Editor’s note: On February 21, 2024, the 10th (Spring 2024) Global Governance Forum “Second Anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Impact and Insights” was successfully held in Beijing. It was hosted by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies of Renmin University of China (RUC), organized by the Global Governance Research Center of the RUC and the China-U.S. People-to-People Exchange Research Center of the RUC, and co-organized by the School of Global and Area Studies at RUC. Ding Xiaoxing, director of the Institute of Eurasian Studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, was invited to deliver a speech at the keynote seminar session. The following is a transcript of his speech:
编者按：2024年2月21日，由中国人民大学重阳金融研究院（人大重阳）主办，中国人民大学全球治理研究中心、中国人民大学中美人文交流研究中心承办，中国人民大学区域国别研究院合办的第十届（2024年春季）全球治理论坛“俄乌冲突两周年：影响与启示”在北京成功召开。中国现代国际关系研究院欧亚所所长丁晓星受邀出席本次会议在主题研讨环节发表演讲，以下为其发言实录：
I would like to talk mainly about some of the features that have defined the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the past two years. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict is indeed one of the most significant geopolitical events since the Cold War, we have closely observed and followed it these last two years, and I think that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been characterized by four features:
我想重点谈一谈俄乌冲突两年来的一些特点。因为俄乌冲突确实是冷战以后最重大的一个地缘事件，这两年我们紧密地观察、跟踪，我觉得俄乌冲突这两年大概有四个特点：
First, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a tug-of-war, a positional war, and a war of attrition.
第一，俄乌冲突是一场拉锯战、阵地战、消耗战。
At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia intended to take a blitzkrieg approach to resolve the issue, so Russia announced that it was only a “special military operation”. That is, Russia did not intend to declare war against Ukraine, and alleged that it was only engaging in a special military operation. But to be honest, there was an error of judgment in the early stages, and Russian forces encountered strong resistance from Ukraine. Russia later withdrew from Kyiv, and then the battles were mainly concentrated in the eastern part of Ukraine, Mariupol and Donetsk. Afterward, Russia occupied about 18% of Ukraine’s territory, including four oblasts in eastern Ukraine.
俄乌冲突一开始俄罗斯是想以闪电战的方式来解决乌克兰问题，所以叫“特别军事行动”，就是没有想打一场全面战争，是特别军事行动。但是说实话，前期是存在失误判断的，遭到了乌克兰的顽强抵抗。后来从基辅撤出，然后战线就集中在乌东，马里乌波尔、顿涅茨克，后来占了乌克兰大概18%的领土，乌东四周。
By September 2022, Ukraine had counterattacked and regained the territory of Kharkiv. In this sense, the two countries were in a tug-of-war. The fight for some cities in particular has evolved into cruel positional warfare. This trend can be seen in Mariupol and Bakhmut for example, and more recently in Avdiivka, Donetsk, and so on.
但是到2022年9月份，乌克兰又反击，收复了哈尔科夫的领土，所以等于是一个拉锯的状态。尤其是在一些城市的争夺，更是惨烈的阵地战。比如马里乌波尔、巴赫穆特，最近的阿夫杰耶夫卡等等顿涅茨克等等，都反映出这样的特点。
Overall, Russia launched the special military operation in 2022, but was met with strong resistance from the Ukrainian army, which was highly mobile and active on the battlefield. In 2023, Ukraine was overly optimistic and rashly launched a counteroffensive in June. The counteroffensive failed: since Ukraine did not realize that the Russian defensive line was very strong, the Ukrainian army suffered heavy losses and the counteroffensive failed. Consequently, the two parties were mired in a stalemate where whoever goes on the offensive may suffer losses.
总体看，2022年俄罗斯发起军事行动，但是遭到了乌军的顽强抵抗，乌军的机动性强，在战场上是主动的。2023年乌克兰又过于乐观，从6月份贸然发起反攻，实际上是失败的，没有想到俄军的防线非常坚固的，所以乌军损失惨重，反攻失败，所以就形成了谁进攻谁吃亏的局面。
Second, the cost of war was high.
第二，消耗是巨大的。
The most prominent feature of the Russia-Ukraine war has been that both sides are firing artillery shells to bombard each other, a kind of warfare not much different from that of World War I. Armies in the First World War also used such a strategy, using artillery shells to bombard each other. The consumption of ammunition has been huge. At its peak in 2022, Russia was able to fire 50,000 to 70,000 artillery shells a day, and Ukraine had about 10,000 as well. So as we see now, each party is running out of artillery shells, especially Ukraine. Shells are in severely short supply because of intense firing. Russia has also been trying to figure out how to manage. The loss of equipment has been massive as well. According to Ukraine, it has destroyed nearly 6,000 Russian tanks.
俄乌战争最突出的特点是双方用炮弹互相对轰，这种情况和一战没什么区别。一战也是这样的，拿炮弹对轰，消耗量巨大。2022年的高峰期，俄罗斯一天能打出5万到7万发炮弹，乌克兰也有1万发左右。所以我们现在看到，大家都没有炮弹了，尤其是乌克兰，炮弹是严重短缺，因为打没了，所以俄罗斯也在想办法，消耗的这些装备也是巨大的，乌克兰方面曾经就说，俄罗斯大概有6千辆坦克被毁。
The loss of personnel has been even greater. Accurate data has not been released from either side, so we have no way of knowing the precise casualties, and can only calculate the loss based on information from the Internet. However, if you add up the numbers, there have been at least hundreds of thousands of casualties. So this war has been the deadliest one in Europe since World War II. With regard to loss of life, there’s a Chinese saying that sudden rains don’t fall all day—a downpour can’t last a whole day—and I suspect that a war of this intensity can’t last for long. In an article I wrote at the end of last year, I suggested that 2024 will likely be the decisive year for Russia and Ukraine. Not that the war will end in 2024, but that in 2024 we may be able to have a clear picture of the eventual outcome. In this sense, 2024 will be the decisive year.
人员的损失更大，双方都不发布准确的数据，我们也无从得知，只能是大家从网上去看，但是至少加起来看到伤亡是几十万起。所以是欧洲二战以后规模最大的。从人员的角度上讲，中国有句话叫骤雨不终日，瓢泼的大雨不可能下一天，我个人感觉，这么高烈度的战争是不可能持续下去的。去年年底我写了一篇文章，我觉得2024年应该是俄乌的决战之年，并不是说2024年战争结束了，只是2024年我们会看到大家的走向是清楚的，所以2024年是决战之年。
Third, Ukraine’s ability to resist depends entirely on Western aid.
第三，乌克兰的抵抗能力完全取决于西方的援助。
In two years, the West has provided over $200 billion in aid to Ukraine, and there has been a division of labor: the Americans provide the military aid and the Europeans provide financial aid. There are also some international organizations involved, like the World Bank, the IMF, and so on. The West not only offered financial support, but according to Russian intelligence, some complicated weapons were in fact operated by Western military personnel. In this sense, the West has been deeply involved in this conflict. Except for head-to-head confrontations on the battlefield, in which Western forces have not been involved, they have participated in all kinds of military operations including intelligence support, tactical command, and so on. They have also engaged in hybrid warfare in multiple fields—financial warfare, economic warfare, diplomatic warfare, information warfare, sanctions—as discussed by everyone here.
两年来，西方向乌克兰提供了2千多亿美元的援助，是有分工的，美国人提供军事援助，欧洲人提供财政援助。还有一些国际组织，像世行、IMF等等。不光是财政的支持，俄罗斯掌握的一些情报显示，实际上一些复杂的武器是由西方的军人操作的，所以西方已经深度地参与到了这场冲突中。除了战场上的正面交锋，除了西方的人不下去，其他都有，包括情报支持、战术指挥等等。还有多领域的混合战，金融战、经济战、外交战、信息战、制裁，大家都谈到了。
Fourth, some new forms of warfare have emerged.
第四，呈现出了一些新的战争形态。
The Russia-Ukraine conflict bears some resemblance with World War I, as a century later, everyone is still fighting with artillery forces. But it also has some new features. For example, there are no large-scale encounters or battles, as large-scale gatherings will be instantly eliminated by bombing. The usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), such as drones and unmanned boats, has been very frequent. The conflict has witnessed the first large-scale UAV operation, the first UAV war. Ukraine has established a new UAV combat unit, and also planned to produce a million UAVs a year. In fact, many of the UAVs are exceptionally cheap, and can engage in warfare with only a bomb attached to them. Expensive heavy weapons can be destroyed with extremely cheap UAVs. In this context, anti-drone equipment and air defense capabilities are crucial.
俄乌冲突既像一战那样，100年以后大家还是用炮弹打，但是也有一些新的特点。比如大规模的会战没有了，大规模聚集瞬间就被炸没了。无人机的特点是非常突出的，无人机、无人艇，第一次大规模的无人机作战、无人机战争。乌克兰专门新成立了无人机作战部队，乌克兰还要每年生产100万的无人机，其实很多都是特别廉价的无人机，绑个炸弹就可以发挥作用。用极其廉价的无人机，可以摧毁价格高昂的重型武器。在这种背景下，反无人机装备和防空能力是至关重要的。
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is the first war to be fully webcast, and people may feel that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is happening right in front of them. You can watch the videos and see the photos every day, so it is impossible to carry out indiscriminate bombing. We all know that in World War II, from the beginning of 1945, the Americans started the massive bombing of Japan’s mainland, and in World War II everyone bombed civilians indiscriminately. It is impossible to do that in the current war. Also, the number of secondary disasters from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is particularly high, such as the attack on the Crimean bridge, the explosion at the Kakhovka Dam, and the security risks at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and so on. The number of secondary disasters is particularly high.
俄乌冲突是首次全程网络直播的战争，大家觉得俄乌冲突就发生在面前，每天都可以看到视频，看到照片，所以不可能进行无差别的轰炸。我们都知道，二战的时候美国人从1945年的年初就开始大规模地轰炸日本，在日本本土，二战大家都是无差别地轰炸平民，现在的战争不可能做到这一点。还有就是俄乌冲突次生灾害特别多，比如克里米亚大桥遇袭，卡夫霍卡水电站爆炸，还有扎巴罗热核电站的安全风险等等，次生灾害特别多。
These are the four main features over the past two years, and I personally believe that there are also two more future directions:
这主要是两年来的四个特点，我个人认为还有两个未来的走向：
First, the situation may become increasingly unfavorable for Ukraine.
第一，形势对乌克兰可能越来越不利。
Previously, a stalemate was generally formed. Since last winter, the situation has become increasingly unfavorable for Ukraine. The first and biggest factor is naturally the cessation of aid from the United States. Initially, assisting Ukraine was a bipartisan consensus in the United States. Everyone felt it was impossible not to provide assistance. According to the director of the CIA, offering aid to Ukraine had been the most cost-effective investment for the United States: it could use just a small amount of money to trap Russia in the war and diminish its power. But now, since the two parties are fighting fiercely against each other and as the election approaches, the aid bill for Ukraine could not be passed by the House of Representatives, and now Ukraine is already experiencing a severe shortage of artillery shells. Coupled with the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and high-level struggles in Ukraine, the situation is getting more and more unfavorable for Ukraine.
之前大概形成了一个僵局的状态，从去年冬天，形势对乌克兰越来越不利。首先最大的因素自然是美国的援助停止了，本来援助乌克兰是美国两党的共识，大家觉得不可能不援助，美国中情局的局长讲，援助乌克兰对美国来说是最划算的一笔投资。用了少量的钱，把俄罗斯拖在那里，消耗它。但是现在因为两党在急剧地斗，因为今年要大选，众议院就是不通过这个法案，现在乌克兰已经出现严重的炮弹短缺。再加上还有巴以冲突的影响，乌克兰高层的斗争，所以形势对乌克兰越来越不利。
Secondly, this year could be decisive.
第二，今年可能是一个决战之年。
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a war to the death, and the stakes are getting higher for both sides, but it seems that the conditions for peace talks are not there yet, and it seems now that both sides will continue to fight. As long as Western aid doesn’t stop, Ukraine will fight on. If Russia can gain a clear advantage on the battlefield and is able to push the frontline quickly, it will gain more territories in addition to the four oblasts. Many senior Russian officials say that Odesa and Kharkiv are Russian cities. As for Europe, despite its fatigue, no serious divisions have appeared about the aid for Ukraine, and it will continue to firmly support Ukraine. Denmark has given all its stockpiles of artillery shells to Ukraine.
俄乌冲突是一场你死我活的战争，双方的押注越来越大，但是现在看来和谈还不具备基础，现在看双方还要打下去。只要西方援助不停，乌克兰就会打下去。如果说俄罗斯能够在战场上出现明显的优势，能够快速突进，甚至俄罗斯也不仅仅止步于这四个州。俄罗斯很多高官说，敖德萨、哈尔科夫都是俄罗斯的城市。欧洲虽然疲劳，也没有出现严重的分裂，还是要坚定地挺乌克兰，所以丹麦把所有库存的炮弹都给了乌克兰。
Overall, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a two-year stalemate, but all wars have to end someday. A high-intensity war like this between Russia and Ukraine takes a huge toll on both sides. 2024 may be the most critical year. If U.S. military assistance to Ukraine is long delayed, and Russia could break through this line of defense after the battle for Avdiivka. With that, Russia could reverse the situation that whoever goes on the offensive loses. Under those circumstances, Ukraine and the West will be under pressure to seek negotiations to prevent even greater losses.
总的来说，俄乌冲突两年僵持不下，但是任何一场战争都有结束的那一天。像俄乌这样高烈度的战争，对双方都造成巨大的损害。2024年可能是最关键的一年，如果说美国对乌克兰的军事援助迟迟不能到位，俄罗斯能够突破这个防线，就是继阿夫杰耶夫卡打完以后能够继续突破防线，就可能扭转了谁进攻谁吃亏的局面，能够迅速突进的话，在这种情况下，乌克兰和西方就会在压力之下，为防止更大的损失来谋求谈判。
What to do, then, as fighting on won’t reverse the situation and more cities may be lost? Negotiate, or at least stop a bit and take some pauses. If Western aid is not in place for a long time, Russia still can’t break through this line of defense, and the battlefield remains unchanged in a persistent stalemate, what would be the point for the two sides to continue their battle? As for the past two years, neither side pushed the frontline successfully, and continuing to fight would only lead to more pointless losses and more people dying. Under these circumstances, I think the possibility of peace talks would be lost as well, especially since the U.S. election also takes place this year, which will add more risks to the situation.
因为再打下去扭转不了这个局面，还可能损失更多的城市。那么怎么办？谈判，至少停一停，缓一缓。如果在西方援助迟迟不到位的情况下，俄罗斯仍然突破不了这条防线，战场仍然没有变化，还是这个僵局，双方打下去还有什么意义呢？因为两年都是这条线。所以在这种情况下继续打只会进行更无谓的消耗，只会有更多的人死亡。在这种情况下，我觉得和谈的可能性也会丧失，尤其今年还有美国大选，这个变数更大。
So, in my personal opinion, after the U.S. election, the parties will probably take steps to discuss ceasefire plans. Of course, this process is not destined to be smooth sailing. Both sides may suspect that the other side is using peace talks to gain a window of opportunity for future battles. Therefore, after a short ceasefire, there will be new rounds of conflict, which may form a back-and-forth loop. In short, the root cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the fundamental problem of European security. If this problem is not solved, I think the Russia-Ukraine conflict will last a long time, and Russia’s confrontation with NATO will last for a prolonged period as well.
所以我个人认为，大概会在美国大选后，各方逐步地讨论停火方案，当然这个过程注定不会一帆风顺，双方都怀疑对方是运用和谈来赢得喘息之机，所以在短暂的停火之后，还会有新一轮的冲突，形成打打停停，停停打打的局面。总之，俄乌冲突的根是欧洲安全的根本性问题，如果这个问题不解决，我觉得俄乌冲突会持续很长时间，与北约的对峙也会长期持续。
In conclusion, I would like to say that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has brought to this turbulent world more uncertainty, the forming formation of different camps, all kinds of negative security-related trends, and the degradation of global governance. But as we may see, especially since 2023, China has become the major and the most important factor in maintaining global peace and development. Because in a world where both the West and Russia want confrontation, the West divides the world into democracies and non-democracies, and Russia divides the globe into friendly and unfriendly countries, the confrontation is very visible. But if China’s policy chooses confrontation, the world may be in a state of a new Cold War.
最后我想说，俄乌冲突给这个动荡不安的世界带来了更多的不确定性，阵营化，各种安全上的风邪，全球治理的退化。但是这里我们应该看到尤其是从2023年这一年，我们看到中国实际上已经成为维护全球和平和发展最主要和最重要的因素。因为在这样一个西方也要对抗，俄罗斯也要对抗，西方把这个世界分为民主国家、不民主国家，俄罗斯把全球分为友好国家和不友好国家，对抗很明显。但是如果说中国的政策选择对抗，那世界可能就是新冷战。
If China chooses division, the world may be divided into different camps. But as China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference this year made clear, China’s policy is clear and consistent, and we will continue to contribute to building a community of common destiny for mankind. Therefore, China is taking a prudent attitude in policymaking. As major changes unseen in a century have unfold, China has indeed become the most important constructive force in maintaining global security and stability.
如果中国选择分裂，世界可能就阵营化。但是我们看到我们今年中央外事工作会议很清楚，我们中国的政策是清晰的，是一贯的，我们还是要推动构建人类命运共同体，所以中国的政策是克制的。随着百年变局的展开，中国确实已经成为维护全球安全稳定最主要的建设力量。