In discussions in international political theory and historical research concerning the modern great-power system and the rise and fall of great powers, the concept of “great power” as used by scholars has numerous specific definitions. In all cases, however, it refers neither to states that are larger in geographic or population terms nor to regional powers that merely exert significant regional influence, but to states that exert significant global influence in security affairs. Such states may therefore also be called “global powers.” Ranke noted that a great power “must be able to maintain itself against all others, even when they are united.”¹ This definition is widely regarded as a classic understanding that captures the essential characteristics of a great power.² A country’s great-power status cannot be sustained solely by individual advantages it possesses; rather, it is determined by its composite ranking across multiple factors in the international system, usually including at least population and territorial size, natural resources, military strength, political stability, and state capacity.³ Moreover, to develop global influence, these factors constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions. For example, Organski noted that China became a global power under circumstances in which the other factors remained unchanged but the way in which they were utilized underwent a major change;⁴ that is, the governing capacity of the Communist Party of China brought about a fundamental change in China’s state capacity. 

According to the above standards, Brazil ranks among the world’s leading countries in terms of natural endowments, and its potential to become a global power has long been recognized, yet this potential has never been realized. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the momentum of Brazil’s economic rise has attracted worldwide attention, greatly fueling Brazilians’ ambition to make their country a global power.⁵ Can Brazil, then, escape the awkward predicament of being the “country of the future” and always remaining so,⁶ and leap from being a regional power in Latin America and a global middle power to being a global power?⁷

From the perspective of political logic and historical experience, this is by no means easy. For a country to rise to become a global power, it must rely not only on growth in its own economic and military strength, which may not be entirely synchronized, but also on numerous structural factors in the international environment, such as regional disparities in the world economy and volume of trade and shifts in these, the relative pace of development of other countries, and military attacks by other great powers and great-power alliances.⁸ Even if a country possesses all the necessary internal and external conditions, it will not necessarily achieve its rise; however, the absence of any one key condition is sufficient to halt its rise. This is also why, since the modern great-power system took shape in 1495, only 13 countries have ever joined the ranks of global powers.⁹ If Brazil wishes to realize its ambition to rise as a great power, it likewise requires a number of supporting conditions. At present, Brazil’s economic and social growth and its foreign economic and trade situation have both improved significantly, but Brazil’s international strategic choices are constrained by the United States’ “new Monroe Doctrine” policy. The former will not necessarily lead to Brazil’s rise, whereas the latter is sufficient to constitute a “one-vote veto.” 

For a country to rise to become a global power, its international identity positioning and international bloc orientation are of critical importance in its international strategic choices. A country’s international identity positioning materially affects domestic and international expectations of its behavior because great-power status depends to a considerable extent on perceptions: its leaders and people must believe that their country possesses certain rights and obligations as a great power, and other countries must also recognize this.¹⁰ A country’s international bloc orientation, meanwhile, materially determines the forces on which it can rely internationally and the resistance it must overcome. For Brazil, in making international strategic choices, it must take into account that, over the historical course of long-term U.S. penetration of Brazil, the most important influence has arisen not from what the United States has directly done to Brazil, but from “the shadow of the colossus, falling long and dark over the hemisphere,” which “constitutes a permanent and pervasive sort of pressure that most Latin Americans understand all too well.”¹¹ Changes within the United States itself, particularly changes in its Western Hemisphere strategy, are sufficient to place pressure on Brazil to make adjustments. 

I. Brazil’s International Strategic Dilemma 

Brazil’s vision of becoming a global power directly conflicts with the United States’ national security strategy of maintaining absolute hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The United States has long regarded the Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence. The Monroe Doctrine aimed to “resist interference in Western Hemisphere affairs by countries outside the region,” while the Roosevelt Corollary advocated “the exercise of ‘international police power’ by the United States in the Western Hemisphere.” Going further, the “Trump Corollary” (also known as the “Donroe Doctrine”) established in the 2025 National Security Strategy declares that the United States seeks to “ensure our continued access to key strategic locations.” This directly threatens the legitimate international rights and interests of Brazil and countries outside the region.¹² Amid an international landscape shifting from “one superpower and multiple great powers” toward multipolarity, and given the pressure placed on Latin American countries by the Trump administration to choose sides in the China-U.S. strategic competition, Brazil faces a dual dilemma concerning its international identity positioning and international bloc orientation in making its international strategic choices. 

(1) Brazil’s Dilemma over Its International Identity Positioning 

A country’s positioning of its own international identity directly affects its international strategic choices, while also influencing other countries’ perceptions and responses, thereby affecting the international status it is able to attain. Brazil’s limited comprehensive national strength makes it difficult for the country to become one pole in the global configuration, but it hopes to attain an international status at least commensurate with its status as an emerging power. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil has encountered difficulties in positioning both its international political identity and its international economic identity. Particularly against the background of sharply divergent perceptions among the country’s domestic left- and right-wing political forces, which have alternated in power, Brazil’s international identity positioning has fallen into a serious dilemma. 

1. Dilemma over International Political Identity Positioning

Since the era of Portuguese colonial rule, Brazil has never played the role of a global power in international politics. When Brazil participated in the Paris Peace Conference as one of the victorious countries of the First World War, it positioned itself as “a middle power capable of playing a coordinating role between great and small powers.”¹³ After the end of the Second World War, although Brazil possessed the conditions necessary to develop nuclear weapons, it did not attempt, as India did, to consolidate its international status by possessing nuclear weapons. In 1998, Brazil signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but did not sign the Additional Protocol allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct surprise inspections. As one of the few countries possessing full nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, Brazil has never developed nuclear weapons, but it has nevertheless maintained certain reservations in its nuclear policy. Some observers therefore believe that it continues to harbor great-power ambitions.¹⁴ Since the beginning of the 21st century, as Brazil’s comprehensive national strength has increased and integration within the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has deepened, and particularly as the world’s major powers have attached increasing importance to South America, Brazil has faced important opportunities and challenges requiring it to weigh the advantages and disadvantages and adjust its international identity positioning. It urgently needs to resolve the following two problems. 

First, there is a dilemma over Brazil’s positioning as a “global power.” An identity as a “global power” means not only that a country enjoys status and interests at the global level, but also that it must make substantive commitments to shoulder global responsibilities while maintaining its autonomy. Before the 21st century, Brazil actively sought international status but was never prepared to make substantive commitments. As the only Latin American country to deploy troops in the Second World War, Brazil sought to become a permanent member of the Security Council during the establishment of the United Nations, but it failed to achieve this goal because of its limited strength and contributions.¹⁵ Since the end of the Second World War, Brazil has consistently participated relatively actively in international affairs in the hope of gaining recognition from the international community.¹⁶ In participating in international affairs, however, Brazil has been more inclined to promote negotiations and participate in peacekeeping while avoiding confrontational actions, and has been unwilling to become embroiled in major international conflicts as a consequence of adhering to an autonomous position. This is attributable to a considerable extent to the fact that Brazil has never been regarded as a great power by the international community. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on Brazil clearly states that Brazil is not a major player in international affairs, but rather a country that “has the potential to play an influential role in international affairs.”¹⁷ Brazilians also have deeply ambivalent feelings about global-power status. On the one hand, they take pride in their country’s long-standing role as an advocate of moral principles; on the other hand, they are frustrated by their country’s failure to accomplish anything in confrontational international affairs. As early as the 20th century, the writer Stefan Zweig described Brazil as the “country of the future,” yet more than 80 years later, it remains the “country of the future.” 

Second, there is a dilemma over Brazil’s political-system and cultural positioning. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the “end of history” thesis has been disproved by political realities, and the Western-style liberal democratic system is no longer regarded as the only path for humanity’s future development. Theories of the clash of civilizations and ethnic conflict have exerted a profound influence on both international public opinion and real-world politics. How Brazil positions itself internationally along the two dimensions of political system and civilization directly affects the range of strategic choices available to it in international relations. 

In terms of political system, Brazil ended military rule in 1985 and formulated a new constitution in 1988, establishing a system characterized by the separation of powers and federalism. Since then, Brazil has faced a dilemma over how to position its political system. On the one hand, Brazilians generally affirm the democratic system and believe that their country has made substantive progress in building such a system and is a relatively successful liberal democracy in political terms. On the other hand, Brazilians feel unable to uphold liberal democratic norms. Amid the radicalization of both left- and right-wing political positions, both the left- and right-wing camps have incentives to resort to political contention outside the institutional framework and tend to pursue their political demands through populist movements, military intervention, or the politicization of the judiciary. 

In the civilizational dimension, Brazil faces a similar dilemma. On the one hand, many Brazilians accept the praise of Brazil’s cultural inclusiveness offered by Gilberto Freyre and others and position Brazilian civilization as a unique Luso-tropical civilization. They believe that Brazilian civilization blends European, African, and Indigenous American civilizations, giving Brazilians a peace-loving, pluralistic, and tolerant national character, and regard this as a major advantage of Brazilian civilization.¹⁸ However, this positioning is not conducive to Brazil’s realization of its great-power aspirations. Although it is viewed positively from a pluralist perspective, it neither helps Brazil win recognition from the white societies of developed countries in Europe and North America nor enables it to attract African countries that lack autonomy to follow its lead. Its emphasis on the uniqueness of Brazil’s Portuguese heritage is even liable to provoke opposition from Latin American countries that were formerly Spanish colonies, thereby depriving Brazil of regional representativeness. On the other hand, many white elites believe that the mainstream of Brazilian civilization is Western Christian civilization and that “this civilization represents the direction of development of human civilization and is clearly advanced.”¹⁹ However, this positioning disregards Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous traditions. It is not conducive to uniting domestic groups of other ethnic and religious backgrounds, nor does it help Brazil rally developing and emerging countries internationally. 

2. Dilemma over International Economic Identity Positioning

Brazil’s status and ambition as Latin America’s largest economy are beyond doubt. Brazil ranks first in Latin America and is among the world’s leading countries in resource endowments, and it has become the undisputed dominant economic power in South America. First, Brazil prevailed over Argentina in the competition for regional economic dominance. The two countries long stood side by side as South America’s two leading powers. Because Brazil inherited Portugal’s South American colonial territory intact, it enjoyed clear territorial and demographic advantages over Argentina. However, for a considerable period, Argentina’s level of economic development was higher than Brazil’s or at least comparable to it. It was not until 2001 that Argentina’s currency board arrangement, established in 1991 to control persistent inflation, collapsed, while Brazil’s Real Plan, launched in 1994 for the same purpose, was sustained and produced tangible results. As a result, Argentina’s economy collapsed while Brazil’s economy grew, creating a significant gap between the two countries.²⁰ Second, Brazil helped establish and has led several important multilateral mechanisms in South America. After the end of the Cold War, U.S. attention to South America declined sharply, leaving significant room for Brazil to expand its influence in the region. Because the United States continued to focus on Mexico in North America and on Central America, while Mexico also resisted the expansion of Brazilian influence, Brazil’s status as a regional leader has been manifested primarily in South America rather than in Latin America as a whole. In South America, Brazil and Argentina joined Uruguay and Paraguay in signing the Treaty of Asunción in 1991, establishing the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the world’s first economic integration organization established entirely by developing countries. Through its subsequent development, MERCOSUR came to have six States Parties (with Venezuela’s membership suspended), seven Associated States, and two observer states from outside the region. It became South America’s largest economic integration organization, with Brazil playing a leading role within it. 

However, Brazil faces multiple dilemmas in positioning its international economic identity. First, there is a dilemma over how to position its level of economic development. Should Brazil join an organization of developed countries to improve the quality of its economic performance, or should it continue to enjoy the preferential treatment accorded to developing countries? To date, Brazil has consistently been widely regarded as a developing country. When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was concluded in 1947, Brazil was already a developing contracting party. At the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, Brazil joined other developing countries in establishing the Group of 77 and collectively conducted negotiations with developed countries on trade and development issues. The World Trade Organization (WTO) began operating in 1995 and formally replaced GATT the following year. Since then, Brazil has enjoyed “special and differential treatment” within the WTO as a third-category developing country. Since the beginning of the 21st century, some Brazilians have argued that Brazil should join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), even if this means losing its developing-country status. The principal reason is that, as a “club of developed countries,” the OECD sets normative requirements and specific indicators for the economic governance of its members. This would help Brazil better resolve domestic factional conflicts, improve the quality of its economic performance, and enhance its attractiveness to domestic and foreign investors. However, other Brazilians believe that joining the OECD would mean relinquishing developing-country status, that Brazil would pay an enormous price in forums such as the WTO, and that the resulting costs would outweigh the benefits. Both positions have merit, making it difficult for the Brazilian government to choose between them. 

Second, there is a dilemma over how to position its economic development model. Should Brazil become a manufacturing country with a relatively comprehensive industrial system, or should it become a clearly export-oriented exporter of primary products? Beginning in the 1930s, Brazil vigorously pursued an import-substitution industrialization strategy, advancing horizontal industrialization under government leadership and rapidly establishing a light industrial system aimed at satisfying domestic demand for manufactured goods. In the 1960s, the growth potential of horizontal industrialization was exhausted, and Brazil began introducing U.S. capital and technology on a large scale to advance vertical industrialization aimed at vertically integrating multiple factors of production.²¹ From 1950 to 1982, Brazil’s industrial output grew at an average annual rate of as high as 8.1 percent, its share of gross domestic product increased from 26 percent to 37 percent, and the completeness of its industrial system likewise attracted worldwide attention.²² However, under the mixed-ownership model, Brazil’s industrial enterprises operated inefficiently. Its industrial sector expanded in scale without adequately improving in quality and was severely deficient in international competitiveness. Brazil’s economy, particularly its industrial sector, declined severely in the 1980s and was considered to have experienced a “lost decade.”²³ This dealt a heavy blow to Brazil’s exports of manufactured goods. Between 1989 and 2014, manufactured goods’ share of Brazil’s exports fell sharply from approximately 60 percent to less than 30 percent.²⁴ Beginning in the late 1990s, amid the overall prosperity of the world economy, and particularly a surge in demand from emerging economies such as China for energy, raw materials, and agricultural products, Brazil’s economy grew rapidly through large-scale exports of these primary products, and its gross domestic product at one point ranked seventh in the world. Many Brazilians believe that Brazil should not be content merely to be a major producer and exporter of primary products. However, Brazil lacks both the capability and the resolve to establish and maintain an internationally competitive industrial system. This constitutes Brazil’s dilemma over how to position its economic development model. 

Third, there is a dilemma over how to position the enterprise ownership structure. Should Brazil strengthen state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to facilitate government-led economic development, or should it further weaken the position of SOEs in order to draw on external forces to promote development? Brazil’s SOEs have a long history, dating back to 1808, when the Portuguese royal court established public enterprises in its colony. Beginning in the 1940s, the Brazilian government actively invested in advancing import-substitution industrialization. Over the more than 30 ensuing years, it built up a vast array of SOEs in such strategic sectors as minerals, steel, chemicals, and electric power. By the year before the 1982 debt crisis erupted, Brazil had 530 large SOEs at the federal level alone, in addition to numerous state- and lower-level SOEs.²⁵ Faced with enormous deficit and debt pressures, Brazil carried out large-scale privatization of SOEs in the 1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, SOEs continued to play an important role in key sectors of the national economy and even occupied a dominant position. By the early 2020s, the Brazilian federal government had 130 SOEs under its jurisdiction, while state governments operated 260 SOEs.²⁶ Among them, Petrobras is the country’s leading enterprise in the oil and natural gas industry. It exercises overall control over the entire process of petroleum resource exploration and development and participates in the formulation and implementation of national petroleum policy. However, it rarely directly engages in production activities and primarily obtains substantial revenue through revenue-sharing arrangements with foreign oil companies investing in the country’s oil and gas sector. The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), meanwhile, plays a central role in economic development, particularly in financing infrastructure construction. In addition, Brazilian SOEs hold equity stakes in numerous non-state-owned enterprises through various forms of investment and exert varying degrees of influence over them. Brazilians hold significantly divergent views regarding the status and role of SOEs. Supporters argue that Brazil is a developmental state and that SOEs are vital to Brazil’s economic and social development. Privatization would not only significantly reduce the wages of SOE workers but also depress the wages of workers at related private enterprises.²⁷ Opponents argue that Brazil’s SOEs are inefficient, resulting in corruption, rent-seeking, and resource misallocation. They contend that SOEs are detrimental to the achievement of genuine economic development²⁸ and to Brazil’s compliance with the OECD’s restrictive provisions concerning SOEs, and that they run counter to the purpose and requirements of the “Growth in the Americas” initiative. These conflicting perceptions have left Brazil in a dilemma over how to position its enterprise ownership structure. 

(2) Brazil’s Dilemma over International Bloc Alignment 

Since gaining independence, Brazil has remained under the shadow of the Monroe Doctrine and has rarely been a key country that the world’s major powers have sought to win over. During the Cold War, Brazil maintained relatively close relations with the United States. In the 1960s, Brazil and the Soviet Union engaged in relatively low-profile cooperation, but Brazil remained substantively subordinate to the U.S.-led Western bloc.²⁹ Formally, as an observer state of the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil maintained a certain degree of neutrality as a major Third World country amid the confrontation between the two blocs. 

Since the beginning of the 21st century, as Brazil’s national strength has grown rapidly, the realistic prospects of the country realizing its potential as a global power have received more widespread attention. At the same time, the comprehensive strength and international standing of Global South countries, including China, have risen rapidly, and the international configuration has rapidly evolved from the post–Cold War configuration of “one superpower and multiple major powers” toward multipolarity. Against this backdrop, the United States has openly suppressed and contained China worldwide and once again vigorously pursued the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America in an attempt to exclude China’s normal international interactions in the region, giving rise to a trend toward bloc formation in international politics and economics. As Brazil’s capacity for political and economic autonomy has increased, the interdependence of its international political and economic exchanges has deepened, and, in particular, its mutually beneficial economic cooperation with China has strengthened, Brazil faces a dilemma over international bloc alignment at both the political and economic levels in the face of coercive U.S. pressure to “choose sides.” 

1. Dilemma over International Political Bloc Alignment 

First, there is a dilemma over dependence within a sphere of influence. Should Brazil accept the Monroe Doctrine, become politically dependent on the United States, and passively accept the political bloc delineated by the United States, or should it independently pursue great-power diplomacy? The Monroe Doctrine was promulgated in 1823, when Brazil had only just gained independence, and the 1904 “Roosevelt Corollary” further expanded the doctrine’s scope. After the end of the Cold War, the United States, as the world’s sole superpower, at one point believed that it was no longer necessary to raise the banner of the Monroe Doctrine. Beginning with Trump’s first term, however, the United States pursued a “New Monroe Doctrine” in an attempt to explicitly redefine the Western Hemisphere, particularly Latin America, as its sphere of influence. The Biden administration largely continued this policy orientation, although it employed softer methods. During Trump’s second term, the United States pursued a series of “New Monroe Doctrine” policies and openly advocated intervening in the internal affairs of Latin American countries.³⁰ The 2025 National Security Strategy explicitly proposed the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.”³¹ Against this backdrop, Brazil, as a major Latin American country, will inevitably come under greater pressure in choosing its political bloc alignment. 

Second, there is a dilemma over “choosing sides.” Even if Brazil can break free from the constraints of the U.S. “New Monroe Doctrine” and independently determine its own diplomatic position and foreign relations, it must still confront increasingly intense strategic competition among global powers and therefore cannot avoid the dilemma of “choosing sides.” Since the beginning of the 21st century, as the configuration of “one superpower and multiple major powers” has evolved toward a multipolar configuration, the United States is no longer confident that it can maintain its position as the sole hegemon. In the future international configuration, in addition to the very few superpowers capable of competing for dominance in international politics, there will be a limited number of “global swing states,” whose choices will, to a certain extent, determine the superpowers’ prospects for prevailing in geopolitical competition. Brazil is widely regarded as an important “global swing state.”³² Both the Trump and Biden administrations explicitly identified China as a strategic competitor and pressured important, relatively neutral countries to “choose sides.” In its National Security Strategy, the first Trump administration explicitly defined China and Russia as strategic competitors, unilaterally delineated strategic blocs, and began coercing major countries around the world to follow the United States while distancing themselves from, or even becoming hostile toward, China and Russia. The United States regards China as the only strategic competitor with both the intention and the capability to threaten its hegemonic position. It has demanded that Brazil distance itself from China and has also criticized Brazil’s neutral position on the Russia–Ukraine conflict. In the international environment of confrontation between great-power blocs created by the United States, Brazil, as an important “global swing state,” cannot avoid the dilemma of choosing a bloc. 

2. Dilemma over International Economic Bloc Alignment 

Historically, Brazil has generally formed part of the capitalist market-economy bloc dominated by the major powers of Europe and the United States. As a developing country, Brazil’s economy has long been dependent on the U.S.-led Western economic system, providing it with agricultural products, minerals, and primary processed products. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil’s economic exchanges with emerging countries have grown increasingly close, and its economic cooperation with the BRICS countries in particular has rapidly deepened. At present, the volume of trade between Brazil and China has significantly surpassed that between Brazil and the United States. In September 2006, Brazil, Russia, India, and China held their first meeting of foreign ministers, launching the BRICS cooperation mechanism. In June 2009, the leaders of the four BRICS countries held their first formal meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia, and issued a joint statement, formally establishing BRICS as an international cooperation organization. Following multiple rounds of expansion, by 2025 BRICS had 11 member countries and 10 partner countries. The annual value of China–Brazil trade in goods surged from $9.1 billion in 2004 to $158 billion in 2024. During the same period, trade with China as a share of Brazil’s global trade rose from 5.8 percent to 26.3 percent, while Brazil’s trade surplus with China reached $30.7 billion in 2024.³³ 

As the United States has continued to unilaterally undermine the authority of the World Trade Organization and adopt deglobalization measures, the importance of bilateral cooperation, regional cooperation, and limited-scope multilateral cooperation has become increasingly prominent. U.S. pressure on Brazil to distance itself from the BRICS countries, particularly China, in its international economic cooperation has continued to mount. Since Trump again became president of the United States in 2025, economic relations between the United States and Brazil have once again become strained. The Trump administration sought to use “reciprocal tariffs” to compel Brazil to make trade concessions to the United States and, after Brazil refused, announced that it would impose a 50 percent tariff on imports from Brazil. U.S. pressure and the importance of trade with the United States for Brazil’s economic development have left Brazil facing a dilemma of “choosing sides” in its international economic bloc alignment. 

II. Measures for Brazil to Address Its International Strategic Dilemmas 

Faced with severe international strategic dilemmas, Brazil needs to take measures regarding both the positioning of its international political and economic identities and its choice of bloc alignment in order to pursue advantages and avoid disadvantages. Faced with the reality of long-term, all-encompassing U.S. penetration, Brazil needs both to strengthen its autonomy and to avoid provoking the United States and thereby triggering hegemonic suppression. 

(1) Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Identity Positioning 

In Brazil’s view, positioning itself politically as a global power and economically as a developed, industrialized market economy is more consistent with its national development interests. However, such positioning is in structural conflict with U.S. political and economic hegemony, and measures must be taken to effectively alleviate this conflict.

1. Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Political Identity Positioning 

First, Brazil remains firm in its conviction that it should become a global power and puts this conviction into practice. Firstly, the Brazilian government has explicitly stated its intention to make Brazil a global power. Every Brazilian president since Cardoso has expressed the ambition to elevate Brazil into the ranks of the global powers. Even the Bolsonaro administration, regarded as the administration that most closely followed the United States, had a strong desire for autonomy as a major power. In his inauguration speech, the Bolsonaro administration’s foreign minister explicitly stated that Brazil should change its past tendency to curry favor with other countries, particularly major powers. He proposed that Brazil should express its own wishes without hesitation rather than submit to the wishes of other countries or even impose limits on and doubt itself in order to accommodate them.³⁴ Secondly, Brazil strives to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (“secure permanent membership”). Brazil has a long history of serving as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. In the late 1990s, the Cardoso administration put Brazil forward as a candidate for permanent membership of the Security Council, but soon withdrew this bid. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil has taken substantive steps and actively sought permanent membership of the Security Council, particularly under the Lula administration. At the impetus of the Lula administration, Brazil not only formed the Group of Four (G4) with Japan, Germany, and India to collectively coordinate their actions in pursuit of permanent membership, but also joined with emerging countries such as India and South Africa in calling for reform of the United Nations, particularly reform of the Security Council, thereby building international public opinion favorable to itself.³⁵

Second, Brazil emphasizes consensus and takes consensus-oriented action in an attempt to overcome its dilemma over political-cultural positioning. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazilian governments have placed greater emphasis on a pluralist democratic system and less emphasis on the country’s cultural characteristics. Brazilian society has an exceptionally complex ethnic composition. In addition to European colonizers, Indigenous peoples, and people of African descent, it also includes large numbers of later immigrants, including people of Japanese descent, and the geographical distribution of its ethnic groups exhibits pronounced regional characteristics. Brazil’s religious composition is also highly complex, and all of the world’s major religious groups have a significant presence in the country. Particularly since the beginning of the 21st century, large numbers of Brazilian Catholics have converted to Protestantism, evangelical Protestant forces have grown rapidly, and Islam has also been actively spreading in Brazil. Under these circumstances, emphasizing either Luso-tropical civilization or Christian culture is not conducive to Brazil securing greater benefits in its domestic and foreign affairs. Against this backdrop, except for the right-wing Bolsonaro administration, which emphasized Brazil’s conservative Christian values to some extent in order to cater to the U.S. Trump administration, successive Brazilian governments since the beginning of the 21st century have primarily emphasized Brazil’s consensus-based democratic system. In terms of political-cultural positioning, domestically, Brazil emphasizes the achievements made in consolidating democracy and gives priority to domestic political development; diplomatically, it emphasizes the importance Brazil attaches to consultation and negotiation and advocates a consensus-oriented diplomatic culture of soft power.³⁶

2. Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Economic Identity Positioning 

First, Brazil’s identification as a developing country has clearly weakened, and it has taken firmer steps in pursuit of developed-country status. At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil still maintained its positioning as a developing country. After the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round negotiations broke down in 2008, Brazil actively took the lead in forming a major grouping of developing countries within the WTO to jointly safeguard developing countries’ interests. It led calls for developed countries to reduce agricultural subsidies and tariffs and demanded that developing countries be given greater scope to protect their industries and service sectors. However, as the WTO’s capacity declined severely because of obstruction by U.S.-led anti-globalization forces, Brazil began to change its strategy. Its identification as a developing country clearly weakened, and it began resolutely seeking developed-country status in order to obtain a more favorable environment for economic development. In March 2019, Bolsonaro announced in a joint statement with U.S. President Trump that Brazil would no longer seek “special and differential treatment” for developing countries in future WTO negotiations.³⁷ At the same time, Brazil also began actively seeking accession to the OECD and assisting the OECD in carrying out activities in Latin America. In 2022, the OECD formally designated Brazil as an accession candidate. In 2023, Lula’s third administration continued the Bolsonaro administration’s positioning of Brazil’s international economic identity and continued advancing Brazil’s accession to the OECD. Although the foreign minister in Lula’s third administration repeatedly stated that Brazil remained a developing country and was a developing member of the WTO, the administration took few substantive actions in this regard. 

Second, Brazil’s economic orientation has shifted from export orientation to neo-industrialization. At the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil achieved rapid economic growth by exporting large quantities of energy resources, raw materials, agricultural products, and primary products, and its gross domestic product at one point ranked seventh in the world. The mainstream of Brazilian society viewed favorably the deindustrialization that had occurred since the late 1980s, and the privatization and deregulation recommendations made by international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It believed that the industrial system established in the 20th century on the basis of an import-substitution industrialization strategy and government borrowing had been a tremendous mistake. In 2019, the Bolsonaro administration even abolished the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services, which had been established in 1961, and relaxed government oversight of important institutions such as BNDES. However, with the rise of the anti-globalization tide, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and weakness in the global economy, the prices of primary products fell sharply, and Brazil’s economy was severely affected. From 2011 to 2018, Brazil’s average annual gross domestic product growth rate was only 0.1 percent. For this reason, Lula resolved to pursue neo-industrialization during his third term. In 2023, he restored the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services and launched Brazil’s new industrial policy, which was intended to vigorously strengthen innovation capacity, end the country’s dependence on exports of agricultural products, minerals, and primary products, and make Brazil an emerging industrialized country pursuing sustainable development. Based on their potential impact on national economic and social development, Brazil’s new industrial policy identified several strategic areas for investment and placed innovation and sustainable development at its center.³⁸

Third, Brazil is optimizing the governance structure of its state-owned enterprises to consolidate its status as a market economy. Developed European countries and the United States also own state-owned enterprises to varying degrees and have relatively well-developed market and corporate governance systems. To build consensus on the governance of state-owned enterprises, the OECD formulated the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in 2005 and subsequently revised them in 2015 and 2024, providing guidance on the governance of state-owned enterprises in OECD member countries.³⁹ Brazil is unwilling either to privatize its large number of existing state-owned enterprises, which would cause the government to lose control over the economy, or to allow the government to intervene deeply in the operation and management of state-owned enterprises, which would result in efficiency losses and external criticism. In view of this, by accepting the OECD’s guidance on the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, Brazil could seek to become a full OECD member without altering the overall structure under which the Brazilian government retains control over state-owned enterprises. Beginning in 2007, the Brazilian government took reform measures based on the OECD’s guidance and related requirements to improve the governance of state-owned enterprises.⁴⁰ In 2016, Brazil promulgated the State-Owned Enterprises Law, intensifying its reform of state-owned enterprises. Its reform arrangements were based largely on the OECD’s guidance, particularly the requirements that state-owned enterprises make timely and clear disclosures and that clear standards be established for appointing their senior executives and directors.⁴¹

(2) Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Bloc Alignment 

Following the 2008 financial crisis, the United States became increasingly concerned that China’s rise would endanger its hegemonic position. It not only mobilized its alliance system to contain China, but also coerced other countries into “choosing sides.” Since Trump returned to office in 2025, the United States has pursued a “New Monroe Doctrine” policy in Latin America, vigorously excluding China’s normal international interactions in the region and reinforcing the trend toward bloc formation. As an emerging major power, Brazil maintains close relations with both China and the United States. Faced with a severe dilemma over international bloc alignment, Brazil has had to adopt cautious measures in response. 

1. Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Political Bloc Alignment 

First, faced with the United States’ intention to incorporate Brazil into its own bloc as an important “global swing state,” Brazil has clearly proclaimed a position of independence and autonomy in its rhetoric, although the forcefulness of such rhetoric varies with changes in the combination of political factions governing the two countries. In practice, however, Brazil has continued to engage in close military and security cooperation with the United States. Through this approach of differentiating between its words and actions, Brazil has attempted to conceal its dilemma over whether to become dependent on the United States. 

Regardless of whether left- or right-wing parties are in power, Brazil has consistently sought to maintain its diplomatic independence and has not wished to be placed under the control of U.S. hegemonism. However, the strategies adopted by successive administrations have differed significantly. Historically, Brazil long pursued a strategy of “autonomy through distance.” At the turn of the century, the Cardoso administration adopted a strategy of “autonomy through participation,” actively integrating into various international organizations in order to influence international rules and international political practices. During his first period in office, Lula vigorously pursued a strategy of “autonomy through diversification,” strengthening Brazil’s global influence by developing cooperation with emerging-market countries in an attempt to alter its disadvantageous position in the existing international configuration.⁴² Successive Brazilian administrations following Lula’s first term also continued this strategy to varying degrees, and the Bolsonaro administration was no exception. Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022, the United States initiated international sanctions against Russia. The Bolsonaro administration explicitly expressed its opposition and refused to sign a joint statement condemning Russia at a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS).

When ideologically similar governments are in power at the same time in Brazil and the United States, political cooperation between the two countries generally proceeds more smoothly. In 2019, after Bolsonaro took office as president of Brazil, he quickly sought to strengthen political and economic relations with the United States. U.S. President Trump announced that the United States would designate Brazil as a major non-NATO ally. The two countries formally launched the “U.S.–Brazil Prosperity Partnership” and decided to resume and accelerate negotiations under the framework of the 2011 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, with trade facilitation as one of the core issues. In 2020, the two countries signed the Protocol Relating to Trade Rules and Transparency. In 2021, several differences arose between the Biden administration in the United States and the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil. During Brazil’s 2022 election, the United States demanded that the Brazilian government safeguard the freedom and fairness of the election and ensure a smooth transfer of power. After Lula returned to office in 2023, Brazil and the United States quickly began cooperating closely on climate change and environmental protection. In 2025, after Trump again became president of the United States, U.S.–Brazil cooperation in the military and security fields continued, but some major differences arose in the political sphere. The Trump administration opposed the prosecution of former President Bolsonaro by Brazil’s judiciary and imposed sanctions on several justices of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court. 

Regardless of which governments are in power in Brazil and the United States, the two countries have consistently maintained close, institutionalized cooperation in the military and security fields. In 2010, the two governments signed a new and wide-ranging U.S.–Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement. The agreement entered into force after being approved by Brazil’s Congress, whereas congressional approval was not required in the United States. In the same year, the two governments also signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement. Despite the impact of the incident involving large-scale U.S. electronic surveillance, Brazil’s Congress nevertheless approved the agreement in 2015. In addition, the two countries hold annual U.S.–Brazil Strategic Defense Talks, through which they consult and coordinate on global and regional defense matters and various major defense and security issues. The first Trump administration provided Brazil with several forms of military assistance and technical support in 2019.⁴³ The Biden administration also continued close cooperation with Brazil in defense and security, engaging in various forms of substantive military and security coordination and cooperation, including joint military exercises and sales of advanced weapons, and conducting relatively close law enforcement cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics. 

Second, while substantively moving closer to the United States politically, Brazil conducts political cooperation and coordination on certain contentious issues with other major powers targeted by the United States. It seeks to maneuver between the two sides, replacing “bloc-based alignment” with “selective alignment” on specific international issues. While avoiding having such cooperation regarded by the United States as strategic confrontation, Brazil independently cooperates with countries that the United States regards as adversaries, such as China and Russia. China and Brazil established a strategic partnership in 1993 and established the China–Brazil High-level Coordination and Cooperation Committee in 2004. Led by this committee, the two countries formulated the China–Brazil Joint Action Plan and the China–Brazil Strategic Plan. In 2012, they elevated bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Brazil in 2024, the two countries signed a joint statement, further elevating bilateral relations to a “China–Brazil community with a shared future for a more just world and a more sustainable planet.” Brazil not only conducts close economic and trade cooperation with China, but also collaborates with China on issues of global governance and coordinates positions with it on major international issues such as the Ukraine crisis. In May 2024, the two countries reached common understandings on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. In September of the same year, they initiated the establishment of the “Group of Friends for Peace” within the framework of the United Nations and advocated the peaceful settlement of the Ukraine crisis.⁴⁴ Even the Bolsonaro administration, which professed close ideological alignment with the United States, withstood U.S. pressure and conducted pragmatic political cooperation with China. In the extremely sensitive fields of 5G and security equipment, the Bolsonaro administration opened the market to Chinese companies such as Huawei and procured security equipment from China. The succeeding Lula administration also continued this policy. 

2. Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Economic Bloc Alignment 

First, on economic issues, Brazil adopts a pragmatic strategy of separating nominal positioning from material interests and maneuvering between the two sides, seeking as much as possible to prevent ideological and superficial political differences from harming its economic interests. Because the current issue of international economic blocs has been caused primarily by the United States, and China and other major economies regarded by the United States as competitors have not coerced other countries into “choosing sides,” Brazil is not concerned that its pursuit of OECD membership will invite sanctions, nor is it concerned that it will face pressure because of its normal economic exchanges with the United States and other Western countries. However, when participating in BRICS mechanisms and conducting normal economic exchanges with China, Russia, and other countries, Brazil must seek to avoid nominally positioning itself in opposition to the United States. The Bolsonaro administration moved closer to the United States in its public rhetoric, obtaining designation as a major non-NATO ally and signing a cooperation agreement with the United States that included trade facilitation measures. In substance, however, the Bolsonaro administration actively advanced rather than weakened economic exchanges with China. After taking office, Bolsonaro quickly changed the hardline rhetoric toward China that he had used during the election. He not only stopped making provocative statements and taking provocative actions regarding Taiwan, but also maintained and developed economic cooperation with China. During his administration, he vigorously promoted economic exchanges between Brazil and China, particularly by cooperating with China on major economic issues such as 5G, and the volume of trade between the two countries grew significantly. In 2024, the Lula administration signed relevant cooperation documents with China concerning the Belt and Road Initiative. However, it explicitly stated that this did not mean that Brazil was joining the Belt and Road Initiative, but rather that Brazil’s relevant economic plans would be linked and coordinated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In its public messaging about BRICS, the Lula administration attaches great importance to refuting claims that “BRICS is an anti-Western organization.” This is attributable to a considerable extent to the enormous pressure exerted by the U.S. government. Brazil has repeatedly emphasized that it is a Western country and practices a capitalist economic system. During the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Brazil’s foreign minister responded to reporters’ suggestions that BRICS might become an anti-Western grouping by explicitly stating that BRICS was not against anyone and that Brazil itself was, to a large extent, a Western country.⁴⁵ In 2023, regarding the expansion of BRICS, Brazil explicitly opposed admitting “any anti-Western country” to BRICS.⁴⁶ These striking statements alleviated pressure on Brazil from the United States and its developed-country allies and facilitated Brazil’s efforts to maneuver between the two sides. 

Second, Brazil categorizes economic issues and addresses them separately, striving to maximize its interests. In the field of finance and investment, Brazil strives to maintain close cooperation with the United States. The United States has long been Brazil’s largest source of investment. Both the stock and flows of U.S. direct investment in Brazil are markedly greater than those from other countries. At the end of 2023, the stock of U.S. direct investment in Brazil was as high as $87.9 billion, concentrated primarily in manufacturing and finance. At the same time, Brazil had a stock of $6.5 billion in direct investment in the United States.⁴⁷ However, the United States remains considerably dissatisfied with Brazil’s restrictive investment policies. On the one hand, the United States hopes that Brazil will substantially reduce or eliminate investment restrictions in healthcare, mass media, telecommunications, aviation, land assets, marine resources, and other fields, because the United States generally possesses investment advantages in these fields.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the United States hopes that Brazil will restrict Chinese investment, particularly Chinese investment in Brazilian critical minerals, infrastructure, and other fields. Faced with pressure from the United States, the Brazilian government has continued strengthening investment cooperation with the United States, particularly by meeting U.S. investment demands in the field of critical minerals. In 2020, the United States and Brazil jointly established the U.S.–Brazil Critical Minerals Working Group and have continued conducting critical-minerals cooperation within the framework of this working group, such as by allowing the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to invest in Brazilian cobalt and nickel mines and other critical minerals. The United States also hopes that U.S. companies will play an important role in the strategic-minerals investment fund launched by BNDES. However, in fields involving resources over which Brazil possesses monopolistic advantages, such as niobium, Brazil has adopted a balancing strategy between China and the United States, allowing Chinese companies to acquire shares in Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração or acquire mineral assets held by third parties in Brazil.⁴⁹

In the field of trade, Brazil maintains close cooperation with China as far as possible. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, and the total volume of Brazil’s merchandise trade with China far exceeds that with other economies. More importantly, China has continuously been Brazil’s largest export market since 2009 and, in recent years, has become the most important source of Brazil’s trade surplus. By contrast, the United States has been a source of Brazil’s trade deficit throughout the past decade. After Trump returned to office, he imposed a 10 percent “reciprocal tariff” on all countries on April 2, 2025, and Brazil responded by passing the Economic Reciprocity Law on April 14. Trump subsequently criticized Brazil specifically for imposing unfair tariffs on the United States. On the pretext that the Brazilian government was suppressing social media and persecuting individuals, he launched a trade investigation against Brazil and imposed a punitive tariff of 40 percent, while also applying the 10 percent baseline reciprocal tariff to Brazil.⁵⁰ Brazil then invoked the Economic Reciprocity Law to retaliate. According to calculations by the WTO and other institutions, Brazil’s average applied most-favored-nation tariff rate in 2024 was 12 percent, compared with 3.3 percent in the United States during the same period.⁵¹ Considering the U.S. trade surplus with Brazil, Brazil needs to make only limited concessions in the trade war between the two countries and has absolutely no need to submit to the United States. Brazil has even taken advantage of China–U.S. trade frictions to capture from the United States a share of China’s market for soybeans and other agricultural products. 

Regarding enterprise ownership, Brazil outwardly continues to preserve the results of privatization, improve the governance procedures of state-owned enterprises, and publicize the effectiveness of privatization. In substance, however, it seeks as far as possible to maintain the Brazilian government’s right to veto major decisions by state-owned enterprises and to make further arrangements and undertake further exploration with respect to mechanisms such as golden shares. 

III. Assessment of the Gains and Losses of Brazil’s Measures for Addressing Its International Strategic Dilemmas 

Whether a country can become a global power depends not only on its objective domestic and external conditions, but even more on whether it possesses the strategic will to resolutely make use of those conditions and willingly bear the corresponding costs.⁵² Overall, in responding to its international strategic dilemmas, Brazil, faced with adverse factors such as constraints imposed by U.S. hegemony, has emphasized tactical maneuvering while lacking the will to bear the corresponding costs. 

(1) Effectiveness and Limitations of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Identity Positioning 

In addressing the dilemma over its international identity positioning, Brazil emphasizes soft power while neglecting hard power in its international political identity positioning, and emphasizes policy performance and external image while relatively neglecting the development of long-term fundamentals in its international economic identity positioning. This imbalance can readily produce short-term effects, but cannot sustain the country’s long-term influence.

1. Gains and Losses of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Political Identity Positioning 

Although Brazil has firmly expressed its desire to become a global power, it lacks measures to strengthen its military capabilities, and this will not bring it genuine major-power status. Since World War II, the countries that have gained worldwide recognition as global powers have in fact been limited to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, particularly the United States, China, and Russia. The major-power status of these countries stems from their military strength and their historical military contributions, especially their contributions during World War II. China’s history in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea is the fundamental reason why China is widely regarded as a member of the “international strategic triangle.” As Mearsheimer explicitly points out, a global power must possess sufficient military assets to wage an all-out conventional war against the most powerful country in the world.⁵³ In this sense, Brazil’s military strength falls far short of what would be needed for it to wage a conventional war against any current global power, let alone counterbalance the United States. At the same time, the soft-power orientation advocated by Brazil is fundamentally detrimental to its establishment of credible deterrence as a major political power on the international political stage. Although China and Russia are often grouped together with Brazil, India, and other countries as emerging countries, this classification applies only in an economic sense. China and Russia are established global powers, whereas Brazil and India are not. 

Under these circumstances, Brazil’s efforts to secure a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council are unlikely to produce results. Adding permanent members to the Security Council or changing the existing veto arrangements would require an amendment to the United Nations Charter, which presents two major difficulties. First, it would be difficult to obtain the unanimous agreement of all five existing permanent members, each of which holds veto power. Adding permanent members to the Security Council, particularly changing the existing veto arrangements, is not in the interests of the existing permanent members, and reaching a consensus is almost impossible. In fact, among the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia have merely made tactical statements supporting Brazil’s bid for permanent membership. China has emphasized that consensus must first be reached on Security Council reform and the principle of increasing representation. Although the United States has verbally expressed support, it has in practice delayed progress by imposing conditions such as restrictions on the expansion of veto power. Second, it would be difficult to win the support of a two-thirds majority of United Nations member states. Expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council would give rise to significant regional disputes. On the one hand, the allocation of seats among regions must meet certain requirements of fairness, because countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia are currently relatively underrepresented on the Security Council. On the other hand, disputes over representation exist within each region. Some small and medium-sized countries hope that the leading major powers in their regions will become permanent members, but major powers do not want their regional competitors to gain permanent membership and thereby become a force capable of constraining them. Brazil, Japan, Germany, and India each face opposition from countries in their respective regions, and their chances of jointly securing permanent membership are negligible. 

Brazil has downplayed its racial and religious background and cultural traditions and instead emphasized a system of pluralist consensus democracy. This measure has been successful to a considerable extent, helping Brazil avoid many potential conflicts on the international political stage and cultivate a nonthreatening national image. At the same time, however, Brazil has been unable to project an image as a hard-power state because its positions are insufficiently distinct. 

2. Gains and Losses of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Economic Identity Positioning 

Brazil has achieved significant results in downplaying its developing-country status and pursuing developed-country status. Brazil has downplayed its developing-country status in economic affairs essentially in order to join the OECD as soon as possible and leverage this external constraint to address the difficulty of domestic interest groups interfering in national economic policy. According to the OECD’s assessment, Brazil has already made significant progress within the constraints of relevant OECD frameworks in economic governance, particularly in the governance of state-owned enterprises. Once Brazil formally joins the OECD, if it again seeks relevant economic benefits on the basis of its developing-country status, particularly “special and differential treatment” within the WTO framework, its position will lack persuasiveness. Moreover, as a middle-income country, Brazil is not among the “least developed countries” identified through the United Nations’ triennial review. It therefore does not automatically enjoy “special and differential treatment” in the WTO, but instead obtains relevant treatment through negotiations as a self-designated developing member. Given that the WTO can no longer operate effectively and that Brazil’s own level of development makes it difficult for the country to continue benefiting from its developing-country status, Brazil merely states publicly that it still belongs to the developing-country camp. In practice, however, it is moving closer to the OECD and improving its domestic economic governance in accordance with OECD practices, which accords with Brazil’s long-term interests in economic development. 

The shift in Brazil’s economic strategic orientation from export orientation to neo-industrialization faces enormous risks. Since the beginning of the 21st century, Brazil’s economy has undergone severe fluctuations in step with cycles of boom and decline in the global economy. This has made Brazil more keenly aware that, without promoting industrial upgrading and technological innovation, it cannot realize its dream of becoming an economic powerhouse by relying solely on its advantages in resources and primary products. However, left- and right-wing political forces in Brazil disagree over how to achieve industrial upgrading. Right-wing forces represented by Bolsonaro hope to relax regulation and use market mechanisms to attract foreign investment and technology, whereas left-wing forces represented by Lula hope to implement industrial policy on a large scale and achieve neo-industrialization in a planned manner through government financing. The new industrial policy promulgated during Lula’s third term identified industrialization tasks in six areas: agricultural equipment, healthcare, urban services, digital transformation, the ecological economy, and national defense. It requires BNDES to administer a massive 300 billion Brazilian reais (approximately U.S. $60 billion) in funding to support the implementation of the new industrial policy.⁵⁴ Brazil’s neo-industrialization process has only just begun. Because it lacks fundamental support such as competitive human capital and institutional foundations, this process will likely, like Brazil’s 20th-century experience of advancing industrialization through large-scale borrowing, ultimately end in failure. 

Brazil’s measures to improve the governance structures of state-owned enterprises in order to consolidate its market economy status have achieved significant results. Brazil has maintained the leading position of state-owned enterprises in strategic and high-value-added sectors. Improving their governance structures rather than privatizing them helps the government maintain macroeconomic stability and implement the objectives of national development strategies. The progress made by state-owned enterprises in reforms concerning board independence, financial transparency, audit compliance, and other areas in accordance with OECD standards not only contributes to the development of the enterprises themselves, but also helps attract international investment and expand trade ties. Through forms of public-private cooperation such as golden shares, Brazil has both retained the government’s decision-making authority in major strategic enterprises and leveraged and introduced foreign capital and technology.⁵⁵ However, because the government controls personnel appointments and oversight at state-owned enterprises, these measures also carry risks of institutional regression in multiple respects. 

(2) Gains and Losses of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Bloc Alignment 

In addressing the dilemma over international bloc alignment, Brazil has adopted measures in both its political and economic orientation that prioritize material benefits over nominal positioning and select positions according to issues rather than blocs. In terms of actual results, Brazil’s response measures have yielded more losses than gains politically. Although they can produce gains in the short term, they detract from Brazil’s recognition by other countries. Economically, however, they have been successful and have essentially achieved the objective of maneuvering between the two sides. This is because political logic differs significantly from economic logic: What matters most in politics is distinguishing friends from enemies, whereas what matters most in economics is obtaining material benefits. 

1. Gains and Losses of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Political Bloc Alignment 

Brazil has adopted measures that distinguish between words and actions in handling its political and military relations with the United States. These measures essentially accord with Brazil’s current national interests and have produced relatively favorable results. 

Brazil currently has no need to distance itself from the United States in practice. The United States remains the country with the greatest overall national strength in the world and possesses a global alliance system. Although the Trump administration is implementing strategic retrenchment to a certain extent, the United States’ determination to control the political and security situation in the Western Hemisphere has increased considerably. Furthermore, although the Trump administration has shown greater concern for Brazil’s right-wing forces, the United States has generally maintained a relatively restrained attitude toward both left- and right-wing governments in Brazil. The United States maintains relatively close ties with Brazil’s elite groups. If Brazil were to take substantive political and military action to distance itself from the United States, it would provoke a backlash from the United States and pro-U.S. forces within Brazil, thereby endangering domestic political stability. In conducting military cooperation with Brazil, the United States has also provided Brazil with valuable assistance in technology, equipment, management, and other areas. Within the regional landscape, the principal targets of intervention under the U.S. “New Monroe Doctrine” are Central America and the Caribbean, particularly Panama, Venezuela, and other countries, and it has not posed a significant threat to Brazil. 

Brazil’s rhetorical criticism of the United States also accords with Brazil’s national interests. First, Brazil’s criticism of the U.S. “New Monroe Doctrine” helps enhance its regional appeal and leadership, thereby increasing its bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States. The United States regards Brazil as an important “swing state” not only because of its rapid economic growth, but also because of its overall influence in South America.⁵⁶ Although Brazil rhetorically criticizes the “New Monroe Doctrine,” it has not substantively obstructed the United States from acting according to its own wishes in Central America and the Caribbean. The countries in these regions can also understand Brazil’s position and are essentially satisfied with Brazil providing support only in its public statements. Second, Brazil’s criticism of the United States on certain international issues has generally been relatively restrained and does not harm the fundamental interests of the United States. For example, on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, because the United States has been widely criticized by the international community, Brazil’s criticism can be understood and accepted by the United States. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, although Brazil has refused to condemn Russia and has even opposed sanctions against Russia, it has not prevented the United States from taking corresponding measures. Moreover, economic exchanges between Brazil and Russia are not close and will not have a substantive impact on the United States. 

Brazil’s adoption of “selective alignment” according to specific international issues rather than “bloc-based alignment” has also yielded relatively significant benefits. The main reason Brazil leans more toward the United States in its political and military relations is not that it trusts the United States, but that it is wary of it. Brazilian political elites, regardless of their political orientation, regard the United States as the principal disruptive force in global affairs and are deeply suspicious of U.S. hegemony. Consequently, Brazil does not dare to commit itself fully to a bloc that opposes the United States, while it is also unwilling to commit itself fully to the U.S. bloc and be forced to accept the control of U.S. hegemony. Whenever possible, Brazil seeks to develop relations with China, Russia, and other major powers.⁵⁷ When conducting political cooperation with these countries, Brazil attaches great importance to avoiding issues involving strategic competition between the United States and these countries. For example, in its political cooperation with China, Brazil seeks to avoid provoking the United States. Beyond matters of bilateral cooperation between China and Brazil, the two countries communicate and coordinate more frequently on issues such as South–South cooperation and global governance. In major international events such as the Ukraine crisis, Brazil has refused to follow the United States in condemning Russia also because the United States acted as a behind-the-scenes driving force in the crisis, having European countries take the lead rather than itself directly entering the front line of confrontation, thereby leaving Brazil ample latitude. 

Whether Brazil distinguishes between words and actions in handling its political relations with the United States or strategically chooses its alignment according to different issues, neither approach is conducive to Brazil becoming a global political power. Brazil’s simultaneous resistance to and accommodation of the United States under the pressure of U.S. hegemony demonstrates that Brazil still has a long way to go in enhancing its overall national strength and achieving domestic political integration. 

2. Gains and Losses of Measures for Addressing the Dilemma over International Economic Bloc Alignment 

Brazil’s strategy of separating nominal positioning from substantive practice in its international economic bloc alignment has been quite successful, essentially achieving its objective of maneuvering between both sides and obtaining benefits from each. Brazil is currently the only country that is both a full member of BRICS and highly likely to be admitted as a member of the OECD. Russia previously attempted to join the OECD, but its accession process was terminated after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022. Brazil has continuously strengthened its economic, trade, and investment ties with BRICS countries, particularly China, through specific projects in order to obtain material benefits. In its overall public messaging, however, it maintains a certain distance from strategic economic plans such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. This allows Brazil both to obtain China’s understanding and cooperation and to avoid criticism from the United States and its Western allies. Although the BRICS countries possess enormous economic scale, their international economic competitiveness and overall influence remain inferior to those of the Western countries led by the United States, and they have particular shortcomings in finance and high technology. Therefore, joining the BRICS does not constrain Brazil’s efforts to align itself with the United States and Europe, nor does it impede Brazil’s efforts to join the OECD. Brazil’s repeated statements expressing admiration for the Western market economy system also have a practical rationale. 

Brazil’s strategy of distinguishing among economic issues and addressing them separately has also produced relatively favorable results. In its domestic economic governance reforms, Brazil has continuously aligned itself with OECD standards and used external pressure to accelerate the reform of its state-owned enterprises. Its close cooperation with the United States in finance and investment has stabilized Brazil–U.S. relations and reduced the pressure of U.S. intervention. Its close cooperation with China in trade and investment has promoted the comprehensive development of Brazil’s economy and, in particular, enabled Brazil to accumulate valuable capital. As a country rich in resources whose economy is still undergoing modernization, Brazil’s flexible strategy of choosing sides according to specific issues is superior to a bloc-based alignment strategy and contributes to advancing the country’s modernization process. 

Overall, the measures Brazil has adopted regarding its international identity positioning and international bloc alignment have, to a certain extent, alleviated the international strategic dilemmas it faces under the shadow of U.S. hegemony and yielded material benefits conducive to national development. However, they are far from sufficient to support its ambitions of becoming a global power.