP authorities also claim to be “a member of the democratic world,” attempting to use a so-called “values identity” to join the United States-led “democratic camp” and “rely on the United States to seek independence,” so as to oppose the mainland. In December 2021, the Biden administration organized a so-called “democracy summit” with the participation of 110 countries, to which the DPP authorities were also invited. Biden is openly “setting the stage” in the international arena for the “Taiwan independence” forces. Another reason for Biden to play the “liberal democracy card” in the Taiwan Strait is that, by strengthening ties with Taiwan in soft ways such as ideology and values, Taiwan’s “strategic value” can be brought fully into play without bumping up against the red line of the one-China principle. In the future, the Biden administration will certainly continue “making a fuss” over “freedom and democracy” to promote U.S.-Taiwan collusion and contain China.

Fifth, the United States will raise its alertness in the Taiwan Strait due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and may increase its intervention efforts. On May 23, 2022, Biden said in Japan that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has made the responsibility of defending Taiwan “even more significant” and that mainland China “taking Taiwan by force” would “dislocate” the entire region, warning that the PLA military aircraft flying around Taiwan were “playing with fire.” This was one of the strongest public statements of U.S. support for Taiwan in the last decade.⁴¹ In his China policy speech, Blinken mentioned that the United States considers Russia’s military actions in Ukraine to be “the most serious and immediate threat to international stability,” but the United States still sees China as “a greater threat.” ⁴² At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Austin said the Indo-Pacific region is a priority for the U.S. military, which has more than 300,000 troops stationed there, implying that the United States has not changed its strategic focus on account of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. ⁴³

U.S. strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait are far greater than those in Ukraine, and the United States has not neglected the Taiwan Strait because of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. First of all, the United States wants to avoid as much as possible responding simultaneously to two major geopolitical crises that could occur in Europe and the Taiwan Strait. Second, the United States also wants to focus on preventing China from taking similar actions in the Taiwan Strait, and has consequently increased its intervention in the Taiwan Strait. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Biden has sent one delegation after the other to Taiwan in a short period of time, and even U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi wanted to visit Taiwan, but later failed to do so due to a positive COVID-19 test. Jacob Stokes, a researcher with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, pointed out that his U.S. delegation was visiting Taiwan “to demonstrate our continued robust support for Taiwan” and that at a time of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, “the United States has not lost focus on the Indo-Pacific region, and China should not think or act like Russia.” ⁴⁴ Stokes added that “maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is of the utmost importance to the United States and its regional allies and partners. And any use of coercion or force that seeks to upend the status quo would pose a major threat to U.S. interests and values.” ⁴⁵ The clear increase in the frequency of U.S. warship and military aircraft activity around Taiwan recently could be interpreted as a kind of “warning” to China.

Conclusion

The current framework of U.S.-China relations dictates that the Biden administration will not abandon its strategic thinking of playing the “Taiwan card” and “using Taiwan to control China.” Since Biden took office, he has used nominal adherence to the one-China policy to undermine the one-China principle in order to achieve U.S. strategic interests, reflecting consideration of a pragmatism of sorts. The core goal of the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy is to use the United States’ relatively superior geopolitical advantage in the Taiwan Strait to counterbalance China, in order to slow down China’s rise and maintain U.S. hegemony. Although the Russia-Ukraine conflict has made the United States more vigilant in the Taiwan Strait, and the United States has taken measures to increase its intervention there, such as sending delegations to Taiwan and warships across the Taiwan Strait, the United States still has not breached the bounds of “strategic ambiguity” in general. The U.S. Taiwan Strait policy has not changed from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity,” but has only seen a tactical “re-ambiguation.” While the Biden administration’s “re-ambiguation” of Taiwan Strait policy appears to be “shrewd,” in fact it seriously undermines China’s security interests and sovereignty claims, leaving hidden dangers for future conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. As the United States and China grows closer in strength, Taiwan will gradually change from a strategic “asset” to a “liability” for the United States. ⁴⁶ At present, the mainland has firmly grasped leadership and the initiative in cross-strait relations, and the U.S. policy of Taiwan Strait “re-ambiguation” is becoming increasingly ineffective.