The Russian Ministry of Defense recently held its annual expanded meeting, which reviewed the achievements in the development of the Russian armed forces in 2022 and the progress of the special military operation in Ukraine. In light of the weaknesses exposed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the meeting announced new plans for the next step in military reform in order to improve the Russian armed forces’ overall combat capabilities, ensure the completion of the objectives of the special military operation, and effectively respond to security threats from NATO.
不久前,俄罗斯国防部召开年度扩大会议,总结了2022年俄武装力量的建设成果以及在乌克兰特别军事行动的进展。针对俄军在俄乌冲突中暴露出的建设短板和能力弱项,会议提出下一步军队改革调整新计划,以提升俄军整体作战能力,确保完成特别军事行动目标、有效应对北约安全威胁。
Strengthening nuclear forces to ensure strategic deterrence against NATO
巩固核力量确保对北约战略威慑
As the buildup of Russia’s conventional forces is lagging behind, nuclear forces have become an important counterweight by which Russia maintains strategic parity with the United States and NATO.
在常规力量建设相对滞后的情况下,核力量成为俄保持对美、北约战略均势的重要砝码。
In 2022, despite pouring a large amount of military resources into Ukraine, Russia continued to invest in its strategic nuclear triad, a pillar of national security, increasing the proportion of modern armaments in its nuclear forces to 91.3 percent. This year, the first Tu-160M strategic bomber was delivered to the Aerospace Forces, the Project 955A strategic nuclear submarine Generalissimus Suvorov joined the Northern Fleet, and the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile officially entered combat duty. In addition, Russia has further developed nonnuclear forms of deterrence, especially hypersonic weapons, as an effective complement to its nuclear deterrent, so as to achieve a dual-deterrence strategy with both nuclear and conventional weapons.
2022年,尽管在乌克兰方向投入大量军事资源,俄仍保持对“三位一体”战略核力量的投入力度,将核武器这一国家安全柱石的现代化率提升至91.3%。这一年,首架图-160M战略轰炸机交付空天军,955A型战略核潜艇“苏沃洛夫大元帅”号入列北方舰队,“萨尔马特”洲际弹道导弹也正式进入战斗值班序列。此外,俄还丰富拓展以高超声速武器为代表的非核遏制力量,将其作为核遏制的有效补充手段,以实现“核常并重”的双重遏制战略效果。
During the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in the face of the comprehensive pressure on Russia exerted by the “collective West,” Russia sent clear signals of nuclear deterrence, such as demonstrating its nuclear power through nuclear exercises, putting Russian nuclear forces on a higher level of alert, and warning that the third world war would be a nuclear one. Furthermore, in actual combat, Russia demonstrated its resolution and strength by using strategic bombers to launch cruise missiles and repeatedly firing Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, deterring NATO from direct military intervention. To ensure effective strategic deterrence against NATO, Russia plans to continue to maintain and improve its nuclear triad, which it sees as an important guarantee for its sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the strategic balance of power in the world.
俄乌冲突期间,面对整个“西方集体”对俄实施的全手段综合施压,俄罗斯一方面通过核演习展示核实力、提升核力量战备等级、警告“第三次世界大战将是核战”等方式,高调发出核威慑信号;另一方面在实战中以战略轰炸机发射巡航导弹、多次使用“匕首”高超声速导弹等方式显示决心和实力,慑止北约直接军事介入冲动。按计划,俄将继续保持“三位一体”战略核力量建设力度,将其作为维护主权和领土完整、国际战略平衡的重要保障,确保对北约进行有效战略威慑。
Rebuilding a joint operations structure with the army at its core
重建以陆军为核心的联合作战体制
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has fully awakened Russia to the fact that land warfare is still key to the outcome of wars.
俄乌冲突让俄罗斯充分认识到,陆地战场的胜负仍是左右战争结局的关键。
At the beginning of the conflict, the Russian military tried to achieve its objectives through multi-domain joint combat operations, the central element of which was the battalion tactical group. Confronting a Ukrainian army empowered by NATO’s combat support system, however, the Russian battalion tactical groups showed weaknesses such as poor self-sustainability in combat and insufficient support capabilities. In addition, the Russian military was lacking in joint combat capabilities; on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, its various service branches and units could not coordinate effectively due to various factors.
冲突伊始,俄军试图依靠以营级战术群为核心的多域联合作战行动达成作战目的,但面对拥有北约作战保障体系赋能的乌军,俄军营级战术群作战自持力不强、保障力不足等弱点相继暴露。此外,俄军联合作战能力有限,在乌东陆战场,受多重因素影响,俄各军种、各部队无法进行高效联合。
According to reports, to streamline the chain of command on the land battlefield, the Russian military plans to rebuild a joint operations structure with the army at the core and achieve highly unified battlefield command at the tactical and operational levels, which will enable Russian troops to gain the initiative in battle through large-formation operations, a traditional advantage of the Russian army. One reform measure is the reorganization of brigades into divisions. Although a brigade is mobile and flexible, its relatively low number of personnel and limited strength mean that it cannot effectively fight a protracted and high-intensity war of attrition. The Russian military intends to restore the division system. Apart from planning to expand seven motorized infantry brigades into motorized infantry divisions and raise three new motorized infantry divisions, Russia will also create two additional air assault divisions for its airborne force, as well as five naval infantry divisions based on the existing naval infantry brigades. Another measure is to assign aerospace forces to each group army. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Russian air force flew too few sorties, with unsatisfactory precision strike performance and limited coordination with ground forces. To address this issue, Russia plans to allocate one composite aviation division and one army aviation brigade to each group army to ensure integrated air-land operations. Third, Russia will optimize the deployment of troops in the country’s west. In response to new threats that may emerge after Finland and Sweden join NATO, the Russian military plans to create two new military districts—Moscow and St. Petersburg—and the western military district may specifically deal with threats from Ukraine.
据报道,为理顺陆战场作战指挥关系,俄军计划重建以陆军为核心的联合作战体制,使部队在战术战役层面实现战场指挥权的高度统一,从而通过发挥俄军传统大兵团作战优势取得战场主动权。一是推动旅改师进程。旅机动灵活,但编制员额较小、力量有限,无法有效应对持久高强度消耗战。俄军有意恢复师团制,除打算将7个摩步旅扩编为摩步师并新组建3个摩步师外,空降兵也将增加2个空降突击师编制,同时还计划在现有海军陆战旅基础上组建5个海军陆战师。二是为各集团军配属空天军作战力量。俄乌冲突中,俄空天军出动架次过少、精确打击效果欠佳、与陆军协同程度有限。为此,俄准备给每个集团军配属1个混成航空兵师和1个陆航旅,确保实施空地一体作战。三是优化西部战略方向兵力部署。为应对芬兰和瑞典加入北约后可能出现的新威胁,俄军计划新建莫斯科和列宁格勒两个新军区,西部军区可能专门应对乌克兰方向威胁。
Changing its approach and substantially increasing the number of military personnel
转变思路大幅增加军队员额
The “New Look” military reforms carried out in recent years by the Russian military focused on transforming an army designed for large-scale conflicts and dependent on mobilization into a lean, mobile standing army that could win future local wars and armed conflicts. To this end, Russia reduced the number of its military personnel to about one million. However, the country has a territory of more than 17 million square kilometers that spans 11 time zones, and a one-million-strong standing army is barely able to perform mobile homeland defense and foreign garrison duties. Security threats such as NATO’s eastward expansion, turmoil in the Caucasus, and the territorial claims of the United States’ Asia-Pacific allies, moreover, have increasingly spotlighted the Russian military’s insufficient manpower .
近年来,俄军推进的“新面貌”军事改革,核心是将大战动员型军队转变为常备机动型军队,以精干常备部队打赢未来局部战争和武装冲突。为此,俄通过裁军将军队员额压减至约100万。但俄国土面积1700多万平方千米,横跨11个时区,百万常备部队勉强能够执行国土机动防御和境外驻军任务,加之面对北约东扩压力、高加索地区动荡、美亚太盟友领土声索等现实安全威胁,俄军兵力不足问题不断凸显。
In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Russian military has found it difficult to complete combat tasks simultaneously on multiple fronts. Experience has shown that it is difficult for a lean army to satisfy the demands of high-intensity attrition warfare. Therefore, Russia has taken measures to significantly increase the number of military personnel.
在俄乌冲突中,俄军难以同时在多个方向上完成作战任务。实践表明,精干型军队难以满足高强度对抗消耗战需求,俄军遂采取一系列措施大幅扩充军队员额。
It has, first of all, enlarged its combat forces. In August 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a decree, which would come into effect on January 1, 2023, to increase the number of combat personnel by 137,000 to 1.15 million. Another increase has been announced at the expanded meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense, with the number of troops set to rise to 1.5 million, including 695,000 soldiers serving under contract—almost twice the current number. Second, Russia plans to change its conscription policy, raising the lower limit of the conscription age from 18 to 21 and the upper limit from 27 to 30. Citizens may choose to enter contract service from the first day of military service. Third, Russia has found it necessary to improve the national defense mobilization system. In response to problems revealed by the recent partial mobilization, such as the enlistment of unqualified personnel and the lack of equipment and materials, Russia intends to take measures such as improving the system of military service enlistment and the system of stockpiling combat equipment and material resources to ensure that enlisted personnel match the needs of combat missions and that they achieve combat effectiveness as quickly as possible.
一是扩大武装力量规模。2022年8月,俄总统普京签署命令,从2023年1月1日起,俄武装力量员额增加13.7万,达到115万。此次俄国防部扩大会议上,俄再次宣布扩军,计划将俄军人数增至150万。其中,合同兵将增加至69.5万,与当前数量相比几乎翻了一番。二是调整征兵政策。公民应征年龄下限从18岁提高到21岁、上限从27岁提高到30岁。公民可根据意愿,从入伍第一天起就按照合同制服兵役。三是完善国防动员体系。针对此前局部动员中出现的征召不符合条件人员入伍、装备物资缺乏等问题,俄计划通过改进兵役征召体系、完善装备物资储备体系等措施,确保征召入伍人员与作战任务需求相匹配,并尽快形成战斗力。
Speeding up efforts to remedy deficiencies such as insufficient information-related capabilities
加快弥补信息化能力不足等短板
At present, as a result of insufficient information-related combat capabilities, the Russian military has continued to follow the traditional tactics of mechanized warfare in the special military operation.
当前,俄军信息化作战能力不足,导致在特别军事行动中仍沿袭机械化战争传统战法。
In light of this, the Russian army is not only actively adjusting its strategy and tactics and taking a cautious approach, but is also speeding up efforts to remedy its deficiencies, with a focus on improving its information-related combat capabilities. First, it aims to increase the informatization level of command and communication systems. Measures include expanding the coverage of automated command and control systems, with priority given to equipping combat units below the battalion level with automated command system terminals and new-generation software-defined radios, and actively introducing artificial intelligence technology to enhance the efficiency of combat systems. Second, the Russian military seeks to improve battlefield situational awareness. This primarily involves equipping combat units at the squad and platoon levels with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and integrating them into a unified battlefield reconnaissance network, with real-time transmission of information through secure channels, which will greatly enhance the efficiency of the reconnaissance-strike loop. A third task is to accelerate the development of intelligent combat equipment such as UAVs—with a focus on strategic drones, integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, and loitering munitions—and expand the production of precision-guided munitions, especially precision-guided artillery shells.
对此,俄军在积极调整战略战术、力求步步为营的同时,也在加快弥补自身短板弱项,重点提升信息化作战能力。一是提升指挥和通信系统的信息化水平。拓展指挥自动化系统的覆盖范围,优先为营以下作战分队配备指挥自动化系统终端和新一代数字电台;积极引入人工智能技术,提升作战体系效能。二是提升战场态势感知能力。主要是将无人机配备到班、排作战单元,并将之整合于统一的战场侦察网络,通过保密信道实时传送信息,从而大幅度提升“侦察-打击”回路效能。三是加快发展无人机等智能作战装备,重点发展战略无人机、察打一体无人机和巡飞弹,扩大精确制导弹药,特别是精确制导炮弹的生产。
In addition, in response to prominent logistical problems besetting the Russian army in the early stages of operations and mobilization, Russia has emphasized the role of the Military-Industrial Commission and concentrated its efforts on meeting the material and technical needs of the special military operation. Building on that—and upholding the principle that “there are no small matters on the battlefield”—Russia aims to provide its troops with advanced medical kits, body armor, and other equipment. At the same time, it will further optimize the system of outsourcing in logistics support and improve the military’s own capabilities of mobile equipment repair and maintenance, reestablishing repair units at all levels of the army to ensure that support capabilities meet the needs of the battlefield.
此外,针对前期作战和动员过程中俄军后装保障方面出现的突出矛盾和问题,俄强调发挥军事工业委员会作用,集中力量保障特别军事行动的物资技术需求。在此基础上,坚持“战场无小事”原则,确保为部队配备先进的医疗包、防弹衣等装备。同时,进一步优化“外包式”后装保障结构,提高军队自身“伴随式”装备维修保障能力,恢复各级部队的修理分队编制,确保保障能力适应战场需要。