I. Point of Departure for Our Question

A country’s security policy must have a “grand strategy”‎¹ to guide its specific operations. Otherwise, the country’s security policy will always remain at the level of coping with emergencies. The most important thing for a country’s security grand strategy is to determine the purpose of the national security policy, that is, the ideal security environment pursued by the country.

A country’s ideal security environment is determined by many factors², such as its geographical environment, and its definition of national interests. For example, the ideal security environment of the United States can be simply summarized as one where “no other power (including an alliance of powers) can compete with the United States.” Therefore, the grand strategy of the United States is to “prevent the rise of any power that might challenge the United States or prevent and impede such a power from confronting the United States.”^3‎ As another example, Singapore’s ideal security environment is “a peaceful and stable regional and international environment conducive to economic development.” Therefore, Singapore’s grand strategy is to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and a prosperous international economic environment.

In China, current research on strategic issues rarely involves the field of “grand strategy.”^{4 ‎}However, a discussion of and answers to questions regarding grand strategy not only have guiding significance for China’s specific security policy, but also can reduce suspicion and misunderstanding of China’s security policy on the part of other countries⁵‎.

This article only attempts to answer a question in the field of China’s grand strategy, namely: What is the ideal security environment that China should pursue? Especially in the Asia-Pacific region,^6‎ what security structure would China most want to see? As an Asia-Pacific country, China’s most important national interests are almost all concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China’s security will also primarily depend on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

II. Grand Strategy: China’s Ideal Security Environment

Here, I divide the goals of China’s security strategy into two categories: global and regional.

Global Goals

In terms of global security goals, in order of importance, China’s strategic security goals should be:

1. Maintain an effective strategic deterrence. Strategic deterrence has become one of the cornerstones of the international security framework. ^‎ Therefore,⁷ China must maintain an effective “minimum nuclear deterrence” to prevent any potentially hostile power from threatening its vital interests. The missile defense system that the United States and Japan seek to develop is the most dangerous factor that could cause structural changes in the international security environment. Once this missile defense system is successfully deployed, it will fundamentally shake the understanding of national security established since World War II, namely: that national security is based on interdependence and mutual deterrence, so national security is relative. Under such a strategic situation, the unilateral development of a missile defense system by any country or camp would break the understanding of security as interdependent and based on mutual nuclear deterrence. Offense would once again predominate over defense, thereby greatly aggravating the security dilemma between nations and leading to a new arms race. The nuclear powers must either cooperate in the development of missile defense systems or exercise restraint. Otherwise, the escalation of the arms race will be unavoidable.

2. A new “multipolar world” that does not repeat the constant wars and turmoil in European history is in China’s interests, but China’s grand strategy should not be determined by a particular international structure. Although human history records many large-scale wars that broke out in Europe under multipolar world conditions, from the perspective of international relations theory, a multipolar structure greatly restricts the behavior of states in at least three aspects: 1) A multipolar world places the most powerful constraints on the actions of states, especially great powers;⁸ 2) In a multipolar world there is minimal pressure for great powers to involve themselves in conflicts where they have no real interest because of “face” or “credibility;” ^9‎ 3) Uncertainty about their allies makes great powers cautious^10‎.

The new multipolar world will be qualitatively different from the war-torn “multipolar world” of continental Europe in the following ways: 1) None of the major powers is (or at least is not explicitly) an enemy of any other, and all major powers maintain relatively stable bilateral relations in order to maintain strategic ambiguity and flexibility. The ambiguity and flexibility of this strategy help to undermine the ambitions of great powers. 2) Great powers are determined to repair relationships when they fall to a low point (such as in Sino-U.S. relations). 3) The deepening of economic interdependence and international norms/international institutions are even more important factors for stabilizing relations between great powers. 4) In addition to bilateral cooperation, great powers also seek multilateral cooperation. 5) Although power is still the basis of inter-state politics, the pursuit of territorial expansion has become difficult to achieve, or in other words, the world of the past where “might made right” has become milder. All of these factors have the potential to make the new multipolar structure more peaceful and stable. However, changes in the international structure generally cannot be driven by people, but are mainly the result of economic development (non-equilibrium growth) or even accidental factors.¹¹ Therefore, China’s grand strategy should not be determined by a particular international structure.

Regional Goals

In terms of the regional security environment, China should pursue the following goals:

1. National economic strength is the ultimate guarantee of national security. Therefore, one of China’s most important strategic security goals is to ensure that China’s economic foundation is safe from attack. To achieve this, China must have sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent any adversary from attempting to attack China’s economic foundation due to fear of painful retaliatory strikes. We must change our understanding of the role of defensive forces: The task of defensive forces is first to deter, and second, to have sufficient defensive force to repel the enemy when deterrence fails. China’s coastal areas have become the lifeblood of China’s economy. For the foreseeable future, the countries capable of actually posing substantial threats to our coastal areas are the United States and Japan. Therefore, while maintaining our deterrent power, we must also maintain Sino-U.S. relations at least at the level of “not friends, but not enemies” (非敌非友).

The triangular Sino-U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important trilateral relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, however, a triangular relationship is the most unstable type of combination relationship in the international structure. Therefore, China, the United States, and Japan must be aware of the difficulty and importance of handling this triangular relationship, and especially its balanced development¹².

2. Although China’s economic foundation is mostly concentrated in the coastal areas, China is a mainland country after all, and security on land is the foundation of China’s security. Therefore, China must consolidate its security environment on the Asian continent. Moreover, the most frightening threat to our land security environment is a hostile Russia. Therefore, another important strategic security goal of China is to prevent a re-emergent Russia from becoming an enemy of China. China cannot and should not prevent Russia’s re-emergence, but we can strive to make an again-powerful Russia a friend.

No matter how powerful China and Russia are in themselves, if they are at odds with each other, their strategic positions will be greatly weakened. Conversely, if the two sides can support each other, this will greatly strengthen the strategic positions of both. There is no natural geographical barrier between China and Russia. If there is ever bad blood between them, the “security dilemma” will be unbearable (this is borne out by the past history of China and the Soviet Union). Therefore, from a long-term perspective, Sino-Russian relations are no less important than Sino-U.S. relations. As a proud nation, what Russia hates most is when others look down on it, and history has proven that Russia is the most terrible enemy of those who look down on it. Therefore, China must give Russia the respect it deserves and strive to keep Russia as a friendly partner even after it is strong¹³.

3. On the premise of preventing Taiwan’s independence, try to achieve the reunification of the motherland by peaceful means. Taiwan’s relationship with China is by no means merely a matter of Taiwan’s strategic position or of “washing away national humiliation” to save face. Rather, it is related to the question of whether “China,” as an idea, can continue to exist. Therefore, this is China’s most vital interest.

To resolve the Taiwan issue, whether or not the United States intervenes is an important variable. In order to reduce the possibility of U.S. involvement, in addition to developing a deterrent military force, China must do all it can to create reasons for the United States (government and people) to accept a unified China.

China must make the United States realize that a China without Taiwan will no longer be “China” in the eyes of the Chinese people. Taiwan holds the same importance for China as democracy and freedom for the United States. We must also make the United States aware that a dismembered China will always be a destabilizing factor in its global power framework. Only a unified China will have the sense of responsibility and willingness to partner with the United States to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. China is more than willing to be a country that is satisfied with the status quo, but that must come after reunification.

The three goals above are the most important goals of China’s ideal security environment. Second, China must also:

4. On the basis of preventing the deterioration of the situation on the Korean peninsula, ensure that the ultimate reunification of the Korean peninsula will not have a negative impact on China’s security environment. The strategic position of the Korean peninsula is indisputable. Given that there are still many uncertainties in the relationships between China, Russia, the United States, and Japan, no side wants to see a unified Korean peninsula fall into the sphere of influence of another side. The geographical location of the Korean peninsula means that a unified Korean peninsula and the formation of a military alliance by any side would worsen the security dilemma of the other sides, thereby creating a hidden danger to the long-term stability of the region.

By contrast, a unified Korean peninsula whose neutrality was backed by the Big Four could bring lasting peace to the entire Northeast Asian region. Pursuing a neutral unification of the Korean peninsula is not only conducive to promoting the reunification of the Korean peninsula and realizing the national goal of the Korean nation. It can also set a precedent for multilateral cooperation among the Big Four.¹⁴ Therefore, China’s most realistic and most ideal security goal in Northeast Asia should be a neutral and unified Korean peninsula.

A neutral, unified Korean peninsula also provides an excellent opportunity for China and the United States to reach a strategic understanding. If China and the United States can jointly support a neutral and unified Korea, it will greatly enhance trust between the two countries. Taking account of China’s interests, the United States would no longer insist on stationing troops on the reunified Korean Peninsula; while China, taking account of the interests of the United States, would not pursue a “pro-China” Korean Peninsula. Such mutual concessions would lay a substantive foundation for more cooperation between China and the United States.

5. On the basis of preventing the Southeast Asia region from being dominated by hostile forces, seek more wide-ranging cooperation.¹⁵ Trade between China and Southeast Asian countries is expanding and Southeast Asia can by hostile forces as a base to threaten China’s economic lifeline. This means that Southeast Asia is just as important to China’s security as the Korean Peninsula¹⁶.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would welcome a situation where the power of major countries could be roughly balanced making it impossible for these powers to control regional affairs ¹⁷. This situation is in the interest of China as well as the interest of the other major powers. From this point of view, if ASEAN can truly become a “peaceful, free, and neutral zone,” this should be welcomed by all major countries, ¹⁸ even though it may be very difficult to realize this ideal.

The Asia-Pacific region is the region most likely to form a multipolar world, and the ASEAN is bound to be an important force among them. China and many ASEAN countries share the common interest of pursuing a multipolar world. However, whether ASEAN can become a pole, or how solid it is as a pole depends to a large extent on two points: 1) The cohesion of ASEAN and the judgment of major powers as to the strength of ASEAN; 2) The leading status of Indonesia as the largest ASEAN country and the quality of its leadership. Furthermore, Vietnam’s influence on the Indochina Peninsula is a point that is likely to become increasingly important in the future.

Since ASEAN already includes all the countries in Southeast Asia, in forming a high degree of cohesion within the organization, the focus of ASEAN’s future efforts will be to establish an institutional policy coordination and intervention mechanism. Judging from its responses to the last two crises (the financial crisis and the Indonesia/Timor-Leste crisis), ASEAN still cannot effectively handle crises at critical times. Therefore, at least for now, ASEAN is not a real pole in the Asia-Pacific region, or at best it is a weak pole. Second, if ASEAN wants to become a pole in the Asia-Pacific region, it must “walk a tightrope” in its relations with major powers: That is to say, it cannot be too close to any one major power, but nor can it be too distant. This is a difficult balance to strike. In addition, the different countries in ASEAN have quite different attitudes towards the major powers. Therefore, even if ASEAN becomes a true pole, it still has to learn to speak with one voice. Moreover, it is difficult for an alliance to become a true pole as there will be inevitable conflicts between the interests of the countries within the alliance ¹⁹. Within ASEAN, three countries play a key role for the future of ASEAN: Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The importance of Indonesia to ASEAN does not need to be discussed, and the participation of the three Indochinese countries Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the Indochina Peninsula increased Vietnam’s influence on regional affairs overnight. Myanmar’s pivotal strategic position in Southeast Asia is also clearly evident: Myanmar not only straddles the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, but it also brings together the north and south parts of Southeast Asia.

Therefore, on the basis of strengthening relations with all ASEAN countries, China must strengthen its relations with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. It is critical that China and Indonesia develop some sort of strategic partnership (although the situation in Indonesia remains volatile). For a long time, the relationship between China and Indonesia has been in an unstable state for historical and cultural reasons. As a result,  Indonesia’s China policy has long been based on a hostile and distrustful stance ²⁰. It is necessary for China to strengthen relations with Indonesia in all respects, including the relations between the two militaries.

The recent warming in Sino-Vietnamese relations shows that Vietnam has become increasingly aware that other powers can come and go, while China will always be Vietnam’s neighbor (of course, this does not mean that Vietnam is no longer wary of China). On the basis of this sort of strategic understanding, Sino-Vietnamese relations can take a significant step forward.

Therefore, on the basis of existing economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries, China should promote economic cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong sub-region (including China’s Yunnan province, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand). The intent of this sub-regional economic cooperation is not to turn the region into China’s sphere of influence, but to establish “interdependence” between these countries and China, so as to bring the interests of the various countries into closer alignment and drive the economic development of China’s southwest region in coordination with China Western Development. This will be more conducive to the improvement of the security environment around China. In the future, China is bound to become an important market and source of technology/capital for Southeast Asian countries. These factors will provide the real-world necessity for the development of sub-regional economic cooperation. China must extensively participate in various ASEAN consultation and institutionalization processes. Only in this way can China ensure that, no matter how ASEAN develops, China can effectively establish wide-ranging relations with ASEAN and maintain its influence over regional affairs. The attitudes of the various ASEAN countries towards major powers range from relatively friendly to relatively skeptical. This also determines that, as long as China does not adopt excessive policies, the ASEAN policy toward China will be relatively moderate, This not only serves China’s strategic interests, but also benefits the security of the region as a whole.

6. Guarantee regional stability in Central Asia, prevent religious extremism and separatism in the region from threatening the security of China’s western region, and guarantee China’s access to Central Asian energy supplies when necessary. To achieve these goals, the best strategy is to vigorously promote the economic integration of Central Asia. Given the fact that Russia still sees Central Asia as its backyard and the importance of Sino-Russian relations, China should try to persuade Russia to cooperate more extensively with China in Central Asia.

Economic integration in Central Asia would provide the following benefits at least: 1) Economic growth brought about by economic integration can provide an economic foundation for the stability and development of the region. 2) To a certain extent, economic development can also curb the power of Muslim extremism. 3) Economic integration can lay a solid foundation for other cooperations in the region. 4) Sino-Russian cooperation in the economic integration of Central Asia can eliminate the possibility of damage to the Sino-Russian partnership due to conflicting interests in the region. 5) The economic integration of Central Asia will also cooperate with China’s western development plan to achieve the strategy of a “two-sided attack” with respect to the development of the northwest region.

The promotion of economic integration in Central Asia can be carried out on the basis of the annual meeting of the five heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The annual meeting of the five heads of state is already an international mechanism and can promote the interdependence and mutual trust of the countries and make these countries place a greater value on cooperation. Economic integration in Central Asia is a good strategy, or even the only strategy, by which Central Asian countries can adapt to economic globalization²¹.

Finally, the economic integration of Central Asia has a deeper geopolitical significance. The current fierce competition among various forces in the region introduces latent factors of instability to the region. If the major powers can adopt a more cooperative attitude so as to stabilize the region and then integrate the region into a broader mechanism of regional cooperation, this would go a long way to deescalating the situation in the region.

7. Prevent a rising India from becoming an enemy of China. The rise of India is a trend that China and the world must face. Just as the world is concerned about the direction of China’s rise, China is likewise concerned about the direction of India’s rise.

China cannot deny that India is a regional superpower in the South Asian subcontinent. Therefore, China has to recognize India’s status and power in the South Asian subcontinent. China’s aim should not be to attempt to prevent the rise of India’s power, but to seek a strong India that will not adopt a hostile attitude towards China because of its nationalism.

Specifically, China should seek to play the role of an external balancing force in South Asia²². However, this strategy of balancing India should not be our end goal: China’s aim is to make India realize that confrontation with China can only be a game that benefits neither party so that India can appreciate the benefits of Sino-Indian cooperation.

Unfortunately, the existence of the Himalayas greatly mitigates the security dilemma between China and India, so the chances of China and India reaching a certain understanding are reduced. Therefore, while China hopes that China and India can reach an understanding, the hope for such an understanding cannot be too high.

The relationship between China and India is constrained by many other factors (such as Sino-Pakistan relations, India-Pakistan relations, U.S.-India relations, Russia-India relations, etc.). Both the United States and Russia hope to use India to balance China to a certain extent. From India’s point of view, it is in India’s best interest to maintain this convenient strategic posture. This strategic flexibility may be related to India’s strategic culture²³.

A certain strategic environment is necessary to achieve a Sino-Indian reconciliation. This strategic environment needs to meet at least four conditions: 1) India finds that the support it can obtain from the United States is limited. 2) India’s hostility towards China and between India and Pakistan can be basically eliminated, so that it can face history more rationally. 3) India realizes that seeking hegemony in South Asia will only invite South Asian countries to unite against India. 4) The common interests between China and India, such as economic interests, continue to expand, so that the current political relations between China and India cannot meet the needs of the development of economic relations. From this point of view, the “Sub-regional Economic Cooperation Zone of the Bay of Bengal Countries and Southwest China” advocated by the “Kunming Initiative” has long-term strategic significance²⁴.

7. Ensure energy supply from the Middle East. The Gulf War gave the United States and Britain the perfect excuse to maintain their hold over the Persian Gulf situation in perpetuity. The reliance of many Arab countries on the United States and its allies makes the Gulf an inland sea of the United States. This makes is it far less likely that any other outside power will intervene in the region and challenge the position of the United States. If the U.S. presence and influence in the Gulf region are weakened, this will be mostly due to changes in the domestic political situations of pro-U.S. Gulf countries, which will eventually force the United States to withdraw from the Gulf.

Under such circumstances, any attempt to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Gulf is unlikely to succeed. However, China can and should seek to establish a “minimum balance of power” in the Gulf. Given that the United States already controls the west coast of the Persian Gulf, China and Russia should seek to expand relations with Iran, which sits on the east coast of the Gulf. The goal of developing this relationship should not be to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Gulf. Instead, the oil in the Gulf will be able to flow freely due to the cooperation between the two sides of the Gulf. The purpose is to prevent the United States from imposing oil embargoes on other countries during special periods.

In addition, the development of Sino-Iran relations should not prevent China and other pro-U.S. Gulf states from developing broader and deeper relations, nor should it prevent Iran from continuing to improve and develop relations with the United States. The “minimum balance of power” China pursues in the Gulf is not about confrontation with the United States, but an insurance policy to cope with certain contingencies.

III. Major Questions in the Ideal Security Environment

The grand strategy of a country inevitably involves some questions that are almost “philosophical.” The answers given to these questions basically determine the general conception of a country’s grand strategy. Here, we will discuss some issues that have already received a great deal of attention in an attempt to tie such discussions to specific security issues.

1. The international structure should not determine China’s grand security strategy. Because the impact of the international structure on a country’s security environment is far less decisive than is widely believed, the international structure should not determine China’s grand security strategy. In fact, changes in the international structure have historically been “accidental” in origin: the unpredictable consequences of “unbalanced growth”²⁵ and wars, rather than conscious initiative. When a certain “unipolar,” “bipolar,” or “multipolar” structure of the world arrives, it does so in a completely “natural”, or you could say “random,” manner. The international structure is only an additional product of world development. In fact, it is difficult for a state to establish a certain type of structure for the purpose of one’s grand strategy. Most of the time, the diplomacy of a state is how the state seeks to raise or at least maintain its position in the structure at present and for the foreseeable future. Historically, the most successful countries are the ones that adapt best to the environment. As Guiguzi said: “In ancient times, those who did well in the world had to weigh the powers of the world and comprehend the minds of princes” (古之善用天下者，必量天下之权而揣诸侯之情).

Given that the current global pattern will continue to exist for a considerable period of time²⁶, while taking the establishment of a global multipolar world as its long-term strategic goal, China should place more emphasis on seeking to establish an ideal security environment in the important areas around China. This is because, under the same global structure, different regions will have different regional structures²⁷.

The establishment of a regional multipolar structure does not contradict the current unipolar world (or one superpower) on the global scale. The United States, as a global power, must necessarily disperse its power. However, as an Asia-Pacific country, China can concentrate its power on pursuing its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Because of the existence of Japan, China, ASEAN, and Russia, it is reasonable to hold that East Asia will be the first region in the world to start the formation of a multipolar world²⁸. If there is any region where the United States cannot get its own way, it must be in East Asia.

Second, if we hope for a multipolar world, we must prepare for the consequences of multipolarity. The most important of these consequences is the question of Japan’s status. Japan, as America’s most important ally in Asia, cannot truly escape the orbit of the United States (nor does it intend to escape the orbit of the United States), and the United States will not allow Japan to escape from its orbit. However, as a great power, Japan should naturally also play an important role in international affairs, because in a multi-polar world, Japan will rightfully constitute one pole. This means that what China has to consider is not whether to accept Japan’s role, but to what extent to accept it. On these issues, China has not considered enough.

2. Development and shaping: Security interdependence. “Development is the absolute principle” (发展才是硬道理) is still the ultimate means for countries (especially major powers) to ensure their own security in a state of anarchy. However, the national security environment is a system. Therefore, a country’s grand strategy is not only concerned with developing its strength. This is because a country, especially a major country like China, will definitely have a major influence on international politics, especially on some surrounding countries, when it develops. China’s development has not only changed its own security environment, but also the security environments of other countries. Likewise, changes in the security environments of other countries will in turn affect China’s security environment. Therefore, in order to shape the ideal security environment for a country, it is necessary to attempt to influence the security environments and policies of other countries.

This requires China to work with other countries to mitigate the “security dilemma” and shape a favorable security environment for China while it develops. From this point of view, development and shaping are equally important to the country’s grand strategy.

No matter how powerful China itself is, China’s security will always depend on other countries. Therefore, China’s ideal security environment must necessarily contain an “idealistic” (理想主义, as in the international relations theory of “idealism”) side. This is not just because Chinese culture has always upheld a sense of justice. In addition, it is because, if it has no moral code, a grand strategy cannot win the support of the people, nor can it be accepted by other countries, nor can it succeed.

3. Shaping the surrounding security environment: The utility of multilateralism. When shaping the surrounding security environment, we should not only use traditional bilateral cooperation, but, even more, promote multilateral cooperation to closely link the interests of more countries. China should seek more multilateral cooperation, especially regional economic cooperation, in several regions around China that offer a high possibility of multilateral cooperation, such as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.

The ultimate goal of such multilateral regional cooperation is that, in the next fifteen to twenty years, when China’s economic scale has made it a large market both in absolute terms and in terms of purchasing power, China will have followed a different strategy of economic development from Japan, that is, China will gradually become a big market for neighboring countries. This sort of open economic system will, in a sense, establish an economic system arrayed in a ring around China. This ability to link the economies of neighboring countries with China’s economic system will greatly strengthen China’s influence on its surrounding security environment, and will also greatly mitigate the concerns that neighboring countries have about China’s strength. From this perspective, China must pay attention to the three (sub)regional economic cooperation zones (Lancang-Mekong, Bay of Bengal, Central Asia) relevant to western China. These three (sub)regional economic cooperation zones run from south to north and these, together with the “China-Japan-Korea Economic Cooperative” (or other Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation method)²⁹ currently under discussion, will cover almost all of China’s major neighbors. In the next 20 to 30 years, if the economic cooperation in these regions can become a substantial economic cooperation zone or an economic integration organization, this will not only provide an international environment for the development of the western regions of China, but also make the various countries interdependent and provide a guarantee for the stability and peace of the entire region. Ultimately, when China became the undisputed largest economy in East Asia, China also became a bridge linking the economic regions of South Asia, Central and Western Asia, and East Asia. Such a China will undoubtedly be one of the pillars for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the future, regardless of the number of poles of the future structure of the Asia-Pacific region.

At present, the concept of security in the Asia-Pacific region is still a situation of competition among various concepts. These range from the concept of “peace under hegemony” of the United States, to the “comprehensive security” of ASEAN, to the “new security concept” advocated by China and Russia, to the “multilateral security” of Canada³⁰. But in fact, excepting the ideologically conflicting “peace under hegemony” concept of the United States, the various multilateral security concepts have much in common with each other. How to find common ground among these multilateral security concepts and build a multilateral security mechanism that serves the interests of not only China, but also other countries will become the most important issue in China’s future security strategy.

The direction of the reunified Korean peninsula is a good opportunity: If China can make the reunified Korean peninsula a neutral country, not only would this go a long way towards eliminating the biggest security risk in Northeast China, but it would also show that China does not consider only its own security interests, but that it also takes into account the interests of other major powers and the Korean nation itself. This would build a certain degree of mutual security and trust among the major powers.

The interactivity, incompatibility, and irreversibility of national security policy choices. The national security environment is a system. Therefore, changes at any point may cause changes at other points, or even changes in the system as a whole. This means that, many times, in order to achieve certain strategic goals, we must consider the interaction of different policies. This is the interactivity of national security policy choices.

The systemic nature of the national security environment means that the consequences of a state’s security policies are almost always impossible to judge in isolation. In many cases, the choice of one policy limits other options. This is because two options may be inherently contradictory, or the result of the first option makes the second option impossible. Moreover, once a chosen policy is found to be unworkable or inconsistent with the country’s strategic goals, it is impossible to return to the original point and choose another policy. This is the incompatibility and irreversibility of national security policy choices.