中国国际军事安全危机行为研究
Return to the Library

Research on China’s Behavior in International Military Security Crises

中国国际军事安全危机行为研究

In this sweeping analysis of China’s behavior in military crises since 1949, a prominent security analyst argues how Beijing has refined and improved its international crisis management paradigm over time and provides suggestions for future improvements. He argues that China should “closely integrate crisis management, conflict resolution, and opportunity management” as part of its peaceful development.


FacebookTwitterLinkedInEmailPrintCopy Link
Original text
PDF
English text
PDF
See an error? Drop us a line at
View the translated and original text side-by-side

Since the founding of New China more than 60 years ago, as the international situation and China’s domestic and foreign policies have evolved, China’s international military security crisis behavior has undergone profound changes. Especially in the last 20 years, in China’s national security decisionmaking mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms have been continuously strengthened, its guidelines and principles of crisis management have been increasingly enriched and developed, and China’s ability to carry out crisis management has been significantly strengthened.

新中国建立60余年来,随着国际形势和自身内外政策的演变,中国的国际军事安全危机行为发生了深刻的变化。特别是近20年来,在中国的国家安全决策机制中,危机管理机制不断加强,危机管理的方针、原则日益丰富与发展,中国进行危机管理的能力明显加强。

Based on the basic theory of crisis management, this paper focuses on the major international military security crises experienced by China. It compares, analyzes, and summarizes China’s crisis behavior (with particular attention to crisis management) in different periods, paints a general picture, summarizes its changes and the reasons for these changes, and puts forward prospects for its future development.

本文根据危机管理的基本理论,围绕中国经历的主要国际军事安全危机事件,对中国在不同时期的危机行为(特别是危机管理)进行比较、分析与归纳,勾画其概貌,总结其变化及变化的原因,并对其未来发展做出展望。

I. Definitions and research object

一,定义与研究对象

In order to discuss and summarize China’s international security crisis behavior, we must first provide clear and accurate definitions of key terms and our research object.

对中国国际安全危机行为进行探讨与总结,首先要对相关定义及研究对象做出清晰、准确的界定。

(i) On international military security crises
(一)关于国际军事安全危机

As normally defined, international military security crises refers to a situation where the relationships between countries are in a dangerous state where military conflict or even war may erupt. Such a crisis involves three factors: First, the core or major interests of the parties involved in the crisis are threatened. Second, there is a time limit or a sense of urgency. Third, there is a serious danger of military conflict. 1

根据通常的定义,国际军事安全危机是指国家之间的关系处于一种可能爆发军事冲突甚至战争的危险状态。它主要由三个因素构成:一是危机相关方的核心利益或重大利益受到威胁;二是存在时间限制或紧迫感;三是有发生军事冲突的严重危险。

An international military security crisis is conceptually different from an international security crisis. The former is only a subset of the latter. International security crisis has a more expansive definition, including both traditional and non-traditional international security crises. The concept of an international military security crisis basically overlaps with the concept of a traditional international security crisis, mainly involving disputes over territory and sovereignty as well as geopolitical conflicts. In addition, under the new situation, it also involves certain non-traditional security crises, such as international terrorism crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, it is quite different from more non-traditional international security crises, such as financial crises, energy scarcity crises, and international crises that may be caused by climate change, environmental pollution, and the international spread of infectious diseases. The latter usually does not have the potential of directly triggering a military conflict.

国际军事安全危机与国际安全危机并非等同概念,它只是后者的一部分。国际安全危机有更大的内涵,既包括传统国际安全危机也包括非传统国际安全危机。国际军事安全危机的概念与传统国际安全危机的概念基本重合,主要涉及领土、主权权益争议及地缘政治冲突;此外,在新形势下,它还涉及某些非传统安全危机,如国际恐怖主义危机、大规模杀伤性武器扩散危机等;但它与更多的非传统国际安全危机,如金融危机、能源短缺危机以及可能由气候变化、环境污染、国际传染病等引发的国际危机有较大的区别,后者通常不存在直接引发军事冲突的可能。

International military security crises are divided into potential and actual. When a relevant country (or countries) has a conflict of interest in military security, but the degree of confrontation or external conditions have not yet reached a certain critical point, the crisis is in the latent stage. At this stage, the crisis is called a potential crisis. When the degree of confrontation intensifies or the conflict of interests is rapidly exacerbated due to changes in external conditions, the possibility of military conflict increases sharply, and the potential crisis becomes an actual crisis. Of course, there are also some crises that persist for a long time with alternating periods of high and low intensity, so it is hard to divide them into potential and actual crises. In these crises, the sense of urgency is relatively diminished, but the inherent conflict of interests and the risk of triggering a military conflict are always there.

国际军事安全危机有潜在与现实之分。有关国家(或多国)在军事安全上存在利益冲突,当对立程度或外部条件尚未达到某个临界点时,危机处在潜伏阶段,这时的危机称为潜在危机。当对立程度加剧或由于外部条件的变化导致利益冲突迅速激化时,发生军事冲突的可能性急剧上升,潜在危机就转化为现实危机。当然,也有一些危机会以时明时暗的形态长期持续,以至很难区分它们是潜在危机还是现实危机。在这些危机中,时间紧迫感相对下降,但其内含的利益冲突和引发军事冲突的风险始终存在。由于危机的性质与程度有所不同,某些国际军事安全危机被称做准危机。这些危

Some international military security crises are called quasi-crises because their nature and extent are somewhat different. These crises involve relatively serious conflicts of military security interests and time pressure and may cause serious damage to the political and diplomatic relations of the relevant countries, but generally do not lead to military conflicts and wars.2 Such crises are mostly sudden or unexpected events that produce limited direct consequences. But even in such crises, the possibility of a misfire accidentally triggering a military conflict [擦枪走火, to accidentally shoot a gun while polishing it] remains serious. In addition, given the extreme urgency in time, the risk of a military conflict will rise sharply in the event of a miscalculation of the nature of the crisis.

机也有较大的军事安全利益冲突和时间压力,也可能给相关国家的政治和外交关系带来严重损害,但通常不致引发军事冲突与战争。这类危机多是一些突发或意外事件,其造成的直接后果有限。但即使在这类危机中,擦枪走火的可能性仍然严重存在;此外,由于时间极其紧迫,一旦对危机性质做出误判,军事冲突的风险将会急剧上升。

(ii) On military confrontation and crisis management
(二)关于军事对抗与危机管理

In the face of an international military security crisis, crisis participants usually have two types of approaches: One approach is to determine to resolve conflicts of interest by military means in order to safeguard one’s own interests, even at the cost of war. This paper defines this approach as military confrontation. A military confrontation may be a proactive decision, an action forced upon the actor, or the result of the failure of crisis management. Another approach is to strive to safeguard one’s own interests on the one hand, while making every effort to control the risk of crisis escalation, prevent the outbreak of military conflicts, and gradually mitigate the crisis on the other hand. This is crisis management. In the process of crisis management, the two sides involved in the crisis usually adopt various crisis negotiation strategies, both gamesmanship and cooperation, both conflict and compromise. In most cases, successful military crisis management does not seek to resolve conflicts of interest, but rather looks to avoid worst-case scenarios.3

面对国际军事安全危机,危机行为者通常有两种做法:一种做法是不惜一战,决心以军事手段解决利益冲突,以达到维护自身利益的目的。本文将此定义为军事对抗。军事对抗可能是主动做出的决定,也可能是被迫采取的行动或者是危机管理失败的结果。另一种做法则是一方面力求维护自身利益,一方面又尽力控制危机升级的风险,防止爆发军事冲突,使危机逐步得到缓解。这就是危机管理。在危机管理的过程中,危机双方通常采取各种危机谈判策略,既博弈又合作,既斗争又妥协。在大多数情况下,成功的军事危机管理并非是寻求解决利益冲突,而是避免出现最差的场景。

In addition to the two clearly different crisis behaviors described above, a third situation sometimes occurs, whether crisis management is the main approach, but it is supplemented by military confrontation, with the latter approach serving the former. In this case, the degree of military confrontation is limited.

除了上述两种明显不同的危机行为外,有时还会出现第三种情况,即以危机管理为主,以军事对抗为辅,后者服务于前者。在此情况下,军事对抗的程度较为有限。

(iii) Research object
(三)研究对象

According to the above definitions, the research content of this paper involves the main international military security crises experienced by New China, including actual crises, potential crises, and quasi-crises. Such crises either occur directly between China and foreign countries, or although they occur between other countries, they lead to intervention by China because they have a significant impact on China’s national security interests. Among these crises, the Taiwan Strait crisis is particularly distinctive. The Taiwan question is a part of China’s internal affairs, but due to the long-term U.S. policy of interference in Taiwan, this issue has a certain “international character.” Military conflicts and crises between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have repeatedly triggered military security crises between China and the United States.

根据上述定义,本文研究内容涉及新中国经历的主要国际军事安全危机,包括现实危机、潜在危机和准危机。它们或直接发生在中外之间,或虽然发生在他国之间却由于对中国的国家安全利益有重大影响而导致中国的介入。其中,台海危机具有较大的特殊性。台湾问题是中国的内政,但由于美国长期实行对台干涉政策,致使这一问题具有了一定的“国际性”,两岸之间的军事冲突与危机曾多次引发中美之间的军事安全危机。

Among the many international military security crises that China has experienced, some have directly triggered military confrontations between China and foreign countries. Others have triggered military conflicts or even wars, although both crisis management and military confrontation have been combined in the development of the crises. Still, others were contained or mitigated by the practice of crisis management. This paper deals with two major international military security crisis behaviors practiced by China—military confrontation and crisis management. However, the focus of our research is on crisis management. The former approach is involved in order to better study and explain the latter, and to demonstrate the profound changes in China’s behavior in international military security crises.

在中国经历的诸多国际军事安全危机中,有些直接引发了中外军事对抗;有些虽然也引发了军事冲突甚至战争,但在其发展过程中危机管理与军事对抗兼而有之;还有一些则因实行危机管理得到了控制或缓解。本文涉及中国的两种主要国际军事安全危机行为———军事对抗与危机管理,但研究的重点是危机管理。涉及前者是为了更好地研究与说明后者,展现中国国际军事安全危机行为的深刻变化。

Many non-traditional security crises that are quite different from military security crises are outside the scope of this study, but the global nuclear proliferation crisis, especially around China’s periphery, provides an important context for our study. In addition, we should point out that, after the start of the 21st century, the crises and challenges brought about by international terrorism have attracted more and more attention from China. So far, China has been less involved in international crisis management in this area, but in the long run, it is inevitable that China will gradually intervene more in the future.

与军事安全危机有较大区别的诸多非传统安全危机不在本文研究范围之内,但在国际上特别是在中国周边发生的核扩散危机则是研究的重要内容之一。此外,应指出的是,进入21世纪后,国际恐怖主义带来的危机与挑战已经引起了中国越来越多的重视。到目前为止,中国尚较少介入这方面的国际危机管理,但从长远看,逐步介入将是必然的发展趋势。

II. Overview of crises response

二,危机应对概述

This section is divided into two periods and provides a brief analysis of the major crisis events that China has experienced over the past 60 years.

本节分两个时期,简析60余年来中国经历的主要危机事件。

(i) Cold War period
(一)冷战时期

When the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Cold War had already begun, and it lasted for more than 40 years after China’s founding. During this period, faced with frequent international military security crises, China repeatedly intervened in or became involved in military conflicts and wars.

1949年新中国建立时,冷战已经发生,此后又持续了40余年。在此期间,面对频发的国际军事安全危机,中国曾多次介入或卷入军事冲突与战争。

The Indochina War was the first war in which New China intervened. Shortly after the end of World War II, the Indochinese Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh, launched a struggle against French colonialism. In early 1950, they requested that China send troops to join the war. At that time, because they wanted to support the national liberation movement and eliminate the threat of Western colonial forces facing China’s periphery, the Chinese leaders did not hesitate to make the decision to aid Vietnam in resisting the French. However, after careful consideration, they decided not to send troops to join the war directly, but to intervene by sending a military advisory group and providing weapons and material assistance. In 1953, after the war in Indochina entered a state where the forces were evenly balanced, France tried to seek a compromise, but the United States wanted France to continue to fight, and actively planned to send troops to aid the French. Under these conditions, China participated in the Geneva Conference and worked hard on all parties to the conflict, especially the Vietnamese side. China made important contributions to the signing4 of the Geneva Armistice Agreement in July 1954.

印度支那战争是新中国介入的第一场战争。二战结束不久,胡志明领导的印度支那共产党即发动了反对法国殖民主义的斗争,并于1950年初向中国提出派兵参战的请求。当时,从支援民族解放运动和消除中国周边面临的西方殖民势力威胁出发,中国领导人毫不犹豫地做出了援越抗法的决定。但经过慎重考虑,决定不直接派兵参战,而是以派军事顾问团和提供武器及物资援助的方式介入。1953年,在印度支那战争进入势均力敌状态后,法国试图寻求妥协,美国却希望法国继续打下去,并积极策划出兵援法。在此形势下,中国参加日内瓦会议,努力做冲突各方特别是越方的工作,对1954年7月《日内瓦停战协议》的签订做出了重要贡献。

The Korean War was a major local war in which China was directly involved. The Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950. Very quickly, U.S. military intervention turned a Korean civil war into an international war and posed a serious threat to China’s national security. The Chinese leaders decided to prepare in two ways: On the one hand, they ordered troops to quickly concentrate on the border between China and North Korea, and on the other hand, they actively carried out diplomatic activities in the hope of easing tensions and preventing the war from expanding and directly involving China.5 At that time, China and the United States had no diplomatic relations, communication was very difficult, and there was a serious lack of mutual understanding. Due to these as well as other reasons, the United States wrongly judged that China could not send troops to take part in the war.6 After the U.S. military ignored a series of warnings from China in crossing the “38th parallel” on a large scale and approaching the Yalu River, the long-brewing major military confrontation became a reality even though both sides had wanted to avoid it. From October 19, 1950, when the Volunteers secretly crossed the Yalu River and went on to push the U.S. military back to the “38th parallel” to the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953, the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea lasted for nearly three years. This war had a significant and far-reaching influence on the subsequent strengthening of military security crisis management between China and the United States.

朝鲜战争是中国直接卷入的一场重大局部战争。1950年6月25日朝鲜战争爆发。很快,美国的军事干涉使朝鲜内战转变成国际战争,并对中国的国家安全形成严重威胁。中国领导人决定做两手准备:一方面命令部队迅速向中朝边境集结,另一方面积极开展外交活动,希望缓和紧张局势,避免战争扩大和被直接卷入战争。当时中美两国没有外交关系,沟通十分困难且严重缺乏相互了解,再加上其他种种原因,美国做出了中国不可能出兵参战的错误判断。在美军无视中国一系列警告大规模越过“三八线”并逼近鸭绿江后,一场酝酿已久、但双方都希冀避免的重大军事较量成为现实。从1950年10月19日志愿军秘密跨过鸭绿江到把美军打回“三八线”,再到1953年7月27日签订朝鲜停战协议,抗美援朝战争持续近三年。这场战争对于后来中美加强相互间的军事安全危机管理具有重大而深远的影响。

In 1954 and 1958, China twice launched military struggles against Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait known as the “shelling of Kinmen.” The goal of the former struggle (August 1954 to May of the following year) was to liberate the islands off the coast of Zhejiang, combat the harassment by Chiang Kai-shek’s army toward the coast of the mainland, and prevent the United States from signing a military alliance treaty with the Taiwan region. The goal of the latter struggle (August to October 1958) was to counter the harassment by Chiang’s army of the mainland of the motherland, take the opportunity to seize the islands off the coast of Fujian occupied by Chiang, and clarify the scope of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China.7 In the two crises in the Taiwan Strait, the United States responded strongly both times, not only concentrating its forces on the Taiwan Strait, but also publicly issuing nuclear threats to China. Chinese leaders insisted on the military struggle against Taiwan, while at the same time trying to avoid direct military conflict with the United States. 8 They did not end military operations until some of the goals of the military struggle were achieved. Through these two military struggles, Chinese leaders clearly identified the bottom lines of the U.S. side and made important judgments: The United States is determined to protect the Taiwan region militarily, but it does not support the use of China’s coastal islands by Taiwan authorities to harass the mainland and is even less willing to become involved in a military conflict between the two sides of the strait on these islands; the Taiwan issue will be protracted due to U.S. interference. Mao Zedong decided to adjust his policy. He abandoned the original plan to capture the two islands of Kinmen and Matsu in order to oppose the United States’ attempt to create “two Chinas.”

1954年和1958年,中国两次在台海发动了以“炮击金门”闻名的对台军事斗争。前者(1954年8月至次年5月)的目标是解放浙江沿海岛屿,打击蒋军对大陆沿海的袭扰,阻止美国与台湾地区签订军事同盟条约;后者(1958年8月至10月)的目标是反击蒋军对祖国大陆的袭扰,伺机夺取福建沿海蒋占岛屿,搞清《美台共同防御条约》的范围。在两次台海危机中,美国均做出强烈反应,不仅向台海大规模集结兵力,还公开对中国发出核威胁;中国领导人坚持对台军事斗争,同时努力避免与美国发生直接军事冲突,直至实现部分军事斗争目标后才结束军事行动。通过这两次军事斗争,中国领导人搞清楚了美方的底线并做出重要判断:美国决意武装保护台湾地区,却不支持台湾当局利用中国沿海岛屿袭扰大陆,更不愿卷入两岸在这些岛屿的军事冲突;台湾问题将由于美国的干涉而长期化。毛泽东决定调整政策,放弃原定攻占金门、马祖两个岛屿的计划,以反对美国制造“两个中国”的企图。

In 1962, a serious military conflict occurred between China and India concerning a territorial dispute. In the autumn of 1959, armed men from the two countries exchanged fire on the border for the first time. At that time, in order to ease tensions, China proposed to India in November that the two sides retreat from the Line of Actual Control, and unilaterally retreated 20 kilometers after the Indian side rejected the suggestion. In early 1960, after negotiating with some neighboring countries to demarcate boundary lines, China once again gave a concrete proposal to India for the signing of a boundary agreement, but this was once again rejected by the Indian side. At the end of 1961, India began to send troops to encroach on the disputed western sector. Then, in June of the following year, it began to cross the Line of Actual Control between the two sides in the disputed eastern sector in order to set up military points.9 In the face of China’s renewed proposal for negotiations, India stated that it could only discuss the issue of China’s “withdrawal.” In this situation, Chinese leaders made the judgment that India was taking advantage of the difficulties faced by China 10 to forcibly change the status quo on the border using a policy of military encroachment. In order to maintain the status quo along the border and maintain the stability of the border, China decided to conduct a border self-defense counterattack against India. On October 20, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched an attack on the invading Indian army. In late November, China announced a ceasefire and withdrew its troops within 20 kilometers of the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control.

1962年,因领土争议中国与印度发生了一场严重军事冲突。1959年秋两国武装人员在边境初次发生交火事件。当时,为缓和紧张形势,中国曾于11月向印度提出双方从实际控制线后撤的建议,并在印方拒绝建议后单方面后撤20公里;1960年初,在与一些邻国通过谈判划定边界线后,中国再次向印度提出签订边界协定的具体建议,却又一次遭到印方拒绝。1961年底印度开始向争议西段地区派兵设点蚕食,次年6月便开始在争议东段越过双方实际控制线进行军事设点。面对中国再次提出的谈判建议,印度表示只能讨论中国“撤军”问题。在此形势下,中国领导人做出判断,印度是要利用中国面临的困难,以军事蚕食方针强行改变边界现状。为维持边界现状,保持边界安定,中国决定对印度进行边界自卫反击战。10月20日,解放军向入侵印军发起攻击;11月下旬,中国宣布停火,并将部队撤回到实际控制线中方一侧20公里内。

The effort to aid Vietnam to resist the United States was China’s longest indirect military conflict with the United States during the Cold War. In August 1964, the United States comprehensively escalated the Vietnam War and began a policy of “strike the south and bomb the north” against Vietnam. China responded strongly, clearly announcing that it would send personnel to Vietnam to fight the U.S. military and attack any U.S. planes that invaded Chinese airspace.11 At the same time, China still hoped to prevent a direct large-scale military conflict with the United States and prevent the flames of the Vietnam War from spreading within China’s borders. In the first half of 1965, Chinese leaders sent the following messages to the United States through various channels: China had no intention of provoking a war against the United States, China’s response would be reciprocal, the United States must not cross the 17th parallel, and China would not send troops to southern Vietnam. If U.S. military operations against northern Vietnam were limited to naval and air operations, the participation of Chinese troops in the north would be limited to combat support.12 This time, the United States clearly noted the signals sent by China. Up to the end of the war, the United States did not launch a ground war against northern Vietnam, and it always strictly prohibited U.S. military aircraft from entering China on combat missions. After 1968, as the war transitioned to “Vietnamization,” the military security crisis between China and the United States gradually eased. In 1970, all Chinese support troops withdrew to China.13 In this crisis, the format and outcome of the confrontation between China and the United States were very different than in the Korean War. The two countries not only avoided direct military conflict, but also embarked on the road of de-escalation before the crisis was concluded.14

援越抗美是中国在冷战期间与美国进行的一场为时最长的间接军事冲突。1964年8月,美国全面升级越南战争,开始对越南“南打北炸”。中国做出强烈反应,明确宣布将派遣人员到越南与美军作战并将对入侵中国领空的美机予以打击。与此同时,中国仍希望防止与美国直接发生大规模军事冲突、防止越战战火燃到中国境内。1965年上半年,中国领导人通过多种途径向美方传话:中国无意挑起对美战争,中国的反应将是对等的,美国不过十七度线,中国不会向越南南方派兵;美国对越南北方的军事行动如限于海空作战,中国在北方的参战部队将仅限于作战支援。这一次,美国显然注意到了中国发出的信号,直到战争结束,美国未对越南北方发动地面战争,也始终严禁美军机进入中国境内作战。1968年后,随着战争向“越南化”转变,中美之间的军事安全危机逐渐趋缓。1970年,中国支援部队全部撤回中国。此次危机中,中美对抗的形式和结果与朝鲜战争时大不相同,两国不仅避免了直接军事冲突,而且在危机尚未完结时即走上了缓和之路。

The Battle of Xisha (Battle of the Paracel Islands) in January 1974 was an episode at the end of China’s effort to aid Vietnam and resist the United States. Under favorable circumstances, Chinese leaders decided to launch a self-defense counterattack against the South Vietnamese navy that had invaded the waters off the Xisha Islands. In one stroke, the Chinese recovered their islands that had been occupied by the South Vietnamese regime.

1974年月1月的西沙之战是发生在中国援越抗美末期的一个插曲。在有利的形势下,中国领导人决定对入侵西沙海域的越南南方海军进行自卫反击,一举收复了被越南南方政权占领的中国岛屿。

In 1969, a serious border conflict broke out between China and the Soviet Union. The direct cause was a territorial boundary dispute, but the deeper context was the intensification of ideological differences between the two parties and the overall breakdown of the relationship between the two countries. Before the outbreak of the conflict, the friction between the two sides along the eastern sector of the border was intensifying, and it had progressed to the point of an imminent eruption. Faced with the high-pressure policies adopted by the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders decided to respond in kind and make no concessions. In March and August 1969, the border guards of both sides participated in armed clashes, first on Zhenbao Island in the eastern sector of the border and then at Tielieketi in the western sector. Faced with a very severe situation, Mao Zedong issued a call to the whole country to “prepare for war,” and China entered a war footing. The Soviet Union accelerated the deployment of troops to the border area between the two countries, doubling its troop strength in a short period of time, and issued a nuclear threat to China. In September of the same year, a meeting between the premiers of the two countries at the Beijing airport eased the atmosphere of confrontation. However, the consensus to ease the conflict and maintain the status quo on the border reached during the meeting was not supported by the top leaders of the two countries, so the meeting resulted in failure. Afterward, Sino-Soviet relations remained in a state of complete confrontation for a long time.

1969年,中国与苏联爆发了严重的边界武装冲突。其直接导因是领土边界争议,更深刻的背景则是两党意识形态分歧的激化和两国关系的全面破裂。冲突爆发前,双方在东段边境的摩擦日益加剧,已成一触即发之势。面对苏联采取的高压政策,中国领导人决定针锋相对、毫不退让。1969年3月和8月,双方边防部队先后在边界东段的珍宝岛和西段的铁列克提发生武装冲突。面对十分严峻的形势,毛泽东向全国发出“要准备打仗”的号召,中国进入临战状态。苏联则加速向两国边境地区调兵,短期内使兵力增加一倍,并向中国发出核威胁。当年9月,两国总理在北京机场的会晤使对抗气氛有所缓和,但会晤中达成的缓和冲突、维持边界现状的共同意见未得到两国最高领导人的支持,会谈结果失效。此后,中苏关系曾长期处于全面对抗状态。

China’s final foreign military conflict during the Cold War occurred in 1979. Starting even before the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, historical grievances, disputes over territorial and maritime rights, and strategic differences between China and Vietnam gradually emerged. In 1977, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated sharply. In 1978, with the support of the Soviet Union, Vietnam aggressively attacked Cambodia, igniting the fuse that set off a Sino-Vietnamese military conflict. In order to maintain its own and regional security and oppose the expansion of the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the Indochinese Peninsula region, in the autumn of 1978, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders decided to conduct a self-defense counterattack against Vietnam. To this end, China actively conducted diplomatic actions15 and fully prepared for the possibility of Soviet intervention. The operation started in February 1979. After reaching their basic combat objectives in March, the Chinese troops completely withdrew from Vietnam. From 1980, China continued to carry out small-scale follow-up cross-border combat operations against Vietnam.16 In March 1988, China and Vietnam fought a battle in the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), and the Chinese navy subsequently recovered some islands and reefs occupied by Vietnam.

冷战期间中国的最后一场对外军事冲突发生于1979年。早在1975年越南统一前后,中越之间的历史积怨、领土与海洋权益争议及战略分歧即已逐渐显露。1977年越南入侵柬埔寨,中越关系急剧恶化。1978年越南在苏联支持下大举进攻柬埔寨,点燃了中越军事冲突的导火索。为维护自身与地区安全,反对苏联和越南在中南半岛地区扩张,1978年秋,邓小平等中国领导人决定进行对越自卫反击战。为此,中国积极开展外交行动并对苏联介入的可能性做了充分准备。1979年2月作战开始;3月在达到基本作战目标后,中国军队从越南全部撤出。从1980年起,中国又对越南进行了后续小规模跨界作战。1988年3月,中越之间还发生了南沙之战,中国海军随后收复了被越南占领的一些岛礁。

In addition, during the Cold War, China also intervened to a certain extent in the two Indo-Pakistani wars in 1965 and 1971. At that time, China provided military assistance to Pakistan at the request of the Pakistani government. In particular, in 1965, Chinese leaders made an explicit decision to send troops to assist Pakistan when necessary. Because India took measures to retreat from the Sino-Sikkim border after receiving an “ultimatum note” from China, China did not ultimately send troops.17

此外,在冷战期间,中国还在一定程度上介入了1965年和1971的两次印巴战争。当时,应巴基斯坦政府的请求,中国曾对巴基斯坦进行军事援助。特别是在1965年,中国领导人已明确做出了在必要时出兵援助巴基斯坦的决定。由于印度在接到中国“最后通牒式的照会”后在中锡边界采取了退避措施,中国最后没有出兵。

(ii) Since the end of the Cold War
(二) 冷战结束以来

The Cold War ended in 1991. Since then, in the region and on the global scale, various military security crises have continued to occur from time to time. However, there has been a significant reduction in crises directly between China and foreign countries, and China has not been involved in any more international military conflicts.

1991年冷战终结。此后,在地区与世界范围内,各种军事安全危机仍然不时发生,但直接发生在中外之间的危机明显减少,中国也未再卷入任何国际军事冲突。

The Mischief Reef incident between China and the Philippines in 1995 presents a microcosm of the South China Sea dispute between China and five Southeast Asian countries. In January of that year, China sent a scientific research vessel to conduct a scientific investigation of the Mischief Reef in the Nansha islands and build shelters for fishermen on the reef. The Philippine government not only rapidly sent more troops to the disputed area, but also took a variety of actions to intensify the conflict on the grounds that “Chinese warships” had “invaded” its territorial waters and built “military facilities” on Mischief Reef.18 Given this situation, countries involved in other disputes in Southeast Asia intervened one after another and stepped up their activities in the waters of the Nansha Islands. The Mischief Reef incident became the focus of the international community’s attention for some time. After the incident, the Chinese government strengthened its vigilance on the relevant waters of the Nansha Islands to resolutely safeguard China’s legitimate rights and interests on the one hand. On the other hand, it insisted on conducting diplomacy with the Philippine government and opposed its practice of increasing tensions and internationalizing disputes between the two countries. At the end of July, at the China-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, China put forward a comprehensive position on resolving the Nansha dispute, expressing its willingness to peacefully resolve the dispute with relevant countries in accordance with international law and the principles of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This proposal was welcomed by all participants. Since then, the tensions produced by the Mischief Reef incident have gradually eased.

1995年发生的中菲美济礁事件是中国与东南亚五国南海争端的一个缩影。当年1月,中国派科考船对南沙美济礁进行科学考察并在礁上修建渔民避风设施。菲律宾政府以“中国军舰”“侵入”其海域和在美济礁建造“军事设施”为由,不仅迅速向争议地区增兵,还采取了多种激化矛盾的行动。在此形势下,东南亚其他争议相关国纷纷介入其中,加紧了在南沙海域的活动。美济礁事件一时成为国际社会关注的焦点。事件发生后,中国政府一方面加强对南沙相关海域的警戒,坚决维护中国的合法权益;另一方面坚持与菲政府进行外交交涉,反对其加剧紧张局势和将两国争议国际化的做法。7月底,在中国-东盟外长对话会上,中国全面提出了解决南沙争议的立场,表示愿与有关国家根据国际法、《联合国海洋法公约》的原则和平解决南沙争议,受到与会各方欢迎。此后,美济礁事件引发的紧张形势逐渐趋于缓和。

From 1995 to 1996, the third Taiwan Strait crisis broke out between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and between China and the United States. The crisis was caused by the U.S. government’s blatant violation of its promise and its allowance of Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. The Chinese government responded strongly, first interrupting all dialogue and exchanges between the two countries, recalling the ambassador to the United States, and then conducting a series of military exercises and missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in June and July of 1995. In March 1996, in response to the “presidential” election in the Taiwan region, China decided to conduct additional missile test launches and military exercises. The U.S. government was highly tense and urgently discussed military deployment to the Taiwan Strait. They decided to send two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan Strait. In the face of this serious situation, China remained steadfast and insisted on completing the scheduled missile test launches and large-scale joint land, sea, and air military exercises. On March 28, the PLA’s joint military exercise ended, the same day as the end of the “presidential” election in Taiwan and the arrival of the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz in the Western Pacific. Afterward, the crisis in the Taiwan Strait significantly eased. Taiwan decided to cancel its planned military exercise, and the U.S. Navy quietly left. After this test of strength, the United States gained a new understanding and awareness of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue,19 and the Taiwan authorities’ attempt to change the one-China framework by pursuing “Pragmatic Diplomacy” was suppressed. During this crisis, both China and the United States wanted to avoid military conflict, and the two sides maintained necessary lines of communication.20 In this crisis, there was no military confrontation between China and the United States in the true sense.21

1995年至1996年,台海两岸及中美之间爆发了第三次台海危机。这次危机是由美国政府公然违反承诺、允许台湾地区领导人李登辉访美而引起的。中国政府做出强烈反应,先是中断两国一切对话交流,召回驻美大使,接着又于1995年6月、7月在台海进行一系列军事演习和导弹试射。1996年3月,针对台湾地区“总统”选举,中国决定再次进行导弹试射和军演。美国政府高度紧张,紧急讨论对台海进行军事部署,决定向台海派出两个航母编队。面对严峻局势,中方毫不动摇,坚持完成了预定的导弹试射和大规模陆海空联合军演。3月28日,解放军的联合军演结束,与台湾地区“总统”选举结束和美国美尼米兹号航母抵达西太平洋为同一天。此后,台海危机明显缓解,台湾决定取消原定的军事演习,美国海军也悄然离开。经过这场较量,美国对于台湾问题的敏感性有了新的理解与认识,台湾当局企图以推行“务实外交”改变一个中国框架的势头受到抑制。在此次危机中,中美两国都希望避免军事冲突,双方保持了必要的沟通联络,中美之间并未形成真正意义上的军事对峙。

Since then, the “Taiwan independence” forces have created trouble and caused tensions in the Taiwan Strait many times.22 By enacting the Anti-Secession Law, China fully expressed its goodwill to the Taiwanese people on the one hand, while on the other hand, it clearly declared its bottom lines regarding the use of force for “Taiwan independence” and continuously strengthened preparations for a military struggle for Taiwan. In addition, on the basis of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, China is actively working to cooperate with the United States and the main opposition parties on the island of Taiwan against “Taiwan independence”. China’s efforts have created strong and effective political, military, and diplomatic pressure on the “Taiwan independence” forces so that all their attempts to provoke a Taiwan Strait crisis have failed in succession. Since the spring of 2008, Cross-Strait relations have undergone major changes, entering a new stage of rapid improvement and development.

后来“台独”势力又曾多次制造麻烦,造成台海紧张局势。中国则通过制定《反分裂国家法》,一方面对台湾人民充分表达善意,另一方面明确宣示对“台独”动武底线,并不断加强对台军事斗争准备。此外,中国还在维持台海现状的基础上,积极争取与美国及台湾岛内的主要反对党开展反“台独”合作。中国的努力对“台独”势力形成了强大、有效的政治、军事、外交压力,使其挑起台海危机的企图一次次地落了空。2008年春以来,两岸关系发生重大变化,进入了一个迅速改善与发展的新阶段。

At the turn of the century, two sudden military security crises broke out between China and the United States due to the bombing of an embassy23 and a plane collision24. Relatively speaking, the bombing was a more sudden and serious event than the plane collision25, but the plane collision was more complex26 and entailed greater risks than the bombing.27 At the time, despite their lack of experience in dealing with such emergencies,28 Chinese leaders nevertheless quickly took a series of measures to gradually ease the two crises. China’s basic response policy was to resolutely defend the country’s sovereignty and dignity, fight against the wrongful behavior of the United States, and at the same time, strive to maintain the general situation of Sino-U.S. relations and strive to avoid confrontation. Tensions after the bombing incident began to ease after the United States apologized many times and paid corresponding compensation. The collision incident was finally resolved by adopting separate methods to deal with the pilot and the machine29. These two events allowed Chinese leaders to accumulate valuable experience in dealing with sudden crises. Since then, China’s security crisis management coordination mechanisms have been significantly strengthened.

世纪之交,由于炸馆事件与撞机事件,中美之间连续爆发了两场突发性军事安全危机。相比较而言,炸馆事件比撞机事件更突然、更严重;撞机事件则比炸馆事件更复杂、更具风险。当时,虽然缺少处理这类突发事件的经验,中国领导人仍然较快地采取一系列措施,使这两次危机逐步得到了缓解。中国的基本应对方针是:坚决捍卫国家主权尊严,与美国的错误行为做坚决斗争,同时努力维护中美关系大局,力争避免对抗。炸馆事件在美方多次道歉和进行相关赔偿后趋向缓和;撞机事件则通过人机分开处理的办法最终得到解决。这两次事件为中国领导人处理突发性危机积累了宝贵经验。此后,中国的安全危机管理协调机制得到明显加强。

A crisis also broke out between China and Japan in 2004 due to disputes over maritime rights and interests. In May of that year, Japanese media began to report extensively on China’s development of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea, claiming that Chinese oil and gas exploration west of the “middle line” would siphon off oil and gas resources belonging to Japan. Japan unreasonably accused China of trying to monopolize the seabed resources of the East China Sea. This required the government to take decisive measures to defend Japan’s maritime rights and interests.30 The Japanese government immediately strengthened its military reconnaissance and oil and gas resources investigation in the relevant waters and made “stern representations” to China. The disputes between China and Japan over oil and gas development and the demarcation of the East China Sea abruptly heated up. The East China Sea dispute aggravated public opinion and increased political tensions in the already fierce confrontation between the two countries,31 and calls that “China and Japan must go to war” began to be heard. In the face of a highly tense situation, the Chinese government resolutely safeguarded its national sovereignty and rights and rejected all unreasonable demands from the Japanese. At the same time, it clearly put forward to the Japanese a proposal for joint development in the disputed area and for dialogue concerning the dispute. In addition, the Chinese government also strengthened coordination between relevant departments and the guidance of public opinion, in an effort to prevent the occurrence of a misfire in the East China Sea that could trigger a military conflict. In October of that year, China and Japan began negotiations on the East China Sea, and the tensions in the East China Sea dispute were brought under control.

由于海洋权益争议,2004年中日之间也爆发了一场危机。当年5月,日本媒体开始大量报道中国在东海开发油气田,宣称中国在“中间线”以西开采油气会把属于日本的油气资源吸走;日本无理指责中国企图独占东海海底资源;要求政府采取断然措施,捍卫日本的海洋权益。日本政府随即加强在相关海域的军事侦察及油气资源调查,并向中国提出“严正交涉”,中日围绕油气开发和东海划界的争议骤然升温。东海争议加剧了两国原已激烈对抗的公众舆论和紧张的政治关系,“中日必有一战”的声音开始出现。面对高度紧张的局势,中国政府坚决维护国家主权权益,回绝了日方的种种无理要求,同时又明确向日方提出了在争议区进行共同开发和就争议开展对话的建议。此外,中国政府还加强了相关部门之间的协调和对舆论的导向,努力防止在东海出现“擦枪走火”事件。当年10月,中日双方开始进行东海磋商,东海争端的紧张形势得到控制。

Since 1998, China has also intervened in several international nuclear crises, making active efforts to maintain the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, ease tensions, and avoid military conflicts. During the India-Pakistan nuclear crisis32, China fully cooperated with the other member states in the UN Security Council33 to bring the crisis under control relatively quickly. In the face of the North Korean nuclear crisis,34 China consistently maintained close contact and consultation with relevant parties including North Korea and the United States, viewing the Six-Party Talks as the main platform to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, while supporting the necessary role played by the Security Council.35 In addition, China has also strengthened coordination among relevant domestic departments and its own military preparedness. In response to the Iranian nuclear crisis,36 from participating in discussions at the International Atomic Energy Council to participating in the UN Security Council consultations, from participating in the Six-Nation Talks to directly working with Iran, China’s involvement in the management of the Iranian nuclear crisis has gradually deepened and its influence has gradually expanded.37

自1998年起,中国还陆续介入了多场国际核危机事件,为维护国际核不扩散机制,缓解紧张局势,避免军事冲突进行了积极的努力。在印巴核危机中,中国在联合国安理会与其他成员国全力合作,使这场危机较快地得到了控制。面对朝核危机,中国一直与包括朝美在内的有关各方保持紧密接触与磋商,将六方会谈作为解决朝核问题的主要平台,同时支持安理会发挥必要的作用。此外,中国还加强了国内相关部门的协调和自身军事戒备。针对伊朗核危机,从参加国际原子能理事会讨论到参加联合国安理会磋商,从参加六国会谈到直接对伊朗做工作,中国介入伊朗核危机管理的程度逐步加深,影响力逐渐扩大。

In addition, before the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2002, China made unremitting efforts to de-escalate the Iraqi crisis38. At the time, China actively participated in international cooperation to fight terrorism, but did not approve of the so-called “War on Terror” fought by the United States around the world. It was even more opposed to the “pre-emptive” military strikes conducted by the United States against other countries in the name of fighting terrorism. Facing the tense situation resulting from the decision by the United States and the UK to use force against Iraq, China called for a political solution to the Iraqi issue within the framework of the United Nations and opposed the Security Council’s automatic authorization of the United States to use force against Iraq39. Together with many countries, it waged a fierce contest with the United States and the UK. Although these efforts failed to prevent the United States and the UK from starting a war, they upheld international morality and the UN Security Council’s basic principles of maintaining peace and security. In the end, the Security Council did not give the green light to the United States and the UK to use force against Iraq. At that time, China not only coordinated and cooperated with major powers with similar positions such as France, Germany, and Russia, but also fought against countries with opposite positions such as the United States and the UK. With the Security Council as the main diplomatic platform, bilateral consultations and summit diplomacy were also frequently carried out. This allowed China to accumulate many new experiences in international military security crisis management.

此外,在2002年伊拉克战争爆发前,中国还曾为缓解伊拉克危机进行了不懈的努力。当时,中国积极参与国际反恐合作,但不赞成美国在全球大打所谓“反恐战争”,更反对美以反恐为名随意对他国进行“先发制人”军事打击。面对美英决意对伊拉克动武的紧张局势,中国呼吁伊拉克问题应在联合国框架内寻求政治解决,反对安理会自动授权美对伊动武,与许多国家一起与美、英进行了激烈的较量。虽然这些努力最终未能阻止美、英发动战争,但却坚持了国际道义,坚持了联合国安理会维护和平安全的基本原则,安理会最终也未给美、英对伊拉克动武开绿灯。当时,中国既与法、德、俄等立场相近的大国协调合作,又与美、英等立场相悖的国家进行斗争;既以安理会作为主要外交平台,又频繁开展双边磋商、首脑外交,积累了进行国际军事安全危机管理的许多新的经验。

In September 2010, a collision of Chinese and Japanese ships in the Diaoyu Islands40 triggered a serious crisis between the two countries. Facing a state of emergency in which Japan detained the Chinese fishing boat and crew members and claimed that the incident would be handled in accordance with domestic law, China first made urgent and solemn representations to Japan through diplomatic channels. While Japan continued to detain the Chinese captain, China went on to announce the suspension of all exchanges between the two countries at the vice-ministerial level and above, showing its uncompromising attitude towards the incorrect practices adopted by Japan. During the crisis, the two sides maintained necessary diplomatic contacts. The crisis gradually eased after Japan released the Chinese captain on the 24th of the same month.41 In December, the leaders of the two countries held their first official meeting since the crisis on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Tokyo. Both sides agreed that maintaining the long-term and stable development of the strategically mutually beneficial Sino-Japan relationship was in their common interest.

2010年9月,中日发生钓鱼岛撞船事件,在两国间引发了一场严重危机。面对日方扣押中国渔船及船员并声称将以国内法对事件进行处理的紧急状态,中方先是通过外交途径与日方进行紧急、严正交涉;在日方继续扣押中国船长的情况下,又宣布暂停两国间副部级以上一切交流活动,对日方错误做法表示了决不妥协的姿态。危机期间,双方保持了必要的外交接触。这场危机在日方于当月24日释放中方船长后逐渐趋缓。12月,两国首脑在东京亚太经合组织(APEC)会议期间进行了危机后的首次正式会晤,双方一致表示,保持中日战略互惠关系长期稳定发展符合双方的共同利益。

III. Summary and conclusions

三,归纳与总结

Based on the analysis of major crisis case studies, this section provides an overall analysis and summary of China’s international military security crisis behavior over the past 60 years from different perspectives, and then attempts to draw some basic conclusions.

在对主要危机案例分析的基础上,本节从不同的视角,对60余年来中国的国际军事安全危机行为进行总体分析与归纳,试图得出一些基本结论。

(i) Overall changes in crisis behavior
(一) 危机行为的总体变化

From the above overview of China’s response to international military security crises, we can clearly see that, over the past 60 years, China’s crisis behavior has followed a trajectory from military confrontation to crisis management, from conflict avoidance to mutual benefit.

从上文对中国应对国际军事安全危机的概述中,我们可以清楚地看到,60余年来,中国的危机行为划出了一道从军事对抗到危机管理、从避免冲突到争取双赢的轨迹。

Faced with frequent international military security crises during the Cold War, China five times decided to directly adopt military confrontation to deal with crises, namely, to aid Vietnam and resist France, in the Sino-Soviet conflict on Zhenbao Island, in the Sino-Vietnamese (southern Vietnam) Battle of Xisha, in the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam, and in the Sino-Vietnamese (North Vietnam) Nansha skirmish. In these cases, military confrontation was the clear choice made by China.

冷战期间,面对频发的国际军事安全危机,中国5次决定直接采取军事对抗手段应对危机,即进行援越抗法、中苏珍宝岛之战、中越南(越南南方)西沙之战、对越自卫反击战和中越(越南北方)南沙之战。在这些案例中,军事对抗是中国的明确选择。

During the same period, there were also five occasions where China adopted both crisis management and military confrontation, including resisting the United States and assisting North Korea, the two military struggles in the Taiwan Strait, assisting Vietnam and resisting the United States, and the Sino-Indian border counterattack. Among these cases, before becoming involved in the Korean War and the military conflict with India, China had made crisis management efforts to try to de-escalate the crisis and avoid conflict but failed in this aim. In the two military struggles against Taiwan and when aiding Vietnam and resisting the United States, China carried out military strikes against the Taiwan military and limited its involvement in the Vietnam War. At the same time, China actively managed the crisis and avoided direct military confrontation with the United States. In these cases, military confrontation was still one of the important options for China to deal with the crises.

在同一时期,兼取危机管理与军事对抗手段的也有5次,包括抗美援朝、两次台海军事斗争、援越抗美及中印边界反击战。其中,在卷入朝鲜战争和与印度发生军事冲突之前,中国曾在危机管理上做出努力,试图缓解危机,避免冲突,但未能如愿。在两次对台军事斗争及援越抗美中,中国对台军进行军事打击和有限介入越战,同时积极进行危机管理,避免了与美国发生直接军事对抗。在这些案例中,军事对抗仍是中国应对危机的重要选项之一。

Taking the above two together, China intervened or became involved in 10 military conflicts and wars during the Cold War. In addition, China almost dispatched troops to intervene in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. “Military confrontation is the main approach, supplemented by crisis management” was the main feature of China’s international military security crisis behavior during this period.

上述两者加在一起,中国在冷战争期间介入或卷入的军事冲突与战争共有10场。此外,中国还差一点派兵介入了1965年的印巴战争。“军事对抗为主,危机管理为辅”是这一时期中国国际军事安全危机行为的主要特征。

Since the end of the Cold War, various international military and security crises have continued to occur frequently, but China has not yet experienced any foreign military conflicts so far. Crisis events have directly occurred between China and foreign countries, such as the Sino-Philippines Mischief Reef incident, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the “embassy bombing incident”, the “Sino-U.S. plane collision incident”, the Sino-Japan East China Sea Crisis, and the Diaoyu Islands Collision Incident, all of which were brought under control or controlled relatively well. Especially concerning the Taiwan issue, while maintaining the right to use force, China extended crisis management from between China and the United States to between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, demonstrating the greatest determination and desire to strive for peaceful reunification.

冷战结束以来,各种国际军事安全危机仍频频发生,但迄今为止,中国却未再发生任何对外军事冲突。中外间直接发生的危机事件,如中菲美济礁事件、台海危机、“炸馆事件”、“中美撞机事件”、中日东海危机、钓鱼岛撞船事件等,都得到了控制或较好的控制。尤其是在台湾问题上,中国在保持使用武力权利的同时,已把危机管理从中美之间延伸到两岸之间,展示了争取和平统一的最大决心与愿望。

At the same time, some disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests that have historically led to battlefield confrontations between Chinese and foreign forces have been completely resolved, such as the Sino-Soviet/Russian border dispute, the Sino-Vietnamese land border dispute, and the Beibu Gulf (Tonkin Gulf) delimitation dispute. Others have been brought under better control without triggering new military security crises, such as Sino-Indian territorial disputes42 and Sino-Vietnamese maritime disputes.

与此同时,某些历史上曾导致中外兵戎相见的领土与海洋权益争议或者得到彻底解决,如中苏/俄边界争议、中越陆上边界争议及北部湾划界争议;或者得到较好的控制而未再引发新的军事安全危机,如中印领土争议、中越南海争议。

In addition, China has also intervened in the management of major international military security crises such as the India-Pakistan nuclear crisis, the Iraq crisis, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and the Iranian nuclear crisis. China made active efforts to control the escalation of these crises, avoid military conflicts, and seek long-term and comprehensive solutions. In these crises, China was not a party or a major party to the crises, but they posed a major threat to regional and world security, involved huge risks of causing military conflicts or even wars, and they all occurred in areas around China or in areas of interest to China. Therefore, with the rise of China’s national strength and international influence, China’s involvement in these international military security crises has gradually increased.

此外,中国还介入了对印巴核危机、伊拉克危机、朝鲜核危机、伊朗核危机等重大国际军事安全危机的管理,为控制危机升级,避免军事冲突,寻求长远、全面的解决方案,做出了积极的努力。在这些危机中,中国不是危机的当事方或主要当事方,但由于这些危机对地区与世界安全形成重大威胁,孕育着引发军事冲突甚至战争的巨大风险,并且都发生在中国周边或与中国利益攸关的地区,随着中国国力的上升和国际影响力的提高,中国对这些国际军事安全危机的介入日益加强。

In short, the most notable changes in China’s crisis behavior since the 1990s are: Military confrontation, China’s main approach during the Cold War, has been replaced by crisis management; foreign military conflict, a phenomenon that recurred in crises during the Cold War, has been avoided with active crisis management; with the strengthening of crisis management, important changes have taken place in the conditions that led potential crises to often become actual crises during the Cold War, so that now some potential crises tend to be weakened and resolved and other potential crises have been effectively controlled; efforts to find long-term solutions to conflicts of interest and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes have started to become the direction of China’s efforts.

总之,自20世纪90年代以来,中国危机行为最显著的变化是:军事对抗这一冷战时期的主要做法已为危机管理所代替;对外军事冲突这一在冷战中伴随危机的发生而反复出现的现象在积极的危机管理下得以避免;随着危机管理的加强,冷战中潜在危机不断转化为现实危机的状况出现了重要变化,一些潜在危机趋向弱化并得到解决,一些潜在危机得到了有力的控制;努力争取利益冲突的长久解决和实现双赢的结局,开始成为中国的努力方向。

In fact, the starting point of this major shift in China’s behavior in international military security crises may be traced back even earlier to the early 1980s. For the decade or so from this time to the end of the Cold War in 1991, there was a significant reduction in China’s foreign military conflicts, with the only exception being small-scale military conflicts between China and Vietnam. In addition, before the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990, in order to achieve Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait in order to resolve the Gulf crisis peacefully, China began to use diplomatic mediation, taking an important step in the direction of intervening in the management of an international military security crisis.43

事实上,中国的国际军事安全危机行为发生重大转变的起点也许还可以追溯到更早的时候,即20世纪80年代初。自那时起到1991年冷战终结,在十年左右的时间里,中国的对外军事冲突已明显减少,只剩下了中越之间的小规模军事冲突。此外,在1990年海湾战争爆发之前,为争取伊拉克从科威特撤军从而和平解决海湾危机,中国已开始进行外交斡旋,朝着介入国际军事安全危机管理的方向迈出了重要的一步。

(ii) Development and changes in crisis decision/management mechanisms
(二) 危机决策/管理机制的发展变化

China’s decisionmaking/management mechanisms for international military security crises have always been determined by China’s national security leadership system and its operations. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China’s national security leadership system has been relatively stable and continuous. Its basic arrangement is as follows: Major diplomatic and military decisions are made by the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee and the Politburo Standing Committee. The Secretariat of the Central Committee is responsible for handling the daily work of the Central Committee, including matters related to national security. The State Council, the Central Military Commission, the relevant leading groups of the CCP Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and relevant national security departments are involved in handling specific matters related to national security.44

中国的国际军事安全危机决策/管理机制始终由中国的国家安全领导体制及其运作所决定。自新中国建立以来,从总体看,中国的国家安全领导体制相对稳定、一脉相承。其基本安排是:重大外交、军事决策由中共中央政治局和中央政治局常委会负责;中央书记处负责处理中央日常工作,也包括负责处理与国家安全有关的事务;国务院、中央军委、党中央的相关领导小组、外交部、国家有关安全部门参与处理与国家安全有关的具体事务。

However, in the past few decades, the operation of China’s national security leadership system has undergone three major changes, which have had different effects on the country’s military security crisis decisionmaking/management mechanisms. The first change was during the ten-year “Cultural Revolution,” when Party and government organizations at all levels were paralyzed or rendered ineffective. The original central collective leadership system was severely damaged. An extremely abnormal situation occurred, where decisionmaking was limited to a very small number of people, and final decisions were made by Mao Zedong alone. Under these circumstances, China’s decisionmaking for international military security crises suffered a significantly negative effect. The second change was that, with the end of the “Cultural Revolution,” the operation of the national security leadership system returned to normal, and a central leadership collective with Deng Xiaoping at its core was formed. Under these circumstances, China’s decisionmaking/management mechanisms for international military security crises were strengthened. The third change was when the older generation of leaders withdrew from the national political arena. China’s national security decisionmaking began a major shift from relying mainly on the experience of a few leaders45 to relying mainly on the top leadership collective for institutionalized decisionmaking. This transition is still ongoing. This change has accelerated the process of improving and strengthening China’s international military security crisis management mechanisms.

然而,在几十年的时间里,中国国家安全领导体制的运作却经历了三次大的变化,从而对国家的军事安全危机决策/管理机制带来了不同的影响。第一次是在十年“文化大革命”期间,由于各级党政组织陷于瘫痪或形同虚设,原先的中央集体领导制度遭到严重破坏,行成了决策囿于极少数人并最终由毛泽东一人拍板决定的极不正常局面。在此状况下,中国的国际军事安全危机决策受到了明显的消极影响。第二次是随着“文化大革命”的结束,国家安全领导体制的运作恢复正常,并形成了以邓小平为核心的中央领导集体。在此情况下,中国的国际军事安全危机决策/管理机制得到加强。第三次是随着老一辈领导人退出国家政治舞台,中国的国家安全决策开始从主要依靠少数领袖人物经验决策向主要依靠最高领导集体进行机制化决策的重大转变,这一转变仍在发展之中。这次变化加快了中国国际军事安全危机管理机制趋向改进与强化的进程。

Since the late 1990s, for major security and foreign policy decisions, the Politburo Standing Committee has had the highest decisionmaking authority. In this group, top party and state leaders play a central role. In the face of different military security crisis events, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Group, the Central National Security Leading Group46, the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Work, and the Central Military Commission respectively undertake the main tasks of policy formulation.47 The Foreign Affairs Office of the CCP Central Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff Department, and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee (the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council) are responsible for internal coordination, formulating crisis management plans, and proposing countermeasures and suggestions. Numerous relevant functional departments and national think tanks are gradually starting to participate in policy coordination.

自20世纪90年代后期以来,对于重大安全与外交决策,中央政治局常委会拥有最高决策权,党和国家最高领导人在其中发挥核心作用。面对不同的军事安全危机事件,中央外事领导小组、中央国家安全领导小组、中央对台工作领导小组、中央军委分别承担政策制定的主要任务。中央外办、外交部、总参、中央台办(国务院台办)等部门负责内部协调、制订危机管理预案和提出对策建议,众多的相关职能部门、国家智库逐步参与到政策协调之中。

External communication mechanisms including hotlines, emergency liaison systems, special envoys, and second-track contacts have been initially established.48 For example, China and the United States have established a hotline between heads of state and a military hotline. China and Russia have established a hotline between heads of state. China and Japan have established a hotline between prime ministers/premiers and are discussing the establishment of an emergency liaison system between the navies and air forces of the two countries. China and South Korea have established direct telephone lines between the navies and air forces of the two countries. The practice of dispatching special envoys has been used many times in handling the Taiwan Strait crisis, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and some other international crises. Various second-track mechanisms have also played a role in helping decision-makers understand the real situation and explore solutions during some crisis events.

包括热线、紧急联络制度、特使、第二轨道联系等在内的对外沟通机制初步建立。例如,中美已建立首脑热线及军事热线;中俄建立了首脑热线;中日建立了总理热线并正在商讨建立两国海空军之间的紧急联络制度;中韩已建立了两国海空军之间的直通电话等。派遣特使的做法已在处理台海危机、朝核危机及其他一些国际危机中得到较多的运用。各种二轨机制在一些危机事件中,对于了解真实情况、探讨解决途径亦发挥了一定的作用。

Due to the development of informatization and the increasing influence of public opinion, during crisis events, the Chinese government increasingly focuses on listening to and guiding public opinion. The establishment of relevant coordination mechanisms played an important role in handling the Sino-U.S. plane collision, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Sino-Japanese political and security frictions, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and other security disagreements between China and foreign countries. In addition, in the past 20 to 30 years, information intelligence work has been greatly developed and strengthened as an important part of China’s national security decisionmaking mechanisms and military security crisis decisionmaking/management mechanisms. The ability of foreign affairs, news, military, security, and other departments to collect information and intelligence has been significantly improved,49 and the ability of relevant leading departments to comprehensively evaluate information and intelligence has continuously strengthened. This has played an important role in ensuring that Chinese leaders make timely and accurate decisions on various military security crises.50

针对信息化的发展和公众舆论影响的日益上升,在危机事件中,中国政府对于倾听与引导公众舆论也越来越重视,有关协调机制的建立对于应对中美撞机事件、台海紧张局势、中日政治安全摩擦、朝核危机及其他一些中外安全分歧,发挥了重要作用。此外,近二三十年来,作为中国国家安全决策机制及军事安全危机决策/管理机制的一个重要组成部分,信息情报工作得到了长足的发展与加强。外交、新闻、军事、安全等部门搜集信息情报的能力明显提高,有关领导部门综合评判信息情报的能力不断加强,为中国领导人对各种军事安全危机做出较为及时、准确的决策,发挥了重要的保障作用。

(iii) Development and changes in crisis management principles and behavioral paradigms
(三) 危机管理原则与行为范式的发展变化

Over the past 60 years, Chinese leaders have formed some basic crisis management principles and behavioral paradigms through their abundant practice in dealing with various military security crises. These principles and paradigms are of great significance for guiding and understanding China’s international military security crisis behavior.

60余年来,中国领导人在应对各种军事安全危机的丰富实践中,形成了一些基本的危机管理原则与行为范式,它们对于指导与认识中国的国际军事安全危机行为具有十分重要的意义。

These crisis management principles first came from some important strategic and tactical ideas formed by the older generation of Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong during the long-term revolutionary struggle. For example, “Strategically despise the enemy but tactically respect him”—we must combine courage and skill in fighting and unify a principled approach to strategy and a flexible approach to tactics; or “on just grounds, to our advantage, and with rational restraint”—we must uphold the “defensive,” “local,” and “temporary nature” of the fight while acting in accord with morality, so as to achieve “self-defense,” “victory,” and an “end of hostilities” altogether; or “respond in kind” [以两手对两手, literally: use two hands against two hands]—we must adopt both hard and soft approaches, talk when we are talked to, and strike when we are struck, and practice both cooperation and struggle; or “promises must be kept and action must be resolute”—once we show our determination to act and our bottom line, we must say what we mean and back up our words with deeds. Since the founding of New China, these strategic and tactical ideas have been extensively applied in the practice of successive Chinese leaders when dealing with international military and security crises. Up to the present, they still play an important guiding role in crisis management and are recognized by the Chinese strategic research community as crisis management principles with Chinese characteristics.

这些危机管理原则首先是来自毛泽东等老一辈中国领导人在长期革命斗争中形成的一些重要的战略战术思想,如“战略上藐视敌人,战术上重视敌人”———要求将敢于斗争与善于斗争相结合,将战略上的原则性与战术上的灵活性相统一;如“有理、有利、有节”———要求在拥有道义的前提下坚持斗争的“防御性”、“局部性”和“暂时性”,从而实现“自卫”、“胜利”和“休战”三者的统一;如“以两手对两手”———要求软硬两手相结合,以谈对谈,以打对打,既合作又斗争;如“言必信,行必果”———一旦表明行动决心与底线,即说到做到等。这些战略战术思想在新中国建立后中国历届领导人应对国际军事安全危机的实践中得到广泛应用,至今仍然对危机管理发挥着重要的指导作用,被中国战略研究界公认为是具有中国特色的危机管理原则。

However, with the development and changes in the international security situation and the increasing awareness of the dangers of military security crises and the importance of crisis management, China’s crisis management principles are also developing and changing, with their content being continuously enriched and improved. Since the end of the Cold War, while implementing new practices for dealing with foreign relations, including various international military security crises, Chinese leaders have also put forward many new principles and policies from various perspectives, such as adhering to the UN Charter and the norms of international law and seek authorization for the use of force against other countries from the UN Security Council except in cases of self-defense; always grasp the overall situation of the country’s overall relations and insist on “fighting without breaking” [斗而不破, competing with an adversary but avoiding military conflict]; prioritize peaceful dialogue, increase trust, and avoid confrontation; and give equal importance to crisis prevention and crisis control.51 In addition, some research results52 from the Chinese strategic research community have been valued highly by relevant functional departments in the Chinese government. This has supplemented and refined China’s principles for the management of international military security crises.

然而,随着国际安全形势的发展变化,随着对军事安全危机危害性及危机管理重要性认识的不断提高,中国的危机管理原则也在发展变化,其内容不断得到充实与完善。冷战结束以来,在处理对外关系、包括各种国际军事安全危机的新的实践中,中国领导人又从多种角度提出了许多新的方针政策,如坚持《联合国宪章》和国际法准则,除自卫外,对他国使用武力必须得到联合国安理会授权;始终把握国家总体关系的大局,坚持“斗而不破”;将和平对话、增加信任、避免对抗放在第一位;危机防范与危机控制并重等。此外,中国战略研究界的一些研究成果也受到了中国政府有关职能部门的高度重视,对中国的国际军事安全危机管理原则起到了补充和细化的作用。

The principles of crisis management mentioned above are not all at the same level. I do not intend to classify them here, but one thing is certain, which is that China’s military security crisis management principles have already developed a great deal. They not only carry on the tradition but also innovate. They not only adhere to Chinese characteristics but also draw on the experience of other countries and are gradually aligning with international practice. The main focus has been on achieving the transformation from an approach that gives prominence to struggle to one that takes into account both struggle and compromise.

上述种种进行危机管理的原则并非都是同一层次上的内容,笔者也无意在此对其进行划分归类,但有一点是确定无疑的,即中国的军事安全危机管理原则已有长足的发展,既保持了传统,又有所创新;既坚持了中国特色,又汲取他国经验,逐渐与国际接轨;主要着眼点实现了从突出斗争向兼顾斗争与妥协的转化。

Compared with the development and changes in military security crisis management principles, China’s military security crisis management behavior paradigm53 has remained relatively stable over the past 60 years. From the “Overview of Crisis Response” section above, it is clearly apparent that some basic practices have appeared repeatedly in China’s management of international military security crises, including issuing timely diplomatic warnings, taking certain military actions to demonstrate credible deterrence,54 always fighting in self-defense and never firing the first shot, seeking necessary compromises in the contest in order to maintain long-term and overall interests, and valuing morality and “face” (that is, always putting the maintenance of international justice and the maintenance of the dignity of the nation and the people in a very prominent position).55

与军事安全危机管理原则的发展变化相比较,60余年来,中国的军事安全危机管理行为范式相对稳定。从上文的“危机应对概述”一节中不难看到,一些基本做法在中国的国际军事安全危机管理中曾反复出现,其主要包括:及时发出外交警告;采取某些军事行动以显示可信的威慑;“后发制人”,不打第一枪;为维护长远和总体利益,在博弈中寻求必要的妥协;看重道义与“面子”(即始终把维护国际正义和维护民族与国家尊严放在十分显要的位置)等。

In fact, over the past 10 years, as its crisis management mechanism and guiding principles have developed and changed, China’s relatively stable international military crisis management paradigm has also shown some subtle but important changes, the most important of which are the following four: first, China started to use more non-military means such as diplomacy rather than military actions to send warning signals; second, China pays more attention to acting in accordance with international law and seeking legitimacy for its actions; third, China is strengthening efforts to build security confidence measures with relevant parties; and fourth, China pays more attention to seeking mutual compromises and concessions, striving to achieve win-win situations and avoid a lose-lose situation. These developments and changes have made China’s international military security crisis management more reasonable and effective and increased the predictability of China’s military security crisis behavior.

事实上,近10年来,随着危机管理机制和指导原则的发展变化,中国相对稳定的国际军事危机管理范式也显现出了某些微妙而重要的变化,其中最主要的有四点:一是开始更多地使用外交等非军事手段而非军事行动来释放警示信号;二是更加重视遵照国际法行事,寻求行动的合法性;三是日益加强了与相关方建立安全信任措施的努力;四是更加注重寻求相互妥协与让步,争取双赢,避免双输。这些发展变化使中国的国际军事安全危机管理变得更加合理、有效,增大了中国军事安全危机行为的可预见性。

(iv) Reasons for changes in crisis behavior
(四) 危机行为变化的原因

China’s international military security crisis behavior is not the result of arbitrary choices by Chinese leaders. Rather, it is determined by multiple international and domestic factors. Among them, the most influential are the international strategic landscape, the relationship between China and the international system, the central mission and ideology of the CCP and the nation, and the resulting Chinese concept of the international security order.56

中国的国际军事安全危机行为并非中国领导人的随意选择,而是由国际、国内多重因素决定的。其中,影响最大的是国际战略格局、中国与国际体系的关系、中国共产党及国家的中心任务和意识形态以及由此形成的中国的国际安全秩序观等。

In general, during the Cold War period when the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for hegemony, and especially in the first 30 years after the victory of the Chinese revolution, due to the severe hostilities with the United States and then the Soviet Union and its policy of alignment, due to long-term exclusion from major international organizations such as the United Nations, due to the fact that the world was still in the era of revolution and war, and a new world war would be hard to avoid, and due to the long-term policies of “taking class struggle as the key link” and opposing “imperialism, revisionism, and counter-revolution”, plus the fact that Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had the experience of leading a long-term revolutionary war to achieve national independence and liberation and a unique understanding of crises, it should come as no surprise that New China intervened or became involved in one military conflict after another. At that time, it was subjectively difficult to make crisis management the main approach by which Chinese leaders dealt with military security crises, while efforts to avoid military conflicts were also limited in effect due to the lack of necessary objective conditions. Military conflict is the main approach, supplemented by crisis management was the main feature of China’s international military security crisis behavior during this period.

总的看,在美苏争霸的冷战时期,特别是在中国革命胜利后的前30年间,由于先后与美苏处于严重敌对状态及采取结盟政策,由于长期被排斥在联合国等主要国际组织之外,由于认为世界仍处于革命与战争时代、新的世界大战难以避免,由于在较长时间内采取了“以阶级斗争为纲”和反对“帝修反”的政策,再加上毛泽东等中国领导人所具有的领导长期革命战争取得国家独立解放的经历和对危机的独特认识,新中国介入或卷入一场又一场的军事冲突是毫不奇怪的。当时,危机管理在主观上难以成为中国领导人应对军事安全危机的主要手段,避免军事冲突的努力也因客观条件的欠缺而成效有限。军事斗争为主,危机管理为辅,是这一时期中国国际军事安全危机行为的主要特征。

During the final period of the Cold War, and especially since the end of the Cold War, with the continuous development of multi-polarization, globalization, and informatization, China’s international environment and surrounding environment have undergone tremendous changes. Bipolar confrontation has disappeared, peace and development have become the themes of the age, and the forms and roles of war have also undergone profound changes.57 With the emergence of a new pattern of major power relations and the overall improvement of China’s relations with neighboring countries, China no longer faces major direct military threats. Domestically, Chinese leaders have abandoned the erroneous policy of “taking class struggle as the key link” and continued to develop reform and opening up with modernization at the center. In order to adapt to the changes described above, Deng Xiaoping proposed that world wars could be avoided and China should implement an independent foreign policy of peace and diplomacy and a policy of non-alignment,58 adhere to peaceful development, and actively integrate into the international community. After entering the 21st century, Chinese leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao proposed a new security concept centered on “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and cooperation”. They proposed that China would always “hold high the banner of peaceful development and cooperation” and be a responsible major power and that China would “build a harmonious world and strive for mutual benefit.” Under this new situation, the views of Chinese leaders concerning crises have changed significantly,59 and crisis management was highly valued by the Chinese government and China’s strategic research community.60 Resolving disputes and avoiding military conflicts and wars through dialogue not only became an important means of maintaining security, but also a major goal for maintaining national, regional, and global security. Crisis management replaced military confrontation, becoming the main feature of China’s crisis behavior during this period.

冷战末期特别是冷战结束以来,随着多极化、全球化、信息化的不断发展,中国所处的国际环境、周边环境发生了巨大变化,两极对抗消失,和平与发展成为时代主题,战争的形态与作用亦发生了深刻变化。在大国关系出现新格局、中国与周边国家的关系全面改善的情况下,中国不再面临直接重大军事威胁。在国内,中国领导人放弃“以阶级斗争为纲”的错误方针,以现代化建设为中心的改革开放持续发展。为适应上述变化,邓小平提出世界大战可以避免,中国应实行独立自主的和平外交政策和不结盟政策,坚持和平发展,积极融入国际社会。进入21世纪后,江泽民、胡锦涛等中国领导人又提出了以“互信、互利、平等、协作”为核心的新安全观;提出中国将始终“高举和平发展合作的旗帜”,做负责任的大国;提出要“建立和谐世界,争取互利双赢”。在此新形势下,中国领导人的危机观发生了显著变化,危机管理受到了中国政府及中国战略研究界的高度重视。通过对话化解争端和避免军事冲突与战争不仅成为维护安全的重要手段,而且成为维护国家、地区和世界安全的重大目标。危机管理取代军事对抗,成为这一时期中国危机行为的主要特征。

It is worth pointing out that, in the context described above, the improvement and strengthening of China’s security crisis management mechanisms, the enrichment and development of its crisis management principles, the significant rise of China’s position in international mechanisms, and the remarkable progress of national defense modernization61 have all greatly strengthened China’s ability to conduct crisis management.  This makes it possible for China to manage international military security crises more effectively and to actively participate in the management of some regional and even global military security crises.

值得指出的是,在上述大背景下,中国安全危机管理机制的改善与加强,危机管理原则的充实发展,中国在国际机制中地位的明显上升以及国防现代化的显著进展,均有力地加强了中国进行危机管理的能力,从而使中国可能更有效地进行国际军事安全危机管理,并积极主动地参加到一些地区性、甚至是全球性的军事安全危机管理之中。

It is precisely because of the strong awareness of and desire for crisis management and the significant improvement in crisis management capability that China’s international military security crisis behavior has undergone such huge and profound changes.

正是由于有了危机管理的强烈意识与愿望,加之危机管理能力的明显提高,中国的国际军事安全危机行为才发生了如此巨大、深刻的变化。

IV. Outlook for the future

四,对未来的展望

The various international military and security crises facing China have and continue to undergo profound changes.

中国面对的各种国际军事安全危机已经并在继续发生着深刻的变化。

For a long time, the international military and security crises that China has dealt with can be divided into three main categories: The first is crises in the surrounding area and military security crises between China and foreign countries caused by military conflicts and wars in China’s surroundings. The second is crises caused by disputes over territory and maritime rights and interests between China and foreign countries. The third is the crises caused by the Taiwan issue. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the beginning of the 21st century, all three types of crises have undergone profound changes.

长期以来,中国应对的国际军事安全危机主要有三类:一是在周边发生的危机和因周边军事冲突与战争引发的中外军事安全危机;二是因中外领土与海洋权益争议引发的危机;三是因台湾问题引发的危机。冷战结束特别是进入21世纪以来,这三类危机都发生了深刻的变化。

First, on the global scale, military conflicts or local wars caused by traditional security issues and geopolitics (especially great power geopolitics) have been on the decline, and there has been a gradual decrease in military security crises resulting from these conflicts. However, security crises and military conflicts caused by non-traditional security issues are on the rise. This change has a profound impact. Compared with traditional security crises, in most non-traditional security crises, although there are still various differences in interests and fierce gamesmanship, the international community, including major powers, has greater room for maneuvering in crisis management and a stronger tendency to seek cooperation because countries often have greater common interests.

第一,在世界范围内,因传统安全问题、地缘政治(尤其是大国地缘政治)引发的军事冲突或局部战争不断下降,因其引发的军事安全危机也逐步减少,而因非传统安全问题引发的安全危机、军事冲突则呈日益上升趋势。这一变化带来的影响是深刻的。与传统安全危机相比,在多数非传统安全危机中,虽然仍然存在各种利益分歧与激烈博弈,但由于各国往往拥有较大的共同利益,包括大国在内的国际社会进行危机管理的余地扩大,寻求合作的倾向增强。

Second, some disputes over territorial and maritime rights and interests that previously led to military conflicts between Chinese and foreign countries have either been completely resolved or maintained in a basically stable state so that no new military conflicts have been triggered. Compared with territorial disputes on land, disputes over territorial waters and maritime rights and interests between China and some other countries have fluctuated in recent years. These disputes show a gradual trend towards greater tensions, but they are generally still under control. The general improvement in and development of political, economic, and security relations between the disputant countries, the existence of various dialogue and negotiation mechanisms, the establishment and strengthening of military security confidence-building measures, and the gradual acceptance of the idea of “putting aside disputes and pursuing joint development” (搁置争议,共同开发) by the parties to disputes62 are all important reasons for this situation.

第二,一些历史上曾导致中外兵戎相见的领土与海洋权益争议或者得到彻底解决,或者保持基本稳定,未再引发新的军事冲突。与陆地领土争议相比,近年来中国与一些国家间的海上领土与海洋权益争议时起时伏,有逐步上升的趋势,但总体上仍处于可控状态。争议国家间政治、经济、安全关系的普遍改善与发展,多种对话谈判机制的存在,军事安全信任措施的建立与加强,“搁置争议,共同开发”主张逐渐为争议各方所接受,这些都是出现这种状况的重要原因。

Third, after renewed outbreaks of crises and constant tensions, the situation in the Taiwan Strait has seen a major turning point in recent years, and we can see prospects for continued easing of tensions, improvement, and development in cross-strait relations. Although there is still a long way to go to completely resolve the Taiwan issue, because China has made the peaceful reunification of the two sides its unwavering goal, and China’s comprehensive national strength will continue to increase rapidly for a long time in the future, this coupled with the changes in the balance of political power within the island of Taiwan has caused the probability of a recurrence of another Taiwan Strait crises to drop significantly.

第三,在一度重新爆发危机并不断出现紧张局势后,近年来台海形势发生重大转折,两岸关系出现了持续缓和、改善与发展的前景。虽然台湾问题的彻底解决依然任重道远,但由于中国将实现两岸和平统一作为坚定不移的目标,中国的综合国力在未来较长时间内将继续快速发展,加之台湾岛内政治力量对比的变化,台海危机再现的概率已显著下降。

Under this new situation, further strengthening the management of international military security crises and striving to combine this approach with conflict resolution and opportunity management should become the direction of China’s future efforts. These three changes are closely connected and are of great significance for better safeguarding national security and promoting peace and development in the region and the world.

在此新形势下,进一步加强国际军事安全危机管理,并努力将其与、冲突解决、机遇管理相结合,应成为中国未来的努力方向。这三者之间存在着紧密的联系,对于更好地维护国家安全、推进地区及世界的和平与发展缺一不可,都具有十分重要的意义。

Crisis management (including crisis avoidance and crisis control) is a process in which the two sides in the crisis practice both gamesmanship and cooperation. The main goal is to try to protect one’s own interests while attempting to prevent conflicts of interest from escalating and turning into military conflicts and wars. Even in response to those major or serious conflicts of interest that cannot be eliminated for a long time in the future, such as land and maritime territorial disputes between China and foreign countries and maritime security frictions between China and the United States, some traditional security crises that still exist in China’s surroundings (such as the traditional conflict between India and Pakistan, the north-south confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the hostility between North Korea and the United States), and certain non-traditional security crises that are increasing in importance (such as crisis events and crisis situations that may be triggered by nuclear proliferation or international terrorism), crisis management should still be the primary and most important approach and method. In order to deal with these crises more effectively, in addition to continuously strengthening its own crisis management mechanisms, China should make greater efforts to establish bilateral and multilateral crisis management mechanisms with relevant countries.

危机管理(包括危机规避与危机控制)是危机双方既博弈又合作的过程,其主要目标是在尽力维护自身利益的同时,努力防止利益冲突升级并演变为军事冲突与战争。为应对那些在未来较长时间内仍然无法消除的重大或严重利益冲突,如中外间的陆地与海上领土争议、中美之间的海上安全摩擦,中国周边仍然存在的某些传统安全危机(如印巴间的传统冲突、朝鲜半岛上的南北对立及朝美的敌对状态等)以及某些正在上升的非传统安全危机(如核扩散、国际恐怖主义可能引发的危机事件与危机局势),危机管理仍应是首要的和最重要的途径与手段。为更有效地应对这些危机,除持续加强自身的危机管理机制外,中国应在与有关国家建立双边及多边危机管理机制方面付出更大的努力。

Conflict resolution means we must go beyond the temporary suppression of the crisis to completely eliminate the root cause of the conflict, allowing the parties to the conflict to rebuild their relationship with each other so that their goals are no longer in conflict with each other, or making all parties aware that their goals can be achieved without conflict.63 This is a more difficult and time-consuming task, but if it is achieved, it will have greater significance for peace and security. For some disputes over maritime rights and interests between China and foreign countries and concerning the differences that still exist between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, conflict resolution should be the focus of China’s future efforts. In addition, China should also redouble its efforts to move toward conflict resolution once some multilateral crisis management has achieved significant results.64

冲突解决是要超越危机的暂时平息以彻底消除冲突的根源,让冲突各方重新构建彼此关系以使各方的目标不再相互冲突,或者使各方都意识到可以在避免冲突的情况下达成各自的目标。这是一项更为困难并耗时费力的工作,但如得以实现,对于和平与安全将具有更大的意义。对于中外间的某些海洋权益争议,对于台海两岸间仍然存在的分歧,冲突解决应成为中国未来努力的重点。此外,一旦某些多边危机管理取得重大成效,中国也应为促其朝着冲突解决的方向发展而加倍努力。

Opportunity management requires the relevant countries and parties to transcend their differences in interests to seize all opportunities and conditions, cooperate as much as possible, and strive to attain the best possible outlook in security fields or issues where they share overlapping interests. To this end, we must completely abandon the Cold War mentality, change all the mindsets that start from considering the worst-case scenario, and avoid missing important opportunities for cooperation on other issues due to the prominence of differences at the current time or with regard to a single issue, much less be quick to stop cooperation on major issues as a means to resolve differences. This effort plays an irreplaceable role in expanding common interests, increasing mutual trust, and restraining and resolving differences.

机遇管理则要求有关各国、各方超越利益分歧,在有共同利益交汇的安全领域或问题上,抓住一切机会与条件,尽可能地开展合作,争取最佳前景。为此,必须彻底抛弃冷战思维,改变一切从最坏场景出发的思维定式,防止因一时、一事分歧的突显错失在其他问题上的重要合作机遇,更不要轻易以停止重大事项合作作为解决分歧的手段。这一努力对于扩大共同利益、增加互信、抑制和化解分歧具有不可替代的作用。

Opportunity management is an inevitable necessity given the new international situation, new challenges, and new types of major power relations facing a China that is determined to follow the path of peaceful development. It should develop together with crisis management and conflict resolution, with each promoting the others, and become an increasingly prominent aspect of China’s foreign relations.

机遇管理是国际新形势、新挑战及新型大国关系对决心走和平发展道路的中国提出的必然要求。它应与危机管理、冲突解决共同发展,相互促进,成为中国对外关系中越来越突出的一个方面。

In fact, in recent years, China has actively promoted the concept of “building a harmonious world”, worked hard to implement a foreign policy of peaceful development and mutual benefit, actively advocated a new security concept that reflects the concepts of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security, proposed many new crisis management principles one after another, and put forward pragmatic solutions to specific disputes and various policies to address the non-traditional security challenges intensifying around the world. This has already pointed out the direction by which China can closely integrate crisis management, conflict resolution, and opportunity management. This effort should accompany the whole process of China’s peaceful development. Its successful realization will not only vigorously promote China’s own security and development, but also promote lasting peace, development, and prosperity for the world.

事实上,近年来中国积极推行的“建立和谐世界”的理念,努力实行的和平发展、互利共赢的对外政策,积极倡导的体现全面安全、共同安全、合作安全理念的新安全观,陆续提出的诸多新的危机管理原则,针对某些具体争端提出的务实的解决途径以及为应对全球日益加剧的非传统安全挑战制定的种种政策,已经为中国将危机管理、冲突解决、机遇管理三者紧密结合指明了方向。这一努力应伴随中国和平发展的全过程;其成功实现不仅将有力地促进中国自身的安全与发展,而且将促进世界的持久和平、发展与繁荣。

To top

Cite This Page

张沱生 (Zhang Tuosheng) (2022). "Research on China’s Behavior in International Military Security Crises [中国国际军事安全危机行为研究]". Interpret: China, Original work published April 14, 2011, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/research-on-chinas-behavior-in-international-military-security-crises/

FacebookTwitterLinkedInEmailPrintCopy Link