台海危机与风险管理:1987-2017为例
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Taiwan Strait Crisis and Risk Management: The Case of 1987-2017

台海危机与风险管理:1987-2017为例

A scholar of Taiwan and cross-Strait issues at Xiamen University lays out the “root causes” of the Taiwan Strait crises and argues that in the past 30 years, the PRC has improved its crisis management response. He advises Chinese leadership to pursue crisis management in the Taiwan Strat by continuing to cut Taiwan off from international institutions, arms sales, and diplomatic recognition and by using targeted escalation strategically to clarify China’s red lines to the international community.


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Since the 1980s, the mainland has taken a series of measures to ease Cross-Strait relations and promote the opening of Cross-Strait exchanges in order to break the ice of isolation between the two sides of the Strait. On October 14, 1987, the relevant person in charge at the State Council issued a speech, expressing a “warm welcome to Taiwan compatriots to visit relatives and travel in the mainland of the motherland.” Inspired by the mainland’s policy and the joint efforts of compatriots on both sides of the strait,1 as well as Taiwan’s abandonment of the policy of “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise,”2 the door to Cross-Strait exchanges has finally been opened. In the past 30 years, great progress has been made in the development of cross-Strait relations. However, it should also be noted that since the structural contradictions between the two sides of the Strait still exist – in particular, the separatist forces on the island of Taiwan are still unwilling to give up their political persistence, the development of Cross-Strait relations is still turbulent. In particular, the Taiwan Strait crisis and Cross-Strait risks continue, seriously affecting the stability of cross-Strait relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. With the opening of the door to cross-Strait people-to-people interactions, the real needs of mainland China to deal with the Taiwan Strait crisis and risks have greatly increased. However, since there is no existing processing model to learn from, it will undoubtedly increase the pressure on the mainland to improve its ability to deal with the Taiwan crisis and Cross-Strait risks. Nonetheless, mainland China has continuously strengthened its crisis management capabilities in dealing with the Taiwan Strait crisis and Cross-Strait risks, which has generally guaranteed the stability of the Taiwan Strait region and the development of Cross-Strait relations.

20世纪80年代以来,大陆为打破两岸封闭隔绝的坚冰,采取了一系列缓和两岸关系、推进打开两岸交流大门的举措。1987年10月14日,国务院有关方面负责人发表谈话,表示“热情欢迎台湾同胞到祖国大陆探亲旅游”。在大陆政策感召和两岸同胞的共同努力下,以及台湾方面放弃“不接触、不谈判、不妥协”的政策,两岸交流的大门终于被打开。过去三十年里,两岸关系发展取得了很大的进展,但也要看到,由于两岸结构性矛盾仍然存在,特别是台湾岛内的分离主义势力仍然不愿意放弃其政治坚持,两岸关系的发展仍然呈现动荡起伏的状况,特别是台海危机与两岸风险不断,严重影响两岸关系和台海局势的稳定。随着两岸民间互动的大门洞开,也使中国大陆应对台海危机与风险的现实需求大增,但由于没有现存的处理模式可以借鉴,无疑使大陆提升应对台湾危机与两岸风险的能力的压力增大。尽管如此,中国大陆在应对台海危机及两岸风险方面不断强化其危机管理的能力,总体上保障了台海区域的稳定以及两岸关系的向前发展。

I. The Taiwan Strait Crisis and Cross-Strait Risks in the 30 Years since the Opening of Cross-Strait Exchanges

一、两岸开放交流三十年以来的台海危机与两岸风险

(i) The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Basic Types of Cross-Strait Risks
(一)台海危机与两岸风险的基本类型

Since 1987, although the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have written a moving chapter from hostility to reconciliation, the process has been anything but easy, and crises and risks have not been uncommon, having caused considerable impacts on cross-Strait relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. These crises and risks are mainly manifested in the following ways:

1987年至今,海峡两岸虽然写下了从敌对走向和解的动人篇章,但这个过程其实并不容易,其间的危机与风险并不少见,并对两岸关系和台海局势造成了相当严重的冲击与影响。这些危机与风险主要表现为以下几种类型:

1. Military security crises and risks
1、军事安全危机与风险

Crises begin with conflicts, with the possibility of war. This is the broadest description of a crisis. Crisis, as a special situation, has a time pressure and requires decisions. Crises are often highly correlated with chaos and turmoil. Generally speaking, a military security crisis is the most aggravated crisis state among actors and usually refers to a unique phenomenon that lies between peace and war. Since 1949, there have been many military security crises and risks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Even in the past 30 years since the door to people-to-people exchanges across the Strait was officially opened, there have been serious Taiwan Strait crises. For example, in 1995, Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States and his provocative remarks detonated a major military security crisis in the Taiwan Strait that lasted from 1995 to 1996. This kind of crisis not only caused huge risks to cross-Strait relations but also almost made the situation in the Taiwan Strait approach the brink of war.3 The military security crisis is undoubtedly the most serious of all types of crises across the Taiwan Strait, its level of confrontation is the most intense, and its crisis management proves the most difficult.

危机始于冲突,又有爆发战争的可能性,这是对危机概念的最为宽泛的描述。危机作为一种特殊形势的情境,具有时间方面的压力,而且必须要做出决断。危机往往与混乱、动荡有高度的相关性。一般而言,军事安全危机是行为体之间性质最为恶化的危机状态,通常它是指介于和平与战争之间的特有现象。自1949年以来,两岸之间爆发了多起军事安全危机与风险。即便是两岸民间交流大门正式开启的这三十年里,也曾爆发了严重的台海危机事件。如1995年,由于李登辉访美并发表具有挑衅性的言论,从而引爆了1995-1996年的台海重大军事安全危机,这类危机不但给两岸关系造成巨大的风险,而且也差点使台海局势攀升到战争的边缘。军事安全危机无疑是两岸各类危机中性质最为严重,对抗程度最为激烈,危机管理难度最高的。

As far as the nature of cross-Strait relations is concerned, since the two sides of the Strait have not officially ended the state of hostility, nor have they signed a cross-Strait peace agreement, there has always been a hidden danger of a military security crisis on both sides of the Strait. However, judging from the development of cross-Strait relations in the past three decades, the military security crisis has not become the protagonist of cross-Strait crises and risks. In fact, with the continuous expansion and deepening of cross-Strait non-governmental exchanges, the frequency of cross-Strait military security crises has been decreasing. Cross-Strait military security crises are extremely harmful and can easily lead to intervention by external forces. Coupled with its high cost, the willingness of all parties to trigger a military security crisis is reduced, such that, objectively speaking, endogenous forces can restrain the outbreak of a cross-Strait military security crisis.

仅就两岸关系的本质而论,由于海峡两岸至今尚未正式结束敌对状态,也未签署两岸和平协议,两岸始终都存在爆发军事安全危机的的隐患。但从过去三十年两岸关系的发展历程来观察,军事安全危机并未成为两岸危机与风险的主角。事实上,随着两岸民间交流的持续扩大与不断深入,两岸军事安全危机的爆发频率不断降低,次数也大为减少。两岸军事安全危机由于其危害性极大,也容易引发外力的介入,加上其成本过高,都使各方对引发军事安全危机的意愿有所降低,客观上也成为抑制两岸军事安全危机爆发的内生力量。

2. Political conflict crisis and risk
2、政治冲突危机与风险

Structure determines function, and function reacts to structure. Political conflict crises always exist in the interaction of cross-Strait relations, and it is also the most likely trigger of cross-Strait crises and risks. Its influence is mainly manifested in increasing the emotional distance between people on both sides of the Strait, and even causing an emotional rupture that radiates out, affecting the political sentiment of the people on both sides, infecting their political behavior, increasing political estrangement, and worsening the political environment on both sides of the Strait. The frequent occurrence of political conflicts and crises between the two sides of the Strait is mainly attributable to structural contradictions between the two sides of the Strait. From the emergence of the Taiwan issue to today, there have been competitions and struggles between the two sides in terms of ideology, political system, values, and representation. Although Resolution 2758 passed by the 26th UN General Assembly in 1971 has resolved the question of the legitimate representative of China on both sides of the Taiwan Strait from the perspective of international law and international political reality, the situation within Taiwan is very complicated, and serious differences still exist. Moreover, the essence behind this difference is not all that substantial: Whether it is Blue Camp’s formulation of the “one China, two representatives” or the Green Camp’s “separatism” proposition, the logic behind it, of course, still means dealing with the political positioning and identity representation of the Taiwan authorities. The aforementioned problems are of course structural problems that have existed in cross-Strait relations for a long time and are also the main reason for the frequent outbreak of cross-Strait crises and cross-Strait risks over the past three decades. Political conflict crises and risks in cross-Strait relations can be divided into the following:

结构决定功能,功能反作用于结构,政治冲突危机在两岸关系互动中始终存在,也是最容易引发两岸危机与风险的诱因。其影响主要表现为拉大两岸民众之间情感上的距离,甚至引起情感破裂,产生辐射效应,影响双方民众的政治情绪,感染他们的政治行为,加大政治隔阂,使两岸政治环境更趋恶化。两岸之间的政治冲突危机之所以频繁出现,主要是由两岸之间的结构性矛盾所造成。台湾问题发展至今,双方在一定程度上仍然存在着意识形态、政治制度、价值观念以及代表性的角逐与斗争。虽然1971年第26届联合国大会通过的2758号决议,已从国际法及国际政治现实层面解决了两岸谁是中国合法性代表的问题。但台湾内部的情形非常复杂,仍然存在严重的分歧。而这种分歧背后的本质并无多大实质差别,无论是蓝营的“一中各表”之提法,还是绿营的“分离主义”之主张,其背后的逻辑当然还是意指要处理台湾当局的政治定位及身份代表问题。上述问题当然是两岸关系中长期存在的的结构性难题,也是过去三十年里台海危机及两岸风险频频爆发的主因所在。两岸关系中的政治冲突危机与风险又可以分为以下几种类型:

1. Cross-Strait crises triggered by Taiwan’s pursuit of international engagement. Any attempt by Taiwan to expand international participation, especially to join an international organization that only sovereign states can participate in, may lead to incidents and the risk of cross-Strait political conflict. In fact, the confrontation and conflict between the two sides in the field of foreign affairs is a major contributor to the tension in the Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait risks. This constitutes a structural problem in the cross-Strait relationship. In the absence of a final solution to the Taiwan issue, such crises and risks naturally cannot be completely eliminated. Although different political parties are in power in Taiwan, and the magnitude and intensity of foreign-related crises across the Taiwan Strait are different, the nature of foreign-related crises has not changed all that much.

①台湾寻求国际参与所引发的两岸危机。台湾方面任何试图拓展国际参与,特别是加入只有主权国家才能参与的国际组织等冲撞行为,都有可能导致两岸政治冲突的危机与风险。事实上,两岸在涉外领域的对抗与冲突,是引发台海局势紧张及两岸风险的重要诱因,这是两岸关系中的结构性问题。在台湾问题没有得到最终解决的情形下,这种危机与风险自然无法完全消除。虽然台湾地区不同政党执政,两岸涉外危机爆发的幅度与烈度有所差异,但涉外危机的本质并无多大变化。

2. Cross-Strait crises triggered by “Taiwan independence” separatist behavior. “Taiwan independence” is the political ideology and proposition of separatism. For a long time, Taiwan separatism has been one of the main causes of cross-Strait conflict and Taiwan Strait incidents. Since 2000, as the “Taiwan independence” forces continue to gain momentum on the island, the risk of “Taiwan independence” has increasingly become an important source of cross-Strait crises. The “constitutional revision” and “United Nations membership applications” promoted by the Chen Shui-bian authorities have greatly aggravated the crisis situation in the Taiwan Strait and caused unprecedented tension in cross-Strait relations. After the DPP returned to power in 2016, despite claims to “maintain the status quo,” because Tsai Ing-wen authorities have refused to give up actions such as “de-sinicization,”4 cross-Strait relations have been drastically reversed, and the potential risk of a Taiwan Strait incident has greatly increased.

②“台独”分离主义行为所引发的两岸危机。“台独”就是分离主义的政治意识形态及主张。长期以来,台湾分离主义一直是引发两岸冲突与台海危机的主要诱因之一。进入2000年以来,随着“台独”势力在岛内不断坐大,“台独”风险越来越成为引发两岸危机事件的重要源头。陈水扁当局推动的“修宪制宪”、“公投入联”等动作,都极大地加剧了台海区域的危机形势,造成两岸关系的空前紧张。民进党2016年重返执政后,尽管声称“维持现状”,但由于蔡英文当局并未放弃“去中国化”等动作,使两岸关系急剧倒退,台海危机爆发的潜在风险大为增长。

3. Cross-Strait crises triggered by ideology. The Kuomintang-Communist civil war that broke out from 1946 to 1949 was itself closely related to the serious differences between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party on China’s future development path and system choices. Therefore, since 1949, the cross-Strait struggles and contests in the political system and ideology have never ceased. Even in the past 30 years, although the door to people-to-people exchanges across the Strait has been opened and the social interaction between the two sides has become increasingly frequent, the struggle between the two sides over ideology and values has never stopped.5 The continuous collusion between political forces on the island of Taiwan and various anti-China forces can easily lead to antagonism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, resulting in the emergence of cross-Strait crises.

③意识形态领域引发的两岸危机。1946-1949年爆发的国共内战,其本身就与国共两党对中国未来的发展道路及制度选择存在严重分歧密切相关。因此,1949年以来,两岸在政治制度及意识形态等领域的斗争与较量从未停止。即便是在过去的三十年里,虽然两岸民间交流交往的大门洞开,两岸社会互动日益频繁,但两岸在意识形态及价值观念上的斗争并未停止。台湾岛内政治势力与各种反华势力的勾结持续不断,这些都易引发海峡两岸之间的对立情绪,从而导致两岸危机事态出现。

4. Cross-Strait crises caused by Taiwan’s handling of internal affairs. Cross-strait relations are extremely sensitive and complex. Even as Taiwan authorities deal with their internal affairs, seemingly simple issues may trigger a crisis situation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. For example, when the Taiwan authorities deal with so-called “constitutional amendments,” “referendums,” and other issues, as well as major election activities in Taiwan, they may stimulate the sensitive nerves of cross-Strait relations, thereby triggering major events such as the Taiwan Strait crisis and cross-Strait risks.

④台湾处理内部事务引发的两岸危机。两岸关系极具敏感性与复杂性,即便是台湾当局在处理其内部事务时,看似单纯的议题,也可能会引发两岸之间的危机情势。诸如台湾当局在处理所谓的“修宪”、“公投”等议题时,以及台湾内部的重大选举活动都可能会刺激两岸关系的敏感神经,从而引发台海危机及两岸风险等重大事态。

5. Cross-Strait crises caused by Taiwan’s handling of external affairs. The Taiwan authorities’ handling of external affairs or interactions with other countries and regions may also trigger a Taiwan Strait crisis and cross-Strait risks. For example, the foreign military procurement by the Taiwan authorities, as well as the close interaction between Taiwan and certain countries in non-economic and cultural fields such as military and security, may cause crises between the two sides of the Strait.

⑤台湾处理外部事务所引发的两岸危机。台湾当局处理外部事务,或与其他国家地区的互动中也可能会引发台海危机及两岸风险的发生。诸如台湾当局的对外军事采购,台湾与一些国家在军事、安全等非经济文化领域的密切互动,都有可能会引发两岸之间的危机事件。

The cross-Strait political crisis is mainly caused by the structural problems between the two sides of the Strait and usually changes with the situation of cross-Strait relations, especially the change of the ruling party in Taiwan. This is its major feature. When the confrontation between the ruling parties on both sides of the Strait is notable, the political crisis is more prominent. The political crisis across the Taiwan Strait will not only intensify the emotional confrontation between the two sides but may also lead to confrontation and countermeasures between the two sides at a policy level.

海峡两岸政治危机主要由两岸之间的结构性问题所引发,它通常会随着两岸关系的状况而变化,特别是因台湾地区执政党的变化而变化,这是其重要特色之所在。当两岸执政党对抗情绪明显时,政治危机就比较突出。两岸政治危机不但会激化两岸的情绪对抗,而且也有可能引发双方在政策层面的对抗与反制。

3. Social communication crises and risks
3、社会交流危机与风险

Crises and risks in social exchanges have been common problems in cross-Strait exchanges in the past. They mainly refer to the crises and risks to cross-Strait relations and even the situation in the Taiwan Strait caused by accidents, travel incidents, personal safety, and other events during the interaction of social personnel across the Strait. The level of this type of crisis is not high, and its impact on cross-Strait relations is mainly reflected in the rise of confrontation or hostility between the two sides, which may affect all aspects of cross-Strait exchanges and thus cannot be ignored.

社会交流危机与风险是两岸过去交流中普遍存在的问题,它主要是指两岸社会人员互动过程中,包括意外事件,旅游事件,人身安全等事件引发的,对两岸关系甚至台海局势造成的风险与危机。这类危机的等级并不高,它对两岸关系的影响主要还是体现在双方对抗或敌对情绪的上升,进而有可能影响到两岸交流的各个面向,不容忽视。

In the process of cross-Strait exchanges, it is inevitable that disorder or conflict will occur. Given the large-scale people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Strait, it is natural for many social risks to arise. Initially, it has mainly been a matter of cross-border crimes and the smuggling of goods. Since then, there have also been problems such as drug trafficking and triads, as well as environmental, food, and disease transmission issues. This has resulted in the breeding of a series of non-traditional security issues between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and has led to various crises and risks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. For example, in July 1990, due to the simple, crude, and irresponsible behavior of the Taiwan authorities when dealing with private migrants from the mainland6, a major and vicious incident that eventually resulted in the death of many people shocked society on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and sparked extensive discussions on the need to establish some kind of communication mechanism between the two sides of the Strait to deal with crises. Although the Qiandao Lake Incident in 1994 was just a tragedy that Taiwanese tourists encountered when they traveled to the mainland, its impact on cross-Strait relations should not be underestimated. Since there was not much experience in contact and interaction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait at that time, there were large differences in the thinking and modes of handling crisis incidents between the two sides. In addition, the Lee Teng-hui authorities took the opportunity to incite public opinion in Taiwanese society and maliciously slander the mainland, all but destroying the benign atmosphere created by the two sides since the Wang-Gu Talks.7 In July 2016, the “burning car incident” occurred in a serious car accident and fire in Taoyuan, Taiwan involving a tour bus for a Liaoning tour group, killing 26 people, including 24 mainland tourists. Although the accident had nothing to do with cross-Strait politics and was a rare tourism crisis, the lack of affection for compatriots by the Taiwan authorities in handling this incident also triggered a strong rebound in mainland public opinion, which had a certain negative impact on cross-Strait relations. Judging from the practice of people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Strait over the past three decades, Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks are mainly reflected in the field of political crises.

两岸交流的过程,自然不可避免出现失序或冲突的现象。两岸开展大规模的民间交流交往后,自然会衍生很多社会风险,最初主要是跨境犯罪、物品走私等问题,此后还有毒品、黑社会等问题出现,以及环境、食品、疾病传染等问题,造成了两岸之间一系列非传统安全问题的滋生,从而引发两岸之间的各类危机与风险。例如,1990年7月,由于台湾当局在处理大陆私渡客时的做法简单粗暴,不负责任,最终导致多人死亡的重大恶性事件发生,这一事件震惊了两岸社会,也引发了对两岸需要建立某种沟通机制以处理危机事情的广泛探讨。1994年的“千岛湖事件”,虽然只是一起台湾游客在大陆旅游时遭遇不幸的悲剧,但对两岸关系的影响不容低估。由于当时海峡两岸接触与互动的经验并不多,双方对危机事件处理的思维与模式存在较大的差异,加上李登辉当局在台湾社会借机煽动民意,恶意诋毁大陆,使两岸自“汪辜会谈”以来所营造的良性氛围几乎荡然无存。2016年7月发生的“火烧车事件”,为一辆辽宁旅行团乘坐的游览车在台湾桃园发生严重车祸和火灾,造成26人罹难,其中包括24名大陆游客的重大悲剧。尽管该事故与两岸政治无关,属于偶发的旅游危机事情,但由于台湾当局在处理这件事情时缺乏同胞之情,也引发大陆民意的强烈反弹,对两岸关系造成了一定的负面影响。从过去三十年两岸民间交流交往的实践来观察,台海危机及两岸风险主要体现在政治危机的领域。

(ii) Exploration of the root causes of Taiwan Strait crises and the frequent outbreak of cross-Strait risks
(二)台海危机与两岸风险频频爆发的根源探究
1. Lack of political mutual trust across the Taiwan Strait
1、海峡两岸缺乏政治互信

Crisis management requires institutionalized communication channels for all parties involved in the crisis. However, due to the lack of political mutual trust between the two sides, it is difficult to establish effective institutionalized communication channels. The main reason why the crises and risks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have continued in the past three decades is the lack of political mutual trust between the two sides. In other words, since the state of hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has not yet subsided, the hostility between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has not been completely resolved. This is the key to causing turbulence in cross-Strait relations and constant crises across the Strait. The formation of the Taiwan issue was mainly caused by the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and with the intervention of the United States, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait finally confronted each other across the Taiwan Strait. In the past three decades, although cross-Strait relations have shifted from isolation to exchanges and significant progress has been made, after all, the state of hostility between the two sides has not ended, and the hostility between the two sides has not been completely resolved. The level of mutual trust between the two sides, whether it is through official or private interactions, is still very low. It is precisely because of the extreme lack of political mutual trust between the two sides that the two sides cannot normally carry out institutionalized consultation and cooperation. Even if some institutionalized measures and arrangements have been established at a certain historical stage, once the political parties are rotated, these arrangements often cannot continue to play a substantial role.

危机管理需要危机相关各方有制度化的沟通管道,但由于两岸缺乏政治互信,很难建立有效的制度化沟通管道。两岸过去三十年的危机及风险之所以不断,其中最主要的根源还在于双方缺乏政治互信。换言之,由于两岸尚未结束敌对状态,两岸之间的敌意尚未完全得到消解。这是造成两岸关系动荡不安,两岸危机不断的关键所在。台湾问题之形成主要就是国共内战所引发,加上美国的干预,最终使两岸隔台海海峡而对立。过去三十年,虽然两岸关系由封闭走向交流,并取得了重大的进展,但毕竟两岸尚未结束敌对状态,两岸敌意并未完全化解,双方无论是官方还是民间互动,相互信任的水平仍然很低。正是由于两岸政治互信的极度缺乏,双方自然无法正常开展制度化的协商与合作,即便在某个历史阶段建立了一些制度化措施和安排,但一旦政党轮替,这些安排往往无法继续发挥实质性作用。

2. Existence of separatist forces in Taiwan
2、台湾分离主义势力的存在

In the past 30 years, although the people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Strait have been very lively, due to the significant differences between the two sides on the future prospects and development path of cross-Strait relations, the struggle between the two sides of the Strait has continued, and even major crises in the Taiwan Strait have occurred. Mainland China actively pursues the goal of the ultimate peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait, while what Taiwan pursues is to seek peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, not to lead to the ultimate reunification, especially as the Taiwan separatist forces gradually grow in numbers. This is the main source of tension in cross-Strait relations. This has also led to the continuous struggle between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait over peaceful reunification and maintaining the status quo. As the struggle between reunification and “independence” continues,8 crises have frequently occurred. Since the Taiwan separatist forces disregard the public opinion on both sides of the Strait and the overall interests of the Chinese nation, they wantonly promote the separatist movement, which will inevitably lead to tensions and conflicts on both sides of the Strait and increasingly become the main hidden danger of the Taiwan Strait crisis and cross-Strait risks. In addition, Taiwan’s separatist forces attempt to rely on external forces to counter the reunification process across the Taiwan Strait, which will inevitably lead to an escalation of cross-Strait crises and conflicts.

过去三十年来,虽然两岸民间交流非常热络,但由于双方对两岸关系未来前景及发展道路存在重大的分歧,从而导致两岸之间的斗争持续不断,甚至引发台海区域的重大危机事件发生。中国大陆积极追求两岸最终实现和平统一的目标,而台湾方面追求的则是谋求台海区域的和平稳定状况,并非导向最终的统一,特别是随着台湾分离主义势力的逐渐坐大,越来越成为两岸关系陷入紧张的主要根源。这也使得在过去三十年里,海峡两岸围绕和平统一与维持现状,以及统与“独”之间的斗争持续不断,危机频发。由于台湾分离主义势力不顾两岸民意和中华民族的整体利益,大肆推动分离主义运动,必然会引发海峡两岸的紧张与冲突,也越来越成为诱发台海危机与两岸风险的主要隐患。加上台湾分离势力企图倚重外部势力,图谋对抗两岸的统一进程,必然会造成两岸危机冲突的升级。

3. The United States has been involved in the Taiwan issue for a long time
3、美国长期介入台湾问题

The United States has always been an important external factor triggering Taiwan Strait crises. The formation of the Taiwan issue itself also has something to do with the United States. In fact, several major Taiwan Strait crises that broke out since 1949 are inextricably linked with the United States. For example, major crises such as the Kinmen (Quemoy) Artillery Battle in 1958 were inseparable from the direct involvement of the United States in the Taiwan issue, especially the attempt of the United States to concoct “two Chinas” between the two sides of the Strait. At that time, the leaders of mainland China were aware of the conspiracy of the United States, and thus used the Kinmen (Quemoy) Artillery Battle, a crisis event that triggered cross-Strait tensions, to contain Chiang Kai-shek and smash the United States’ attempt to split China. Although great breakthroughs have been made in cross-Strait people-to-people exchanges since 1987, the shadow of the United States is playing a role behind many Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks. For example, in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996, it was precisely because the United States insisted on giving the green light for Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States despite the firm opposition of the Chinese mainland, which triggered tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In this crisis, the United States not only played the role of the initiator of the crisis but also sent an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait region in an attempt to exert military pressure on the mainland. These actions of the United States directly led to the continuous escalation of the Taiwan Strait crisis. In addition to major military security crises, the United States is also an important external source of cross-Strait risks. After the DPP returned to power, even the most basic form of mutual trust between the two sides of the Strait was lacking. However, U.S. President-elect Trump had a direct phone call with Tsai Ing-wen, the leader of the Taiwan region. Such behavior was of course a major event, and it also triggered tensions in cross-Strait relations and elevated cross-Strait risks.

美国一直是引发台海危机的一个重要外部因素。台湾问题之形成本身就与美国有关系。事实上,1949年以来所爆发的几次重大的台海危机,都与美国有着千丝万缕的关系。如1958年发生的金门炮战等重大危机事件,都与美国直接介入台湾问题,特别是美国在两岸之间炮制“两个中国”的企图密不可分。当时中国大陆领导人意识到美国的阴谋,从而以金门炮战这一引发两岸紧张局势的危机事件来牵制住蒋介石,粉碎美国分裂中国的企图。虽然1987年以来两岸民间交流取得了较大的突破,但不少台海危机及两岸风险的背后都有美国的影子在发挥作用。例如,在1995-1996年的台海危机中,正是由于美国方面不顾中国大陆方面的坚决反对,执意为李登辉访美大开绿灯,从而引发台海区域的紧张局势。在这一次危机中,美国不但扮演了引爆危机的始作俑者之角色,更是向台海区域派出了航空母舰,企图向大陆方面进行军事施压,美国的这些动作直接导致台海危机的不断升级。除了重大军事安全危机外,美国也是制造两岸风险的重要外部源头。民进党重返执政后,两岸之间本来就缺乏最为基本的互信,但美国候任总统特朗普却与台湾地区领导人蔡英文直接通电话,这种行为当然是重大事件,也会引发两岸关系的紧绷,使两岸关系的风险越发增加。

II. Mainland China’s related explorations and results in responding to the Taiwan Strait crisis and risks

二、中国大陆应对台海危机与风险的相关探索及其成效

Over the past 30 years of people-to-people exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, in the face of the Taiwan Strait crisis and the growing trend of cross-Strait risks, mainland China has begun to actively explore the management of these crises and risks and has achieved profound results. The mainland’s attempts and exploration of the Taiwan Strait crisis and risk management are mainly reflected in the aspects of strategy, means, and root causes.

海峡两岸民间交流交往三十年以来,面对台海危机及两岸风险日趋增多的发展态势,中国大陆开始了对这些危机与风险进行管理的积极探索,并取得了重要的成果。大陆方面对台海危机及风险管控的尝试与探索,主要体现在策略、手段、根源等面上。

(i) Attempts and explorations in crisis management strategies
(一)在危机管理策略上的尝试与探索

Crisis escalation is an important model that is often used in crisis management. In crises, escalation is both a common occurrence and is often employed as a strategy, including controlled escalations and limited brinkmanship based on the actual needs and possibilities of the crisis situation. Escalation is at the heart of sound crisis management. Crisis escalation is often the only way to effectively resolve a conflict. “The goal of crisis management is to escalate the crisis to the best possible position but at the same time limit it to the lowest possible level.”9 In reality, although crisis escalation is used as a strategy, this use is by no means arbitrary but is rather based on the practical needs of crisis management. Of course, the implementation of the crisis escalation strategy also requires some basic conditions as a premise. Taking the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996 as an example, mainland China made good use of the crisis escalation strategy at that time. Although the United States had also dispatched aircraft carriers during this crisis, the United States did not want the situation in the Taiwan Strait to go completely out of control. The goal of mainland China at that time was not to cross the sea to reunify Taiwan but to hope that the Lee Teng-hui authorities could return to the existing political consensus of “one China.” At the same time, mainland China wanted to warn the United States about the wrong policy of supporting Taiwan in the hopes of turning the crisis situation in a direction that is beneficial to mainland China. Therefore, the purpose of conducting military exercises in mainland China was to oppose the interference of external forces in China’s internal affairs and the increasingly arrogant “Taiwan independence” separatist forces. The mainland used deterrence to escalate the Taiwan Strait crisis to a limited extent. The purpose was to declare to the international community that China, on issues related to national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will not succumb to any external pressure and hopes to use this to create more opportunities and greater strategic space for handling the Taiwan issue in the future. The mainland’s crisis escalation strategy has indeed achieved certain results objectively. The military action not only caused Taiwan’s stock market to plummet, capital to outflow, and panic to spread, but it also created a favorable environment on the island to ease tensions across the Taiwan Strait. It was the use of this crisis escalation strategy that finally made the United States realize the complexity of the Taiwan issue and made a commitment to “not support Taiwan’s independence.”10 As a result, the situation in Taiwan would develop in a direction that is beneficial to the mainland. At the same time, in our escalation strategy, in order to prevent the crisis from getting out of control, we have also carried out effective management and control. We still hope to promote the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue through communication and contact. From the perspective of rational choices, it is also in the interests of mainland China to avoid direct military conflict with the United States and prevent a large-scale war in the Taiwan Strait. For example, even during the most stressful of times of crisis, the channels between China and the United States in maintaining information exchange have always been relatively smooth. Embassy relations between China and the United States, military exchanges, and high-level negotiations were ongoing.11 In particular, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Clinton also held a summit meeting at the commemorative meeting of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. The maintenance of these communication channels has a very positive effect on crisis management. Clinton also reiterated that the United States respects Beijing’s position that “Taiwan is part of China.”12 Such a statement certainly played a significant role in easing tensions at the time.

危机升级是危机管理中常常被运用的重要模式。在危机中,逐步升级既是司空见惯的现象,也常常被视为策略来加以运用,包括根据危机情势的现实需要及可能而采取有控制的升级理念和有限的边缘战略。升级概念是健全的危机管理之核心。危机升级常常是有效解决一场冲突局势的唯一方法。“危机管理的目标是将危机升级到最有利的地位但同时限制在尽可能低的程度。”在现实中,危机升级虽然作为一种策略而被运用,但这种运用绝非随心所欲,而是基于危机管理的现实需要。当然危机升级策略的实施也需要有一些基本的条件作为前提。以1995-1996年的台海危机为例,中国大陆当时就很好地运用了危机升级的战略。虽然在这场危机中,美国也派出了航空母舰,但美国并不希望台海事态走向完全的失控。而中国大陆当时的目标并不是要渡海统一台湾,而是希望李登辉当局能够重新回到“一个中国”的既有政治共识上来,同时对美国可能支持台湾的错误政策进行某种程度的警告,从而使危机情势朝有利于中国大陆的方向发展。因此,中国大陆开展军事演习的目的就是为反对外部势力对中国内政的干涉,以及针对日益嚣张的“台独”分裂势力。大陆用威慑的手段,将台海危机进行有限升级的举措,目的是向国际社会宣告,中国在关系到国家主权和领土完整问题上,不会屈服于任何外来压力,并希望藉此在政治上为今后处理台湾问题创造更多的机会和更大的战略空间。而大陆的这种危机升级策略,客观上也确实达到了一定的效果。军事行动不仅使台湾的股市大跌,资金外流,人心慌张,而且在岛内也形成了要求缓和两岸紧张形势的有利环境。正是这种危机升级战略的运用,使美国最终认识到台湾问题的复杂性,做出了“不支持台湾独立”的承诺,从而使台湾局势朝着有利于大陆的方向发展。与此同时,我方在升级战略中,为避免危机失控,也进行了有效的管控,仍然希望透过沟通和接触的方式,来促成台湾问题的和平解决。从理性选择的角度,避免与美国发生直接的军事冲突,防止在台湾海峡爆发一场大规模的战争也符合中国大陆的利益。例如,即便是在危机最为紧张的时期,中方与美方在保持信息交流方面的管道始终比较畅通,包括中美两国的大使馆关系、军事交流和高层谈判等都一直在进行,尤其是中方领导人江泽民主席与美国总统克林顿还在联合国成立50周年的纪念会议上举行了高峰会晤。这些沟通管道的维系对于危机管理有着相当正面的效应。克林顿也重申了美方尊重北京的“台湾是中国一部分”的立场。这种表态在当时对于缓解紧张局势当然有其重大的作用。

(ii) Attempts and explorations in crisis management methods
(二)在危机管理手段上的尝试与探索

Over the past three decades, the mainland has also continuously strengthened its attempts and exploration of means of crisis management in the Taiwan Strait. After all, the Taiwan issue involves a wide range and is extremely complex. The management and control of the Taiwan Strait crisis should also be actively explored in practice.

过去三十年,大陆也不断强化对台海危机管理手段的尝试与探索。毕竟台湾问题牵涉面广,极为复杂,对台海危机的管控也要在实践中进行积极的摸索。

1. Exploration of U.S. role awareness
1、对美国角色认知的探索

Mainland China also has gained a gradual understanding of the functions and roles of the United States in the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis. For Beijing’s management of the Taiwan Strait crisis, is the United States a hindrance or a help or is it impossible to draw a simple conclusion? For a long time after 1949, the United States has long been an important external factor that has triggered the outbreak of Taiwan Strait crises. The main reason is that the United States, with its strong military advantages, has been creating crisis situations in the Taiwan Strait in order to achieve its national interests. From this perspective, for the mainland, the role the United States plays in cross-Strait relations and the Taiwan Strait is of course negative. However, in the past three decades, with the rapid increase in the strength of mainland China, the relative strength of China and the United States has drawn closer. The United States has grown increasingly worried about the risk of being drawn into a cross-Strait conflict or even a military confrontation that could directly trigger the rivalry between the two major powers. This is obviously what the United States does not wish to see. Under such circumstances, the United States began to block and oppose Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” and Chen Shui-bian’s “United Nations application,” “constitution referendum,” and other “Taiwan independence” behaviors. Therefore, there have been some changes in the role and function of the United States in cross-Strait relations. As a result, China and the United States have at least a certain degree of space and opportunity for cooperation on the major issue of suppressing “Taiwan independence.” In the past 30 years of cross-Strait crisis management, the role of the United States has begun to show some positive energy. In the least, the United States has become a positive factor in restraining “Taiwan independence” forces. The mainland has also increasingly found that maintaining the peace and stability of cross-Strait relations is crucial. In particular, taking the United States as an important party in the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis will also help the mainland to improve the efficiency of Taiwan Strait crisis management. Of course, the U.S. factor requires dialectical analysis and evaluation, taking into account its negative aspects. At this stage, both sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot completely rule out the intervention and influence of the United States in the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis, and the U.S. factor will still exist for a certain period of time in the future. The negative role of crisis management in the Taiwan Strait is a major issue worthy of consideration.

中国大陆对美国在台海危机管理中的功能及角色也有一个逐渐认识的过程。对于北京的台海危机管理而言,美国到底是阻力还是助力,抑或无法简单定论?1949年之后的相当长时期内,美国长期作为引发台海危机爆发的重要外部因素。其主要原因就是美国凭借其强大的军事优势,为达到其国家利益,一直在台海区域制造危机情势。从这个角度来看,对大陆而言,美国在两岸关系及台海区域中所发挥的角色当然是负面的。但过去三十年以来,随着中国大陆实力的快速增强,中美实力的相对拉近,美国越来越担心有可能被卷进两岸冲突的风险之中,甚至有可能直接引发中美两个大国之争的军事对抗。这显然是美国不愿看到的。在这种情势下,美国方面开始对李登辉的“两国论”,以及陈水扁推动的“入联公投”、“修宪制宪”等“台独”行为予以阻止和反对。因此,美国在两岸关系上的角色和功能有一些变化。是故,中美双方在抑制“台独”这个重大问题上至少有了一定程度合作的空间和机会。而过去三十年的两岸危机管控中,美方的角色开始出现一些正面的能量,至少美国也成为抑制“台独”势力暴冲的积极因素。大陆也越来越发现,维持两岸关系的和平稳定至关重要,特别是将美国作为台海危机管理的重要一方,也有助于大陆方面对台海危机管理效率之提升。当然,对于美国因素,需要辩证的分析与评估,也要看到其负面的一面。由于现阶段海峡两岸双方在台海危机管理中尚无法完全排除美国的干预与影响,美国因素在未来一定的时期范畴内仍将存在,如何发挥美国的第三方协助之角色,同时又回避掉美国对台海危机管理的负面角色,是一个值得思考的重大问题。

2. Attempts and explorations of legal means
2、对法律手段的尝试与探索

For a long time, due to the complexity of the Taiwan issue itself and the strong intervention of external forces, in the face of the complex Taiwan Strait crisis situation, mainland China has relatively limited means of crisis management. Especially with the development of “Taiwan independence” forces on the island, the pressure on the mainland to deal with the crisis in the Taiwan Strait is increasing day by day. However, with the continuous enhancement of mainland China’s comprehensive strength and a deeper understanding of the Taiwan issue itself, the mainland has begun to use legal means to strengthen the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis. On March 14, 2005, the National People’s Congress, after deliberation, passed the Anti-Secession Law, which clearly stipulated and provided a legal basis for the argument that the Taiwan issue is a matter of China’s internal affairs. The Anti-Secession Law undoubtedly draws an insurmountable red line for the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces and is also the fundamental bottom line for cross-Strait relations. It also provides legal means for mainland China to strengthen the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis and its risk management.

长期以来,由于台湾问题本身形成的复杂性,以及外部势力的强力干预,面对复杂的台海危机情势,中国大陆进行危机管理的手段相对有限。特别是随着“台独”势力在岛内的发展,大陆处理台海危机的压力与日俱增。但随着中国大陆综合实力的不断增强,以及对台湾问题本身的认识更为深刻,大陆方面开始用法律的手段来强化对台海危机的管理力度。2005年3月14日,全国人民代表大会通过审议,高票通过了《反分裂国家法》,明确规定台湾问题是中国的内政,为今后采取各种方式维护台湾作为中国一部分的地位,解决台湾问题提供了法律依据。《反分裂国家法》无疑为“台独”分离势力划定了一条不可逾越的红线,也是两岸关系的根本底线。它也为中国大陆强化台海危机管理及其风险管控提供了法律的手段。

3. Attempts and explorations to eliminate the root cause of the crisis
3、对消除危机根源的尝试与探索

Over the past 30 years of cross-Strait exchanges, the outbreaks of Taiwan Strait crises, of course, have complex social and historical roots and backgrounds. For crisis management to have a real effect, it is necessary to eliminate the root causes of the crises. In addition to the structural contradictions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the outbreaks of Taiwan Strait crises are directly related to the limited scope and depth of cross-Strait exchanges. For a long time, Taiwanese society’s perception of the mainland has been largely misunderstood. In the past 30 years, although a cross-Strait exchange situation has been formed, the strength of the exchanges is insufficient, and the duration of exchanges has not been long. At the same time, Taiwanese society still doesn’t know much about the connotation of the mainland’s policy toward Taiwan, as well as the development status and prospects of the mainland. These matters must be gradually resolved through cross-Strait non-governmental exchanges. Under this circumstance, mainland China adopted the policy of prioritizing economics before politics, going after the easy before the difficult. By promoting the interaction between people on both sides of the Strait through economic, cultural, social, and other exchanges, China has laid a solid economic foundation and public opinion foundation for continuous breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. Especially since 2008, cross-Strait relations have entered a stage of peaceful development. Cross-Strait trade, mail, and navigation have been basically realized, and various exchanges have been greatly advanced. It has shortened the distance between the people and the society on both sides of the Strait and has enhanced affection.

两岸交流三十年以来,台海危机之所以爆发,当然有其复杂的社会历史根源与背景。而危机管理要有真正的效果,则需要消除危机产生的根源。台海危机的爆发除了两岸之间存在结构性的矛盾外,更与两岸交流范畴不广、程度不深有着直接的关系。长期以来,台湾社会对大陆的认知存在很大的偏差和误解,而这在过去三十年里,虽然两岸交流局面已经形成,但交流的力度还不足,交流的时间还不长。同时,台湾社会对大陆的对台政策内涵,以及对大陆的发展现状及前景仍然了解不多,这些都需要借助两岸民间交流来逐步化解。在这种情况下,中国大陆采取了先经后政、先易后难的政策,通过经济、文化、社会等交流来推进两岸民众的互动,为两岸关系的不断突破打下了强大的经济基础和民意基础。特别是2008年以来,两岸关系进入到和平发展阶段,两岸通商、通邮、通航等基本实现,各项交流得以大幅度推进。拉近了两岸民众及社会的彼此距离,增进了情感。

At present, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges flow from Taiwan to the mainland through the flow of people, logistics, and capital. The flow of people, logistics, and capital from the mainland entered the island at a later stage. Today, on both sides of the strait, a positive interaction pattern is taking shape of mutual need. The continuous flow and integration of cross-Strait economies, societies, and demands will connect the two societies on both sides of the Strait, naturally forming a material foundation for cross-Strait crisis management and risk management and providing both sides with greater means and possibilities.

当前,两岸经贸交流由台湾人流、物流、资金流入大陆,到后来的大陆的人流、物流及资金流进入岛内,两岸你中有我,我中有你的良性互动格局正在形成。两岸经济、社会及要求的不断流动及整合,都会把两岸两个社会连接在一起,这当然为两岸危机管理与风险管控积累了物质基础,也提供了更多的手段和可能。

(iii) The effect of crisis management in mainland China is very obvious
(三)大陆危机管理的效果非常明显

The purpose of crisis management in the Taiwan Strait is to strengthen and improve the level and capability of crisis management, prevent the situation in the Taiwan Strait from going completely out of control, maintain regional peace in the Taiwan Strait, and create a relatively favorable cross-Strait environment for the mainland’s reform and opening-up strategy. Therefore, the direct goal of crisis management across the Taiwan Strait is of course not the pursuit of unification. From this point of view, the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis in the past three decades has been quite successful.

台海危机管理的目的在于强化和提升危机管理的水平和能力,不使台海局势完全失控,维持台海区域和平,为大陆的改革开放战略创造相对有利的两岸环境。因此,台海危机管理的直接目标当然并不是追求统一。从这一点来说,过去三十年的台海危机管理是相当成功的。

Over the past 30 years, the situation in the Taiwan Strait has not been calm. In particular, the intervention of the United States and waves of provocations by the “Taiwan independence” forces on the island have caused constant crises, even major military and security crises, but we have ultimately ensured the situation in Taiwan never went out of control and never led to conflict or war. This has also enabled the long-term and continuous exchanges of cross-Strait relations, especially the continuous development of interactions in the economic, social, and personnel fields, such that the two sides of the Strait continue to move from confrontation to reconciliation. From this point of view, the crisis management objective of the mainland has been fully achieved, and its effect is also positive. The stability of the situation in the Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait relations is also the strategic goal of the Chinese mainland. In particular, the grand strategy of reform and opening up has created a favorable cross-Strait environment. Not only is it conducive to the re-communication and cooperation between mainland China and the international community, but it also makes Taiwan an important participant in the mainland’s reform and opening up. The mainland’s economic development has made significant progress and its overall national strength has been greatly enhanced, a success of the past three decades. All of this is of course closely related to the mainland’s successful management of the Taiwan Strait crisis.

三十年来,台海局势并不平静,特别是美国的介入,岛内“台独”势力一波波的挑衅,所引发的危机不断,甚至是重大的军事安全危机,但我方最终都确保台湾局势没有失控,没有爆发战争冲突。也使两岸关系长期持续保持交流,特别是在经济、社会及人员领域的互动持续开展,使两岸不断从对立走向和解,维持两岸关系越来越朝有利于大陆,有利于最终实现统一的方向迈进。从这一点来说,大陆方面的危机管理目标完全达成,其效果也是正面的。台海局势和两岸关系的稳定也为中国大陆的战略目标,特别是改革开放的大战略营造了良好的两岸环境,不但有利于中国大陆重新与国际社会进行交流与合作,而且也使台湾成为大陆推进改革开放的重要参与者。大陆经济发展取得重大进步,综合国力大为增强,也是在过去三十年里所取得。这一切当然也与大陆方面对台海危机的成功管理有着密切的关系。

III. Relevant inspirations from mainland China’s response to the Taiwan Strait crisis and risk management

三、中国大陆应对台海危机与风险管理的相关启示

(i) Containing the “Taiwan Independence” forces
(一)遏制住“台独”势力

From the observation of the situation of the Taiwan Strait crisis and cross-Strait risks in the past three decades, the “Taiwan independence” forces have increasingly become the main source of the outbreak of the Taiwan Strait crisis, which has attracted great attention from the mainland, and the mainland has also continuously strengthened the management and control of the “Taiwan independence” crisis. Regarding the issue of “Taiwan independence,” its essence is a separatist ideology and political proposition, which is particularly harmful to cross-Strait relations. Of course, the struggle for “Taiwan independence” will be a long-term process. Since the development of cross-Strait relations, cross-Strait interaction is no longer just a relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party but now also involves the pressure of resisting and guarding against separatism.

从过去三十年台海危机及两岸风险的情形观察,“台独”势力越来越成为台海危机爆发的最主要根源,引起了大陆方面的高度重视,大陆也不断强化对“台独”危机的管控力度。对于“台独”问题,其本质是一种分离主义的意识形态与政治主张,其对两岸关系的危害性尤为严重。当然对于“台独”的斗争,将是一个长期的过程。两岸关系发展至今,两岸互动已不再只是国共两党之间的关系了,而是加入了抵御和防范分离主义的压力。

Under the current situation of the DPP’s return to power where cross-Strait relations are at an impasse, the mainland must resolutely oppose any form of “Taiwan independence” activities. As General Secretary Xi Jinping said in his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, we “will never allow any person, organization, or political party to separate any piece of Chinese territory from at any time and in any form.”13 From a global perspective, separatist movements have spread all over the world, seriously affecting national and regional peace and stability. Over the past three decades, the frequent outbreak of crises in the Taiwan Strait and cross-Strait risks is directly related to the growing arrogance of the “Taiwan independence” forces on the island. It can be said that the “Taiwan independence” forces have become the main hidden danger of detonating Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks. Mainland China, through proactive and proactive crisis management strategies, has effectively curbed the attempts of the “Taiwan independence” forces to separate Taiwan from Chinese territory. In this way, Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks can always be controlled to a certain extent and scope so that the situation never goes completely out of control. This, of course, has something to do with the mainland’s appropriate crisis management strategies. Judging from the actual situation, although the DPP has won a ruling position twice, the Green Camp authorities do not dare to ignore the reality on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and do not dare to pursue a radical “Taiwan independence” line and can only adopt the policy orientation of maintaining the status quo. As such, the “Taiwan independence” forces can only admit defeat.14

在当前民进党重返执政、两岸关系陷入僵局的形势下,大陆方面一定要坚决反对任何形式的“台独”活动。正如习近平总书记在十九大报告中所言,“绝不允许任何人、任何组织、任何政党、在任何时候、以任何形式、把任何一块领土从中国分裂出去”。从世界范围来看,分离主义运动遍及全球,严重影响到国家和区域的和平与稳定。过去三十年以来,台海危机及两岸风险之所以频频爆发,这与岛内特别是“台独”势力的日益嚣张有直接的关系。可以说“台独”势力已成为引爆台海危机及两岸风险的主要隐患。中国大陆方面通过主动出击,积极的危机管理策略,有效地遏制了“台独”势力要把台湾从中国领土分离出去的企图,从而使台海危机及两岸风险始终能够控制在一定的程度和范畴,不至于陷入完全失控的境地。这当然与大陆方面得当的危机管理策略有关系。从现实情况来观察,民进党虽然两次取得执政地位,但绿营当局也不敢无视两岸现实,不敢推行激进的“台独”路线,只能是采取维持现状的政策取向,“台独”势力也只能自认失败。

(ii) Preventing external intervention
(二)阻止外部的介入

Observing the practice of crisis management in the Taiwan Strait in the past three decades, external forces must be prevented from intervening in the Taiwan issue. External causes of Taiwan Strait crises and risk outbreaks must be vigorously eliminated in order to effectively maintain “One China.” Because of this, over the past 30 years, the mainland has resolutely curbed the Taiwan authorities’ various “Taiwan independence” separatist acts in the international community and has actively sought the understanding and support of the international community for China’s position against “Taiwan independence” to great effect. At present, the vast majority of countries in the world adhere to the “One China” policy. More and more countries have clearly expressed their opposition to “Taiwan independence,” opposing any words and deeds of the Taiwan authorities aimed at changing Taiwan’s status and moving towards “Taiwan independence” and any acts by the Taiwan authorities to undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan authorities’ attempts to “return to the United Nations” and squeeze into the World Health Organization have been thwarted year after year. The remarkable achievements in Taiwan-related diplomatic work have effectively upheld the one-China principle in the international community.

从过去三十年来台海危机管理的实践来观察,必须要阻止外部势力对台湾问题的介入,大力消除台海危机及其风险爆发的外部根源,才能有效维护“一个中国”的局面。正因为如此,过去三十年以来,大陆方面坚决遏制台湾当局在国际社会中的各种“台独”分裂行为,并积极争取国际社会对中方反对“台独”立场的理解和支持,取得了明显的成效。当前,世界上绝大多数国家都坚持“一个中国”的政策。越来越多的国家明确表示反对“台独”,反对台湾当局任何旨在改变台湾地位和走向“台独”的言行,反对台湾当局破坏台湾海峡地区的和平与稳定,台湾当局过去多次“重返联合国”及挤进世界卫生组织的图谋连年遭到挫败。涉台外交工作取得的显著成就,在国际社会有效地维护了一个中国原则。

In terms of preventing external forces, especially the vigorous intervention in the Taiwan issue in the 1990s by the United States, China has successively strengthened its management of the Taiwan Strait crisis through political, economic, and especially military means, and has also made the United States realize the sensitivity and severity of the Taiwan issue. Since then, the leaders of the Taiwan region have not been able to visit the United States during their term of office, which is also an important achievement of our side in strengthening the management of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, taking Taiwan’s foreign military relations as an example, it is through crisis management that mainland China has effectively prevented the intervention of external forces. In the 1990s, European countries were keen to carry out arms sales to Taiwan, especially France’s sale of Mirage 2000 aircraft to Taiwan. This undoubtedly triggered pressure on crisis management in the Taiwan Strait. If we did not block the way for France to sell arms to Taiwan and will indirectly induce other European countries and even other regional countries to follow France’s example of selling arms to Taiwan. To this end, China strengthened crisis management, and ultimately, the French government promised not to allow French companies to participate in arming Taiwan in the future.15 For us, blocking the way for France to sell arms to Taiwan dispelled the notion for other European countries to follow the example of France in selling arms to Taiwan. Under the international situation at the time, this was indeed a very difficult achievement.

在阻止外部势力方面,特别是美国在20世纪90年代大力介入台湾问题,我方先后透过政治、经济,特别是军事斗争的手段,强化对台海危机的管理,也使美国认识到台湾问题的敏感性和严重性。此后,台湾地区领导人无法在其任期之内访问美国,这也是我方加强对台海危机管理的重要成就。此外,以台湾对外军事关系为例,中国大陆正是透过危机管理,有力地阻止了外力的介入。上世纪90年代,欧洲国家热衷于开展对台军售,特别是法国对台出售幻影2000飞机。这无疑引发了台海危机管理的压力,如果我方不堵住法国对台售武的门路,则会间接诱使其他欧洲国家,甚至其他地区国家效仿法国向台售武的念头。为此,中方加强了危机管理,终使法国政府承诺今后不批准法国企业参与武装台湾。对于我方而言,堵住法国售台武器的门路,打消了其他欧洲国家效仿法国军售台湾的念头。这在当时的国际形势下,确实是一个非常不容易的成就。

(iii) Adhering to the idea of development
(三)坚持发展的思路

The core of crisis management in the Taiwan Strait is to face the essence of the Taiwan issue. The Taiwan issue itself is extremely complex, involving not only the entanglements and disputes in the past but also true power and interests. Therefore, dealing with Taiwan-related issues requires grand strategic thinking so that the efficiency of crisis management can be achieved. In fact, as long as the Taiwan issue has not been completely resolved, any form of crisis management across the Taiwan Strait will only serve as a temporary cooling effect, as there is no way to fundamentally eliminate the root cause of the Taiwan Strait crisis. In other words, the outbreaks of Taiwan Strait crises will exist for a long time to come. Therefore, it is necessary to think about the Taiwan issue from the perspective of development and from the perspective of serving the national strategy. Only in this way can Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks be effectively dealt with.

台海危机管理的核心还是要直面台湾问题的本质。台湾问题本身极具复杂性,既涉及过往历史的纠结与纷争,又与现实的权力及利益等面向相牵连,因此,处理涉台问题需要具有大战略的思维,危机管理的效率才有可能得到提升。事实上,只要台湾问题还没有得到彻底解决,任何形式的台海危机管理,都只会起到暂时降温之功效,没有办法从根本上去消除台海危机爆发的根源。换言之,台海危机的爆发在未来相当长的时期内都将长期存在。因此,需要从发展的思维,从服务国家战略的层面来思考台湾问题。唯如此,才能使台海危机及两岸风险得到有效的应对。

At present, the use of development thinking and strategies to solve the Taiwan issue and deal with crises in the Taiwan Strait and its risks is to place the solution of the Taiwan issue in China’s overall thinking of state governance. We must strengthen the management of the Taiwan Strait crises by improving the effectiveness of governance. In fact, the concepts of cross-Strait integration and development currently proposed by mainland China well reflect the meaning of governance.

当前运用发展的思维和战略来解决台湾问题,处理台海危机及其风险,就是要将台湾问题的解决置于整个中国的治国理政思路中去,台湾问题的处理只是整个中国内部区域治理的一个重要部分,我们需要透过提升治理的实效来强化对台海危机的管理。事实上,当前中国大陆方面提出的两岸融合发展等概念都很好地体现了治理的意涵。

(iv) Promoting institutionalized negotiations
(四)推进制度化协商

For the management of Taiwan Strait crises, it is particularly important to promote the construction of an institutionalized communication mechanism. Under the circumstance that the structural contradiction between the two sides has not been resolved, the importance of an institutionalized communication and consultation mechanism across the Taiwan Strait for resolving the Taiwan Strait crisis is self-evident. In the past 30 years, the institutionalized consultation mechanism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has also made some progress and achieved many achievements. For example, at the beginning of the opening up of cross-Strait non-governmental exchanges, especially around 1990, a small number of people in the coastal areas of Fujian went to Taiwan privately, and this caused several tragic incidents around repatriation. In this situation, the Red Cross organizations on both sides of the strait played an important role in communication and signed a repatriation operation agreement to incorporate the repatriation of smugglers into standardized procedures; this is the famous “Kinmen Agreement” of cross-Strait relations. The SEF and the ARATS were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively, as non-governmental organizations with permanent authorization on both sides of the Strait. The “Two Sessions” were described by the media as having “white glove” roles and functions. With the in-depth development of cross-Strait exchanges, the interaction between the institutions and persons in charge of cross-Strait affairs has become necessary, and it is also an important institutionalized attempt to deal with the Taiwan Strait crisis and cross-Strait risks. In 2014, Zhang Zhijun, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, and Wang Yuqi, head of Taiwan’s “Mainland Commission,” met in Nanjing, officially opening the mechanism for normalized communication between cross-Strait affairs agencies and their leaders. This is one of the important mechanisms for both sides to deal with crises and risks. In addition, the more than 20 agreements signed by the two sides of the Strait in the past are also an important part of the cross-Strait system consultation mechanism, which has played an important role in resolving Taiwan Strait crises.

对于台海危机管理而言,推进制度化的沟通机制之建设尤为重要。在两岸结构性矛盾尚未化解的情况下,两岸制度化的沟通协商机制对于化解台海危机的重要性不言而喻。两岸之间的制度化协商机制在过去三十年的时程中,也有一些进展,并取得了不少的成就。例如,针对两岸民间交流开放之初,特别是1990年前后,福建沿海地区出现了少数民众私渡去台的现象,并引发数起因为遣返而造成的悲剧事件。在这种情势下,两岸红十字会组织扮演起沟通的重要角色,并签定遣返作业协议,将私渡人员遣返纳入规范程序,这就是两岸关系史上有名的“金门协议”。而作为两岸常设授权的民间机构,海基会和海协分别于1990年和1991年相继成立,“两会”被媒体形容为具有“白手套”角色和功能。随着两岸交流的深入发展,两岸负责两岸事务的机构及负责人的互动成为必要,也是两岸应对台海危机及两岸风险的重要制度化尝试,两岸在2008-2016年间取得了一定的突破和进展。2014年,国台办主任张志军与台湾“陆委会”负责人王郁琦在南京会面,正式开启了两岸主管两岸事务机构及其负责人常态化联系沟通的机制。这是两岸处理危机与风险的重要机制之一。此外,两岸过去所签署的二十多项协议,也是两岸制度协商机制的重要组成部分,为两岸化解台海危机发挥了重要的功能。

At present, the difficulties between the two sides of the Strait are mainly due to the unwillingness of the DPP to return to the common political consensus between the two sides after returning to power. This is the biggest challenge in promoting the institutionalized consultation mechanism between the two sides. Observing from the 30-year history of cross-Strait people-to-people exchanges, institutionalized communication channels are very important, and although this communication channel is not enough to resolve all disputes between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, its effectiveness is quite limited. However, for the management of the Taiwan Strait crisis, establishing cross-Strait communication channels are crucial to advance the institutionalized consultation mechanism across the Taiwan Strait.

当前,两岸之间的困难主要在于民进党重返执政后不愿意回到两岸共同的政治共识上去,这是造成当前两岸在推进制度化协商机制中的最大挑战。从两岸民间交流三十年的历程来观察,制度化的沟通管道非常重要,尽管这种沟通管道尚不足以化解两岸所有的纷争,其效用也相当有限,但对于台海危机管理而言,建立两岸沟通管道,推进两岸制度化协商机制至关重要。

IV. Conclusion

四、结语

30 years of people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have written a moving chapter from enmity to reconciliation between the two sides of the Strait.16 Although the Taiwan issue is China’s core national interest, based on the overall strategy of national development, the mainland considers the solution to the Taiwan issue under the grand strategy of mainland China’s economic development and national rejuvenation. Mainland China hopes to gradually create a better internal and external environment for resolving the Taiwan issue through the road of development and opening up. This is an important consideration for Taiwan’s strategy. It is under the guidance of this line of thinking that in the past three decades, mainland China has adopted a relatively restrained and pragmatic approach to the management of Taiwan Strait crises and cross-Strait risks. This effectively guarantees the advancement of the main task. At the same time, this has not made the Taiwan issue fall out of control. It has not only provided a more favorable situation for the resolutions of Taiwan Strait crises but has also created more conditions for the final settlement of the Taiwan issue.

两岸民间交流三十年,写下了两岸从敌对走向和解的动人篇章,虽然台湾问题是中国的核心国家利益之所在,但大陆方面基于国家发展总体战略,把台湾问题的解决置于中国大陆经济发展和民族振兴的大战略下来思考。中国大陆希望通过发展和开放之路,逐渐为解决台湾问题创造更好的内部及外部环境。这是对台战略的重要思考面向,正是在这一思路指导下,中国大陆在过去的三十年里,针对台海危机及两岸风险之管理,采取了相对克制和务实的做法。从而有力的保证了主要任务的推进。同时也没有使台湾问题陷入失控的境地,不但为台海危机的化解提供了更为有利的形势,而且也为最终解决台湾问题创造了更多的条件。

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陈先才 (Chen Xiancai) (2022). "Taiwan Strait Crisis and Risk Management: The Case of 1987-2017 [台海危机与风险管理:1987-2017为例]". Interpret: China, Original work published February 20, 2018, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/taiwan-strait-crisis-and-risk-management-the-case-of-1987-2017/

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