加强危机管理是当前中美、中日安全关系的首要任务
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Strengthening Crisis Management is the Top Priority in Current China-U.S. and China-Japan Security Relations

加强危机管理是当前中美、中日安全关系的首要任务

In this contribution to a bi-annual review of the international strategic landscape published by Peking University, a top security analyst argues that strengthening crisis management is now a “primary and strategic task” for China’s security relations with the United States and Japan. He soberly assesses each relationship’s existing crisis management mechanisms, and makes recommendations for leaders in all three countries.


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At present, China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations are facing extremely and relatively great security risks, respectively. Strengthening crisis management has become the primary and strategic task in China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations. If crisis management is ineffective and security frictions lead to military crises or even military conflicts, China-U.S. relations will inevitably move towards full confrontation; China-Japan relations may once again lose opportunities for improvement and development and fall back into tension and confrontation.

当前, 中美、中日安全关系分别面临着极大和较大的安全风险,加强危机管理已成为中美、中日安全关系中的首要任务和战略任务。如果危机管理不力,安全摩擦引发军事危机甚至军事冲突,中美关系将不可避免地走向全面对抗;中日关系则可能再次失去改善、发展机遇而重陷紧张与对抗。

Since the end of the Cold War, China-U.S.-Japan security relations have become the most important group of trilateral security relations concerning peace, stability, and development in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations have faced ups and downs and have had a great influence on one another. At present, with the great changes in the international situation, these two groups of relations have entered a critical moment.

冷战结束后,中美日安全关系成为事关东亚及亚太地区和平、稳定、发展的最重要的一组三边安全关系。其中,中美、中日安全关系一直起伏不定,相互影响很大。当前,随着国际形势的巨大变化,这两组关系都进入了关键时刻。

At the end of 2017, as the Trump administration of the United States made major adjustments to its China policy, the United States began to apply pressure on China in various fields such as politics, economics, S&T, military security, and people-to-people and cultural exchanges, resulting in a serious deterioration of China-U.S. relations. At present, China-U.S. security relations are facing high risks. Once a crisis breaks out, it will be extremely difficult to manage and control. Under this situation, strengthening crisis management has become the top priority in China-U.S. security relations and a strategic task for the two countries to avoid entering into a cold war or even a hot war.

2017 年底,随着美国特朗普政府对其对华政策做出重大调整,美国开始在政治、经济、科技、军事安全、人文交流等各个领域全面对华施压,致使中美关系趋向严重恶化。当前,中美安全关系面临的风险高,一旦爆发危机,管控难度极大;在此形势下,加强危机管理已成为中美安全关系中的首要任务,成为两国避免进入冷战、甚至热战的一项战略任务。

Quite unlike China-U.S. relations, after years of serious deterioration and fierce collisions and with the joint efforts of both parties, China-Japan relations returned to a normal development track in 2018. However, the security relationship is still the weakest bond in the relationship between China and Japan, and the situation of high security risks on both sides has not fundamentally changed; negative factors in security relations are on the rise yet again. Under this situation, strengthening crisis management has also become the primary task in the security relationship between China and Japan; its success or failure will have a decisive impact on whether the overall relationship between China and Japan can continue to develop in the direction of stability and improvement.

与中美关系有较大的不同,经过多年严重恶化与激烈碰撞之后,在双方共同努力下,中日关系于2018年重回正常发展轨道。然而,安全关系仍然是中日两国关系中的最短板,双方安全风险居高不下的状况没有得到根本改变;2020年全球新冠肺炎疫情的突然暴发和中美关系的加速恶化,又使两国安全关系中的消极因素再次上升。在此形势下,加强危机管理亦成为中日两国安全关系中的首要任务;其成败与否对于中日总体关系能否继续朝着稳定、改善的方向发展将具有决定性的影响。

This paper first discusses the differences, frictions, and risks in the China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations, analyzes the serious harm they may bring to bilateral relations, and points out the extreme importance of China-U.S. and China-Japan strengthening of crisis management. Secondly, it analyzes and compares the situations of crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogues between China and the United States and China and Japan and clarifies the direction of efforts by China and the United States and China and Japan to strengthen crisis management. Finally, based on the above analysis, some policy suggestions are put forward on how to strengthen the crisis management between China and the United States and China and Japan.

本文首先论述中美、中日安全关系中的分歧、摩擦与风险,分析其可能给两对双边关系带来的严重危害,指出中美、中日加强危机管理的极端重要性;其次分析、比较中美、中日双方之间的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设及安全防务对话的状况,明确中美、中日加强危机管理的努力方向;最后在上述分析的基础上,就如何加强中美、中日危机管理提出若干政策建议。

I. China-U.S. and China-Japan security risks and the necessity and urgency of strengthening crisis management

一、中美、中日安全风险与加强危机管理的必要性、紧迫性

(i) China-U.S. security risks and the necessity of strengthening crisis management
(一)中美安全风险与加强危机管理的必要性

Since the end of 2017, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, China-U.S. relations have experienced a comprehensive and serious deterioration. At present, the most striking are the trade war, tech war, and diplomatic war between China and the United States, as well as the possibility of “comprehensive decoupling” and the “political and ideological battle” between the two countries. However, the greatest risk is the military security friction between the two sides. If China and the United States cannot manage this effectively, China and the United States may not only have a military crisis but may even have a serious military conflict.

2017年底以来,中美关系在冷战结束后首次出现了全面严重恶化的状况。当前最引人注目的是中美“贸易战”、“科技战”和“外交战”,及两国发生“全面脱钩”和陷入“政治制度与意识形态之争”的可能,但风险最大的却是双方的军事安全摩擦。如果中美两国不能对之进行有效管理,中美不但可能爆发军事危机,甚至可能发生严重的军事冲突。

At present, the greatest security risk between China and the United States lies in the Taiwan Strait. This is not only because cross-Strait relations have deteriorated again since 2016, and the views of China and the United States on the DPP Tsai Ing-wen regime are severely opposed, but also because the United States has been playing the “Taiwan card” to exert pressure on China. Under this situation, the situation in the Taiwan Strait has entered the most dangerous moment since the end of the Cold War. In the past three years, PLA military planes and warships have repeatedly flown and sailed around the island of Taiwan to implement military deterrence against “Taiwan independence” and external interfering forces. With the obvious intensification of military operations between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait, the possibility of a military crisis or military conflict in the Taiwan Strait due to misjudgment or miscalculation has risen sharply. The bigger risk is that if the “Taiwan independence” forces and foreign intervening forces openly cross the red line set by China’s Anti-Secession Law, China will be forced to use non-peaceful means, including military means, to fight against separatism. Under this situation, China and the United States may fall into military conflict or even war in the Taiwan Strait.

目前,中美之间最大的安全风险在台海。这不仅是因为台海两岸关系自2016年以来再次严重恶化,中美双方对民进党蔡英文政权的看法严重对立,而且因为美国为对华施加压力大打“台湾牌”。在此形势下,台海形势已进入冷战结束以来最危险的时刻。近三年来,解放军军机、军舰多次绕台湾岛飞行、航行,对“台独”及外部干涉势力实施军事威慑;而自2019年以来美国军舰穿越台海也已趋向常态化。随着中美两国在台海地区军事行动的明显加强,双方因误判或擦枪走火在台海爆发军事危机、军事冲突的可能性急剧上升。而更大的风险则是,如果“台独”势力和外国干涉势力公然越过中国《反分裂国家法》设定的红线,中国将被迫采取包括军事手段在内的非和平方式进行反分裂斗争。在此形势下,中美将可能在台海陷入军事冲突、甚至战争。

The second major risk in the China-U.S. security relationship is military friction in the South China Sea. In recent years, while the United States has publicly intervened in disputes over sovereignty and rights between China and its neighbors, as it continues to strengthen military reconnaissance of China’s approaching, intensifying the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” (FONOP) in the waters surrounding Chinese-owned islands and reefs in the South China Sea, and frequently dispatching more strategic weapons platforms, including aircraft carriers, into and out of the South China Sea, it has also held several joint military operations and large-scale joint military exercises with its allies in the South China Sea. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a statement on the South China Sea in 2019, completely denying China’s claims to sovereignty and rights and interests in the South China Sea, in an attempt to intensify maritime disputes between China and relevant countries in the South China Sea and undermine the negotiation between China and ASEAN countries to establish the South China Sea code of conduct and joint efforts to maintain stability in the South China Sea. Under this severe situation, the PLA has vigorously strengthened the surveillance and expulsion of U.S. ships and aircraft that conduct close-in reconnaissance and FONOPs in the South China Sea and has conducted more military exercises, including missile test launches, in the South China Sea.

中美安全关系中的第二大风险是双方在南海的军事摩擦。近年来,美国公开介入中国与邻国的主权、权益争议的同时,不断加强对华抵近军事侦察、强化在南海中国所属岛礁周边水域的“航行自由行动”(FONOP)、频繁派遣更多的包括航母在内的战略武器平台进出南海,并与盟国多次在南海举行联合军事行动和大规模联合军演。美国前国务卿蓬佩奥(Mike Pompeo)2019年更发表涉南海声明,全面否定中国对南海主权、权益的声索,企图激化中国与南海有关国家间的海上争议,破坏中国与东盟国家磋商建立南海行为准则、共同维护南海稳定的努力。在此严峻形势下,解放军大力加强对美军在南海进行抵近侦察和开展“航行自由行动”的舰机的监视与驱离,并在南海开展更多的包括导弹试射在内的军事演习。

It must also be pointed out that, whether in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, although the U.S. military has continuously proposed that it is willing to strengthen crisis communication and management with the PLA, the U.S. government has adopted an approach of near-maximum pressure on China politically, diplomatically, and militarily. This greatly increases the risk of military crises and conflicts between the two sides.

还须特别指出的是,当前无论是在台海还是南海,虽然美军方不断提出愿与解放军方加强危机沟通与管控,美政府却在政治、外交与军事上对华采取近似极限施压的做法,这大大增加了双方爆发军事危机与军事冲突的风险。

In addition, in the China-U.S. security relationship, a long list of actual and potential risks can also be drawn: For example, the nuclear dialogue between the United States and the DPRK has completely broken down, and the situation on the peninsula has grown ever tenser; the United States and its allies have strengthened their anti-missile deployment against China in East Asia; the United States deploys land-based intermediate-range and low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific; outer space and cyber security incidents have occurred between China and the United States; there is an arms race between China and the United States in the development of non-nuclear strategic weapons, AI weapons, and hypersonic weapons; there have been maritime incidents with China and Japan.

此外,在中美安全关系上,还可以开出长长的现实与潜在的风险清单:如美朝核对话彻底破裂、半岛形势重趋紧张恶化;美国与盟国在东亚强化针对中国的反导部署;美国在亚太部署陆基中导及低当量(low-yield)战术核武器;中美发生外空与网络安全突发事件;中美两国在发展非核战略武器、人工智能武器、高超音速武器上出现军备竞赛;以及中日发生海上突发事件;等等。

After the end of the Cold War, the Taiwan Strait crisis broke out between China and the United States from 1995 to 1996, and then in 1999 and 2001, the embassy bombing and aircraft collision occurred successively. Since the China-U.S. relationship was mainly based on contact and cooperation at that time, and both sides paid attention to the overall situation of the relationship between the two countries, the three crises were relieved relatively quickly. In the period after 2012, with the escalation of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the maritime crises between China, Japan, and the Philippines, the risk of China and the United States being involved in crises and conflicts due to third-party factors has increased significantly but the risk of a direct military crisis between the two countries is small. However, the current situation has changed significantly. China-U.S. relations have changed from a “cooperation-competition” relationship to a seriously unbalanced “competition-cooperation” relationship. Even in the “strategic competition relationship,” confrontation factors between the two countries have increased significantly. Military and security frictions between the two sides continue to intensify, military dialogues and exchanges are rapidly declining, and the security relationship is seriously deteriorating. Under such circumstances, if China-U.S. military security frictions trigger a military crisis, the risk of a military conflict will be greatly increased, and crisis management will be much more difficult than in the past. Moreover, once the military crisis gets out of control, a military conflict may quickly plunge China-U.S. relations into the abyss of a “new cold war.”

冷战结束后,中美两国曾在1995—1996年爆发台海危机,后又于1999年、2001年先后发生“炸馆事件”和“撞机事件”。由于当时中美关系以接触合作为主,双方又都以两国关系大局为重,三次危机都较快地得到了缓解。在2012年后的一段时间里,随着朝核危机升级及中日、中菲发生海上危机,中美双方因第三方因素卷入危机、冲突的风险一度明显上升,但是两国间发生直接军事危机的风险并不大。然而,目前情况已经发生了重大变化,中美关系已由“合作—竞争”关系转变为严重失衡的“竞争—合作”关系,甚至是“战略竞争关系”,两国间的直接对抗因素明显上升,双方的军事安全摩擦不断加剧,军事对话交流快速滑坡下行,安全关系严重恶化。在此情况下,如果中美军事安全摩擦引发军事危机,爆发军事冲突的风险将大大增加,进行危机管理要比过去困难得多。而一旦军事危机失控,一场军事冲突就可能使中美关系迅速跌进“新冷战”的深渊。

In the face of a very serious security situation, military leaders of China and the United States have agreed to strengthen risk and crisis management, maintain dialogue and exchanges, and make the relationship between the two militaries a “stabilizing force” or “stabilizer” for the relationship between the two countries. This is the effort made by the Chinese and American militaries to maintain the bottom line of “no conflict and no confrontation” between the two sides. As of 2019, the militaries of the two countries still maintain a number of dialogues and exchanges, such as the China-U.S. maritime military security consultation, the China-U.S. Asia-Pacific security dialogue, and the China-U.S. Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT).

面对十分严峻的安全形势,中美两国、两军领导人一致同意要加强风险与危机管理,保持对话交流,使两军关系成为两国关系的“稳定力量”或“稳定器”。这是中美两军为守住双方“不冲突、不对抗”底线而做出的努力。至2019年,两国军方仍然保持了若干对话交流,如中美海上军事安全磋商、中美亚太安全对话、中美国防部工作会晤(DPCT)。

However, the outbreak of the global pandemic in 2020 and the accelerated deterioration of the relations between the two countries have not only brought the dialogue between the two militaries to a standstill but also further increased the military confrontation and various security frictions between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

然而,2020年全球疫情的暴发及两国关系的加速恶化,不仅使两军对话完全陷入停滞,而且使双方在台海、南海的军事对峙及各种安全摩擦进一步上升。

In 2020, in a public video speech, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper criticized and accused China while also expressing his hope to visit China in 2020 to “establish a necessary crisis communication system” with China. Shortly thereafter, the defense ministers of China and the United States had a 90-minute phone call. During the call, the two sides had serious opposing positions, but both stated that they would maintain communication and consultation and strengthen risk and crisis management. This interaction shows from another perspective that the task of strengthening crisis management between China and the United States has become extremely urgent.

2020年,在一次公开视频演讲中,美国国防部长马克·埃斯珀(Mark Esper)一面批评指责中国,另一面又表示希望2020年内访华,与中方“建立必要的危机沟通体系”。此后不久,中美两国防长进行了长达90分钟的通话,通话中双方立场严峻对立,但都表示要保持沟通协商,加强风险与危机管理。这一互动从另一角度表明,中美加强危机管理的任务已经变得极为紧迫。

(ii) China-Japan security risks and the necessity of strengthening crisis management
(二)中日安全风险与加强危机管理的必要性

After years of serious friction and difficulties, China-Japan relations have returned to the normal development track marked by the official exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries in 2018. In 2019, China-Japan relations continued to improve. The leaders of the two countries successfully met in Osaka, and the two sides reached an important consensus on building a China-Japan relationship that meets the requirements of the new era, explicitly proclaiming to “actively promote the building of constructive bilateral security relations and gradually establish a solid strategic mutual benefit and mutual trust.” According to the plan, in the spring of 2020, President Xi Jinping will make an official visit to Japan, at which time the two sides may issue a fifth political document as China-Japan relations are expected to enter a new stage of development.

在经历多年严重摩擦与困难之后,以2018年两国领导人正式互访为标志,中日关系重返正常发展轨道。2019年中日关系继续改善,两国领导人在大阪成功会晤,双方就构建契合新时代要求的中日关系达成重要共识,其中明确提出“积极推动构建建设性双边安全关系,逐步确立稳固的战略互惠互信”。根据计划,2020年春,习近平主席将正式访问日本,届时双方可能发表第五个政治文件,中日关系有望进入一个新的发展阶段。

However, the outbreak of the global pandemic in 2020 and the accelerated deterioration of China-U.S. relations have brought serious obstacles to the further improvement and development of China-Japan relations. President Xi’s visit to Japan has been postponed indefinitely; the Olympic cooperation between the two sides has stalled; the two sides’ determination to strengthen economic, trade and investment cooperation, including third-party cooperation, has been severely affected by the closure and isolation measures adopted by both sides in response to the pandemic. In this situation, the negative factors between China and Japan, especially the differences and friction in the security field, are on the rise again.

然而,2020年全球疫情的暴发和中美关系的加速恶化却给中日关系的进一步改善与发展带来了严重阻碍,习主席访日被无限期推迟;双方的奥运合作陷入停滞;双方决心加强的经贸合作、投资合作、包括第三方合作,因双方应对疫情而采取的封闭与隔离措施而受到了严重影响。在此形势下,中日之间的消极因素,尤其是安全领域的分歧与摩擦再次抬头。

In March 2020, a Japanese warship collided with a Chinese fishing boat in the East China Sea. Since May, Chinese and Japanese law enforcement ships have had many frictions in the waters of the Diaoyu Islands, and the Japanese media once hyped it up. At the end of June, the Ishigaki City Council of Japan passed a resolution to change the name of the administrative division of the Diaoyu Islands and its affiliated islands (called “Senkaku Islands” in Japan) to “Tonoshirosenkaku,” and the new name will officially take effect on October 1, 2020. In late July, Japanese media claimed that Japan had found a Chinese official ship in the area adjacent to the Diaoyu Islands for 100 consecutive days, setting a record for the longest consecutive days since September 2012. According to this, Japanese scholars criticized China for taking advantage of the pandemic to carry out “maritime expansion.”

2020年3月,一艘日本军舰与一艘中国渔船在东海相撞。5月以来,中日执法船在钓鱼岛海域内多次发生摩擦,日本媒体一度对此大加炒作。6月底日本石垣市议会通过决议,把钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿(日本称“尖阁诸岛”)的行政区划名称改为“登野城尖阁”,新名称将于2020年10月1日正式生效。7月下旬日本媒体宣称,日方已连续100天在钓鱼岛毗邻区发现中国公务船,这创下了自2012年9月以来的最长连续天数纪录。据此日方学者批评中国借疫情之机进行“海上扩张”。

In fact, the stability and improvement of China-Japan relations in recent years has been relatively fragile. The improvement of economic relations between the two sides is the most obvious, the improvement of political relations and political atmosphere is second, and as the improvement of security relations is quite limited, the security risk remains high.

实际上,近几年中日关系的稳定与改善原本就是比较脆弱的。双方经济关系的改善最为明显;政治关系、政治气氛的改善次之;安全关系的改善则相当有限,安全风险依然居高不下。

First, none of the maritime disputes between China and Japan have been resolved. These disputes include territorial sovereignty disputes over the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands, delimitation of the East China Sea Exclusive Economic Zone and resource disputes, the air game formed by the large overlap of the air defense identification zones of the two countries, the friction between the Chinese navy and air force entering the Western Pacific through the international channel of the Japanese archipelago and the Japan Sea and Air Self-Defense Force, as well as the disputes and frictions between the two sides on the South China Sea issue. Under this situation, the risk of maritime incidents between China and Japan still exists.

首先,中日两国的海上争端至今无一得到解决。这些争端包括关于钓鱼岛岛礁归属的领土主权争端,东海专属经济区的划界及资源争端,两国防空识别区大面积重叠形成的空中博弈,中国海空军经日本列岛国际通道进入西太平洋与日本海空自卫队的摩擦,以及双方在南海问题上的争执与摩擦等。在此形势下,中日发生海上突发事件的风险仍然严重存在。

Secondly, it will be difficult to mitigate the potential for a military confrontation that has formed between China and Japan in the near term. After the two Diaoyu Islands crises in 2010 and 2012, Japan began to clearly regard China as a major security threat, and the deployment of troops accelerated from north to southwest; China also vigorously strengthened preparations for military confrontation in the East China Sea. Over the years, the military confrontation between China and Japan has been fully reflected in defense policies, defense budgets, and military deployments of the two countries. In addition, the two sides still have “strategic mutual doubts,” and the military confrontation between China and Japan will be difficult to swiftly resolve despite the improvement of the overall relationship between the two countries.

其次,中日已形成的军事对峙难以在短期内消失。2010年、2012年两次钓鱼岛危机发生后,日本开始明确将中国视为主要安全威胁,兵力部署加速由北转向西南;中国亦大力加强在东海方向的军事斗争准备,两国在战后首次形成了军事对峙。多年来,中日军事对峙已全面反映在两国的防务政策、国防预算和军事部署之中,再加上双方仍然存在“战略互疑”,中日军事对峙难以随两国总体关系的改善而较快发生变化。

Thirdly, the serious deterioration of the situation in the Taiwan Strait will bring severe challenges to China-Japan relations. For a long time, Japan has always had strong pro-Taiwan forces, and the Taiwan issue has always been one of the three points of friction between China and Japan. In recent years, as the situation in the Taiwan Strait has worsened and become increasingly tense, the possibility of a military crisis or even a military conflict between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait has continued to rise. As the main military ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is likely to be involved in the Taiwan Strait crisis or even a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

再次,台海形势的严重恶化将给中日关系带来严峻挑战。长期以来,日本一直存在着较强的亲台势力,台湾问题也一直是中日三大摩擦点之一。近年来,随着台海形势重新恶化、日益紧张,中美在台海发生军事危机、甚至军事冲突的可能性不断上升。作为美国在亚太地区的主要军事盟国,日本存在着卷入台海危机,甚至台海军事冲突的可能。

Finally, the trend of Japan and the United States to continue to strengthen military alliances and cooperation will further increase the security friction between China and Japan. In January 2019, Japan officially decided to introduce two land-based Aegis Combat Systems from the United States. In April of the same year, Japan and the United States confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation in outer space and cyber security and confirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the space and cyber fields. In 2019, after the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it proposed to deploy intermediate-range missiles in East Asia, which is different from the attitude of South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, which refused to deploy. Japan was ambiguous on this. In June 2020, due to technical and cost considerations, the Japanese government decided to abandon the deployment plan of the ground-based Aegis anti-missile system, but immediately began to discuss whether Japan should have the ability to attack enemy bases. Under such circumstances, senior U.S. officials publicly suggested that Japan would be a candidate for the United States to deploy an intermediate-range missile system in Asia. In August of the same year, Japanese media reported that Japan and the United States would further develop a joint anti-missile system and jointly build a defense network for missile detection and tracking consisting of thousands of small satellites. These small satellites would run in low orbits 300-1000 kilometers from the ground. In the next two years, if Japan agrees to U.S. deployment of a ground-based intermediate missile system on its territory and to further strengthen Japan-U.S. anti-missile cooperation, it will surely bring new serious troubles and challenges to China-Japan security relations.

最后,日美继续加强军事同盟合作的趋势将进一步加大中日之间的安全摩擦。2019年1 月,日本正式决定从美国引进两套陆基“宙斯盾”反导系统(Aegis Combat System)。同年4月日美确认将加强双方在外空、网络安全上的合作,并确认《日美安全保障条约》第五条适用于太空和网络领域。2019年美退出中导条约后提出将在东亚部署中导,与韩菲澳三国谢绝部署的态度不同,日本对此态度暧昧。2020年6月,出于技术和成本方面的考虑,日本政府决定放弃陆基“宙斯盾”反导系统部署计划,但随即开始讨论日本是否应拥有攻击敌方基地的能力。在此形势下,美国高官公开提出日本将是美在亚洲部署中导系统的候选地。同年8月日本媒体报道,日本将与美国进一步发展联合反导系统,共同打造由上千颗小卫星组成的探测、追踪导弹的防御网络,这些小卫星在距离地面300—1000公里的低轨道中运行。未来两年,日本如果同意美国在其领土部署陆基中导系统并进一步加强日美反导合作,必将给中日安全关系带来新的严重困扰与挑战。

In conclusion, although China-Japan relations have improved and developed substantially in the past two years, the improvement is still fragile and unbalanced, and the risk of security relations is still very high given new developments in 2020. Under this situation, strengthening crisis management, especially crisis prevention, must be the top priority in China-Japan security relations. Otherwise, even if the two countries face major challenges such as the Taiwan Strait crisis, and even if the two sides have unexpected incidents at sea, the atmosphere for the improvement of China-Japan relations may be quickly reversed, and the development of bilateral relations will once again face serious setbacks.

总之,近两年来中日关系在总体上虽然有了较大的改善与发展,但其改善仍是脆弱的、不平衡的,其中安全关系的风险依然很大,且在2020年又有了新的发展。在此形势下,加强危机管理、特别是危机防范,须成为中日安全关系中的首要任务。否则,毋论两国面临台海危机一类重大挑战,即使双方在海上发生意外突发事件,也可能令中日关系改善的气氛迅速扭转,使两国关系的发展再次面临严重挫折与倒退。

From the above, three basic points can be drawn.

综上所述,可以得出三点基本看法。

First, the current China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations are facing great and greater security risks respectively. If they cannot be managed effectively, China-U.S. relations may move towards confrontation and conflict; China-Japan relations may once again lose the opportunity to improve relations and may result in tensions and deterioration.

第一,当前的中美、中日安全关系分别面临着极大和较大的安全风险,如果不能进行有效管理,中美关系将可能走向对抗冲突;中日关系则可能再次失去关系改善的机遇而重陷紧张、恶化。

Second, since the United States and Japan are allies, no matter whether a military crisis or military conflict occurs between China and the United States or between China and Japan, it will have a serious negative impact on the security relationship of the other pair. That is, when one pair of security relations is in crisis, the other pair cannot be expected to develop smoothly. In the current situation of tense security relations between China and the United States and China and Japan, a worse situation can occur. That is, when one pair of relations is in crisis and conflict, the other pair of relations will also be quickly dragged into crisis and conflict.

第二,由于美日是盟国,无论中美还是中日发生军事危机、军事冲突,都会对另一对安全关系带来严重消极影响。也就是说,当其中一对安全关系陷入危机时,绝不能指望另一对关系会平稳发展。而在当前中美、中日安全关系都紧张的形势下,还可出现更糟的情况,即当其中一对关系发生危机冲突时,另一对关系也被迅速拖入危机与冲突。

Third, in order to avoid the above-mentioned prospects, both China and the United States and China and Japan must attach great importance to strengthening crisis management in the current and long-term future and must regard crisis management as the primary task in the field of military security.

第三,为避免出现上述前景,在当前及未来较长的时间里,中美、中日都必须高度重视、加强危机管理,都须将危机管理作为军事安全领域的首要任务。

II. Crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogue between China and the United States and China and Japan

二、中美、中日之间的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设和安全防务对话

In the field of security, the awareness of security crisis management mainly refers to the awareness of crisis prevention and crisis avoidance, the awareness of non-zero-sum games and necessary compromises for the overall good, and in particular, the awareness to prevent crises from escalating out of control, triggering military conflicts and wars.

在安全领域,安全危机管理意识主要是指危机防范、危机规避的意识;非零和博弈及为了整体利益做出必要妥协的意识;尤其是防止危机升级、失控、引发军事冲突与战争的意识。

Crisis management mechanism construction is the concentrated reflection and manifestation of crisis management awareness. A crisis management mechanism consists of internal, bilateral, and multilateral mechanisms; the specific contents of the latter two mainly include crisis communication and liaison mechanism, military mutual trust mechanisms, and military and security codes of conduct. A sound crisis management mechanism is an important tool and guarantee for effective crisis management. This article mainly discusses the situation of China-U.S. and China-Japan bilateral crisis management mechanism construction.

危机管理机制建设是危机管理意识的集中反映与体现。危机管理机制由自身、双边及多边机制组成;后两者的具体内容主要包括危机沟通联络机制、军事互信机制及军事与安全行为准则等。完善的危机管理机制是进行有效危机管理的重要工具与保障。本文主要论述中美、中日双边危机管理机制建设的情况。

Security and defense dialogues are necessary means of handling differences and carrying out crisis management, including establishing crisis management mechanisms, reducing misunderstandings and misjudgments, and conducting crisis consultations and negotiations. Some dialogues themselves have the role of crisis management.

安全对话和防务对话是进行分歧与危机管理,包括建立危机管理机制、减少误解误判、开展危机磋商谈判的必要途径,有些对话本身就具有危机管理的作用。

The above three aspects, namely crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogues, are all crucial for China, the United States, and Japan to strengthen crisis management in the new situation.

上述三个方面,即危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设与安全防务对话对于中美、中日在新形势下加强危机管理都至关重要。

(i) Crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogues between China and the United States
(一)中美两国间的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设和安全防务对话

After the end of the Cold War, the awareness of crisis management between China and the United States has been continuously strengthened.

冷战结束后,中美两国间的危机管理意识不断加强。

In the early days of the Cold War, China and the United States were in a state of hostility, and the two countries had experienced many military crises, military conflicts, and even wars. The most famous of these are the Korean War of 1950-1953, the two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, and the Vietnam War of 1964-1973. During this period, both China and the United States experienced military conflicts and wars and put crisis management into practice. In the second half of the Cold War, China and the United States jointly responded to the threat of Soviet hegemony and became security partners. The two militaries gradually established an exchange framework with high-level mutual visits, professional counterpart exchanges, and military-technical cooperation as the main content.

在冷战前期,中美处于敌对状态,两国曾多次发生军事危机、军事冲突甚至战争。其中最著名的是1950—1953年朝鲜战争,1954—1955年、1958年的两次台海危机,以及1964—1973年的越南战争。在此期间中美双方既有军事冲突和战争的经验,也有危机管理的实践。冷战后半期,中美共同应对苏联霸权主义威胁,成为安全合作伙伴,两军逐步建立起以高层互访、专业对口交流和军事技术合作为主要内容的交流框架。

However, with the occurrence of political turmoil in 1989 (when the United States decided to impose comprehensive sanctions on China, the military and security exchanges between the two sides were terminated), the end of the Cold War, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the security differences and frictions between China and the United States were re-emphasized. Since the early 1990s, there has been the U.S. sale of 160 F16 fighter jets to Taiwan (1992), the “Galaxy Incident” (1993), the Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996), and the “bombing incident” in Yugoslavia (1999), and the South China Sea “aircraft collision” (2001). Under this situation, crisis management has been quickly put on the agenda of both China and the United States, and the awareness of crisis management between the two sides has also been continuously strengthened. After entering the second decade of the 21st century, with the rapid growth of China’s comprehensive national strength, the friction and competition between China and the United States have become more prominent, and the awareness of crisis management between the two sides has also further increased.

然而,随着1989年政治风波的发生(当时美国决定对中国进行全面制裁,双方军事安全交流全部终止)和冷战结束、苏联解体,中美安全分歧与摩擦重新突显。自20世纪90年代初起,两国间先后发生美国售台160架F16战机事件(1992年)、“银河号事件”(1993年)、台海危机(1995—1996年)、南斯拉夫“炸馆事件”(1999年)和南海“撞机事件”(2001年)。在此形势下,危机管理较快提上了中美两国的议事日程,双方之间的危机管理意识也随之不断加强。进入21世纪的第二个10年后,随着中国综合国力的快速增长,中美两国之间的摩擦与竞争更加突出,双方之间的危机管理意识也进一步上升。

In 1997, China and the United States decided to establish a summit hotline, which was opened the following year. In 1998, the defense agencies of China and the United States signed the Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety. In the same year, the two heads of state announced that China and the United States would not target each other’s strategic nuclear weapons. In 2007, the defense agencies of the two countries reached an agreement on the establishment of a military hotline, which opened in 2008. In 2014, the defense ministers of China and the United States signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters. In 2015, the two sides signed two new appendices to the two memorandums, Military Crisis Notifications and Air Encounters. In 2016, China and the United States established a direct hotline for combating cybercrime and related matters. In 2018, the Chinese and American militaries began to communicate on the establishment of the Crisis Prevention Communication Framework between the two militaries.

1997年中美决定建立首脑热线,热线于次年开通。1998年中美两国国防部签署《关于建立加强海上军事安全磋商机制的协定》。同年,两国元首宣布中美双方互不将战略核武器瞄准对方。2007年两国国防部就建立军事热线达成协议,热线于2008年开通。2014年中美两国国防部长签署《关于建立重大军事行动相互通报信任措施机制的谅解备忘录》和《海空相遇安全行为准则谅解备忘录》。2015年,双方又围绕两个备忘录,签署新增的“军事危机通报”及“空中相遇”两个附件。2016年中美就打击网络犯罪及相关事项建立直通热线。2018年中美两军开始就建立两军《危机预防沟通框架》进行沟通。

So far, China and the United States have established a number of crisis management mechanisms. These mechanisms have played an important role in crisis management between the two sides in recent years, reducing misunderstandings and misjudgments, and avoiding maritime and air incidents. However, in the face of the increasingly severe and deteriorating security relations between the two countries and the rising security risks, these imperfect mechanisms are obviously not enough. In the future, both sides must urgently make greater efforts to establish a bilateral crisis management mechanism.

到目前为止,中美两国已建立了多项危机管理机制。这些机制对于近年来双方进行危机管理,减少误解误判,规避海空突发事件发挥了重要的作用。然而,面对当前两国日益严峻恶化的安全关系和不断上升的各种安全风险,这些不完善的机制显然是不够的。未来双方亟须在建立双边危机管理机制上做出更大的努力。

Since the late 1990s, the two militaries of China and the United States have begun to rebuild their security and defense dialogue mechanisms. The dialogue mechanisms established by the two sides include: the Chinese Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense Consultation (1997-2014), China-U.S. Maritime Military Security Consultation (1998-2019), China-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Consultation (2001-2016) and China-U.S. Financial Anti-Terrorism Working Group Consultation (2002-2016), China-U.S. Consultation on Strategic Security, Multilateral Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Issues (2003-2016), Chinese Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense Working Meeting (2005-2020), China-U.S. Strategic Security Dialog (2011-2016), Chinese Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense Asia-Pacific Security Dialog (2014-2019), U.S.-China Army Dialog (2015), China-U.S. High-level Joint Dialog on Combating Cybercrime and Related Matters (2015, 2016), China-U.S. Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialog (2017), China-U.S. Diplomatic and Security Dialog (2017, 2018), and China-U.S. Joint Staff Dialog (2017).

从20世纪90年代末起,中美两国、两军开始重建双方的安全、防务对话机制。双方陆续建立的对话机制主要包括:中美国防部防务磋商(1997—2014年),中美海上军事安全磋商(1998—2019年),中美反恐磋商(2001—2016年)及中美金融反恐工作组磋商(2002—2016年),中美战略安全、多边军控与防扩散问题磋商(2003—2016年),中美国防部工作会晤(2005—2020年),中美战略安全对话(2011—2016年),中美国防部亚太安全对话(2014—2019年),中美陆军对话(2015年),中美打击网络犯罪及相关事项高级别联合对话(2015年、2016年),中美执法与网络安全对话(2017年),中美外交安全对话(2017年、2018年),中美联合参谋部对话(2017年)等。

In the past 20 years or so, although the China-U.S. security and defense dialogue has been temporarily suspended several times and though the continuity of the dialogue is often affected by the change of the U.S. government, the dialogue between the two sides has been moving forward for most of the time, reaching a peak under the Obama administration. These dialogues have played a positive role in strengthening communication between the two countries and the two militaries, achieving security cooperation and managing differences and crises.

在过去20多年的时间里,虽然中美安全、防务对话曾几次暂时中止,而且对话的持续性往往因美国政府换届受到影响,但在多数时间里双方对话是向前发展的,并在奥巴马执政时期达到了高峰。这些对话对于两国、两军加强沟通,开展安全合作,管理分歧与危机,发挥了积极的作用。

However, in recent years, with the serious rise of China-U.S. security frictions, especially with the overall deterioration of relations between the two countries since Trump took office, the China-U.S. security and defense dialogue has been severely weakened. As of 2019, most security and defense dialogues between the two sides have stalled. The outbreak of the global pandemic in 2020 has further stalled the institutional dialogue between the two sides, forming a vicious cycle. The stalled dialogue has exacerbated the deterioration of the security relationship between the two countries, and the accelerated deterioration of the security relationship has made it more difficult for the two sides to resume dialogue. This situation is obviously contrary to the consensus reached by leaders of China and the United States and the two militaries to strengthen risk and crisis management and has brought a very negative impact on the crisis management of both sides.

然而,近几年来,随着中美安全摩擦的严重上升,特别是随着特朗普执政以来两国关系的全面恶化,中美安全、防务对话已遭受严重削弱。截至2019年,双方的大多数安全、防务对话已陷入停滞状态。2020年全球疫情的暴发则更使双方机制性对话全部停滞,并形成了恶性循环——对话停滞加剧了两国安全关系的恶化,安全关系的加速恶化又增加了双方恢复对话的困难。这种状况显然有悖中美两国、两军领导人多次达成的要加强风险与危机管理的共识,对双方开展危机管理带来了十分消极的影响。

In addition, it is worth pointing out that since the 1990s, with the support of the two governments, think tanks of China and the United States have successively established and carried out a number of “Track 2” and “Track 1.5” security dialogues. These dialogues cover military-to-military relations, nuclear strategy and non-proliferation, crisis management, Taiwan Strait security, maritime security, cyber security, space security, and anti-terrorism, covering almost all aspects of China-U.S. security relations and playing an important and unique role in carrying out security cooperation and managing differences and crises. Worryingly, however, these conversations have also experienced serious stagnation in recent years.

此外,值得指出的是,自20世纪90年代以来,在两国政府的支持下,中美两国的智库陆续建立、开展了多个“二轨”与“一轨半”安全对话。这些对话涉及两军关系、核战略与防扩散、危机管理、台海安全、海上安全、网络安全、太空安全及反恐等,几乎覆盖中美安全关系的各个方面,对于双方加强相互了解,减少误判,开展安全合作和管理分歧、危机起到了重要而独特的作用。然而,令人担忧的是,近年来这些对话亦已出现严重停滞的趋势。

(ii) Crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogues between China and Japan
(二)中日两国间的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设和安全防务对话

Since the end of the Cold War, the security differences and maritime disputes between China and Japan have gradually increased, which has brought increasing troubles to the relationship between the two countries. However, for a long time, China and Japan have clearly lacked the awareness of crisis management, and the construction of a crisis management mechanism between the two countries has seriously lagged behind. There are various reasons for this.

冷战结束后,中日两国间的安全分歧、海上争端逐步上升,给双方关系带来了日益增多的困扰。但在相当长的时间里,中日之间却明显缺少危机管理意识,两国间的危机管理机制建设严重滞后。这种状况是由多种原因造成的。

In the early days of the Cold War, the Japanese government at that time followed the United States’ anti-China policy in an all-round way. China and Japan belonged to two hostile camps, but there was no direct military crisis or military conflict between the two countries. This is very different from the situation between China and the United States. After the two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1972, China-Japan relations entered a 20-year honeymoon period. During this period, the dispute over island sovereignty between the two sides has been put aside and has been in a relatively calm state.

在冷战前期,当时的日本政府在政治上全面追随美国反华,中日分属两个敌对阵营,但中日两国之间并未发生过任何直接军事危机或军事冲突。这与中美间的情况有很大不同。1972年两国恢复邦交后,中日关系进入长达20年的蜜月期。在此期间,双方的岛屿主权争议被搁置一边,一直处于较为平静的状态。

In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Japan followed the United States to enhance relations with the Taiwan region, formulated new security policies with the United States, and strengthened the development of military power. In turn, security friction between China and Japan began to rise. In addition, at that time, due to China’s nuclear testing and Japanese right-wingers establishing a lighthouse on the Diaoyu Islands, there have been frictions between China and Japan, but these frictions are far from developing to the level of a crisis. At that time, there were very few naval and air military interactions between China and Japan, and maritime and air military security issues were not prominent. Therefore, crisis management has not been put on the agenda of China and Japan for a long time, and it is reasonable that the awareness of crisis management between the two sides is low.

冷战结束后头十年,日本追随美国提升与台湾地区关系,并与美制定新安保方针,加强军力发展,中日安全摩擦开始上升。此外,当时因中国进行核试验及日本右翼分子登上钓鱼岛设置灯塔,中日双方也曾发生摩擦,但这些摩擦都远未发展到危机的程度。当时中日之间的海空军事互动很少,海空军事安全问题并不突出,中日总体关系仍在曲折中向前发展。因此,危机管理迟迟没有提上中日双方的议事日程,双方之间的危机管理意识较低也在情理之中。

After entering the 21st century, the power balance between China and Japan began to undergo major changes. In 2007 and 2010, China’s military expenditures and gross domestic product (GDP) surpassed that of Japan. Against this background, the political and security frictions between the two countries have risen significantly. First, historical frictions have formed a serious political crisis between the two countries, and then maritime frictions between the two sides are on the rise. Under this situation, the sense of crisis and the awareness of crisis management in the two countries have been improved. Strengthening crisis management and establishing a crisis management mechanism have begun to appear on the agendas of China and Japan. Compared with China, Japan had a greater sense of crisis at that time, and the establishment of a maritime emergency liaison mechanism was first proposed by the Japanese side in 2007.

进入21世纪后,中日实力对比开始发生重大变化,2007年、2010年中国的军费和国内生产总值(GDP)先后超过日本。在此大背景下,两国之间的政治安全摩擦明显上升。先是历史摩擦在两国间形成了严重政治危机,接着双方之间的海上摩擦日益上升。在此形势下,两国的危机感和危机管理意识有所提升,加强危机管理、建立危机管理机制开始提上中日两国的议事日程。与中国相比,当时日本有更大的危机感,建立海上紧急联络机制就是日方于2007 年首先提出来的。

However, due to the serious historical grievances between the two countries and the extreme lack of mutual trust between the defense agencies of the two sides, the construction of the crisis management mechanism of the two sides has progressed very slowly. In 2010 and 2012, China and Japan had two consecutive Diaoyu Islands incidents. Both crises escalated rapidly, causing all kinds of dialogue and exchanges between the two sides to cease. If the first crisis was mainly manifested as a diplomatic and political crisis, the second crisis brought the relationship between the two countries to the brink of military conflict. For a period of time, both sides strengthened the deployment of troops, and maritime dangers between military aircraft and warships of the two countries continued to occur. The two Diaoyu Islands incidents exposed the serious lack of crisis management awareness, a crisis management mechanism, and the capacity for crisis management between China and Japan.

然而,由于两国间的严重历史积怨及双方防务部门间的极度缺乏互信,双方危机管理机制的建设进展十分缓慢。2010年、2012年中日接连爆发两次钓鱼岛危机。两次危机发生后都迅速升级,并导致双方各种对话交流全部停止。如果说第一次危机还主要表现为外交政治危机的话,第二次危机则使两国关系一度走到了军事冲突的边缘。在一段时间里,双方都加强兵力部署,两国军机、军舰之间的海上险情不断发生。两次钓鱼岛危机把中日两国间严重缺少危机管理意识、危机管理机制和危机管理能力的状况暴露无遗。

At the end of 2014, after arduous negotiations, China and Japan reached a four-point principled consensus on handling and improving China-Japan relations. In the principled consensus, the two sides clearly proposed to “establish a crisis management and control mechanism to avoid unforeseen events.” This is an important advance. Since then, both China and Japan have strengthened crisis management in the East China Sea, security and defense dialogues between the two sides have gradually resumed, and the consultation on a maritime liaison mechanism has been restarted.

2014年底,经过艰苦谈判,中日双方就处理和改善中日关系达成四点原则共识。在原则共识中,双方明确提出“建立危机管控机制,避免发生不测事态”。这是一个重要的进步。此后,中日两国都加强了在东海的危机管理,双方的安全防务对话逐步恢复,海上联络机制磋商重新启动。

So far, China and Japan have established only two crisis management mechanisms. One is the government hotline, and the other is the maritime and air liaison mechanism memorandum signed between the defense departments of the two countries.

到目前为止,中日建立的危机管理机制仅有两项。一是政府热线,二是两国防务部门之间签署的海空联络机制备忘录。

The governments of China and Japan reached an agreement in 1998 to establish a government hotline. The hotline was opened in 2000, and in 2010, it was announced that the head-of-state hotline would be rebuilt. The hotline between the Chinese and Japanese governments was not used in the two Diaoyu Islands incidents and did not play any role in crisis management. In addition, another possibility is not ruled out. That is, the two sides have never given the government hotline the function of crisis management.

中日两国政府于1998年达成建立政府热线的协议,热线曾于2000年开通,后又于2010 年宣布重建总理热线。中日政府热线在两次钓鱼岛危机中均未使用,对危机管理未发挥任何作用,可谓名不符实。此外,也不排除另一种可能,就是双方从未赋予政府热线危机管理的功能。

The China-Japan Maritime and Air Liaison Mechanism was finally launched in 2018 after 10 years of tortuous negotiation. At present, after several rounds of consultations between the defense departments of the two countries, positive progress has been made on the direct telephone connection between the maritime and air liaison mechanism, and the construction is expected to start as soon as possible. Affected by the pandemic, the follow-up specific arrangements have been delayed. In addition, the author believes that the defense agencies of both sides still lack mutual trust and a lack of awareness of crisis management.

中日海空联络机制历经10年曲折磋商过程,最终于2018年启动。目前,两国防务部门经过多轮磋商,已就海空联络机制直通电话事宜取得积极进展,有望尽快启动建设。受疫情影响,后续具体安排有所迟滞。此外,笔者认为,双方防务部门仍存在缺乏互信,并且缺少危机管理意识等情况。

Since the 1990s, China and Japan have made great progress in establishing a mechanism for security and defense dialogues. The dialogue mechanisms established by the two sides include: China-Japan Security Dialogue (1993-2019), China-Japan Defense Consultation (1997-2011), China-Japan Consultation on East China Sea Issue (2004-2008), China-Japan Strategic Dialogue (2005-2019), China-Japan High-level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (2012-present), and China-Japan High-level Political Consultation (2014-present).

20世纪90年代以来,中日在建立安全防务对话机制方面取得了较大的进展。双方先后建立的对话机制主要包括:中日安全对话(1993—2019年)、中日防务磋商(1997—2011 年)、中日东海问题磋商(2004—2008年)、中日战略对话(2005—2019年)、中日海洋事务高级别磋商(2012年至今)、中日高级别政治磋商(2014年至今)等。

However, the intermittent nature of China-Japan security and defense dialogues is very prominent. After the second Diaoyu Islands incident broke out in 2012, all dialogues were interrupted for a long time. During this period, the friction and confrontation between the two sides became more serious, misunderstandings and suspicions continued to intensify, and the risk of crisis continued to rise.

然而,中日安全防务对话时断时续的现象非常突出,在2012年爆发第二次钓鱼岛危机后,曾出现全部对话较长时期中断的状况。在此期间,双方的摩擦对立更加严重,误解与猜忌不断加剧,危机风险持续上升。

By 2019, with the warming of China-Japan relations, the China-Japan security and defense dialogues have been basically restored and developed. If this trend can continue to develop, it will help both sides to strengthen crisis management mechanism construction and crisis management.

到2019年,随着中日关系转暖,中日安全防务对话已得到基本恢复与发展。这种趋势如能保持发展下去,将有利于双方加强危机管理机制建设、加强危机管理。

For a long time, compared with the situation between China and the United States, Track 2 security dialogues between China and Japan started late, are few in number, and lack continuity. However, in recent years, the Track 2 dialogues held by think tanks in China and Japan have developed rapidly, and their influence on the decision-making of the two governments has increased.

长期以来,与中美两国间的情况相比,中日之间的二轨安全对话起步晚、数量少、持续性较差,在参会人员的层级、范围、研讨内容等方面,也比较保守。然而,近些年来,中日双方智库举办的二轨对话出现了较快发展,对两国政府决策的影响有所增长。

Unfortunately, the mechanism for China-Japan defense and security dialogues in 2020 has generally stalled. This stagnation, however, is not due to a new crisis between the two countries; it is due to the restrictions on international exchanges brought about by the outbreak of the global pandemic. In the face of the raging COVID-19 pandemic, China and Japan have carried out certain forms of cooperation in the fight against the pandemic and have always maintained communication between their foreign affairs agencies. This will help the two sides resume dialogues after the pandemic eases.

不幸的是,2020年中日防务安全对话机制又普遍陷入停滞之中。但此次停滞并非因为两国间发生了新的危机,而是由于全球疫情的暴发对国际交往带来的限制。面对新型冠状病毒肺炎疫情的肆虐,中日在抗疫方面开展了一定的合作,并始终保持了外交部门之间的沟通。这有助于双方在疫情减轻后恢复对话。

To sum up, by comparing crisis management awareness, crisis management mechanism construction, and security and defense dialogues between China and the United States and China and Japan, three basic views can be drawn.

综上所述,将中美、中日之间的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设和安全防务对话做一比较,可以得出三点基本看法。

First, in terms of crisis management awareness, for a long time, the United States has been stronger than China and Japan, which is related to its experience of fierce confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Cold War; the crisis management awareness between China and the United States is stronger than that between China and Japan, which is mainly determined by the different experiences of China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations after the war and at the beginning of the end of the Cold War. In recent years, after years of a state of crisis, the awareness of crisis management between China and Japan has been greatly improved, which will help both countries to strengthen crisis management in the future.

第一,在危机管理意识上,长期以来,美国强于中日两国,这与其在冷战中与苏联激烈对抗的经历有关;中美之间的危机管理意识强于中日之间,这主要为中美、中日安全关系在战后及冷战结束初期的不同经历所决定。近年来,在经历多年的危机状态之后,中日之间的危机管理意识已有较大提高,这将有益于两国在未来加强危机管理。

Second, in the construction of a bilateral crisis management mechanism, the mechanism construction between China and the United States and between China and Japan must be vigorously strengthened and improved. In comparison, the crisis management mechanism between China and the United States is significantly stronger than that between China and Japan. Before the serious deterioration of the relationship between the two countries, the establishment of the bilateral crisis management mechanism between China and the United States had made some progress. However, it was not until the power transfer between the two countries and the sharp rise in disputes between the two countries that the construction of the bilateral crisis management mechanism between China and Japan started slowly, and therefore faltered and progressed slowly. In the future, in the construction of crisis management mechanisms, China and the United States should focus on implementing, enriching, and improving relevant mechanisms, while China and Japan must redouble their efforts to change the serious lack of bilateral mechanisms.

第二,在双边危机管理机制建设上,中美及中日之间的机制建设都须大力加强与完善。相比较而言,中美之间的危机管理机制明显强于中日之间。在两国关系严重恶化之前,中美双边危机管理机制建设已取得一定进展;但直到两国发生权势转移、双方争端急剧上升时,中日双边危机管理机制建设才姗姗起步,以至步履蹒跚,进展缓慢。未来,在危机管理机制建设上,中美双方应重在落实、充实与完善相关机制,中日双方则须为改变双边机制严重缺失的状况而加倍努力。

Third, since the end of the Cold War, China and the United States and China and Japan have made great progress in establishing a mechanism for security and defense dialogues. The main problem with the two is that the dialogues are intermittent and less continuous. This is particularly evident between China and Japan. China and Japan have long lagged behind China and the United States in conducting Track 2 dialogues. However, in recent years, China-U.S. and China-Japan dialogues have shown different development trends. The China-Japan security and defense dialogues have gradually resumed and strengthened, while the China-U.S. security and defense dialogues have become increasingly stagnant. The former is beneficial for China and Japan to strengthen crisis management mechanism construction and carry out crisis management; the latter increases the difficulty for China and the United States to improve the crisis management mechanism and carry out crisis management.

第三,在建立安全防务对话机制上,自冷战结束以来,中美、中日双方都取得了较大进展。二者存在的主要问题是对话时断时续,持续性较差。这在中日之间表现得尤为突出。在开展二轨对话方面,中日之间曾长期落后于中美之间。然而,近年来中美、中日对话出现了不同的发展趋势,中日安全防务对话逐步恢复与加强,中美安全防务对话却日趋停滞。前者有利于中日加强危机管理机制建设和进行危机管理;后者却增加了中美完善危机管理机制和进行危机管理的困难。

III. Strengthening the management of China-U.S. and China-Japan security crises

三、如何加强中美、中日安全危机管理

On the basis of analyzing the security risks existing between China and the United States and between China and Japan, as well as the crisis management awareness of China and the United States and China and Japan, the construction of crisis management mechanisms and the development and changes in security and defense dialogues, this section puts forward policy recommendations on how to strengthen China-U.S. and China-Japan crisis management.

在分析中美、中日之间存在的安全风险和中美、中日双方的危机管理意识、危机管理机制建设及安全防务对话发展变化的基础上,本节对如何加强中美、中日危机管理提出政策建议。

There are three common suggestions: First, China, the United States, and Japan must further strengthen their awareness of crisis management and fully realize that in the new international situation, major powers must no longer resort to military conflicts and wars to resolve disputes; otherwise, there will be endless troubles. Second, in the face of the rising military security friction between the two sides, both China and the United States and China and Japan must vigorously strengthen and improve the construction of bilateral crisis management mechanisms. Third, both China and the United States and China and Japan must adopt a combination of online (internet) and offline (on-site) methods to resume security and defense dialogues as soon as possible in a focused and selective manner.

共同的建议有三条:一是中美日三国都必须进一步加强危机管理意识,充分认识到,在新的国际形势下,大国之间决不能再用军事冲突与战争解决争端,否则将后患无穷。二是面对双方军事安全摩擦不断上升的现实,中美、中日双方都须大力加强与完善双边危机管理机制建设。三是中美、中日都须采取线上(互联网)、线下(实地)相结合的方式,有重点、有选择地尽快恢复双方的安全防务对话。

Below, we propose some specific suggestions for China and the United States and China and Japan to strengthen crisis management.

下面,分别对中美、中日加强危机管理提出一些具体建议。

(i) Suggestions for Strengthening China-U.S. Crisis Management
(一)对加强中美危机管理的建议

In the current and foreseeable future, the focus of China-U.S. crisis management should be placed on the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and cyberspace. Specifically, the South China Sea and cybersecurity frictions are new challenges faced by China and the United States in the past decade. While strengthening crisis management measures, it is necessary to clarify each other’s bottom lines as soon as possible. On the issue of the Taiwan Strait and the peninsula, after a long period of confrontation, the bottom line of both China and the United States is relatively clear. The key to avoiding the crisis is to never challenge the bottom line of the other side. In the long run, the East China Sea and outer space should also be important areas for both sides to strengthen crisis management.

在当前与可预见的未来,中美危机管理的重点应置于台海、南海、朝鲜半岛与网络空间。其中,南海和网络安全摩擦是近10年来中美两国面临的新挑战,在加强危机管理措施的同时必须尽快明确彼此的底线。在台海和半岛问题上,经过长期碰撞,中美双方的底线都比较清晰,规避危机的关键是决不挑战对方的底线。从长远看,东海、外空也应是双方加强危机管理的重要领域。

At present, China and the United States should redouble their efforts to prevent maritime and air incidents due to misunderstandings and misjudgments or miscalculations. The two sides must effectively strengthen maritime military security consultation mechanisms. They must consciously and strictly abide by the code of conduct for the safety of maritime and air encounters and the mutual notification mechanism for major military operations jointly formulated by the two sides and their two annexes. In practice, its content must be constantly enriched and improved. To this end, in addition to insisting on holding annual situation and risk review meetings, relevant authorities on both sides must strengthen periodic and ad hoc consultations to eliminate hidden dangers in a timely manner and strive to keep security risks to a minimum.

当前,中美应加倍努力,防止因误解误判或擦枪走火发生海空突发事件。双方须切实加强海上军事安全磋商机制,自觉、严格遵守双方共同制定的海空相遇安全行为准则和重大军事行动相互通报机制及其两个附件,并在实践中使其内容不断得到充实与改进。为此,除应坚持召开年度形势、风险评审会议外,双方有关部门须加强阶段性磋商和临时性磋商,及时排除隐患,争取把安全风险控制在最小范围之内。

In their efforts to resume and strengthen security and defense dialogues, China and the United States should make crisis management an important part of the dialogues. To this end, conditions should be jointly created, first of all, to resume the China-U.S. Diplomatic and Security Dialog (or China-U.S. Defense Consultation), the China-U.S. Joint Staff Dialog, the China-U.S. Maritime Military Security Consultation Annual Meeting, and the China-U.S. Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialog. These dialogues should include the establishment and improvement of bilateral crisis communication mechanisms, various security confidence measures (including codes of conduct in maritime and air, cyberspace, and outer space), and how to avoid “militarization of the South China Sea.” In addition, the two sides should strive to launch the China-U.S. strategic stability dialogue at an early date. While focusing on the nuclear strategy, nuclear development strategy and related issues of cyber security, outer space security, anti-missile deployment, and development of new conventional strategic weapons, crisis stabilization, and the development of confidence measures in the nuclear field are also important components of the dialogue.

中美双方在恢复与加强安全防务对话的努力中,应明确将危机管理作为对话的一项重要内容。为此,应共同创造条件,首先恢复中美外交安全对话(或中美防务磋商)、中美联合参谋部对话、中美海上军事安全磋商年度会晤及中美执法与网络安全对话。这些对话应将建立与完善双边危机沟通机制、各种安全信任措施(包括海空、网络空间与外空行为准则)及如何避免“南海军事化”等作为磋商内容。此外,双方还应争取早日启动中美战略稳定对话,在聚焦双方核战略、核发展战略及相关网络安全、外空安全、反导部署、新型常规战略武器发展等问题的同时,将危机稳定及制定核领域的信任措施亦作为对话的重要组成部分。

China and the United States should clarify and strengthen the crisis management function of the hotline of the two heads of state and the hotline of the defense agencies to ensure that the hotlines play an important role in crisis prevention and control. To this end, the frequency of dialogue should be increased, the appointment time should be shortened, and the hotline should be used to quickly exchange information, clarify intentions, and send clear signals. In order to establish crisis communication more quickly, the two sides should also seriously consider the issue of establishing military hotlines between the relevant theaters of the two countries. The various hotlines can be available at normal times, but their functionality in a crisis is key.

中美应明确、强化两国元首热线和国防部热线的危机管理功能,确保热线在危机预防和危机控制中发挥重要作用。为此,应增加对话频次、缩短预约时间,充分发挥热线快速交流信息、澄清意图、发出明确信号的作用。为更快地建立危机沟通,双方还应认真考虑在两国相关战区之间建立军事热线的问题。各种热线在平时也可使用,但在危机中发挥作用才是关键。

In addition to various hotline communication mechanisms, the two sides should also fully implement the role of the embassies and special envoys of the two sides for emergency communication. In addition, the two sides should set up a joint working group to deal with emergencies as soon as possible. Its main functions should include collecting and sharing risk information, discussing crisis prevention, controlling contingency plans, conducting crisis communication, and making recommendations to decision-makers before incidents. After incidents, they should conduct joint evaluations and summarizations of lessons learned. The joint working group can be set up under the diplomatic and security dialogues mechanism of the two countries and can be subject to the direct leadership of the diplomatic and military departments of the two countries.

除各种热线沟通机制外,双方还应充分发挥双方大使馆及派遣特使进行紧急沟通的作用。此外,双方还应尽快设立一个应对突发危机事件的联合工作小组,其主要职能包括收集和分享风险信息,商讨危机预防与控制应急计划,第一时间进行危机沟通和向决策者提出建议,事后进行联合评估与经验教训总结等。联合工作组可设在两国外交安全对话机制之下,接受两国外交与军事部门的直接领导。

Senior leaders of China and the United States and the two militaries should reach a consensus on the basic principles of crisis management. In China-U.S. security crisis management Track 2 dialogues, experts from both sides have jointly put forward several basic principles of crisis management, such as “always keeping direct communication channels open and sending clear and specific signals,” “escalating slowly and making symmetrical responses,” “working towards interests rather than from ideologies,” “using high-pressure methods with caution and preventing the promise trap,” “breaking difficult disputes into easier solutions and solving them gradually.” If these basic principles of crisis management can become the consensus of the high level of the two countries, it will be of great significance to strengthen the crisis management between China and the United States.

中美两国、两军高层应就危机管理的基本原则达成共识。在中美安全危机管理二轨对话中,双方专家曾共同提出危机管理的若干基本原则,如“始终保持直接沟通渠道的畅通并发出明确、具体的信号”“缓慢升级,做出对称性的反应”“基于利益原则而非意识形态原则”“慎用高压手段,防止承诺陷阱”“将难以解决的争端分解为较易解决的问题,逐步加以解决”等。这些危机管理的基本原则如能成为两国高层的共识,将对加强中美危机管理具有重要意义。

China and the United States should continue to support Track 2 security dialogues. Over the years, as a supplement to government dialogues, Track 2 security dialogues held by think tanks of the two countries have played a positive role in the two sides’ cooperation on security, managing differences and crises, reducing misunderstandings and misjudgments, and increasing mutual trust. Given that current security and defense dialogues between the two governments face serious difficulties, various Track 2 security dialogues, including the China-U.S. Security Dialogue, China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Dialogue, China-U.S. Security Crisis Management Dialogue, and China-U.S. Cyber Security Dialogue, should not be suspended but should be further strengthened.

中美两国应继续支持和发挥第二轨道安全对话的作用。多年来,作为政府对话的补充,两国智库举行的二轨安全对话对于双方开展安全合作,管理分歧、危机,减少误解误判,增加相互信任,发挥了积极的作用。在当前两国政府间安全防务对话面临严重困难的情况下,包括“中美安全对话”“中美战略核对话”“中美安全危机管理对话”“中美网络安全对话”等在内的各种二轨安全对话不仅不应停摆,而且应进一步加强。

(ii) Suggestions for Strengthening China-Japan Security Crisis Management
(二)对加强中日安全危机管理的建议

Both China and Japan must fully and earnestly implement the China-Japan maritime and air liaison mechanism that has been launched, further strengthen the management of maritime disputes, and strictly prevent the occurrence of maritime and air incidents. At present, an urgent task is to establish a defense hotline as soon as possible. In order to break the two-year deadlock on this issue, it is recommended that high-level leaders of the two countries jointly promote the matter and require that the defense authorities of both countries complete the task within a time limit.

中日双方须全面、认真落实已经启动的中日海空联络机制,进一步加强海上争端管理,严防海空突发事件的发生。当前,一项紧迫任务是尽快把防务热线建立起来。为打破近两年来在此问题上的僵局,建议两国高层联合予以推动,要求两国防务部门限时完成任务。

Both China and Japan should seize the opportunity to improve the overall relationship and make up for the shortcomings of the bilateral crisis management mechanism as soon as possible. The two sides should strive to first reach an agreement on the establishment of a direct hotline between the top leaders of the two countries or the reactivation of the hotline between the two governments. Secondly, they can learn from the practices between China and the United States and conduct consultations on the development of a code of conduct for China-Japan maritime and air security and a mechanism for mutual notification of major military operations. In addition, the two sides should establish a liaison mechanism and code of conduct between the maritime law enforcement agencies of the two countries as soon as possible.

中日双方应抓住总体关系改善的机会,尽快补上双边危机管理机制建设的短板。双方应争取首先就建立两国最高领导人直通热线或者重启两国政府热线达成一致;其次可借鉴中美之间的做法,就制定中日海空安全行为准则和重大军事行动相互通报机制开展磋商。此外,双方还应尽快建立两国海上执法部门之间的联络机制与行为准则。

China and Japan should continue to resume and strengthen bilateral security and defense dialogues. First of all, annual defense and security consultations at the vice-ministerial level between China and Japan that have been stalled for many years should be restarted. The two countries should elevate the level of dialogue and exchanges between the defense agencies of the two countries and actively work to gradually change the military confrontation between the two countries and develop non-traditional security cooperation. This dialogue can also incorporate security issues such as cyber and outer space. Second, efforts should be made to resume consultations on the East China Sea issue at an early date and make efforts to gradually resolve the China-Japan border demarcation dispute through negotiations. Finally, the two sides should consider giving more crisis management functions to the high-level political consultations between China and Japan. In the future, the above-mentioned three dialogues will continue to be carried out together with the China-Japan Security Dialogue, the China-Japan High-level Consultation on Maritime Affairs, and the Annual Maritime and Air Liaison Mechanism Meeting, which will form an important guarantee for strengthening China-Japan crisis management.

中日应继续恢复与加强双方的安全防务对话。首先应重启停滞多年的中日副部级年度防务安全磋商,提升两国防务部门对话交流的层级,为逐步改变两国的军事对峙和开展非传统安全合作进行积极对话;这一对话还可把网络、外太空等安全问题纳入其中。其次应争取早日恢复东海问题磋商,为通过谈判逐步解决中日划界争端做出努力。最后,双方应考虑赋予中日高级别政治磋商更多危机管理的功能。未来,上述三个对话与中日安全对话、中日海洋事务高级别磋商及海空联络机制年度会议共同持续开展,将对加强中日危机管理形成重要保障。

China and Japan should form positive interactions to jointly maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. On the Taiwan issue, China adheres to the policy of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems.” Japan abides by the “one-China policy” established when it resumed diplomatic relations with China and its commitment not to develop any official relations with the Taiwan region. On the South China Sea issue, China supports all countries, including Japan, to jointly maintain the safety and smoothness of maritime passages in the South China Sea. Japan supports the “dual-track approach” proposed by China and endorsed by ASEAN countries to resolve the South China Sea issue. If China and Japan can form the above-mentioned positive interaction, it will fundamentally prevent the two sides from crises and conflicts in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

中日应就共同维护台海、南海和平稳定形成积极互动。在台湾问题上,中国坚持“和平统一、一国两制”的大政方针,日本恪守恢复对华邦交时确立的“一中政策”和做出的不与台湾地区发展任何官方关系的承诺;在南海问题上,中方支持包括日本在内的各国共同维护南海海上通道的安全、通畅,日方支持中国倡导并得到东盟国家赞同的解决南海问题的“双轨思路”。中日两国如能形成上述积极互动,将从根本上防止双方在台海与南海发生危机与冲突。

China and Japan should also consider jointly promoting the trilateral security dialogue between China, Japan, and the United States at an appropriate time to discuss the many security issues which involve all three states. The main tasks of the dialogue are to formulate confidence-building measures (CBM) in military and security, reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations, manage differences and crises, and strengthen non-traditional security cooperation. This is of very positive significance for strengthening the crisis management between China and Japan and between China and the United States and in breaking the long-term confrontation between China and Japan and the United States in the bilateral military alliance.

中日还应考虑适时共同推动开展中日美三边安全对话,就涉及中日美三国的众多安全问题开展讨论,并将制定军事与安全信任措施(CBM)、减少误解误判、管理分歧与危机、加强非传统安全合作作为对话的主要任务。这对于加强中日、中美危机管理,打破中国与日美双边军事同盟的长期对立状态,具有十分积极的意义。

China and Japan should vigorously develop and strengthen Track 2 security dialogues. Specifically, the China-Japan Crisis Management Dialogue, which has been carried out for several years, should receive more attention from relevant authorities on both sides, making it truly an important platform for exploring and strengthening China-Japan crisis management. In addition, while continuing to carry out existing Track 2 security dialogues, think tanks of the two countries should also establish new Track 2 dialogues on cyber security and outer space security, with emphasis placed on the management of differences and crisis management. In the future, some Track 2 dialogues can be upgraded to Track 1 dialogues.

中日两国应大力发展与加强二轨安全对话。其中,已开展数年的“中日危机管理对话”应得到双方有关部门的更多重视,使之真正成为探索加强中日危机管理的一个重要平台。此外,两国智库在继续开展现有二轨安全对话的同时,还应建立中日网络安全、外空安全等新的二轨对话,并在这些二轨对话中将分歧管理、危机管理作为对话的重要内容。未来,一些二轨对话可提升为一轨对话。

Looking ahead, there may be two prospects for the development of China-U.S. and China-Japan security relations.

展望未来,中美、中日安全关系都可能有两种发展前景。

First, crisis management is ineffective, and the security friction between the two sides spins out of control, leading to military crises and even military conflicts. Under this scenario, the China-U.S. relationship, which has seriously deteriorated, will inevitably move towards a full-scale confrontation and a cold war; the China-Japan relationship, which has gradually recovered and improved in recent years, may once again deviate from the normal development track and become tense and confrontational once again.

一是危机管理不力,双方安全摩擦失控,引发军事危机甚至军事冲突。在此情景下,已经严重恶化的中美关系将不可避免地走向全面对抗与冷战;近年来逐步恢复改善的中日关系则可能再次脱离正常发展轨道,重趋紧张与对抗。

Second, through effective crisis management, the security frictions between the two sides can be controlled, major military crises and conflicts can be avoided, security risks for the two sides can be gradually reduced, and security relations can be gradually stabilized. The emergence of such a scenario will help the overall China-U.S. relationship gradually enter a long period of mutual adjustment and mutual adaptation and will help the overall China-Japan relationship continue to move forward on a normal track.

二是通过有效的危机管理,双方的安全摩擦得到控制,重大军事危机、军事冲突得以避免,双方安全风险逐步下降,安全关系渐趋稳定。出现这样的情景,将有利于中美总体关系逐步进入一个较长的相互磨合与相互适应期,将有利于中日总体关系在正常轨道上继续向前发展。

There is no doubt that China, the United States, and Japan should all make active efforts to avoid the first prospect and realize the second because this is not only in the fundamental interests of China, the United States, and Japan but also in the fundamental interests of the Asia-Pacific region and even the rest of the world.

毫无疑问,中美日三国都应为避免第一种前景、实现第二种前景做出积极的努力,因为这不仅符合中美日三国的根本利益,而且符合亚太地区乃至世界各国的根本利益。

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Cite This Page

张沱生 (Zhang Tuosheng) (2022). "Strengthening Crisis Management is the Top Priority in Current China-U.S. and China-Japan Security Relations [加强危机管理是当前中美、中日安全关系的首要任务]". Interpret: China, Original work published December 31, 2021, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/strengthening-crisis-management-is-the-top-priority-in-current-china-u-s-and-china-japan-security-relations/

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