Translation Tag: global governance
Yang Guoliang, a professor at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing, frames U.S. pursuit of strategic competition with China as a reemergence of Western imperialism. He suggests the relative shift in economic power away from the West in past decades, toward the rest of the world, has led Washington to characterize globalization as “out-of-control” and introduce its own set of restrictions on international commercial engagement. While reiterating the need for continued reform and opening up, he underscores the need for China to set its own limits on commercial openness — particularly in the realm of inbound foreign investment from the West — in order to safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests.
This is a set of questions and answers related to the 20th Central Committee’s Third Plenum Resolution in July 2024. Jointly compiled and published by teams at Study Press (学习出版社), a publishing house under the CCP Propaganda Department, and the Party Building Books Publishing Press (党建读物出版社), under the CCP Organization Department, the document is intended to improve understanding and implementation of guiding principles laid out in the plenum. These excerpts, selected by Interpret: China, cover Beijing’s approach to technology upgrading, military reform, supply chain security, soft power projection, and domestic topics such as social stability and demographic change.
A prominent Russia scholar, Feng Shaolei, analyzes the conflict in Ukraine, arguing that it reflects deep structural changes in the international system. These changes include increasing polarization between Russia and the West and growing relevance of the Global South in international affairs. Feng suggests that following the war, what he terms an “Asian Mediterranean” or Eurasian economic sphere will emerge, attendant with Russia’s pivot to the East and what he sees as China’s strengthening position in the Asia-Pacific.
Zhang Jie, a prominent scholar at the Xi’an International Studies University, suggests India’s intensified engagement with Global South aims to amplify New Delhi’s voice in global governance, compete with China for geopolitical influence, and deepen ties with Washington. Zhang suggests other Global South countries are unlikely to be receptive to this engagement, given their inherent suspicion of India’s growing ties with the West and fear of friction with China.
This is a transcript of a July 2023 speech delivered by Shi Yinhong, an international relations scholar at Renmin University, and an interview conducted by Xue Li, a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Shi argues that due to rising suspicion of China in developing countries and economic resource constraints at home, Beijing must become much more targeted and responsive to the needs of developing countries in initiating and facilitating projects along the BRI. Shi also encourages Beijing and Chinese experts to be careful when making public assessments of the geo-strategic significance of the BRI so as not to raise concerns in potential partner countries.
Niu Haibin, a foreign policy scholar at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, explains the rising international influence of the Global South and assesses implications for China. Niu recommends Beijing amp up efforts to frame itself as a member of the Global South and publicly push for expansion of BRICS and other initiatives, which can enhance China’s ties with individual members of the Global South and build perceptions of China as a leader of among them.
Ren Lin, a global governance scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, suggests Washington is selectively engaging the Global South in ways designed to intensify contradictions and antagonisms between its membership. This strategy, Ren assesses, ultimately aims to isolate China and reduce the effectiveness of BRICS and other groups that threaten U.S. agenda-setting in global governance.
Xiang Haoyu, a research fellow at a prominent Chinese think tank, presents a typology of China’s diplomatic partnerships – which range from “strategic” partnerships (the most common type, held with at least 80 countries) to “all-weather” or “permanent” partnerships, describing very close ties with countries such as Pakistan, Venezuela, and Belarus. Xiang contrasts Beijing’s pursuit of partnerships to the “zero-sum” alliance network of the West, and suggests partnerships are a powerful diplomatic tool for Beijing that can be flexibly adapted to the counterpart country’s conditions and needs.
Dai Changzheng, a national security scholar at the Beijing-based University of International Business and Economics, argues China’s external environment is becoming more challenging due to rising tensions with the United States and heightened risk of pandemics, economic crises, and regional conflicts. Yet, Dai suggests that Beijing now has significant power to shape its external environment, given its substantial economic growth in past decades. Dai recommends Beijing advance and preserve China’s interests in this new environment by deepening ties with developing and regional countries and actively participating in global governance institutions.
A Middle East researcher explores drivers behind Arab countries’ growing interest in BRICS membership, on the back of successful accession of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates to the organization in 2023. He argues that the countries hope to benefit economically from closer ties with China and Russia in the energy field, but also see BRICS membership as a way to accelerate the formation of a multipolar world order more favorable to their interests.