理想安全环境与新世纪中国大战略
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Ideal Security Environment and China’s Grand Strategy in the New Century

理想安全环境与新世纪中国大战略

This lengthy analysis of China’s grand strategy was written at the turn of the millennia by Tang Shiping, a highly regarded political scientist and international relations scholar at Fudan University. The piece makes for interesting context on a host of issues that are currently front-of-mind, including cross-Strait relations, the China-US relationship, as well as China’s relationship with Russia.


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I. Point of Departure for Our Question

一  问题的出发点

A country’s security policy must have a “grand strategy”‎1 to guide its specific operations. Otherwise, the country’s security policy will always remain at the level of coping with emergencies. The most important thing for a country’s security grand strategy is to determine the purpose of the national security policy, that is, the ideal security environment pursued by the country.

一个国家的安全政策必须有一个 “大战略” (Grand Strategy)来指导其具体的运作,否则,国家的安全政策将永远停留在应付突发事件的水平上。而国家的安全大 战略中最重要的乃是确定国家安全政策的目的,即国家所追求的理想安全环境。

A country’s ideal security environment is determined by many factors2, such as its geographical environment, and its definition of national interests. For example, the ideal security environment of the United States can be simply summarized as one where “no other power (including an alliance of powers) can compete with the United States.” Therefore, the grand strategy of the United States is to “prevent the rise of any power that might challenge the United States or prevent and impede such a power from confronting the United States.”3As another example, Singapore’s ideal security environment is “a peaceful and stable regional and international environment conducive to economic development.” Therefore, Singapore’s grand strategy is to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and a prosperous international economic environment.

一个国家的理想安全环境是由其所处的地理环境等多个因素和其对国家利益的定义来决定的。比如美国的理想安全环境可以简单地概括成 “没有其它任何力量(包括力量联盟)可以和美国抗衡”,因此,美国的大战略便是 “防止任何有可能挑战美国的力量的崛起或防止和阻止该力量与美国对抗”。又比如,新加坡的理想安全环境是 “ 利于经济发展的和平与稳定的地区和国际环境”。因此,新加坡的大战略就是维护亚太地区的和平与稳定以及国际经济环境的繁荣。

In China, current research on strategic issues rarely involves the field of “grand strategy.”4 However, a discussion of and answers to questions regarding grand strategy not only have guiding significance for China’s specific security policy, but also can reduce suspicion and misunderstanding of China’s security policy on the part of other countries5‎.

我国目前的战略问题研究很少有涉及 “大战略” 领域的。然而,对大战略的讨论和回答不仅对我国具体的安全政策有指导意义,更可以减少其它国家对我国安全政策的猜疑和误解。

This article only attempts to answer a question in the field of China’s grand strategy, namely: What is the ideal security environment that China should pursue? Especially in the Asia-Pacific region,6 what security structure would China most want to see? As an Asia-Pacific country, China’s most important national interests are almost all concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, China’s security will also primarily depend on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

本文只想试图回答中国大战略中的一个问题,即:中国所应追求的理想安全环境是什么?特别是在亚太地 区,中国最希望看到的安全结构是什么?作为一个亚太国家,中国最重要的国家利益几乎都集中在亚太地区, 因此中国的安全也将主要取决于亚太地区的安全环境。

II. Grand Strategy: China’s Ideal Security Environment

二  大战略:中国理想的安全环境

Here, I divide the goals of China’s security strategy into two categories: global and regional.

在这里,我将中国安全战略的目标分为全球性的和地区性的两类。

Global Goals
全球性目标

In terms of global security goals, in order of importance, China’s strategic security goals should be:

在全球性的安全目标上,按重要性排列,中国安全战略目标依次应该是:

1. Maintain an effective strategic deterrence. Strategic deterrence has become one of the cornerstones of the international security framework. Therefore,7 China must maintain an effective “minimum nuclear deterrence” to prevent any potentially hostile power from threatening its vital interests. The missile defense system that the United States and Japan seek to develop is the most dangerous factor that could cause structural changes in the international security environment. Once this missile defense system is successfully deployed, it will fundamentally shake the understanding of national security established since World War II, namely: that national security is based on interdependence and mutual deterrence, so national security is relative. Under such a strategic situation, the unilateral development of a missile defense system by any country or camp would break the understanding of security as interdependent and based on mutual nuclear deterrence. Offense would once again predominate over defense, thereby greatly aggravating the security dilemma between nations and leading to a new arms race. The nuclear powers must either cooperate in the development of missile defense systems or exercise restraint. Otherwise, the escalation of the arms race will be unavoidable.

1. 维持有效的战略威慑。战略威慑已经成为国际安全框架的基石之一,因此,中国必须维持有效的“最低限度核威慑”,以阻止任何潜在的敌对力量威胁中国生死攸关的利益。美国和日本要发展的导弹防御系统是能使国际安全环境发生结构性变化的最危险因素。一旦导弹防御系统被成功部署,它将从根本上动摇二战以来的国家安全理念:即国家的安全是基于相互依赖和相互威慑的安全,因此国家的安全是相对的。在这样的战略态势下,任何一国或阵营单方面发展导弹防御系统都将打破建立在相互核威慑上的相互依赖的安全概念,使进攻重新压倒防御,从而大大增加国家之间的安全困境,导致新的军备竞赛。核大国间在导弹防御系统上要么合作发展,要么采取克制态度,否则军备竞赛将不可避免地升级。

2. A new “multipolar world” that does not repeat the constant wars and turmoil in European history is in China’s interests, but China’s grand strategy should not be determined by a particular international structure. Although human history records many large-scale wars that broke out in Europe under multipolar world conditions, from the perspective of international relations theory, a multipolar structure greatly restricts the behavior of states in at least three aspects: 1) A multipolar world places the most powerful constraints on the actions of states, especially great powers;8 2) In a multipolar world there is minimal pressure for great powers to involve themselves in conflicts where they have no real interest because of “face” or “credibility;” 9 3) Uncertainty about their allies makes great powers cautious10.

2. 一个有别于欧洲历史上战乱不断的新 “ 多极世界”符合中国的利益,但中国的大战略不应由某一特定的国际结构来决定。尽管人类历史上许多大规模战争均爆发在多极世界下的欧洲,但从国际关系理论上来说,多极结构至少对国家的行为从三个方面有高度的限制力:1)多极世界对国家,特别是对大国行动的约束力是各种结构中最高的;2)多极世界中大国因“面子” 或“信誉” 而卷入没有实际利益的冲突的压力是最小的; 3)盟友的不确定会让大国谨慎行事。

The new multipolar world will be qualitatively different from the war-torn “multipolar world” of continental Europe in the following ways: 1) None of the major powers is (or at least is not explicitly) an enemy of any other, and all major powers maintain relatively stable bilateral relations in order to maintain strategic ambiguity and flexibility. The ambiguity and flexibility of this strategy help to undermine the ambitions of great powers. 2) Great powers are determined to repair relationships when they fall to a low point (such as in Sino-U.S. relations). 3) The deepening of economic interdependence and international norms/international institutions are even more important factors for stabilizing relations between great powers. 4) In addition to bilateral cooperation, great powers also seek multilateral cooperation. 5) Although power is still the basis of inter-state politics, the pursuit of territorial expansion has become difficult to achieve, or in other words, the world of the past where “might made right” has become milder. All of these factors have the potential to make the new multipolar structure more peaceful and stable. However, changes in the international structure generally cannot be driven by people, but are mainly the result of economic development (non-equilibrium growth) or even accidental factors.11 Therefore, China’s grand strategy should not be determined by a particular international structure.

新的多极世界将在以下几点和欧洲大陆曾有过的战乱不断的“多极世界”有质的区别:1)各大国均不(或至少不明确地)与对方为敌,大国之间均保持相对稳定的双边关系,以保持战略的模糊和灵活性。这种战略的模糊和 灵活性有助于削弱大国的野心;2)大国之间具备在关系跌入低谷时修复关系的决心(比如中美关系);3)经济相互依存的日益深化和国际准则/ 国际机构更是稳定大国关系的重要因素;4)大国之间不只有双边合作,也会谋求多边合作;5)尽管权力仍旧是国家间政治的基础,但追求领土扩张的行为已经很难行得通,或者说过去“强权即真理” 的世界已经变得相对温和。这些因素都有可能使新的多极结构更加和平和稳定。但是,国际结构的变化一 般并不能被人为地推动,而主要是经济发展 (非均衡增长),乃至是偶然因素造成的结果。因此,中国的大战略不应由某一特定的国际结构来决定。

Regional Goals
地区性目标

In terms of the regional security environment, China should pursue the following goals:

在地区安全环境上,中国应追求的目标是:

1. National economic strength is the ultimate guarantee of national security. Therefore, one of China’s most important strategic security goals is to ensure that China’s economic foundation is safe from attack. To achieve this, China must have sufficient deterrence capabilities to prevent any adversary from attempting to attack China’s economic foundation due to fear of painful retaliatory strikes. We must change our understanding of the role of defensive forces: The task of defensive forces is first to deter, and second, to have sufficient defensive force to repel the enemy when deterrence fails. China’s coastal areas have become the lifeblood of China’s economy. For the foreseeable future, the countries capable of actually posing substantial threats to our coastal areas are the United States and Japan. Therefore, while maintaining our deterrent power, we must also maintain Sino-U.S. relations at least at the level of “not friends, but not enemies” (非敌非友).

1. 国家经济实力是国家安全的最终保障,因此,中国最重要的安全战略目标之一是保证中国的经济基础不 遭到打击。要达到这一目的,中国必须拥有充分的阻吓(威慑)能力,以阻止任何试图打击中国经济基础的对手都面临惨痛的报复性打击。我们必须转变对国防力量的 任务的认识:国防力量的任务首先是阻吓(威慑),其次才是在阻吓失败后有足够的防守力量击退敌人。中国的 沿海地区已成为中国经济的命脉,而在可预见的将来,真正能对我沿海地区形成实质性威胁的国家非美国和日本 莫属。因此,在维持我方威慑力量的同时,也必须将中美 关系至少保持在“非敌非友”的水平上。

The triangular Sino-U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important trilateral relationship in the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, however, a triangular relationship is the most unstable type of combination relationship in the international structure. Therefore, China, the United States, and Japan must be aware of the difficulty and importance of handling this triangular relationship, and especially its balanced development12.

中美日三角关系对亚太地区是最重要的三边关系。然而,不幸的是,三角关系是国际结构中最不稳定的关系 组合。因此,中美日三国都必须意识到处理这一三角关 系的难度和重要性,特别是它的平衡发展。

2. Although China’s economic foundation is mostly concentrated in the coastal areas, China is a mainland country after all, and security on land is the foundation of China’s security. Therefore, China must consolidate its security environment on the Asian continent. Moreover, the most frightening threat to our land security environment is a hostile Russia. Therefore, another important strategic security goal of China is to prevent a re-emergent Russia from becoming an enemy of China. China cannot and should not prevent Russia’s re-emergence, but we can strive to make an again-powerful Russia a friend.

2. 尽管中国的经济基础大都集中在沿海地区,但中国毕竟是一个大陆国家,陆地安全乃中国安全之根本。因此,中国必须巩固在亚洲大陆上的安全环境。而对我国陆上安全环境最可怕的威胁是一个有敌意的俄罗斯。所以,中国另一重要的安全战略目标是预防一个重新崛起的俄罗斯与中国为敌。中国无法也不应该阻止俄罗斯的重新崛起,但可以努力使一个重新强大的俄罗斯成为朋友。

No matter how powerful China and Russia are in themselves, if they are at odds with each other, their strategic positions will be greatly weakened. Conversely, if the two sides can support each other, this will greatly strengthen the strategic positions of both. There is no natural geographical barrier between China and Russia. If there is ever bad blood between them, the “security dilemma” will be unbearable (this is borne out by the past history of China and the Soviet Union). Therefore, from a long-term perspective, Sino-Russian relations are no less important than Sino-U.S. relations. As a proud nation, what Russia hates most is when others look down on it, and history has proven that Russia is the most terrible enemy of those who look down on it. Therefore, China must give Russia the respect it deserves and strive to keep Russia as a friendly partner even after it is strong13.

不管中国和俄罗斯各自多强大,如果彼此不和,则双方的战略地位都将大大削弱。反之,如果双方能相互支撑,则双方的战略地位都将大大加强。中俄两国之间没有天然的地理屏障,一旦交恶,“安全困境”将是无法忍受的(中苏过去的历史已证明这一点)。因此,从长远来看, 中俄关系的重要性绝不亚于中美关系的重要性。作为一个骄傲的民族,俄罗斯最痛恨的就是别人轻视它,而历史已经证明俄罗斯是那些轻视它的人的最可怕的敌人。所以,中国必须给俄罗斯应有的尊敬,争取俄罗斯在强大后,仍是一个友好的伙伴。

3. On the premise of preventing Taiwan’s independence, try to achieve the reunification of the motherland by peaceful means. Taiwan’s relationship with China is by no means merely a matter of Taiwan’s strategic position or of “washing away national humiliation” to save face. Rather, it is related to the question of whether “China,” as an idea, can continue to exist. Therefore, this is China’s most vital interest.

3. 在阻止台湾独立的前提下,尽量以和平方式达成祖国的统一。台湾对中国绝不仅仅是台湾的战略位置或是“洗刷国耻” 的面子问题,而是关系到“中国” 作为一个理念能否继续存在下去的问题,因此它是中国最生死攸关的利益。

To resolve the Taiwan issue, whether or not the United States intervenes is an important variable. In order to reduce the possibility of U.S. involvement, in addition to developing a deterrent military force, China must do all it can to create reasons for the United States (government and people) to accept a unified China.

要解决台湾问题,美国是否介入是一个重要的变数。为了降低美国介入的可能性,中国除了要发展阻吓军力外,还要尽量为美国(政府和民众)创造接受一个统一中国的理由。

China must make the United States realize that a China without Taiwan will no longer be “China” in the eyes of the Chinese people. Taiwan holds the same importance for China as democracy and freedom for the United States. We must also make the United States aware that a dismembered China will always be a destabilizing factor in its global power framework. Only a unified China will have the sense of responsibility and willingness to partner with the United States to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. China is more than willing to be a country that is satisfied with the status quo, but that must come after reunification.

中国必须让美国认识到,一个没有台湾的中国在中国人心目中将不再是“中国”。台湾对中国就象民主和自由对美国一样重要。我们还必须让美国意识到,在它的全球力量框架中,一个不统一的中国将始终是其中的不安定因素;而只有一个统一的中国才会有与美国共同承担维护亚太地区和平与安全的责任和意愿。中国极愿意成为一个满足现状的国家,但那必须是在统一之后。

The three goals above are the most important goals of China’s ideal security environment. Second, China must also:

上述三个目标乃是中国理想安全环境的最重要的目标。其次,中国还要:

4. On the basis of preventing the deterioration of the situation on the Korean peninsula, ensure that the ultimate reunification of the Korean peninsula will not have a negative impact on China’s security environment. The strategic position of the Korean peninsula is indisputable. Given that there are still many uncertainties in the relationships between China, Russia, the United States, and Japan, no side wants to see a unified Korean peninsula fall into the sphere of influence of another side. The geographical location of the Korean peninsula means that a unified Korean peninsula and the formation of a military alliance by any side would worsen the security dilemma of the other sides, thereby creating a hidden danger to the long-term stability of the region.

4. 在防止朝鲜半岛局势恶化的基础上,保证朝鲜半岛的最终统一不会对中国安全环境造成负面影响。朝鲜半岛的战略位置不容置疑。在中俄美日四大国的关系中仍有许多不确定因素的情况下,任何一方都不愿看到一个统一的朝鲜半岛落入另一方的势力范围。朝鲜半岛的地理位置决定了统一后的朝鲜半岛和任何一方结成军事联盟都会恶化另一方的安全困境, 从而为该地区的长期稳定埋下隐患。

By contrast, a unified Korean peninsula whose neutrality was backed by the Big Four could bring lasting peace to the entire Northeast Asian region. Pursuing a neutral unification of the Korean peninsula is not only conducive to promoting the reunification of the Korean peninsula and realizing the national goal of the Korean nation. It can also set a precedent for multilateral cooperation among the Big Four.14 Therefore, China’s most realistic and most ideal security goal in Northeast Asia should be a neutral and unified Korean peninsula.

相比之下,一个为四大国支持的中立的统一的朝鲜半岛则能为整个东北亚地区带来永久的和平。 以一个中立的统一朝鲜半岛为目的,不仅有利于促进朝鲜半岛的统一, 实现朝鲜民族的国家目标;同时也能为四大国之间的多边合作开创先例。因此,中国在东北亚地区最现实而又最理想的安全目标应该是一个 中立的统一朝鲜半岛。

A neutral, unified Korean peninsula also provides an excellent opportunity for China and the United States to reach a strategic understanding. If China and the United States can jointly support a neutral and unified Korea, it will greatly enhance trust between the two countries. Taking account of China’s interests, the United States would no longer insist on stationing troops on the reunified Korean Peninsula; while China, taking account of the interests of the United States, would not pursue a “pro-China” Korean Peninsula. Such mutual concessions would lay a substantive foundation for more cooperation between China and the United States.

一个中立的统一朝鲜半岛还为中美两国提供了一个达成战略理解的绝佳机会。如果中美两国能共同支持一 个中立的统一朝鲜,将大大增强两国间的信任。美国考 虑到中方的利益,不再坚持在统一后的朝鲜半岛驻军;而 中方考虑到美国的利益,不追求一个“亲中”的朝鲜半岛。这种相互让步将为中美之间更多的合作奠定实质性的基点。

5. On the basis of preventing the Southeast Asia region from being dominated by hostile forces, seek more wide-ranging cooperation.15 Trade between China and Southeast Asian countries is expanding and Southeast Asia can by hostile forces as a base to threaten China’s economic lifeline. This means that Southeast Asia is just as important to China’s security as the Korean Peninsula16.

5. 在防止东南亚地区为敌对势力所左右的基础上,谋求更广泛的合作。中国和东南亚国家的贸易日趋扩大和东南亚可以被作为威胁中国经济命脉的敌对势力的基地,意味着东南亚地区对中国安全的重要性不亚于朝鲜半岛。

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) would welcome a situation where the power of major countries could be roughly balanced making it impossible for these powers to control regional affairs 17. This situation is in the interest of China as well as the interest of the other major powers. From this point of view, if ASEAN can truly become a “peaceful, free, and neutral zone,” this should be welcomed by all major countries, 18 even though it may be very difficult to realize this ideal.

东盟乐于见到的局面是一个各个大国的力量能大体保持平衡,因而无法左右地区事务的局面。这样的一个局面符合中国的利益,也符合其它各个大国的利益。从这一点上来说,东盟如果能真正成为一个“和平、自由、中立区”  是值得各个大国欢迎的,尽管实现这一理想恐怕有很大困难。

The Asia-Pacific region is the region most likely to form a multipolar world, and the ASEAN is bound to be an important force among them. China and many ASEAN countries share the common interest of pursuing a multipolar world. However, whether ASEAN can become a pole, or how solid it is as a pole depends to a large extent on two points: 1) The cohesion of ASEAN and the judgment of major powers as to the strength of ASEAN; 2) The leading status of Indonesia as the largest ASEAN country and the quality of its leadership. Furthermore, Vietnam’s influence on the Indochina Peninsula is a point that is likely to become increasingly important in the future.

亚太地区是最有可能形成多极世界的地区,而东南亚国家联盟将势必是其中重要的力量。中国和东盟的许多国家有着谋求一个多极世界的共同利益,但东盟能否成为一极,或者其作为一极的坚实程度在很大程度上取决于两点:1)东南亚国家联盟的凝聚力以及大国对东盟力量的判断;2)印度尼西亚作为东南亚国家联盟最大的国家,其在东盟中的领导地位和领导的好坏。而将来很有可能越来越重要的一点是越南对印度支那半岛的影响。

Since ASEAN already includes all the countries in Southeast Asia, in forming a high degree of cohesion within the organization, the focus of ASEAN’s future efforts will be to establish an institutional policy coordination and intervention mechanism. Judging from its responses to the last two crises (the financial crisis and the Indonesia/Timor-Leste crisis), ASEAN still cannot effectively handle crises at critical times. Therefore, at least for now, ASEAN is not a real pole in the Asia-Pacific region, or at best it is a weak pole. Second, if ASEAN wants to become a pole in the Asia-Pacific region, it must “walk a tightrope” in its relations with major powers: That is to say, it cannot be too close to any one major power, but nor can it be too distant. This is a difficult balance to strike. In addition, the different countries in ASEAN have quite different attitudes towards the major powers. Therefore, even if ASEAN becomes a true pole, it still has to learn to speak with one voice. Moreover, it is difficult for an alliance to become a true pole as there will be inevitable conflicts between the interests of the countries within the alliance 19. Within ASEAN, three countries play a key role for the future of ASEAN: Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. The importance of Indonesia to ASEAN does not need to be discussed, and the participation of the three Indochinese countries Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the Indochina Peninsula increased Vietnam’s influence on regional affairs overnight. Myanmar’s pivotal strategic position in Southeast Asia is also clearly evident: Myanmar not only straddles the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, but it also brings together the north and south parts of Southeast Asia.

由于东盟已经包括了所有的东南亚国家,因此,在组织内形成高度的凝聚力,建立机制性的政策协调和干预机制将是东盟今后努力的重点。从最近两次对危机 (金融危机和印尼/东帝汶危机)的应对来看,东盟仍不能在关键时候有效地处理危机。因此,至少在目前,东盟还不是亚太地区真正的一极,或者说最多是虚弱的一极。其次,东盟如果想成为亚太地区的一极,必须在对大国的关系上“走钢丝”:即不能和任何一个大国靠得太近,又不能离得太远,而这一点是十分难以把握的。加上东盟内部不同国家对大国的态度有相当大的差别,因此,东盟即便成了真正的一极,仍然要学会以一个声音说话。况且,一个联盟很难成为真正的一极,因为联盟内的国家的利益 将不可避免地有抵触。在东盟内,有三个国家对东盟的未来起着关键作用:印度尼西亚、越南、缅甸。印度尼 西亚对东盟的重要性无需多论,而越南、柬埔寨、老挝三 个印度支那半岛国家加入东盟意味着越南对地区事务的 影响力也在一夜间变大了。缅甸的在东南亚举足轻重的 战略地位也是显而易见的:缅甸不仅横亘于印度洋和太 平洋之间,也是东南亚南北两部分的结合地。

Therefore, on the basis of strengthening relations with all ASEAN countries, China must strengthen its relations with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Myanmar. It is critical that China and Indonesia develop some sort of strategic partnership (although the situation in Indonesia remains volatile). For a long time, the relationship between China and Indonesia has been in an unstable state for historical and cultural reasons. As a result,  Indonesia’s China policy has long been based on a hostile and distrustful stance 20. It is necessary for China to strengthen relations with Indonesia in all respects, including the relations between the two militaries.

因此,在加强和所有东盟国家关系的基础上,中国必须加强和印尼、越南和缅甸的关系。中国和印度尼西亚 发展某种意义上的战略伙伴关系是至关重要的 (尽管印尼的局势仍旧动荡不安)。长期以来,历史和文化的原因导致中国和印尼的关系一直处于不稳定的状态,使印尼的对华政策长期以来基本上是建立在一种敌视和不信任 的立场上。中国有必要加强和印度尼西亚的全方位的关系,包括两军间的关系。

The recent warming in Sino-Vietnamese relations shows that Vietnam has become increasingly aware that other powers can come and go, while China will always be Vietnam’s neighbor (of course, this does not mean that Vietnam is no longer wary of China). On the basis of this sort of strategic understanding, Sino-Vietnamese relations can take a significant step forward.

中越关系最近的升温表明越南已经越来越意识到其它大国可以来了又去,而中国却注定是越南的邻邦 (当然,这不意味着越南不再对中国持有戒备心理)。在这样的战略理解基础上,中越关系还可以向前迈进许多。

Therefore, on the basis of existing economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries, China should promote economic cooperation in the Lancang-Mekong sub-region (including China’s Yunnan province, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand). The intent of this sub-regional economic cooperation is not to turn the region into China’s sphere of influence, but to establish “interdependence” between these countries and China, so as to bring the interests of the various countries into closer alignment and drive the economic development of China’s southwest region in coordination with China Western Development. This will be more conducive to the improvement of the security environment around China. In the future, China is bound to become an important market and source of technology/capital for Southeast Asian countries. These factors will provide the real-world necessity for the development of sub-regional economic cooperation. China must extensively participate in various ASEAN consultation and institutionalization processes. Only in this way can China ensure that, no matter how ASEAN develops, China can effectively establish wide-ranging relations with ASEAN and maintain its influence over regional affairs. The attitudes of the various ASEAN countries towards major powers range from relatively friendly to relatively skeptical. This also determines that, as long as China does not adopt excessive policies, the ASEAN policy toward China will be relatively moderate, This not only serves China’s strategic interests, but also benefits the security of the region as a whole.

因此,在和东盟国家业已存在的经济合作的基础上, 中国应该推动澜沧江-湄公河次地区经济合作 (包括中国的云南、越南、缅甸、老挝、柬埔寨、泰国)。这种次地区经济合作的意义不在于要将该地区变成中国的势力范围,而在于能在这些国家和中国之间建立“相互依存” 关系,使各个国家的利益更加紧密的联系在一起,配合中国 的西部大开发带动中国西南地区的经济发展,从而更有 利于中国周边安全环境的改善。在未来,中国势必将成 为东南亚国家的重要市场和技术/资金来源,这些都为发展次地区经济合作提供了现实的必要性。中国必须广泛参与东盟的各种协商和机制化的进程。只有这样,才能保证无论东盟如何发展,中国都能有效地和东盟建立广泛的关系,并保持对地区事务的影响力。东盟各国对各大国的态度从相对友好到相对怀疑应有尽有,这也就决定了只要中国不采取过激的政策,东南亚国家联盟的对华政策将是相对温和的,而这不仅附合中国的战略利益, 更有利于整个地区的安全。

6. Guarantee regional stability in Central Asia, prevent religious extremism and separatism in the region from threatening the security of China’s western region, and guarantee China’s access to Central Asian energy supplies when necessary. To achieve these goals, the best strategy is to vigorously promote the economic integration of Central Asia. Given the fact that Russia still sees Central Asia as its backyard and the importance of Sino-Russian relations, China should try to persuade Russia to cooperate more extensively with China in Central Asia.

6. 保证中亚地区的地区稳定,防止该地区宗教极端主义和分裂主义威胁中国的西部安全,保障中国在必要时能获得中亚的能源供应。要达成上述目标,最好的策略是大力推动中亚地区的经济一体化。鉴于俄罗斯仍将中亚地区视为其后院和中俄关系的重要性,中国应该试图说服俄罗斯在中亚地区和中国开展更广泛的合作。

Economic integration in Central Asia would provide the following benefits at least: 1) Economic growth brought about by economic integration can provide an economic foundation for the stability and development of the region. 2) To a certain extent, economic development can also curb the power of Muslim extremism. 3) Economic integration can lay a solid foundation for other cooperations in the region. 4) Sino-Russian cooperation in the economic integration of Central Asia can eliminate the possibility of damage to the Sino-Russian partnership due to conflicting interests in the region. 5) The economic integration of Central Asia will also cooperate with China’s western development plan to achieve the strategy of a “two-sided attack” with respect to the development of the northwest region.

中亚地区经济一体化至少有以下几个收获:1)经济一体化带来的经济增长可以为该地区的稳定和发展提供一个经济基础。2)经济的发展又可以在一定程度上遏制穆斯林极端主义的力量。3)经济一体化可以为该地区的其他合作打下一个坚实的基础。4)中亚经济一体化中的中俄合作可以消除中俄因在该地区中的利益冲突而损害中俄伙伴关系的可能性。5)中亚经济一体化还将配合中国的西部大开发计划,对西北地区的发展实现 “两面夹击”的战略。

The promotion of economic integration in Central Asia can be carried out on the basis of the annual meeting of the five heads of state of China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. The annual meeting of the five heads of state is already an international mechanism and can promote the interdependence and mutual trust of the countries and make these countries place a greater value on cooperation. Economic integration in Central Asia is a good strategy, or even the only strategy, by which Central Asian countries can adapt to economic globalization21.

推动中亚地区的经济一体化完全可以在中哈塔吉俄五国元首年会的基础上进行。五国元首年会已经是一个国际机制,它可以促进各国的相互依赖和相互信任,使各国都对合作更加重视。中亚地区经济一体化是中亚地区国家应对经济全球化的良策,甚至是唯一的策略。

Finally, the economic integration of Central Asia has a deeper geopolitical significance. The current fierce competition among various forces in the region introduces latent factors of instability to the region. If the major powers can adopt a more cooperative attitude so as to stabilize the region and then integrate the region into a broader mechanism of regional cooperation, this would go a long way to deescalating the situation in the region.

最后,中亚地区的经济一体化还有一个更深层次上的地缘政治意义。该地区目前各种势力的激烈争夺使该地区潜伏着许多不稳定的因素。如果各大国能采取更加合作的态度,使该地区稳定下来,然后将该地区融合到一个更广大的地区合作机制中去,将大大缓解该地区的局势。

7. Prevent a rising India from becoming an enemy of China. The rise of India is a trend that China and the world must face. Just as the world is concerned about the direction of China’s rise, China is likewise concerned about the direction of India’s rise.

7. 防止一个崛起的印度成为中国的敌人。印度的崛起是中国和世界必须面对的趋势。象世界关心中国崛起的走向一样,中国也关心印度崛起的走向。

China cannot deny that India is a regional superpower in the South Asian subcontinent. Therefore, China has to recognize India’s status and power in the South Asian subcontinent. China’s aim should not be to attempt to prevent the rise of India’s power, but to seek a strong India that will not adopt a hostile attitude towards China because of its nationalism.

中国无法否认印度是南亚次大陆的地区性超级大国,因而中国也不得不承认印度在南亚次大陆的地位和力量。中国的目的不应是试图阻止印度力量的上升,而是谋求一个强大的印度不会因为其民族主义而对中国采取敌意的态度。

Specifically, China should seek to play the role of an external balancing force in South Asia22. However, this strategy of balancing India should not be our end goal: China’s aim is to make India realize that confrontation with China can only be a game that benefits neither party so that India can appreciate the benefits of Sino-Indian cooperation.

具体地说,中国应谋求的是南亚地区的外部平衡力量的角色。但这种平衡印度的战略不应该是最终目的:中国的目的是要让印度意识到和中国对抗只能是两者都不受益的游戏,从而让印度认识到印中合作的好处。

Unfortunately, the existence of the Himalayas greatly mitigates the security dilemma between China and India, so the chances of China and India reaching a certain understanding are reduced. Therefore, while China hopes that China and India can reach an understanding, the hope for such an understanding cannot be too high.

不幸的是,喜马拉雅山脉的存在大大缓解了中印之间的安全困境,所以中印达成某种理解的机会反而减少 了。因此,虽然中国希望中印达成理解,但对达成这种理 解的希望也许无法太高。

The relationship between China and India is constrained by many other factors (such as Sino-Pakistan relations, India-Pakistan relations, U.S.-India relations, Russia-India relations, etc.). Both the United States and Russia hope to use India to balance China to a certain extent. From India’s point of view, it is in India’s best interest to maintain this convenient strategic posture. This strategic flexibility may be related to India’s strategic culture23.

中国和印度的关系受到众多其它因素 (比如中巴关系、印巴关系、美印关系、俄印关系等)的制约。美国和俄罗斯都希望在一定程度上利用印度来平衡中国。而从印 度的角度来看,维持这种左右逢缘的战略态势对其最有 利。这种战略的灵活性可能与印度的战略文化有关。

A certain strategic environment is necessary to achieve a Sino-Indian reconciliation. This strategic environment needs to meet at least four conditions: 1) India finds that the support it can obtain from the United States is limited. 2) India’s hostility towards China and between India and Pakistan can be basically eliminated, so that it can face history more rationally. 3) India realizes that seeking hegemony in South Asia will only invite South Asian countries to unite against India. 4) The common interests between China and India, such as economic interests, continue to expand, so that the current political relations between China and India cannot meet the needs of the development of economic relations. From this point of view, the “Sub-regional Economic Cooperation Zone of the Bay of Bengal Countries and Southwest China” advocated by the “Kunming Initiative” has long-term strategic significance24.

要达成中印和解需要一定的战略环境。这一战略环境至少需要满足四个条件:1)印度发现能从美国那得到的支持是有限的;2)印度对中国以及印度和巴基斯坦间的敌意能基本消除,从而更加理性地面对历史;3)印度认识到谋求南亚霸权只能招来南亚各国联合对抗印度。4)中印间的共同利益,比如经济利益不断扩大,以至于目前中印间的政治关系无法满足经济关系发展的需要。从这一点上来说,“昆明行动”所倡导的“孟加拉湾国家与中国西南地区次地区经济合作区”具有长期的战略意义。

7. Ensure energy supply from the Middle East. The Gulf War gave the United States and Britain the perfect excuse to maintain their hold over the Persian Gulf situation in perpetuity. The reliance of many Arab countries on the United States and its allies makes the Gulf an inland sea of the United States. This makes is it far less likely that any other outside power will intervene in the region and challenge the position of the United States. If the U.S. presence and influence in the Gulf region are weakened, this will be mostly due to changes in the domestic political situations of pro-U.S. Gulf countries, which will eventually force the United States to withdraw from the Gulf.

7. 保障中东的能源供应。海湾战争给了美国和英国永久把持海湾局势的完美借口。许多阿拉伯国家对美国 及其盟国的依赖使得海湾正成为美国的内海,任何其他外部势力介入该地区并挑战美国地位的可能性大大降低。如果美国在海湾地区的存在和影响受到削弱,那多 半要来自于亲美国的海湾国家国内政局的变化,而导致 美国最终被迫从海湾收缩。

Under such circumstances, any attempt to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Gulf is unlikely to succeed. However, China can and should seek to establish a “minimum balance of power” in the Gulf. Given that the United States already controls the west coast of the Persian Gulf, China and Russia should seek to expand relations with Iran, which sits on the east coast of the Gulf. The goal of developing this relationship should not be to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Gulf. Instead, the oil in the Gulf will be able to flow freely due to the cooperation between the two sides of the Gulf. The purpose is to prevent the United States from imposing oil embargoes on other countries during special periods.

在这种情况下,任何想挑战海湾地区美国霸权的行为都不大可能成功。但中国可以也应该在海湾地区谋求 建立一个“最低限度的力量平衡”。鉴于美国已经完全控制了海湾的西岸,中国和俄罗斯应谋求和地处海湾东岸 的伊朗发展更加广泛的关系。发展这种关系的目的不应 是为了挑战美国在海湾的霸主地位,而是谋求海湾的石 油要在海湾两岸的合作下才能畅通无阻。其目的是防止 在特别时期美国对其他国家实行石油禁运。

In addition, the development of Sino-Iran relations should not prevent China and other pro-U.S. Gulf states from developing broader and deeper relations, nor should it prevent Iran from continuing to improve and develop relations with the United States. The “minimum balance of power” China pursues in the Gulf is not about confrontation with the United States, but an insurance policy to cope with certain contingencies.

发展中国和伊朗的关系也不应该妨碍中国和其他亲美的海湾国家发展更广泛和深入的关系,也不应该妨碍 伊朗继续改善和发展同美国的关系。中国在海湾地区追 求的“最低限度的力量平衡” 并不是要和美国对抗,而是一种以防万一的保险政策。

III. Major Questions in the Ideal Security Environment

三  理想安全环境中的重大问题

The grand strategy of a country inevitably involves some questions that are almost “philosophical.” The answers given to these questions basically determine the general conception of a country’s grand strategy. Here, we will discuss some issues that have already received a great deal of attention in an attempt to tie such discussions to specific security issues.

国家的大战略中不可避免地涉及一些近乎“哲学”的问题。对这些问题的回答基本上决定了一个国家大战略的总体思想。在这里,将讨论一些大家已经谈得很多的问题,试图将这样的讨论和具体的安全问题联系起来。

1. The international structure should not determine China’s grand security strategy. Because the impact of the international structure on a country’s security environment is far less decisive than is widely believed, the international structure should not determine China’s grand security strategy. In fact, changes in the international structure have historically been “accidental” in origin: the unpredictable consequences of “unbalanced growth”25 and wars, rather than conscious initiative. When a certain “unipolar,” “bipolar,” or “multipolar” structure of the world arrives, it does so in a completely “natural”, or you could say “random,” manner. The international structure is only an additional product of world development. In fact, it is difficult for a state to establish a certain type of structure for the purpose of one’s grand strategy. Most of the time, the diplomacy of a state is how the state seeks to raise or at least maintain its position in the structure at present and for the foreseeable future. Historically, the most successful countries are the ones that adapt best to the environment. As Guiguzi said: “In ancient times, those who did well in the world had to weigh the powers of the world and comprehend the minds of princes” (古之善用天下者,必量天下之权而揣诸侯之情).

1. 国际结构不应决定中国的安全大战略。由于国际结构对一个国家的安全环境的影响远不是像人们普遍认为的那么具有决定性,所以国际结构不应决定中国的安全大战略。事实上,国际结构的变化在历史上都是 “偶然” 得来的:即来源于 “非均衡增长” 和战争的不可预知的结果,而不是有意识的推动。当“单极”、“两极”、“多极” 世界的某一结构到来的时候,完全是“自然” 的,或者说是“随机”的。国际结构只是世界发展的附加产物。事实上,国家很难以建立某种结构为其大战略的目的。绝大多数时侯,国家的外交是如何在现在和可预见的未来谋求国家在结构中的地位提升或至少是维持。在历史上,最成功的国家是对环境适应最好的国家,正如鬼谷子所说的那样:“古之善用天下者,必量天下之权而揣诸侯之情。”

Given that the current global pattern will continue to exist for a considerable period of time26, while taking the establishment of a global multipolar world as its long-term strategic goal, China should place more emphasis on seeking to establish an ideal security environment in the important areas around China. This is because, under the same global structure, different regions will have different regional structures27.

鉴于目前的全球格局在相当时间内将继续存在,中国应该在以建立一个全球范围的多极世界为长期战略目标的同时,更着重谋求在中国的重要周边地区建立一个理想的安全环境。这是因为,在同样的全球结构下,不同地区的地区性结构是不同的。

The establishment of a regional multipolar structure does not contradict the current unipolar world (or one superpower) on the global scale. The United States, as a global power, must necessarily disperse its power. However, as an Asia-Pacific country, China can concentrate its power on pursuing its interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Because of the existence of Japan, China, ASEAN, and Russia, it is reasonable to hold that East Asia will be the first region in the world to start the formation of a multipolar world28. If there is any region where the United States cannot get its own way, it must be in East Asia.

建立地区性的多极结构和目前全球范围的单极世界(或一超多强) 的事实并不矛盾。美国作为一个全球力量,必需分散它的力量。而作为亚太国家的中国,却可以集中力量,谋求在亚太地区的利益。因为日本、中国、东南亚联盟、俄罗斯的的存在,有理由断言,东亚将是全球最早开始形成多极世界的区域。如果说,美国在某个地区不能我行我素的话,那肯定是在东亚。

Second, if we hope for a multipolar world, we must prepare for the consequences of multipolarity. The most important of these consequences is the question of Japan’s status. Japan, as America’s most important ally in Asia, cannot truly escape the orbit of the United States (nor does it intend to escape the orbit of the United States), and the United States will not allow Japan to escape from its orbit. However, as a great power, Japan should naturally also play an important role in international affairs, because in a multi-polar world, Japan will rightfully constitute one pole. This means that what China has to consider is not whether to accept Japan’s role, but to what extent to accept it. On these issues, China has not considered enough.

其次,希望出现一个多极世界,就必须准备应对多极化带来的后果。其中最重要的问题莫过于日本的地位问题。日本作为美国在亚洲最重要的盟友,无法真正地脱离美国的轨道(它也没有打算要脱离美国的轨道),而美国也不会允许日本脱离美国的轨道。然而,作为一个大国,日本当然,也应该在国际事务中发挥重要作用,因为 在多极的世界里,日本将理所当然地成为一极。这意味 着中国要考虑的不是接不接受日本的作用,而是接受多 少的问题。在这些问题上,中国还缺乏足够的思考。

2. Development and shaping: Security interdependence. “Development is the absolute principle” (发展才是硬道理) is still the ultimate means for countries (especially major powers) to ensure their own security in a state of anarchy. However, the national security environment is a system. Therefore, a country’s grand strategy is not only concerned with developing its strength. This is because a country, especially a major country like China, will definitely have a major influence on international politics, especially on some surrounding countries, when it develops. China’s development has not only changed its own security environment, but also the security environments of other countries. Likewise, changes in the security environments of other countries will in turn affect China’s security environment. Therefore, in order to shape the ideal security environment for a country, it is necessary to attempt to influence the security environments and policies of other countries.

2. 发展和塑造:安全的相互依赖。“发展才是硬道理” 仍是国家(特别是大国)在无政府状态保障自身安全的最终手段。然而国家安全环境是一个系统,因此,国家 的大战略绝不意味着只顾发展实力。这是因为,一个国 家,特别是像中国这样的大国在发展时一定会对国际政 治,特别是周边的一些国家产生重大影响。中国的发展 不仅改变了自己的安全环境,也改变了别国的安全环境。而别国的安全环境的改变也将反过来影响中国的安 全环境。因此,要塑造国家的理想安全环境,必须试图影 响别国的安全环境和政策。

This requires China to work with other countries to mitigate the “security dilemma” and shape a favorable security environment for China while it develops. From this point of view, development and shaping are equally important to the country’s grand strategy.

这就要求中国在发展的同时,必须和其他国家一起, 通过相互共同努力缓解“安全困境”,为中国塑造一个良好的安全环境。从这一点上来说,发展和塑造对于国家的大战略具有同等的重要意义。

No matter how powerful China itself is, China’s security will always depend on other countries. Therefore, China’s ideal security environment must necessarily contain an “idealistic” (理想主义, as in the international relations theory of “idealism”) side. This is not just because Chinese culture has always upheld a sense of justice. In addition, it is because, if it has no moral code, a grand strategy cannot win the support of the people, nor can it be accepted by other countries, nor can it succeed.

无论中国自己多强大,中国的安全都将依赖于其它国家。因此,中国的理想的安全环境必定要包含“理想主义” 的一面。这不仅仅是因为中国的文化始终保持着正义感,而且是因为大战略如果没有道义上的准则,无法获 得人民的支持,也无法让其它国家接受,也就无法成功。

3. Shaping the surrounding security environment: The utility of multilateralism. When shaping the surrounding security environment, we should not only use traditional bilateral cooperation, but, even more, promote multilateral cooperation to closely link the interests of more countries. China should seek more multilateral cooperation, especially regional economic cooperation, in several regions around China that offer a high possibility of multilateral cooperation, such as Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.

3. 塑造周边安全环境:多边主义的功利性。对周边安全环境的塑造不仅应利用传统的双边合作,更应该推动多边合作以将更多的国家的利益紧密地联系在一起。对中国周边的几个多边合作可能性大的区域,东北亚、东南亚、南亚、中亚,中国都应该谋求更多的多边合作,特别 是经济区域合作。

The ultimate goal of such multilateral regional cooperation is that, in the next fifteen to twenty years, when China’s economic scale has made it a large market both in absolute terms and in terms of purchasing power, China will have followed a different strategy of economic development from Japan, that is, China will gradually become a big market for neighboring countries. This sort of open economic system will, in a sense, establish an economic system arrayed in a ring around China. This ability to link the economies of neighboring countries with China’s economic system will greatly strengthen China’s influence on its surrounding security environment, and will also greatly mitigate the concerns that neighboring countries have about China’s strength. From this perspective, China must pay attention to the three (sub)regional economic cooperation zones (Lancang-Mekong, Bay of Bengal, Central Asia) relevant to western China. These three (sub)regional economic cooperation zones run from south to north and these, together with the “China-Japan-Korea Economic Cooperative” (or other Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation method)29 currently under discussion, will cover almost all of China’s major neighbors. In the next 20 to 30 years, if the economic cooperation in these regions can become a substantial economic cooperation zone or an economic integration organization, this will not only provide an international environment for the development of the western regions of China, but also make the various countries interdependent and provide a guarantee for the stability and peace of the entire region. Ultimately, when China became the undisputed largest economy in East Asia, China also became a bridge linking the economic regions of South Asia, Central and Western Asia, and East Asia. Such a China will undoubtedly be one of the pillars for the stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the future, regardless of the number of poles of the future structure of the Asia-Pacific region.

这种多边区域合作的最终目的是在未来的十五到二十年中,当中国的经济规模无论是以绝对值或是购买力衡量都已经成为一个大市场时,中国已经走了一条和日本不同的经济发展大战略,那就是中国将逐步成为周边国家的一个大市场。这种开放的经济体系将在某种意义上建立一种环中国经济体系。而这种能将周边国家的经济都和中国的经济体系联系在一起的能力,将大大强化中国对周边安全环境的影响力,也将大大缓解周边国家对中国强大的担忧。中国必须以这样的眼光来重视目前关于中国西部的三个(次)地区经济合作区(澜沧江-湄公河、孟加拉湾、中亚)。这三个(次)地区经济合作区从南到北,和正在讨论中的“中日韩经济合作体”(或其他的东北亚区域经济合作方式) 将覆盖中国几乎所有的主要邻国。如果在未来的二十至三十年内,这些地区经济合作能成为实质意义上的经济合作区或是经济一体化组织,将不仅能为西部开发提供国际环境,更能使得各个国家相互依赖,为整个地区的稳定与和平提供一份保障。最终,当中国成为东亚地区无可置疑的最大经济体时,中国也成了联接南亚、中西亚和东亚经济区的桥梁。这样的中国不管未来的亚洲地区结构是几极,将无可置疑地是未来亚太地区稳定的支柱之一。

At present, the concept of security in the Asia-Pacific region is still a situation of competition among various concepts. These range from the concept of “peace under hegemony” of the United States, to the “comprehensive security” of ASEAN, to the “new security concept” advocated by China and Russia, to the “multilateral security” of Canada30. But in fact, excepting the ideologically conflicting “peace under hegemony” concept of the United States, the various multilateral security concepts have much in common with each other. How to find common ground among these multilateral security concepts and build a multilateral security mechanism that serves the interests of not only China, but also other countries will become the most important issue in China’s future security strategy.

目前亚太地区的安全观念仍是各种观念竞争的局面。从美国的“霸权下的和平”、到东盟的 “综合安全”、到中国和俄罗斯倡导的 “新安全观”、到加拿大的“多边安全” 应有尽有。但事实上,各种多边安全观念,除了和美国的“霸权下的和平” 有理念上的冲突之外,彼此间有许多共同点。如何在这些多边安全观念中寻找共同点并建立不仅符合中国,也同样符合其它国家利益的多边安全机制 将成为中国未来安全战略中最重要的课题。

The direction of the reunified Korean peninsula is a good opportunity: If China can make the reunified Korean peninsula a neutral country, not only would this go a long way towards eliminating the biggest security risk in Northeast China, but it would also show that China does not consider only its own security interests, but that it also takes into account the interests of other major powers and the Korean nation itself. This would build a certain degree of mutual security and trust among the major powers.

朝鲜半岛统一后的走向是一个很好的机会:中国如果能够促成统一后的朝鲜半岛是一个中立的国家,不仅可以在很大程度上消除中国东北地区的最大安全隐患, 更可以显示中国不仅仅考虑自己的安全利益,也考虑其他大国和朝鲜民族本身的利益,从而在大国间构筑一定的相互安全信任。

The interactivity, incompatibility, and irreversibility of national security policy choices. The national security environment is a system. Therefore, changes at any point may cause changes at other points, or even changes in the system as a whole. This means that, many times, in order to achieve certain strategic goals, we must consider the interaction of different policies. This is the interactivity of national security policy choices.

国家安全政策选择的互动性、不兼容性和不可逆性。国家安全环境是一个系统,因此,任何一点的变化都 有可能引起其它点的变化,甚至引起整个系统的变化。 这就意味着,许多时候,我们要达成一定的战略目标,必 须将考虑不同政策的相互作用。这是国家安全政策的互动性。

The systemic nature of the national security environment means that the consequences of a state’s security policies are almost always impossible to judge in isolation. In many cases, the choice of one policy limits other options. This is because two options may be inherently contradictory, or the result of the first option makes the second option impossible. Moreover, once a chosen policy is found to be unworkable or inconsistent with the country’s strategic goals, it is impossible to return to the original point and choose another policy. This is the incompatibility and irreversibility of national security policy choices.

国家安全环境的系统性还意味着国家的安全政策所带来的后果绝大多数时候是不可能被孤立地评判的。在 很多时候,当选择某一种政策时,也就限制了其他的选 择。这是因为两种选择本身就是矛盾的,或是第一种选 择的结果使得第二种选择变得不可能。而一旦发现选择 的政策是行不通或是不符合国家的战略目标时,想再回到起初的政策选择点也已经不可能。这就是所谓的国家 安全政策选择的不兼容性和不可逆性。

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唐世平 (Tang Shiping) (2022). "Ideal Security Environment and China’s Grand Strategy in the New Century [理想安全环境与新世纪中国大战略]". Interpret: China, Original work published December 5, 2000, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/ideal-security-environment-and-chinas-grand-strategy-in-the-new-century/

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