The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is an important factor in once-in-a-century global changes. A century ago, a power transition occurred between the UK and the United States, and whether a power transition will happen between China and the United States in the future will become the most closely-watched international political matter of the 21st century. Currently, the United States views China as its biggest strategic competitor, and the situation of full-spectrum, global competition between China and the United States is increasingly becoming a reality. In the Middle East, the United States’ strategic contraction and the expansion of China’s influence demonstrate a trend of “China rising and the United States falling,” and the competition between China and the United States in the Middle East is gradually evolving from a media topic into a serious academic subject. How China and the United States coexist in the Middle East is a real and pressing issue. Changes are occurring simultaneously at global, regional, and bilateral levels, necessitating a new phase in the coexistence model between China and the United States in the Middle East.
中华民族伟大复兴,是世界百年未有之大变局的重要因素。一百年前权力转移出现在英国与美国之间,未来中美之间会否发生权力转移,将成为21世纪最令人瞩目的国际政治事件。目前,美国将中国视为最大战略竞争对手,中美全方位、全球性竞争的态势日益真实。在中东,美国战略收缩,中国影响力扩大“,中升美降”的态势凸显,中美在中东的博弈渐渐由一个媒体话题演变为严肃的学术题目。中美如何在中东相处是一个真实的紧迫问题,全球、地区和双边三个层次的因素同时出现显著变化,中美在中东的相处模式必然要进入新阶段。
I. An Increasingly Tense Global Environment
一、全球环境渐趋紧张
In May 2020, the U.S. State Department published the United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, announcing that U.S.-China relations had moved from “engagement” to an era of “strategic competition.” The 2022 version of the U.S. National Security Strategy directly declared, “The post-Cold War era has ended, and the era of great power competition has begun,”1 elevating strategic competition with China to the theme of the era for the United States. U.S.-China relations have entered an era of strategic competition, the U.S.-Russia relationship is in a “quasi-war” state, and relations between major powers have never been as tense since the end of the Cold War. In May 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken delivered a speech on China policy, stating that strengthening the United States domestically, building a network of allies and partners externally, and shaping China’s external strategic environment are the basic paths of U.S. policy towards China.2 Reviewing the actions of the Biden administration over two years, the U.S. containment system against China can be divided into three major categories: first, establishing a technology alliance with developed countries; second, building a security alliance around China; and third, organizing a loose alliance to weaken China’s influence globally.
2020年5月,美国国务院公布《美国对中国战略方针》,宣布美中关系从“接触”进入“战略竞争”时代。2022版美国《国家安全战略》直接宣布,“后冷战时代结束,大国竞争时代开始”,对华战略竞争升级为美国的时代主题。美中关系进入战略竞争时代,美俄关系处于“准战争”状态,冷战结束以来大国关系从未如此紧张。2022年5月,美国国务卿布林肯发表对华政策演讲,称对内增强美国实力,对外构建盟友、伙伴网络,塑造中国的外部战略环境,是美国对华政策的基本路径。回顾拜登政府两年来的言行,美国遏制中国的联盟体系可分为三大类:一是同发达国家建立科技联盟,二是在中国周边构建安全联盟,三是全球范围内组织削弱中国影响的松散联盟。
The tech war is at the core and forefront of U.S. containment of China, with Western developed countries as its main partners. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes, “Technology is at the center of geopolitical competition and a reliable support for U.S. security, economy, and democracy.”3 On one hand, the United States is enhancing or adding anti-China functions to traditional Western alliances like the G7 and NATO. In June 2022, the G7 Summit for the first time included countries such as India and Indonesia, and comprehensively criticized China’s economic and technology policies. Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor to the White House, called the G7 Summit “a steering committee of the free world.” The United States has some advocates for expanding the G7 to a G12, inviting Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, NATO, and the EU to join. In the same month, the NATO Madrid Summit for the first time invited Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea to attend, declaring China a comprehensive “systemic threat” to NATO. The United States is also forming new alliances in key technology fields. In September 2020, the United States proposed the “Chip Four Alliance,” including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In June 2021, the United States led the establishment of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, which has held two ministerial meetings to date, coordinating positions on issues such as technology standards, investment review, export control, supply chain restructuring, and digital infrastructure. In October 2022, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Alan Estevez revealed that the United States is consulting with Japan and the Netherlands on a trilateral chip mechanism to coordinate sanctions against China.
科技战是美国遏制中国的核心和前哨,西方发达国家是其主要合作伙伴。2022版美国《国家安全战略》强调,“技术是地缘政治竞争的中心,也是美国安全、经济和民主的可靠依托”。一方面,美国充实或新增G7、北约等传统西方联盟的科技反华功能。2022年6月,G7峰会首次吸纳印度、印尼等国家参会,全面批评中国的经济、科技政策。白宫国家安全事务助理沙立文称G7峰会是“自由世界的指导委员会”,美国还有一些人倡议将G7扩大为G12,吸纳澳大利亚、新西兰、韩国、北约、欧盟加入。同月举行的北约马德里峰会首次邀请澳大利亚、日本、新西兰、韩国参会,宣布中国为北约全方位“系统性威胁”。另一方面,美国针对关键技术领域组建新联盟。2020年9月,美国倡议“芯片四方联盟”,成员包括美国、日本、韩国、中国台湾。2021年6月,美国牵头成立美国—欧盟贸易和技术委员会,迄今召开过两届部长级会议,就技术标准、投资审查、出口管制、供应链重组、数字基础设施等议题协调立场。2022年10月,美国商务部次卿艾伦·艾斯蒂维兹透露,美国正在与日本、荷兰磋商一个芯片三边机制,协调对华制裁。
Establishing political, economic, and military encirclements is the United States’ geostrategic containment of China, with China’s neighboring countries as its main partners. Beyond traditional bilateral systems such as U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea, U.S.-Australia, and U.S.-ASEAN, the United States frequently builds new multilateral systems. In September 2021, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia held the Quad Security Dialogue mechanism (QUAD) in Washington, engaging in exclusive cooperation in regional security, infrastructure, supply chains, and emerging technologies; the four countries also formed the “Quad Security Dialogue mechanism+” with Vietnam, New Zealand, and South Korea. In the same month, the United States, Australia, and the UK established a trilateral security partnership (AUKUS), with the UK and the United States assisting Australia in building a nuclear-powered submarine fleet and cooperating in digital security and other fields. In May 2022, the United States launched the “Indo-Pacific Economic Prosperity Framework” (IPEF) with 13 “Indo-Pacific” countries, targeting cooperation in trade, supply chains, infrastructure, clean energy, taxation, anti-corruption, and other fields. In September, the United States held a summit in Washington with leaders from 14 Pacific countries and economies, issuing the “U.S.-Pacific Partnership” statement.
建立政治、经济和军事包围圈是美国遏制中国的地缘战略,主要合作伙伴是中国周边国家。在美日、美韩、美澳、美国—东盟等传统双边体系之外,美国频频构建新的多边体系。2021年9月,美国、日本、印度、澳大利亚在华盛顿召开四方安全对话机制(QUAD),在地区安全、基础设施、供应链、新兴技术等方面展开排他性合作;四国还同越南、新西兰、韩国组成“四方安全对话机制+”。同月,美国、澳大利亚、英国建立三边安全伙伴关系(AUKUS),英、美两国协助澳大利亚建造核动力潜艇舰队,并在数字安全等领域合作。2022年5月,美国与13个“印太”国家启动“印太经济繁荣框架”(IPEF),瞄准贸易、供应链、基建、清洁能源、税收、反腐等领域的合作。9月,美国与14个太平洋国家和经济体的领导人在华盛顿举行峰会,发表“美国—太平洋伙伴关系”声明。
Around trade rules, technology standards, market share, ideology, and other issues, the United States forms alliances globally to weaken China’s influence, serving as a supplementary mechanism in the U.S.’ containment strategy against China. The United States organizes networks of partnerships of various forms and sizes based on different issues, forming very loose relationships with members spread across the globe. In August 2020, the United States launched an expanded version of the “Clean Network” program,” mobilizing 60 countries to join, aiming to exclude Chinese technology and products from network construction. In September 2022, the United States held the first “Mineral Security Partnership” ministerial meeting, planning to reduce reliance on China’s supply chain in key mineral areas within 5-10 years. The United States also held the “Global Religious Conference” and “Global Democracy Conference,” representing a looser and vaguer anti-China mechanism.
围绕贸易规则、技术标准、市场份额、意识形态等议题,美国在全球范围内拉帮结派,削弱中国影响力,这是美国遏制中国战略的辅助机制。美国依据不同议题组织形式各异、规模不等的伙伴关系网络,这是一种非常松散的关系,成员遍布全球。2020年8月,美国推出扩展版“清洁网络计划”,动员60国加入,想把中国技术、产品排除在网络建设之外。2022年9月,美国召开首届“矿产安全伙伴关系”部长级会议,规划5~10年内摆脱关键矿产领域对华供应链的依赖。美国还召开“全球宗教大会”和“全球民主大会”,这是一种更松散、更模糊的反华机制。
The competition between China and the United States is becoming increasingly global, with all regions of the world involved in the U.S.’ strategic competition against China, although the degree and manner of involvement differ. Compared to others, the Middle East is less affected and has been passively involved. Geographically, the United States relies on Europe and “Indo-Pacific” core allies, with the Middle East on the periphery; functionally, the Middle East (except for Israel) is not part of the green alliance, the “democracy alliance,” the technology alliance, the Asia-Pacific alliance, or the U.S.-EU alliance. Clearly, in the U.S.’s three types of alliance systems against China, the Middle East ranks third and is in a marginal position.
美中竞争越来越具有全球性,全球各个地区都卷入了美国对华战略竞争,但是涉入的程度和方式有区别。相比之下,中东受影响较小,且是被动卷入的。从地理角度看,美国依赖欧洲、“印太”核心盟友,中东属于外围;从功能角度看,绿色联盟、“民主联盟”、技术联盟、亚太联盟、美欧联盟等,中东(以色列除外)都不在其中。显然,在美国遏制中国的三类同盟体系中,中东位列第三类,处在边缘位置。
From the Chinese side, with the unfolding of the global contest between China and the United States, the Middle East’s position in China’s global strategy has once again attracted attention. As early as the Yan’an period, the leaders of the Communist Party of China considered the Middle East as the “middle zone” of the superpower contest, where German and Japanese forces could converge against China, forming a joint encirclement.4 After 1949, China aimed to “prevent hostile great powers from controlling the Middle East, posing an indirect military threat to China.”5 In 1987, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: “We care about the situation there (in the Middle East) because it involves the issue of peace and war regarding the prospects of a Third World War. From the perspective of global strategy, we are concerned about the situation and outlook of this region.”6 After the end of the Cold War, the Middle East was no longer the main battlefield of great power games, and China mainly focused on the Middle East market, occasionally using the Middle East to coordinate China-U.S. relations. Currently, the importance of the Middle East in great power games has once again attracted attention from domestic and international academic circles, and the concept of the “middle zone” has re-emerged.7
中国方面,随着中美全球性博弈展开,中东在中国全球战略中的地位再度引起关注。早在延安时期,中共共产党领导人就认为中东属于超级大国争霸的“中间地带”,德国、日本势力可能汇合于中东,对中国形成联手包围之势。1949年后,中国要“防止敌对大国控制中东,对中国构成间接军事威胁”。1987年,邓小平指出:“我们之所以关心那里(中东)的局势,是因为那里是一个战略要地,那里的问题,牵扯到第三次世界大战的战与和的问题。从全球战略出发,我们关心这个地区局势的发展。”冷战结束后,中东不再是大国博弈的主阵地,中国主要着眼于中东的市场,偶尔也借中东策应中美关系。目前,中东在大国博弈中的重要性再度引起国内外学术界关注“,中间地带”概念重出江湖。
II. A Relatively Relaxed Regional Environment
二、地区环境相对宽松
Compared to the increasingly tense global strategic environment, the situation of China-U.S. relations in the Middle East is relatively relaxed. In terms of regional affairs, there are no obvious conflicts between China and the United States. The United States is strategically contracting in the Middle East, and China maintains a relatively neutral and detached Middle East policy, resulting in little pressure for Middle Eastern countries to take sides. Of course, there are often frictions between China and the United States on certain regional hot issues, but these contradictions remain at the level of mutual accusations and non-cooperation, without escalating to direct confrontation. A report by the Council on Foreign Relations asserts that although China opposes the U.S. approach on issues like Syria and Iran, it has not directly challenged the U.S.’ regional dominance.8
同日趋紧张的全球战略环境相比,中美关系在中东的处境则相对宽松。在地区事务上,中美两国没明显的冲突。美国中东战略收缩,中国维持相对中立、超脱的中东政策,中东国家鲜有选边站的压力。当然,在一些地区热点问题上,中美常有龃龉,但矛盾处于相互指责、互不配合的层次上,尚未上升到直接对抗的层次。美国对外关系委员会报告断言,尽管中国在叙利亚、伊朗问题上反对美国的做法,但是没直接挑战美国的地区主导地位。
From the perspective of great power games, the U.S.’ strategic contraction and China’s strategic caution create a relatively relaxed space for coexistence. From the attacks on 9/11 in 2001 to the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the Middle East was once at the core of U.S. global strategy. Currently, Middle Eastern oil remains important, but the United States has achieved energy independence; Israel is still the United States’ most important ally in the Middle East, but Israel is fully capable of protecting itself; Middle Eastern terrorism is still a major security concern for the United States, but there have been no major terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the past 20 years. The Middle East’s share in U.S. global strategy continues to decline, and both parties’ administrations have been implementing a strategy of contraction. A report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy states, “The debate in Washington is not about whether to contract, but how to do so.”9 If the United States has not yet decided what to do in the Middle East, what it does not want to do there is clearer. The United States will no longer fight a large-scale Middle Eastern war, nor will it fully reshape Middle Eastern society, let alone take on the responsibility of governing the Middle East. Obama once said, “The United States does not have the ability to govern the Middle East, and the idea of doing so is wrong; even if the Middle East is particularly important to the United States, there is no way for the United States to improve the situation there.”10 In the past decade, the United States has not led wars in Syria, Yemen, or Libya, and its support for key countries like Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon has waned. On the Chinese side, although there has been increased attention and involvement in regional situations, there has been no substantive intervention in any regional crisis. Regarding issues like the Astana process for Syria, the Vienna conference, the Quartet mechanism for the Israel-Palestine issue, the Paris, Palermo, and Berlin conferences for Libya, and the “Stockholm Agreement” for Yemen, China either did not participate or did not play a leading role. Therefore, contrary to the predictions of power transition theory, there has been no struggle between China and the United States for strategic space in the Middle East.
从大国博弈角度看,美国战略收缩,中国战略谨慎,中美共处的空间相对宽松。2001年“9·11”事件到2011年美国从伊拉克撤军,中东一度处在美国全球战略的核心位置。目前,中东石油仍然重要,但是美国已经实现能源独立;以色列仍然是美国最重要的中东盟友,但是以色列完全有实力保护自己;中东恐怖主义仍然是美国的重大安全关切,但是20年来美国本土没遭受大的恐怖袭击。中东在美国全球战略中的份量持续下降,两党历届政府都在执行战略收缩政策。美国华盛顿近东政策研究所报告说:“华盛顿的辩论不是美国要不要收缩,而是怎么收缩。”如果说美国还没有决定要在中东做什么,那么美国不想在中东做什么则比较清晰。美国再也不会打一场大规模中东战争了,也不会全面重塑中东社会了,更不会承担治理中东的责任了。奥巴马曾说:“美国没有能力治理中东,治理的想法是错误的;即使中东对美国特别重要,美国也没有办法改善那里的形势。”近10年来,美国没有主导叙利亚、也门、利比亚战争,对埃及、约旦、伊拉克、黎巴嫩等重点国家的帮扶也意兴阑珊。中国方面,尽管对地区形势的关注度、参与度均有增加,但是没有实质性介入任何一场地区危机。关于叙利亚问题的阿斯塔纳进程、维也纳会议,关于巴以问题的四方机制,关于利比亚问题的巴黎会议、巴勒莫会议、柏林会议,关于也门问题的“斯德哥尔摩协议”等,中国要么没有参加,要么没唱主角。因此,同权力转移理论的预测相反,中东地区并没有出现中美对战略空间的争夺。
From the perspective of regional countries, these countries do not want to see China-U.S. strategic competition, are reluctant to take sides, and prefer to maintain a balance among major powers to enhance their own sovereignty. During the Cold War, Arab countries formed two camps around the U.S.-Soviet competition; after the Cold War, the United States dominated the Middle East, and Arab countries were divided into moderate and radical Islamic nations according to U.S. preferences. After the Arab Spring of 2011, non-Arab countries like Iran, Turkey, and Israel rose alongside Arab powers like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Qatar. These regional powers neither align with U.S. preferences nor choose sides between China and the United States, but seek a new balance among the United States, Europe, Russia, China, and India. The United States remains the most influential country, but the attractiveness of other countries is rising, with no Middle Eastern country fully betting on the United States. For example, the UAE simultaneously strengthens relations with China, India, South Korea, France, and Japan. In 2021, China was the UAE’s largest trading partner ($75.6 billion), India second ($61 billion), and Japan third ($37 billion), with India and Japan being the UAE’s largest export destinations, respectively. In December 2021, negotiations for the UAE to purchase U.S. F-35 fighter jets broke down, and in the same month, the UAE signed a $19 billion military procurement contract with France, followed by a $3.5 billion missile purchase contract with South Korea the next month, and an announcement to buy 12 Chinese L-15 training aircraft the following month. Although these military purchases cannot replace the F-35, the UAE’s intention to diversify its security is very clear. On the Libyan issue, the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Qatar, the UAE, the EU, the United Nations, and NATO all have been involved, with the United States not playing a leading role, and the Middle Eastern political stage has never seen so many equivalent main actors. The increasingly diversified regional pattern reduces the regional driving force of China-U.S. strategic competition.
从地区国家角度看,地区国家不想看到中美战略竞争,不愿意选边站,而想在大国间维持平衡,增强自己的自主权。冷战期间,阿拉伯国家围绕美苏竞争形成两个阵营;冷战结束后,美国独霸中东,阿拉伯国家根据美国的偏好分为温和伊斯兰国家与激进伊斯兰国家。2011年“阿拉伯之春”后,伊朗、土耳其、以色列等非阿拉伯国家崛起,同沙特、埃及、阿联酋、卡塔尔等阿拉伯国家各领风骚。这些地区强国既不围绕美国偏好站队,也不在中美之间选边站队,而是在美、欧、俄、中、印之间寻求新平衡。美国仍然是影响力最大的国家,但其他国家的吸引力上升,没有一个中东国家完全押注美国。以阿联酋为例,同中国、印度、韩国、法国、日本的关系同步强化。2021年,中国是阿联酋第一贸易伙伴(756亿美元),印度第二(610亿),日本第三(370亿),而印度、日本又是分别是阿联酋最大出口目的地。2021年12月,阿联酋购买美国F-35战斗机的谈判破裂,当月与法国签署190亿美元军购合同,第二个月同韩国签署35亿导弹购买合同,第三个月宣布购买12架中国L-15训练机。虽然这些军购不能取代F-35,但阿联酋安全多元化的意图非常明显。在利比亚问题上,美国、德国、法国、意大利、希腊、土耳其、埃及、以色列、卡塔尔、阿联酋、欧盟、联合国、北约都有卷入,美国并未发挥主导作用,中东政治舞台上从来没有出现这么多旗鼓相当的主角。日益多元化的地区格局,消减了中美战略竞争的地区动力。
From the perspective of self-interest, China and the United States have broadly similar interests in the Middle East, with few points of conflict and a low degree of contradiction. In 2011, Obama defined U.S. interests in the Middle East as energy, counterterrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and protecting Israel’s security and promoting Israel-Palestine peace talks.11 Ten years later, U.S. interests in the Middle East remain in these four areas, unchanged and rarely controversial. For China, energy security, counterterrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promoting Israel-Palestine peace talks also completely align with its own interests. In this regard, China-U.S. interests almost completely overlap. A report by the RAND Corporation states outright that China and the United States have consistent interests in most areas in the Middle East, and if the United States only views China through the lens of great power competition, it will miss many areas for potential cooperation.12 The United States aims to protect its Middle Eastern allies, mainly maintaining Israel and some Arab countries; China implements a non-aligned balanced policy, maintaining normal relations with all countries, without distinguishing between friends and enemies, which is the biggest difference between China and the United States. Even from this perspective, China and the United States are not completely opposed and occasionally have some space for cooperation. For instance, on the Iran issue, China and the United States have significant differences in stance: the United States views Iran as an enemy, while China sees Iran as a partner, but both China and the United States do not want to see Iran become a nuclear state, and regional stability is very important to China. Therefore, in the intermittent nearly 20 years of negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, China and the United States have generally cooperated more than argued. In August 2022, Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, testified in the Senate, stating that, so far, the United States believes China is playing a positive role in the Iran nuclear negotiations.13 Even in areas where China and the United States have conflicting interests in the Middle East, there have been no active, initiative-taking actions to undermine each other’s policy goals. Overlapping interests form the basis for China and the United States to coexist peacefully in the Middle East.
从自身利益的角度看,中美在中东的利益大体相似,矛盾点少、矛盾程度较轻。2011年,奥巴马把美国在中东的利益界定为能源、反恐、防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散,以及保护以色列安全和推动巴以和谈。10年后,美国在中东的利益仍然是这4个领域,没有变化,且鲜有争议。对中国而言,能源安全、反恐、防止大规模杀伤性武器扩散、推动巴以和谈等,也完全符合自身利益。在这一点上,中美利益几乎完全重叠。美国兰德公司报告直言,中美在中东多数领域利益一致,若美国仅通过大国竞争视角看中国,会错失诸多可以合作的领域。美国要保护自己的中东盟友,主要是维护以色列和部分阿拉伯国家;中国实行不结盟的平衡政策,同所有国家保持正常关系,没有敌我之分,这是中美最大的差别。即便从这个角度看,中美也并非完全对立,偶尔还有一些合作空间。如在伊朗问题上,中美立场差异很大,美国视伊朗为敌人,中国视伊朗为伙伴,但是中美都不愿看到伊朗成为核国家,地区稳定对中国十分重要。因此,在断续近20年的伊核谈判中,中美大体上合作多于冲突。2022年8月,美国国务院负责近东事务的助理国务卿芭芭拉·丽芙在参议作证时表示,到目前为止美国认为中国在伊核谈判中发挥着积极作用。即便中美在中东有利益冲突的领域,也未有积极、主动地破坏对方政策目标的行为。利益重叠是中美能够在中东和平共处的基础。
From the perspective of regional influence, the United States enjoys security advantages, while China has economic strengths. Neither country shows high enthusiasm for weakening or replacing the other’s advantages, lacking the will for comprehensive competition. The nature of China and U.S. influence in the Middle East is different, making it impossible for one to replace the other, and even the cost of challenging each other is prohibitively high. Economically, China’s trade with the Middle East increased from $15.2 billion in 2000 to $284.3 billion in 2021, while U.S. trade only grew from $63.4 billion to $98.4 billion over the same period. China imports about 5 million barrels of oil per day from the Middle East, compared to about 800,000 barrels for the United States. In terms of economic affairs, China’s importance is significantly greater than that of the United States, a result of the respective economic structures of the two countries, not easily changeable. In security, from 2017 to 2019, the Middle East purchased 140.6 billion yuan in arms, with 67% coming from the United States and 6.7% from China. China’s arms exports to the UAE are less than 2% of those from the United States, and to Saudi Arabia less than 1%. The United States maintains tens of thousands of combat troops in the Middle East, while China has no stationed forces. The United States has military bases or facilities in Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE, whereas China does not. The United States has seven major non-NATO allies in the Middle East, while China adheres to a non-aligned policy and has no allies. Clearly, China cannot match the United States in terms of security influence. China’s economic relationships with Middle Eastern countries are mutually beneficial; the Middle East will not abandon China simply because the United States is dissatisfied, and challenging China would require the United States to incur substantial political and economic costs. Likewise, China neither desires nor has the capability to challenge the U.S.’ security position. The United States spends $75 billion annually on regular military expenses in the Middle East, which is 15% of its total military budget, not including war costs,14 while China’s total military budget in 2020 was only $178.6 billion. U.S. officials judge that China is unlikely to challenge the United States in the security field, where the U.S.’ strategic advantage is very prominent.15 Dawn Murphy, an associate professor at the U.S. National War College, states that China’s presence in the Middle East is economic, not security-related, and China has not moved in that direction.16
从地区影响力的角度看,美国享有安全优势,中国拥有经济优势,中美削弱、取代对方优势的积极性不高,缺乏全面竞争的愿意。中美在中东影响力的性质不同,不可能相互取代,就连挑战对方的代价都过于高昂。经济上,中国与中东的贸易额从2000年的152亿美元增长到2021年2843亿美元,同期美国仅从634亿美元增长到984亿美元;中国进口中东石油约500万桶/天,美国约80万桶/天。在经济领域,中国的重要性明显大于美国,这是中美各自经济结构决定的,不可能轻易改变。安全上,2017~2019年中东采购军火1406亿元,美国武器占67%,中国占6.7%;中国对阿联酋武器出口不到美国的2%,对沙特不到美国的1%;美常驻中东战斗部队达数万人,中国没有驻军;美国在巴林、吉布提、埃及、伊拉克、以色列、约旦、科威特、阿曼、卡塔尔、沙特、土耳其、阿联酋拥有军事基地或设施,中国没有军事基地;美国在中东拥有7个“非北约重要盟国”,中国则实施不结盟政策,没有盟国。显然,美国在安全上的影响力,中国难以企及。中国同中东国家的经济关系是互利共赢的,中东不会因为美国不满意就放弃中国,美国要挑战中国,必然要付出相当大的政治、经济成本。同理,中国也无心、无力挑战美国的安全地位。国在中东每年开支750亿美元常规军费,相当于总军费的15%,这还不包括战争费用,而2020年中国总军是安全,他们也没有向那个方向迈进。
Despite this, the tense global strategic relationship spills over into regional affairs, influencing China-U.S. attitudes in these matters and raising some unsettling signals. Since 2015, with Russia’s intervention in Syria, cooperation between Israel, Arab countries, and the United States has increased, and Iran, Turkey, and Russia have also coordinated to some extent, creating a two-camp pattern, although China has not been involved. After the Ukraine crisis in 2022, the United States has increasingly viewed China, Russia, and Iran as a camp, signaling a return to a sort of “small Cold War” in the Middle East. United States scholars list China alongside Iran, terrorism, and oil supply as one of the United States’ concerns in the Middle East.17 In July 2022, before Biden’s visit to the Middle East, he wrote in The Washington Post, “Countering Russia’s aggression, better competing with China, and making the Middle East more stable are why I am visiting Saudi Arabia.”18 Afterward, discussion of the great power game in the Middle East intensified.
尽管如此,全球战略关系紧张明显外溢到了地区事务中,影响着中美在地区事务上的态度,带来一些令人不安的信号。2015年以来,随着俄罗斯跃进到叙利亚,以色列、阿拉伯国家与美国的合作增多,伊朗、土耳其和俄罗斯亦有所协调,两个阵营格局若隐若现,中国没有涉入其中。2022年乌克兰危机后,美国越来越把中国、俄罗斯、伊朗看作一个阵营,中东“小冷战”似乎又要回来了。美国学者将中国同伊朗、恐怖主义、石油供应并列为美国在中东的关切之一。2022年7月,拜登出访中东前在《华盛顿邮报》撰文指出:“反制俄罗斯的侵略、更好地同中国竞争、让中东地区更稳定,是我访问沙特的原因。”此后,大国中东大博弈的话题瞬间升温。
Currently, these signals are sporadic and intermittent, sometimes even barely perceptible. Overall, conflicts and contradictions in regional affairs between China and the United States are still not prominent, and Middle Eastern affairs themselves are unlikely to lead to China-U.S. conflict. However, it is noteworthy that outside of regional affairs, Chinese and U.S. political, economic, and security activities in the Middle East increasingly display opposition and even conflict.
目前,这些信号还是零星、断续的,甚至是若有若无的。整体看,中美在地区事务中的矛盾冲突仍然不突出,中东事务本身不会导致中美冲突。但值得关注的是,在地区事务之外,中美各自在中东的政治、经济和安全活动日益呈现出对立甚至冲突的一面。
III. Increasingly Sharp Bilateral Contradictions
三、双边矛盾日益尖锐
For over two thousand years, trade has been the primary link between China and the Middle East, transitioning from jewels, spices, and silk in the past to oil and industrial products today. However, in the past decade, China’s engagement with the Middle East in finance, investment, technology, arms sales, politics, and security has increased, transforming the bilateral relationship from one dominated by economic trade to a comprehensive one, climbing from the lower to the higher end of the production chain. This shift has led to a change in China-U.S. relations in the Middle East from complementary to homogenous competition, with inevitable tensions and contradictions. The United States is not concerned about China replacing its position, nor does it believe China can fully challenge its dominance. However, in the context of a tense global strategic environment, these contradictions are sufficient to stimulate the United States to adopt a policy of skepticism and hostility towards China.
两千多年来,贸易始终是中国与中东的主要联系,主要交易品以前是珠宝、香料、丝绸,如今是石油和工业制成品。然而,近10年来中国同中东在金费才1786亿美元。美国官方判断,中国在安全领域挑战美国的可能性很小,美国的战略优势非常突出。美国国家战争学院副教授道安·墨菲表示,中国在中东的存在是经济方面,而不融、投资、科技、武器销售、政治、安全等领域的交往日渐增多,双边关系由经济贸易主导型向综合型转换,从产业链低端向高端攀升。这种变化导致中美在中东的关系从互补向同质竞争转换,紧张、矛盾不可避免。美国并不担心中国取代美国,甚至也不认为中国能全面挑战其主导地位,但是在全球战略环境紧张的背景下,这些矛盾足以刺激美国采取怀疑、敌视中国的政策。
In the technological field, the United States’ exclusive competition against China is intensifying, mixed with economic interests, political suspicion, and security dilemmas, steering China-U.S. relations towards zero-sum competition. Traditionally, the United States has been at the upper end of the supply chain, engaging in energy exploration, finance, insurance, design, regulation, management, and consulting, while China excels in mining, infrastructure, production, and processing, with more complementarity than competition. In recent years, China’s technological content in trade, investment, and project contracting has continuously increased, gradually moving up the supply chain and becoming more competitive in fields like the digital economy, aerospace, clean energy, and the defense industry, rapidly expanding the scope of China-U.S. economic competition. This is the natural logic of economic development. However, globalization and technological progress have blurred the line between economy and security, especially against the backdrop of a tense global strategic environment, where the United States often views economic competition from a political and strategic perspective. Barbara Leaf stated that over the years, the United States and the Middle East have formed a large system or ecosystem composed of infrastructure, military equipment, high-tech products, and dual-use technology. Now, as China aims to break through this system, the United States is concerned about the security of the system and even more worried about China replacing the U.S. system.19 Clearly, the United States wants to maintain the exclusivity of this system. Both China and the United States are competing for technological access and standards, which are at the heart of competition in 5G, space technology, ports, and weaponry, and represent the sharpest contradictions between China and the United States in the Middle East, with almost no room for reconciliation. For China, it is inevitable to expand into investment and high-tech fields while maintaining its trade advantage, extending from the economic to the political and security fields, which is both the natural logic of economic development and an inevitable choice for a major power to expand its global influence. Chinese companies have signed 116 “Smart City” and “Safe City” projects globally, with 17 in the Middle East, making it the region with the most such projects. Huawei has signed 5G cooperation agreements with 11 telecom companies in Gulf countries, making the Middle East a key area for China’s overseas 5G construction. China’s Beidou and the U.S. Global Positioning System compete in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Turkey signing digital Silk Road agreements with China’s Beidou. In these areas, the United States explicitly demands Middle Eastern countries choose sides. The United States has successfully excluded Huawei equipment from Israel’s 5G network and requested the UAE do the same by 2025. In July 2022, during Biden’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Israel, he signed technology cooperation memorandums with both countries, proposing to build dependable 5G and 6G networks, excluding Chinese technology and equipment. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly proposes a “national industrial policy,” reversing the tenets of free-market capitalism, strengthening the government’s role in international economic competition, and using state power to intervene in market competition, further blurring the lines between domestic policy, economy, and diplomacy. In the future, conflicts between China and the United States in this field will only intensify.
在技术领域,美国针对中国的排他性竞争愈演愈烈,混杂着经济利益、政治猜忌和安全困境等多重因素,使中美关系日益朝着零和博弈的方向发展。在经济领域,传统上美国处于产业链上游,从事能源勘探、金融、保险、设计、监管、管理、咨询等活动,中国则擅长开采、基建、生产、加工等领域,双方互补多于竞争。近年来,中国在贸易、投资和工程承包领域的科技含量不断提高,逐渐向产业链上游位移,在数字经济、航空航天、清洁能源、军工等领域越来越有竞争力,中美经济的竞争面迅速扩大。本来,这是经济发展的自然逻辑。但是,全球化与科技进步让经济与安全之间的界线模糊了,特别是在全球战略环境紧张的背景下,美国往往从政治、战略视角看待经济竞争。芭芭拉·丽芙直言,多年来美国与中东构成一个由基础设施、武器装备、高科技产品和军民两用技术构成的大系统或生态环境,现在中国要突破这个系统,美国担忧中国破坏系统的安全性,更担心中国取代美国的系统。显然,美国想继续维持这个系统的排他性,中美既争夺技术准入,又争夺技术标准,这是关于5G、太空技术、港口、武器竞争的核心,也是中美在中东最尖锐的矛盾,几乎没有调和的空间。对中国而言,必然会在保持贸易优势的基础上,向投资、高科技领域拓展,从经济领域向政治、安全领域扩大,这既是经济发展的自然逻辑,也是大国扩大全球影响的必然选择。中企在全球范围内签署116个“智慧城市”“平安城市”项目,中东占17个,是合作项目最多的地区。中国华为同海湾国家的11家电信公司签署5G合作协议,中东成为中国海外5G建设的重点区域。中国的北斗、美国的全球定位系统在中东同台竞争,沙特、阿联酋、埃及、土耳其与中国北斗签署了数字丝路协议。在这些领域,美国明确要求中东国家选边站队。美国已经成功地把华为设备排挤出以色列5G网络,还要求阿联酋2025年前完成同样的事情。2022年7月,拜登在访问沙特、以色列期间,同两国分别签署科技合作备忘录,提出建设可靠的5G和6G网络,排挤中国技术和设备。2022版美国《国家安全战略》明确提出“国家工业政策”,一反自由资本主义的教条,强化政府在国际经济竞争中的作用,动用国家力量干预市场竞争,内政、经济和外交之间的界线进一步模糊。未来,中美在这个领域的冲突只会更加激烈。
In the soft power domain, the influence of China and the United States wax and wane, constituting competition between two models, whether by active choice or natural outcome. Given the clear differences in ideology, political systems, economic systems, and diplomatic values between China and the United States, the rise of the “Chinese model” inevitably means a decline in the “American model.” Although few believe weakening the United States is the main goal of China’s Middle East policy, most think China’s actions objectively erode U.S. influence. International organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund set preconditions for economic aid, but China-led institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Silk Road Fund explicitly state no political conditions attached. China-led international financial institutions and the Shanghai Oil Exchange are exploring yuan pricing, challenging dollar hegemony. In response to the Belt and Road Initiative, China has established new mechanisms for resolving trade and investment disputes, weakening the trade system dominated by the West. China also offers Middle Eastern countries an alternative development model to the West, the “Chinese-style modernization” path, achieving economic growth while maintaining political stability. Compared to technological competition, the impact of China’s soft power is subtle and will not shake the U.S.-dominated political and economic system in the short term, “with no signs, except for some technological factors, indicating that the Chinese model poses a challenge to the United States in the Middle East.”20 However, ideological competition is very sensitive, largely a matter of sentiment and psychology, and even minor quantitative changes can easily trigger panic reactions. A poll in early 2022, the “Arab Barometer,” showed that more than half of Arab people believe democracy is not conducive to economic development, prompting a British scholar to lament, “Arab nations may lean more towards the Chinese system.”21
在软实力领域,中美影响力此消彼长,无论是主动选择还是自然形成的结果,都构成了两种模式的竞争。因为中美意识形态、政治制度、经济体制和外交价值观差异明显,“中国模式”影响力上升必然意味着“美国模式”下降。尽管极少有人认为削弱美国是中国中东政策的主要目标,但是多数人认为中国的言行客观上侵蚀着美国的影响力。世界银行、国际货币基金组织等国际组织均为经济援助设定前提条件,中国主导的金砖国家新开发银行、亚洲投资银行、新丝路基金,明确表示不附加任何政治条件;中国主导的国际金融机构、上海石油交易市场均试水人民币计价,冲击美元霸权;针对“一带一路”项目,中国建立了新的贸易、投资纠纷解决机制,削弱美西方主导的贸易体系。中国还为中东国家提供了西方之外的另一种发展模式,即“中国式现代化”道路,既实现经济增长又维护政治稳定。同科技竞争相比,中国软实力的冲击是潜移默化的,相当长时间内不会动摇美国主导的政治经济体系,“除一些技术因素外,没有任何迹象表明中国模式在中东对美国形成挑战。”然而,意识形态竞争非常敏感,很大程度上是一个感情心理问题,即便是微小的量变也极易引起恐慌性反应。2022年初,“阿拉伯晴雨表”民调显示,半数以上的阿拉伯人认为民主制度不利于经济发展,一位英国学者感叹:“阿拉国家可能更倾向中国制度。”
In the field of diplomacy, the fundamental principles of China and the United States collide head-on, leading to diametrically opposed positions on certain regional matters of contention. Unlike the United States, China has not directly involved itself in these issues. However, as an emerging power approaching the center of the Middle Eastern political stage, China adheres to its principles on every major issue. China has proposed the “Five-Point Peace Initiative” on the Israel-Palestine conflict, the “Three Basic Principles” on the Libya issue, the “Six Proposals” on the Syria issue, and the “Five-Point Initiative” for security and stability in the Middle East. Although these initiatives and principles have not had a substantial impact for the time being, they highlight the stark differences in approaches and practices between China and the United States, with both sides vying for the moral high ground. On the Israel-Palestine issue, the United States has long favored Israel, while China consistently supports the Palestinian cause; the United States almost always votes against UN resolutions condemning Israel, while China votes in favor. On the Iran issue, the United States spares no effort to build a political, economic, and military cordon to contain Iran, while China insists on maintaining normal political, economic, and military interactions with Iran. On the Syria issue, the United States employs a combination of economic sanctions, military intervention, and political isolation to attempt regime change, while China has vetoed U.S. interventions in Syria 10 times in the UN Security Council. China does not directly challenge the United States, but consistently portrays itself as an alternative to the United States, questioning American development models and intervention policies.22 As China’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs increases, conflicts between China and the United States in this field are likely to increase accordingly.
在外交领域,中美基本原则迎头相撞,导致在个别地区热点问题上南辕北辙。同美国不同,中国自身未直接卷入热点问题。但是,中国作为一个正在走近中东政治舞台中心的新兴大国,在每一个重要问题上都坚持自己的原则。中国提出关于巴以冲突的“五点和平倡议”、利比亚问题的“三点基本原则”、叙利亚问题的“六点主张”、中东安全稳定的“五点倡议”。虽然这些倡议、原则一时难以产生实质影响,却彰显中美之间迥异的思路、做法,双方抢占道义制高点的意味非常明显。在巴以问题上,美国长期偏袒以色列,中国一贯支持巴勒斯坦事业,美国几乎对每个谴责以色列的联合国决议案投反对票,中国都投赞成票。在伊朗问题上,美国竭尽所能构筑遏制伊朗的政治、经济和军事包围圈,中国则坚持维护同伊朗正常的政治、经济和军事交往。在叙利亚问题上,美国动用经济制裁、军事干预和政治孤立等综合手段,试图搞政权更迭,中国则在联合国安理会10次投下否决票,就是要反对美国干预叙利亚内政。中国没有直接挑战美国,但总是塑造美国替代者的形象,质疑美国的发展模式、干预政策。随着中国对中东事务参与的增多,中美在该领域的冲突也会相应增加。
In the military domain, the United States regards the Middle East as a no-go zone, and any China-U.S. competition in this area would lead to sharp contradictions. Military security is a pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East and a primary means of influencing the region. U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that the economy is one thing, but the military is another. Currently, the United States has recognized China’s leading position in trade and energy and may in the future recognize China’s advantages in investment. However, the United States is not willing to relinquish its military superiority and remains highly vigilant, even considering this a “red line.” An article in The Economist suggests that if China constructs dual-use ports or engages in sensitive technological cooperation, the United States will demand its Middle Eastern allies to choose sides.23 As early as 1999, when Israel sold reconnaissance planes to China, the United States exerted significant pressure, forcing Israel to terminate all military cooperation with China, a stance that remains to this day. In the spring of 2021, U.S.-UAE negotiations over the sale of F-35 fighter jets broke down, with the United States citing concerns not only about 5G but also about the UAE’s defense cooperation with China.24 In recent years, due to the cost-effectiveness of Chinese drones, countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have purchased them from China, and in 2017, Saudi Arabia and China discussed establishing a joint drone production factory, the third such project globally. In response, in 2020, then-CENTCOM commander Kenneth McKenzie stated in a video conference that one of his responsibilities is to prevent Gulf countries from buying armed drones from China.25 So far, China’s involvement in the military affairs of the Middle East has been limited, with the United States maintaining a significant advantage, and conflicts between China and the United States in the military domain are not prominent, with only individual isolated incidents occurring.
在军事领域,美国视中东为禁脔,中美竞争一旦触及这个领域,矛盾会非常尖锐。军事安全是美国中东政策的支柱,也是美国影响中东的主要手段。美国官员一再表示,经济是一回事,军事是另一回事。目前,美国已经认可中国在贸易、能源领域的领先地位,未来也可能承认中国在投资领域的优势地位,但是美国不会放弃军事优势,并对此高度警惕,甚至可以理解为这是美国划下的“红线”。英国《经济学家》文章认为,“如果中国建设军民两用港口或搞敏感技术合作,美国就会要求中东盟友选边站。”早在1999年以色列向中国出售侦察机,美国就施加强大压力,迫使以色列终止与中国的一切军事合作,到目前仍然如此。2021年春天,美国与阿联酋关于F-35战斗机军售的谈判破裂,美方认为“分歧不仅是5G,阿联酋与中国的国防合作,有很多问题需要澄清”。近年来,因中国无人机价廉物美,阿尔及利亚、埃及、伊拉克、约旦、沙特、阿联酋等中东国家都向中国购买,2017年沙特与中国协商建立无人机联合生产厂,这是全球第三个类似的项目。对此,2020年,时任美国中央司令部司令麦肯锡在一次视频会议中说,我的职责之一就是不能让海湾国家购买中国的武装无人机。迄今为止,中国对中东军事领域的事务参与程度较轻,美国优势突出,中美在军事领域的冲突不明显,只有个别零星事件发生。
In the area of strategic security, both China and the United States worry about the Middle East becoming a card in the other’s hand, potentially creating a classic security dilemma. The United States, as an existing superpower, often has excessive anxiety and a sense of peril, tending to exaggerate the power and intentions of rising nations. China, as a rising power, is often eager to showcase its strength and status. The Middle East, as a third party, worries about the United States’ contraction and is eager to use rising China to balance the United States, also willing to exaggerate its own influence. The possibility of the United States cutting off energy supply lines is a persistent shadow over China, which is China’s primary concern regarding the Middle East. Senior U.S. Middle East expert Gause points out, “Overall, if U.S.-China relations deteriorate, and the United States can control the oil-rich areas, it gains an additional card.”26 Conversely, the United States also worries about the Middle East becoming increasingly reliant on China for energy, potentially becoming a card in China’s hand, with Gulf countries increasingly dependent on the Chinese energy market. The United States is concerned about China controlling Gulf energy technology standards, forming exclusive trade groups.
在战略安全领域,中美都担心中东成为对方手中的一张牌,可能形成典型的安全困境。美国作为现存大国,往往有过度的焦虑、忧患意识,倾向于夸大崛起国家的实力和意图;中国作为崛起中的大国,往往急于展现大国的实力和地位;中东作为第三方,担心美国的收缩,急于利用崛起的中国平衡美国,也乐于虚张声势。美国切断能源供应线始终是中国挥之不去的一个阴影,这是中国最担心的牵涉中东的议题。美国资深中东问题专家高斯就指出:“整体而言,如果中美关系恶化,美国能够控制富油区,手里就多了一张牌。”反过来,美国也担心中东在能源上越来越依赖中国,反而成为中国手中的一张牌,海湾国家对中国能源市场的依赖越来越大,美国担心中国控制海湾能源技术标准,形成排他性贸易集团。
These contradictions are inevitable. If regarded as the primary contradiction in China-U.S. relations in the Middle East, they hold strategic significance. Currently, both China and the United States view these contradictions as tactical, not altering their respective Middle East strategies. If managed properly in the future, these contradictions will not harm the overall China-U.S. relationship; however, if they are allowed to worsen or are deliberately magnified, they could easily escalate into a strategic conflict.
这些矛盾不可避免,若视其为中美在中东的主要矛盾,就具有战略意义。目前,中美均视其为战术性矛盾,没有改变中美各自的中东战略。未来这些矛盾若控制得当,则不会伤害中美关系大局;若任其恶化,甚至故意放大其影响,很容易上升为战略冲突。
IV. A Critical Crossroads
四、关键十字路口
Historically, the relationship between China and the Middle East can be divided into three stages. From 1949 to 1978, China actively participated in the great power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East. From 1978 to 2013, the focus of China’s Middle East policy was on energy and trade. Since 2014, the relationship has entered a third stage, evolving beyond energy and trade to include finance, investment, technology, and culture, becoming more comprehensive. Whether the relationship will advance to a fourth stage, transitioning from an economically dominated relationship to a more balanced engagement including political and military aspects, remains an open question.
回顾历史,1949~1978年可谓中国与中东关系第一阶段,中国积极参与美苏在中东的大国博弈;1978~2013年是中国与中东关系第二阶段,中国的关注重心是能源和贸易;2014以来中国与中东关系进入第三阶段,双边关系超越能源和贸易,向金融、投资、科技、文化领域扩展,越来越具有综合性。未来,中国与中东关系能否迈向第四阶段,从经济为主向更平衡的经济、政治和军事关系升级,现在还是一个未知数。
Correspondingly, China-U.S. relations in the Middle East have also evolved. Between 1949 and 1970, the relationship was antagonistic. From 1970 to 1990, there was sporadic cooperation, and from 1990 to 2018, the relationship was characterized by parallel engagement. During this period of parallel relations, China’s approach was not to cooperate with, support, or confront the United States, and not to consider the United States as a primary factor in its Middle East policy. Currently, the strategic confrontation between China and the United States on a global scale is becoming increasingly apparent. On the regional level, however, there is good compatibility of interests and strategic space, with limited conflict. On a bilateral level, structural contradictions and security dilemmas are evident. As tensions in the upper and lower layers of relations increase, the core middle layer is pressured and impacted, making the current state of parallel relations unsustainable. A new phase in China-U.S. interactions in the Middle East is inevitable. Global, regional, and bilateral levels are just the objective environments faced by Sino-American relations, influencing but not determining policy. The interpretation of these environments involves considerable subjectivity, and the choice of policy involves significant agency.
与此相对应,中美关系1949~1970年在中东是敌对关系,1970~1990年是零星协作关系,1990~2018年是平行关系。在平行关系时代,中国的基本态度是不配合、不支持、不对抗美国,不以美国为主要考虑因素。目前,中美在全球战略层次上对抗的态势越来越明显;在地区层次上,中美利益兼容性较好、战略空间宽松,冲突性不大;在双边层次上,中美存在结构性矛盾,安全困境明显。上下两层的关系日益紧张,中间内核受到挤压、冲击,平行关系的现状不可持续,中美在中东的相处模式必然会进入一个新阶段。同时,全球、地区和双边三个层次仅是中美关系面对的客观环境,环境影响政策,却不能决定政策。如何解读客观环境具有相当大的主观性,采取什么样的政策具有相当大的能动性。
From the U.S. perspective, marked by the 2022 version of the U.S. National Security Strategy, U.S. policy towards China has crossed a critical juncture and entered an era of strategic competition. The China-U.S. relationship has many characteristics of the Cold War but is more complex than the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Whether it will evolve into a global and comprehensive confrontation remains flexible. Even if a form of Cold War does develop between China and the United States, it does not mean that the United States will allocate resources evenly across all regions and issues globally; such decisions will be context-specific. The United States has only a vague concept of the model of coexistence between China and the United States in the Middle East and is unwilling to see the reality of “China rising and the United States falling.” However, how much of a threat this poses to the United States and how many resources the United States is willing to invest in response are hotly debated issues within the United States.
美国方面,以2022版美国《国家安全战略》为标志,美对华政策已经迈过十字路口,进入了战略竞争时代。中美关系具有冷战的诸多特征,又远比美苏关系复杂,是否形成全球性、全方位的全面对抗,仍具有较大的可塑空间。即便中美一定程度上形成冷战,也不意味着美国会在全球各个地区、各议题上均衡分配资源,一定是因时、因事、因地而定。对于中美在中东的共处模式,美国只有模糊概念,不愿看到“中升美降”的现实,但是这对美国的威胁有多大,美国愿投入多大的资源应对,是美国国内激烈辩论的议题。
Within the United States, there are varying assessments of the importance of the Middle East and China’s policy in the region. One view sees the Middle East as a new frontier or even a key area in global competition between China and the United States, urging the United States to stop its strategic contraction and reorganize its Middle East strategy to contain China. This perspective believes that China views the Middle East as a strategically significant area, second only to the Western Pacific,27 and that China-U.S. strategic competition in the Middle East is a reality that U.S. policymakers are reluctant to acknowledge.28 Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Zakheim criticized the Biden administration for recognizing China’s challenge as global but focusing only on Asia-Pacific, leaving opportunities for China in the Middle East.29 Some even argue that the Middle East is not just a new frontier in China-U.S. global competition, but also a crucial area. If the United States concedes the Middle East to China, China could become the dominant power in Eurasia, contesting Eurasian dominance.30 U.S. Central Command chief Michael Kurilla suggested that the Middle East is the center of global competition between China and the United States, both substantively and symbolically.31 This view holds that the United States cannot continue to ignore China’s strategic expansion in the Middle East and must adjust its current policies.
美国国内对中东的重要性和中国的中东政策具有不同的判断。第一种观点视中东为中美全球竞争的新边疆甚至是关键区域,呼吁美国停止战略收缩,重新布局遏制中国的中东战略。这种观点认为,中国已经视中东为仅次于西太平洋的战略重地,中东是中美西太平洋战略竞争的自然延伸;中国决心取代美国在中东的主导地位,中美在中东的战略竞争已经是现实,只不过美国决策者不愿承认罢了。美国前国防部次长扎克海姆在题为“中国打开中东新大门”的文章中批评,拜登政府虽然承认中国的挑战是全球性的,却只关注亚太,在中东给中国留下了机会。更有甚者认为,中东不仅是中美全球竞争的新边疆,而且是非常重要、关键的区域。美国若把中东拱手让给中国,中国必然藉此成为欧亚大陆的主导力量,这是对欧亚大陆主导权的争夺。美国中央司令部司令迈克尔·库里拉表示,无论在实质意义上还是象征意义上,中东都是美中全球竞争的中心。这派观点认为,美国不能继续无视中国在中东的战略扩张,必须调整现行中东政策。
A second perspective argues that the United States can safely engage in strategic contraction in the Middle East and quickly shift its global strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific. This view posits that with U.S. energy independence, the importance of the Middle East has declined. The United States does not need to control or dominate Middle Eastern affairs but only prevent any hostile country from doing so. According to this opinion, the United States should acknowledge the end of its domination in the Middle East and allow global and regional powers to form a new balance of power, with the United States being just one of many players. There is no great power competition in the Middle East; Russia is merely a disruptor, and China has not transformed its economic resources into political or military influence. Moreover, China and the United States have similar interests in the Middle East.32 Harvard Professor Stephen Walt suggests that Middle Eastern countries are simply playing a balancing game between China and the United States, and the United States should be cautious and not satisfy all their demands because of their flirtations with China.33 On the contrary, if the United States opts to contain China, it could only provoke China into military competition, potentially making China a real military threat. The United States needs to learn to coexist with China, and there are many areas where cooperation is possible.34
第二种观点认为美国可以放心搞中东战略收缩,尽快把全球战略重心转向“印太”。这种观点认为,随着美国能源独立,中东的重要性下降,美国没有必要控制或主导中东事务,只需要防范任何一个敌对国家这样做,而中东并不存在这样的危险。美国应当承认,美国独霸中东的时代结束了,可以放手让全球性大国、地区大国形成新的权力平衡,美国只是众多玩家之一。中东不存在大国竞争,俄罗斯只是个搅局者,中国没有把强大的经济资源转化为政治、军事影响力,更何况中美在中东有相似的利益,美国最好让地区国家之间形成自己的秩序,美国管得越多,效果越差。哈佛大学教授史蒂芬·沃特表示,中东国家只是在中美之间玩平衡游戏,对中国打美国牌,对美国打中国牌,美国需要谨慎判断,不能因为这些国家与中国调情,美国就满足它们的一切要求。相反,若美国选择遏制中国,只能刺激中国搞军事竞争,反而会让中国成为一个真的军事威胁。美需要学会同中国共处,甚至中美之间有诸多可以合作的空间。
A third view suggests that the United States should both contract its strategy in the Middle East and be wary of China filling the vacuum. This perspective maintains that the energy transition is uncertain and the importance of the Middle East hard to judge. Historically, the Middle East has always attracted U.S. strategic attention. As former U.S. diplomat Elliot Koss says, “You may not be interested in the Middle East, but the Middle East is interested in you.”35 China’s strategy is also unclear, a composite of economic, energy, political, and security factors, with dynamic changes in the importance, reality, and strength of these factors. The United States must prepare for both scenarios. The rapid U.S. strategic contraction over the past 20 years was a mistake that allowed China and Russia to expand their influence in the Middle East.36 In the future, the United States should slow its contraction pace and build a regional environment conducive to great power competition. This “look both ways” attitude is actually a hedging strategy that seems ideal but is in fact conflicting in its objectives, high in cost, risky, and difficult to balance. Georgetown University Professor Mark Lynch warns that as China’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs increases, the United States, in seeking a balance between regional interests and competition with China, could face dangerous misunderstandings.37
第三种观点认为美国既要中东战略收缩,又要警惕中国增补真空。这种观点认为,能源转型具有不确定性,中东的重要性难以判断,历史上中东总是能吸引美国的战略注意力。美国资深外交官埃利特·科思说:“你对中东不感兴趣,但中东对你感兴趣。”同时,中国的战略也不清晰,是一个兼具经济、能源、政治和安全等因素的复合体,各个因素的主次、虚实、强弱变化是动态的,不好预判,只能做好两手准备。过去20年美国战略收缩太快,这个失误已经让中国、俄罗斯扩大了在中东的影响力。未来,一方面美国要放慢收缩步伐,另一方面要构建有利于大国竞争的地区环境。这种“东张西望”的态度实际是对冲战略,看起来两全其美,其实两个目标是相互对立,操作起来成本高、风险高、平衡难。美国乔治城大学教授马克·林奇警告,随着中国参与中东事务增多,当美国在地区利益和同中国竞争之间寻求平衡时,可能出现危险的误解。
Similarly, in China, there are three views on its Middle East policy. One is to prepare for a major Sino-American competition in the Middle East, re-emphasizing great power competition as a key consideration in China’s Middle East policy, significantly elevating the importance of the Middle East in international political struggle, and accordingly advancing the Middle East in China’s global strategic order, increasing economic, political, and military resource investment in the region. To some extent, this would be a return to China’s pre-1980 Middle East policy. The second view continues to see the Middle East as an important economic partner, avoiding a major China-U.S. competition in the region as much as possible. Since the end of the Cold War, the Middle East has been an important source of energy supply and a commodity export market for China, as well as a good partner in international politics, serving as an “ecological conservation area” for China’s peaceful development. The value of the Middle East lies in its own economic and political impact, not in the role it plays in great power competition. As China’s influence increases, it will naturally weaken the U.S.-led order, a result of natural formation, not a deliberately pursued strategic goal. As Professor Dawn Murphy of the U.S. National War College says, China does not seek to replace the existing order or confront the United States, but China has established its own system, which could confront the United States in the future.38 From 1980 to the present, China’s Middle East policy has largely been as such. The third view is to adopt a hedging strategy, focusing on the economic potential of the Middle East and also preparing for a major Sino-American competition in the region, preparing for the best and the worst, a compromise and mix of the two aforementioned choices. China’s establishment of an economic, political, and security system in the Middle East to hedge against the United States, while not confronting or challenging the United States, seems to be the safest choice, but it is not without cost or risk. Ultimately, it may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy – by worrying about and preparing for confrontation, it leads to confrontation. Whether the first or third choice, both would significantly change China’s current Middle East policy. China’s Middle East policy has been distant from great power competition for over 30 years, and whether it needs to change is a significant question.
同美国国内的辩论类似,中国国内对中国中东政策亦有三种观点。一是着手准备中美在中东大博弈的前景,重新把大国博弈作为中国中东政策的重要考虑因素,大幅提升中东在国际政治斗争中的重要性,相应前移中东在中国全球战略中的排序,加大对中东的经济、政治和军事资源投入。一定程度上,这是回到1980年前中国的中东政策。二是仍然视中东为重要的经济伙伴,尽最大可能避免中美在中东的大博弈。冷战结束以来,中东既是中国重要的能源供应地和商品出口市场,也是中国在国际政治中的好伙伴,可谓是中国和平发展的“生态涵养区”。中东的价值体现在其本身的经济、政治影响,而非在大国博弈中的作用。随着中国影响力的增加,客观上会削弱美国主导的秩序,这是自然形成的结果,而非刻意追求的战略目标。正如美国战争学院学者道安·墨菲所言,中国不寻求取代现存秩序、不对抗美国,但是中国建立了自己的一个体系,未来可以对抗美国。1980年到今天,中国的中东政策大体如此。三是采取对冲战略,既着眼于中东的经济潜力,也着手中美在中东的大博弈,着眼最好的,准备最坏的,是前述两种选择的折中与混合。中国在中东着手建立对冲美国的经济、政治和安全体系,同时不对抗、挑战美国,似乎是最保险的选择,实际上成本不小、风险不低,最终可能出现“自我实现的预言”,你担心对抗、为对抗做准备,结果导致对抗。无论是第一种选择还是第三种选择,都会大幅度改变现行中国中东政策。中国中东政策远离大国博弈近30多年,是否需要作出改变,是一个值得深思的大问题。
If China prematurely or excessively prepares for a China-U.S. competition in the Middle East, it would incur unnecessary costs and exacerbate the risk of regional conflicts. Conversely, a delayed response could result in strategic passivity and missed opportunities. Adopting a hedging strategy would also face cost and risk challenges. China’s economic influence naturally transforming into political influence and thereby weakening American influence is one thing; deliberately arranging economic activities to enhance political influence and aiming to weaken America’s dominant position is another. Taking the oil yuan as an example, the U.S. dollar accounts for 60% of global reserve currencies and 40% of payment currencies, while the yuan accounts for about 3% in both areas, making it unlikely that the yuan will challenge the dollar’s position in the short term. However, the oil yuan has become a sensitive topic and even a focal point of contention in the trilateral relationship between China, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. suspects that China and Saudi Arabia are promoting the oil yuan for political and security reasons, whereas China believes the United States is suppressing the yuan for similar motives.
中国过早、过度为中美在中东的博弈作准备,会付出不必要的成本,加剧地区冲突的风险;若反应过于迟缓,则会陷入战略被动,错失时机;如果采取对冲战略,同样面临成本和风险问题。中国的经济影响水到渠成地转化为政治影响,自然而然地削弱美国影响,是一回事;中国以增强政治影响为出发点安排经济活动,以削弱美国主导地位为目标,是另一回事。以石油人民币为例,美元占全球储备货币60%、支付货币40%,人民币各占3%左右,短期内人民币挑战美元地位的可能性不大。但是,石油人民币已经成为中国、美国和沙特三边关系中的敏感话题甚至斗争焦点。美国怀疑中国与沙特出于政治、安全动机推动石油人民币,中国则认为美国基于同样的动机打压人民币。
Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China in the Middle East, being a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy. Currently, China’s dependence on foreign oil exceeds 70%, with the Middle East accounting for about 50% of this. Traditionally, China has secured Middle Eastern oil through various means to ensure a stable supply. However, oil sanctions post-1973 have generally been consumer countries sanctioning producer countries, not the other way around. More importantly, these sanctions have all been initiated by the West The last decade has shown that only the U.S. has the capability to implement oil sanctions against China, integrating oil, finance, insurance, shipping, and technology, and only the U.S. has this capacity. Thus, ensuring China’s energy security primarily targets the U.S., not the Middle East. The question of which China-U.S. coexistence model in the Middle East benefits China’s energy security is a topic worthy of in-depth study.
能源安全是中国在中东最重要的战略利益,是中国中东战略的重中之重。目前中国原油对外依存度达70%以上,中东占其中的50%左右。传统上,中国通过各种方式锁定中东石油,以保证石油供应安全。然而,1973年以后的“石油制裁”基本上都是消费国对生产国的制裁,而非生产国对消费国的制裁。更重要的是,这些制裁都是美西方发动的。近10年国际石油政治博弈表明,只有美国才有能力对中国实施石油制裁,石油制裁是融石油、金融、保险、航运、科技为一体的综合手段,只有美国有这个实力。确保中国能源安全,关键目标是美国,而非中东。中美在中东什么样的相处模式有利于中国能源安全,还是一个值得深入研究的课题。
Long-term involvement in Middle Eastern economic affairs means that if China intends to prepare for major power competition, it needs to adjust the priorities and allocation of its global strategy. Economically, China can maintain balanced relations with all regional countries, but once it enters the deeper waters of military and political domains, such relations become nearly impossible to sustain. It can be predicted that without major sudden events, China is unlikely to proactively make significant adjustments to its current Middle East policy, instead cautiously observing and adjusting within the dynamics of China-U.S. interaction. If China and the United States can seize opportunities and make the right choices, they can avoid a continuous crisis management mode of conflicts and contradictions in the Middle East. If they miss future opportunities, the region may tilt towards comprehensive competition. Currently, the Indo-Pacific and Europe have already entered a mode of strategic competition between China and the U.S., and the future direction of the Middle East may offer insights for Latin America and Africa.
长期以来,中国主要参与中东经济事务,未来若要着手大国博弈的准备工作,就需要调整全球战略的优先顺序和资源分配。在经济事务上,中国可以做到同所有地区国家保持平衡的关系,一旦进入到军事、政治领域的深水区,这种关系几乎不可能维持。可以预言,没有重大突发性事件的刺激,中国不会主动大幅调整现行中东政策,而会在中美互动中谨慎观察、调整。如果中美能抓住机遇,作出正确的选择,则能避免两国在中东进入矛盾、冲突不断的危机管控模式;如果中美错过未来机会之窗,则会在中东倒向全面竞争。目前,“印太”、欧洲地区已经进入中美战略竞争模式,中东何去何从,或许对拉美、非洲有启示意义。