The New Right in Latin America is an emerging political force that has come to power in recent years in countries including Brazil, Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras. Most of these forces embrace economic liberalism, political authoritarianism, and cultural conservatism and advocate comprehensive and thorough social transformation. Because their organizational and operational logic and policy orientations differ somewhat from those of the traditional right, they have been termed the “New Right.” Among them, some national leaders have been labeled “far-right” because they pursue more extremely conservative policies. The composition of the New Right in Latin America is highly complex: its political spectrum ranges from the far right to the center-right, its ideological positions range from extreme to conservative, and its supporters range from elites to the istrata of society. Countries governed by New Right parties share certain commonalities while also having distinctive characteristics of their own. A report by the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) describes the New Right in Latin America as “a composite political force that combines such diverse elements as hypernationalism, anti-gender politics, radical liberalism, and populist mobilization.”¹ The strong momentum behind the rise of the New Right in Latin America has attracted widespread attention from the international community. Its rise has been driven both by changes in domestic political and social currents of thought and by support from external right-wing conservative forces. It reflects both the objective influence of the traditional political pendulum and alternation between the left and right and the proactive stance of the New Right in adeptly grasping public sentiment and calling for change. The fact that the New Right has come to power in many Latin American countries is attributable to a considerable extent to its effective grasp of timing and use of electoral strategies. The principal challenges confronting the New Right after taking office are how to fulfill its campaign promises, safeguard national sovereignty and independence in the face of pressure from U.S. interference, overcome difficulties in national governance, and identify a realistic and feasible path of development. 

Manifestations and characteristics of the rise of the New Right in Latin America 

In recent years, Latin America’s New Right has put forward numerous reform ideas and policy proposals that are diametrically opposed to those of the left and also differ markedly from those of the traditional right. These ideas and proposals have been welcomed by many voters dissatisfied with the status quo, and the strong momentum behind the New Right’s growth has attracted widespread attention. 

1. The rise of the New Right in Latin America has significant linkage and demonstration effects 

As regional circumstances have evolved, Latin America’s political landscape has undergone a major shift marked by the collective rise of right-wing forces. In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right “political outsider,” was elected president of Brazil, marking the rise of New Right forces in Latin America. Although Bolsonaro lost the 2022 election to Lula, a leading figure of the Brazilian left, by a narrow margin of less than 1 percent, the rise of the New Right did not cease. In February 2019, Nayib Bukele, who holds radical right-wing positions, was elected president of El Salvador. In October 2023, the far-right politician Daniel Noboa was elected president of Ecuador. 

In November 2023, Javier Milei, a “political outsider” in Argentina, ran in the presidential election as the candidate of the far-right electoral alliance La Libertad Avanza (“Freedom Advances”) and defeated the candidate of the governing left-wing party with 55.65 percent of the vote. After taking office, Milei pursued a series of disruptive reforms, ushering in a process of comprehensive transformation in Argentina. In the October 2025 midterm elections, the governing coalition led by Milei secured more than 40 percent of the vote, gaining 48 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 13 in the Senate. Most notably, it defeated the long-governing left-wing Peronist party in Buenos Aires Province, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of Argentina’s population, achieving a key breakthrough.² Milei sold off or closed dozens of state-owned enterprises and comprehensively deregulated sectors such as energy and transportation. This series of radical “shock therapy” measures prompted widespread public debate. Many people believed that adopting an entirely new model of national governance would help resolve problems such as high inflation and thereby achieve economic growth. Drawing on Milei’s policy measures, Colombia’s right-wing opposition proposed a “Fiscal Responsibility Bill” calling for a cap on the fiscal deficit and cuts to social welfare spending to address excessively high public debt.³ Citing Argentina’s example, members of the Peruvian Congress called for the privatization of the energy and mining sectors to be accelerated in order to attract more foreign investment. Meanwhile, Milei’s campaign strategies, including his anti-establishment narrative and mobilization through social media, attracted the support of large numbers of young people and others dissatisfied with the status quo. His electoral victory provided the Latin American right with a model of political operation from which it could draw lessons. During the election campaign, a Venezuelan opposition leader directly borrowed Milei’s call to “burn down the old system” in an attempt to replicate Milei’s logic of political mobilization. 

Spurred by the effect of Milei’s example, the Latin American right performed even more strongly in 2025, winning national elections in multiple countries and achieving historic breakthroughs. In Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz, the candidate of the center-right Christian Democratic Party, won the general election, ending nearly 20 years of rule by the country’s left. In Chile, José Antonio Kast, the candidate of the far-right Republican Party of Chile, was elected president, breaking the country’s long-standing pattern of alternating center-left and center-right rule. In Honduras, Nasry Asfura, the candidate of the far-right National Party, was elected president, bringing about a rightward shift in the country’s politics. In Ecuador, the right-wing Noboa made public security, the issue of greatest concern to voters, a top priority and pledged to crack down severely on drug trafficking and violent crime, winning the support of large numbers of voters and securing reelection. With a succession of New Right leaders taking office, coupled with the longstanding rule of the right in countries such as Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Belize, and Paraguay, the New Right has become a major force in Latin America’s political landscape. In addition, a group of New Right politicians has emerged in Latin America. Although they have not come to power, their influence continues to grow, and their development momentum should not be underestimated. For example, the far-right Peruvian politician Rafael López Aliaga has attracted attention for his radically conservative and populist positions and has been called the “Bolsonaro of Peru.” The Popular Renewal party that he leads won the 2021 Lima mayoral election. María Fernanda Cabal, a leading figure of Colombia’s far right and a leader of the Democratic Center party, firmly opposes peace talks, supports the use of force to eliminate guerrilla groups, and actively participates in conferences organized by international conservative forces. 

2. The New Right exhibits policy orientations combining radicalism and pragmatism 

Although the Latin American countries governed by New Right parties differ somewhat in their positions on the political spectrum and their policy proposals, they also share prominent commonalities. In the economic sphere, they favor liberalization policies and radical reforms. In the political and sociocultural spheres, they advocate upholding extremely conservative traditional values and emphasize a return to “law and order.” In foreign affairs, they exhibit a “pragmatic” tendency to be politically “pro-U.S.” while attaching importance to China in economic and trade relations. This demonstrates the diversity, complexity, flexibility, and pragmatism of the New Right’s policy orientations. 

First, economic reforms have become “extreme.” The far right advocates adopting “shock therapy” and implementing radical neoliberal reforms to completely dismantle the economic order dominated by the left’s “state interventionism.” After taking office, the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil reduced the number of ministerial-level agencies from 29 to 22, opposed the Workers’ Party’s high-welfare policies, raised the minimum retirement age, extended the required pension contribution period, and accelerated privatization. It completed 50 privatization projects in its first year in office, demonstrating the considerable scale of its reforms. The radical reforms implemented by Argentine President Milei have been even more disruptive and impactful. Describing himself as an “anarcho-capitalist,” he advocates wholesale privatization and complete marketization and has adopted a package of reform measures that includes eliminating government agencies, imposing fiscal austerity, cutting spending, deregulating, and encouraging competition. The United States and other Western countries have lavished praise on him, with some even claiming that he has ushered in “Mileinomics.” Although the economic policies of other countries governed by New Right parties have not been as radical as Milei’s, these countries have also intensified neoliberal reforms to varying degrees. Chilean President Kast is regarded as the country’s most right-wing president in nearly 30 years. Describing himself as an apprentice of the “Chicago School,” he advocates reducing regulation, substantially lowering corporate taxes, and introducing more flexible and relaxed labor laws. His policy orientation is quite similar to Milei’s.⁴ Bolivian President Paz seeks to break the ideological deadlock and adopts a problem-solving orientation, advocating lower tariffs, a stable exchange rate, and stronger tax incentives. Although Paz has adopted a moderate and pragmatic approach to economic reform, he is nevertheless regarded as “Bolivia’s most right-wing president in nearly two decades.”⁵ 

Second, there is a “conservative turn” in the political and sociocultural spheres. In the political sphere, the New Right generally advocates strengthening “state authority and order,” expanding police and military powers, and severely cracking down on crime. In the sociocultural sphere, it advocates upholding traditional values, opposes gender equality, and calls for the education system to return to “traditional morality.” Chilean President Kast once publicly expressed “nostalgia for the dictatorship of the Pinochet military government,” advocated strengthening the military’s role in national governance, and firmly opposed abortion and same-sex marriage. He claimed that “gender equality is a conspiracy of the left that will destroy families and religion” and stated that he would prohibit primary and secondary schools from teaching content related to gender equality.⁶ During his tenure as president of Brazil, Bolsonaro publicly opposed same-sex marriage on multiple occasions, stating that “homosexuals are a social pathology,” and pushed Congress to pass legislation restricting same-sex marriage. These leaders launch “culture wars” in defense of traditional values, misrepresenting the multicultural policies of left-wing governments as the “destruction of traditional values” in order to mobilize conservative voters. 

Third, foreign policy exhibits a degree of “pragmatism.” Countries governed by the right, including Argentina, Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Paraguay, generally exhibit a “pro-U.S. and anti-communist” ideological orientation and strongly endorse Trump’s “America First” philosophy. In the political sphere, they cooperate with the U.S. strategy of dividing Latin America by “suppressing the left and supporting the right,” while in the security sphere, they respond to U.S. demands regarding counternarcotics efforts and crackdowns on illegal immigration. These countries are viewed as the Trump administration’s “political allies” in the Western Hemisphere. In the economic and trade sphere, however, many countries governed by the right have come to recognize through practice the importance of diversifying their external cooperation. In particular, they have become acutely aware that their economic development cannot proceed without China. They attach importance to China’s market, capital, and technology and hope to expand pragmatic cooperation with China in pursuit of new development opportunities. Even Argentine President Milei, who is strongly “pro-U.S.,” has demonstrated a pragmatic side in cooperation with China. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, he praised China as “a great trading partner” and has also publicly expressed his desire to visit China on multiple occasions. 

3. The New Right is not simply a return of the traditional right 

Latin America’s New Right shares a degree of historical continuity with the traditional right, which advocated neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. Both advocate economic liberalization, marketization, and privatization, emphasize reducing state intervention, and favor maintaining close cooperation with the United States in foreign relations. Their supporters include the business community and members of the upper middle class. Compared with the traditional right, however, the New Right exhibits more new characteristics, including more forceful economic and social reforms, a more “instrumentalized” approach to politics and ideology, and greater emphasis on new social movement models in its organization and operations. To win public support, it mobilizes around diverse issues involving the economy, public security, culture, and religion, expanding its voter base to different social groups, including young students, people living in poverty, the unemployed, and religious conservatives. In foreign relations, it also displays its “pro-U.S.” position more openly and prominently. 

In its economic and social policies, the traditional right generally supports economic globalization, advocates gradual neoliberal reforms, emphasizes properly balancing efficiency and equity, and tends to retain basic welfare systems and state regulation of core industries. The New Right, by contrast, generally has reservations about multilateral cooperation. Some countries governed by the radical right place a one-sided emphasis “on putting their national interests first” and oppose globalization. Economically, they advocate radical liberal reforms, strongly champion “minimal government,” reject welfare systems wholesale, and call for substantial cuts to social welfare. 

In politics and ideology, the traditional right typically consists of establishment elites. It emphasizes maintaining the existing political system and social order, respects the authority of elites, and advocates gradual political reform and compromise within the existing system. The New Right, by contrast, has a strong anti-establishment and populist character. It portrays itself as the “spokesperson for the people” and advocates mobilizing the public against the “corrupt elite.” It criticizes not only members of left-wing parties but also traditional right-wing elites. Argentine President Milei collectively referred to traditional right-wing parties and left-wing governments as the “political oligarchy” and declared that his election represented “a revolution of the people against the elite.” In their stances toward democratic institutions, the traditional right advocates fully accepting and respecting the overall institutional framework of “liberal democracy.” The New Right, particularly far-right forces, displays skepticism and contempt toward checks and balances, minority rights, and the free and independent operation of the media. After taking office, its conflicts with legislative and judicial institutions are generally more frequent and intense. During his tenure as president of Brazil, Bolsonaro regarded Congress and the Supreme Court as “institutional obstacles” and repeatedly threatened to dissolve Congress. After losing his bid for reelection, he incited his supporters to storm the National Congress building, an action viewed as a Brazilian replica of the U.S. Capitol riot. 

In terms of organization and operations, the traditional right relies on grassroots party organizations and mainstream media for mobilization and publicity. The New Right, by contrast, bypasses traditional media and party systems, using short videos, livestreams, and online hype to disseminate simplified political slogans and cultivate the image of a “heroic leader.” Salvadoran President Bukele livestreamed anti-gang operations on TikTok, with a single video receiving more than 100 million views and attracting the support of large numbers of internet users. Argentine President Milei appeared on a television program wielding a chainsaw as a symbol of “cutting ties” with the old system, briefly becoming a focal point of global public attention. 

Causes of the rise of the New Right in Latin America 

The rise of the New Right in Latin America is rooted in a profound and complex contemporary context and is the product of both internal and external factors. Internally, Latin America’s increasingly severe development difficulties have driven changes in the region’s political landscape, while voters’ strong desire for something new and for change has created opportunities for the New Right to enter the political arena. Externally, the global rise of conservatism and growing coordination among conservative forces have provided guidance for the New Right’s ideas and actions. 

First, the ferment of diverse political and social currents seeking novelty and change has created opportunities for the New Right to grow in strength. The spread of a crisis of confidence characterized by the rejection of “tradition,” “authority,” and “incumbents” has provided a basis for the “anti-establishment” New Right to come to power. For more than a decade, a series of structural problems has constrained Latin America’s economic and social development, plunging the region into severe difficulties. From 2015 to 2024, Latin America’s economy experienced a second “lost decade,” with an average annual growth rate of only 0.9 percent. Prolonged economic stagnation has exacerbated poverty, the wealth gap, public security problems, and other issues. In 2025, Latin America’s poverty rate reached 33.2 percent, its youth unemployment rate was as high as 28.5 percent, and its Gini coefficient reached 0.51, far above the global average of 0.38.⁷ The economic downturn has led to a continuing deterioration in public security, making public security one of the issues of greatest concern to the public. Latin America has the world’s highest rate of organized crime. Hundreds of large organized criminal groups, including drug cartels, gangs, and militias, have remained active for years, and Latin America has the world’s highest homicide rate.⁸ Faced with these many problems, public discontent has soared. The despair of those living in poverty has become intertwined with the anger of the middle class. Extreme distrust of the existing system, traditional political parties, veteran political figures, and those in power has grown steadily, while confidence in countries’ development prospects has seriously eroded. A report released in 2025 by Latinobarómetro, a Latin American polling organization, showed that 68 percent of respondents believed that “traditional political parties are unable to represent the interests of the people,” while 72 percent were “disappointed with the existing political system.” Public trust in political parties stood at only 17 percent, and trust in Congress at only 24 percent.⁹ In this social climate of profound distrust toward the traditional system, voters have cast “angry votes” and “punitive votes” against those in power, causing governing parties to suffer successive defeats in national elections. Latin America’s Generation Z displays a particularly strong rejection of tradition and elites. Accustomed to expressing their demands through social media, its members have a pronounced anti-establishment character. Because neither the traditional left nor the traditional right has been able to resolve the region’s development problems, the public hopes that emerging political forces and new leaders will arise to carry out comprehensive and thorough reforms. During Chile’s 2025 general election, 42 percent of voters identified a “desire for change” as their foremost consideration in voting, ahead of the economy at 38 percent and public security at 35 percent. New Right forces comprising emerging parties, fringe parties, and “political outsiders” have capitalized on this momentum and moved quickly to fill the power vacuum. Some radical right-wing politicians have played the populist card, vigorously attacking the existing system and frequently making statements opposing immigration and gender equality in an effort to cultivate an image of being unafraid to defy convention and willing to forge ahead. The New Right’s political positions combine economic and moral issues, winning support from the upper strata of society, parts of the middle class, and large numbers of people from the lower strata. It therefore has a broader base of public support.¹⁰ 

Latin America’s entry into a political cycle of “the left declining and the right rising” has created opportunities for the New Right to govern. Because neither the left nor the right has been able to resolve the many problems confronting national and social development, contention between the left and right and changes of governing party have become the norm. Latin America’s most recent “leftward turn” began in 2018, when the left successively came to power in Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Colombia, Brazil, and other countries, giving rise to a new “Pink Tide.” Although the left won elections in many countries, constraints imposed by opposition parties prevented it from undertaking comprehensive structural reforms. As a result, it could neither resolve the problem of sustainable economic development nor improve the public security situation that increasingly concerned voters. As the left lost large numbers of supporters, left-wing forces in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, and other countries suffered successive defeats in national elections in recent years, with representatives of the New Right winning in every case. This indicates that Latin America’s political pendulum has begun a “rightward turn” and that the region has entered a new cycle of right-wing rule. In 2026, right-wing parties in Peru and Colombia have attracted even greater attention in their national elections, while Lula, Brazil’s president and a traditional left-wing political figure, also faces strong challenges from far-right candidates. 

Second, the New Right has intensified its theoretical and practical exploration, seeking to respond to voters’ demands through the results of reform. To further clarify their positioning, New Right parties have focused on strengthening their articulation of ideology and reform policies, with the aim of clearly distinguishing themselves from the left and the traditional right. The New Right centers its discourse on opposition to elites and the system, collectively labeling traditional political parties and political elites, including some on the right, the “corrupt oligarchy,” while deliberately cultivating an image as the “spokesperson for the people.” In contrast to the left’s “state interventionism” and “multicultural policies,” the New Right adheres to “radical liberalism” and “cultural conservatism.” It explicitly opposes nationalization, the welfare state, and gender equality, advocates wholesale privatization, and firmly upholds traditional values. During the election campaign, Chilean President Kast proposed “conservative constitution-making,” openly confronting the left’s proposal for “pluralist constitution-making.” During his campaign, Bolivian President Paz called for “ending 20 years of left-wing rule and rebuilding national order,” conveying a clear policy direction to voters and ultimately defeating the long-governing left-wing government. 

Unlike traditional political parties, which emphasize political compromise and policy balance, the New Right has unequivocally introduced a series of radical reform proposals. In the economic sphere, the New Right advocates intensifying neoliberal reforms. Argentine President Milei introduced the omnibus bill “Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines,” containing 238 reform provisions, including reducing the number of public employees, relaxing exchange-rate controls, cutting energy subsidies, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. In December 2025, the Milei administration stated in a report marking its second anniversary in office that its reforms had made progress in eliminating the fiscal deficit and inflation, maintaining public order, and reducing public spending. Argentina had achieved fiscal surpluses for two consecutive years, while the monthly inflation rate had fallen from 25.5 percent in December 2023 to 1.6 percent in June 2025, the poverty rate had declined from 52.9 percent to 31.6 percent, and the number of homicides nationwide had fallen to its lowest level in nearly 25 years.¹¹ The Noboa administration in Ecuador has vigorously advanced pension reform, raising the pension eligibility age from 60 to 65, while also cutting government spending. Since taking office, it has achieved important results in promoting fiscal sustainability and enhancing economic dynamism. The monthly inflation rate fell to 1.24 percent in October 2025, its lowest level in nearly four years.¹² In the sphere of public security, the New Right favors “iron-fisted governance” and “zero tolerance” for crime. In 2022, Salvadoran President Bukele declared a “state of exception,” allowing the police to detain suspects without arrest warrants. Under a series of forceful measures, public security in El Salvador has improved markedly. The homicide rate fell sharply from 50.4 per 100,000 people in 2018 to 1.36 in 2025,¹³ transforming El Salvador from a country with one of the world’s more serious violent crime problems into one of the safest countries in Latin America. Because of the notable results achieved in combating crime, Bukele’s approval rating has remained above 70 percent for an extended period. In 2024, he won reelection with 83 percent of the vote. During Bolsonaro’s tenure as president of Brazil, he pushed Congress to pass the Anti-Crime Law, granting the police broader law-enforcement powers and bringing about a marked decline in the violent crime rate. To a certain extent, these highly targeted reform measures have responded to the public’s core demands for economic development and public security, giving the New Right greater leverage to consolidate its governing foundation. 

Third, the resurgence of conservative forces worldwide and the escalation of U.S. actions to “suppress the left and support the right” in Latin America have provided major external impetus for the rise of the New Right in Latin America. The global resurgence of conservatism has provided guidance for the New Right’s ideas and actions. Ultraconservative political forces in the United States and Europe have made noneconomic issues such as religion, same-sex marriage, immigration, and public security central election issues, winning the support of large numbers of conservative and evangelical Christian voters. Trump’s reelection as president of the United States and the continued rise of far-right parties in Europe mark a powerful global resurgence of conservatism. Emboldened by these developments, right-wing political elites in Latin America have begun to imitate the political marketing and campaign strategies of far-right politicians in the United States and Europe and have stepped up their interactions and coordination. Argentine President Milei is a staunch supporter of Trump, and the two are closely aligned ideologically. Milei has traveled to the United States to meet with Trump on multiple occasions, and the two frequently echo and support each other on social media. Milei, Kast, Bukele, and other leading representatives of the Latin American right have also repeatedly attended events organized by the two far-right organizations, the Conservative Political Action Conference and the Madrid Forum. Brazil and Mexico hosted the Conservative Political Action Conference in 2019 and 2023, respectively. Coordination among conservative forces worldwide has provided ideological and operational guidance for Latin America’s New Right. Milei’s “radical liberalism” derives directly from the theories of U.S. economist Milton Friedman, while his proposal for “dollarization” has received public support from conservative U.S. think tanks. Chilean President Kast’s “anti-gender ideology” slogan draws on the policy rhetoric of the Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán. The Trump administration in the United States has escalated its actions in the Western Hemisphere to “suppress the left and support the right,”aiding the rise of the New Right in Latin America. At the end of 2025, the Trump administration released the U.S. National Security Strategy, which put forward the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” also known as the “Donroe Doctrine.” The administration declared that it would “restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere,” repositioned Latin America as an area of core interests, increased its intervention in Latin American affairs, and adopted a divisive strategy of openly supporting the right and attacking the left.¹⁴ In early 2026, the United States suddenly launched a military operation against Venezuela and forcibly abducted President Maduro and his wife. This seriously intimidated the region’s left-wing camp and further inflamed the right’s desire to seize power.

The United States’ support for right-wing forces in Latin America is reflected mainly in two areas. First, political support. Before and after Argentina’s 2023 general election, Trump repeatedly expressed support for Milei on social media, saying that Milei would “make Argentina great again” and promising to strengthen cooperation between the United States and Argentina if Milei were elected.¹⁵ During Bolivia’s 2025 general election, the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia publicly criticized the left-wing government for “undermining democracy,” indirectly lending support to the right-wing candidate. The United States has also sought to isolate left-wing governments in the region and create a political environment favorable to the New Right by supporting the Venezuelan opposition, imposing sanctions on Cuba, and taking other such measures. Second, economic support. Through the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral financial institutions, the United States provides loans to right-wing governments on the condition that they implement neoliberal reforms. After Milei took office, the International Monetary Fund immediately stated that it would increase its assistance. Meanwhile, the United States has intensified financial, trade, energy, and other sanctions against countries governed by radical left-wing parties in order to help the right seize power. 

Support from the United States and conservative forces worldwide has bolstered the momentum of the New Right in Latin America. During Argentina’s 2023 general election, Milei’s polling support rose by 8 percentage points after Trump publicly voiced his support for him. During Chile’s 2025 general election, OpenSecrets, a U.S. organization that tracks political funding, stated in an analysis that Kast had likely received financial support from conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute and that the volume of his campaign advertising was 2.3 times that of the left-wing candidate.¹⁶

Development prospects for the New Right in Latin America 

In the short term, the New Right in Latin America will continue its strong upward trajectory. The New Right represents an important emerging political force in the region. The impact of its rise is extending beyond electoral politics into the institutional, social, cultural, and other spheres. The New Right has introduced comprehensive economic and social reforms that have, to some extent, responded to voters’ desire for something new and for change. Some countries governed by right-wing parties have achieved relatively clear results in stabilizing their macroeconomies and improving public security governance. The Milei administration in Argentina has sharply reduced inflation, and UK Conservative Party leader Kemi Badenoch praised it as “a model of liberal reform.” The Bukele administration in El Salvador has dramatically reduced the crime rate and achieved notable results in public security governance in the region. The demonstration effect of these examples has contributed to historic victories for right-wing forces in Bolivia, Chile, and other countries. 

As Latin America’s political landscape shifts in a direction favorable to governance by right-wing parties and the United States intensifies implementation of its “Donroe Doctrine” aimed at controlling and dividing Latin America, the region’s “rightward turn” may well accelerate. In February 2026, Costa Rica held a general election, in which Laura Fernández, the candidate of the right-wing Sovereign People’s Party, won the presidency. Peru, Colombia, Brazil, and other countries will also hold general elections in 2026. New Right forces are highly competitive in all of these countries, potentially disrupting Latin America’s political landscape of coexistence between left- and right-wing governments. The rise of the New Right in Latin America and the escalation of U.S. interference are mutually reinforcing, exerting a major impact on Latin America’s geopolitical landscape and the development of the regional situation. As U.S. interference and coercive actions continue to escalate, left-wing governments in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other countries face existential tests. Tensions between the left and right will intensify, the regional integration process will be severely impeded, and Latin America will enter a distinctive period of change marked by deepening internal political and social tensions and increased external interference. 

Faced with impediments to their autonomous development and growing pressure to “choose sides” in great-power rivalry, Latin American countries tend to handle their foreign relations more cautiously, and those governed by the right are no exception. Some countries that are highly economically dependent on the United States hope to take maximum advantage of U.S.-driven “nearshoring” to expand domestic production and increase exports to the United States, while also taking important markets such as China into account. Because some South American countries have closer economic and trade ties with China, they generally pursue balanced diplomacy, aligning with the United States on certain diplomatic and security issues while seeking to deepen economic and trade cooperation with China. 

The New Right has been able to come to power in many Latin American countries largely because of its inflammatory policy slogans, targeted voter-mobilization strategies, and external assistance from the United States. However, it lacks a solid governing foundation. If it cannot fulfill its election promises, voter discontent will inevitably deepen, the political pendulum will quickly swing from right to left, and another change of governing party will occur. Overall, the New Right in Latin America faces multiple challenges. First, its foundation of public support is unstable. The New Right’s supporters usually form a highly heterogeneous and loose coalition comprising “conservative religious groups, economic elites, and lower- and middle-class voters.” Economic elites value market-oriented reforms, while lower- and middle-class voters desire improvements in their quality of life and welfare benefits. These groups have differing demands, making it difficult to forge a political consensus or stable coalition. Former Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s excessive pursuit of privatization during the latter part of his presidency resulted in the loss of some evangelical voters, highlighting the fragility of the governing coalition. Some elements of the New Right’s reform agenda are contradictory. Strengthening public security governance requires increasing the number of police officers, while building more prisons requires greater fiscal expenditure, both of which conflict with the objective of fiscal austerity. Second, radical short-term policies pose a series of risks. Driven by its positions and interests, the New Right is bound to create opportunities for financial capital groups to reap enormous profits through policies such as liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and tax cuts. These policies are not only unlikely to fundamentally resolve structural problems such as inequality and vulnerability confronting Latin America’s economic and social development, but may also, because of excessive dependence on foreign capital and external assistance, weaken countries’ capacity to withstand risks and even trigger debt and financial crises.¹⁷ The New Right aggressively plays up “culture wars.” Although this can mobilize conservative voters in the short term, it also intensifies social divisions and creates latent dangers of political and social unrest. Under El Salvador’s “state of exception” for combating criminals, the police have expanded their law-enforcement powers, while Argentina’s Milei administration has attempted to restrict the powers of the Supreme Court. These legal issues and conflicts could become triggers for crises in New Right governance. Third, it will be difficult for the New Right to govern stably over the long term. The New Right has not proposed a systematic governance strategy for long-term national development and also lacks a foundation for remaining in power over the long term. The UK publication The Economist has observed that the New Right’s governance logic of “emphasizing short-term results while neglecting long-term planning” will have difficulty resolving Latin America’s deep-seated structural contradictions. It is widely believed that the New Right will have difficulty remaining in power over the long term and that the swing of Latin America’s political pendulum and alternation between the left and right are likely to continue. How to achieve tangible results in the short term, how to maintain a balance between reform and stability, and how to unite different political forces to reach a consensus on national development will be key questions and urgent tasks generally faced by New Right governments.