总体国家安全观视域中的意识形态安全 
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Ideological Security in the Framework of the Overall National Security Outlook

总体国家安全观视域中的意识形态安全 

This lengthy analysis by a CCP Central Party School researcher takes critical aim at “the West” for seeking to “subvert” the CCP’s hold on power through propagating “neoliberalism” and “universal values” such as democracy and the rule of law. Argues that “ideological security” is an important component of traditional “national security.”


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Security is the core interest of the nation and a prerequisite for the state’s orderly development. At present, China is in a period of strategic opportunity in terms of its development, but this is also a period of prominent contradictions and risks. In the face of diverse and complex traditional security threats intertwined with non-traditional security threats, maintaining national security and national interests is an arduous job. Maintaining ideological security is one of this effort’s important tasks. Some academic research has been done on ideological security, but to be frank, these studies go no further than “general strategies for promoting theoretical knowledge” or “public opinion struggles” [舆论斗争]. Few rise to the level of considering “national security strategies,” and none look at ideological security in the post–Cold War period in the framework of the Overall National Security Outlook. The main task of this paper is to do away with the generalized model used to interpret ideological construction and explore the concepts, positioning, functions, and other basic theoretical questions concerning ideological security from the perspective of the Overall National Security Outlook. 

安全是国家的核心利益,也是实现国家有序发展的前提。当前,我国既处于发展的战略机遇期,又处于矛盾与风险凸显期;面临多元复杂的安全威胁,传统安全威胁与非传统安全威胁相互交织,维护国家安全和国家利益的任务艰巨繁重。维护意识形态安全是其中的一项重要任务。学术界对意识形态安全已有相关研究,但坦率地说,这些研究基本停留在“一般理论宣传策略”或“舆论斗争”的层面上,很少上升到“国家安全战略”加以研究,更没有从总体国家安全观高度审视后冷战时期的意识形态安全。本文的主要任务在于摆脱意识形态建设的普遍化阐释模式,从总体国家安全观的角度探讨意识形态安全的概念、定位、功能等基本理论问题,以及当前我国意识形态安全面临的挑战及其应对等重大现实问题。

I. Overall National Security Outlook and Ideological Security

一、总体国家安全观与意识形态安全

When looked at through different theoretical lenses, ideological security can present different connotations and extensions. To understand ideological security in present-day China, it is necessary to first grasp the Overall National Security Outlook. 

在不同的理论视角下,意识形态安全呈现出不同的内涵与外延。理解当前我国意识形态安全,前提性条件就是把握总体国家安全观。

(i) Concepts of the Overall National Security Outlook

    (一)总体国家安全观的概念

While presiding over the first meeting of the National Security Commission of the CCP Central Committee on April 15, 2014, General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed the concept of an Overall National Security Outlook. [In a speech at the meeting, Xi said,] “At present, the connotations and extensions of Chinese national security are richer than at any other time in history. National security takes in a broader scope of time and space than at any other time in history and involves more complicated internal and external factors than at any other time in history. We must adhere to the Overall National Security Outlook. Viewing the security of the people as the aim; political security as the fundamental principle; economic security as the foundation; military, cultural, and societal security as the guarantees; and the promotion of international security as a source of support, we will forge a path of national security with Chinese characteristics.” The core contents of the Overall National Security Outlook are the “five elements” [五大要素] and “five relationships” [五对关系]. The “five elements” refer to national security’s aim (the security of the people), fundamental principle (political security), foundation (economic security), guarantees (military, cultural, and societal security), and support (international security). The “five relationships” refer to the need to emphasize both external security and internal security, both homeland security and the security of Chinese citizens, both traditional security and non-traditional security, both development issues and security issues, and both one’s own security and common security. 

2014年4月15日,习近平总书记在中央国家安全委员会第一次会议上首次提出了“总体国家安全观”的概念。“当前我国国家安全内涵和外延比历史上任何时候都要丰富,时空领域比历史上任何时候都要宽广,内外因素比历史上任何时候都要复杂,必须坚持总体国家安全观,以人民安全为宗旨,以政治安全为根本,以经济安全为基础,以军事、文化、社会安全为保障,以促进国际安全为依托,走出一条中国特色国家安全道路。”总体国家安全观的核心内容是“五大要素”和“五对关系”。“五大要素”指的是国家安全的宗旨(人民安全)、根本(政治安全)、基础(经济安全)、保障(军事、文化、社会安全)、依托(国际安全)。“五对关系”指的是既重视外部安全,又重视内部安全;既重视国土安全,又重视国民安全;既重视传统安全,又重视非传统安全;既重视发展问题,又重视安全问题;既重视自身安全,又重视共同安全。

The Overall National Security Outlook goes beyond both the “traditional view of national security” and the “new view of security.” The traditional view is centered on political and military security. The significant rise in non-traditional security threats in the post–Cold War period has increasingly showcased the limitations of this outlook. In response to the complex and changing international situation in the 1990s, the CCP Central Committee proposed a “new view of security centered on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation.” In essence, this new view of security was a type of “view on external security.” Although it included some non-traditional security elements, it did not incorporate domestic security and the security of the people. Research on national security generally explores the “four questions” [四个议题]. We can consider these questions to better understand the basic features and differences between the Overall National Security Outlook and past views on security. The first question is, whose security? Security refers to an objective state of affairs wherein the subject is free from danger. The answer to the question, “whose security?” tells us the security of the subject with which we are concerned. In the traditional view of security, the subject is the nation-state. In non-traditional security, research generally focuses on the security threats posed by “non-state actors” (such as supra-national organizations, subnational groups, or individuals). The Overall National Security Outlook takes into account both traditional and non-traditional security. It is concerned with states, societies, individuals, and other subjects but still views the nation-state as the primary subject. The second question is, what threatens security? This question explores the “realm of threat” [威胁场域]. In both the traditional and new views of security, the primary focus is on external threats to states. The Overall National Security Outlook holds that threats can come from both inside and outside the state. The third question is, which fields of security? The fields covered by the Overall National Security Outlook include traditional security fields such as political, military, and homeland security as well as non-traditional security fields such as economic security, cultural security, societal security, science and technology security, cybersecurity, environmental security, resource security, nuclear security, and the security of overseas interests. The fourth question is, where is security implemented? This question explores the goals and values to which security is oriented. The Overall National Security Outlook sees the maintenance of national sovereignty, security, and development interests as the goals and value orientation of security. It also sees the security of the people as its aim, and all efforts are made for the people. In this way, this view seeks to combine the values of “national security” and “human security.”

总体国家安全观是对“传统国家安全观”和“新安全观”的双重超越。传统国家安全观以政治和军事安全为中心,进入后冷战时期,随着非传统安全威胁明显上升,它越来越显示其局限性。20世纪90年代,针对复杂多变的国际形势,党中央提出了“以互信、互利、平等、协作为核心的新安全观”。新安全观本质上是一种“对外安全观”,尽管关注了一些非传统安全要素,但它并没有将国内安全、人的安全等纳入其中。国家安全研究一般探讨“四个议题”,我们可以从这些议题中透视总体国家安全观与以往安全观的不同,以及它的基本特征。一是“谁的安全”。安全是一种属性,指主体没有危险的客观状态。“谁的安全”拷问的是安全的主体。传统安全观的主体是国家,非传统安全着重研究的是“非国家主体”(超国家、次国家、个体)所带来的安全威胁。总体国家安全观统筹了传统安全和非传统安全,既关涉国家主体,也关涉社会、个体等主体,但核心主体还是国家。二是“什么威胁安全”。它探讨的是“威胁场域”。传统安全观和新安全观主要关注的是国家的外部威胁。总体国家安全观认为要应对来自国家内部和外部两个方面的威胁。三是“哪些安全领域”。总体国家安全观涵盖的安全领域,既包括政治安全、军事安全、国土安全等传统安全领域,也包括经济安全、文化安全、社会安全、科技安全、网络安全、生态安全、资源安全、核安全和海外利益安全等非传统安全领域。四是“安全落在何处”。它探讨的是安全的目标和价值指向。总体国家安全观既以维护国家主权、安全、发展利益为目标和价值指向,又以人民安全为宗旨,一切为了人民,实现“国家安全”和“人的安全”的价值统一。

(ii) Relevant Concepts of Ideological Security as Viewed from the Overall National Security Outlook

    (二)从总体国家安全观看意识形态安全相关概念

Guided by the Overall National Security Outlook, the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China defines the concept of “national security” as follows: “National security refers to the situation wherein state power, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, the people’s well-being, sustainable economic and social development, and other major interests of the state are relatively secure and free from internal and external threats as well as the ability to guarantee a continuous state of security.” As a constituent part of the system of national security, “ideological security” refers to the situation wherein the state’s dominant ideology is relatively secure and free from internal and external threats as well as to the ability to ensure a continuous state of security. 

在总体国家安全观的指导下,《中华人民共和国国家安全法》对“国家安全”概念进行了界定:“国家安全是指国家政权、主权、统一和领土完整、人民福祉、经济社会可持续发展和国家其他重大利益相对处于没有危险和不受内外威胁的状态,以及保障持续安全状态的能力。”作为国家安全体系的构成部分,意识形态安全指一个国家的主流意识形态相对处于没有危险和不受内外威胁的状态,以及保障持续安全状态的能力。

Drawing on the “four questions” of the Overall National Security Outlook, we can further interpret the specific meaning of the concept of ideological security. (1) Whose security? The subjects of ideological security are both states and societies. For states, the primary focus is on external challenges and threats. For societies, the primary focus is on internal challenges and threats. From the perspective of states, ideological security primarily concerns the ideological security of the state (and the ideological challenges posed by hostile states). From the perspective of societies, ideological security primarily concerns the ideological security of the ruling class (and the challenges to the ideology of the ruling class or trends of thought within society at large). (2) What threatens security? In the era of globalization, the ideologies of nation-states are impacted by foreign cultures and ideologies as well as non-mainstream ideologies and subnational identities. (3) Which fields of security? Some scholars classify ideological security as an aspect of cultural security under the “non-traditional security” category. This is incorrect, or at least incomplete. Ideological security has attributes of both “traditional security” and “non-traditional security.” At the same time, it is also a part of political security. The CCP Central Committee clearly indicates this: “Ideological security is an important component of political security.” As we can see, ideological security brings the two fields of political security and cultural security together. (4) Where is security implemented? The basic goals and values of ideological security are to maintain political legitimacy and the national culture’s characteristics and independence. 

从总体国家安全观的“四个议题”,我们可以进一步阐释意识形态安全概念的具体所指。一是“谁的安全”。意识形态安全指涉对象既有国家主体,也有社会主体,前者主要针对的是外部挑战与威胁,后者主要针对的是内部挑战与威胁。从国家主体看,意识形态安全主要指国家意识形态安全(针对敌对国的意识形态挑战);从社会主体看,意识形态安全主要指统治阶级意识形态安全(针对被统治阶级意识形态或一般社会思潮的挑战)。二是“什么威胁安全”。在全球化时代,民族国家意识形态既受到外来文化、意识形态的冲击,也受到非主流意识形态、次国家认同等冲击。三是“哪些安全领域”。一些学者将意识形态安全划分为“非传统安全”类别,归属于文化安全的一个类别,这实际上是不对的,至少是不全面的。意识形态安全具有双重属性,既有“传统安全属性”,又有“非传统安全属性”,同时也是政治安全的一部分。党中央明确指出:“意识形态安全是政治安全的重要组成部分。”可见,意识形态安全统合了政治安全和文化安全两个领域。四是“安全落在何处”。意识形态安全以维护政治合法性、民族文化的特性和独立性为基本目标和价值指向。

But how can we determine whether the state’s dominant ideology is secure (and its level of security)? This involves the issue of a “measurement standard for ideological security.” To measure whether or not a subject has ideological security, we cannot rely on the subjective opinions of the ruling class or ruling coalition [执政集团], nor can we confine ourselves to making “true-or-false judgments” at the ideational level [思想观念层面]. Specifically, we can perform an analysis on three aspects. First, from the “functional” perspective, ideological security means that an ideology can perform its corresponding functions. What are these functions? From the perspective of the “ideational level,” the mainstream ideology is functioning when it is dominant in the field of ideas and concepts and exercises a guiding, cohesive, and controlling power over various other trends of social thought. From the perspective of the “non-ideational level,” the mainstream ideology is functioning primarily when it plays an active and effective role in economics, politics, society, and other such fields. For example, its functions include political identification, organization and mobilization, social integration, and criticizing opponents. Second, from the “social foundation” perspective, “ideological security” refers to a sense of identification with the mainstream ideology among the main social classes in a country and the majority of the people in society. Third, from the “state apparatus” [国家机器] perspective, the mainstream ideology is secure when the ruling class or ruling coalition can fully grasp the various ideological resources and elements and fully mobilize ideology-related departments and institutions—in other words, when they can master and operate the state’s ideological apparatus.

如何判断一个国家的主流意识形态是否安全(以及安全度)?这里涉及到“意识形态安全衡量标准”的问题。衡量意识形态是否安全,不依靠统治阶级和执政集团的主观感受,也不囿于思想观念层面进行“真假判断”,而是从意识形态安全在维护国家利益和国家安全的功能中加以探讨。具体说来,可以从三个方面加以分析:第一,从“功能”的角度看,意识形态安全首先意味着意识形态能够发挥其应有功能。有哪些应有功能?从“思想层面”的角度看,意识形态发挥功能,指的是主流意识形态在思想观念领域具有主导性,对其他各种社会思潮发挥着引导力、凝聚力和控制力。从“非思想层面”的角度看,意识形态发挥功能,主要指主流意识形态对经济、政治、社会等领域起着积极有效的作用,比如政治认同、组织动员、社会整合、批判敌手等功能。第二,从“社会基础”的角度看,意识形态安全指一国内主要阶级和大多数社会民众对主流意识形态有认同感。第三,从“国家机器”的角度看,主流意识形态安全指的是,统治阶级或执政集团能够充分掌握各种意识形态资源、要素,能够充分调动意识形态相关部门和机构,一句话,能够掌握并运用好意识形态国家机器。

II. The Place of Ideological Security Overall National Security

    二、意识形态安全在总体国家安全中的地位

The status or importance of ideological security can be expressed in two phrases: “an important means to realize national interests” and “an important defense to safeguard national security.” National security is integral and systemic. That is, national security in various fields constitutes an interconnected whole, and security situations in different fields interact with each other. In fact, the place of ideological security in overall national security primarily refers to the important effects it has on other security fields. Here, we will focus our discussion on two main areas.

意识形态安全的地位或重要性,可以用两句话集中表达出来:一是“实现国家利益的重要手段”;二是“维护国家安全的重要屏障”。国家安全具有整体性、系统性,也就是说,各个领域的国家安全构成了相互联系的一个整体,不同领域的安全是相互作用的。意识形态安全在总体国家安全中的地位,实际上主要指它对其他安全领域起到的重要作用。在这里,我们主要谈两个方面:

(i) Ideology as Related to Political Security

    (一)意识形态关乎政治安全

Ideological security is a part of political security. At the same time, it plays a critically important role in the maintenance of political security. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized this idea when he said, “Ideology is about the banners flown, the paths taken, and national political security.” The core of national political security is the security of the regime and the political system. Moreover, the field of ideology is always the first to be challenged by external forces against the security of the regime and political system. In recent years, some Western forces have regarded China’s rise as a challenge to their values and institutional models and have stepped up their efforts to Westernize and split China [西化分化] through ideological infiltration and other means. The interpretation of the Chinese path [中国道路] in various Western discourses, the criticism of the Chinese system, and attempts to transplant Western liberal and democratic systems pose a great threat to the security of China’s political system. We must strengthen our confidence in our political system and avoid two wrong views: “When we see that other countries have something that we do not, we assume this is a deficiency and that China must move to address it” and “When we see that we have something that other countries do not, we assume it is unnecessary and that China has to get rid of it.” From the perspective of ideological security work, maintaining regime security and political system security requires demonstrating and publicizing the rationality and legitimacy of the people’s democratic dictatorship, the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, and the Party’s leadership. The importance of ideology to political security lies in its ability to bestow political legitimacy, which provides an effective defense of political regimes and systems. [American sociologist Seymour Martin] Lipset said, “Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society.” Once mainstream ideology loses its ability to defend its legitimacy, political security will face serious threats, especially if a state is penetrated by the ideology of a hostile state. 

意识形态安全既是政治安全的一部分,同时又在维护政治安全中起着至关重要的作用。习近平总书记强调过:“意识形态关乎旗帜、关乎道路、关乎国家政治安全。”国家政治安全的核心是政权安全和制度安全。而外部势力对政权安全和制度安全率先发起挑战的,往往是在意识形态领域。这些年,西方一些势力往往把中国崛起视为对其价值观和制度模式的挑战,加紧通过意识形态渗透等手段进行西化分化,以各种西方话语解读中国道路,批判中国制度,试图移植西方自由民主制度,给我国的制度安全带来极大威胁。我们要坚定政治制度自信,避免两种错误的观点:“看到别的国家有而我们没有就简单认为有欠缺,要搬过来;或者,看到我们有而别的国家没有就简单认为是多余的,要去除掉。”维护好政权安全和制度安全,从意识形态安全工作的角度看,就是要论证好、宣传好人民民主专政、中国特色社会主义制度和党的领导的合理性与合法性。意识形态之于政治安全的重要性,归根到底在于它能提供政治合法性,能为政权和制度提供有效辩护。李普塞特认为:“合法性意味着政体具备提出并维持一种信念——现有的政治制度是最适合所在社会的制度——的能力。”主流意识形态一旦丧失合法性辩护的功能,政治安全就会面临严重的威胁,尤其是在敌对国意识形态渗透的时候更是如此。

(ii) Ideology as Related to Societal Security

    (二)意识形态关乎社会安全

Societal security is an important part of national security. In the process of social transformation, factors affecting societal security and stability become increasingly prominent. Maintaining societal security requires a multi-pronged approach. One of the important conditions is “social cohesion.” Differentiation is a distinctive feature of modern society, but an orderly society must unify both differentiation and integration into a single whole. Excessive class differentiation, differentiation of interests, and differentiation of various social systems will bring about social centrifugation, leading to social conflicts, social contradictions, and even the disintegration of society. Maintaining societal security requires effective integration, which requires social cohesion and a centripetal force. “The domestic factors in national security are not only based on force and control but also require legitimacy and social cohesion”—i.e., a dominant ideology and set of values can give cohesion to a society in transition. “Different societies have different vulnerabilities, depending on how their ‘identities’ [认同] are constructed”—i.e., the more inspiring and appealing the dominant ideology of a society is, the less vulnerable, more cohesive, and the more secure the society. Contemporary China is undergoing a profound change and transformation and is facing ever-increasing “diversification” and “differentiation.” The role of ideology has also been constantly highlighted, continuously enhancing social cohesion and strengthening the centripetal force in constructing the Chinese spirit, helping consolidate social stability, and promoting social progress. 

社会安全是国家安全的重要内容,在社会转型中,影响社会安全和社会稳定的因素不断凸显。维护社会安全,需要多管齐下,其中一个重要的条件就是“社会凝聚力”。分化构成了现代社会的一个显著特征,但一个有序社会是分化与整合的统一体。过度的阶层分化、利益分化以及社会各系统的分化会带来社会离心化,导致社会冲突、社会矛盾,乃至社会的解体。维护社会安全需要有效的整合,需要社会凝聚力和社会向心力。“国家安全的国内因素不仅基于武力与控制,还需要合法性和社会凝聚力。”主流意识形态、主流价值观能够给予转型中的社会以凝聚力。“不同的社会具有不同的脆弱性(Vulnerability),这取决于它们的‘认同’是如何被构建的。”一个社会的主流意识形态越是具有感召力和号召力,这个社会的脆弱性就越低、凝聚力就越强,社会也就越安全。当代中国正处在一场深刻的变革与转型中,面对不断彰显的“多元化”和“差异化”,意识形态作用也不断凸显,在建构中国精神中不断增强社会凝聚力和向心力,巩固社会稳定和促进社会进步。

III. Dual Challenges: Current Risks to Ideological Security in China 

    三、双重挑战:当前我国意识形态安全风险

The opposite of security is danger or risk. The core objects of research into ideological security are the variety of factors that threaten it. They include “non-ideological factors” (such as economic crises, political corruption, and military conflicts), “ideological factors” (such as trends of social thought), and “ideology-related factors” (factors that are outside of the scope of ideas and concepts but closely related to ideology, such as the platforms, vehicles, and institutional systems of ideological dissemination). Here, we will primarily focus on current threats to China’s ideological security from the latter two types of factors. At present, the threats China faces in the field of ideological security can be divided into external and internal threats. The main external threat is the ideological penetration of China by Western states. Internal threats include various trends of social thought, non-mainstream values, and other pressures on and challenges to the dominant ideology.

安全的对立面是危险或风险。意识形态安全研究的核心对象是威胁意识形态安全的各种因素。那些威胁意识形态安全的因素是多方面的,既有“非意识形态的因素”(比如经济危机、政治腐败、军事冲突等),也有“意识形态因素”(比如社会思潮),还有“意识形态相关因素”(一些不属于思想观念范畴、但与意识形态紧密相关的因素,比如意识形态传播的平台、载体、体制机制等)。在这里,我们主要是从后两类探讨当前我国意识形态安全风险问题。当前我国意识形态安全面临的威胁可以分为外部威胁与内部威胁:一是西方国家对我国进行的意识形态渗透;二是国内的各种社会思潮、非主流价值观等对主流意识形态构成的压力与挑战。

(i) External Challenges: Penetration by Western Ideology

    (一)外部挑战:西方意识形态渗透

[Xi Jinping said,] “Hostile Western forces have always regarded China’s development and growth as a threat to Western values and institutional models. They have not for a moment ceased their ideological infiltration of China.” In recent years, the main method of Western ideological penetration has been to promote “universal values,” dissolve China’s dominant ideology, and lay discursive traps [话语陷阱] in order to criticize the Chinese path and Chinese institutions as part of an attempt to misdirect China’s approach to reform and opening up. The Western “universal values” strategy generally lays discursive traps around the concepts of “freedom,” “democracy,” and “human rights” in order to carry out ideological infiltration. 

“西方敌对势力一直把我国发展壮大视为对西方价值观和制度模式的威胁,一刻也没有停止对我国进行意识形态渗透。”近些年,西方意识形态渗透的主要方式是推广“普世价值”,消解我国主流意识形态,并且通过设置话语陷阱,评判中国道路、中国制度,试图误导中国改革开放的方向。西方“普世价值”战略一般是围绕“自由”、“民主”、“人权”等概念设置话语陷阱,进行意识形态渗透。

One such trap is the myth of neoliberalism. Neoliberal thought originated in developed capitalist countries of the West. Since the 1980s, and especially after the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it has spread throughout the world through the “Washington Consensus.” Neoliberalism’s core value and concept is “freedom.” Neoliberalism holds that “individual freedom” is the highest-value demand and advocates freedom as a “universal value.” Individual freedom constitutes the fundamental yardstick for measuring all social activities, and individual freedom and personal interests become the reasons used to explain all individual or social behaviors and historical events. Taking individual freedom as its ultimate value, neoliberalism’s position in the economic field is embodied in the “three changes” [三化]: privatization, marketization, and liberalization. First, neoliberal economists advocate the “myth of private property rights.” They promote privatization for two main reasons: (1) private ownership can guarantee individual freedom, and individual ownership of the means of production gives individuals the opportunity to accumulate wealth and have the conditions for free choice, and (2) private ownership can stimulate individual proactivity, initiative, and creativity in economic activities, thereby increasing efficiency. At the same time, neoliberal economists strongly oppose public ownership for two main reasons: (1) public ownership causes individuals to lose their freedom because a dictator who controls the means of production will bring the entire society under totalitarian rule, and (2) public ownership leads to murky and non-transferable property rights, which can lead to economic inefficiency, waste, and corruption. Next, it holds the “theory of the omnipotence of the market.” Neoliberalism is also a type of market fundamentalism that believes in the omnipotence of the market, advocates complete marketization, and believes that market mechanisms can solve all economic and social problems. This also means that neoliberalism opposes state intervention and macro-control by the state. Finally, it advocates “global liberalization.” Neoliberalism promotes market fundamentalism globally, advocating that all countries abolish all forms of economic protection in order to realize the complete liberalization and internationalization of finance and trade. The neoliberal trend of thought has severely affected China’s dominant ideology and has had a serious impact on China’s Reform and Opening policy and economic foundation. [Neoliberalism] not only endangers China’s ideological security but also endangers the state’s economic security. The values of the supremacy of the individual and freedom have a negative impact on dominant Chinese values such as collectivism, equity, and justice. The theory of privatization challenges the current Chinese concept of socialist ownership and impacts the economic foundation of public ownership. Both the theory of market omnipotence and trade liberalization are in fact opposed to the role of the government and government supervision and advocate “de-nationalization.” These principles have had a [negative] impact on the Party’s leadership and the socialist state system. 

一是新自由主义神话。新自由主义思潮起源于西方发达资本主义国家,20世纪80年代以来,尤其是苏东剧变之后,通过“华盛顿共识”传播至全球。新自由主义的核心价值理念是“自由”,它认为“个人自由”是普世的、最高的价值诉求,把自由鼓吹为“普世价值”。个人自由构成衡量一切社会活动的根本尺度,个人自由、个人利益成为解释一切个体或社会行为、历史事件的缘由。以个人自由为终极价值的新自由主义在经济领域的主张体现为“三化”:私有化、市场化和自由化。首先,“私有产权神话”。新自由主义经济学家鼓吹“私有产权神话”,他们主张私有化的理由主要有两个方面:第一,私有制能够保障个人自由。个人拥有生产资料所有权,意味着个人有了发财致富的机会,有了自由选择的条件。第二,私有制能够激发个体从事经济活动的积极性、主动性、创造性,从而能够提高效率。与此同时,新自由主义经济学家极力反对公有制,主要理由也是两点:第一,公有制导致个体丧失自由,掌握生产资料的独裁者会将整个社会带入集权主义的统治之中。第二,公有制导致产权不清晰、不可转让,会造成经济效率低下、浪费与腐败。其次,“市场万能论”。新自由主义同时也是一种市场原教旨主义,相信市场万能,主张彻底市场化,认为市场机制能够解决一切经济社会问题。这也意味着,新自由主义反对国家干预,反对国家宏观调控。最后,“全球自由化”。新自由主义把市场原教旨主义推广到全球,主张各国取消各种经济保护,实现金融和贸易的完全自由化和国际化。新自由主义思潮严重冲击了我国主流意识形态,并且对我国改革开放政策、经济基础带来了严重影响,不仅危及到意识形态安全,也危及到经济安全。个人至上、自由至上的价值观给集体主义、公平正义等主流价值观带来负面影响;私有化理论挑战了当前我国社会主义所有制观念,冲击了以公有制为主体的经济基础;无论是市场万能论还是贸易自由化,实际上都是反对政府作用和政府监管,主张“去国家化”,这些都给党的领导和社会主义国家制度带来了冲击。

A second discursive trap is the Western conception and model of freedom and democracy. Western ideology permeates the political level, mainly manifesting in the impact of Western democratic concepts and the liberal democratic model on China’s socialist political system. The focus of the ideological strategy of Western developed countries is to “export democracy,” and this is first achieved by Western powers’ successful construction of discursive authority in the area of democracy. The prevailing Western democratic theory was constructed through “three steps.” The first step was to transform the concept of democracy from popular sovereignty to electoral democracy. The second step was to place democracy within the framework of liberalism. The third step was to change the concept of legitimacy, arguing that only a political system with competitive elections at its core is democratic and legitimate. Western states have established “electoral democracy” as the only model of democracy. At the same time, this is used as the only criterion for judging whether or not a country’s political system is democratic. In recent years, Western states have vigorously promoted freedom, democracy, and other “universal values” and “liberal democratic models” in China with the goal of “competing with us for strategic positions, the hearts of the people, and the masses and ultimately overthrowing the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese socialist system.” Some in the West believe that China’s political system does not conform to the “liberal democratic model,” whose basic features include electoral democracy and a multi-party system. Therefore, they have determined that the Chinese political system is non-democratic: totalitarian, despotic, or authoritarian. For this reason, they attack the leadership of the CCP and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. These discursive advantages have obviously also influenced some people in China: [As Xi Jinping said,] “Some people define reform and opening up as a change in the direction of Western ‘universal values’ and Western political systems. To them, anything else is not reform and opening up.” 

二是西方自由民主观念和模式。西方意识形态渗透在政治层面上,主要表现为西方民主观念和自由民主模式对我国社会主义政治制度的冲击。西方发达国家意识形态战略的重点就是“输出民主”,而这首先得力于西方成功建构了民主话语权。今天普遍流行的西方民主理论是通过“三步走”而建构起来的:第一步是改造民主的概念,实现从人民主权到选举式民主的转换。第二步将民主框定在自由主义框架之内。第三步是改造合法性概念,论证只有以竞争性选举为核心的政治制度才是民主的、具有合法性的。西方国家将“选举式民主”建构成民主的唯一模式,同时也构成评判别国政治制度民主与否的唯一标准。这些年,西方国家在我国大肆推广自由、民主等“普世价值”和“自由民主模式”,目的“就是要同我们争夺阵地、争夺人心、争夺群众,最终推翻中国共产党领导和中国社会主义制度”。西方一些人认为,中国政治制度不符合以选举民主、多党制等为基本特征的“自由民主模式”,所以判定中国政治制度是非民主的——极权主义、专制主义或威权主义,由此攻击中国共产党的领导和中国特色社会主义制度。这些强势话语显然也影响到国内一些人:“有的人把改革开放定义为往西方‘普世价值’、西方政治制度的方向改,否则就是不改革开放。”

A third discursive trap is the strategy of cultural hegemony that places “human rights above sovereignty.” In the political and cultural fields, risks to China’s ideological security also manifest as the cultural penetration of “human rights diplomacy” and the “placement of human rights above sovereignty” promoted by the West. First, they subjectively believe that their countries provide the highest level and best state of human rights. Second, they believe they should break through the restrictions of national sovereignty in order to “implant” the optimal human rights structures in countries with low levels of human rights. Finally, if they encounter countries and regimes that use national sovereignty as a barrier to resist the entry of Western forms of human rights, they must forcibly restrict the exercise of such sovereignty. The concept of “human rights above sovereignty” provides legitimacy for Western countries to promote hegemony and interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. Its ideological harm to China primarily manifests as attacking the patriotism of the Chinese people and downplaying the Chinese people’s awareness of sovereignty, especially their awareness of “cultural sovereignty,” thus clearing a path for Western cultural hegemony and cultural expansion.

三是“人权高于主权”的文化霸权战略。在政治和文化领域,我国意识形态安全风险还表现为西方推行的“人权外交”、“人权高于主权”的文化渗透:首先,主观地认为本国的人权水平是最高的,人权状态是最好的;其次,应该突破国家主权的限制,将这种最佳的人权结构“种植”于那些人权水平不高的国家;最后,如遇到那些以国家主权作为屏障抵制西方人权形式进入的国家和政权,必须强行限制其主权的实现。“人权高于主权”观念为西方国家推行霸权主义和干涉别国内政提供了合法性,它对于我国意识形态领域的危害主要体现在:攻击中国人的爱国主义精神,淡化中国人的主权意识,尤其是“文化主权”意识,从而为西方的文化霸权、文化扩张开辟道路。

(ii) Internal Challenges: Pressure from Non-mainstream Ideologies

    (二)内部挑战:来自非主流意识形态的压力

Broadly speaking, the internal challenges to the dominant ideology can be divided into “the challenge of diversity” and “the challenge of secularization.” 

概括说来,主流意识形态面临的内部挑战可以划分为:“多元化挑战”和“世俗化挑战”。

First, we will address “the challenge of diversity.” With the continuous deepening of the Reform and Opening policy, especially the establishment and development of the socialist market economic system, China’s social structure is constantly dividing, and the interests and demands of the people continue to diversify. The differentiation of interests and the diversification of demands inevitably lead to a diversification of ideas. It is against this social backdrop that various trends of social thought have emerged in China. The advocates of these trends are all seeking to make their voices heard, influence the development trajectory of contemporary Chinese politics and society, and influence the thoughts and behavioral choices of the people in society. The “challenge of diversity” faced by the current dominant ideology manifests in at least two ways. First, there has been a significant increase in the independence, selectivity, variability, and differentiation of people’s ideological activities, which has led to the dominant ideology’s ineffectiveness in its functions of educational guidance and integration, or at least to an increase in the difficulty it faces in these areas. The excessive diversification of ideological concepts and their corresponding behavioral orientations dissolves the dominant ideology’s authority and adds to the “centrifugal forces” acting on society. Second, non-Marxist trends in social thought impact the dominant ideology’s political authority. At present, there are many schools and trends of social thought in China. We must analyze them dialectically, not only to see their harmfulness, but also to correctly understand their reasonable components. However, we must be soberly aware that the “dominant aspect” [主导面] of these trends of social thought is negative and deleterious. They deny and attack the unified status of Marxism and advocate for pluralism in guiding ideologies. For example, democratic socialism claims that it does not rely on any single ideology and advocates for a pluralism of ideas that includes Marxism. Its actual effect is to use pluralism to negate Marxism’s guiding position. These non-Marxist social thoughts or political views have spread widely, presenting severe challenges to Marxism’s guiding position in the ideological field. 

一是“多元化挑战”。随着改革开放不断深入,尤其是社会主义市场经济体制的建立与发展,我国社会结构不断分化,人们的利益诉求不断多元化;利益分化、诉求多元化必然带来思想观念的多元化。正是在这样的社会背景下,国内出现了各种社会思潮,它们都在谋求发出自己的声音,并且努力影响当代中国政治社会发展走向以及社会民众的认知与行为选择。当前主流意识形态面临的“多元化挑战”至少表现在两个方面:其一,人们思想活动的独立性、选择性、多变性、差异性明显增强,导致主流意识形态的教育引导、整合等功能无法有效发挥,或者说发挥作用的难度在增加。过度多元化思想观念及其行为取向,消解着主流意识形态权威,也会给社会增加“离心力”。其二,非马克思主义的社会思潮冲击主流意识形态统治权。当前我国存在的社会思潮流派众多,我们对其要辩证分析,既要看到它们的危害性,也要正确认识其合理成分。但是,我们要清醒地意识到这些社会思潮的“主导面”是负面的、消极的,它们否定、冲击马克思主义的一元化地位,主张指导思想的多元化。比如,民主社会主义声称,不依赖任何单一的意识形态,主张包括马克思主义在内的多元化思想,其实质是用思想多元化取消马克思主义的指导地位。这些非马克思主义社会思潮或政治观点广泛蔓延,使得马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位面临严峻挑战。

Second, there is the “challenge of secularization.” [American sociologist] Daniel Bell pointed out that the cultural contradiction of capitalism lies in the separation of the “economic impulse” and the “religious impulse.” As capitalism continues to expand, the “economic impulse” is constantly highlighted, while the “religious impulse” continues to recede. When the whole world is completely secularized, a crisis of faith arises. Since reform and opening up, we have established a development strategy “centered on economic construction” and have subsequently entered an “era of material interests.” The introduction of the market economy system has made our entire society more secular and materialistic. The market economy is not only a material force but also a powerful spiritual force. It continuously penetrates into people’s spiritual lives, constantly changing the “mental outlook” and “ideological portrait” of the entire age. The entire cultural system, including the dominant ideology, is facing a “challenge of secularization,” or more precisely, a “challenge of market-based profit-seeking.” The negative side of the market and its transactional principles permeate people’s spiritual lives. Money worship, hedonism, and extreme individualism have grown and spread within a certain range, while mainstream values such as socialism, collectivism, and patriotism have encountered challenges. Even more worryingly, in terms of values, some people have adopted skepticism and nihilism, rejecting ideals and deconstructing the noble and sublime. The lofty ideals of communism and the common ideal of socialism with Chinese characteristics have been “dissolved” and “deconstructed” to some extent, which has influenced the people’s identification with the values of the dominant ideology.

二是“世俗化挑战”。丹尼尔·贝尔曾指出,资本主义文化矛盾在于“经济冲动力”与“宗教冲动力”的分离。随着资本主义的不断扩张,“经济冲动力”不断彰显,“宗教冲动力”节节败退,整个世界彻底世俗化,信仰危机由此产生。改革开放以来,我们确立了“以经济建设为中心”的发展战略,不断进入到一个“物质利益时代”。市场经济体制的引入,使得整个社会更加快速地世俗化、物质化。市场经济不仅是一种物质力量,也是一种强大的精神力量,它不断渗透到人们的精神生活中,不断改变整个时代的“精神面貌”和“思想肖像”。包括主流意识形态在内的整个文化系统面临“世俗化挑战”,或者更为准确地说,是“市场逐利性的挑战”。市场的消极面、市场交换原则等观念渗透到人们的精神生活中来。拜金主义、享乐主义、极端个人主义在一定范围滋长蔓延,社会主义、集体主义、爱国主义等主流价值遭遇到挑战。更为严重的是,一些人在价值观层面上持怀疑主义、虚无主义立场,拒绝理想,解构崇高,共产主义远大理想和中国特色社会主义共同理想受到一定程度的“消解”、“解构”,影响了民众对主流意识形态的价值认同。

IV. How to Maintain Ideological Security

    四、如何维护意识形态安全

How are we to maintain ideological security? The most fundamental way is to elevate ideological construction to a strategic position in national security and formulate and implement a national ideological security strategy [国家意识形态安全战略]. On January 23, 2015, a meeting of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee reviewed and approved the Outline of National Security Strategy (国家安全战略刚要), China’s first comprehensive national security strategy text. However, China still has not formulated a specific and targeted strategic text for ideological security. Therefore, we will explore relevant approaches to maintaining ideological security, guided by the Overall National Security Outlook and based on high-level security strategy [安全战略高度, literally “the heights of security strategy”]. Ideological security strategy includes two levels: strategic goals and strategic means. The most fundamental strategic goal is the “two consolidates” [两个巩固]: [As Xi Jinping said,] “The work of propaganda and ideology is to consolidate Marxism’s guiding position in the field of ideology and consolidate the common ideological foundation for the united struggle of the whole Party and all people of the country.” At the intermediate level, the ways and means to achieve the goals of ideological security can be explored in three systems: cognition-interpretation, value-belief, and decision-action.

如何维护意识形态安全?最根本的一条就是把意识形态建设上升到国家安全的战略地位,制定和实施国家意识形态安全战略。2015年1月23日,中央政治局会议审议通过了《国家安全战略纲要》,它是我国第一个完整的国家安全战略文本。关于意识形态安全,我国还没有形成具体的、有针对性的战略文本。因此,我们将以总体国家安全观为指导,基于安全战略高度,探讨维护意识形态安全的相关路径。意识形态安全战略包括了战略目标和战略手段两个层面。最根本的战略目标就是“两个巩固”:“宣传思想工作就是要巩固马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位,巩固全党全国人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础。”从中观层面上看,实现意识形态安全目标的途径和手段可以从认知-解释、价值-信仰和决策-操作等三个系统加以探讨。

(i) Cognition-Interpretation System

    (一)认知-解释系统

From the perspective of cognition-interpretation, the key to maintaining the validity and rationality of the dominant ideology is to answer the question of “what”—that is, to provide a convincing interpretation and description of social reality. The dictum that “theory must be persuasive” must be applied in at least two aspects. First, “theory must be able to guide practice.” Before 1978, the main manifestation of the crisis of the dominant ideology was its divorce from reality and a serious “hollowing out.” Although the theory of “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat” formally maintained “absolute authority,” it was in fact ossified, divorced from reality, and facing a crisis. Since reform and opening up, the Party has continuously adjusted and changed the dominant ideology while still adhering to the basic principles of Marxism. According to the changing conditions of the times and social development during the reforms, the Party has promoted the continuous innovation and development of Marxism, forming the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. At present, to maintain ideological security, we must continue to promote the Sinicization of Marxism [马克思主义中国化], achieve continuous innovation in the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and use new theories to guide new practices and reforms. Second, “theory must interpret practice.” A dominant ideology’s effectiveness also manifests in its ability to effectively interpret practice, which is particularly important in the current ideological struggle. A loss of discursive authority is a concentrated reflection of the insecurity of a country’s dominant ideology. Regarding the issue of contemporary Chinese ideological security, the most pressing need is to break the West’s discursive hegemony, construct Chinese theories and Chinese discourse, and firmly grasp the discursive authority to interpret the Chinese path. Since reform and opening up, we have embarked on a path of modernization that has attracted worldwide attention, but we lack a complete system of discourse through which to clearly explain ourselves. Instead, the Chinese path is often interpreted through the Western system of discourse, in which the Chinese path is characterized by terms such as “authoritarianism,” “capitalism with Chinese characteristics,” and “authoritarian socialism.” The discourse of “universal values” is used to monitor the Chinese path and try to guide the direction of China’s reform and opening up, and Western discourses such as the idea that “strong countries inevitably seek hegemony,” the “China threat theory,” and the “theory of China’s irresponsibility” are used to deliberately misinterpret the Chinese path and criticize China’s development model. These powerful Western discourses have been exaggerated in China, influencing some people. In the Chinese experience and the Chinese path, the strength of Western discourses has posed great challenges to the dominant ideology’s discursive authority and authority of interpretation. In response to Western discursive hegemony, we must strengthen the construction of a contemporary system of Chinese Marxist discourse, build a discursive system that can effectively explain the Chinese path, establish a “defensive discourse,” and build a discursive security barrier. In these efforts, there are three strategic points. First, regarding the Chinese model of economic development, we must resist the proliferation of neoliberal discourse, actively construct a discursive system around a socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics, and seize the discursive authority to interpret the Chinese economic development model. Second, regarding the Chinese model of political development, it is necessary to resist the infiltration of Western liberal and democratic discourse, especially Western discourse concerning legitimacy; actively construct a discursive system around a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics; and create a discourse of “Chinese-style democracy.” In particular, it is necessary to demonstrate that “the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Third, regarding China’s foreign strategy, in order to respond to the West’s exaggerated “China threat theory,” it is necessary to actively construct an external discursive system and explain the inherent pacifism of the Chinese path. It is the “high road” of pacifism, not the “hegemonic road” of power politics.

从认知-解释层面看,主流意识形态要维护其有效性、合理性,关键是要回答好“是什么”的问题,即对社会现实的解释与说明有说服力。“理论要有说服力”至少表现在两个方面:(1)“要能指导实践”。1978年之前,主流意识形态危机的重要表现就是脱离实际,严重的“空洞化”。“无产阶级专政下继续革命”理论,尽管在形式上保持“绝对权威”,但其实它是僵化的,脱离实际的,面临着危机。改革开放以来,我们党在坚持马克思主义基本原理的前提下,不断调整和变革主流意识形态,根据变化了的时代条件和变革中的社会发展,推动马克思主义不断创新、发展,形成了中国特色社会主义理论体系。当前,维护意识形态安全就要继续推进马克思主义中国化,实现中国特色社会主义理论体系不断创新,用新的理论指导着新的实践、新的改革。(2)“要能解释实践”。主流意识形态的有效性还表现为能够有效地解释实践,在当前意识形态斗争中,这一点尤为重要。话语权旁落是一个国家主流意识形态不安全的集中表现。对于当代中国意识形态安全议题,紧迫之事就是破除西方话语霸权,构建中国理论、中国话语,牢牢把握解释中国道路的话语权。改革开放以来,我们走出了一条举世瞩目的现代化之路,但是我们却缺少一整套把自己说清楚的话语体系,反而,中国道路常常在西方话语体系中被言说,要么用“专制主义”、“中国特色资本主义”、“威权社会主义”等话语给中国道路定性;要么用“普世价值”话语观察中国道路,试图引导中国改革开放的方向;要么用“国强必霸论”、“中国威胁论”、“中国不负责论”等话语,有意曲解中国道路,指责中国发展模式。这些强势的西方话语在国内大肆渲染,影响到一些人。在中国经验、中国道路上,西方强势话语给主流意识形态的解释权和话语权带来极大挑战。针对西方话语霸权,我们应当加强当代中国马克思主义话语体系建设,构建起能够有效解释好中国道路的话语系统,建立起“防御性话语”,筑起话语安全屏障,其战略支点有三。第一,在中国经济发展模式上,要抵制新自由主义的话语泛滥,积极主动构建中国特色社会主义政治经济学话语体系,要掌握解释中国经济发展模式的话语权。第二,在中国政治发展模式上,要抵制西方自由民主话语,尤其是西方合法性话语的渗透,积极主动构建中国特色社会主义民主话语体系,打造“中国式民主”话语,特别是要论证好“中国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征”。第三,在中国对外战略上,针对西方大肆渲染的“中国威胁论”,要积极主动构建对外话语体系,解释好中国道路的内在和平主义特质,它是和平主义的“王道”,而非强权主义的“霸道”。

(ii) Value-Belief System

    (二)价值-信仰系统

Identity is an important variable in national security. A national identity crisis inevitably leads to national security risks. Whether it is the penetration of external ideologies or the internal challenges posed by competition among trends in social thought, the ultimate cumulation is an “identity crisis.” From the perspective of maintaining ideological security, the key to solving an identity crisis is to construct a value-belief system, the essential core of an ideological structure. This involves two approaches: “deconstruction” and “construction.” (1) Deconstruct “universal values.” To deconstruct “universal values,” we need to start from both the academic and political levels. First, we must criticize the theoretical basis of “universal values” from an academic perspective. “Universal values” blurs the universality of values [价值的普遍性] and the universalism of values [价值的普遍主义], separates the universality and particularity of values, and universalizes the West’s particular values as the sole standard to be imposed on others. Second, we must expose the “true intentions” behind “universal values” from the perspective of political practice. “Universal values” occupy the moral high ground. They seem to be values that are generally accepted and recognized by the entire human society. Therefore, a country that does not accept these values will be cut off from the entire human society. In fact, “universal values” reflect the values of Western capitalist interests and are an ideological tool in the service of Western capitalist politics. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that some countries have been thrown into disarray under the instigation of these “universal values,” saying, “If we use the Western capitalist value system to shape our practices and use the Western capitalist evaluation system to measure our country’s development, then everything is fine if we meet Western standards. However, if we don’t meet Western standards, we are backward and obsolete. We must criticize and attack. The consequences will be disastrous!” Why must we criticize “universal values?” Because they point to the construction of a certain state system and its standards, accepting “universal values” will inevitably result in logically accepting Western systems and models such as private ownership, multi-party systems, and electoral democracy. The fundamental goal of criticizing “universal values” is to seize the “right to construct systems.” (2) Construct “core values.” Core values are the “important stabilizers” of a state. Constructing core values means establishing a “greatest common denominator” in the field of values with which all the people agree and which serve to shape national identity and identify common values. From the perspective of shaping identity and maintaining ideological security, we must highlight three aspects in the current process of constructing and interpreting China’s core socialist values. First, focus on the construction of legitimacy and on explaining the moral foundations of the state system. Second, focus on constructing national systems and providing the basic direction for their construction. This is done to achieve the in-depth integration of values and national systems and firmly grasp the “authority to construct systems.” Third, focus on social values in order to establish the dominant values of society, truly achieve the “cohesive” effect of core values, and resist the threat of “differentiation” posed by non-mainstream values. 

认同是国家安全的一个重要变量。国家认同危机必然导致国家安全风险。无论是外来意识形态渗透,还是内部的社会思潮竞争带来的挑战,最终都集中到一点:“认同危机”。从意识形态安全维护的角度看,解决认同危机,关键还是意识形态结构中最核心部分——价值-信仰系统的建设。这涉及到两个方面:“解构”与“建构”。(1)解构“普世价值”。解构“普世价值”,需要从学术和政治两个层面入手。第一,从学理上批判“普世价值”在理论依据上的错误。“普世价值”模糊了价值的普遍性和价值的普遍主义,将价值的普遍性与特殊性割裂开来,把西方特殊价值普遍化,作为唯一的标准强加于人。第二,从政治实践角度揭露“普世价值”背后的“真实意图”。“普世价值”占领道义制高点,它们好像是整个人类社会普遍接受、认同的价值观念,因此,没有接受这些价值观念的国家就是自绝于整个人类社会。实际上,“普世价值”是西方资本主义利益的价值观念反映,它是为西方资本主义政治服务的意识形态工具。习近平总书记指出,一些国家在“普世价值”的鼓捣下被折腾得不成样子了。“如果我们用西方资本主义价值体系来剪裁我们的实践,用西方资本主义评价体系来衡量我国发展,符合西方标准就行,不符合西方标准就是落后的陈旧的,就要批判、攻击,那后果不堪设想!”为什么要批判“普世价值”?因为它背后指向的是国家制度的建构及其标准,接受了“普世价值”,必然会“合乎逻辑”地接受私有制、多党制、选举民主等西方制度模式。批判“普世价值”根本目标在于夺取“制度建构权”。(2)建构核心价值观。核心价值观是一个国家的“重要稳定器”。建构核心价值观,就是确立民众共同认同的价值观这一“最大公约数”,也就是塑造国家认同、价值认同。从塑造认同、维护意识形态安全的角度看,当前我国社会主义核心价值观的建构与阐释的过程中,应当更加凸显三个面向:第一,着眼于合法性建构,着力阐释国家制度的道义基础。第二,着眼于制度建设,为国家制度的建构提供基本方向,即实现价值观与国家制度的深入融合,牢牢掌握“制度建构权”。第三,着眼于社会价值,奠定社会的主导价值,真正实现核心价值观的“凝心聚力”作用,抵制非主流价值观的“分化”威胁。

(iii) Decision-Action System

    (三)决策-操作系统

The decision-action system explores the behavioral patterns involved in the political socialization of ideology. It involves a series of elements pertaining to activities of ideological practice, such as ideological subjects, resources and platforms, institutions and mechanisms, communication methods, and audiences. In terms of decision-action systems, to firmly seize control of ideological work and maintain ideological security, there are currently at least two key tasks. First, implement a system of responsibility for ideological work. [As Xi Jinping said,] “The disintegration of a regime often begins in the realm of ideas. Political upheaval and regime change may occur overnight, but the evolution of ideas is a long-term process. However, when the defensive line on the plane of thought is breached, other lines of defense are hard to hold.” Ideological work is extremely important and plays a vital role in regime security. Therefore, to do ideological work well, we must insist on Party-wide action. We must fully implement the system of responsibility for ideological work and consolidate and reinforce political and leadership responsibilities for maintaining ideological security. To implement the work responsibility system, it is necessary to strengthen strategic position building and management, carry forward the spirit of struggle, always stand on the front line of the ideological struggle, and dare to draw swords [敢于亮剑]. Second, establish early-warning mechanisms for ideological security risks. Generally speaking, this involves three types of specific mechanisms. The first is monitoring mechanisms; by monitoring focal points, hot spots, and other such information in the ideological field, we can conduct effective analysis and judgments to accurately grasp the dynamics and directions of ideological security risks. The second is alert mechanisms; when the monitoring results (including analysis and judgment conclusions) show warning signs for ideological security, the Party and the government will be alerted through relevant channels and mechanisms. The third is response mechanisms; leading institutions involved in ideological work must quickly adopt effective measures to resolve ideological security incidents. It can be said that the three types of mechanisms all depend on the design of an early-warning metric for ideological security risks. The occurrence of ideological risks and ideological security incidents is a process and can have warning signs. Therefore, how can we predict such risks? This requires some specific metrics and variables, which constitute indicators that allow us to observe ideological security risks. What are the early-warning metrics for ideological security risks? How can we assess the warning level? These matters require quantitative scientific research. From a qualitative point of view, according to the different stages of security risks, early-warning metrics of ideological security risks [意识形态安全风险预警指标] can be divided into three categories. The first is warning-source [警源] metrics such as the penetration of Western ideology, penetration of domestic anti-Marxist trends of thought, the influence of non-mainstream values, and the incitement of opposition forces at home and abroad. The second is warning-sign [警兆] metrics such as the level of identification with the core values of socialism, the level of identification with the main leaders of the Party and the state, the level of trust in the Party’s governance, and the level of satisfaction with the relationship between cadres and the masses. The third is warning-condition [警情] metrics such as political disputes, political rumors, complaints, and radical comments. Different types of early-warning metrics have different warning-level assessments. In general, the purpose of the early-warning mechanisms for ideological security risks is to recognize the source of the warning, predict the warning signs and situations, and eliminate the warning situations. Previously, we mentioned that ideological security risks are, to some extent, a kind of “identity crisis”—that is, a failure to identify with the country’s development model and institutions or a failure to identify with the dominant values. Therefore, we can compile statistics on and measure warning-sign metrics (such as the level of identification with the core values of socialism, the level of identification with the main leaders of the Party and the state, the level of trust in the Party’s governance, and the level of satisfaction with the relationship between cadres and the masses) in order to assess security risks to the dominant ideology. 

决策-操作系统探讨的是关于意识形态的政治社会化的行为模式,它涉及到意识形态实践活动的一系列要素,比如意识形态主体、意识形态资源与平台、工作体制机制、传播方式方法、意识形态受众等。从决策-操作系统来说,牢牢掌握意识形态工作领导权、维护意识形态安全,当前至少有两个方面的重点任务:(1)落实意识形态工作责任制。“一个政权的瓦解往往是从思想领域开始的,政治动荡、政权更迭可能在一夜之间发生,但思想演化是个长期过程。思想防线被攻破了,其他防线就很难守住。”意识形态工作极端重要,对政权安全起着至关重要的作用。因此,做好意识形态工作必须坚持全党动手。全面落实意识形态工作责任制,压紧压实维护意识形态安全的政治责任、领导责任;落实工作责任制就要加强阵地建设和管理,要发扬斗争精神,始终站在意识形态斗争第一线,敢于亮剑。(2)建立意识形态安全风险预警机制。一般说来,它有三个方面的具体机制:一是监测机制。通过监测意识形态领域焦点、热点等信息,进行有效的分析与研判,准确把握意识形态安全风险的动态和方向。二是警报机制。当发现监测结果(包括分析研判结论)显示意识形态安全出现警情征兆时,通过相关渠道、机制向党和政府发出警报。三是反应机制。意识形态工作相关领导机构快速采取有效措施,解决意识形态安全事件。可以说,三种机制都依赖于意识形态安全风险的预警指标体系的设计。意识形态风险、意识形态安全事件的发生是有一个过程的,并且具有可征兆性。那么,如何预测呢?这就需要一些特定的指标、变量,它们构成了我们观测意识形态安全风险的指示器。意识形态安全风险有哪些预警指标?如何评估预警警级?这些都需要科学的定量研究。从定性的角度看,根据安全风险所处的不同阶段,意识形态安全风险预警指标可以分为三大类:一是警源指标。相关指标有:西方意识形态渗透、国内反马克思主义思潮的渗透、非主流价值观的影响、国内外反对势力的煽动等。二是警兆指标。相关指标有:对社会主义核心价值观的认同度、对党和国家主要领导人的认同度、对党执政的信任度、干群关系满意度等。三是警情指标。相关指标有:政治争论、政治谣言、牢骚言论、激进言论等。不同类的预警指标,有着不同预警警级的评估。总的来说,意识形态安全风险预警机制的目的在于认识警源、预测预报警兆警情、排除警情。前面,我们也提到,意识形态安全风险,在某种程度上,是一种“认同危机”,即对国家的发展模式和制度的不认同、对主流价值观的不认同,等等。因此,我们可以通过对一些警兆指标(比如,对社会核心价值观的认同度、对党和国家主要领导人的认同度、对党执政的信任度、干群关系满意度)的统计与测量,对主流意识形态安全风险进行评估。

In conclusion, we must accurately grasp the national ideological security situation [国家意识形态安全形势] and discuss a series of theoretical issues related to ideological security from the theoretical height of the Overall National Security Outlook. In order to grasp the internal and external risks to China’s ideology, we should formulate a targeted national ideological security strategy, maintain the leadership and dominance of the dominant ideology, and build an ideological line of defense for overall national security. 

总而言之,我们要准确把握国家意识形态安全形势,在总体国家安全观的理论高度探讨关于意识形态安全的一系列理论议题;在把握当前我国意识形态面临的内外部风险的前提下,有针对性地制定国家意识形态安全战略,维护主流意识形态的领导权和主导权,为总体国家安全构筑思想防线。

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唐爱军 (Tang Aijun) (2022). "Ideological Security in the Framework of the Overall National Security Outlook [总体国家安全观视域中的意识形态安全 ]". Interpret: China, Original work published December 12, 2019, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/ideological-security-in-the-framework-of-the-overall-national-security-outlook/

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