“去风险”看似温和,背后隐藏几多风险?
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“De-risking” Looks Mild, But How Many Risks are Hidden Behind It?

“去风险”看似温和,背后隐藏几多风险?

Jian Junbo, a Europe scholar at Fudan University, argues the term “de-risking” rather than “decoupling” does not represent a substantive shift in European technology and economic policy toward China. In fact, Jian argues, the term may be more dangerous for China because it rhetorically legitimizes technology and economic controls on the basis of responding to “risks,” appeals to stakeholders with varying threat perceptions of China, and paves the way for greater transatlantic coordination.


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On the surface, “de-risking” seems to be milder than “decoupling,” but de-risking has great ambiguity of meaning, and scope for generalization based on security risks. This makes its operational space huge. It is not as mild as we imagine, and it is quite deceptive and dangerous. We must understand the real intention of Europe’s de-risking from China on the basis of its rising geopolitical awareness. Therefore, China’s enduring agenda will be to formulate corresponding hedging strategies at different levels.

“去风险”表面上看来比“脱钩”要温和,但去风险具有极大的含义上的模糊性,以及基于安全风险的泛化,这使其操作空间巨大,并不如我们想象中那样温和,它具有相当大的欺骗性和危险。我国需要在欧洲日益上升的地缘政治意识的基础上来理解其对华“去风险”的真正意图。因此,根据不同层面制定相应的对冲策略,是中国持久的议程。

Recently, there has been a great deal of rhetoric in Western media about Germany’s de-risking from China. Of course, such arguments are being raised not only by Germany, but also by the European Union and a number of other member states. In fact, it was European Commission President [Ursula] von der Leyen who first put forward the argument for trade and economic de-risking from China. She first proposed “de-risking” from China in a speech at two European think tanks at the end of March this year, prior to her visit to China, in order to replace the controversial “decoupling.” However, while de-risking rhetoric is gaining in popularity in Europe, the true meaning of the term and its practical implications for economic and trade policy toward China have yet to be clarified or clearly defined. This may be precisely the effect that Europe wants to achieve—using a vague term and an unspoken meaning to provide enough space for Europe to implement a more flexible economic and trade policy toward China.

近日,西方媒体上有关德国对华“去风险”的论调甚嚣尘上。当然这一论调不仅是德国正在提起,欧盟和其他一些成员国也正在提起。事实上,最先提出对华经贸“去风险”论调的是欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩,今年3月底她访华前曾在两家欧洲智库的演讲中首次提出对华“去风险”(de-risk),以代替备受争议的“脱钩”(de-couple)。然而,“去风险”论调在欧洲逐渐流行之际,这一词汇的真实含义及对华经贸政策的实际影响尚未得到澄清或清晰定义。这或许正是欧洲所希望达到的效果:用一种模糊的词汇和不言明的含义为欧洲实施更灵活的对华经贸政策提供足够的空间。

Regardless of whether Europe intends to give a clear meaning to the term, why do the EU and some of its countries prefer de-risking to decoupling to summarize their economic and trade policies toward China? The reasons include the following.

无论欧洲是否有意给予该词汇以清晰含义,欧盟及其部分国家为何偏爱用“去风险”而非“脱钩”来概述其对华经贸政策?原因包括如下几点。

Why does Europe choose “de-risking?”

欧洲为何选择去风险

First, by using this term, the EU is attempting to gain a moral advantage in Sino-European relations, and thereby inject an abundance of legitimacy into the implementation of harsh trade protection and even possible sanctions against China. Associate Professor Hang Yuan of Sichuan University has asserted that the so-called de-risking is “a discourse trap of the EU. … De-risking puts the blame on the other side, stigmatizes the other side, and puts the other side on moral trial. This becomes the moral basis for all subsequent actions.” I am convinced that this is the case.

第一,欧盟通过这一词汇试图在中欧关系中占据道德优势,从而在实施对我国严厉的贸易保护乃至可能的制裁时注入丰沛的合法性。四川大学原航副教授曾断言,所谓“去风险”是“欧盟的话语陷阱……去风险则将责任推给对方,污名化对方,对对方进行道德审判,这是后续一切行动的道德依据”。本文深以为然。

“Risk” means that the EU faces a “threat” from China, meaning a passive, external constraint and challenge, and thus implying that the responsibility for its unfavorable relationship with the other party comes from the other party’s challenge, rather than involving Europe’s responsibility. Therefore, by pursuing a “de-risking” policy, the EU not only shifts the responsibility for the problems in Sino-European economic and trade relations onto China, but also legitimizes, to a great extent, its subsequent economic and trade policies toward China. By means of linguistic and ideological suggestion, the EU has pushed China onto a seat of moral judgment through the implementation of the de-risking policy. Thus, on this issue, the Europeans are not only the plaintiffs but also the judges. This disregard for facts and playing with words puts China-EU economic and trade relations in an ideological light and legitimizes the EU’s position and possible subsequent actions.

“风险”意味欧盟面临来自中国的“威胁”,也就意味着一种被动的、来自外部的制约和挑战,从而暗示自身与对方处于不利境况关系的责任来自对方的挑战,而非涉及欧洲的责任。因此,通过推行“去风险”政策不仅会将中欧经贸关系中问题的责任推给中国,并高度合法化后续的对华经贸政策。欧盟通过语言上的意识形态暗示,通过实施“去风险”政策,将中国推到了道德审判席。因此,在这一问题上,欧洲人不仅是原告,而且也是审判官。这种无视事实而玩弄词汇,将中欧经贸关系意识形态化,并使欧盟立场与后续的可能行动合法化。

Second, the use of the term de-risking instead of decoupling can, to a certain extent, calm the internal controversy in Europe, which provides Europe an opportunity to adopt flexible economic and trade policies toward China. As most people see it, decoupling is synonymous with a radical, total and complete severance of ties. It seeks to break the value and supply chains with China. However, this is both unrealistic and difficult to truly achieve. What is especially important is that, politically, decoupling ultimately means containment of China, which would bring about a Cold War-like state of affairs in China-Europe relations.

第二,丢弃脱钩而使用“去风险”这一词汇,一定程度上能平息欧洲的内部争议,这为欧洲采取对华灵活的经贸政策提供机会。在多数人看来,脱钩是一种激进的、全面和彻底断绝关系的代名词,是寻求对华在价值链、供应链上的断裂。然而这既不现实也很难真正实现。尤其重要的是,脱钩在政治上最终意味着对华遏制,它将给中欧关系带来类似冷战的状态。

During the Cold War era, mutual economic exchanges between the two camps were essentially zero. If the ultimate meaning of decoupling is to cut off economic and trade exchanges, then one facet of the Cold War would be realized between China and Europe. If this decoupling were then extended to the high-tech, financial, and political fields, then it would, in fact, mean a new Cold War. For Europe, this outcome is clearly not yet an acceptable goal for its China policy. Therefore, de-risking has become a kind of ambiguous term that meets the psychological expectations of many politicians, the general public, and enterprises, and has become a powerful tool for bridging the gap between Europe’s economic and trade policy and its overall policy toward China. In the name of de-risking, those politicians and enterprises that advocate decoupling can find a basis for casting off dependence on China, while those who advocate continuing economic and trade exchanges with China can also find opportunities in other areas after de-risking. And of course, it conforms very well to the appetites of those who seek selective, limited cooperation with China, or selective containment and supply chain breaking. In any case, it fits the China policy preferences of a diverse group of Europeans across the political spectrum, from hard line to lukewarm to relatively friendly.

在冷战时代,两大阵营相互经济交流基本为零。如果脱钩的终极含义是断绝经贸交流,那么冷战的一个面相就会在中欧间实现。如果这种脱钩再延伸到高科技、金融和政治领域,那么它在事实上就将意味着新的冷战。对欧洲而言,这一结局显然还不是其对华政策所能接受的目标。因此,“去风险”就成为一种模糊的、符合许多政客、大众和企业心理期待的用词,成为能够弥平欧洲对华经贸政策乃至于整体政策分歧的利器。在“去风险”名义下,那些鼓吹脱钩的政客与企业能找到摆脱对华依赖的依据,而主张继续和中国开展经贸交流的人士也能从去掉风险后的其他领域中找到机会。当然它也非常符合那种追求和中国有选择的、有限合作或选择性遏制与供应链断裂者的胃口。无论如何,它符合欧洲不同人群的对华政策偏好,从强硬到冷淡再到相对友好的各个政治光谱。

Of course, the ambiguity of the meaning of de-risking provides a basis for the EU to develop a flexible and opportunistic policy toward China. This will both bring about European unity and the realization of a single voice on China policy, and be able to satisfy the demands and policy preferences of different groups of people, thus allowing European politicians to satisfy their own constituencies on China policy. Of course, it also enables the use of a variety of policy tools in dealings with China, and the formation of an economic and trade policy deterrent against China. In this regard, the EU may be intentionally blurring the concept, and will not give it a clear definition.

当然,“去风险”含义的模糊性给欧盟制定灵活、充满机会主义的对华政策提供依据,这既带来欧洲在对华政策上的团结和实现一个声音说话,也能够满足不同群体的诉求和政策偏好,从而使欧洲的政客们在对华政策上满足自己的选民,当然也能在对华交往中运用各种政策工具,并形成对华经贸政策的威慑力。就这一点而言,欧盟可能会有意让这一概念模糊化,而不会对它作出清晰的界定。

Third, by using the de-risking policy, the EU has found a so-called common narrative with its U.S. ally toward China, which will be conducive to coordination between the United States and Europe on economic and trade policies toward China. It is an interesting fact that after [European Commission President] von der Leyen used the term “de-risking” instead of “decoupling,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken soon used the same term to describe U.S. economic and trade policy toward China. The EU and the United States are allies with abundant bilateral communication and coordination mechanisms, so the fact that they have both begun to use “de-risking” instead of “decoupling” in their economic and trade policies toward China is most likely the result of internal coordination between the two sides. Whether that is the case or not, in economic and trade relations with China, Europe and the United States have found common ground to meet their respective internal requirements.

第三,欧盟通过使用“去风险”政策,与美国盟友找到了所谓的共同对华叙事方式,这将有利于欧美协调对华经贸政策。一个有趣的事实是,当冯德莱恩用“去风险”代替脱钩之后,美国国务卿布林肯很快也使用该词来描述美国的对华经贸政策。作为同盟和具有丰富双边沟通协调机制的欧盟和美国,双方的对华经贸政策都开始使用“去风险”来代替“脱钩”,这极有可能是双方内部协调后的结果。无论如何,欧美在对华经贸关系上找到了符合各自内部需求的共同点。

An obfuscated de-risking concept—the greatest common denominator in the economic and trade policy of Europe and the United States toward China—can be interpreted in its larger sense as decoupling, which is in line with the United States’ intention to contain China. In its more limited sense, it can be interpreted as a limited reduction of dependence on China in the supply chain, which meets the demands of many Europeans. This broad space for interpretation is of major significance for Europe and the United States to further coordinate their economic and trade policies toward China, as well as to deepen the alliance relationship between Europe and the United States in the context of the so-called great transformation of the international landscape. In fact, Europe and the United States differ on many international issues, and there has always been a temperature difference in their policies toward China, but the use of de-risking will become the adhesive for a common agenda of Europe and the United States toward China.

欧美在对华经贸政策上的最大公约数——一个模糊化的“去风险”概念往大了说,可以解释为“脱钩”,这符合美国的遏制中国的意图,往小了说可以解释为有限降低供应链上的对华依赖,这满足不少欧洲人的诉求。这种宏阔的解释空间对欧美进一步协调对华经贸政策,以及在所谓国际局势大转换背景下整体上深化欧美同盟关系具有重要意义。欧美实际上在许多国际问题上存在差异,在对华政策上也一直存在温差,然而“去风险”的使用将成为欧美共同对华议程的粘合剂。

Fourth, de-risking in the ultimate sense implies viewing the EU’s economic and trade policy toward China in security terms, which is in line with Europe’s aim in recent years to increasingly see all its external relations from a security perspective. De-risking not only responds to concerns about supply chain dependence on China that the Western world has been dwelling on lately, but also responds to the concerns about the erosion of their countries’ security that the West, especially the United States, has been dwelling on since the Trump administration. Thus, de-risking means both reducing supply chain dependence on China (e.g., diversifying the sources of rare earths, lithium batteries, etc.) and removing China’s “threat” to their national defense and security (e.g., removing Huawei’s 5G equipment or public surveillance equipment made by Chinese companies). Considering that the reduction of Europe’s supply chain dependence is also being viewed as part of its defense security, de-risking is, in fact, the result of Europe’s security-centered perspective on its trade and economic relations with China. Under a security-centered perspective on China-EU relations, de-risking becomes a policy manifestation of viewing economic and trade relations with China in security terms, which will subject China-EU economic and trade relations to challenges under a more macro-security perspective.

第四,“去风险”在终极意义上意味着欧盟对华经贸政策安全化,这符合近些年来欧洲日益将对外关系泛安全化的目的。“去风险”不仅回应了最近西方世界一直鼓吹的对华供应链依赖的忧虑,而且回应了特朗普当政以来西方尤其是美国所鼓吹的对他们国家的安全侵蚀的忧虑。因此,“去风险”既包含降低对华供应链依赖的含义(如实现稀土、锂电池等的来源地的多样化),也包含去除中国对其国防安全“威胁”的含义(如拆除华为5G设备或中国公司生产的公共场所监控设备)。考虑到欧洲将降低供应链依赖也正在被视作维护国防安全的一部分,因此“去风险”事实上是欧洲从安全化视角看待对华经贸关系的结果。中欧关系在安全化视角下,“去风险”就成为对华经贸关系安全化的政策体现,这将会让中欧经贸关系在更宏观的安全视角下受到挑战。

Fuzzy Boundaries and Concrete Implications

模糊的边界与具体的含义

To sum up, de-risking will become a tool for the EU and some European countries to maintain a position of moral superiority over China, a tool for accusations and struggles in political and ideological fields, a way to carry out trade protectionism and partial supply chain breaking economically, and a manifestation of viewing economic and trade policies toward China in security terms. For the EU, de-risking has become a flexible and wide-ranging China policy tool. However, while de-risking’s boundaries are still blurred in the economic and trade field, its concrete implications are increasingly evident, including, in particular, precisely eliminating or reducing dependence on China and so-called “security threats,” and preventing China from gaining relevant advantages. Specifically, this is reflected mainly in the following aspects:

综上,“去风险”将成为欧盟和一些欧洲国家所谓在道德上保持对华优势地位,在政治和意识形态领域进行指责与斗争的工具,在经济上进行贸易保护主义和开展部分产业链断裂的途径,以及对华经贸政策安全化的体现。“去风险”已然成为了欧盟灵活和广泛的对华政策工具。然而,在经贸领域,“去风险”的边界尽管依然模糊不清,但也日益显示出其具体的含义,尤其包括精准地去除和降低对中国的依赖与所谓“安全威胁”,以及不让中国获得相关优势。具体来说,这主要体现在以下几个方面:

First, reducing or eliminating dependence on key raw materials. This is because China is Europe’s provider of some key raw materials, including rare earths and related products, new energy materials such as solar panels or lithium batteries, raw materials in the pharmaceutical field, and some other chemical raw materials. The EU has listed a number of key dependent materials and is trying to reduce imports from China by diversifying its sources.

第一,降低或摆脱对关键原材料的依赖。由于中国是欧洲一些关键原材料的提供者,这些原材料包括稀土及其相关制品、新能源所需的材料如太阳能板或锂电池、制药领域的原初材料及其他一些化工原料等。欧盟罗列了一些关键依赖材料并正试图通过来源的多样化以减少来自中国的产品进口。

Second, reducing or eliminating dependence on the Chinese market. This is mainly reflected in investment. Some European politicians believe that a large amount of investment in China (especially in the manufacturing sector) increases the risks to European capital, and therefore advocate achieving diversification of foreign investment, shifting part of the investment in China to Southeast Asia and other countries, thereby reducing dependence on the Chinese market.

第二,降低或摆脱对中国市场的依赖。这主要体现在投资方面,欧洲一些政客认为,在华大量投资(尤其在制造业领域)使欧洲资本面临的风险上升,因此主张实现对外投资多样化,将部分在华投资转移到东南亚等国家,从而降低对华市场依赖。

Third, preventing China from obtaining high-tech advantages. Europe will pay more and more attention to the export of dual-use technologies to China, and will prevent the flow of such technologies to China by all possible means. It will also try its best to prevent the transfer of high technology to China in the name of intellectual property protection. In short, in order to maintain Europe’s technological advantage over China and reduce the speed of China’s industrial upgrading, Europe may take a variety of deterrent measures in the name of de-risking.

第三,阻止中国获得高科技等优势。欧洲将会越来越重视军民两用技术的对华出口,并会通过各种可能的方式阻止这种技术流向中国,也会在知识产权保护的名义下极力阻止高新技术对华转让。总之,为了保持欧洲对中国的技术优势以降低中国产业升级的速度,欧洲可能会以“去风险”名义采取各种阻遏手段。

Fourth, maintaining so-called social and national security. This is reflected in Europe banning trade in some specific sectors or goods, or preventing Chinese capital from entering some specific industries in Europe, such as power infrastructure, ports, or certain high-tech fields, all in the name of maintaining security.

第四,维护所谓社会与国家安全。这表现为欧洲会以维护安全的名义禁止一些特定部门或物品的贸易,或阻止中国资本进入欧洲的一些特定行业,如电力基础设施、港口或某些高科技领域等。

Multiple levels of operation require having multiple levels of hedging

多个层面的操作应有多个层面的对冲

Therefore, de-risking seems to be milder than decoupling on the surface, as the former is mainly concerned with security issues, and it seems that normal exchanges can still be maintained in areas not related to security. Decoupling, however, represents leaving, a complete break at all levels. This is true as far as the seriousness of the semantics is concerned, but the problem is that the great ambiguity of de-risking and its generalization based on security risks make de-risking a policy with a great deal of room for maneuver, so while it may not be as serious as decoupling, it is also not as benign as we might imagine.

因此,“去风险”表面上看来比“脱钩”要温和,前者主要在乎安全问题,不涉及安全的领域似乎依然可以维持正常的交流;而“脱钩”代表了离开,是一种各个层面的完全断裂。从语义所表达的严重程度来说确实如此,但问题在于,去风险具有极大的含义上的模糊性,以及基于安全风险的泛化,这使“去风险”政策的操作空间巨大,尽管可能没有脱钩那样严重,但也并不会如我们想象中那样温和。

For China, the de-risking rhetoric popular in Europe is, in fact, quite deceptive and dangerous. As mentioned earlier, the ambiguity of its meaning is, to a very large extent, intentional on the part of the Europeans. We must understand the real intention of Europe’s de-risking from China on the basis of its rising geopolitical awareness. De-risking will operate on multiple levels, posing a continuing challenge to China-EU relations. Therefore, China’s enduring agenda will be to formulate corresponding hedging strategies at different levels. However, in any case, as long as China’s industrial upgrading and opening-up process remain unchanged, the risks to China from Europe’s de-risking policy will continue to diminish and even disappear.

对中国而言,正在欧洲流行的对华“去风险”论调其实具有相当大的欺骗性和危险。如前所述,其含义的模糊性在很大程度上是欧洲人有意为之。我国需要在欧洲人日益上升的地缘政治意识的基础上来理解其对华“去风险”的真正意图。“去风险”将有多个层面的操作,这将给中欧关系带来持续的挑战。因此,根据不同层面制定相应的对冲策略,是中国持久的议程。但无论如何,只要持续保持中国的产业升级和对外开放进程不变,欧洲的对华“去风险”政策对中国带来的风险将会不断降低,甚至直至消失。

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Cite This Page

简军波 (Jian Junbo). "“De-risking” Looks Mild, but How Many Risks Are Hidden behind It? [“去风险”看似温和,背后隐藏几多风险?]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in The Paper [澎湃], June 29, 2023

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