With the China-U.S. strategic game intensifying, the United States is frequently playing the “Taiwan card” in a vain attempt to use the Taiwan issue as a “counterweight” to pressure China and force China to “make concessions” on other issues. In recent years, the Tsai Ing-wen administration has insisted on taking the path of “gradual Taiwan independence” and being “pro-United States and anti-mainland China.” The United States, meanwhile, has adopted a “supportive” or “facilitating” attitude in many areas such as mutual visits with Taiwan officials, legislation, and military affairs, raising the official level of U.S.-Taiwan interaction, increasing arms sales to Taiwan, and passing several Taiwan-related bills that openly defy China’s bottom line. Although the Biden administration has made some adjustments in its Taiwan Strait policy compared to its predecessor, it has not changed the strategic thinking of “using Taiwan to control China,” and appears to be “more structured” and “shrewd and calculating” in its implementation. “This trend is very dangerous. It is playing with fire, and those who play with fire will set themselves on fire.”1
随着中美战略博弈加剧，美国频打 “台湾牌”，妄图利用台湾问题这一 “砝码” 对华施压，迫使中国在其他问题上 “退让”。近年来，蔡英文当局坚持走“渐进式台独” 和 “亲美抗陆” 路线，而美国则在与台官员互访、立法、军事等多领域采取 “支持” 或 “助推” 态度，不断提升美台互动的官方层级，加大对台军售力度，通过多个涉台法案，公然挑衅中国底线。在台海政策上，拜登政 府较之前任虽有所调整，但并未转变 “以台制华” 的战略思维，在实施层面上还显得 “更有章法” 和 “老谋深算”。“这一趋势十分危险，是在玩火，而玩火者必自焚。”
For some time now, the U.S. government has unreasonably blamed the high tension in the Taiwan Strait on “military, diplomatic and economic pressure” on Taiwan by mainland China, and groundlessly accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of conducting “provocative military activities” around the Taiwan Strait. It has also cooperated with the Tsai Ing-wen administration to continuously hype so-called “incursions” into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” by PLA military aircraft, which is a false proposition completely inconsistent with basic facts and elementary international law, and contrary to the consistent position of the United States. Under the pretext of “opposing unilateral changes to the status quo or undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,” it intervenes in Taiwan Strait affairs and finds “reasonableness” to support provocations such as sending more U.S. warships and aircraft to conduct high-frequency activities in the region. The collusion of all kinds between the United States and Taiwan has caused grave damage to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive core issue between the United States and China, and if not handled properly, it will cause subversive and comprehensive damage to China-U.S. relations. The next moves and potential tactics of U.S.-Taiwan collusion, as well as its impact on the direction of the U.S.-China Taiwan Strait game, deserve close attention, and it is especially important to analyze how to stop its “spillover” from negatively affecting our national security and overall diplomatic situation.
一段时期以来，美国政府毫无道理地将台海局势高度紧张的局面归咎于中国大陆对台 “军事、外交和经济施压”，无端指责中国人民解放军在台海周边进行 “挑衅性军事活动”，并配合蔡英文当局持续炒作所谓解放军军机 “侵入” “台湾防空识别区” 这一完全不符合基本事实和国际法常识且有悖美国一贯立场的伪命题，以为其借口 “反对单方面改变现状或破坏台海和平与稳定” 而插手台海事务并派遣更多美军舰机在本地区高频次活动等挑衅行为寻得 “合理性” 支撑。美台互相勾连的种种行径已对中美关系造成严重损害。台湾问题是中美 之间最重要、最敏感的核心问题，若处理不当，将对中美关系造成颠覆性、全 局性破坏。美台勾连的下一步动向和潜在抓手，及其对中美台海博弈走向的影 响，均值得密切关注，而研析如何遏阻其 “外溢” 对我国家安全和外交大局产生消极影响尤具重要现实意义。
1. The “negative” direction of the Biden Administration’s Taiwan Strait policy is apparent
一、拜登政府台海政策 “消极” 走向明显
The Trump administration took a reckless, go-it-alone approach to U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations, continuously eroding the spirit of the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, aggressively strengthening the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, constantly bumping up against and jolting the political foundation and the most important cornerstone of U.S.-China relations—the one-China principle. Compared to the Trump administration’s “blustering” approach, the Biden administration has made some adjustments in tactics, but it has failed to fundamentally change the strategic thinking of “using Taiwan to control China.” Its “salami-slicing” ploys on Taiwan-related issues have increased in strength and frequency, its manner of playing the “Taiwan card” has become more “underhanded” and “scheming,” and the threat that its initiatives pose to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait continues to rise. In recent years, the “two-faced nature” of the Biden administration’s policy toward China has become increasingly apparent. As State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a press conference for the “Two Sessions” in March 2022, “U.S. leaders and some senior officials have said that the United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to change China’s institutions, does not seek to strengthen alliances against China, does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ and has no intention of engaging in conflict or confrontation with China. Regrettably, however, these statements were left hanging in the air and never implemented.” 2
特朗普政府在中美关系、美台关系上恣意妄为、另搞一套，不断蚕食中美 三个联合公报精神，大肆强化 “与台湾关系法” 及对台 “六项保证”，不断触碰、冲击中美关系的政治基础与最重要的基石———一个中国原则。相较于特朗普政府的 “暴冲作法”，拜登政府在策略手段上虽进行了一定调整，但未能从根本上转变 “以台制华”的战略思维，其在涉台问题上 “切香肠” 小动作的力度和频度甚有提增，其打 “台湾牌” 的方式更加 “阴损”、更多 “谋局”，其相关举措对台海和平稳定的威胁持续上升。近年来，拜登政府对华政策的 “两面性” 愈益明显，正如国务委员兼外交部长王毅在 2022 年 3 月 “两会” 记者会上所说: “美方领导人和一些高官相继表示，美方不寻求新冷战，不寻求改变中国的体制，不 寻求强化同盟关系反对中国，不支持 ‘台独’，无意同中国发生冲突对抗。但令人遗憾的是，这 ‘四不一无意’的表态始终飘浮在空中，迟迟没有落地。”
(1) The United States has stepped up its emphasis on Taiwan “strategy,” and keeps reiterating its “commitment” to Taiwan
(一) 美加大对台 “战略” 重视，不断重申对台 “承诺”
Since the Biden administration took office, its “salami slicing” ploys on Taiwan-related issues have been incessant, the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” document it issued promotes the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue, and it has actively made public statements to the outside world to “bolster” Taiwan and constantly given the wrong signals to Taiwan. This has encouraged the “Taiwan independence” forces to go further and further down the road of “relying on foreign powers to seek independence,” which has seriously damaged the relationship between China and the United States and peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
拜登政府执政以来，在涉台问题上 “切香肠” 小动作不断，其发布 “印太 战略” 文件力推台湾问题 “国际化”，并积极对外表态公开 “挺台”，不断向台释放错误信号，使得 “台独” 势力大受鼓舞而在 “挟洋谋独” 路上越走越远， 严重破坏了中美两国关系与台海和平稳定。
As the United States pushes forward with comprehensive strategic competition with China, “deterrence” against China in the Taiwan Strait is an important tactic. The Biden administration has continued the Trump administration’s practice of mentioning Taiwan in its National Security Strategy. Its Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021 states that, in accordance with its long-term commitments, it will support Taiwan as a “democracy, a key economy, and a security partner.”3 In February 2022, the Biden administration released the Indo-Pacific Strategy document, which in regard to Taiwan-related issues explicitly indicates: “We (the United States) will also work with partners in the region and beyond to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, including supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, to ensure an environment in which the future of Taiwan is peacefully determined by the will and best interests of its people. As we do so, our approach remains consistent with our one-China policy and the longstanding commitments we have made under the ‘Taiwan Relations Act,’ the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.” 4 Even after the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in Europe, Russia’s priority as a strategic competitor to the United States did not rise. In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Defense submitted a classified version of the National Defense Strategy to Congress. In its published “Fact Sheet,” the United States still considers China “the most important strategic competitor” and “will prioritize the Chinese challenge in the Indo-Pacific.” It is likely that the undisclosed portion of the document contains Taiwan-related content similar to that of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.5
美国推展对华全面战略竞争，在台海对华 “威慑” 是重要抓手。拜登政府延续了特朗普政府在 “国家安全战略” 中提及台湾的作法，在其 2021 年 3 月发布的 《国家安全战略临时指南》中，称将根据美国长期承诺，支持台湾这个“民主政体、关键经济体与安全合作伙伴”。 2022 年 2 月，拜登政府发布 《印太战略》文件，其就涉台问题明确指出: “我们 ( 美国) 也将与区域内外伙伴协作维护台海和平稳定，包括支援台湾自卫能力，以确保能有一个依循台湾人民的 意志与最大利益和平地决定台湾未来的环境。我们如此行事，我们的处理方法 仍然符合我们的一个中国政策以及我们在 ‘与台湾关系法’、 ‘三个联合公报’ 和 ‘六项保证’ 中所作长期承诺。” 即便欧洲爆发俄乌冲突，俄罗斯作为美国战略竞争对手的优先级也没提升。2022 年 3 月，美国国防部向国会呈交机密版《国防战略》，在其已公布的 “基本情况” 中仍把中国视为 “最重要的战略竞争对手” 而 “将中国在印太挑战作为优先事项”，其未公开部分很可能含有与《印太战略》相类似的涉台内容。
In recent years, the “double standard” and “using Taiwan to control China” tendency in the external statements of senior U.S. government officials has become increasingly apparent. When Secretary of State nominee Antony Blinken addressed the Taiwan issue at a U.S. Senate hearing on January 19, 2021, he professed his support for the Trump-era approach of lifting restrictions on U.S.-Taiwan relations. 6 The State Department under Blinken’s leadership later issued a statement on January 23 groundlessly accusing China of “military pressure against Taiwan” that “threatens regional peace and stability,” emphasizing the U.S. commitment to Taiwan in response to the alleged repeated penetration of PLA military aircraft into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone,” stressing that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is “rock-solid” and that it will honor its commitments under the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances to Taiwan, and continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining adequate self-defense capabilities. 7 In a media interview in April, Blinken alleged that China was raising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and stressed that the United States had what he called a “serious commitment” to maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, adding that “anyone who tries to use force to change the status quo will be making a serious mistake.” 8 In a speech at the IISS-Fullerton Lecture in July, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin peddled the “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” Talking about the Taiwan issue, he said that U.S. collaboration with Taiwan to enhance its self-defense capabilities is consistent with the United States’ one-China policy. 9 The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan shook public opinion in Taiwan, but Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s National Security Advisor, emphasized that “the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is as strong as it’s ever been,” and said “Afghanistan is different from Taiwan.” 10 In a statement issued in early October in response to the so-called record “incursions” by PLA military aircraft into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, the U.S. Department of State, in addition to repeating the January statement, “urged Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion on Taiwan,” and also expressed its high level of concern over “provocative military actions” by mainland China around Taiwan. 11
近年来，美国政府高官对外表态的 “双重标准” 和 “以台制华” 倾向愈益明显。2021 年 1 月 19 日，美国国务卿提名人布林肯在参议院听证会上谈及台湾问题，声称支持特朗普时期有关解除美台交往限制的作法。 稍后，对于所谓解放军军机多次进出 “台湾防空识别区” 一事，布林肯领导下的国务院于 1 月 23 日发表声明，无端指责中国 “对台军事施压威胁区域和平稳定”，强调美对台承诺 “坚如磐石”，将信守在中美三个联合公报、 “与台湾关系法”、对台 “六项保证” 中所作承诺，继续协助台湾维持足够的自卫能力。 布林肯在 4 月接受媒体采访时，指称中国大陆加剧台海紧张局势，并强调美国在维持台湾自卫能力 一事上有所谓 “严肃的承诺”，还表示 “任何人试图使用武力改变现状都将犯下严重错误”。 7 月，美防长奥斯汀在富勒敦讲座发表演讲兜售 “印太战略”，在谈及台湾问题时表示，美国与台协作以增强其自卫能力符合美国的一个中国政 策。 美国撤离阿富汗一事曾使台湾舆论震动，美国总统国家安全事务助理沙利文就此强调 “美国对台承诺一如既往坚实”，并称 “阿富汗与台湾情况不同”。 在 10 月初针对所谓解放军军机创纪录 “侵入” “台湾防空识别区” 事件的声明中， 美国务院除了重复 1 月声明中 “敦促北京停止对台军事、外交、经济施压和胁迫” 等相关表述，还表示对中国大陆在台周边 “挑衅性军事行动”高度关注。
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has escalated its “pro-Taiwan” stance significantly, and compared the Taiwan issue to the Ukraine issue. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said at a hearing before the House Financial Services Committee on April 6, 2022 that sanctions against Russia would apply to other situations, and that the current administration would use all the sanctions it could impose if China “invaded Taiwan.” 12 At a breakfast meeting of the Economic Club of Washington On April 14, [National Security Advisor] Jake Sullivan said in an interview that the White House believes China will “learn a lesson” from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, that the Taiwan and Ukraine situations are different, and that the United States will take all possible measures to ensure that a Chinese “invasion of Taiwan” never happens. 13 At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on April 26 to discuss the FY 2023 State Department budget, [Secretary of State] Blinken said that the current administration is determined to ensure that Taiwan has all the means necessary to defend itself against any potential “aggression,” and will focus on supporting Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its asymmetric deterrence capabilities. 14
在俄乌冲突爆发后，美国 “挺台” 表态明显升级，并将台湾问题与乌克兰问题相类比。2022 年 4 月 6 日，美国财长耶伦在出席众议院金融服务委员会的听证会上称，对俄制裁手段亦适用其他情形，若中国大陆 “侵台”，本届政府将采用所能实施的全部制裁措施。 4 月 14 日，沙利文在出席华盛顿经济俱乐部早餐会接受采访时表示，白宫认为中国会由俄乌冲突 “吸取教训”，台湾与乌克兰情况不同，美国会采取一切可能措施确保中国大陆 “侵台” 不会发生。 4 月 26日，布林肯在出席参议院外交关系委员会讨论 2023 财年国务院预算的听证会上称，本届政府决心确保台湾拥有一切必要手段抵御任何潜在 “侵略” 行为，并将重点支持台加强不对称威慑能力。
(2) The United States has been making a high-profile effort to help Taiwan expand its “international space,” and is “teaming up” to vigorously “use Taiwan to control China”
(二) 美高调助台拓展 “国际空间” 并 “组团” 大搞 “以台制华”
Compared to the Trump administration, the Biden administration appears more adept at promoting the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue, and it uses many of its allies to “team up” and build momentum for maximizing China’s consumption of diplomatic resources on the Taiwan issue, thereby accomplishing its goal of alienating China’s relations with relevant countries.
较之特朗普政府，拜登政府显然更加善于推动台湾问题 “国际化”，并利用众多盟友 “组团” 造势在台湾问题上最大程度地消耗中国外交资源，遂行其离间中国与相关国家关系之目的。
Since the start of the Biden administration, the U.S. government has made a high-profile effort to help Taiwan expand its so-called “international space.” May 2021, Secretary of State Blinken called on World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to invite the Taiwanese authorities to participate in the annual meeting of the World Health Assembly as observers. 15 In September, the United States also publicly supported Taiwan’s membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), although it is not a CPTPP member itself. 16 In October, Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement calling on all UN member states to join the United States in supporting the Taiwan authorities’ participation in the UN system, particularly in the annual meetings of the WHO and the International Civil Aviation Organization. 17 In December, the United States invited the Taiwan authorities to participate in the so-called “Leaders’ Summit for Democracy,” despite China’s firm opposition, boosting the arrogance of the “Taiwan independence” forces. 18 In March 2022, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Michele Sison said that Taiwan had contributed to the international community on many issues and called on the United Nations to include the Taiwan region. 19
拜登执政以来，美国政府高调助台拓展所谓 “国际空间”。2021 年 5 月，国务卿布林肯呼吁世界卫生组织总干事谭德塞邀请台湾当局以观察员身份参加世 界卫生大会年度会议。 9 月，美国还公开支持台湾地区加入 《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》( CPTPP) ，虽然它本身并非 CPTPP 成员。 10 月，国务卿布林肯发表声明，呼吁所有联合国会员国同美国一道支持台湾当局参与联合国 系统，尤其是参加世卫组织和国际民航组织年会。 12 月，不顾中方坚决反对， 美国邀请台湾当局参加所谓 “领导人民主峰会”，为 “台独” 势力张目。 2022年 3 月，美国负责国际组织事务的助理国务卿米歇尔·西森 ( Michele Sison) 表示，台湾地区在诸多问题上对国际颇有贡献，呼吁联合国接纳台湾地区。
The United States has also actively strengthened its Taiwan-related collusion with its allies, and gone out of its way to “link the two seas with the Taiwan Strait,”20 that is, to forcibly “embed” the Taiwan Strait issue in the South China Sea and East China Sea. In February 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken held talks in Honolulu with Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong. They issued a joint statement after the meeting “emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” 21 It was the first time the words “Taiwan Strait” had appeared in a joint statement by the foreign ministers of the United States, Japan and South Korea. In April, Biden met with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. The post-meeting U.S.-Japan Leaders’ Statement, in addition to reiterating opposition to “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East China Sea” and “China’s unlawful maritime claims and activities in the South China Sea,” also mentioned the Taiwan issue. (This was the first time since the Nixon-Sato summit meeting in 1969 that content on Taiwan was included in a U.S.-Japan leader’s statement) “[We] underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”22 From the Japanese side’s subsequent performance, it is clear that it has “common self-interest” with the United States in “using Taiwan to control China.” As a result, from a security and strategic point of view, Japan has been constantly sending policy signals that it will continue to intervene militarily and intervene in the trend of the situation, alone or by “teaming up” with the United States.23 In May, the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting was held in London, and the joint communiqué issued after the meeting contained a good deal of Taiwan-related content. In addition to declaring support for Taiwan authorities to participate in the WHO and the World Health Assembly, it also went out of its way to “link two seas with the Taiwan Strait” by inserting the issue of Taiwan Strait security into the “East China Sea and South China Sea”—stressing the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and calling for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue, all while focusing on the situation in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. 24 In June, at the urging of the United States and Japan, the joint communiqué of the G-7 summit publicly mentioned the Taiwan Strait issue for the first time in (with wording similar to that of the foreign ministers’ meeting in May).25 In September, the United States, the UK, and Australia announced the establishment of a trilateral security partnership, and included the Taiwan issue in a so-called “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The United States and Australia’s remarks on Taiwan once again exposed their long-standing misunderstandings on the Taiwan issue and their attempt to “use Taiwan to control China.”26 In December, the United States and the European Union held their second “U.S.-EU Dialogue on China” in Washington, D.C. The joint statement issued after the meeting expressed strong concern about China’s “problematic unilateral actions” in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait, which they said “undermine peace and security in the region and have a direct impact on the security and prosperity of both the United States and European Union.”27
美国还积极与其盟友加强涉台勾连，将台海问题强行 “嵌入” 南海、东海方向，大搞 “三海联动”。2021 年 2 月，美国国务卿布林肯、日本外务大臣林芳正和韩国外交部长官郑义溶在檀香山举行会谈，其会后发表的联合声明 “强调台湾海峡和平与稳定的重要性”，这是美日韩外长联合声明中首次出现 “台湾海峡” 字样。4 月，拜登会见来访的日本首相菅义伟。在会后的美日首脑联合声明中，除了重申反对 “任何单方面改变东海现状的企图” 和 “中国在南海的非法主张和活动”，还提及台湾问题 ( 这是自 1969 年尼克松与佐藤荣作会谈以来美日首脑会谈联合声明中首次写入有关台湾的内容) ——— “强调台海和平与稳定的重要性，鼓励两岸问题和平解决”。 从日方后续表现来看，其在 “以台制华” 上与美国存在 “共同私利”，故而从安全及战略角度不断发出日本将单独或与美国 “组团” 军事介入台海、干预形势趋向的政策信号。 5 月，七国集团外长会在伦敦举行，其会后发表的联合公报包含不少涉台内容，除宣称支持台湾 当局参加世卫组织和世卫大会外，还将台海安全议题塞入 “东海和南海” 项下大搞 “三海联动” ———在关注东海和南海局势的同时，强调台海和平稳定的重参见吴怀中: 《日本图谋军事介入台海态势分析》， 《亚太安全与海洋研究》2021 年第 6 期，第要性及呼吁和平解决台海问题。 6 月，在美日两国极力怂恿下，七国集团峰会联合公报中首次公开提及台海问题 ( 措辞与 5 月外长会公报相似) 。 9 月，美英澳宣布建立三边安全伙伴关系，把中国台湾地区纳入所谓 “印太战略”，美澳有关涉台言论再次暴露其长期以来在台湾问题上的错误认知和 “以台制华” 的图谋。 12 月，美国和欧盟外交高层在华盛顿举行第二次 “美欧中国议题对话”，会后发表的美欧联合声明对中国在南海、东海和台海 “有问题的单边行动” 表达强烈关切，并称此已 “破坏区域和平安全且直接影响到美国和欧盟的安全和繁荣”。
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has not given up hyping the Taiwan issue, and has vigorously strengthened its collusion with European allies on Taiwan. On April 21-22, 2022, during consultations in Brussels, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European External Action Service, held the third “U.S.-EU Dialogue on China.” They claimed that they “oppose any actions that undermine the status quo” on the Taiwan issue, and repeated lies about “re-education camps” and “forced labor” in Xinjiang. 28 It is worth noting that some European countries, under the spell of the United States, have mistakenly drawn parallels between the Ukraine issue and the Taiwan issue, such as in British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss’s April 27 speech declaring that NATO “should also protect Taiwan” from mainland China’s “encroachment.” 29
在俄乌冲突爆发后，美国也没有放弃炒作台湾问题，大力加强与欧洲盟友 涉台勾连。2022 年 4 月 21—22 日，美国常务副国务卿舍曼和欧盟对外行动署秘书长萨尼诺在布鲁塞尔进行磋商，其间举行第三次 “美欧中国议题对话”，声称在台湾问题上 “反对任何破坏现状的行径”，并再次重复关于新疆 “再教育营” “强迫劳动” 的谎言。 值得注意的是，部分欧洲国家受美国蛊惑，错误地将台湾问题类比乌克兰问题，如英国外交大臣特拉斯 4 月 27 日发表讲话宣称北约“也应保护台湾” 不受中国大陆 “侵扰”。
(3) U.S.-Taiwan bilateral exchanges frequently touch the red line
China has always firmly opposed any form of official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. The United States should abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and stop official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. The “Taiwan Travel Act,” passed during the Trump administration by the U.S. Congress to unbind official exchanges between the United States and Taiwan at all levels, 30 breached the long-standing norms and restrictions of the “one act and three communiqués.” The Biden administration appears to be further putting the “Taiwan Travel Act” into practice, and bilateral exchanges between the United States and Taiwan are tending to “cross the line.”
中方一贯坚决反对任何形式的美台官方往来，美方理应恪守一个中国原则 和中美三个联合公报规定，停止美台官方交往。特朗普执政时期，美国会通过 的解绑美台各层级官员往来的 “与台湾交往法”，突破了长期以来 “一法三公报” 的规范与限制。拜登政府似乎正在进一步落实 “与台湾交往法”，美台双边交往有 “越线” 倾向。
In January 2021, Kurt Campbell, coordinator for Indo-Pacific affairs on the National Security Council, invited Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s “representative to the United States,” to attend the inauguration of President Biden.31 This was hyped by both the U.S. and Taiwanese media, who said the “invitation” was the first since 1979. In March, President Surangel Whipps Jr. of Palau, a “diplomatic ally” of Taiwan, visited Taiwan, and U.S. Ambassador to Palau John Hennessey-Niland was part of the delegation. This was the first public visit to Taiwan by a U.S. ambassador since 1979.32 In June, despite Chinese opposition, 33 the United States and and Taiwan held talks on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 34 and reached the so-called “ten points of consensus.” (Actually, it is only ten different working groups, focusing on six “trade and investment” issues—agriculture, medical equipment, labor, environment, intellectual property, and financial services—and four “trade and cooperation” issues: bilateral cooperation, supply chains, trade facilitation, and enhancing U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade relations.) 35
2021 年 1 月，美国国家安全委员会印太事务协调员坎贝尔邀请台湾当局“驻美代表” 萧美琴参加拜登总统就职典礼。 美媒和台媒均进行炒作，称此次“受邀” 为 1979 年以来首次。3 月，台湾 “邦交国” 帕劳总统惠恕仁 ( Surangel Whipps，Jr. ) 抵台访问，美国驻帕劳大使亨尼西尼兰 ( John Hennessey－Niland) 也是访团成员之一，这是 1979 年后美国驻外大使首次公开访台。 6 月，美台不 顾中方反对，举行 “贸易暨投资架构协议” ( TIFA) 会谈，达成所谓 “十大共识”( 实际上只是十个不同的工作小组，分别针对农业、医疗器材、劳工、环境、知识产权、金融服务等六个 “贸易与投资” 议题，以及双边合作、供应链、贸易便捷化、提升美台经贸关系等四项“贸易及合作” 议题) 。
In March 2022, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Biden assigned former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen to lead a delegation of former senior U.S. officials to Taiwan to meet with the head of Taiwan’s foreign affairs department, Wu Chao-hsieh, to demonstrate so-called “firm support” for Taiwan. (The five members of the delegation were all former senior U.S. defense and security officials, including Mullen, who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as Meghan O’Sullivan, who served as Deputy National Security Advisor during the Bush administration, and Michèle Flournoy, who served as Under Secretary of Defense under Obama.) 36
2022 年 3 月，俄乌冲突发生后，拜登指派美军前参谋长联席会议主席迈克· 马伦率前高官代表团窜访台湾 ( 代表团共五人，均为美国前高级国防和安全官员， 其中马伦曾在小布什和奥巴马任内担任参联会主席，另外还有小布什政府时期担 任总统国家安全事务副助理的奥沙利文、奥巴马时期的国防部副部长弗卢努瓦 等) ，与台湾外事部门负责人吴钊燮会见，展示所谓对台 “坚定支持”。
Particularly worth noting are the frequent visits to Taiwan by members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives since the Biden administration took office, including: June 6, 2021, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen; November 9, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen and make the first “visit” to Taiwan’s defense department; November 25, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen; and April 15, 2022, when lawmakers visited Taiwan to meet with Tsai Ing-wen. In early April 2022, it was reported in the media that Speaker of the House Pelosi would visit Taiwan. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated his solemn position on this: “If the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, as a state dignitary, knowingly visits Taiwan, it will be a malicious provocation against China’s sovereignty, and gross interference in China’s internal affairs, which will send an extremely dangerous political signal to the outside world. If the U.S. side clings to its reckless course, China will make a resolute response, and all the consequences will be borne by the U.S. side.” 37 Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan failed to materialize due to a positive COVID-19 test result.
特别值得注意的是，拜登政府上台后，美国会参、众议员频频访台，包括: 2021 年 6 月 6 日议员访台与蔡英文会面，11 月 9 日议员访台与蔡英文会面并首次“参访”台湾防务部门，11 月 25 日议员访台与蔡英文会面; 2022 年 4 月 15 日议员访台与蔡英文会面。2022 年 4 月初，有媒体报道，美国会众院议长佩洛西将访问台湾。国务委员兼外长王毅就此表明严正立场: “美国国会众院议长作为一国政要，如明知故犯窜访台湾，将是对中国主权的恶意挑衅，对中国内政的粗暴干涉， 将对外发出极其危险的政治信号。如果美方一意孤行，中方必将作出坚决反应， 一切后果由美方承担。” 因新冠病毒检测结果呈阳性，佩洛西访台未能成行。
(4) U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is growing stronger
The Taiwan issue is purely an internal affair of China, but the U.S. government, in an attempt to “use Taiwan to control China,” has used Taiwan as a pawn to contain China’s development and national rejuvenation. It has made every effort to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship and to help Taiwan build up its “asymmetric warfare capabilities” and enhance its self-defense capabilities.
台湾问题纯属中国内政，但美国政府出于 “以台制华” 企图，将台湾当作遏制中国发展和民族复兴的棋子，竭力强化美台安全关系，设法助台构建 “不对称战力”，提升台湾自我防卫能力。
Since the Biden Administration took office, the United States side has made continuous moves in the areas of arms sales to Taiwan and strengthening U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. In March 2021, the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States signed a so-called “Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Coast Guard Working Group.” 38 The Biden administration has so far announced three arms sales to Taiwan: $750 million in August 2021, $100 million in February 2022, and $95 million in April 2022. 39 In December 2021, President Biden signed the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022,” which contains a number of items related to Taiwan. Based on a continuation of the Trump Administration’s course, it specifies more numerous and more detailed provisions. The main provisions include: Reaffirms that the “Taiwan Relations Act” and the Six Assurances are the foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan; increases U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges, and plans to invite Taiwan to participate in the 2022 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC); emphasizes that the U.S. government should have the ability to prevent mainland China from using force to “invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively;” calls for exploring ways to strengthen cooperation between U.S. and Taiwan intelligence services, wherein U.S. intelligence agencies could use technical and material assistance to help Taiwan to counter “influence operations;” says the U.S. Department of Defense needs to develop programs to help Taiwan improve its “asymmetric warfare capabilities;” and promotes cooperation between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan, including disaster preparedness and response, cybersecurity and communications security, medical cooperation, Mandarin Chinese training and cultural exchanges, and providing National Guard advisors to help train Taiwan’s reserve forces, with cooperation methods to include personnel exchange visits and joint exercises and training. 40 In March 2022, as the situation in Ukraine was intensifying, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities Mara Karlin hyped the “Ukraine model,” and recommended that the Taiwan authorities build “asymmetrical combat power” so that the people of Taiwan would be prepared to make reunification by force as “prickly” as possible. 41
拜登政府执政以来，美方在对台军售、加强美台安全合作等方面动作不断。2021 年 3 月， “美国在台协会” 和 “台北驻美经济文化代表处” 签署了所谓“设立海巡工作小组备忘录”。 拜登政府上任迄今，已三度宣布对台军售，包括: 2021 年 8 月 7. 5 亿美元、2022 年 2 月 1 亿美元和 2022 年 4 月 9500 万美元。 2021 年 12 月，拜登总统签署 2022 财年国防授权法案，包含多项涉台内容，其在延续特朗普政府路线的基础上规定更多、更细致。主要包括: 重申“与台湾关系法” 和 “六项保证” 是美对台政策的基础; 增加美台军事交流，计划邀台参加 2022 年 “环太军演”; 强调美国政府应当具备防止中国大陆使用武力 “在美国可以有效做出反应之前入侵和控制台湾”; 探求美台情报部门如何加强合作，美情报部门可以通过技术和物资援助帮助台湾对抗 “影响力行动”; 美国防部需要制定计划帮助台湾提升 “不对称战力”; 推动美国民警卫队与台合作，包括灾害防救、网络和通讯安全、医疗合作、中文普通话培训和文化交流、 国民警卫队派出顾问帮助台湾训练预备役部队，合作的方式包括人员互访、共 同演训等。 2022 年 3 月，在乌克兰局势愈演愈烈的情况下，美国负责战略、计划与军力的助理国防部长卡尔林 ( Mara Karlin) 在参议院听证会上大肆宣扬 “乌克兰模式”，建议台湾当局构建 “不对称战力”，使台湾人民做好准备令 “武统” 尽可能 “棘手”。
(5) The negative impact of U.S. Congress is increasingly apparent
Under the effect of long-term operations by the Taiwan authorities, the development of forces “friendly to Taiwan” in the U.S. Congress should not be underestimated. During the Trump period, the U.S. Congress focused Taiwan-related legislation on lifting restrictions on official U.S.-Taiwan exchanges, upgrading arms sales to Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan military security relations, and supporting Taiwan’s expanded foreign engagement, passing the “Taiwan Travel Act” (2018), the “Asia Reassurance Initiative Act” (2018), the “Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act” (2019), and the “Taiwan Assurance Act” (2020).42 Since the beginning of the Biden administration, the number of Taiwan-related proposals in the U.S. Congress has increased significantly, with 34 related proposals in the first session of the 117th Congress alone, nearly three times as many as in the 115th Congress. 43 However, it is rarer for Taiwan-related proposals to be passed into law under Biden compared to under Trump, and as of April 2022, the only ones that appear to have been included in the FY2022 Omnibus Appropriations Act are provisions related to “prohibiting the mislabeling” of Taiwan maps, 44 and the only bill passed by both chambers and expected to be signed by President Biden is one on Taiwan’s participation in the WHO (which bill requires the U.S. Department of State to include in its annual report a discussion of the challenges and improvements to its program to support Taiwan’s observer status in the WHO). 45 In addition, the Senate-passed U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (2021) and the House-passed America COMPETES Act (2021) contain essentially the same set of uncontroversial provisions to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation to “resist” mainland China, and are also more likely to be passed by both chambers and become laws.
在台湾当局长年经营下，美国国会中 “友台” 势力发展不容小觑。特朗普时期美国国会涉台立法以解除美台官方往来限制、升级对台军售和美台军事安 全关系、支持台湾地区扩大对外参与为重点，通过了 “与台湾交往法” ( 2018 年) 、“亚洲再保证倡议法” ( 2018 年) 、 “台北法案” ( 2020 年) 、 “台湾保证法”( 2020 年) 等。 拜登政府执政以来，美国会涉台提案明显增多，第 117 届国会仅第一会期的相关提案就达到 34 项，为第 115 届国会的近 3 倍。 不过， 拜登时期的国会涉台提案能获得通过成为法律者较之特朗普时期尚很少见，截 至 2022 年 4 月似乎仅有被纳入 《2022 财年综合拨款法》中的 “禁止不正确标示” 台湾地图相关条款，再有就是已获两院通过且预计拜登总统将会签署成法的涉台参与世卫组织法案 ( 要求美国务院在其年度报告中补充论述有关支持台湾成为世卫组织观察员的计划所面临的挑战及改进方案) 。另外，参议院通过的 《美国创新和竞争法案》( 2021 年) 、众议院通过的 《美国竞争法案》 ( 2021 年) 之中有关加强美台合作 “抵御” 中国大陆的一系列条款基本相同而无争议， 也较有希望获得两院通过成为法律。
As the midterm elections approach, the Democratic and Republican parties are likely to use China-related issues (in which the focus may be Taiwan-related issues) to boost their election campaigns and vie for control of Congress. For example, a March 30, 2022 letter from a bipartisan group of 200 U.S. Representatives to the Biden administration advocated inviting Taiwan to participate in the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. 46 Although there is a consensus in principle between the Democratic and Republican parties on “using Taiwan to control China,” there is still a difference in the methods of promoting it, between “controlled competition” and “extreme containment.” It remains to be seen whether the Biden administration will go further down the road of “using Taiwan to control China” if its domestic support continues to decline.
随着 “中期选举” 临近，美国民主、共和两党为争夺国会控制权，极有可能会利用涉华议题 ( 涉台议题或为重点) 进行舆论炒作提振选情，比如 2022 年3 月 30 日 200 名跨党派美国众议员联名致函拜登政府鼓噪邀请台湾参与 “印太经济框架”。 民主、共和两党虽在 “以台制华” 上存在原则性共识，但在推进方法上尚有 “可控竞争” 和 “极端遏制” 之分歧，国内支持率连续走低的拜登政府会否在 “以台制华” 这条路上走得更远尚未可知。
2. The risk variables facing the U.S.-China Taiwan Strait game may increase
In recent years, the United States and Taiwan have been escalating their collusion, the U.S. and Chinese military forces have been operating intensively in the Taiwan Strait, and the likelihood of an “accidental conflict” has climbed, especially in the “southwest airspace” of the so-called “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone.” In the short term, China and the United States attach more importance to controlling air and sea crises, and the probability of armed conflict between the two sides in the Taiwan Strait is not great. What requires particular attention is the set of negative factors reflected in the recent “public opinion war” involving Taiwan, and the “spillover” risk variables of U.S.-Taiwan collusion in all out “cognitive warfare.” In the short term, especially after the situation in Ukraine enters a stalemate period, the “spillover” risk variables of “cognitive warfare” in the Taiwan Strait may increase dramatically, and the potential harm to China’s diplomatic situation and economic and trade cooperation with the United States and Western countries may be greater.
近年来，美台相互勾连不断升级加码，中美军事力量在台海密集行动，尤 其是在所谓 “台湾防空识别区” 的 “西南空域” 发生 “意外冲突事件” 的可能性攀升。短期来看，中美对海空危机管控皆较重视，双方在台海爆发武装冲突 的可能性不大。需要特别注意的，是近期涉台 “舆论战” 所反映出的消极因素和美台勾连大搞 “认知作战” 的 “外溢” 风险变数。短期来看，尤其是乌克兰局势进入相持期之后，台海 “认知作战” 的 “外溢” 风险变数或将剧增，而且其对我外交大局及与美西方国家经贸合作推展的潜在危害可能更大。
(1) Taiwan’s “relying on foreign powers to seek independence” actions may increase
(一) 台 “挟洋谋独” 行动或将增多
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, some in the United States have drawn parallels between the Taiwan issue and the situation in Ukraine, taking the opportunity to smear and attack China in an attempt to create a new crisis in the Taiwan Strait, so as to serve America’s own geostrategic and economic interests at the cost of regional peace and stability and the welfare of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. 47 Some in the United States keep up a steady “cognitive warfare” drumbeat about “armed reunification,” “luring into war” and “dragging China down,” and it is under its influence that Tsai Ing-wen’s administration has become more confident in “relying on foreign powers to seek independence,” and has begun to spread the “undetermined status of Taiwan theory” or “two-state theory.” In April 2022, Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen and her deputy, Lai Ching-te, made another nonsense speech at the so-called “National Taiwan Conference at Home and Abroad,” using the situation in Ukraine to beg for pity from outside forces, attacking and smearing the mainland, and beating the “two-state theory” drum. Tsai Ing-wen claimed to be “determined to safeguard Taiwan’s security,” while Lai Ching-te hyped the “mainland threat theory” and advocated uniting and cooperating to safeguard Taiwan’s so-called “sovereignty.” 48
在俄乌冲突爆发后，美国一些人将台湾问题与乌克兰局势相类比，借机对 中方抹黑攻击，试图在台海制造一场新的危机，以两岸人民福祉和地区和平稳 定为代价，来服务美国自身的地缘战略和经济利益。 正是在美国一些人不断炒作 “武统” 和 “诱战” “拖垮中国” 等 “认知作战” 影响下，蔡英文当局 “挟洋谋独” 的信心大增，开始大肆散播 “台湾地位未定论” 或 “两国论”。2022 年 4 月，台湾地区领导人蔡英文及其副手赖清德在所谓 “海内外台湾国是会议” 再放厥词，借乌克兰局势乞怜外部势力，攻击抹黑大陆，鼓噪 “两国论”。蔡英文声称 “有决心守护台湾安全”，赖清德则炒作 “大陆威胁论”，并鼓吹要团结合作守护所谓 “台湾主权”。
In recent years, especially from 2017 to 2019, the Taiwan authorities have continued to suffer from a “diplomatic crisis” and a shrinking “international space.” Many of its former “diplomatic allies” have severed “diplomatic relations” with it, and its “representative offices” in countries other than its “diplomatic allies” have been renamed one after another. 49 Unable to accept this normal picture of the one-China principle becoming the overwhelming consensus in the international community, Tsai Ing-wen’s administration has sought opportunities to “counterattack” in some “small countries.” It finally found a “breakthrough point” in Lithuania in 2021 by establishing a “Representative Office in Lithuania” under the name of “Taiwan”—the only existing example among countries that are not Taiwan’s “diplomatic allies.” Given that the “Taiwan independence” forces do not have confidence in their military power and that it is not in the interest of the United States to “change the status quo,” the main focus of the Tsai Ing-wen administration’s “independence-seeking” efforts may still be on “diplomacy.” As the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine unfolds, the Taiwan authorities may “take advantage of the opportunity” to expand the “one China, one Taiwan international space” in Europe. The next step in its “relying on foreign powers to seek independence” may be to strengthen relations with European countries that are not its “diplomatic allies” and to promote the establishment of more “representative offices” under the name of “Taiwan.” In recent years, a number of European parliamentary delegations have visited Taiwan (including a delegation from the European Parliament). The “Taiwan-friendly” forces in some European countries are developing relatively fast, especially in some Eastern European countries, and the Taiwan authorities will continue to vigorously push these countries to follow Lithuania’s suit in establishing “Taiwan representative offices.”
近些年来，尤其是 2017—2019 年，台湾当局持续遭遇 “外交危机”和 “国际空间”缩减，不少之前的 “邦交国”与其 “断交”，“非邦交国”的 “代表机构”相继改名。 蔡英文当局对于此种一个中国原则成为国际社会压倒性共识的正常表象无法接受，力图在一些 “小国”寻机 “反扑”，终于 2021 年在立陶宛找到了 “突破口”，以 “台湾”名义设立了 “驻立陶宛代表处”———台 “非邦交国”中现存唯此一例。鉴于 “台独”势力对其军事实力并无 “抗陆”信心且其 “改变现状” 亦不符合美国利益，蔡英文当局的主要 “谋独”着力点可能还在 “外交”。在当前俄乌冲突下，台湾当局或将 “趁此良机”在欧洲拓展 “一中一台” “国际空间”，其下一步 “挟洋谋独”可能致力于加强与欧洲 “非邦交国” 发展关系，并推动设立更多“台湾”名义 “代表机构”。近年来，已有多个欧洲国家议员代表团访台 ( 包括欧洲议会代表团) ，一些欧洲国家的 “友台”势力发展较快，尤其是在一些东欧国家， 台湾当局将会继续大力推动这些国家 “跟进”效仿立陶宛设立 “台湾代表处”。
(2) The escalation of U.S. actions to “use Taiwan to control China” will heavily impacts mutual trust between China and the United States
(二) 美 “以台制华” 动作升级势将重创中美互信
In the short term, the United States will probably continue promoting the “internationalization” of the Taiwan Strait issue, engaging in “public opinion building” to guide the “spillover” of its connection with the Ukraine issue, and smearing and attacking the normal activities of the PLA in the airspace in and around the Taiwan Strait, in order to form a “moral deterrent” against China internationally. After the situation in Ukraine stabilizes, the United States will most likely strengthen its Taiwan-related collusion with relevant European countries, for example, by using the opportunity of solidarity with Lithuania against “Chinese coercion” to hype issues such as the right to interpret the one-China policy and the definition of “one China, one Taiwan.” It may even actively cooperate with the Taiwan authorities to encourage more European countries that are at odds with Russia to set up “representative offices” under the name of “Taiwan.” At the same time, it will continue to hype issues related to Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, thus causing alienation in China-Europe relations and interfering with the normal development of China-Europe economic and trade cooperation, in order to serve its overall strategic competition with China, and achieve its goals of strengthening its control over Europe, uniting its Western allies to “isolate China,” “making a fresh start” at “reconstructing international economic and trade rules,” containing China’s peaceful rise, and preventing China from challenging U.S. global hegemony.
短期来看，美国很可能会继续力促台海问题 “国际化”，进行 “舆论造势”引导其 “外溢” 与乌克兰问题相关联，对解放军在台海周边空域的正常活动进行抹黑攻击，以期在国际上形成对华 “道义” “威慑”。待乌克兰局势进入平稳期后，美国极有可能会加强与欧洲相关国家涉台勾连，比如借声援立陶宛对抗 “中国胁迫” 之机炒作一个中国政策的解释权及 “一中一台” 如何界定等问题， 甚或积极配合台湾当局鼓动更多与俄罗斯素来不睦的欧洲国家以 “台湾” 名义设立 “代表机构”。与此同时，继续炒作涉疆、涉港、南海和东海等议题，从而离间中欧关系、干扰中欧经贸合作正常发展，以服务其对华全面战略竞争，达 成其加强对欧控制、团结西方盟友 “孤立中国”、 “另起炉灶” 重构国际经贸规则、遏制中国和平崛起及预防中国挑战美国全球霸权之目的。
First, the United States may step up propaganda efforts on the “true meaning” of its one-China policy in a vain attempt to confuse public opinion in the international community and rope in more “unsuspecting” countries to join its “Taiwan’s undefined status” club that hollows out the one-China principle. According to Richard C. Bush, a leading U.S. expert on the Taiwan Strait, the United States’ one-China policy is a very vague and complex amalgamation that can be interpreted by the United States in various flexible ways. In Bush’s view, there are subtle differences between the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, and since the establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations, the United States has maintained a “Taiwan status is undetermined” interpretation that benefits itself and preserves sufficient ambiguity in the United States’ one-China policy. 50 We must maintain a clear recognition that the current U.S. administration hardly agrees with the one-China principle, and its interpretation of the one-China policy is increasingly biased toward promoting potential differences with China’s position. If the U.S. side continues “salami slicing” the one-China principle—the political foundation and most important cornerstone of U.S.-China relations—it will eventually “hollow it out” completely or “slice its own hand” through carelessness, and the mutual trust between the United States and China will be seriously damaged or even “hollowed out.” The risks in interaction between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait will then increase significantly. Secondly, on the Taiwan Strait issue, the United States seems to have adopted a tactic similar to that in the South China Sea game with China, hiding its selfish intention of colluding with the Taiwan authorities to “use Taiwan to control China,” engaging in a campaign of “public opinion preparation” (hyping the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait and China’s “military pressure” on Taiwan), and searching for “rational” excuses for the deepening of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation and the exchange of high-level visits between the United States and Taiwan. In the future, the U.S. government may use “public opinion preparation” to widely publicize the differences between the U.S. one-China policy and China’s position, as a means of strengthening collusion with allies on Taiwan and creating an “international consensus” and “international momentum,” thereby “internationalizing” the Taiwan Strait issue, and thus alienating China from Europe and “isolating China,” driving a wedge in China-EU economic and trade cooperation in particular (including supporting the EU in initiating “arbitration” against China in the WTO over the trade and economic issues between China and Lithuania), blocking China’s promotion of “Belt and Road” initiative cooperation, and even promoting China’s disconnection from the global supply chain and production chain, so as to achieve its goal of “making a fresh start” at reconstructing international economic and trade rules.
首先，美国或将加大力度宣传其一个中国政策的 “真实含义”，妄图在国际社会混淆舆论，拉拢更多 “不明真相” 的国家加入其掏空虚化一个中国原则的 “台湾地位未定论俱乐部”。按美国知名台海问题专家卜睿哲 ( Ｒichard C. Bush)的解读，美国的一个中国政策是非常模糊的杂糅复合体，美国可作不同的灵活 解读。在卜睿哲看来，中美三个联合公报在细微处颇有差异，而美方在中美建 交后一直坚持有利于己方的 “台湾地位未定论” 解读，为美国的一个中国政策保留了充分的模糊性。 我们必须保持清醒认识，现今的美国政府很难认同一个中国原则，而且其对美国所持一个中国政策的解读也愈加偏向宣扬与中国立场 的潜在分歧。中美关系的政治基础与最重要的基石———一个中国原则若继续被美方 “切香肠”，终会被彻底 “切空”，或者因不慎操作而 “切到手”，中美互信亦有严重受损甚或 “切空” 的可能，届时中美在台海的互动风险将大幅增加。其次，在台海问题上，美国似乎采取了与中国在南海博弈的类似招数，隐藏其与台湾当局勾连 “以台制华” 的私心，大搞 “舆论先行” 炒作台海局势紧张、中国大陆对台 “军事施压”，为美台安全合作深化以及美台高层互访寻找 “合理性”借口。未来，美国政府可能通过 “舆论先行” 的方式将美方一个中国政策与中方立场存在的差异 “广而告之”，由此加强与盟友涉台勾连，造成 “国际共识”和 “国际声势”，从而使台海问题 “国际化”，借此离间中欧、“孤立中国”，尤其对中欧经贸合作打入楔子 ( 包括力挺欧盟就中国与立陶宛经贸问题在世界贸易组织发起对华 “仲裁”) ，阻断中国 “一带一路” 倡议合作推展，乃至推动中国与全球供应链产业链的脱离，达成其 “另起炉灶”重构国际经贸规则之目的。
After the situation in Ukraine enters a stable period, the United States and the West may take the opportunity to strengthen Taiwan-related collusion, especially by drawing parallels between the Ukraine issue and China’s “sanctioning” of Lithuania, and increasing “expressions of solidarity” and economic support for Lithuania. They may then promote the formation of a “multinational consensus” on the fine points of “one-China policy” interpretation, stressing that Lithuania allowing the Taiwan authorities to set up a “Taiwan Representative Office” does not mean supporting “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” When the time is ripe, they can join hands with the Taiwan authorities to encourage more European countries to set up “Taiwan Representative Offices.” The United States will probably let European “small countries” charge ahead, while the United States hides behind to “offer advice” and provide “intellectual” support and diplomatic resources to cooperate in fighting “public opinion battles” (such as the United States support for the Philippines’ “South China Sea arbitration case”). This way, the United States can “reap” the spoils of its campaign to contain China while staying “off the field,” and can also “retreat” at any time.
在乌克兰局势进入平稳期后，美西方或将借机强化涉台勾连，尤其是将乌 克兰问题与中国 “制裁” 立陶宛相类比，加大 “声援” 立陶宛和经济扶持的力 度，继而在 “一中政策” 的解释细节上推动形成 “多国共识”，强调立陶宛允许台湾当局设立 “台湾代表处” 并不意味着支持 “两个中国” 或 “一中一台”，待时机成熟便可与台湾当局联手鼓动更多欧洲国家设立 “台湾代表处”。美国很可能会让欧洲 “小国” 冲锋在前，而美国则躲在后面 “支招” 提供 “智力” 支持和外交资源配合打 “舆论战” ( 比如美国对菲律宾 “南海仲裁案” 的支持) ， 如此美国既能在 “场外” “收割” 其遏华战果，也可随时 “抽身而退”。
Finally, the United States and Western countries may support greater “intellectual collusion” on Taiwan-related issues, with the aim of finding “rationality” for their Taiwan Strait narratives through “academic research.” In recent years, in order to hype mainland China’s “military pressure” on Taiwan, many experts in the United States and the West have not scrupled to violate their long-held views on “freedom of navigation,” using a double standard to accuse PLA military aircraft of “intruding” into “Taiwan’s air defense identification zone” and endangering the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. In the future, U.S. and Western think tanks are likely to release more research reports on Taiwan-related issues, especially to “challenge” China’s position with regard to the detailed issues of the legal implications of “one China.” For example, the recent study by Drun and Glaser for the German Marshall Fund, which improperly alleges “distortion of UN Resolution 2758” by Beijing, has had a very bad impact. 51
最后，美西方国家支持涉台问题 “智力勾连” 的力度或将更大，以期通过“学术研究” 为其台海叙事觅得 “合理性”。近年来，为炒作中国大陆对台 “军事施压”，美西方很多专家不惜违反其一贯主张 “航行自由” 的观点， “双标”指责解放军军机 “侵入” “台湾防空识别区” 危及台海和平稳定。未来，美西方智库很可能会发布更多涉台问题研究报告，尤其是就 “一个中国” 法律含义的细节问题 “挑战” 中方立场，比如近期葛莱仪在 “德国马歇尔基金会” 所发妄 称 “北京扭曲联大 2758 号决议” 的研究报告 便造成很坏影响。
(3) Intensive U.S.-China actions in the Taiwan Strait could trigger “accidents”
(三) 中美在台海密集行动可能引发 “意外事件”
Today, the U.S. side still acts as if it is dealing with China “from a position of strength,” and its “double standards” on the Taiwan Strait issue are more ubiquitous than ever. The U.S. side seems to believe that it has the right to undermine the status quo in cross-Strait relations at all levels, and to cheer on “Taiwan independence” elements. U.S. military ships and aircraft enjoy “freedom of navigation and overflight” in the Taiwan Strait, while the PLA’s actions in going “out to sea” are “provocations and threats.” For the U.S. side to use this sort of “American arrogance” thinking and harbor illusions about restricting the PLA’s going “out to sea” is divorced from reality. The U.S. side needs to face the fact that the main factor threatening peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is its policy of “using Taiwan to control China,” whereas regular combat readiness patrols of the airspace around the Taiwan Strait by PLA military aircraft are a necessary measure to counter U.S.-Taiwan collusion. Under this kind of “status quo,” the intensive operations of U.S. and Chinese military aircraft in the airspace around the Taiwan Strait may indeed lead to “accidents.” To avoid triggering further deterioration in the Taiwan Strait situation, the Taiwan authorities and the U.S. and Western media should stop hyping the so-called “incursions” by PLA military aircraft into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” and restore the truth. 52 The U.S. side should cease taking a “double-standard” on the PLA’s normal activities in the Taiwan Strait, strictly control its military actions around the Taiwan Strait, and avoid provocations that “cross the line” and endanger peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, otherwise the consequences would be unthinkable.
现今，美方依然是一副 “从实力地位出发” 与中国打交道的架势，大搞“双重标准” 涉足台海问题更是无处不在。美方似乎认为其有权在各种层面破坏两岸关系现状，为 “台独” 分子撑腰打气; 美军舰机在台海享有 “航行和飞越自由”，而解放军 “出海” 行动便属 “挑衅、威胁”。美方以此类 “美式傲慢”思维对限制解放军 “出海” 行动抱有幻想是不切实际的。美方需要正视其 “以台制华” 政策才是威胁台海和平稳定的主要因素，而解放军军机常态化战备巡航台海周边空域乃是反制美台勾连的必要措施。在此种 “现状” 下，中美军机在台海周边空域密集行动确有可能引发 “意外事件”。为避免引发台海局势进一步恶化，台湾当局和美西方媒体理应停止炒作所谓解放军军机 “侵入” “台湾防空识别区”，还原事实真相。 美方应停止 “双标” 看待解放军在台海的正常活动，对其在台海周边的军事行动加以严格管控，避免 “越线” 挑衅危及台海和平稳定，否则后果不堪设想。
Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory, and the so-called “median line of the Taiwan Strait” does not exist. It is unrealistic to expect a hypothetical “median line” to restrict the PLA’s space for activities, and the U.S. side must have a correct understanding of this. This hypothetical “median line” may have been drawn by the United States in the early 1950s to restrict the Taiwanese authorities’ “counterattack on the mainland” when the PLA’s navy and air force were weak and Kuomintang (Nationalist) warplanes repeatedly conducted reconnaissance, air combat, and even bombing missions in the coastal areas of the mainland west of the “median line.” 53 The U.S. and Taiwan authorities seem to have forgotten this history, and now regard PLA military aircraft exercises in the airspace east of the “median line” as “changing the status quo” or “harmful and unhelpful to regional stability.” This completely turns the facts on their heads. Even if we follow the logic of “traditional freedom of the high seas” that the U.S. side has always claimed, the PLA’s military aircraft exercises in the Taiwan Strait conform to international law, so the U.S. side’s accusations lack justification. In recent years, PLA exercises and training activities in the airspace east of the “median line of the Taiwan Strait” or in the “airspace southwest of Taiwan” have been conducted in “international airspace,” and thus fall under “internationally lawful use” to which the U.S. side claims military aircraft are entitled under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. From the U.S. side’s words and actions related to the so-called “provocative military actions” of mainland China, it seems that it believes only the ships and aircraft of the United States and its “allies” enjoy “freedom of navigation and overflight” and can conduct “peaceful” military activities such as close reconnaissance in “international waters and airspace” adjacent to China’s territorial waters and airspace, while the naval and air force ships and aircraft of China, which is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (which the United States has yet to ratify), are “military threats” once they are “out to sea.” 54 Such “double standard” arguments from the U.S. side are unlikely to deceive knowledgeable members of the international community, and the PLA will not stop its normal and legitimate activities in the Taiwan Strait just because of its unfounded accusations.
台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，不存在所谓的 “海峡中线”，指望一条当年美方假想出来的 “中线” 来限制解放军活动空间是不现实的，美方对此须有正确认知。这条假想出来的 “中线” 可能缘于 20 世纪 50 年代初美国为限制台湾当局 “反攻大陆” 而划设，当时解放军海空军实力均较弱，而国民党战机多次在 “海峡中线” 以西大陆沿海地区执行侦察、空战乃至轰炸任务。 美国和台湾当局似已忘却这段历史，其现今将解放军军机在 “海峡中线” 以东空域演练视为 “改变现状” 或 “有害且无助区域稳定”，这完全是颠倒黑白。即便依循美方一贯主张的 “传统公海自由” 逻辑，解放军军机在台海的演训活动也符合国际法，美方相关指责缺乏理据。近年来，解放军在 “海峡中线” 以东空域或 “台湾西南空域” 的演训活动皆在 “国际空域” 进行，属于美方主张军机依照《联合国海洋法公约》享有的 “国际合法用途”。由美方所谓中国大陆 “挑衅性军事行动” 相关言行观之，其似乎认为只有美国及其 “盟友” 舰机享有 “航行和飞越自由”，可在邻近中国领海、领空的 “国际水、空域” 进行抵近侦察等 “和平的” 军事活动，而作为 《联合国海洋法公约》 ( 美国至今亦未批准加入) 缔约国的中国海空军舰机一旦 “出海” 就是 “军事威胁”。 美方此种 “双重标准” 立论势必难以欺瞒国际社会有识之士，而解放军也不会因其无端指责便停止在台海的正常合法活动。
3. U.S.-China crisis control mechanisms need to be deepened
In recent years, the U.S. military has significantly increased the frequency and intensity of its activities in China’s coastal airspace, and there are also constant actions in the Taiwan Strait, to which China has no choice but to respond. The present situation in the Taiwan Strait is complex and serious. Not only are people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait paying close attention, it has also attracted the attention of the international community. Under the intentional leading of the Taiwan authorities and the biased analysis and propaganda of some U.S. and Western think tanks and media, the normal air exercises of the PLA in the Taiwan Strait and nearby areas have been hyped as “military pressure,” and the so-called PLA military aircraft “incursions” into the “Taiwan Air Defense Identification Zone” have been distorted and interpreted as an important factor in generating tension and “changing the status quo” in the Taiwan Strait. Some U.S. and Western media reports display a “double standard.” Their unprofessional analysis and commentary not only result in serious confusion about the rights and wrongs of the issues involved, but also make people ignore the confidence-building measures and crisis management cooperation that really do need attention.
近年来，美军大幅提升在中国沿海空域的活动频次和强度，在台海亦是动 作不断，中方对此不得不有所回应。当前，台海局势复杂严峻，不仅两岸人民 密切关注，也颇为国际社会注目。在台湾当局的有意引导以及美西方一些智库 和媒体的偏向性评析宣传之下，解放军在台海及附近区域的正常空中演练被炒 作为 “军事施压”，所谓解放军军机 “侵入” “台湾防空识别区” 相关行动被歪曲解读为引发台海局势紧张及 “改变现状” 的重要因素。美西方一些媒体报道显存 “双重标准”，其缺乏专业性的分析评论不仅导致所涉问题的是非被严重混淆，更使真正需要关注的建立信任措施与危机管控合作被忽视。
(1) The application of U.S.-China crisis management mechanisms in the Taiwan Strait faces a “strategic mutual trust dilemma”
(一) 中美危机管控机制在台海适用面临 “战略互信困境”
Since the start of the Biden administration, “hawkish” forces in the United States have been trying to gain the advantage in the “comprehensive strategic competition” with China by “using Taiwan to control China.” There are even comments in the foreign press that the United States is suspected of using the Taiwan Strait issue to goad China into “firing the first shot,” so that it can take the opportunity to unite with its allies and “team up” against China. 55 This view has gained many “fans” since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. U.S. actions have made it difficult to reconcile the contradictions between China and the United States on the Taiwan Strait issue, mainly due to the United States’ insistence on pursuing the “use Taiwan to control China” policy. The United States has increasingly hollowed out the one-China policy in recent years, and it has colluded with the Taiwan authorities to promote the “undetermined status of Taiwan” theory, which seriously threatens peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and makes it particularly urgent to strengthen mechanisms for managing crises between China and the United States. In April 2022, State Councilor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe emphasized during a call with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin (the first call between a U.S. and Chinese defense secretaries since the Biden administration took office) that the U.S. side must put its “four ‘does not’ and one ‘has no intention'” 56 commitment into practice, that the Chinese military will resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, and that Taiwan is an integral part of China. These are the facts and the status quo, which no one can change. 57 Foreign media disclosed that Austin, in addition to focusing on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, also expressed to Wei Fenghe the United States’ concerns about China’s so-called military provocations in the Taiwan Strait and activities in the South China and East China Seas, and reiterated Biden’s remarks about the importance of improving crisis communication between the two countries and managing U.S.-China strategic competition, including in the nuclear, space, and cyber domains. 58 Judging from the relevant content discussed in the call between the U.S. and Chinese defense secretaries, crisis management is by far the biggest point of convergence between the two sides. (“Both sides agreed that the U.S. and Chinese militaries should keep communication channels open, manage risks, and promote the construction of a crisis communication mechanism. 59“)
拜登政府执政以来，美国 “鹰派” 势力一直试图借助 “以台制华” 在与中国 “全面战略竞争” 中占据优势，甚至外媒有评论指出美有利用台海问题煽动中国大陆 “打第一枪” 从而借机联合盟友 “组团” 抗华之嫌疑。 乌克兰危机之后，此种看法获得不少 “拥趸”。美国的作为，使得中美在台海问题上的矛盾 难以调和，这主要是由美国坚持推行 “以台制华” 政策导致的———美国近些年来愈益掏空虚化一个中国政策，其与台湾当局相互勾结大肆宣扬 “台湾地位未定论”，严重威胁台海和平稳定，使得中美间强化危机管控机制变得尤为迫切。 2022 年 4 月国务委员兼国防部长魏凤和在与美国防长奥斯汀通话 ( 拜登政府上台以来中美防长首次通话) 时强调，美方要将 “四不一无意” 承诺落到实处， 中国军队将坚决维护国家主权安全和领土完整，台湾是中国不可分割的一部分， 这是谁也无法改变的事实和现状。 外媒披露，奥斯汀除聚焦俄乌冲突话题外， 还向魏凤和表达了美国对中国在台海所谓军事挑衅和在南海、东海活动的担忧， 并重申拜登所说改进两国危机沟通与管理美中战略竞争 ( 包括在核、太空和网络领域) 的重要性。 从中美防长通话所谈相关内容来看，危机管控是双方目前的最大契合点 ( “双方一致同意，中美两军要保持沟通渠道畅通、管控风险、推进危机沟通机制建设” ) 。
On the Taiwan Strait issue, China and the United States need to further negotiate more practical and in-depth cooperation on confidence-building measures and crisis management at the strategic and technical levels, based on the two countries’ current crisis management mechanisms. The existing crisis management mechanisms of China and the United States mainly have three types of institutional arrangements: high-level interaction, dialogue and communication channels, and military rules of behavior. The first two types of “strategic dialogue”-based mechanisms include Defense Consultative Talks (DCT),60 Joint Strategic Dialogue Mechanism (JSDM), 61 Defense Policy Coordination Talk (PCT), 62 the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), 63 and the Defense Telephone Link (DTL), 64 as well as the suspended Strategic Security Dialogue, the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD) between defense departments, and the Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (two-plus-two). 65 The third category of rules of behavior-based mechanisms at the “technical” level includes the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), 66 adopted at the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in 2014, 67 and the “Notification of Major Military Activities [and] Confidence Building Measures Mechanism” and the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters,”68 established in November 2014. (In September 2015, the two sides completed the formal signing of a “Military Crisis Notification” annex to the “Notification of Major Military Activities” mechanism and an “Air Encounters” annex to the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.”) 69 It is worth noting that rules of behavior-based mechanisms at the “technical” level (e.g., the most specific of the institutional arrangements between the U.S. and Chinese militaries—the “Notification of Major Military Activities and Confidence Building Measures Mechanism” and the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters”) are often influenced by the political climate and overall relationship environment, and do not always play a significant role in curbing maritime conflicts between the two sides. 70 Therefore, to further strengthen U.S.-China crisis management mechanisms for the Taiwan Strait, joint promotion is necessary at both the “strategic” and “technical” levels. It is especially necessary to negotiate on crisis prevention and confidence-building measures in the Taiwan Strait at the “strategic” level, to prevent the “strategic mutual trust deficit” from rendering ineffective the existing “rules of behavior” between the two militaries. In addition, the only way to control the risk variables arising from the U.S. policy of “using Taiwan to control China” so that they do not “spill over” to other aspects of U.S.-China relations is to rely on “strategic dialogue.” Under the current circumstances, if the U.S. side does not “dial back” its Taiwan Strait policy, the gap between the positions of the United States and China will be huge, and cause concern for the practical significance of strengthening the “strategic dialogue” between the United States and China to prevent crises in the Taiwan Strait.
针对台海问题，中美有必要基于两国现有危机管控机制，进一步协商在 “战略” 和 “技术” 层面上更加务实深入的建立信任措施与危机管控合作。中美现有的危机管控机制主要有高层互动、对话沟通管道和军事行为准则三大类制 度安排。前两类以 “战略对话” 为主的机制， 包括中美国防部防务磋商( Defense Consultative Talks，DCT) 、联合参谋部对话 ( Joint Strategic Dialogue Mechanism，JSDM ) 、 国防部工作会晤 ( Defense Policy Coordination Talk， PCT) 、中美海上军事安全磋商 ( Military Maritime Consultative Agreement， MMCA) 、国防部直通电话 ( Defense Telephone Link，DTL) ，以及业已暂停的战略安全对话、国防部亚太安全对话 ( APSD) 和外交与安全 ( 2+2) 对话等。第三类以 “技术” 层面行为规则为主的机制，包括 2014 年第 14 届西太平洋海军论坛 ( WPNS) 上通过的 《海上意外相遇规则》 ( CUES) ，以及 2014 年 11月建立的 “重大军事行动相互通报信任措施机制” 和 “海空相遇安全行为准则” ( 2015 年 9 月双方就重大军事行动相互通报机制新增 “军事危机通报” 附件及海空相遇安全行为准则新增 “空中相遇” 附件完成正式签署) 。值得注意的是，以 “技术” 层面行为规则为主的机制 ( 比如中美两军最为具体的相关制度安排——— “重大军事行动相互通报信任措施机制” 和 “海空相遇安全行为准则”) 往往会受政治氛围和总体关系环境影响，并不总能对抑制双方海上冲突发挥明显作用。 因此，若要进一步针对台海区域强化中美危机管控机制，则有必要 “战略” 和 “技术” 层面共同推进，尤需在 “战略” 层面协商台海危机预防与建立信任措施，避免因 “战略互信赤字” 导致此前中美两军已有 “行为准则” 无法奏效。另外，如何管控美国 “以台制华” 政策所引发的风险变数，使其不致 “外溢” 影响中美关系的其他层面，亦唯有依赖 “战略对话” 方有可能解决。在当前形势下，若美方不对其台海政策有所 “回调”，则中美双方立场差距巨大，加强中美预防台海危机 “战略对话” 的实际意义堪忧。
(2) Potential differences in interpretation of international law and “technical shortcomings” existing mechanisms
(二) 现有机制中潜存国际法解读分歧和 “技术短板”
At the technical level, the construction of crisis control mechanisms between the U.S. and Chinese militaries has made great progress, and mechanisms such as the U.S.-China “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” can effectively reduce misunderstandings and misjudgments when vessels and aircraft from the two sides encounter each other in uncontested and low-sensitivity waters and airspace. However, they all have “technical shortcomings” in terms of obligatoriness and operability, and there are potential differences in the interpretation of international law between the two sides. Therefore, in order for the United States and China to avoid misjudgment and escalation of “accidents” in the increasingly “crowded” Taiwan Strait region, it is necessary for the two sides to hold in-depth consultations on the basis of existing mechanisms, strive to negotiate more detailed rules, and in particular avoid dangerous and provocative actions against each other.
从技术层面而言，虽然中美两军危机管控机制建设已取得较大进展，诸如 中美 “海空相遇安全行为准则” 等机制可以有效地降低双方舰机在无争议和低敏感水、空域相遇时发生误解、误判，但其在强制性和操作性上均有 “技术短板”，而且双方还潜存国际法解读分歧。因此，为使中美在军事行动愈益 “拥挤” 的台海地区避免误判和 “意外事件” 升级，双方有必要在现有机制的基础上深入磋商，争取谈出更多细化规则，尤当杜绝针对彼此的危险性和挑衅性 行动。
First of all, the “rules of encounter” under mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” are not legally binding. 71 They are very thorough for “accidental encounters,” but are rather insufficient for “intentional encounters.” In the case of the Taiwan Strait, if U.S. ships and aircraft carry out “freedom of navigation operations” against China (for which there seems to be no precedent so far, and from the reports issued by the U.S. Department of Defense, there is no record of their transiting the Taiwan Strait to challenge China’s so-called “excessive maritime claims”72) or close reconnaissance and other provocative actions, then the Chinese side’s shadowing, surveillance, and expulsion of U.S. ships and aircraft would clearly not be “accidental encounters,” and mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” can hardly be applied to such “intentional encounters.” It is worth studying how to solve such problems.
首先， “海空相遇安全行为准则” 等机制下的 “相遇规则” 并无法律拘束力，其对于 “意外相遇” 情况来说已很充分，但对于 “有意相遇” 情况颇有不足。就台湾海峡而言，美军舰机若实施针对中国的 “航行自由行动” ( 迄今似无先例，从美国防部发布报告来看，并无其过航台湾海峡挑战所谓中国 “过度海洋主张” 的记录) 或抵近侦察等挑衅性行动，则中方对美军舰机实施跟踪、监视与驱离显然并非 “意外相遇” 情况，“海空相遇安全行为准则” 等机制难以适用此类 “有意相遇” 情况，这类问题如何解决值得研究。
Secondly, the Chinese side has no choice but to “respond” to some “gunboat diplomacy” actions by the U.S. military that violate China’s territorial sovereignty or harm China’s security interests, and such cases are not “accidental encounters.” Mechanisms such as the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” are hardly applicable, and the differences between the United States and China in the interpretation of international law are difficult to resolve in the short term. The United States often talks about “freedom of navigation” to conceal its intention to deploy military forces, but its real claim is “freedom of military activity.” Issues such as “excessive straight baselines,” “innocent passage” of foreign warships in territorial waters, and freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones all stem from this. On the first two issues, the differences between the U.S. and Chinese positions are very clear and difficult to reconcile in the short term. On the issue of freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones, there is still room for “policy” coordination between the United States and China on specific practices.
其次，对于美军一些侵犯中国领海主权或有损中国安全利益的 “炮舰外交” 行动，中方不得不有所 “回击”，此类情况也不属 “意外相遇”， “海空相遇安全行为准则” 等机制难以适用，而中美有关国际法解读分歧问题在短期内颇难解决。美国常爱大谈 “航行自由” 以掩盖其军事力量投放意图，其真实诉求是“军事活动自由” ———有关 “过度的直线基线”、外国军舰领海 “无害通过”、专属经济区内军事活动自由等之类问题莫不源于此。在前两个问题上，中美立 场分歧是非常明确的，而且短期来看也难以调和。关于专属经济区内军事活动 自由问题，中美在具体作法上尚有 “政策” 协调空间。
It is worth noting that the United States often conflates the issue of “freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones” with the issue of “freedom of navigation,” but strictly speaking the two are not the same thing at all. Article 58 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states: “In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”73 The United States is in fact ascribing “freedom of military activity within exclusive economic zones” to the aforementioned “other internationally lawful uses,” but “other internationally lawful uses” cannot be equated with “freedom of navigation.” Rather, they are uses of the seas related to “freedom of navigation.” The U.S. side should reflect on whether it is reasonable to differentiate “rules camps” according to its own interpretation of relevant international law, such as by including China among the 27 countries with which it disagrees on the issue of freedom of military activity in exclusive economic zones, 74 but the “reasonableness” argument offered by the U.S. side is very limited. The U.S. “Freedom of Navigation Operations” reports in recent years have often referred to the “excessive maritime claims” in the Survey and Mapping Law of the People’s Republic of China. If the U.S. side believed that a distinction should be made between military surveying and marine scientific research, and that the United States and China had divergent legal claims on this issue, then it would have been entirely possible for the U.S. side to have consulted with the Chinese side in a “more peaceful” manner to “convince people with reason” rather than just relying on military ships and aircraft to “apply pressure.”
值得注意的是，美国常将 “专属经济区内军事活动自由” 问题混入 “航行 自由” 问题，可二者严格来说根本不是一回事。《联合国海洋法公约》第五十八条规定: “在专属经济区内，所有国家，不论为沿海国或内陆国，在本公约有关规定的限制下，享有第八十七条所指的航行和飞越的自由，铺设海底电缆和管 道的自由，以及与这些自由有关的海洋其他国际合法用途，诸如同船舶和飞机 的操作及海底电缆和管道的使用有关的并符合本公约其他规定的那些用途。”美国事实上是将 “专属经济区内军事活动自由” 归于前述 “其他国际合法用途”，但 “其他国际合法用途” 不可等同于 “航行自由”，而是与 “航行自由”相关的海洋用途。美方应当反思其依照己方相关国际法解读划分 “规则阵营” 的作法是否合理，比如其将中国也列入与其在专属经济区内军事活动自由问题 上有分歧的 27 个国家 之中，但美方所提供的 “合理性” 论证非常有限。美国近年 “航行自由行动” 报告常提及 《中华人民共和国测绘法》中的 “过度海洋主张”，若美方认为应当区分军事测量与海洋科学研究且中美在此问题上存在法律主张分歧，则完全可以通过 “更加和平的” 方式与中方进行磋商 “以理服人”，而不仅是依靠军用舰机来 “施压”。
The U.S.-China “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” expressly states that the “Rules” are without prejudice to the respective “policies” of the two sides regarding military activities in exclusive economic zones. 75 Some scholars have pointed out that China’s opposition to U.S. close reconnaissance and other military operations in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is primarily due to security concerns rather than legal reasons, and that China’s recognition and practice regarding its EEZ is becoming more open as the Chinese military’s overseas activities continue to grow. 76 However, the Taiwan Strait is an exceptionally sensitive area, and the U.S. side should have a clear understanding of this. Within the potential EEZ of the Taiwan Strait, high-profile “passage” by U.S. ships and aircraft is provocative. (China has not accused them of violating international law in any of its statements.) For the “Taiwan independence” forces, moreover, they are a kind of “support and cheering.” They are purely provocative moves that promote the “militarization” of the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. side needs to reduce the frequency and intensity of its military activities in the Taiwan Strait, and not vainly try to intimidate and pressure China in this way. It should abide by the one-China principle and do more things that benefit China-U.S. relations and promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, instead of doing the opposite.
中美 “海空相遇安全行为准则” 明文指出，该 “准则” 无损于双方各自有关专属经济区军事活动问题的 “政策”。 有学者指出，中国反对美国在其专属经济区的抵近侦察和其他军事行动主要是出于安全考虑，而非法律原因，随着 中国军队的海外活动不断增强，中国关于专属经济区的认知和实践越来越开 放。 不过，台海属异常敏感区域，美方理应对此有清醒认知。在台湾海峡潜在的专属经济区范围内，美军舰机的高调 “过航” 活动颇具挑衅性 ( 中方历次表 态皆未指责其违反国际法) ，而且对 “台独” 势力是一种 “撑腰打气”，纯属推动台海 “军事化” 的挑事之举。美方需要降低其在台海军事活动的频次和烈度， 不要妄图以此向中方恫吓施压，应恪守一个中国原则，多做有利于中美关系和 促进台海和平稳定的事，而不是相反。
Finally, it appears that the two sides should explore filling the “gaps” in the existing mechanisms as to rules that may be able to coordinate their practices, such as on how to coordinate their positions and practices in the case of “intentional encounters” in military exercise areas. The Chinese side had already announced the latitude and longitude boundaries of an exercise area in late August 2020, but a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft nonetheless intruded. 77 If such a situation were to occur in the Taiwan Strait, it could have unforeseen and serious repercussions. The difficulty of applying the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters” and other mechanisms to such situations is mainly due to the apparently divergent practices of China and the United States. As stipulated in Section 5, Paragraph 1 of Annex III (“Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters”) to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (“When conducting activities that will affect the safety of nearby military vessels and military aircraft, commanders are to ensure the appropriate danger zone or warning zone is established or declared”) and Paragraph 3 of the same Section (“The military vessels and military aircraft of one Side should refrain from impeding the relevant activities in the applicable zones established or declared by the other Side; however, military vessels and military aircraft always enjoy the rights of freedom of navigation, overflight, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms”) 78, the U.S. side may argue that its reconnaissance aircraft do not interfere with China’s exercise activities, and so do not violate the provisions of these paragraphs, or that its military aircraft have always enjoyed “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” and are not obligated to comply in “international airspace” with exercise area restrictions established by other countries. According to the U.S. position, for an exercise area established by a country outside its airspace, other countries’ ships and aircraft are not required to stay away and have “freedom of navigation” to enter the area to conduct intelligence gathering activities, as long as they have “due regard” for the relevant rights of the country that established the area.79
最后，双方似应探讨填补现有机制中双方或可协调作法的细则 “空白”，比如关于军事演习区域 “有意相遇” 情况如何协调彼此立场和实践。中方 2020 年8 月底黄海军演已事先宣告演习区域经纬度界线而美军 U－ 2 侦察机仍擅自闯入，此种相类情况若发生于台海，则可能引发难以预料的严重后果。 “海空相遇安全行为准则” 等机制对于此类情况难以适用，主要缘于中美相关实践作法似有分歧。按 《中美关于海空相遇安全行为准则谅解备忘录》附件三 “空中相遇安全行为准则” 第五条第一款规定 ( “当有关活动的进行或将影响到附近军用 舰艇和军用航空器的安全时，指挥官应当确保已建立或宣告适当的危险区或警 告区”) 及该条第三款规定 ( “一方的军用舰艇和军用航空器不应妨碍另一方所建立或宣告之适用区域内的有关活动，但军用舰艇和军用航空器总还享有相关 权利及航行和飞越自由，以及与这些自由有关的海洋其他国际合法用途”) ，美方可借口其侦察机并未妨碍中方演习活动而不违反该款规定，或其军机一向 享有 “海洋其他国际合法用途” 而无义务在 “国际空域” 遵守他国设立之演习区域限制———按美方立场，对于一国在领空外划设之演习区域，他国舰机并非必得远离且有进入该区域进行情搜活动之 “航行自由”，只要 “适当顾及” 划设国相关权利即可。
(3) “Air Encounters” in the Taiwan Strait in particular require special attention and refinement of the “rules”
(三) 台海 “空中相遇” 尤须特别关注和细化 “规则”
Since the Biden administration took office, the U.S. military has frequently dispatched ships and aircraft to China’s surrounding sea area and airspace, driving regional militarization and threatening regional peace and stability. 80 With regard to U.S.-China military activities in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding airspace, in order to strengthen crisis control and reduce the risk of U.S. close reconnaissance triggering an incident similar to the “South China Sea collision” in 2001 [the Hainan Island incident], the two militaries need to further strengthen the “Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air-to-Air Encounters” in Annex III of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, strengthen exchanges on specific issues where the two sides have different positions due to different “interpretations” of international law, and actively promote the exploration of “rules” that facilitate practical operations and focus on managing accidents and avoiding friction.”
拜登政府上台以来，美军频繁派遣舰机赴中国周边海空域活动，推动地区 军事化，威胁地区和平稳定。 就中美在台海及周边空域的军事活动而言，为加强危机管控和降低由美方抵近侦察引发类似 2001 年 “南海撞机事件” 之风险， 中美两军有必要进一步强化 《中美关于海空相遇安全行为准则谅解备忘录》附件三 “空中相遇安全行为准则” 中的共识，就双方因国际法不同 “解读” 所致不同立场的具体问题加强交流，积极推动探讨便于实际操作、聚焦管控意外事 件和避免摩擦的 “细则”。
The Taiwan issue is the most central and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. As competition between China and the United States intensifies and the sense of crisis of “Taiwan independence” forces on Taiwan Island grows, the strategic game between China and the United States in the airspace of the Taiwan Strait will become more intense, and the level of tension will even exceed that in the air over the South China Sea. Given the high sensitivity and special nature of the Taiwan Strait region, China and the United States must consider establishing more targeted “strict” rules, and discuss how to avoid problems such as friction in the event of “intentional encounters” between military aircraft of both sides or multiple parties. In addition, China and the United States should also pay attention to and strengthen communication on military UAVs, including standards of conduct and the international law issues involved, so as to avoid misjudgments or even “accidents” triggered by gaps in the “rules.”
台湾问题是中美关系当中最核心的敏感问题。随着中美两国竞争的加剧和 台湾岛内 “台独” 势力危机感的提升，中美双方在台海空域的战略博弈也会复趋激烈，紧张度甚至会超过南海上空。鉴于台海区域的高度敏感性和特殊性， 中美有必要考虑设立较有针对性的 “严格” 规则，对双方或多方军机 “有意相遇” 情景下应如何避免摩擦之类的问题进行探讨。另外， 关于军用无人机( UAV) 的行为规范及所涉国际法问题，中美双方也应予以关注和加强沟通，避免因 “规则” 空白引发误判乃至 “意外事件”。
At present, the root cause of tension in the Taiwan Strait is the attempt by the DPP authorities to change the fact that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same China. Politicians such as Tsai Ing-wen, disregarding the well-being and safety of the Taiwanese people, delude themselves in thinking they can depend on the “empty promises” of external forces in a bid to “rely on foreign powers to seek independence,” but they are doomed to have no way out. China must be reunified and inevitably will be reunified. This is an unstoppable historical process and a major trend. Some people on the U.S. side, in the face of the worsening situation in Ukraine, are trying to “add fuel to the flames” of the Russia-Ukraine conflict on one hand, and on the other are trying to “let others suffer on their behalf” by deliberately drawing parallels between the Taiwan issue and the Ukraine issue and condoning and encouraging the development of “Taiwan independence” forces, which gravely violates the basic norms of international relations. The U.S. side should not indulge in “double standards” when it comes to international rules. As State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said, “There are fundamental differences between the Taiwan issue and the Ukraine issue. There is no comparison. The most fundamental difference is that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory and the Taiwan issue is entirely an internal affair of China, while the Ukraine issue is a dispute between Russia and Ukraine. It is a barefaced double standard for some people to emphasize the principle of sovereignty on the Ukraine issue, but keep undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on the Taiwan issue.” 81
当前，台海局势紧张根源在于民进党当局企图改变两岸同属一个中国的事 实，蔡英文等政客不顾台湾民众的福祉和安危，妄想依靠外部势力 “空头支票” 大搞 “挟洋谋独”，注定没有出路。中国必须统一，也必然统一，这是不可阻挡的历史进程和大势。美方一些人在乌克兰局势愈演愈烈的情况下，一边对俄乌 冲突 “火上浇油”，一边试图 “祸水东引” 而故意拿台湾问题同乌克兰问题类比，纵容鼓动 “台独” 势力发展以遏制中国和平崛起，严重违反国际关系基本准则。对于国际规则，美方不应肆行 “双标” 取舍。正如国务委员兼外交部长王毅所说: “台湾问题与乌克兰问题有着本质区别，没有任何可比性。最根本的不同在于，台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，台湾问题完全是中国的内政， 乌克兰问题则是俄乌两个国家之间的争端。有些人在乌克兰问题上强调主权原 则，但在台湾问题上却不断损害中国的主权和领土完整，这是赤裸裸的双重 标准。”
Recently, the “negative” direction of U.S. policy on Taiwan has become increasingly apparent, and the Biden administration has exceeded its predecessor in words and deeds that hollow out the one-China policy. The latest weather vane is the “U.S. Relations with Taiwan, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet” that was significantly revised and updated on May 5, 2022 82 (the previous version was released on August 31, 2018, under the Trump administration 83), removing “The United States does not support Taiwan independence” from the previous version, as well as “There is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China” and other related expressions. The U.S. side is well aware of the importance of such content for the U.S.-China relationship, but it still uses an “announce to the world” approach to engage in ploys of political manipulation on the Taiwan issue, which are highly suggestive of encouraging “Taiwan independence” elements and “fanning the flames” in the Taiwan Strait.
近来，美国台海政策 “消极” 走向愈加明显，拜登政府较之前任在虚化掏空一个中国政策的言行上有过之而无不及，最近的 “风向标” 即美国务院官网“美台关系事实清单” 于 2022 年 5 月 5 日作出重要修改更新 ( 上一版本是在特朗普执政时 2018 年 8 月 31 日发布) ，删除了此前版本中的 “美国不支持台湾独立” 以及 《中美建交公报》所含 “只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分” 等相关表述。美方明知上述内容对于中美关系的重要性，但仍以 “昭告天下” 的方式在台湾问题上搞政治操弄的小动作，颇有为 “台独” 分子鼓劲及在台海“拱火” 之嫌。
The Taiwan issue concerns China’s core interests. The U.S. side has disregarded the one-China principle and the spirit of the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, and is colluding with the DPP authorities, continuously sending seriously wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” forces and undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. On Taiwan-related issues, if the U.S. side does not reflect on the error of its “using Taiwan to control China” policy and continues to seek gains for itself by “walking a tightrope” or “slicing salami,” it will surely be “playing with fire and end up burning itself.” Given the growing gap between the U.S. and Chinese policy positions on the meaning and content of “one China,” and the possibility of the Taiwan authorities using the situation in Ukraine to play more tricks, U.S.-Taiwan collusion may continue to escalate in the short term, especially before the U.S. midterm elections. The risk variables of the U.S.-China game in the Taiwan Strait are likely to continue to grow and even “spill over” to other areas, and the normal development of economic and trade cooperation between China and other countries may also be “compromised.” In the current situation of increased uncertainty and instability in the Taiwan Strait, China and the United States should meet each other half way and use actions to create a good atmosphere. The U.S. side in particular must be vigilant to avoid any provocative behavior that heightens regional tensions and is likely to cause misunderstandings and misjudgments.
台湾问题事关中国核心利益，美方罔顾一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报 精神而与民进党当局相勾连，不断向 “台独” 势力发出严重错误信号，破坏台海和平稳定。在涉台问题上，美方若不知反省其 “以台制华” 政策谬误而继续通过 “踩钢丝” 或 “切香肠” 谋求私利，则必将 “玩火自焚”。鉴于中美双方在 “一个中国” 含义和内容上政策立场的差距愈渐加大，且台湾当局借乌克兰局势或有更多小动作，短期来看，特别是在美国 “中期选举” 之前，美台勾连或将继续升级，随之中美台海博弈的风险变数很可能会持续增大，甚或 “外溢” 至其他领域，中国与相关国家经贸合作正常发展亦恐遭 “殃及”。在当前台海地区不确定性和不稳定性增多的情况下，中美双方应相向而行，用行动营造良好 氛围，尤其是美方必须有所警醒，避免任何推高地区紧张局势和极易造成误解、 误判的挑衅性行为。