The second decade of the twenty-first century has seen China’s growing comprehensive national power and intensifying efforts in Africa profoundly shape not only China’s relations with African countries, but also its relations with the world’s major countries over Africa. Consequently, the international environment of China’s activities in Africa has changed considerably. First, although China is not the strongest among the great powers that have a stake in Africa, China has inadvertently moved to the center of the African stage and has become a lead actor both in “great-power relations with Africa” and in “great-power relations in Africa.” Second, as China’s interests and influence in Africa rapidly grow and as the “China factor” takes hold, some developed and emerging countries with regional—if not global—influence have also paid closer attention to Africa and increased their involvement there, which has set off a new round of great-power competition in the continent. Third, with the involvement of international factors, especially the “great-power factor,” China’s activities in Africa have triggered increasingly stronger international reactions, and China-Africa relations have increasingly become trilateral or multilateral in nature. Fourth, China’s activities in Africa have to engage with an increasingly broad and complex network of interests as the number of stakeholders continues to rise, with increasingly fierce international competition. Finally, the tension between China and the world’s major countries over Africa involve both commercial competition and conflicts in values and ideology, in addition to geopolitical rivalry, and sometimes they overlap or even reinforce each other. All of these indicate that great-power relations in Africa have entered an era of multilateral competition; “cooperation in competition” and “competition in cooperation” will become the norms, with increasing interaction or linkage between great-power relations in Africa, on the one hand, and great-power relations with Africa or strategic relations between the great powers, on the other.¹ This means that China’s activities in Africa face an ever more complicated international environment and ever more challenging difficulties. The research on China’s international strategy in relation to Africa is intended exactly to address and analyze the above issues.

The positioning and components of China’s international strategy for relations with Africa

Given the comparative strength of the great powers in Africa, it is undoubtedly in China’s interest to maintain Sino-African relations and their healthy interaction with the international system. Whether this subjective wish can be realized, however, does not solely depend on China: just as the saying goes, “even though the tree may long for calmness, the wind will not subside.” Some powers outside Africa are not happy to see China’s arrival in the continent, and some Western powers even regard the surge in Chinese activities and influence in Africa as a challenge to their vested interests. As a result, their Africa policies more or less contain elements designed to interfere with China’s actions and offset its influence there. As part of China’s Africa strategy, China’s international strategy for relations with Africa is a systematic, long-term, and forward-looking master plan for the country’s future relations with other major powers over Africa. Its main purpose is to enable the rational handling of relations with the world’s major countries—especially Western powers—over Africa, to reduce international resistance to China’s entry into the continent, and thus to create a hospitable international atmosphere for China’s activities in Africa and safeguard and expand China’s interests there to the utmost. What place, then, does China’s international strategy for relations with Africa occupy in China’s constellation of strategies, and what are its components?

(1) Strategic positioning of China’s management of great-power relations in Africa

The strategic vision for China’s management of great-power relations in Africa is an international strategy—that is, a sovereign state’s plan to use national power to achieve national interests in international interaction. Since international strategies are enacted by sovereign states in the environment of the international system and take the form of international interaction, they entail the foreign policies and actions of states.² According to systems theory, China’s strategic system is an open system, and China’s international strategy for relations with Africa is an important part of it. National strategy represents the highest level of China’s strategic system, and international strategy refers specifically to the part of national strategy that deals with foreign relations. If we classify national strategy as first in China’s hierarchy of strategy and international strategy as second, then China’s strategy for Africa—as a regional strategy of China’s international strategy—is tertiary,³ and China’s international strategy for relations with Africa, which is part of China’s strategy for Africa, comes fourth. In short, China’s international strategy for African relations is a component of China’s national strategy, international strategy, and Africa strategy.

Strategies at different levels have different focuses. Some of the challenges encountered in China’s entry into Africa and in its activities there originate from China itself, while others involve both China and Africa, and still others concern the relationship between China and other non-African major countries over the continent. China’s strategy for Africa, therefore, covers three directions or levels of work: it needs to handle or coordinate three sets of interests—namely, the interests or collaboration within and between the Chinese government’s Africa-related functional, operational, and auxiliary departments; the relationship of interests between China and African countries; and the relationship of interests between China and the world’s major countries, especially Western powers, over Africa. China’s strategy for Africa, then, is composed of three relatively independent yet interconnected parts—domestic, African, and international.⁴ The international part of China’s strategy for Africa—in other words, China’s international strategy for relations with Africa—deals specifically with the relationship between China and other non-African major countries over the continent. Its relationship with China’s strategy for Africa is one between part and whole or between local and global.

(2) The Definition of China’s International Strategy for Relations with Africa

If China is to maintain healthy interaction between China-Africa relations and the international system, it must formulate a concrete action plan for handling great-power relations in Africa according to its own needs and aspirations. This action plan is consistent with China’s international strategy for African relations. Devised in accordance with Africa’s place in China’s national interest or national strategy, China’s strategy for Africa is a master plan to utilize the country’s national power and resources to fulfill its needs and aspirations in Africa, factoring in any challenges that China’s activities in the continent may face.⁵ As part of China’s Africa strategy, then, China’s international strategy for relations with Africa is a comprehensive, systematic, long-term, and forward-looking plan for the country’s future relations with other major powers over Africa.

China’s international strategy for African relations is a composite concept, made up of various elements such as China’s strategic ideas, goals, and guiding principles for handling relations with major powers over Africa, along with corresponding strategic deployment, resource allocation, implementation procedures, and operation plans. These strategic elements are planned and determined on the basis of needs and possibilities. Moreover, China’s international strategy for African relations is an integrated system. Since China-Africa relations face multifaceted problems and challenges—economic, ideological, and geopolitical, for example—at the level of the international system, China’s strategic vision for managing great-power relations in Africa needs to envisage not only mobilizing various political, economic, cultural, and military resources, but also allocating and using them in a holistic and optimal manner to bring out synergy between them.

In summary, although China’s strategy for managing great-power relations in Africa is based on history and reality, it looks to the future, planning for the long-term development of China’s relations with other major powers over Africa. It does not focus on the inconsequential details of the great powers’ affairs in Africa or contingent events, but on key issues that have long-term or systemic significance for China’s relations with other major powers over Africa. Simply put, the point of China’s international strategy for African relations is to answer the following questions: What are China’s goals in handling great-power relations in Africa? What can China rely on to achieve those goals? And what should China do to achieve them?

China’s Strategic Goals in Managing Great-Power Relations in Africa

China’s strategic goals in managing great-power relations in Africa represent the expected outcomes of China’s handling of its relations with major powers over the continent over a certain period of time. With national interests at stake, strategic goals are thus the most fundamental and central element of China’s international strategy for African relations. In accordance with systems theory, China’s international strategy for African relations—as part of China’s national, international, and Africa strategy—not only directly serves the Africa strategy, but must also serve the national or international strategy when necessary, pursuing, therefore, goals on different fronts in line with the different levels of strategy it serves. On the basis of those levels and their characteristics, the goals can be categorized into two groups—standard and nonstandard. Standard goals fall within the purview of the international strategy for African relations that forms part of China’s “regional strategy” on Africa, whereas nonstandard goals are those pursued by the international strategy for African relations that forms part of China’s “concomitant” Africa strategy.⁶ As these two types of goals have different frames of reference and serve different purposes, there are clear differences between them.

(1) China’s Standard Goals in Managing Great-Power Relations in Africa

The standard goals of China’s international strategy for relations with Africa are what China seeks to achieve within the framework of China’s regional strategy for Africa or at the level of China-Africa relations when it engages with major countries, particularly Western powers, over the continent. These are effectively what the strategy itself seeks to achieve. As the international strategy for African relations is part of China’s Africa strategy, its standard goals largely overlap with the latter’s goals: ultimately, they both aim at expanding and safeguarding China’s interests in Africa. Their specific focuses, however, differ from each other, and their relationship is one of part and whole, or local and global.

As strategic goals are the starting point and desired end of China’s engagement with the great powers over Africa, they cannot be set in an arbitrary manner. Neither overambition nor overcaution is desirable; instead, it is necessary to comprehensively assess relevant variables in the international environment that China faces in Africa to find the best balance between needs and possibilities. Considering the historical and current relationships between the great powers and Africa, the trajectory of great-power strategic relations, and especially the reality that Western powers are still stronger than China in Africa, the standard goals of China’s international strategy for African relations in the next 10 to 20 years should arguably be the flexible handling of relations between China and the world’s—particularly the West’s—major powers over Africa and the encouragement of healthy interaction between China-Africa relations and the international system. Such goals would serve to ease international resistance to China’s entry into Africa and create a favorable atmosphere for China’s activities there, thus expanding and protecting Chinese interests in the continent to the greatest extent.

It should be noted that the standard goals described above are merely an abstract, general statement of the focus of China’s management of great-power relations in Africa over a given period. The specific goals will have to be determined by the specific problems (including specific countries or events) that China encounters in engaging with the great powers over Africa in specific contexts. Examples in this regard abound in the rounds of rivalry between China and Western powers over Africa since the beginning of the twenty-first century.⁷ Frankly speaking, however, China is still new to, or at least inexperienced in, formulating an international strategy for African relations as part of China’s regional strategy for Africa—rather than as part of the concomitant strategy—and setting its goals (namely, standard goals).

(2) China’s Nonstandard Goals in Managing Great-Power Relations in Africa

The nonstandard goals of China’s international strategy for relations with Africa are not what the strategy itself seeks to achieve, but rather goals pursued by China’s international strategy or foreign relations—a higher level of strategy. In other words, the nonstandard goals are essentially equivalent to the goals that China’s national strategy or international strategy tries to accomplish in the context of a specific region at a specific time.⁸ This means that such goals must be set with the big picture in mind—that is, they must be based on, subject to, and of service to the overall situation. In fact, for a long time, China’s strategic vision and practice for Africa have often been conceived and implemented as a concomitant of its national or international strategy. Therefore, China is familiar with setting and working towards nonstandard goals in its international strategy for African relations. Past diplomatic practices show that the nonstandard goals of China’s international strategy for African relations do not have a particular focus, but are determined by policymakers according to a specific situation’s relative importance to China’s national interests.

It is not enough to base nonstandard goals on policymakers’ will alone, however; they must also be backed by the strength of a nation, and China currently has the conditions and capabilities to set the goals. Since the beginning of the 2010s, China’s growing comprehensive national power and intensifying efforts in Africa have significantly improved its position in the continent vis-à-vis other great powers. Most importantly, China has gained the strategic initiative in the new round of great-power competition in Africa, as the country now not only has the ability to independently make decisions and take action in the great-power rivalry over Africa, but also has the ability to influence, induce, or even force other countries to act accordingly in response. In other words, China already has the basic conditions and capabilities to manage great-power relations in Africa through China-Africa relations and thereby trigger a ripple effect in great-power strategic relations. Such conditions and capabilities are also indispensable for setting the nonstandard goals of China’s international strategy for African relations.

The nonstandard goals of China’s international strategy for African relations are intended mainly to synergize with some of China’s specific strategic actions, as the country faces certain special circumstances in international relations. Some of them involve national sovereignty or national security, while others concern China’s image or development: for example, China is one of the few Communist Party-led socialist countries in the world today; it is the world’s second-largest economy but at the same time a rising developing power; its land and maritime boundaries with some countries have not yet been demarcated or are disputed; and it is the only major country that has not yet achieved full national unification.⁹ Some Western countries frequently leverage these issues as bargaining chips against China, causing complications large and small for China’s foreign affairs. In dealing with these issues, China needs to focus on the long-term big picture, go beyond the narrow realm of Africa or China-Africa relations, and situate them in the overall framework of its diplomacy, security, and development strategies, taking a vigorous approach to its relations with Africa and with Western powers over Africa to synergize with its handling of great-power strategic relations. In this way, China may fully utilize China-Africa relations as a counterbalance or point of leverage in its geopolitical strategy, so as to impede—or even force the hand of—its potential rivals and synergize with the implementation of its national or international strategy.

The specific role played by China-Africa relations or China’s relations with Western powers over Africa in China’s national or international strategy depends on the specific circumstances. Admittedly, Africa or China-Africa relations may carry limited weight in China’s grand strategy, but it is worth playing the “Africa card” if China has the actual need to step up its effort in the continent and manage great-power relations there. China, of course, cannot play the Africa card for free—just as the saying goes, “nothing ventured, nothing gained”—and it must accept the possibility that its efforts may well prove fruitless. Unless there is a special need, therefore, China’s international strategy for African relations should refrain from nonstandard operations under normal circumstances. However, with worst-case scenarios and the big picture of foreign relations in mind, China has to prepare a plan—even multiple plans—for nonstandard operations in case of contingencies, so that it can shift China-Africa relations into overdrive when necessary to support its national or international strategy.

As can be seen from the discussion above, the standard and nonstandard goals of China’s international strategy for relations with Africa serve different ends. Standard goals are designed to reconcile China’s interests in Africa with those of the world’s—especially the West’s—major countries and thus allay their strategic doubts about China’s entry into Africa and activities there, thereby maintaining healthy interaction between China-Africa relations and the international system. Nonstandard goals, on the other hand, aim to attract the attention of Western countries, especially the United States, to China’s presence and activities in Africa by taking a firm approach to China-Africa relations—even by going so far as to intentionally sow tension in great-power relations in Africa—in a bid to induce or force them to take corresponding measures in response, which would serve to disrupt and divert the United States’ strategic focus, relieve the pressure faced by China on the “main front” to some extent, and synergize with China’s national or international strategy.

China’s Guiding Principles in Managing Great-Power Relations in Africa

China’s guiding principles in managing great-power relations in Africa are overarching policies formulated in light of the great powers’ comparative strength in the continent to direct China’s engagement with them in order to achieve set strategic goals. In great-power relations in Africa—as in all contemporary international relations—competition, cooperation, and compromise always go hand in hand. Since, as part of China’s Africa strategy, the strategic goals of China’s management of great-power relations in Africa under normal circumstances are to maintain healthy interaction between China-Africa relations and the international system, to reduce international resistance to China’s entry into Africa, and to create a hospitable atmosphere for China’s activities there, then, in accordance with such goals, China should stick to the following three principles in managing great-power relations in Africa.

(1) Prioritizing China’s Own Interests While Taking into Account the Interests of All Parties

In China’s multilayered relationship with the world’s—especially the West’s—major countries over Africa, the relationship of interests occupies center stage. Whether a non-African country’s entry into the continent preceded, coincides with, or follows China’s entry, it constitutes a stakeholder in China’s relations with Africa. As the practice of international relations has repeatedly shown, relationships between states are essentially transactional, and they are always ultimately motivated by the maximization of national interests. Since the great powers all have their own national interests in mind when developing their relations with Africa, which they see as a means to an end, China naturally should also make it a principle to prioritize its own interests when handling great-power relations in Africa. Such a principle means the prioritization of national interests. People often talk about “focusing on the central task and serving the big picture.” What, then, are the central task and the big picture? The biggest central task and biggest picture are none other than the defense of China’s national interests. In handling great-power relations in Africa, China should always put its own national interests first whatever it does and however it does it. In fact, in international politics, the paramountcy of national interests has become the guiding principle for all countries when they plan and implement their international strategies.

“Taking into account the interests of all parties” means showing due consideration for other countries’ interests on condition that China’s national interests take priority. This is necessary given the history and reality of great-power relations with Africa and great-power relations in Africa, as China is a latecomer to such relations compared with those old European powers that, as former colonial parent states, have deep ties with the continent. In the process of China’s entry into Africa, it is inevitable to have overlapping, diverging, and conflicting interests with those “pioneers.” Since Western powers are still stronger than China in Africa, to avoid a premature head-on collision with them before China has gained a foothold, showing due consideration for other countries’ interests may be a good interim option when engaging in great-power relations in Africa. It should be noted that the purpose of giving consideration to the interests of all parties is ultimately to better expand and protect China’s interests in Africa, which remain the priority.

(2) Flexible, Pragmatic, and Non-exclusive Multilateralism

Like international competition, international cooperation is also informed by considerations of national interests. More and more countries are trying to enhance their own capabilities or interests through international cooperation, of which China is both an active advocate and beneficiary. Given the comparative strength of the great powers in Africa, it can be a wise course of action to pursue flexible, pragmatic, and non-exclusive multilateralism if China wants to facilitate and maintain healthy interaction between China-Africa relations and the international system. Specifically, this means pursuing a policy of openness, inclusiveness, equality, and mutual benefit, which is, in fact, China’s current policy. As the Chinese government has explicitly stated, “China upholds openness and inclusiveness in developing its relations with Africa, promoting cooperation rather than confrontation;”¹⁰

“China sincerely supports the diversification of Africa’s partners, welcomes greater investment in Africa by the international community, and is willing to carry out trilateral cooperation in Africa,” “sharing development opportunities and promoting inclusive growth together.”¹¹ Of course, any form of international cooperation in Africa between China and other non-African countries must fully respect the sovereignty and interests of African countries. Any exchange of benefits that bypasses African countries will ultimately harm China’s long-term interests in Africa.¹² Upholding the principle of openness, inclusiveness, cooperation, and mutual benefit in handling great-power relations in Africa can not only reduce the conflict of interests between China and Western powers in the continent, thus easing international resistance to China’s entry into Africa, but can also somewhat allay Western powers’ strategic doubts about China’s activities there. Furthermore, the stakeholders in China’s relations with Africa are all regional—if not global—powers, each cooperating with African countries in its unique ways and thus having its own unique advantages in Africa. Cooperation between China and those stakeholders will generate mutual benefit and complementarity of each party’s advantages. Confrontation, conversely, will leave all parties worse off, which may even undermine China’s Africa strategy, slow down its entry into the continent, and disrupt its normal activities there. Therefore, if China actively responds to the demands of the international community, selectively engages in international cooperation, and—by sharing opportunities—expands the common ground between China’s interests in Africa and those of other major countries, perhaps there will be less rivalry and friction and more compromise and collaboration in the “coopetitive” relationship between them over Africa.

(3) Defending China’s Legitimate Interests with Both Preventive Measures and Countermeasures

As a latecomer to great-power relations with and in Africa, China inevitably has to interact with a variety of non-African state actors over the course of its activities in the continent. Regardless of China’s motivations, the reality is that its entry into Africa has touched the vested interests of those “pioneers,” and some Western countries went to great lengths to criticize or hinder China’s activities in Africa over the past decade. It is clear that China’s entry into the continent faces a myriad of difficulties and obstacles. To deal with these risks, China must plan for worst-case scenarios and prioritize preventive measures, which necessitates an unblinking assessment of the potential tensions and problems in handling great-power relations in Africa, so as to prepare for the worst circumstances while striving for the best results. Only by taking preventive measures, by taking full stock of the difficulties and challenges involved in China’s activities in Africa, and by making thorough plans for dealing with complicated situations and contingencies in great-power relations in Africa, can we remain calm and have room for maneuver in times of emergency. As the saying goes, “Only the prepared shall go far.”

Overcoming an opponent by taking countermeasures against its moves, as a guiding principle for active defense, means China should not be provocative when engaging with other non-African powers over Africa. In fact, China has never excluded or targeted any third party when developing its relations with Africa, nor has it ever passed judgment on other non-African countries’ relations with Africa or their activities in the continent. Regardless of China’s intentions, however, the rapid development of China-Africa relations has triggered various reactions from the stakeholders. Old European powers such as France and Britain are constantly throwing obstacles in the way of China’s activities in Africa, trying to drive a wedge between African countries and China. Not being provocative does not mean endless tolerance or passivity in the face of provocation. It is just a strategy, not an end in itself. When the tension between China and Western powers in Africa becomes irreconcilable, especially when facing some Western powers’ flagrant provocations, China must not compromise and give up its legitimate rights and interests in Africa, but should take timely, decisive, and effective countermeasures, turning passivity into initiative.

In summary, the new round of great-power competition in Africa in the twenty-first century is essentially still a struggle for conditions and room for development. As the intertwinement and alternation of cooperation and competition will continue to be the norm in the future of China’s relations with the world’s—especially the West’s—major countries over Africa, the core principle for China’s management of great-power relations in Africa is the prioritization of national interests, which is also the primary goal of China’s international strategy for African relations. It should be noted that adhering to the principle of “me first, taking into account the interests of all parties“, following the principle of “flexible, pragmatic, non-exclusive” multilateralism, and upholding the principle of “prevention first, taking initiative after” are complementary to one another, they are not of equal weight, and the order in which they are arranged reflects their relative importance. In addition, China also needs to find a balance between the constancy of principles and the flexibility of strategies in handling great-power relations in Africa.

China’s Operational Plan for Managing Great-Power Relations in Africa

Whether and to what extent China’s international strategy for relations with Africa can achieve its goals depend on the appropriateness of its operational plan. The operational plan, or strategic plan, refers to the allocation of resources and the methods, approaches, and procedures to take for achieving China’s strategic goals in managing great-power relations in Africa. In international relations, strategic plans have similarities to diplomatic tactics: both are essentially plans used by sovereign states to maximize their own interests in international interaction. The history of international politics has shown that although the status, rights, and interests that a state enjoys in the international community mainly depend on its strength, the role of diplomatic tactics cannot be underestimated. An appropriate strategic plan can, to some extent, compensate for a state’s lack of strength and help it secure rights and interests that it cannot obtain with its strength alone. Strategic plans in international interaction are thus part of a country’s soft power. China’s operational plan for managing great-power relations in Africa is not plucked out of thin air, but is underpinned by knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of itself and its rivals. In great-power interaction in Africa, a focused operational plan informed by thorough understanding of the strategic environment that China faces in the continent is indispensable for achieving the expected outcomes.¹³

(1) Attitudes or Reactions of the World’s Major Countries to China’s Entry into Africa

China’s strategy for managing great-power relations in Africa serves clear strategic goals. After the strategic goals are set, how to allocate resources, what methods to use, what avenues to pursue, and what steps to take to achieve those goals often have to be determined according to the specific parties or matters involved, which calls for a case-by-case analysis. First of all, it is necessary to identify the main stakeholders in China’s relations with Africa, their relationships with Africa, and especially their attitudes towards China and China’s entry into Africa. Simply put, we first need to distinguish between friends and foes. Currently, the main stakeholders include both developed countries such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Portugal, and Japan, and emerging countries like Russia, India, Brazil, South Korea, and Turkey. Mostly regional—if not global—powers, they can be divided into three groups on the basis of their comprehensive national power, historical and current relationships with Africa, interests and influence in the continent, relations between one another, and especially their strategic relations with China and their attitudes towards China’s rise and China’s activities in Africa.

First, there are the old European powers that have an “Africa complex” and see Africa as their own backyard—namely, former colonial metropoles such as France, Britain, and Portugal. These erstwhile great powers have deep historical, cultural, and linguistic connections with their former colonies on the continent, from which the so-called Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa, and Lusophone Africa originated. Still harboring a strong “Africa complex” today, they view Africa as their exclusive sphere of influence. Despite having been stripped of its African colonies following its defeat in World War I, Germany also falls under this group since it still maintains some traditional ties with African countries. Compared with other non-African countries, these old European powers are pioneers in great-power relations with Africa and have a vested interest in great-power relations in Africa. For this reason, the rapid expansion of China’s interests and influence in the continent has left a sour taste in their mouths. Over the past decade, the main international resistance to China’s move into Africa came from these old European powers, especially Britain and France, though other countries like Germany and Portugal also showed similar hostility. With deep historical ties with and substantial interests in Africa, these old European powers are the main stakeholders in China’s relations with the continent and represent China’s major rivals there. Regarding China’s entry as intrusion into their backyard and China’s normal activities as a threat to their “cake,” they have made combined efforts to contain China’s influence in Africa.

Second, there are developed countries that do not have close traditional ties with Africa but have influence there, not least the United States and Japan. In general, these countries do not have significant historical ties with Africa. Although the United States had contact with Africa due to the slave trade, its traditional influence is mainly limited to Liberia, while Japan, Australia, and South Korea essentially lack a historical connection with the continent. Since the start of the twenty-first century, however, as the “China factor” begins to reshape great-power relations with Africa and great-power relations in Africa, these countries—jolted by China’s meteoric rise—have paid closer attention to the continent and increased their involvement there in consideration of their own political, economic, and security interests, becoming another group of developed countries with frequent contact with Africa aside from the old European powers. China’s relationships with Japan and, in particular, the United States over Africa are more complex than relations with South Korea, involving commercial, ideological, and even geopolitical rivalry. With their strategic relations with China deteriorating, the United States and Japan clearly intend their activities in Africa to counterbalance China’s influence. Although for now they have yet to pull out all the stops to work against China in Africa as they have limited interests there and as their relations with China have not yet broken down, one must fully realize that once the United States has a strategic showdown with China, it will attempt a global, all-around containment, and rivalry between the two countries in Africa will be inevitable.

The last group consists of major emerging countries that see potential in Africa, which they seek to tap for political and economic gains. They mainly include emerging countries with regional or global influence, such as India, Brazil, Russia, and Turkey. Their relationships with Africa differ. India and Brazil have some historical ties with the continent and have significant interests and influence in certain regions of Africa. India mainly engages with African countries along the Indian Ocean and African members of the Commonwealth, with a focus on southern and eastern Africa, whereas Brazil reigns supreme in Portuguese-speaking African countries. The Soviet Union, Russia’s predecessor, exerted ideological influence on African countries during the Cold War and engaged in military cooperation with some so-called African socialist countries. As a new round of great-power rivalry unfolds in Africa in the twenty-first century, these emerging countries have also stepped up their efforts in Africa in order to enhance their comprehensive national power, with India being particularly active. It not only maintains close economic and trade relations with Africa, but also intends to boost its international status through activities there. In addition, India’s deepening relationship with Africa is also intended as a geopolitical strategy to compete with China or counteract China’s influence in the continent. Compared with the first two groups, these emerging countries generally have a milder reaction to China’s entry into Africa or its activities there—with the notable exception of India, whose peaceful coexistence with China in Africa will end as soon as strategic relations between the two countries deteriorate.

Given these three groups of countries’ differing relationships with Africa and, more importantly, their varying attitudes and reactions to China’s entry into Africa and its activities there, China should naturally treat them differently when engaging with these countries over Africa. It should be pointed out that such differences exist not only between the three groups, but also between countries within each group. China should therefore tailor its approach according to each country’s relationship with Africa, interests and influence in Africa, level of strategic trust with China, and attitude towards China’s rise. In short, it is necessary for China to analyze each stakeholder in its relations with Africa on a case-by-case basis and treat different countries with different attitudes, different resources, and different methods.

(2) Handling Relations with Various Stakeholders Rationally and on a Case-by-Case Basis

Although numerous countries take an interest in China’s presence in Africa, only a few of them—particularly France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, and India—have structural incompatibilities with China or may confront China over Africa. The structural incompatibilities here refer to relatively irreconcilable conflict of interests—whether commercial, ideological, or geopolitical—between China and other non-African powers over Africa. Different relationships interact with one another, and the conflict of interests between these countries and China also arises from different sources. In some cases, such as China’s relations with France and Britain over Africa, the conflict arises from China’s intensifying efforts in the continent—that is, from changes in China-Africa relations, which have affected those countries’ vested interests. In other cases, such as China’s relations with the United States, Japan, and—to some extent—India over Africa, it is alarm over China’s meteoric rise that has soured their strategic relations with China and, by extension, their relationships with China in Africa. What strategies China should adopt to engage with the countries mentioned above over Africa depends on the specific context, country, and situation. The key is to understand and carefully manage relations with France and the United States—which are the “critical few”—in Africa.

First, China needs to handle its relations with France and the United Kingdom in Africa in a firm but tactful manner. China’s relationship with France and Britain in Africa essentially revolves around the question of how emerging and established powers should coexist in the continent. Whether to maintain or break the established great-power order in Africa is therefore the focus of the rivalry between these old European powers and China in the continent. Although China does not recognize Africa as any country’s sphere of influence, maintaining that “Africa belongs to Africans; it is no one’s ‘cheese,’” it nevertheless has no intention to break the great powers’ established order in the continent, much less the ambition to take their place and build a new order from scratch. Regardless of China’s motivations, however, the reality of its strong presence in Africa has shocked old European powers like France and Britain—which vastly underestimated the speed of China’s move into Africa and the scale of its activities there—thus triggering a new round of great-power competition in Africa. China has taken the initiative in this round, while old European powers such as France and Britain—erstwhile colonial giants with unrivaled supremacy in Africa—are on the defensive, and this reversal of positions has already shifted the balance of power in the continent among the great powers. As the two largest former colonial parent states in Africa, France and Britain are worried that China’s activities there will change the “African order” (including existing interests and power structures) that they have shaped, leading to a power shift and their loss of dominance in African affairs.

The “Africa complex” of France and Britain stemmed from their historical ties and unique relationships with the continent. In the case of France, Africa is where it has been cultivating its overseas presence for the longest time, where its overseas interests are most concentrated, and where its traditional influence is strongest; most importantly, Africa is crucial to France’s status as a great power. The French government has readily acknowledged that without Africa, France would completely become a second-rate country. It considers Africa an area of strategic interests, and its 2013 white paper on defense and national security reiterates the continent’s geostrategic significance to France.¹⁴ Therefore, France can hardly tolerate the continuous and rapid increase of China’s influence in Africa, as it threatens the balance of power of the great powers in Africa, especially the French-led African order. The respective history and reality of China-Africa and France-Africa relations thus have a considerable influence on relations between China and France over Africa. China should fully understand and take into account France’s historically rooted “Africa complex” and the importance of Africa to Paris’s efforts to maintain France’s status as a great power. Only in this way can it grasp the main trend and substance of the two countries’ relations in Africa.

Britain’s attitude towards China’s entry into Africa is largely similar to that of France. In fact, France and Britain oppose the “meddling” of any other non-African country in Africa, having even joined hands to deal with the United States’ “offensive” in the continent in the mid-1990s. Therefore, if there is a localized strategic competition between China and these old European powers, then it is likely taking place in Africa. Irrespective of its desires, it is undeniable that as a rising global power, China has indeed made a significant impact with its activities in the continent on the “African order” dominated by the old European powers, as can be clearly seen in the relative decline of the traditional influence or interests of former colonial parent states like France and Britain. In the eyes of Paris and London, China’s activities in Africa have disrupted the great powers’ established interests and balance of power there. It is in this sense that China has irreconcilable structural incompatibilities with France and Britain in Africa. Such incompatibilities also exist between China and other old European powers like Germany and Portugal, which, although not as closely connected with Africa as France, also harbor an “Africa complex.”

Since China’s relationships with France and Britain in Africa are those between emerging and established great powers, its best strategy for engaging with them is flexible management of Chinese interests in Africa in relation to those of the old European powers, so as to maintain as much as possible a situation of “competition without catastrophe” and to avoid—at least at the current stage—falling into the Thucydides Trap in Africa. The reason is that as an emerging power on the rise, China is after all a latecomer to great-power relations with Africa despite moving into the continent at full steam, while France and Britain have cultivated their presence there for centuries, with deep-rooted interests. Moreover, Western powers are still stronger than China in Africa and will remain so for a long time to come, and China does not have an advantage in soft power either. It is thus not advisable for China to make too many enemies or launch an all-out offensive; instead, it should try to avoid premature direct conflicts with old European powers like France and Britain during its entry into Africa. In terms of strategic plans, then, although China should prepare a combination of soft and hard tactics for engaging with France and Britain over Africa, it should mainly adopt a soft, flexible approach in practice. Such an operational plan is consistent with China’s guiding principles in managing great-power relations in Africa.

Of course, flexible handling is subject to principles and conditions. On issues unrelated to its principles or core interests, that is, China can adopt a conciliatory approach and rationally respond to the irrational reactions of France, Britain, and other countries to its activities in Africa. It may, for example, show due consideration for the old European powers’ interests and traditional influence in Africa, actively respond to their calls for bilateral or multilateral discussion on African affairs, and selectively engage in trilateral cooperation with them in the continent. In fact, China has already started to pursue these three courses of action. On the other hand, when some old European powers make every attempt to stir up trouble and drive a wedge between China and African countries, China should play hardball and take decisive measures to resolutely defend its national interests if rational responses prove fruitless. Frankly speaking, however, China’s options in this regard are currently very limited. Still lacking an effective military presence in Africa (such as military bases and troops), it should instead focus on its strengths when putting in place measures to defend its legitimate interests. Specifically, it should make more use of economic power, especially the power of capital—a “neutral” force that has long been the engine propelling China’s entry into Africa. This has proved to be where China’s advantage lies. With their relative national power today, neither France nor Britain is able to hold back the influx of Chinese capital into Africa. It was mainly the power of capital, in fact, that fueled the rapid expansion of Chinese interests in Africa over the past two decades.

Second, the focus of China’s handling of relations with the United States and Japan in Africa lies outside the continent. Unlike France, Britain, and other old European powers, the United States and Japan essentially have no structural incompatibility with China in Africa, as the continent is not their traditional sphere of influence. For Washington and Tokyo, great-power relations with Africa do not operate on a “first come, first served” basis, and since the end of the Cold War, the United States has even refused to recognize that the old European powers continue to enjoy privileges in Africa. In fact, as latecomers to great-power relations with Africa, the United States and Japan, like China, are considered intruders by the old European powers. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the relationship between China’s interests in Africa and those of the United States and Japan appears much simpler than is the case between China and the old European powers. This apparent simplicity is deceptive, however. It is not changes in great-power relations with Africa—namely, China’s intensifying efforts there—that causes the conflict of interests between China and the United States and Japan in the continent, but structural incompatibilities in geopolitics between China and the two countries. To be precise, China’s rivalry with the United States and Japan in Africa arises from the spillover effect of the deterioration of its strategic relations with them on great-power relations in Africa. Structural geopolitical incompatibilities, then, have made China’s apparently simple relations with the United States and Japan in Africa a knotty issue that requires more resources to handle.

Although the United States and Japan have slightly different attitudes towards China’s entry into Africa due to their varying interests in the continent, they both assess and respond to China’s activities in Africa from a strategic geopolitical perspective, unsettled by China’s rapid rise. Washington and Tokyo are not concerned about how China’s activities in Africa may change the African order led by old European powers. What they fear, instead, is that China’s rapid rise would shake the order in Asia, or even the global order. Out of geopolitical or strategic considerations, neither the United States nor Japan is pleased to see China extending its reach to the African continent. The timing of their reactions to China’s activities in Africa is telling. It was mainly after 2006 that Western countries leveled an avalanche of criticisms, and their polemics peaked in the early 2010s. Following France, Britain, and Germany, U.S. politicians frequently made irresponsible comments on China’s activities in Africa, and Japan also started a quiet competition with China in the continent.¹⁵ This was no coincidence: in 2006, a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit was held in Beijing, after which China’s influence in Africa soared, and in 2010, China became the second-largest economy in the world, the speed of its rise vastly exceeding what the United States and Japan had anticipated and could tolerate.

As can be seen, changes in China-Africa relations are only a trigger for the worsening of China’s relations with the United States and Japan in Africa. A more important reason lies in the sharp deterioration of China’s strategic relations with the two countries as a result of its meteoric rise. The United States and Japan are worried that a rapidly rising China would challenge or shake the East Asian, Asia-Pacific, and even global order that they have dominated. As I once observed: “In 2010, China became the second-largest economy in the world after its gross domestic product surpassed that of Japan. China’s growing economic strength and international status are changing not only China itself, but also the world; it is shaping not only China’s relations with African countries, but also China’s relations with the world’s major countries over interests in Africa.”¹⁶ Although changes in great-power relations with Africa generally have a more direct impact on great-power relations in Africa, changes in strategic relations between the great powers will also send ripples through great-power relations in Africa, and they may have a greater and longer-lasting influence—as exemplified by the impact of the changes in China’s strategic relations with the United States and Japan on its relations with them in Africa. China’s handling of its relations with them in Africa, then, depends much more on changes in its geopolitical relations—or strategic relations—with these two countries than on its relations with Africa, what it does in Africa and how it does it, or even its relations with the two countries in Africa alone. Nevertheless, China’s strategies for engaging with the United States and Japan in Africa are different due to differences in their interests and presence in Africa vis-à-vis those of China, in their strategic relations with China, and in their comprehensive national power and strategic focuses. Importantly, in China’s relations with other non-African major countries over Africa, Japan’s case is different from that of the United States or France. As long as China keeps its relations with the United States and France in Africa stable, Japan can barely make a ripple there or cause significant trouble for China’s activities.

The crux of U.S.-China relations in Africa lies in the structural incompatibilities between the two countries in geopolitics. Although there is no strategic geopolitical intention in China’s entry into Africa and activities there, the speed of its move and the scale of its activities have confounded U.S. predictions. As strategic trust between the United States and China diminishes, it is unsurprising that the United States has misgivings about China’s intentions in Africa and implements a policy of containment. As early as George W. Bush’s second term, Washington took frequent action, announcing the establishment of the U.S. Africa Command in the name of fighting terrorism in a bid to integrate Africa into its global defense structure. Accustomed to being the world’s leader, the United States has long had a deep-rooted sense of unease in its strategic awareness about any country that might overtake it, such as the Soviet Union and Japan in the past and China today. China’s rise to the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 hit a nerve in Washington. The Obama administration believed that China’s rise posed a serious challenge to the U.S.-led Asia-Pacific—if not global—order. It subsequently announced an eastward shift of the United States’ global strategic focus and the rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, essentially regarding China as a main strategic rival to be contained. Since Donald Trump took office, U.S.-China relations have become increasingly confrontational. Washington more explicitly treats China as the United States’ largest and most dangerous competitor, devoting major national resources to countering it. Out of geopolitical considerations, therefore, the United States is likely to replicate the containment strategy that it used against the Soviet Union during the Cold War in response to China’s activities in Africa. Its containment or encirclement of China is global and comprehensive, which of course covers Africa, and its purpose is clear—to make trouble for China all over the world in order to disrupt China’s strategy, inhibit China’s development, and thereby delay and interfere with China’s rejuvenation.

Admittedly, since Trump came to power, his “America First” policy has somewhat loosened the ties between the United States and Africa, but the United States—especially its military—has not retreated from the continent. Currently, U.S.-China relations in Africa may appear calm, but that is a false impression: with no more strategic trust between the two countries, not only will friction over interests in Africa lead to confrontation, but strategic competition or confrontation between them, too, may disrupt their relations in the continent. The potential conflict of interests in Africa between the United States and China revolves around three aspects—competition for economic and commercial interests, ideological clashes, and geopolitical rivalry—which may sometimes intertwine with and even reinforce one another. The key to U.S.-China relations in Africa lies, however, in the two countries’ strategic relations, given the limited U.S. interests in Africa and the United States’ arm’s-length relationship with the continent following Trump’s “America First” policy. This implies little likelihood of a direct confrontation between the United States and China in Africa in the short term. In other words, the trend of U.S.-China relations in Africa does not depend on what China does there or how it does it, but on the trend of U.S.-China strategic relations. Therefore, in handling U.S.-China relations in Africa, it is necessary not only to focus on Africa and manage the divergence between U.S. and Chinese interests there, but also to go beyond the continent and carefully manage U.S.-China strategic relations from a broad-based, geopolitical perspective.

Although the Chinese government has established an overarching policy of “mutual respect and win-win cooperation rather than confrontation and conflict” for handling China’s strategic relations with the United States, due to structural incompatibilities in geopolitics, U.S.-China strategic relations are unlikely to improve. China’s engagement with the United States in Africa thus requires more tact and wisdom, along with multiple contingency plans. On the basis of China’s strategic goals in managing great-power relations in Africa, the contingency plans can be divided into two types—one based on standard goals, and the other based on nonstandard goals. The former requires China to have sufficient patience and skill to carefully handle various incompatibilities and disagreements in U.S.-China relations in Africa, effectively manage the intensity of their competition for economic interests in the continent, and avoid ideological disputes with the United States. Meanwhile, the latter requires China to keep in mind its long-term national interests and the reality that China and the United States are strategic competitors, take a realistic view and settle into its place as “number two,” and effectively manage various risks and crises to prevent economic competition from turning into a full-scale strategic confrontation, in the hope of maximizing the window of opportunity for China’s rejuvenation. It can be said with certainty that as long as there is no full-scale strategic confrontation between China and the United States, their conflict of interests in Africa will not spiral out of control.

Also, China’s international strategy is an organic whole, of which Africa is an important part. Planning for worst-case scenarios, China should not make endless concessions for the sake of stability and safety when handling U.S.-China relations in Africa and U.S.-China strategic relations. When necessary, it can also take the initiative and move to enlarge its strategic space by raising the strategic priority of China-Africa relations, so as to synergize with its international strategy. Moreover, Africa is a weak link in the United States’ global strategy. In response to the United States’ strategic containment and encirclement, China not only needs to firmly defend its perimeter, but should also strike outward and open up a new front by shifting China-Africa relations into hyperdrive at an opportune moment, taking full advantage of the relations as a synergizing support or counterbalance in China’s geopolitical strategy and as a diversion and leverage in China’s management of great-power relations. It should be noted that striking outward is not a turn away from the main front, but an effort to disrupt or divert the United States’ focus and hinder its Indo-Pacific strategy by raising the strategic priority of China-Africa relations, which may synergize with China’s great-power diplomacy and its handling of the situation closer to home. Even if this vigorous approach to relations with Africa fails to achieve the intended effect, it will not matter much to China.

In summary, although changes in great-power relations with Africa generally have a more direct impact on great-power relations in Africa, changes in strategic relations between the great powers will also send ripples through great-power relations in Africa, and they may have a greater and longer-lasting influence. When China engages with the world’s major countries over Africa, therefore, it should identify which set of relations plays a leading role in the interplay between great-power relations with Africa, great-power relations in Africa, and great-power strategic relations, which is crucial for determining the causes, nature, and degree of the deterioration of great-power relations in Africa and for choosing the appropriate countermeasures. Also, if China hopes to properly handle relations with the world’s—especially the West’s—major countries over Africa, apart from formulating a national strategy for relations with Africa, it needs a series of coordinated support measures as well, which fall under the scope of the domestic and African parts of China’s Africa strategy.