The core goal of China’s security strategy is to provide a peaceful and stable international security environment for China’s reform and opening up. To create an ideal security environment, on the one hand, the international community needs to invest more time and energy to understand China. On the other hand, China also needs to more clarify what the ideal security environment it pursues is. Although we cannot expect that our unilateral efforts alone will make all countries friendly to us, we must make all efforts to remove the doubts of other countries that are unclear about China’s goals. This will make it easier for the international community to accept the arrival of an increasingly powerful China.

In another article, the author explores what China’s ideal security environment should be.¹ Here, the author will discuss China’s ideal security environment from the perspective of some strategic concepts and finally try to answer a core question: What kind of international status should China ultimately pursue (or, in other words, what kind of country does China want to become)? Although such discussions may not seem to be immediately connected to our actual policies, in fact, perceptions of these questions (especially the leaders’ perceptions of these questions) have a constant influence on China’s security policy. In this regard, a brief review of history is enough to lead to such a conclusion.^2‎

I. Responsibilities and Status

As China’s international status has risen, the discussion on how China can be a “responsible power” is gradually deepening both in China and abroad.³ However, none of these discussions touches on the essence of the question, namely, how should China undertake responsibilities? Should we take the initiative to seek responsibilities, or should we wait until other countries ask China to undertake responsibilities? One popular opinion is that if China does not take the initiative to take responsibility, it will be considered too “selfish” or “too much of a realist” (太过现实主义, as in the realist school of international relations) by other countries. Therefore, China should take the initiative to undertake responsibilities.

But in fact, in an anarchic international society, all states are “selfish” in the final analysis, and “selfishness” is not a matter of moral judgment in international relations. In the final analysis, if others consider China, as a state, to be “selfish,” this will not damage our reputation.

From a historical point of view, the fate of those countries considered by other countries to be “selfish” is much better than the fate of countries considered by other countries to be eager to take on responsibilities and therefore eager to emerge as a great power—almost all of the latter were destroyed. This is because countries that take the initiative to take on responsibilities usually do so in order to make a show of taking on responsibility as a means to teach others. This creates antipathy on the part of other countries, especially when these countries do not have the ability to take on the responsibility and thus give the impression that they are “biting off more than they can chew.” This eagerness to take on responsibility will be regarded by other countries as a manifestation of ambition, and it often leads other countries to band together to “contain” the country that tries to take on responsibility. The most famous example of this was Germany before World War I. ⁴

It is only when other countries require a country to assume certain responsibilities that the country taking on these responsibilities will more easily receive acceptance and support from other countries. The American presence in Europe after World War II is a classic example of this. Towards the end of World War II, Roosevelt told Churchill that the United States would withdraw from Europe within two years after the end of the war, leaving the UK and the Soviet Union with the responsibility for maintaining peace in Europe.⁵ The result was that both Britain and France, finding themselves unable to withstand pressure from the Soviet Union, had to actively request the United States to return to Europe. As a result, during the Cold War, even the proud French never asked the United States to withdraw from Europe.

In sharp contrast, in the post-Cold War world of today, when Europe no longer faces external threats and therefore no longer needs the American umbrella, European countries are very dissatisfied with the fact that the United States is still interfering too much in European affairs (in other words, they think the United States has assumed many responsibilities that it should not have assumed). The birth of the European single currency and the emergence of the European Rapid Response Force are in fact a reflection of the fact that European countries no longer want the United States to always take on responsibilities that it should not take on with an arrogant attitude that this is its duty because there is no one else who can do it. The antipathy of the United States to this change in attitude on the part of the European countries is in fact because the United States is too eager to take on responsibility [而美国对欧洲国家这一态度转变的反感其实就是美国太想承担责任, I have given the literal translation, but I suspect the correct interpretation is “This change this the attitude of the European countries to one of antipathy towards the United States is in fact because the United States is too eager to take on responsibility”].

Therefore, in the process of China becoming a “responsible power,” China should only assume such responsibilities that earn it the support and acceptance of other countries. We should never take on responsibilities that are not ours to undertake for the sake of creating a “responsible” image, especially for the sake of face (面子, i.e., reputation). In fact, it is only by taking on responsibilities in a way that earns the support and acceptance of other countries that we can create a true image of a “responsible power.”

Today’s China is still far from being a true great power, and the mentality of slapping one’s face to make one’s self look fat (打肿脸充胖子, puffing one’s self up) is extremely dangerous. This is because such a mentality is bound to have a subtle influence on the behavior of the state, bringing about a series of dangerous actions. Such actions do not even have to be aggressive military expansion, which will arouse the vigilance and antipathy of other countries.

Japan’s performance after its economic take-off in the 1980s provides the most recent example that eagerness to take on responsibility comes at a price. At that time, Japan, which already felt that it was “the world’s No. 1 country,” began to talk about “internationalization” and began to go around teaching people how to do things. The appreciation of the yen after the Plaza Accord in 1985 led Japan into a mad rush to buy up some of the U.S.’s iconic cultural heritage. These actions not only made the American people angry, but also gave American elites and leaders a “worthy adversary” against which to formulate the U.S. Action Program.

As a result, the United States adopted various industrial policies and a trend of learning from Japan. The United States began to see Japan more as an adversary than an ally (U.S. opinion polls shortly before and after the end of the Cold War indicated that Japan had replaced the Soviet Union as America’s No. 1 adversary). As a result, ten years later, when the dust of this war without weapons settled, Japan found that “Japan as the No. 1 country in the world” had always been a fantasy. When Japan woke up from its economic bubble, the Japanese may have asked themselves: How could we have believed that we could become the No. 1 country in the world?

In a sense, China has fallen into the same trap today. After the World Bank released its widely disseminated East Asian Miracle report, coupled with the bubble mentality brought about by China’s overheated economy at that time, the mentality of many Chinese people was suddenly inflated. The talk one heard from Chinese elites during this period was almost identical in mentality and form to the talk of the Japanese before them: They began to talk about the rise and fall of hegemony (that is, the fall of the United States); talk about how many years it will take China to surpass Japan and then the United States; talk about how China will soon replace the United States; and talk about what sort of role model China should for developing countries, what kind of contributions China should make, and what kind of responsibilities it should take on.

Chinese elites who hold these mentalities simply do not realize that, when it realizes that any country could catch up with the it even in the very distant future, the United States, as an extremely nationalistic country, will exaggerate the abilities or potential of that country as much as possible, making it an imaginary enemy so as to consolidate and focus the power of the United States. During the Cold War, American elites constantly exaggerated the strength of the Soviet Union, throwing out myths that the United States had fewer missiles than the USSR [i.e., the “Missile Gap”] and that the USSR’s GDP was already 70% of that of the United States. The same was true of the United States’ attitude to Japan in later years: The titles that swept the United States at that time were Japan as No. 1 and Rising Sun.

Today, the United States is using the same formula for China. All of the ideas about China’s future trends originate in the United States or the West: “theories about China’s future as the No. 1 country” (disguised “China threat theory”), “Asian megatrends,” “Confucian cultural advantage theory,” “relative purchasing power theory,” “how the U.S. Navy will lose to the Chinese Navy in a future war,” and so on. Regrettably, when these sensational myths reach Chinese ears, they are accepted by Chinese elites who long ago lost their theoretical creativity and treasure every piece of garbage spewed by the West. They pass these themes back and forth with relish, hyping them up into big things to satisfy their vanity, which is a product of the serious inferiority complex arising from the nation’s century of humiliation. They have no idea that their lame boosterism is already viewed by the United States and Japan as evidence of China’s ambitions. Therefore, China has the “great honor” to become the new “worthy adversary” of the United States succeeding the Soviet Union and Japan.⁶ It can be said without hesitation that, despite the fact that China’s rapid development in the past two decades cannot be concealed, the behavior and mentality of Chinese elites in the second half of the 1990s clearly deepened other countries’ misgivings about Chinese intentions. This has done considerable harm.

Our elites always like to use the quote about China attributed to Napoleon (“Let China Sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world”) to support their arguments, but this sentence is probably more apt for the United States. You can even add: After this lion wakes, be sure it does not notice you. Today, the predicament facing China is not that the United States does not view China as important, but that it attaches too great an importance to China. As the popular American saying goes: No news is good news.

Japan, Germany, China, India, and other countries with failures in their history inevitably have a sense of urgency that they must quickly wash away or cover up this past with achievements (even if these are illusory), but this kind of psychology is extremely dangerous. If our citizens, elites, and leaders cannot let go of (or at least suppress) the mentality of serious inferiority due to the century of humiliation, China will have no hope of escaping the tragic cycle of history.

II. Integration and Shaping

One question linked to status and responsibility, and perhaps the hottest topic in discussions of China’s grand strategy over the past few years, has been: Is China going to integrate into the current U.S.-led world economic and political system, or is it going to challenge (or shape) this system. Here, the author will focus on two aspects of this question.

1.         Relationship Between Integration and Shaping

In the discussion about integration and shaping, there is no shortage of sharp insights from many scholars, but in general, these discussions consider integration and shaping to be two irreconcilable choices. In fact, however, when any system absorbs a new individual, the system itself changes (although these may be subtle changes that are imperceptible at first). At the same time, when an individual is integrated into a system, this simultaneously gives the individual the potential to change the system. Therefore, integration and shaping are never mutually exclusive. Rather, they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. China’s reform and opening up is itself historical evidence that integration and shaping are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Due to China’s integration into the world economic system, China’s comprehensive national strength has grown significantly in just 20 years. This has also greatly enhanced China’s ability to shape the world economic and political system. Today, China’s influence in international affairs is undoubtedly far greater than it was before the reform and opening up. While China is integrating its own economic system into the world economic system step by step by means such as the large-scale introduction of foreign capital and expansion of international trade, as an emerging international trade power and accumulator of foreign exchange reserves, China will have a profound and far-reaching impact on the world economic system. This effect will become more pronounced as the Renminbi becomes a freely convertible currency.⁷

In the last 10 years, China’s active participation in some international organizations likewise proves the connection between integration and shaping.⁸ For example, when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was first established, one of its main purposes was to assimilate, incorporate, contain, and constrain China through engagement.^9‎ Today, after China began actively participating in various activities of the ARF, it can be clearly seen that although ASEAN countries are still wary of China (in an anarchic international society, mutual defense between countries is “rational”, so this is understandable), it is obvious to all that their trust in China has been greatly strengthened and their attitude regarding the “China threat theory” has gradually changed.

2.         Possibility of Choice

If one looks at the question of integration from another perspective, we can conclude that China seems to have no choice but to continue the process of integration.

First, in view of China’s current domestic social composition, China’s integration over the past two decades has created a powerful vested interest group with the majority of Chinese citizens composing the main body. Despite the widening gap between the rich and the poor at all levels of Chinese society, the material life that the majority of Chinese people enjoy today is obviously a great improvement compared to any period after the founding of New China. Most of the common people have become accustomed to a government that benefits the common people by continuously integrating into the international community while reforming the domestic political and economic system. In addition, although China has paid a huge price in the process of integrating into the world, objectively speaking, the beneficiaries of China’s so-called “globalization” process (the rise of China’s gross national product and total trade value on the global scale is obvious to all) [Translator’s note: This sentence is unclear in the source, but its meaning is probably “the common people of China are the beneficiaries of China’s so-called “globalization” process”]. It would be difficult for the government to convince its citizens that China will no longer be able to enjoy the benefits of this process in the future so it needs to change its policies. As a result, any attempt to cut off this integration process will encounter severe resistance and become basically unfeasible.

Looking at the international environment, China obviously does not possess the external environment and ability to establish a political and economic system by itself. First, history has proved that a system based on coercive means is not only difficult to establish (not to mention that China does not have such coercive capabilities) but is also very unstable. Due to the centrifugal force within the system, the core countries of the system are forced to pay a high price in order to maintain the system, exhausting their national strength (colonial systems such as that of the UK and Eastern Europe under the control of the Soviet Union are the best examples). Therefore, to build a political and economic system, a country must possess a certain spiritual attraction, and China’s modern civilization obviously does not have such an attraction. Furthermore, to build a political and economic system, a country must possess a high degree of tangible influence. Such influence should at least include a sufficiently large economic scale, a sufficiently open market, a hard currency, and a sufficiently large capital reserve (for overseas investment). Obviously, China does not possess these conditions: The dependency of China’s current economy on the economies of other countries is greater than the dependency of these countries on China. In this sort of objective international environment, China’s influence on the international system is extremely limited, so it is also unable to establish its own system.

III. Sea Power and Land Power

The humiliation suffered at the hands of the gunboats of the great powers has long inspired China to become a maritime power. However, we must be soberly aware that military power is developed in order to achieve the country’s strategic goals, not to satisfy the dream of becoming a maritime power.

Besides safeguarding national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, China’s most important strategic goal is to find a way to achieve reunification. Moreover, if we have no choice but to use military means to resolve the Taiwan issue, the most critical part is to deter possible U.S. intervention.¹⁰

Both the Gulf War and the Kosovo War have clearly demonstrated that defensive forces, as traditionally understood, are now unable to counter the long-range attack force of precision-guided weapons. In a sense, like the advent of nuclear weapons, the perfection of precision-guided weapons signifies a further separation of deterrence and defense (especially in conventional warfare).¹¹ Prior to this, even if one country did not have the ability to cause much damage to another country in an attack, it could still deter enemy aggression (or pressure) by fighting for every inch of territory on the battlefield (such as Finland’s strategy against the former Soviet Union). This strategy is deterrence by denial. In the era of precision-guided weapons, because the two sides do not actually come into contact on the battlefield, if the stronger side does not want to occupy the territory of the weaker country, the strategy of deterrence by denial will not be able to deter to the stronger side if its strategy is simply to force the other side into submission. Therefore, in the era of precision-guided weapons, if a country wants to deter similar wars, it must have the ability to make its opponents pay a sufficiently high price, that is, the ability to exercise deterrence by punishment.

Although the deterrent force must be an offensive force, it is not a pure offensive force, but a retaliatory strike force. Like nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence forces should be forces that are not easily destroyed and can strike the enemy. To achieve such deterrence, we must upgrade our military’s conventional deterrence with respect to the United States from its current defensive deterrence to truly meaningful deterrence, that is, deterrence based on retaliatory strike power. The point of deterrence is not to protect ourselves from harm, but to ensure that the losses to the other party are unbearable to it.

The U.S. military’s intervention force in the Far East consists of four pillars: forward garrisons, fast maneuvering aircraft carrier battle groups, comprehensive battlefield information (mainly including satellite, airborne early warning, and listening), and long-range strike forces (including stealth strike forces). With respect to the long-range strike forces of the United States, we likely will not possess effective countermeasures for quite some time in the future. However, to form deterrence against the United States, we do not need the capability to strike all of its forces, but only the remaining three of its four pillars.

The best deterrent weapons against the United States are stealth attack forces: stealth attack aircraft, nuclear attack submarines, and long-range cruise missiles. The effectiveness of stealth attack aircraft as a deterrent weapon is self-evident. Nuclear attack submarines with good stealth capabilities are also excellent deterrent weapons. Nuclear attack submarines can threaten the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet and constitute a powerful deterrent in themselves. Nuclear attack submarines can also carry long-range cruise missiles to attack U.S. ground forces in the Far East, constituting a strike force against the forward garrisons of the United States. These undersea attack forces can inflict heavy losses on the U.S. military even after the U.S. has destroyed our equivalent ground-based missile force. At the same time, nuclear attack submarines can become an effective force for blockading Taiwan. Therefore, nuclear submarines with stealth capabilities are an excellent weapon to strengthen our ability to solve the Taiwan issue: They can be used to deter U.S. intervention and can also be used to force Taiwan to make concessions.

Information attack capabilities are a second weapon of deterrence against the United States. The U.S. military is already heavily reliant on battlefield information superiority. This also means that if we can prevent or interfere with the opponent’s ability to gain battlefield information advantages (such as satellite blocking capabilities and listening interference capabilities), this would greatly increase the risks to U.S. military action in the Far East, thereby helping to deter U.S. military intervention.

The discussion above shows that, in order to deter the United States from intervening in the Taiwan Strait crisis, China does not need to develop a navy that can compete with the United States for dominance of the sea. At this point, missiles, air forces, an underwater navy, and an effective nuclear deterrent would suffice to achieve the above goal. In addition, these forces would be far more effective than an expensive surface navy.

More importantly, if we carefully examine the maritime environment facing our country, we can conclude that: It is almost impossible for China to become a true maritime power. In the vast Pacific Ocean, China does not control any island that could serve as a naval supply base. Even if Taiwan returns to the motherland and even if we persuade a reunified Korean peninsula to become a neutral country, this will still only open two small gaps in the chain of offshore islands around China. Moreover, even if the United States loses Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, it will still have the two iron chains of Japan and the Philippines (and possibly even Singapore and Vietnam), limiting the freedom of movement of the Chinese navy. Looking a step further, the U.S. military presence in Australia and New Zealand will form a second line of defense against our navy, and bases controlled by the United States itself, such as Guam, will form the third line of defense against our navy. Without supply bases at sea, it is impossible for China to compete with the U.S. Navy for “rule of the waves.”

Because the United States will likely think that we mean to challenge its maritime supremacy, the single-minded pursuit of a blue-sea navy will only bring us burdens or even disasters. For example, if we build aircraft carriers so that we can take pride in possessing an aircraft carrier, we risk making the same mistakes that Germany made before World War I: The massive fleet built by Germany could not itself compete with the British Navy, but it indirectly led to the defeat of Germany. This is because, based on Germany’s construction of this massive fleet, the UK concluded that Germany was not content with dominance on the European continent, but also wanted to challenge the UK’s maritime dominance.^12‎ We must not make the same mistake.

Of equal importance is the fact that Asian countries will be uneasy about China’s ambitions in competing with the United States for maritime supremacy. Because a China that controls the sea will be able to threaten other Asian countries at any time, the majority of Asian countries will choose to ally with the distant United States to balance it against neighboring China.‎¹³

In contrast, China’s focus on developing a deterrent military force can alleviate the already tense “security dilemma” between China and the United States as far as possible, without sacrificing national interests. Because the deterrent military force does not seek to project power, but only to prevent the United States from intervening in affairs within the scope of China’s sovereignty, although the United States will still not welcome this development, it will respond better than if we were to try to become a maritime power.

As a composite land–sea country, China has always faced “twice the difficulties in strategy and double the vulnerability in security” (战略上的两难和安全上的双重易受伤害性).¹⁴ Therefore, China has never been able to devote too much of its resources to developing sea power (the navy is much more expensive than the army). Unfortunately, some people’s worship of Mahan’s theory of sea power has almost brought them to the point of paranoia.¹⁵ These people ignored the fact that Mahan’s theory of sea power was actually written to influence the security strategy of the United States at that time,^16‎ and is not necessarily applicable to a country like China, where land power is preeminent. Historically, some countries that believed in the theory of sea power did not “determine history” as Mahan claimed. Athens, the sea power of ancient Greece, did not win its war with Sparta. Kaiser Wilhelm, who had a fanatical admiration for the theory of sea power and claimed to be a devout follower of Mahan, brought only tragedy to Germany in the First World War. The fanaticism of Japanese militarists in Asia for the theory of sea power brought catastrophe to Asia and ultimately led to the destruction of Japan in World War II. In their praise of the theory of sea power on the basis of geopolitical concepts, many of our scholars have forgotten to review their history when they praised the theory of sea power based on geopolitical concepts. They need to remember the catastrophes that geopolitical blind faith has brought to Europe, Asia, and humanity as a whole, over the past century.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the reason for abandoning the goal of becoming a maritime military power is not to abandon maritime development, but to do what is within our capabilities. Military power must be compatible with the overall interests of the country.

IV. Scope of Influence

Although the diversification of roles in the international community has reduced the ability of states to control international affairs, it cannot be denied that the stability and security of the world will still depend on power politics under the leadership of major powers. If the relationship between some major global powers, it will be difficult to maintain the peace of the international community. Conversely, if the major powers can reach a certain tacit strategic understanding or even an agreement and respect each other’s interests, it will be conducive to global peace and stability.

Doubters and critics of geopolitical doctrine (including this author) have made the concept of a sphere of influence an unpopular one. In fact, there is no causal relationship between spheres of influence themselves and geopolitical theory: Geopolitical theory is a theory, which can be right or wrong. A sphere of influence refers to the influence of a country on its region and surrounding countries and affairs. Such spheres are only divided into large and small, not right or wrong. Whether we like the concept of spheres of influence or use other concepts to describe this influence, a country’s influence on neighboring countries and affairs will still actually exist. Spheres of influence themselves are not evil things as many believe, nor are they intrinsically linked to hegemony.

Historically, many important countries have had different sizes and scopes of influence on the affairs of neighboring countries, but this influence is not entirely the result of conquest by force.¹⁷ More often, the formation and size of this influence are determined by the weight of a country’s power in the minds of other countries around it. The perceptions of a country’s power by other countries around it can affect how those countries behave. If these countries behave in a way that shows respect for the first country’s interests, a sphere of influence is formed. Therefore, in a sense, the formation of spheres of influence does not necessarily result from the deliberate efforts of great powers.

In many cases, the interests of great powers are measured by their spheres of influence. Therefore, to a large extent, respect for a sphere of influence also reflects the respect for the strength and status of a country. When major powers can respect each other’s spheres of influence, they can achieve a tacit strategic understanding. Moreover, when one great power challenges the sphere of influence of another, conflict often ensues. During the Cold War, peace between the United States and the Soviet Union was heavily reliant on the two superpowers respecting each other’s spheres of influence. If one side challenges the backyard of the other, a crisis ensues: To a large extent, the Cuban Missile Crisis was a challenge to the United State’s traditional sphere of influence.

Therefore, in the history of international relations, great powers have not been shy about emphasizing their spheres of influence. For example, although the United States denies that it seeks its own sphere of influence in most situations, one of its earliest diplomatic doctrines, the “Monroe Doctrine,” was a doctrine that defined a sphere of influence. Since then, its actions in Central and South America are irrefutable proof that the United States still pursues this doctrine. Similarly, both the former Soviet Union and today’s Russia have emphasized the importance of their sphere of influence to their national security interests. India’s control of South Asia is likewise based on an understanding of spheres of influence.

Along this line, a major issue facing an increasingly powerful China is how to define its sphere of influence, respect the spheres of influence of other great powers, and establish compromise mechanisms in areas with potential conflicts of interest (usually at the intersections of spheres of influence) to prevent and resolve conflicts. In fact, the answers to these questions have defined China’s ideal security environment and security strategy to a considerable extent, and are closely linked to the issues discussed above.

The difficulty of this topic also comes from a problem located at a deeper level: China’s century of humiliation caused China’s sphere of influence from its imperial age to cease to exist, so in a China with growing national power and growing nationalism, many people find it hard to accept the fact that they cannot restore their former glory. Therefore, on the issue of defining spheres of influence, China’s leaders face the daunting task of educating the people and making difficult choices.

One possible way is to gradually make people aware of the pros and cons of various options by defining our own spheres of influence, while simultaneously cooperating with actions that respect the spheres of influence of other countries to convey such a message to other countries. That is, China does not pursue expansion or wish to conquer neighboring countries. China hopes to maintain world and regional peace and stability by reaching a strategic understanding among major powers.

Looking at the four major powers surrounding China (Russia, Japan, the United States, and India), we will see that, at the moment, it is difficult for China to reach a strategic understanding because of the extremely realistic possibility of conflict with the United States (and perhaps Japan) over the Taiwan issue. With Russia, Japan, and India, despite the unavoidable reality of having different interests, it is entirely possible to establish compromise mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts in areas of potential conflict of interest (usually at the intersections of spheres of influence). At the very least, this can reduce the likelihood of an armed conflict breaking out to an extremely low level.¹⁸

China’s strategy of not developing naval power that can challenge the maritime supremacy of the United States, which we proposed earlier, is in fact a demonstration of our respect for the sphere of influence of this United States. It’s just that, here, the sphere of influence is the vast Pacific Ocean. The United States is not shy about the fact that the Pacific Ocean is its sphere of influence. Most American scholars have long believed that the Pacific Ocean will be an “American Lake” for a long time. Some American scholars have already realized that, even if the United States were to allow the reunification of China and neutralization of the Korean peninsula, it would not pose much of a threat to the U.S. position in Asia. In this way, China’s choice not to challenge U.S. supremacy at sea will leave some room for China and the U.S. to reach some sort of strategic understanding: A Sino-U.S. relationship that is governed by making the ocean a dividing line between them (划洋而治) is in the interests of China and the United States.

However, we must be soberly aware that the test as to whether China and the United States can reach a real strategic compromise will still be the Taiwan issue: If the United States remains unwilling to publicly express its support for the arrival of a unified, open, democratic, and strong China even after China has expressed respect for the U.S. sphere of influence, then a war between China and the United States is probably inevitable unless the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can use their wisdom and patience to finally achieve the great cause of the reunification of the Chinese nation.

To date, most elites in the United States have not accepted that the reunification of Taiwan is a legitimate interest of China. Instead, they believe that the reunification of Taiwan will be the beginning of China’s challenge to the U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific region. If this state of affairs continues, not only will it be difficult for the Sino-U.S. relationship to avoid brinkmanship, but it may eventually spiral out of the control of the leaders of both countries. This is because, with the increasingly open and democratized society in mainland China, the people in the mainland increasingly feel that there is more ample reason to demand Taiwan’s reunification and, in the face of such strong public pressure, it is almost impossible for mainland leaders to fail to meet the demands of this sort of popular will. Therefore, American elites must realize that the consequences of the democratization of China will be manifold. Moreover, American elites must prepare the American people for the consequences of China’s democratization.

If the United States fails to respect China’s interests, the relationship between the United States and a reunified China will remain volatile. Therefore, despite the many uncertainties in today’s Sino-U.S. relations, the leaders and elites of China and the United States have faced this issue with great wisdom. However, in the long run, the greatest challenge for the leaders and elites in the two countries is how to convince American elites and the masses to accept the advent of a unified China.¹⁹

V. What Kind of Great Power

After answering the above series of questions, it is finally possible to answer this type of question, namely: What kind of international status should China pursue (or, in other words, what kind of country does China want to become)?

First, we can be certain that, in the era of globalization of the world economy, if a country is to be strong, it must be a global economic force. Therefore, China’s goal of becoming a global economic power is obvious.

Second, because China’s geographical location and strategic needs determine that China cannot become a maritime military power, China should only seek to become a regional military power (rather than a global military power). Therefore, as one of the pillars of regional security, China will be able to work with other countries to maintain regional peace and stability through bilateral and multilateral security cooperation.

Finally, because political status is based on economic and military power, as well as a country’s determination and ability to take on political responsibilities and risks, the political status that China should seek should be “a global political voice, but not a global political force.” As a global economic power, China’s economic interests will extend to regions all over the world. For a China that is unwilling to use military means to safeguard these economic interests, it must use its political influence to safeguard its economic interests. This political influence may come from China’s standing in various international organizations (such as the United Nations and IMF) and historical relations with developing countries. In addition, China needs to strive to expand its strategic partnerships with regional powers around the world.

In summary, the international status that China should seek is to have its own global economic interests, to have a pivotal position in regional security affairs, and to have a political voice in global affairs.

In connection with the issues of responsibility and status discussed earlier, it is reasonable to think that China’s development over the next 50 years will go through two stages.

In the first stage, on the basis of the achievements made in the past reform and opening up, China will become a global economic entity (经济实体) in about 30 years.²⁰ Over the next 30 years, China should further emancipate the mind and unleash innovation in the fields of institutions, thought, scientific research, and technological development in order to cultivate the most important core competency for the sustainable development of the country: the ability of the country to continuously learn as an organization of individuals.^21‎ At the same time, China will participate more extensively in international organizations and communities and prudently assume the responsibilities that the international community entrusts to it (these responsibilities must be in the interests of the majority of countries, including China). On regional security issues, China will gradually build a national defense force on the basis of sufficient deterrence and defense capabilities and work with other countries to maintain regional stability and peace. On the basis of its increasingly extensive participation and undertaking of its due responsibilities, China will gradually construct its political influence in Asia-Pacific and adjacent regions.

In the two decades of the second stage, China will become a truly global economic power. This should not only be reflected in China’s gross national product, but even more so in China’s possession of an important voice in the organizations that affect the world economic structure and order, like other important countries. In this stage, China will earn the world’s recognition and respect by taking on the responsibilities entrusted to China by the international community (which of course means paying a price) and thereby gaining a political voice to influence global affairs. However, China will always be cautious in the exercise of its political influence. China will also complete the establishment of an open civil society. China will not only complete the revival of civilization, but also complete the shaping of a new civilization on the basis of this revival: China’s political voice and influence will have a solid foundation only when our new civilization has a certain attractiveness to other countries in the world.

It is worth pointing out that China’s political influence on global affairs will arise more from the relationships China has with developing countries. This is because, in developed countries, we cannot replace the influence of the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, and France. Therefore, strengthening China’s political influence in world affairs can only come from developing more comprehensive partnerships between China and developing countries. To this end, China should strengthen its relations with major developing countries, especially developing countries that are regional powers (such countries should at least include: Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Egypt, Iran, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and India). Strengthening relations with major developing countries would be mutually beneficial to China and the developing countries: Only these major developing countries can have a common voice in global affairs and only these developing countries can effectively safeguard their interests in the world structure dominated by developed countries and seek the benefit of the many of developing countries. Otherwise, developing countries will be further marginalized in global affairs.

Although it is difficult for China to change its overreliance on developed countries in a short period of time, over the long run, whether in terms of the market required for China’s economic development or the destination of future Chinese foreign investment, developing countries will become increasingly important to China. Unfortunately, the status of developing countries in current Chinese diplomacy is an unknown. Therefore, China should form a long-term policy with respect to developing countries as soon as possible. Of course, developing relationships with these developing countries does not mean we cannot maintain good relations with developed countries, nor should this involve too much ideological coloring.