With the China-U.S. strategic game intensifying, the United States is frequently playing the “Taiwan card” in a vain attempt to use the Taiwan issue as a “counterweight” to pressure China and force China to “make concessions” on other issues. In recent years, the Tsai Ing-wen administration has insisted on taking the path of “gradual Taiwan independence” and being “pro-United States and anti-mainland China.” The United States, meanwhile, has adopted a “supportive” or “facilitating” attitude in many areas such as mutual visits with Taiwan officials, legislation, and military affairs, raising the official level of U.S.-Taiwan interaction, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and passing several Taiwan-related bills that openly defy China’s bottom line. Although the Biden administration has made some adjustments in its Taiwan Strait policy compared to its predecessor, it has not changed the strategic thinking of “using Taiwan to control China,” and appears to be “more structured” and “shrewd and calculating” in its implementation. “This trend is very dangerous. It is playing with fire, and those who play with fire will set themselves on fire.”¹

For some time now, the U.S. government has unreasonably blamed the high tension in the Taiwan Strait on “military, diplomatic and economic pressure” on Taiwan by mainland China, and groundlessly accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of conducting “provocative military activities” around the Taiwan Strait. It has also cooperated with the Tsai Ing-wen administration to continuously hype so-called “incursions” into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” by PLA military aircraft, which is a false proposition completely inconsistent with basic facts and elementary international law, and contrary to the consistent position of the United States. Under the pretext of “opposing unilateral changes to the status quo or undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” it intervenes in Taiwan Strait affairs and finds “reasonableness” to support provocations such as sending more U.S. warships and aircraft to conduct high-frequency activities in the region. The collusion of all kinds between the United States and Taiwan has caused grave damage to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive core issue between the United States and China, and if not handled properly, it will cause subversive and comprehensive damage to China-U.S. relations. The next moves and potential tactics of U.S.-Taiwan collusion, as well as its impact on the direction of the U.S.-China Taiwan Strait game, deserve close attention, and it is especially important to analyze how to stop its “spillover” from negatively affecting our national security and overall diplomatic situation.

1.      The “negative” direction of the Biden Administration’s Taiwan Strait policy is apparent

The Trump administration took a reckless, go-it-alone approach to U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations, continuously eroding the spirit of the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, aggressively strengthening the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, constantly bumping up against and jolting the political foundation and the most important cornerstone of U.S.-China relations—the one-China principle. Compared to the Trump administration’s “blustering” approach, the Biden administration has made some adjustments in tactics, but it has failed to fundamentally change the strategic thinking of “using Taiwan to control China.” Its “salami-slicing” ploys on Taiwan-related issues have increased in strength and frequency, its manner of playing the “Taiwan card” has become more “underhanded” and “scheming,” and the threat that its initiatives pose to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to rise. In recent years, the “two-faced nature” of the Biden administration’s policy toward China has become increasingly apparent. As State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a press conference for the “Two Sessions” in March 2022, “U.S. leaders and some senior officials have said that the United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to change China’s institutions, does not seek to strengthen alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ and has no intention of engaging in conflict or confrontation with China. Regrettably, however, these statements were left hanging in the air and never implemented.” ²

(1) The United States has stepped up its emphasis on Taiwan “strategy,” and keeps reiterating its “commitment” to Taiwan

Since the Biden administration took office, its “salami slicing” ploys on Taiwan-related issues have been incessant, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” document it issued promotes the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue, and it has actively made public statements to the outside world to “bolster” Taiwan and constantly given the wrong signals to Taiwan. This has encouraged the “Taiwan independence” forces to go further and further down the road of “relying on foreign powers to seek independence,” which has seriously damaged the relationship between China and the United States and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

As the United States pushes forward with comprehensive strategic competition with China, “deterrence” against China in the Taiwan Strait is an important tactic. The Biden administration has continued the Trump administration’s practice of mentioning Taiwan in its National Security Strategy. Its Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021 states that, in accordance with its long-term commitments, it will support Taiwan as a “democracy, a key economy, and a security partner.”³ In February 2022, the Biden administration released the Indo-Pacific Strategy document, which in regard to Taiwan-related issues explicitly indicates: “We (the United States) will also work with partners in the region and beyond to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which the future of Taiwan is peacefully determined by the will and best interests of its people. As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our one-China policy and the longstanding commitments we have made under the ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’ the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.” ⁴ Even after the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in Europe, Russia’s priority as a strategic competitor to the United States did not rise. In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted a classified version of the National Defense Strategy to Congress. In its published “Fact Sheet,” the United States still considers China “the most important strategic competitor” and “will prioritize the Chinese challenge in the Indo-Pacific.” It is likely that the undisclosed portion of the document contains Taiwan-related content similar to that of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.⁵

In recent years, the “double standard” and “using Taiwan to control China” tendency in the external statements of senior U.S. government officials has become increasingly apparent. When Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken addressed the Taiwan issue at a U.S. Senate hearing on January 19, 2021, he professed his support for the Trump-era approach of lifting restrictions on U.S.-Taiwan relations. ⁶ The State Department under Blinken’s leadership later issued a statement on January 23 groundlessly accusing China of “military pressure against Taiwan” that “threatens regional peace and stability,” emphasizing the U.S. commitment to Taiwan in response to the alleged repeated penetration of PLA military aircraft into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone,” stressing that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is “rock-solid” and that it will honor its commitments under the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, and continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining adequate self-defense capabilities. ⁷  In a media interview in April, Blinken alleged that China was raising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and stressed that the United States had what he called a “serious commitment” to maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, adding that “anyone who tries to use force to change the status quo will be making a serious mistake.” ⁸ In a speech at the IISS-Fullerton Lecture in July, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin peddled the “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Talking about the Taiwan issue, he said that U.S. collaboration with Taiwan to enhance its self-defense capabilities is consistent with the United States’ one-China policy. ⁹ The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan shook public opinion in Taiwan, but Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s National Security Advisor, emphasized that “the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is as strong as it’s ever been,” and said “Afghanistan is different from Taiwan.” ¹⁰ In a statement issued in early October in response to the so-called record “incursions” by PLA military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, the U.S. Department of State, in addition to repeating the January statement, “urged Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion on Taiwan,” and also expressed its high level of concern over “provocative military actions” by mainland China around Taiwan. ¹¹

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has escalated its “pro-Taiwan” stance significantly, and compared the Taiwan issue to the Ukraine issue. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said at a hearing before the House Financial Services Committee on April 6, 2022 that sanctions against Russia would apply to other situations, and that the current administration would use all the sanctions it could impose if China “invaded Taiwan.” ¹² At a breakfast meeting of the Economic Club of Washington On April 14, [National Security Advisor] Jake Sullivan said in an interview that the White House believes China will “learn a lesson” from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, that the Taiwan and Ukraine situations are different, and that the United States will take all possible measures to ensure that a Chinese “invasion of Taiwan” never happens. ¹³ At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on April 26 to discuss the FY 2023 State Department budget, [Secretary of State] Blinken said that the current administration is determined to ensure that Taiwan has all the means necessary to defend itself against any potential “aggression,” and will focus on supporting Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its asymmetric deterrence capabilities. ¹⁴

(2) The United States has been making a high-profile effort to help Taiwan expand its “international space,” and is “teaming up” to vigorously “use Taiwan to control China”

Compared to the Trump administration, the Biden administration appears more adept at promoting the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue, and it uses many of its allies to “team up” and build momentum for maximizing China’s consumption of diplomatic resources on the Taiwan issue, thereby accomplishing its goal of alienating China’s relations with relevant countries.

Since the start of the Biden administration, the U.S. government has made a high-profile effort to help Taiwan expand its so-called “international space.” May 2021, Secretary of State Blinken called on World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to invite the Taiwanese authorities to participate in the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly as observers. ¹⁵ In September, the United States also publicly supported Taiwan’s membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), although it is not a CPTPP member itself. ¹⁶ In October, Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement calling on all UN member states to join the United States in supporting the Taiwan authorities’ participation in the UN system, particularly in the annual meetings of the WHO and the International Civil Aviation Organization. ¹⁷ In December, the United States invited the Taiwan authorities to participate in the so-called “Leaders’ Summit for Democracy,” despite China’s firm opposition, boosting the arrogance of the “Taiwan independence” forces. ¹⁸ In March 2022, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Michele Sison said that Taiwan had contributed to the international community on many issues and called on the United Nations to include the Taiwan region. ¹⁹

The United States has also actively strengthened its Taiwan-related collusion with its allies, and gone out of its way to “link the two seas with the Taiwan Strait,”²⁰ that is, to forcibly “embed” the Taiwan Strait issue in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In February 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken held talks in Honolulu with Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong. They issued a joint statement after the meeting “emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” ²¹ It was the first time the words “Taiwan Strait” had appeared in a joint statement by the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan and South Korea. In April, Biden met with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. The post-meeting U.S.-Japan Leaders’ Statement, in addition to reiterating opposition to “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea” and “China’s unlawful maritime claims and activities in the South China Sea,” also mentioned the Taiwan issue. (This was the first time since the Nixon-Sato summit meeting in 1969 that content on Taiwan was included in a U.S.-Japan leader’s statement) “[We] underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”²² From the Japanese side’s subsequent performance, it is clear that it has “common self-interest” with the United States in “using Taiwan to control China.” As a result, from a security and strategic point of view, Japan has been constantly sending policy signals that it will continue to intervene militarily and intervene in the trend of the situation, alone or by “teaming up” with the United States.²³ In May, the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting was held in London, and the joint communiqué issued after the meeting contained a good deal of Taiwan-related content. In addition to declaring support for Taiwan authorities to participate in the WHO and the World Health Assembly, it also went out of its way to “link two seas with the Taiwan Strait” by inserting the issue of Taiwan Strait security into the “East China Sea and South China Sea”—stressing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and calling for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue, all while focusing on the situation in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. ²⁴ In June, at the urging of the United States and Japan, the joint communiqué of the G-7 summit publicly mentioned the Taiwan Strait issue for the first time in (with wording similar to that of the foreign ministers’ meeting in May).²⁵ In September, the United States, the UK, and Australia announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership, and included the Taiwan issue in a so-called “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The United States and Australia’s remarks on Taiwan once again exposed their long-standing misunderstandings on the Taiwan issue and their attempt to “use Taiwan to control China.”²⁶ In December, the United States and the European Union held their second “U.S.-EU Dialogue on China” in Washington, D.C. The joint statement issued after the meeting expressed strong concern about China’s “problematic unilateral actions” in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, which they said “undermine peace and security in the region and have a direct impact on the security and prosperity of both the United States and European Union.”²⁷

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has not given up hyping the Taiwan issue, and has vigorously strengthened its collusion with European allies on Taiwan. On April 21-22, 2022, during consultations in Brussels, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European External Action Service, held the third “U.S.-EU Dialogue on China.” They claimed that they “oppose any actions that undermine the status quo” on the Taiwan issue, and repeated lies about “re-education camps” and “forced labor” in Xinjiang. ²⁸ It is worth noting that some European countries, under the spell of the United States, have mistakenly drawn parallels between the Ukraine issue and the Taiwan issue, such as in British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss’s April 27 speech declaring that NATO “should also protect Taiwan” from mainland China’s “encroachment.” ²⁹

(3) U.S.-Taiwan bilateral exchanges frequently touch the red line

China has always firmly opposed any form of official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. The United States should abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and stop official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. The “Taiwan Travel Act,” passed during the Trump administration by the U.S. Congress to unbind official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan at all levels, ³⁰ breached the long-standing norms and restrictions of the “one act and three communiqués.” The Biden administration appears to be further putting the “Taiwan Travel Act” into practice, and bilateral exchanges between the United States and Taiwan are tending to “cross the line.”

In January 2021, Kurt Campbell, coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, invited Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s “representative to the United States,” to attend the inauguration of President Biden.³¹ This was hyped by both the U.S. and Taiwanese media, who said the “invitation” was the first since 1979. In March, President Surangel Whipps Jr. of Palau, a “diplomatic ally” of Taiwan, visited Taiwan, and U.S. Ambassador to Palau John Hennessey-Niland was part of the delegation. This was the first public visit to Taiwan by a U.S. ambassador since 1979.³² In June, despite Chinese opposition, ³³ the United States and and Taiwan held talks on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) ³⁴ and reached the so-called “ten points of consensus.” (Actually, it is only ten different working groups, focusing on six “trade and investment” issues—agriculture, medical equipment, labor, environment, intellectual property, and financial services—and four “trade and cooperation” issues: bilateral cooperation, supply chains, trade facilitation, and enhancing U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade relations.) ³⁵

In March 2022, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Biden assigned former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen to lead a delegation of former senior U.S. officials to Taiwan to meet with the head of Taiwan’s foreign affairs department, Wu Chao-hsieh, to demonstrate so-called “firm support” for Taiwan. (The five members of the delegation were all former senior U.S. defense and security officials, including Mullen, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as Meghan O’Sullivan, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor during the Bush administration, and Michèle Flournoy, who served as Under Secretary of Defense under Obama.) ³⁶

Particularly worth noting are the frequent visits to Taiwan by members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives since the Biden administration took office, including: June 6, 2021, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen; November 9, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen and make the first “visit” to Taiwan’s defense department; November 25, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen; and April 15, 2022, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen. In early April 2022, it was reported in the media that Speaker of the House Pelosi would visit Taiwan. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated his solemn position on this: “If the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as a state dignitary, knowingly visits Taiwan, it will be a malicious provocation against China’s sovereignty, and gross interference in China’s internal affairs, which will send an extremely dangerous political signal to the outside world. If the U.S. side clings to its reckless course, China will make a resolute response, and all the consequences will be borne by the U.S. side.” ³⁷ Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan failed to materialize due to a positive COVID-19 test result.

(4) U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is growing stronger

The Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China, but the U.S. government, in an attempt to “use Taiwan to control China,” has used Taiwan as a pawn to contain China’s development and national rejuvenation. It has made every effort to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship and to help Taiwan build up its “asymmetric warfare capabilities” and enhance its self-defense capabilities.

Since the Biden Administration took office, the United States side has made continuous moves in the areas of arms sales to Taiwan and strengthening U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. In March 2021, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States signed a so-called “Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Coast Guard Working Group.” ³⁸ The Biden administration has so far announced three arms sales to Taiwan: $750 million in August 2021, $100 million in February 2022, and $95 million in April 2022. ³⁹ In December 2021, President Biden signed the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” which contains a number of items related to Taiwan. Based on a continuation of the Trump Administration’s course, it specifies more numerous and more detailed provisions. The main provisions include: Reaffirms that the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances are the foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan; increases U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges, and plans to invite Taiwan to participate in the 2022 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC); emphasizes that the U.S. government should have the ability to prevent mainland China from using force to “invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively;” calls for exploring ways to strengthen cooperation between U.S. and Taiwan intelligence services, wherein U.S. intelligence agencies could use technical and material assistance to help Taiwan to counter “influence operations;” says the U.S. Department of Defense needs to develop programs to help Taiwan improve its “asymmetric warfare capabilities;” and promotes cooperation between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan, including disaster preparedness and response, cybersecurity and communications security, medical cooperation, Mandarin Chinese training and cultural exchanges, and providing National Guard advisors to help train Taiwan’s reserve forces, with cooperation methods to include personnel exchange visits and joint exercises and training. ⁴⁰ In March 2022, as the situation in Ukraine was intensifying,  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities Mara Karlin hyped the “Ukraine model,” and recommended that the Taiwan authorities build “asymmetrical combat power” so that the people of Taiwan would be prepared to make reunification by force as “prickly” as possible. ⁴¹

(5) The negative impact of U.S. Congress is increasingly apparent

Under the effect of long-term operations by the Taiwan authorities, the development of forces “friendly to Taiwan” in the U.S. Congress should not be underestimated. During the Trump period, the U.S. Congress focused Taiwan-related legislation on lifting restrictions on official U.S.-Taiwan exchanges, upgrading arms sales to Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan military security relations, and supporting Taiwan’s expanded foreign engagement, passing the “Taiwan Travel Act” (2018), the “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act” (2018), the “Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act” (2019), and the “Taiwan Assurance Act” (2020).⁴² Since the beginning of the Biden administration, the number of Taiwan-related proposals in the U.S. Congress has increased significantly, with 34 related proposals in the first session of the 117th Congress alone, nearly three times as many as in the 115th Congress. ⁴³ However, it is rarer for Taiwan-related proposals to be passed into law under Biden compared to under Trump, and as of April 2022, the only ones that appear to have been included in the FY2022 Omnibus Appropriations Act are provisions related to “prohibiting the mislabeling” of Taiwan maps, ⁴⁴ and the only bill passed by both chambers and expected to be signed by President Biden is one on Taiwan’s participation in the WHO (which bill requires the U.S. Department of State to include in its annual report a discussion of the challenges and improvements to its program to support Taiwan’s observer status in the WHO). ⁴⁵ In addition, the Senate-passed U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (2021) and the House-passed America COMPETES Act (2021) contain essentially the same set of uncontroversial provisions to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation to “resist” mainland China, and are also more likely to be passed by both chambers and become laws.

As the midterm elections approach, the Democratic and Republican parties are likely to use China-related issues (in which the focus may be Taiwan-related issues) to boost their election campaigns and vie for control of Congress. For example, a March 30, 2022 letter from a bipartisan group of 200 U.S. Representatives to the Biden administration advocated inviting Taiwan to participate in the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. ⁴⁶ Although there is a consensus in principle between the Democratic and Republican parties on “using Taiwan to control China,” there is still a difference in the methods of promoting it, between “controlled competition” and “extreme containment.” It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration will go further down the road of “using Taiwan to control China” if its domestic support continues to decline.

2.      The risk variables facing the U.S.-China Taiwan Strait game may increase

In recent years, the United States and Taiwan have been escalating their collusion, the U.S. and Chinese military forces have been operating intensively in the Taiwan Strait, and the likelihood of an “accidental conflict” has climbed, especially in the “southwest airspace” of the so-called “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone.” In the short term, China and the United States attach more importance to controlling air and sea crises, and the probability of armed conflict between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait is not great. What requires particular attention is the set of negative factors reflected in the recent “public opinion war” involving Taiwan, and the “spillover” risk variables of U.S.-Taiwan collusion in all out “cognitive warfare.” In the short term, especially after the situation in Ukraine enters a stalemate period, the “spillover” risk variables of “cognitive warfare” in the Taiwan Strait may increase dramatically, and the potential harm to China’s diplomatic situation and economic and trade cooperation with the United States and Western countries may be greater.

(1) Taiwan’s “relying on foreign powers to seek independence” actions may increase

Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, some in the United States have drawn parallels between the Taiwan issue and the situation in Ukraine, taking the opportunity to smear and attack China in an attempt to create a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait, so as to serve America’s own geostrategic and economic interests at the cost of regional peace and stability and the welfare of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. ⁴⁷ Some in the United States keep up a steady “cognitive warfare” drumbeat about “armed reunification,” “luring into war” and “dragging China down,” and it is under its influence that Tsai Ing-wen’s administration has become more confident in “relying on foreign powers to seek independence,” and has begun to spread the “undetermined status of Taiwan theory” or “two-state theory.” In April 2022, Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen and her deputy, Lai Ching-te, made another nonsense speech at the so-called “National Taiwan Conference at Home and Abroad,” using the situation in Ukraine to beg for pity from outside forces, attacking and smearing the mainland, and beating the “two-state theory” drum. Tsai Ing-wen claimed to be “determined to safeguard Taiwan’s security,” while Lai Ching-te hyped the “mainland threat theory” and advocated uniting and cooperating to safeguard Taiwan’s so-called “sovereignty.” ⁴⁸

In recent years, especially from 2017 to 2019, the Taiwan authorities have continued to suffer from a “diplomatic crisis” and a shrinking “international space.” Many of its former “diplomatic allies” have severed “diplomatic relations” with it, and its “representative offices” in countries other than its “diplomatic allies” have been renamed one after another. ⁴⁹ Unable to accept this normal picture of the one-China principle becoming the overwhelming consensus in the international community, Tsai Ing-wen’s administration has sought opportunities to “counterattack” in some “small countries.” It finally found a “breakthrough point” in Lithuania in 2021 by establishing a “Representative Office in Lithuania” under the name of “Taiwan”—the only existing example among countries that are not Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies.” Given that the “Taiwan independence” forces do not have confidence in their military power and that it is not in the interest of the United States to “change the status quo,” the main focus of the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s “independence-seeking” efforts may still be on “diplomacy.” As the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine unfolds, the Taiwan authorities may “take advantage of the opportunity” to expand the “one China, one Taiwan international space” in Europe. The next step in its “relying on foreign powers to seek independence” may be to strengthen relations with European countries that are not its “diplomatic allies” and to promote the establishment of more “representative offices” under the name of “Taiwan.” In recent years, a number of European parliamentary delegations have visited Taiwan (including a delegation from the European Parliament). The “Taiwan-friendly” forces in some European countries are developing relatively fast, especially in some Eastern European countries, and the Taiwan authorities will continue to vigorously push these countries to follow Lithuania’s suit in establishing “Taiwan representative offices.”

(2) The escalation of U.S. actions to “use Taiwan to control China” will heavily impacts mutual trust between China and the United States

In the short term, the United States will probably continue promoting the “internationalization” of the Taiwan Strait issue, engaging in “public opinion building” to guide the “spillover” of its connection with the Ukraine issue, and smearing and attacking the normal activities of the PLA in the airspace in and around the Taiwan Strait, in order to form a “moral deterrent” against China internationally. After the situation in Ukraine stabilizes, the United States will most likely strengthen its Taiwan-related collusion with relevant European countries, for example, by using the opportunity of solidarity with Lithuania against “Chinese coercion” to hype issues such as the right to interpret the one-China policy and the definition of “one China, one Taiwan.” It may even actively cooperate with the Taiwan authorities to encourage more European countries that are at odds with Russia to set up “representative offices” under the name of “Taiwan.” At the same time, it will continue to hype issues related to Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, thus causing alienation in China-Europe relations and interfering with the normal development of China-Europe economic and trade cooperation, in order to serve its overall strategic competition with China, and achieve its goals of strengthening its control over Europe, uniting its Western allies to “isolate China,” “making a fresh start” at “reconstructing international economic and trade rules,” containing China’s peaceful rise, and preventing China from challenging U.S. global hegemony.

First, the United States may step up propaganda efforts on the “true meaning” of its one-China policy in a vain attempt to confuse public opinion in the international community and rope in more “unsuspecting” countries to join its “Taiwan’s undefined status” club that hollows out the one-China principle. According to Richard C. Bush, a leading U.S. expert on the Taiwan Strait, the United States’ one-China policy is a very vague and complex amalgamation that can be interpreted by the United States in various flexible ways. In Bush’s view, there are subtle differences between the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, and since the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, the United States has maintained a “Taiwan status is undetermined” interpretation that benefits itself and preserves sufficient ambiguity in the United States’ one-China policy. ⁵⁰ We must maintain a clear recognition that the current U.S. administration hardly agrees with the one-China principle, and its interpretation of the one-China policy is increasingly biased toward promoting potential differences with China’s position. If the U.S. side continues “salami slicing” the one-China principle—the political foundation and most important cornerstone of U.S.-China relations—it will eventually “hollow it out” completely or “slice its own hand” through carelessness, and the mutual trust between the United States and China will be seriously damaged or even “hollowed out.” The risks in interaction between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait will then increase significantly. Secondly, on the Taiwan Strait issue, the United States seems to have adopted a tactic similar to that in the South China Sea game with China, hiding its selfish intention of colluding with the Taiwan authorities to “use Taiwan to control China,” engaging in a campaign of “public opinion preparation” (hyping the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait and China’s “military pressure” on Taiwan), and searching for “rational” excuses for the deepening of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation and the exchange of high-level visits between the United States and Taiwan. In the future, the U.S. government may use “public opinion preparation” to widely publicize the differences between the U.S. one-China policy and China’s position, as a means of strengthening collusion with allies on Taiwan and creating an “international consensus” and “international momentum,” thereby “internationalizing” the Taiwan Strait issue, and thus alienating China from Europe and “isolating China,” driving a wedge in China-EU economic and trade cooperation in particular (including supporting the EU in initiating “arbitration” against China in the WTO over the trade and economic issues between China and Lithuania), blocking China’s promotion of “Belt and Road” initiative cooperation, and even promoting China’s disconnection from the global supply chain and production chain, so as to achieve its goal of “making a fresh start” at reconstructing international economic and trade rules.

After the situation in Ukraine enters a stable period, the United States and the West may take the opportunity to strengthen Taiwan-related collusion, especially by drawing parallels between the Ukraine issue and China’s “sanctioning” of Lithuania, and increasing “expressions of solidarity” and economic support for Lithuania. They may then promote the formation of a “multinational consensus” on the fine points of “one-China policy” interpretation, stressing that Lithuania allowing the Taiwan authorities to set up a “Taiwan Representative Office” does not mean supporting “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” When the time is ripe, they can join hands with the Taiwan authorities to encourage more European countries to set up “Taiwan Representative Offices.” The United States will probably let European “small countries” charge ahead, while the United States hides behind to “offer advice” and provide “intellectual” support and diplomatic resources to cooperate in fighting “public opinion battles” (such as the United States support for the Philippines’ “South China Sea arbitration case”). This way, the United States can “reap” the spoils of its campaign to contain China while staying “off the field,” and can also “retreat” at any time.

Finally, the United States and Western countries may support greater “intellectual collusion” on Taiwan-related issues, with the aim of finding “rationality” for their Taiwan Strait narratives through “academic research.” In recent years, in order to hype mainland China’s “military pressure” on Taiwan, many experts in the United States and the West have not scrupled to violate their long-held views on “freedom of navigation,” using a double standard to accuse PLA military aircraft of “intruding” into “Taiwan’s air defense identification zone” and endangering the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. In the future, U.S. and Western think tanks are likely to release more research reports on Taiwan-related issues, especially to “challenge” China’s position with regard to the detailed issues of the legal implications of “one China.” For example, the recent study by Drun and Glaser for the German Marshall Fund, which improperly alleges “distortion of UN Resolution 2758” by Beijing, has had a very bad impact. ⁵¹

(3) Intensive U.S.-China actions in the Taiwan Strait could trigger “accidents”

Today, the U.S. side still acts as if it is dealing with China “from a position of strength,” and its “double standards” on the Taiwan Strait issue are more ubiquitous than ever. The U.S. side seems to believe that it has the right to undermine the status quo in cross-Strait relations at all levels, and to cheer on “Taiwan independence” elements. U.S. military ships and aircraft enjoy “freedom of navigation and overflight” in the Taiwan Strait, while the PLA’s actions in going “out to sea” are “provocations and threats.” For the U.S. side to use this sort of “American arrogance” thinking and harbor illusions about restricting the PLA’s going “out to sea” is divorced from reality. The U.S. side needs to face the fact that the main factor threatening peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is its policy of “using Taiwan to control China,” whereas regular combat readiness patrols of the airspace around the Taiwan Strait by PLA military aircraft are a necessary measure to counter U.S.-Taiwan collusion. Under this kind of “status quo,” the intensive operations of U.S. and Chinese military aircraft in the airspace around the Taiwan Strait may indeed lead to “accidents.” To avoid triggering further deterioration in the Taiwan Strait situation, the Taiwan authorities and the U.S. and Western media should stop hyping the so-called “incursions” by PLA military aircraft into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” and restore the truth. ⁵² The U.S. side should cease taking a “double-standard” on the PLA’s normal activities in the Taiwan Strait, strictly control its military actions around the Taiwan Strait, and avoid provocations that “cross the line” and endanger peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, otherwise the consequences would be unthinkable.

Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the so-called “median line of the Taiwan Strait” does not exist. It is unrealistic to expect a hypothetical “median line” to restrict the PLA’s space for activities, and the U.S. side must have a correct understanding of this. This hypothetical “median line” may have been drawn by the United States in the early 1950s to restrict the Taiwanese authorities’ “counterattack on the mainland” when the PLA’s navy and air force were weak and Kuomintang (Nationalist) warplanes repeatedly conducted reconnaissance, air combat, and even bombing missions in the coastal areas of the mainland west of the “median line.” ⁵³ The U.S. and Taiwan authorities seem to have forgotten this history, and now regard PLA military aircraft exercises in the airspace east of the “median line” as “changing the status quo” or “harmful and unhelpful to regional stability.” This completely turns the facts on their heads. Even if we follow the logic of “traditional freedom of the high seas” that the U.S. side has always claimed, the PLA’s military aircraft exercises in the Taiwan Strait conform to international law, so the U.S. side’s accusations lack justification. In recent years, PLA exercises and training activities in the airspace east of the “median line of the Taiwan Strait” or in the “airspace southwest of Taiwan” have been conducted in “international airspace,” and thus fall under “internationally lawful use” to which the U.S. side claims military aircraft are entitled under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. From the U.S. side’s words and actions related to the so-called “provocative military actions” of mainland China, it seems that it believes only the ships and aircraft of the United States and its “allies” enjoy “freedom of navigation and overflight” and can conduct “peaceful” military activities such as close reconnaissance in “international waters and airspace” adjacent to China’s territorial waters and airspace, while the naval and air force ships and aircraft of China, which is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the United States has yet to ratify), are “military threats” once they are “out to sea.” ⁵⁴ Such “double standard” arguments from the U.S. side are unlikely to deceive knowledgeable members of the international community, and the PLA will not stop its normal and legitimate activities in the Taiwan Strait just because of its unfounded accusations.

3.      U.S.-China crisis control mechanisms need to be deepened

In recent years, the U.S. military has significantly increased the frequency and intensity of its activities in China’s coastal airspace, and there are also constant actions in the Taiwan Strait, to which China has no choice but to respond. The present situation in the Taiwan Strait is complex and serious. Not only are people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait paying close attention, it has also attracted the attention of the international community. Under the intentional leading of the Taiwan authorities and the biased analysis and propaganda of some U.S. and Western think tanks and media, the normal air exercises of the PLA in the Taiwan Strait and nearby areas have been hyped as “military pressure,” and the so-called PLA military aircraft “incursions” into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” have been distorted and interpreted as an important factor in generating tension and “changing the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Some U.S. and Western media reports display a “double standard.” Their unprofessional analysis and commentary not only result in serious confusion about the rights and wrongs of the issues involved, but also make people ignore the confidence-building measures and crisis management cooperation that really do need attention.

(1) The application of U.S.-China crisis management mechanisms in the Taiwan Strait faces a “strategic mutual trust dilemma”

Since the start of the Biden administration, “hawkish” forces in the United States have been trying to gain the advantage in the “comprehensive strategic competition” with China by “using Taiwan to control China.” There are even comments in the foreign press that the United States is suspected of using the Taiwan Strait issue to goad China into “firing the first shot,” so that it can take the opportunity to unite with its allies and “team up” against China. ⁵⁵ This view has gained many “fans” since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. U.S. actions have made it difficult to reconcile the contradictions between China and the United States on the Taiwan Strait issue, mainly due to the United States’ insistence on pursuing the “use Taiwan to control China” policy. The United States has increasingly hollowed out the one-China policy in recent years, and it has colluded with the Taiwan authorities to promote the “undetermined status of Taiwan” theory, which seriously threatens peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and makes it particularly urgent to strengthen mechanisms for managing crises between China and the United States. In April 2022, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe emphasized during a call with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (the first call between a U.S. and Chinese defense secretaries since the Biden administration took office) that the U.S. side must put its “four ‘does not’ and one ‘has no intention'” ⁵⁶ commitment into practice, that the Chinese military will resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, and that Taiwan is an integral part of China. These are the facts and the status quo, which no one can change. ⁵⁷ Foreign media disclosed that Austin, in addition to focusing on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, also expressed to Wei Fenghe the United States’ concerns about China’s so-called military provocations in the Taiwan Strait and activities in the South China and East China Seas, and reiterated Biden’s remarks about the importance of improving crisis communication between the two countries and managing U.S.-China strategic competition, including in the nuclear, space, and cyber domains. ⁵⁸ Judging from the relevant content discussed in the call between the U.S. and Chinese defense secretaries, crisis management is by far the biggest point of convergence between the two sides. (“Both sides agreed that the U.S. and Chinese militaries should keep communication channels open, manage risks, and promote the construction of a crisis communication mechanism. ⁵⁹“)

On the Taiwan Strait issue, China and the United States need to further negotiate more practical and in-depth cooperation on confidence-building measures and crisis management at the strategic and technical levels, based on the two countries’ current crisis management mechanisms. The existing crisis management mechanisms of China and the United States mainly have three types of institutional arrangements: high-level interaction, dialogue and communication channels, and military rules of behavior. The first two types of “strategic dialogue”-based mechanisms include Defense Consultative Talks (DCT),⁶⁰ Joint Strategic Dialogue Mechanism (JSDM), ⁶¹ Defense Policy Coordination Talk (PCT), ⁶² the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), ⁶³ and the Defense Telephone Link (DTL), ⁶⁴ as well as the suspended Strategic Security Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD) between defense departments, and the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (two-plus-two). ⁶⁵ The third category of rules of behavior-based mechanisms at the “technical” level includes the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), ⁶⁶ adopted at the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in 2014, ⁶⁷ and the “Notification of Major Military Activities [and] Confidence Building Measures Mechanism” and the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters,”⁶⁸ established in November 2014. (In September 2015, the two sides completed the formal signing of a “Military Crisis Notification” annex to the “Notification of Major Military Activities” mechanism and an “Air Encounters” annex to the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.”) ⁶⁹ It is worth noting that rules of behavior-based mechanisms at the “technical” level (e.g., the most specific of the institutional arrangements between the U.S. and Chinese militaries—the “Notification of Major Military Activities and Confidence Building Measures Mechanism” and the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters”) are often influenced by the political climate and overall relationship environment, and do not always play a significant role in curbing maritime conflicts between the two sides. ⁷⁰ Therefore, to further strengthen U.S.-China crisis management mechanisms for the Taiwan Strait, joint promotion is necessary at both the “strategic” and “technical” levels. It is especially necessary to negotiate on crisis prevention and confidence-building measures in the Taiwan Strait at the “strategic” level, to prevent the “strategic mutual trust deficit” from rendering ineffective the existing “rules of behavior” between the two militaries. In addition, the only way to control the risk variables arising from the U.S. policy of “using Taiwan to control China” so that they do not “spill over” to other aspects of U.S.-China relations is to rely on “strategic dialogue.” Under the current circumstances, if the U.S. side does not “dial back” its Taiwan Strait policy, the gap between the positions of the United States and China will be huge, and cause concern for the practical significance of strengthening the “strategic dialogue” between the United States and China to prevent crises in the Taiwan Strait.

(2) Potential differences in interpretation of international law and “technical shortcomings” existing mechanisms

At the technical level, the construction of crisis control mechanisms between the U.S. and Chinese militaries has made great progress, and mechanisms such as the U.S.-China “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” can effectively reduce misunderstandings and misjudgments when vessels and aircraft from the two sides encounter each other in uncontested and low-sensitivity waters and airspace. However, they all have “technical shortcomings” in terms of obligatoriness and operability, and there are potential differences in the interpretation of international law between the two sides. Therefore, in order for the United States and China to avoid misjudgment and escalation of “accidents” in the increasingly “crowded” Taiwan Strait region, it is necessary for the two sides to hold in-depth consultations on the basis of existing mechanisms, strive to negotiate more detailed rules, and in particular avoid dangerous and provocative actions against each other.

First of all, the “rules of encounter” under mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” are not legally binding. ⁷¹ They are very thorough for “accidental encounters,” but are rather insufficient for “intentional encounters.” In the case of the Taiwan Strait, if U.S. ships and aircraft carry out “freedom of navigation operations” against China (for which there seems to be no precedent so far, and from the reports issued by the U.S. Department of Defense, there is no record of their transiting the Taiwan Strait to challenge China’s so-called “excessive maritime claims”⁷²) or close reconnaissance and other provocative actions, then the Chinese side’s shadowing, surveillance, and expulsion of U.S. ships and aircraft would clearly not be “accidental encounters,” and mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” can hardly be applied to such “intentional encounters.” It is worth studying how to solve such problems.

Secondly, the Chinese side has no choice but to “respond” to some “gunboat diplomacy” actions by the U.S. military that violate China’s territorial sovereignty or harm China’s security interests, and such cases are not “accidental encounters.” Mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” are hardly applicable, and the differences between the United States and China in the interpretation of international law are difficult to resolve in the short term. The United States often talks about “freedom of navigation” to conceal its intention to deploy military forces, but its real claim is “freedom of military activity.” Issues such as “excessive straight baselines,” “innocent passage” of foreign warships in territorial waters, and freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones all stem from this. On the first two issues, the differences between the U.S. and Chinese positions are very clear and difficult to reconcile in the short term. On the issue of freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones, there is still room for “policy” coordination between the United States and China on specific practices.

It is worth noting that the United States often conflates the issue of “freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones” with the issue of “freedom of navigation,” but strictly speaking the two are not the same thing at all. Article 58 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states: “In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”⁷³ The United States is in fact ascribing “freedom of military activity within exclusive economic zones” to the aforementioned “other internationally lawful uses,” but “other internationally lawful uses” cannot be equated with “freedom of navigation.” Rather, they are uses of the seas related to “freedom of navigation.” The U.S. side should reflect on whether it is reasonable to differentiate “rules camps” according to its own interpretation of relevant international law, such as by including China among the 27 countries with which it disagrees on the issue of freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones, ⁷⁴ but the “reasonableness” argument offered by the U.S. side is very limited. The U.S. “Freedom of Navigation Operations” reports in recent years have often referred to the “excessive maritime claims” in the Survey and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China. If the U.S. side believed that a distinction should be made between military surveying and marine scientific research, and that the United States and China had divergent legal claims on this issue, then it would have been entirely possible for the U.S. side to have consulted with the Chinese side in a “more peaceful” manner to “convince people with reason” rather than just relying on military ships and aircraft to “apply pressure.”

The U.S.-China “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” expressly states that the “Rules” are without prejudice to the respective “policies” of the two sides regarding military activities in exclusive economic zones. ⁷⁵ Some scholars have pointed out that China’s opposition to U.S. close reconnaissance and other military operations in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is primarily due to security concerns rather than legal reasons, and that China’s recognition and practice regarding its EEZ is becoming more open as the Chinese military’s overseas activities continue to grow. ⁷⁶ However, the Taiwan Strait is an exceptionally sensitive area, and the U.S. side should have a clear understanding of this. Within the potential EEZ of the Taiwan Strait, high-profile “passage” by U.S. ships and aircraft is provocative. (China has not accused them of violating international law in any of its statements.) For the “Taiwan independence” forces, moreover, they are a kind of “support and cheering.” They are purely provocative moves that promote the “militarization” of the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. side needs to reduce the frequency and intensity of its military activities in the Taiwan Strait, and not vainly try to intimidate and pressure China in this way. It should abide by the one-China principle and do more things that benefit China-U.S. relations and promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, instead of doing the opposite.

Finally, it appears that the two sides should explore filling the “gaps” in the existing mechanisms as to rules that may be able to coordinate their practices, such as on how to coordinate their positions and practices in the case of “intentional encounters” in military exercise areas. The Chinese side had already announced the latitude and longitude boundaries of an exercise area in late August 2020, but a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft nonetheless intruded. ⁷⁷ If such a situation were to occur in the Taiwan Strait, it could have unforeseen and serious repercussions. The difficulty of applying the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” and other mechanisms to such situations is mainly due to the apparently divergent practices of China and the United States. As stipulated in Section 5, Paragraph 1 of Annex III (“Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters”) to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (“When conducting activities that will affect the safety of nearby military vessels and military aircraft, commanders are to ensure the appropriate danger zone or warning zone is established or declared”) and Paragraph 3 of the same Section (“The military vessels and military aircraft of one Side should refrain from impeding the relevant activities in the applicable zones established or declared by the other Side; however, military vessels and military aircraft always enjoy the rights of freedom of navigation, overflight, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms”) ⁷⁸, the U.S. side may argue that its reconnaissance aircraft do not interfere with China’s exercise activities, and so do not violate the provisions of these paragraphs, or that its military aircraft have always enjoyed “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” and are not obligated to comply in “international airspace” with exercise area restrictions established by other countries. According to the U.S. position, for an exercise area established by a country outside its airspace, other countries’ ships and aircraft are not required to stay away and have “freedom of navigation” to enter the area to conduct intelligence gathering activities, as long as they have “due regard” for the relevant rights of the country that established the area.⁷⁹

(3) “Air Encounters” in the Taiwan Strait in particular require special attention and refinement of the “rules”

Since the Biden administration took office, the U.S. military has frequently dispatched ships and aircraft to China’s surrounding sea area and airspace, driving regional militarization and threatening regional peace and stability. ⁸⁰ With regard to U.S.-China military activities in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding airspace, in order to strengthen crisis control and reduce the risk of U.S. close reconnaissance triggering an incident similar to the “South China Sea collision” in 2001 [the Hainan Island incident], the two militaries need to further strengthen the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters” in Annex III of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, strengthen exchanges on specific issues where the two sides have different positions due to different “interpretations” of international law, and actively promote the exploration of “rules” that facilitate practical operations and focus on managing accidents and avoiding friction.”

The Taiwan issue is the most central and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. As competition between China and the United States intensifies and the sense of crisis of “Taiwan independence” forces on Taiwan Island grows, the strategic game between China and the United States in the airspace of the Taiwan Strait will become more intense, and the level of tension will even exceed that in the air over the South China Sea. Given the high sensitivity and special nature of the Taiwan Strait region, China and the United States must consider establishing more targeted “strict” rules, and discuss how to avoid problems such as friction in the event of “intentional encounters” between military aircraft of both sides or multiple parties. In addition, China and the United States should also pay attention to and strengthen communication on military UAVs, including standards of conduct and the international law issues involved, so as to avoid misjudgments or even “accidents” triggered by gaps in the “rules.”

4.      Conclusion

At present, the root cause of tension in the Taiwan Strait is the attempt by the DPP authorities to change the fact that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same China. Politicians such as Tsai Ing-wen, disregarding the well-being and safety of the Taiwanese people, delude themselves in thinking they can depend on the “empty promises” of external forces in a bid to “rely on foreign powers to seek independence,” but they are doomed to have no way out. China must be reunified and inevitably will be reunified. This is an unstoppable historical process and a major trend. Some people on the U.S. side, in the face of the worsening situation in Ukraine, are trying to “add fuel to the flames” of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on one hand, and on the other are trying to “let others suffer on their behalf” by deliberately drawing parallels between the Taiwan issue and the Ukraine issue and condoning and encouraging the development of “Taiwan independence” forces, which gravely violates the basic norms of international relations. The U.S. side should not indulge in “double standards” when it comes to international rules. As State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said, “There are fundamental differences between the Taiwan issue and the Ukraine issue. There is no comparison. The most fundamental difference is that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory and the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair of China, while the Ukraine issue is a dispute between Russia and Ukraine. It is a barefaced double standard for some people to emphasize the principle of sovereignty on the Ukraine issue, but keep undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan issue.” ⁸¹

Recently, the “negative” direction of U.S. policy on Taiwan has become increasingly apparent, and the Biden administration has exceeded its predecessor in words and deeds that hollow out the one-China policy. The latest weather vane is the “U.S. Relations with Taiwan, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet” that was significantly revised and updated on May 5, 2022 ⁸² (the previous version was released on August 31, 2018, under the Trump administration ⁸³), removing “The United States does not support Taiwan independence” from the previous version, as well as “There is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China” and other related expressions. The U.S. side is well aware of the importance of such content for the U.S.-China relationship, but it still uses an “announce to the world” approach to engage in ploys of political manipulation on the Taiwan issue, which are highly suggestive of encouraging “Taiwan independence” elements and “fanning the flames” in the Taiwan Strait.

The Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests. The U.S. side has disregarded the one-China principle and the spirit of the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and is colluding with the DPP authorities, continuously sending seriously wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” forces and undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. On Taiwan-related issues, if the U.S. side does not reflect on the error of its “using Taiwan to control China” policy and continues to seek gains for itself by “walking a tightrope” or “slicing salami,” it will surely be “playing with fire and end up burning itself.” Given the growing gap between the U.S. and Chinese policy positions on the meaning and content of “one China,” and the possibility of the Taiwan authorities using the situation in Ukraine to play more tricks, U.S.-Taiwan collusion may continue to escalate in the short term, especially before the U.S. midterm elections. The risk variables of the U.S.-China game in the Taiwan Strait are likely to continue to grow and even “spill over” to other areas, and the normal development of economic and trade cooperation between China and other countries may also be “compromised.” In the current situation of increased uncertainty and instability in the Taiwan Strait, China and the United States should meet each other half way and use actions to create a good atmosphere. The U.S. side in particular must be vigilant to avoid any provocative behavior that heightens regional tensions and is likely to cause misunderstandings and misjudgments.