The United States is the world’s largest economy and a major trading nation, and changes in its policies have a significant impact on global economic and trade development. On January 20, 2025, Donald Trump was officially inaugurated as the 47th President of the United States. Trump is a distinctive and controversial politician who, under new circumstances, has put forward some relatively radical policy reform proposals. Compared with the previous two administrations, his new administration has made considerable policy changes, adding more variables to China–U.S. economic and trade relations and to the changes unseen in a century that are transforming the world. This paper analyzes the policy proposals of the new Trump administration and their similarities and differences with the previous two administrations, assesses the impacts on China and global economy and trade, and puts forward targeted countermeasures. We hope this effort offers substantial research value and practical significance.

Review of the policy proposals of the new Trump administration

The policy proposals of the new Trump administration share both similarities and differences with those of the previous two administrations and exert both positive and negative impacts on the U.S. economy. Due to the influence of multiple factors, the extent to which these proposals can be implemented remains uncertain.

Main policy proposals

Overall, the new Trump administration advocates broad-based domestic tax cuts, comprehensive tariff increases on foreign trade, support for monetary easing and a weak dollar, the development of traditional energy to reduce inflation, and stricter immigration policies.

Fiscal and tax policy: Increase fiscal spending while implementing broad-based tax cuts. The new Trump administration advocates an expansionary fiscal policy and increased investment spending in the infrastructure sector. Trump has stated that he will carry out tax reform centered on large-scale tax cuts, using tax reductions to subsidize the corporate sector, and lowering the corporate income tax rate from 21% to 15%. This may lead to increased pressure on the U.S. fiscal balance and a rise in the fiscal deficit ratio. At the same time, the 2024 Republican Party platform states that Trump’s first-term tax cuts should be made permanent, the “tip tax” on workers in the food service and hospitality industries should be eliminated, and unnecessary government expenditures should be cut to reduce the fiscal burden.

Financial policy: Support for monetary easing and a weak dollar. Trump advocates for interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve and opposes inflation. He supports a weak-dollar policy to promote exports and reduce the trade deficit. In the financial sector, Trump favors deregulation of the financial industry, and he will block the Treasury Department from launching a central bank digital currency. He supports the development of cryptocurrency and seeks to ensure that U.S. citizens can retain individual custody of their digital assets.

Trade policy: Further escalate trade protectionism without restraint and significantly raise tariffs. On February 1, Trump signed an executive order imposing a 10% tariff on goods imported from China. He has also stated that he intends to impose tariffs of 10% to 20% on imports from other countries, including raising tariffs on the European Union, with the goal of prioritizing the development of U.S. industry. For key products involving swing states, such as the automotive sector, Trump proposes terminating Biden’s electric vehicle mandate, imposing all necessary tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and levying a 100% tariff on electric vehicles imported from Mexico. He believes this will revitalize the U.S. auto industry. Trump emphasizes giving priority to U.S. producers over foreign outsourcers, promoting the reshoring of critical supply chains, creating more jobs for American workers and raising their wages, and enhancing the status of the United States as a manufacturing power.

At the same time, the 2024 Republican Party platform states that it will gradually halt imports of essential goods from China and prohibit China from purchasing U.S. real estate and related industries. The Republican Party will continue to pursue the “Buy American and Hire American” policy and will prohibit outsourcing companies from conducting business with the U.S. federal government.

Energy policy: Advocate for the development of traditional energy and increased energy supply to control inflation. Trump has repeatedly emphasized the need to expand oil and natural gas extraction, relax a range of environmental regulations, repeal the Inflation Reduction Act that supports the clean energy industry, and reclaim unused funds. He has pledged to declare a national energy emergency to increase U.S. oil and gas production and significantly boost domestic energy supply. Trump will focus on the development of traditional fuel vehicles, which will benefit the traditional energy industry. The 2024 Republican Party platform also states that the United States should become the largest energy producer that the world has ever seen. Trump’s support for traditional energy sources such as oil may be linked to interest groups backing him, such as his donor Timothy Mellon, whose Mellon Group is involved in sectors such as aluminum, oil, and coal mining.

At the same time, Trump has expressed support for solar energy development, though what comes of this remains to be seen. During a televised debate with Harris held in Philadelphia in September 2024, Trump accused Harris of intending to eliminate fossil fuels if elected but then went on to say that he is a “big fan” of solar energy.

Immigration policy: Stricter immigration policy. Trump will strictly limit immigration, and the approval rate for immigration applications is expected to decline. He plans to deport illegal immigrants, restart construction of the U.S.-Mexico “border wall,” and use advanced technology to monitor the border. However, it is worth noting that Trump advocates easing restrictions on skilled immigration and allowing foreign graduates of U.S. universities to obtain green cards.

Policies already introduced by the new Trump administration

Since taking office, the Trump administration has rapidly introduced a series of policies in areas such as trade, energy, and immigration. So far, these have been largely consistent with his campaign proposals, though there remains room for negotiation with other countries. This reflects Trump’s customary tactic of using negotiating leverage to pressure counterparts and secure greater benefits for the United States.

On trade, Trump announced tariff increases on Canada, Mexico, and China, with plans to impose a total of 20% in tariffs on China in two phases. On February 1, Trump signed an executive order imposing a 25% tariff on products imported from Mexico and Canada, including a 10% tariff increase on Canadian energy products. On February 3, Trump announced a 30-day delay in implementing the tariff measures on the two countries and stated that negotiations would continue. Regarding China trade policy, Trump stated that starting March 4, a further 10% tariff would be imposed on imports from China, following a previous 10% tariff increase on February 4—bringing the total additional tariffs to 20%.

In the energy sector, Trump declared a national energy emergency after taking office, revoked electric vehicle incentives to save the U.S. traditional automotive industry, and floated plans to reallocate electric vehicle subsidies to defense and infrastructure sectors. At the same time, Trump announced that the United States would once again withdraw from the Paris Agreement aimed at addressing climate change.

On immigration, Trump declared a national emergency at the southern border, launched a large-scale plan to deport illegal immigrants, and implemented measures such as increasing the deployment of personnel and resources, expanding physical barriers, and halting all illegal border crossings. At the same time, a new path will be opened for foreign nationals who invest at least 5 million dollars in U.S. projects to obtain residency and eventually citizenship.

In addition, Trump has carried out sweeping reforms of domestic institutions, establishing a Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) led by Elon Musk to review and downsize government departments. Approximately 75,000 people have been laid off, affecting around 3% of government employees.

Analysis of similarities and differences with policies of the previous two administrations

Similarities and differences with Biden administration policies. The new Trump administration shares similar policy positions with the Biden administration in areas such as raising tariffs, increasing infrastructure investment, and containing China’s development, but its tactics are more aggressive, as shown in Table 1. For example, Trump has declared that he will impose across-the-board tariff increases, including significant tariff hikes on China, which may harm the interests of U.S. allies. In contrast, the Biden administration took a friendlier stance toward allies, proposing the “Build Back Better World” initiative and emphasizing the importance of working with allies to contain China’s development.

Table 1: Differences Between Policies of the New Trump Administration and the Previous Two Administrations

The new Trump administration differs significantly from the Biden administration in areas such as domestic taxation, climate and environmental policy, and immigration. During Trump’s second term, policies in these areas are expected to undergo major shifts. In terms of domestic taxation, unlike the Biden administration’s push to raise taxes on corporations and the wealthy, the new Trump administration advocates comprehensive and large-scale tax cuts. In the area of immigration, the new Trump administration’s policies are stricter, embracing skilled immigration while strictly screening for illegal immigration, whereas the Biden administration’s immigration policy was comparatively moderate. In terms of climate and environmental policy, in contrast to the Biden administration’s development of green energy to address climate challenges, the new Trump administration favors a return to traditional energy and may further expand domestic oil and gas exploration.

Similarities and differences between the policies of the first and second Trump administrations. Compared with the first Trump administration, the second Trump administration maintains broadly consistent policy positions on domestic tax cuts, tariff increases, development of traditional energy, and immigration restrictions. However, its scope is broader, implementation more forceful, and stance more determined. For example, in terms of tariff increases, the new administration has expanded the scope of tariffs—not only targeting Chinese exports but also imposing 10% to 20% tariffs on other countries. This may impact Chinese enterprises that export through production facilities in third countries. In areas such as domestic tax cuts and immigration restrictions, the new Trump administration’s proposals are even stronger, with calls for further permanent reductions in tax rates and comprehensive use of technological and physical measures to block illegal immigration. It is also worth noting that 2025–2028 is likely to be Trump’s final term in office. Whether due to constitutional constraints or age, he is unlikely to seek re-election. As a result, the new Trump administration will have fewer concerns during its term and is expected to adopt a more aggressive approach to advance its policy agenda.

Objective evaluation of the new Trump administration’s policy proposals

The policy proposals of the new Trump administration will have both positive and negative impacts on the U.S. economy. On the positive side, the administration’s advocacy of tax cuts and the reshoring of manufacturing will strongly stimulate domestic demand and promote short-term economic growth. Encouraging the development of fossil fuels may help lower energy prices and ease inflation. On the negative side, the administration’s comprehensive tax cut policy may widen the gap between rich and poor and undermine the balance of government revenues and expenditures, leading to an increase in the budget deficit. At the same time, the imposition of tariffs on China and other countries is likely to exacerbate inflation, disrupt supply chains, and raise the cost burden on middle-class households. It may also trigger retaliatory measures from other countries, ultimately affecting the development of the U.S. economy. The deportation of immigrants may result in labor shortages. In addition, the new Trump administration’s passive stance toward sectors such as new energy vehicles could cause the United States to gradually lose its international voice in these fields.

The extent to which the new Trump administration’s policy proposals can be realized remains questionable. These proposals stem not only from Trump and his team’s understanding of economic policy but are also influenced by swing voters, vested interest groups, partisan struggles, and the international situation. Whether these policies will be smoothly implemented in the future depends on the level of support from the U.S. Congress and Supreme Court, as well as responses of other countries and the degree of public support. An analysis by Guo Xinyi (2024) found that of Trump’s campaign promises in 2016, approximately 41% were not fulfilled, and about 32% were only partially fulfilled¹. Based on the current policy proposals of the new Trump administration, there seems to be a tendency to “overpromise” on the campaign to secure votes from swing states and centrist voters. For example, the construction of the border wall is expensive, and whether the fiscal budget can accommodate it on schedule is uncertain. Policy proposals such as tax reform require congressional approval. Although the Republican Party holds a slight majority, there are still internal differences within the party. Trump’s tariff proposals not only risk violating U.S. trade remedy laws and exceeding the scope of congressional authorization but will also inevitably encounter resistance and opposition from other countries², and they may even prompt other nations to follow suit—ultimately harming the U.S. economy and increasing the burden on the American people.

Impact on the global economy and trade

Due to the impact of the new Trump administration’s policy proposals, the global economic and trade landscape will undergo more intense adjustments. There will be broader and more frequent global economic and trade frictions, the multilateral international economic cooperation order will endure shocks, the reshoring of global supply chains will accelerate, a divergence will emerge between the development of new and traditional energy sources, and the evolution of a diversified international monetary system will speed up.

Broader and more frequent global economic and trade frictions. The new Trump administration has declared that it will impose higher tariffs not only on China but also on other countries, including U.S. allies, which will expand the scope of global economic and trade frictions. These actions will inevitably be met with resistance and opposition from other countries. If retaliatory measures are taken against the United States, it may respond by further raising tariffs, resulting in increased frequency and impact of global trade conflicts. For example, when Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum in 2018, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico quickly responded with countermeasures. Trump subsequently announced plans to impose tariffs on imported cars from the EU. Although this was not ultimately implemented, it still reflected his “America First” and “tit-for-tat” approach to resolving disputes. Compared to Trump’s first term, countries are now more familiar with the policy orientation and methods of Trump’s team and have prepared more comprehensive countermeasures and contingency plans. It is foreseeable that under the new Trump administration, major power competition in the economic and trade sphere will shift toward a negative-sum game that harms all parties ³, increasing trade costs, reducing trade efficiency, and ultimately dragging down global trade growth and economic recovery.

The multilateral international economic cooperation order will be impacted. During the last Trump administration, the United States repeatedly withdrew from international agreements, broke contracts, and opposed multilateral trade rules, such as those of the WTO. The new Trump administration is expected to continue this approach. For example, during his campaign, Trump stated that he would abolish the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework launched by the Biden administration. However, the new Trump administration may push for bilateral economic cooperation negotiations between the United States and its allies or other countries to replace existing multilateral agreements and contain China’s development, leading to the challenge of “fragmentation” in international economic cooperation. For example, during the previous Trump administration, the United States led the signing of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), which replaced the original North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The new Trump administration may introduce new discriminatory and America First–oriented economic cooperation agreements that exclude non-trade partner countries. Possible provisions may include, but are not limited to, tariff exemption agreements targeting specific sectors in certain countries, strict rules of origin requirements, and local content requirements in subsidy programs, thereby restricting exports from non-trade partner countries.

The reshoring of global supply chains will intensify. Trump advocates for returning manufacturing to the United States and implementing large-scale tax cuts for enterprises, which will increase the willingness of companies to invest in the U.S. and promote “de-Sinicization” of supply chains. With the new Trump administration in office, measures to drive supply chain reshoring may prompt allies to adopt similar approaches, accelerating the reshoring of supply chains in various countries and leading to a greater frequency in the relocation of foreign-invested enterprises out of China. At the same time, influenced by Trump’s “America First” stance and sharp and drastic shifts in his administration’s policies, some multinational corporations may adjust their business strategies and become more inclined to keep key production processes in their own countries to ensure supply chain security and stability. As a result, the restructuring and reshoring of global supply chains will further intensify.

A divergence will emerge between the development of new and traditional energy sources. The energy sector is one of the greatest points of divergence between the new Trump administration and the Biden administration. The new Trump administration has declared that it will repeal the Inflation Reduction Act supporting the clean energy industry, terminate the electric vehicle mandate, and strengthen the domestic supply of fossil fuels. These moves will result in a drastic shift in U.S. energy policy and profoundly affect the global energy landscape. In terms of traditional energy, U.S. production of crude oil, natural gas, and other resources is expected to rise significantly, impacting the market share of OPEC countries and potentially leading to a global oversupply of traditional energy and a decline in international prices. In terms of new energy, the United States may work with allies such as the EU to further strengthen restrictions on the export of Chinese electric vehicles and related products. As a result, the global new energy product market may face more trade barriers, and competition among countries for international influence in this field will become increasingly intense.

The evolution of a diversified international monetary system will speed up. The new Trump administration advocates a weak dollar policy and supports further interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve. If these policies are implemented as planned, they will reduce returns and increase risks for global investors holding dollar-denominated assets. As a result, central banks in other countries and investors may consider reducing their holdings of U.S. dollars and turning to alternative reserve assets such as the renminbi, the euro, or their own national currencies. The global trend of “de-dollarization” will continue, and the status of currencies such as the renminbi and the euro will rise further as they play a greater role in cross-border trade, investment, and payment and settlement. This will contribute to quicker formation of a more diversified international monetary system. In addition, interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve may prompt other countries to follow suit. To avoid the appreciation of their own currencies and the resulting impact on exports, other countries may begin a new wave of interest rate reductions, leading to global price increases.

Impact on China’s economy and trade

If all of the policy proposals of the new Trump administration are implemented as planned, China’s foreign trade may face some short-term shocks, but the overall impact is expected to be limited. At the same time, the export destinations of Chinese enterprises will shift, and outbound investment by Chinese companies will face greater challenges. However, China’s international influence in the field of new energy products will gradually increase, and the process of renminbi internationalization will present both challenges and opportunities.

Foreign trade may face some short-term shocks, but the overall impact will likely be limited. The new Trump administration’s tariff increases may cause short-term shocks to China’s foreign trade, but the overall impact is expected to be less severe than in 2018, and the effect on economic development will be relatively limited. First, in recent years, China’s share of exports to the United States has declined, reducing the impact of U.S. tariff policies on China’s foreign trade. As shown in Table 2, in 2023, China–U.S. trade accounted for approximately 11.2% of the total value of China’s trade in goods, down 3 percentage points from 14.2% in 2017. Meanwhile, China’s exports to emerging economies such as Russia and Brazil have increased significantly. Second, the new Trump administration has repeatedly emphasized putting U.S. interests first, exerting pressure not only on China but also imposing tariffs on its own allies. This will inevitably harm the interests of those allies and has already led to concerns among them. This may create opportunities for China to improve trade relations with the EU, Japan, South Korea, and other countries, and to pursue new development opportunities in areas such as the export of the “new three” products [solar cells, lithium-ion batteries, and electric vehicles] and automobiles. Third, compared to the first Trump administration, China and other countries now have more mature countermeasures against U.S. trade bullying and will better utilize diverse tools across areas such as trade, law, and international cooperation to respond. In terms of impacted sectors, as shown in Table 3, China’s exports to the United States are currently concentrated in three major industries: machinery, electrical, audio-visual, and electronic equipment and components; miscellaneous products such as chairs, furniture, lighting, and toys; and products such as textiles, footwear, apparel, and down clothing. These three categories account for approximately 70% of China’s exports to the United States. Even after the large-scale tariff hikes under the first Trump administration in 2018, China’s foreign trade maintained solid growth in 2019, and the fundamentals of its economy’s strong development were not affected. After the outbreak of COVID-19, China was the first major economy to achieve positive economic growth, providing an important source of momentum for global economic and trade recovery. China is now actively building a new pattern of development that takes domestic great circulation as the mainstay, in which domestic and international dual circulation are mutually reinforcing. Domestic demand is playing an increasingly important role in economic development, and the level of opening-up continues to rise. China still maintains strong resilience in responding to external shocks.

Table 2: China’s Top 10 Trade Partners in Goods in 2023

Table 3: Top 10 Categories of Chinese Exports to the United States in 2023

The export destinations of Chinese domestic enterprises will shift. On one hand, China’s export flows will increasingly shift toward countries and regions other than the United States. Chinese enterprises will actively explore markets in Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan, South Korea, Africa, and other countries, and they will accelerate the establishment of export sales channels in densely populated areas such as airports, ports, and commercial districts outside the United States. In addition, imposing tariffs will effectively increase the cost of living for ordinary Americans, which will prompt more U.S. consumers to purchase Chinese goods and services abroad. On the other hand, Chinese enterprises are accelerating the shift from export to domestic sales. As China’s unified management system for domestic and foreign trade gradually improves, enterprises continue to accelerate the pace of their integration of domestic and foreign trade operations⁴, enabling them to adapt more effectively to changes in the domestic and international landscape and their own operational needs, and to better leverage production factors such as capital, technology, labor, and data to switch between markets freely. In response to the new Trump administration’s tariff increases on Chinese exports, China’s foreign trade enterprises will place greater emphasis on domestic market expansion.

Outbound investment by Chinese companies will face greater challenges. Amid the wave of supply chain reshoring led by the United States and other Western countries, and due to concerns over the politicization of economic and trade issues, Chinese multinational companies may scale back investments in the U.S. market and those of its allies, relocate production lines in key supply chain sectors, or establish “backup” production lines domestically while investing overseas to ensure the stability and security of their supply chains. In the process of outbound investment, multinational companies will face issues such as more severe geopolitical pressures, unreasonable unilateral sanctions, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. This will place higher demand on enterprises’ capabilities in policy research and assessment, overseas market analysis, cross-border supply chain management, and compliance system development.

China’s international influence in the new energy product sector will increase. Overall, the new Trump administration offers little support for the development of new energy products, and U.S. international influence in this field is expected to decline. In contrast, China has already become the world’s largest producer and consumer of new energy, and domestic enterprises will play an increasingly important role in leading global development in the new energy product sector. According to data from the National Energy Administration, China accounted for over half of the world’s newly installed renewable energy capacity in 2023, with its cumulative installed capacity approaching 40% of the global total. In addition, data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers shows that, China’s production and sales of new energy vehicles ranked first in the world for the ninth consecutive year in 2023. As the production and usage costs of new energy products continue to decline, China’s new energy products will be welcomed by more countries and regions. Taking new energy vehicles as an example, domestic enterprises can not only seize international influence in the trade of vehicle hardware, but also gradually establish a Chinese standards system in service areas such as intelligent cockpit technology, driver assistance systems, and in-car entertainment systems.

The process of renminbi internationalization will present both challenges and opportunities. The new Trump administration’s strict restrictions on Chinese enterprises engaging in trade and investment activities have impacted market expectations and confidence, prompting some foreign-invested enterprises to relocate from China. This may produce shocks on the renminbi exchange rate and further lead to a continued deficit in the foreign exchange settlements and sales under direct investment conducted by banks on behalf of clients. However, the Trump administration’s assertion of dollar hegemony may push the United States to levy international seigniorage taxes on other countries, while shifting costs and risks onto them. This may encourage more countries to join the “circle of friends” of the renminbi and choose to use it as an official reserve currency. The extensive imposition of tariffs by the United States may also provoke resistance from other countries, accelerating the formation of de-dollarized regional blocs centered around smaller currencies. Furthermore, the new Trump administration’s explicit opposition to launching a central bank digital currency creates a historic window of opportunity for China to accelerate international cooperation on the digital renminbi. This will aid its efforts to bypass SWIFT and build a secure and controllable international payment and settlement system⁵.

Countermeasure recommendations

To respond effectively to the impacts of the new Trump administration’s policy proposals, China should focus on six areas: actively promote multilateral and bilateral international economic and trade cooperation; accelerate reforms for the integration of domestic and foreign trade; further increase efforts to attract foreign investment; encourage new energy products to expand into overseas markets; accelerate the internationalization of the renminbi; and strengthen public opinion guidance to amplify confidence in China’s economic outlook. These measures will help China focus on managing its own affairs well and elevate economic and trade development to a new level.

Actively promote multilateral and bilateral international economic and trade cooperation. First, jointly develop international trade dispute settlement mechanisms. Work together with other WTO member states to restore the functioning of the WTO Appellate Body, make full use of existing WTO dispute settlement mechanisms to address trade and economic issues, promote further improvement and development of these mechanisms, and call on all countries to jointly respond to the new Trump administration’s “weaponization” of trade. Make appropriate use of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement to properly manage economic and trade relations with the EU, Japan, and other countries. Second, accelerate the process of joining multilateral trade agreements. Speed up efforts to join CPTPP and DEPA, actively align with high-standard economic and trade rules and carry out pilot reforms in free trade pilot zones (such as Hainan Free Trade Port), and expand both the breadth and depth of international economic and trade exchanges. Third, steadily advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. In line with the historical trend of economic globalization, promote coordination in hard connectivity of infrastructure, soft connectivity of rules and standards, and people-to-people connectivity with partner countries, and work toward building a new order for international economic and trade cooperation. Fourth, strengthen economic and trade cooperation with emerging economies. In sectors heavily impacted by tariff increases—such as machinery, electrical, audio-visual, electronic equipment and components, and textiles—bolster bilateral cooperation with emerging economies such as Russia and Brazil, promote export market diversification, and inject new momentum into economic and trade development.

Accelerate reforms for the integration of domestic and foreign trade. First, improve the integrated regulatory system for domestic and foreign trade. Further clarify the functions of regulatory authorities, accelerate the establishment of a unified, law-based, transparent, balanced, and coordinated regulatory framework for domestic and foreign trade, and promote information and data sharing among departments. Second, continue to promote the alignment of standards and certifications. Advance the coordination of technical standards, quality standards, inspection and quarantine, and certification and accreditation between domestic and international systems and gradually achieve mutual recognition of standards. Further support enterprises in producing products that meet the requirements of “same production line, same standards, and same quality,” and encourage broader recognition of the “three-same” certification results. Third, accelerate the development of new business models and formats for integrated domestic and foreign trade. Encourage the growth of new models such as cross-border ecommerce and market procurement trade, and support initiatives such as campaigns to promote the sale of export-grade products in the domestic market. Fourth, focus on cultivating enterprises that are engaged in integrated domestic and foreign trade. Support qualified enterprises in leveraging their strengths in niche sectors to actively expand into both domestic and international markets, enhance their capabilities in market research, channel development, supply chain management, and business compliance, and improve their international competitiveness. Improve public information services provided by the government and encourage the development of third-party professional service providers to offer support such as policy interpretation, country-specific analysis, legal assistance, and compliance consulting to enterprises engaging in integrated domestic and foreign trade.

Further increase efforts to attract foreign investment. First, ease market access restrictions. While ensuring national security, align with high-standard economic and trade rules, further reduce the negative list for foreign investment, and relax entry and operating restrictions in key industries. Second, continuously improve the business environment for foreign investors. Make full use of the foreign enterprise roundtable mechanism to facilitate communication between the government and foreign businesses, respond promptly to their concerns, and strengthen investor confidence in the Chinese market. Fully implement national treatment for foreign-invested enterprises, promote the cancellation of unreasonable restrictions, and ensure fair competition between domestic and foreign enterprises. Continue to improve visa policies to facilitate travel for personnel of foreign-invested enterprises. Third, step up efforts to attract investment in key sectors. Encourage capable local governments to increase investment promotion in areas such as high technology and critical supply chains to align with their industrial development plans, offer incentives such as subsidies and tax breaks, address gaps in industrial development, and promote diversification of production and supply chains.

Encourage new energy products to expand into overseas markets. First, promote the diversification of overseas expansion by new energy enterprises. Encourage leading new energy enterprises to leverage their technological and cost advantages to help upstream and downstream enterprises in the production chain expand market shares in Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan and South Korea, Africa, and other regions. Support the establishment of overseas R&D centers, delivery centers, and service centers, and the deployment of a global after-sales service system. Second, encourage Chinese standards to “go global” in the new energy product sector. Encourage enterprises to lead or participate in the formulation of international standards related to new energy products—for example, by offering Chinese solutions in areas such as intelligent cockpit technology and driver assistance systems in new energy vehicles—to accelerate the enhancement of China’s international influence. Third, improve the supporting service system. Encourage development banks, policy banks, and other financial institutions to increase credit support for new energy enterprises. Support insurance providers such as SINOSURE in developing trade credit insurance for the new energy sector to reduce transaction risks. Promote the formation of strategic alliances among shipping enterprises and new energy enterprises to integrate warehousing and logistics resources and ensure smooth international logistics channels.

Accelerate the internationalization of the renminbi. First, increase the use of the renminbi in foreign trade and investment. Promote the use of the renminbi for pricing and settlement in economic and trade exchanges with Belt and Road countries and regions, as well as RCEP member states. Support enterprises in using the renminbi for cross-border transactions in outbound investment, overseas contracts, and other activities. Second, accelerate the development of an independent and controllable cross-border payment system. Continue advancing the multilateral central bank digital currency bridge (m-CBDC Bridge) project and promote the cross-border use of the digital renminbi. Encourage foreign financial institutions to participate in the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) for renminbi transactions. Promote the co-construction of payment systems among BRICS countries and the joint maintenance of cross-border payment security. Third, strengthen bilateral local currency swaps and settlement cooperation. Explore local currency settlement arrangements with other countries, promote direct trade between the renminbi and other national currencies, and support the development of renminbi foreign exchange markets in foreign countries and regions to help elevate the international status of the renminbi.

Amplify confidence in China’s economic outlook. First, enhance influence in international economic discourse. In response to the new Trump administration’s repeated dissemination of narratives such as the “China economic threat theory,” it is necessary to accelerate the development of international communication platforms that can rival mainstream U.S. financial media. Leverage the agenda-setting and discourse-guiding functions of elite national think tanks to strengthen the ability in shaping international economic narratives. Use internationally recognized expressions to refute U.S. economic hegemony, tell the story of China’s economic development well, and boost foreign investors’ expectations for China’s economic prospects. Second, foster a favorable domestic public opinion environment through multiple channels. Make full use of official government platforms, elite national think tanks, research institutions, media outlets, and other channels to strengthen publicity around China’s bright economic outlook, create a favorable public opinion climate, and strengthen the confidence of entrepreneurs and consumers.