Since 2000, Sino-Indian security interaction has been characterized by instability. On one hand, security interaction between China and India has increased. Being aware of the importance of managing their security relationship, both countries have intensified their efforts to consult on some security issues and have attempted to build cooperative relationships in some areas. On the other hand, the relationship has also shown tensions from time to time, with a series of specific incidents that have caused setbacks in the interactive relationship, particularly the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley conflict in June 2020. The Sino-Indian security relationship has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Some scholars have used the security dilemma theory to interpret it, maintaining that a security dilemma is at the root of tensions and instability in the bilateral relationship. The academic community has also intensified research on the Sino-Indian security dilemma. For example, in 2019, the journal Asian Security put out an issue with exploring the security dilemma and China-India relations as the research topic.¹ In addition, there have been a number of domestic and international research results in this area, including the 2002 article The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations written by Professor John Garver.² India-China Maritime Competition: The Security Dilemma at Sea (Rajesh Basrur et al. eds.) has examined the Sino-Indian “security dilemma” at sea.³ Ajey Lele, meanwhile, has assessed the Sino-Indian security dilemma in space.⁴ Admittedly, there are also some scholars who say that “security dilemmas” are not suitable for explaining Sino-Indian interaction. Some experts argue that security dilemmas have not played a role in Sino-Indian relations, noting that relations between China and India are characterized not by security dilemmas but by conflicting interests and are influenced by changes in their domestic politics and factors in the international strategic environment.⁵ Some scholars even argue that the emphasis on the Sino-Indian security dilemma is somehow a Western bias and a trap.⁶ Do China and India face a security dilemma? If so, what level of security dilemma do China and India currently face, and what is new about it compared to the traditional security dilemma? How can China and India alleviate the current security dilemma and build a compatible security relationship? This paper argues that the 70-year-old Sino-Indian relationship has gone through different stages, and while the security dilemma has not been evident at every stage, and has not been of uniform severity, it nonetheless exists in the relationship. This paper examines the new manifestations and features of the current Sino-Indian security dilemma and explores the new factors affecting the security dilemma. On that basis, ideas and suggestions are put forward for alleviating the security dilemma.

I. New Manifestations and Features of the Sino-Indian Security Dilemma

The concept of a “security dilemma” (安全困境 or 安全两难) first appeared in the paper Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma by John H. Herz. ⁷ A security dilemma refers to a situation where a country takes measures such as increasing armaments in order to guarantee its own security, but instead reduces the security of other countries, thereby leading to further insecurity for the country itself, so that it falls into an inextricable predicament. There are different theoretical interpretations of the causes of such security dilemmas. Neorealism believes that “military preparedness” security dilemmas are a structural feature inherent in international politics under conditions of anarchy.⁸ John Hertz, for example, argues that the ultimate source of security dilemmas is the lack of a “higher authority” in anarchy and that the immediate cause of security dilemmas is the uncertainty of nations and their mutual fear of harm in a state of anarchy. ⁹ Constructivism argues that “security dilemmas are a product of social constructs.” ¹⁰ Other scholars emphasize psychological factors. Robert Jervis, for example, suggests that “perceptions” and “misperceptions” in relations between states are the main causes of security dilemmas.¹¹ There is currently no unified criterion for examining whether there is a security dilemma in a bilateral relationship. This paper agrees with the following criteria proposed by Harvard University professor Alastair Iain Johnston in assessing whether a security dilemma exists between the United States and China. First, each side ignores the cooperative behavior of the other while magnifying the non-cooperative behavior of the other.¹² Second, both sides increasingly ignore the interactive nature of the relationship, that is, each side believes that the other side is solely responsible for the deterioration of the relationship, whereas the bilateral relationship is maintained thanks to the efforts of both sides. Both sides see their own moves as clearly contributing to stability.¹³ Third, one side is increasingly concerned that the other side will become a status quo-changing state or is increasingly skeptical of the effectiveness of the current strategy.¹⁴

Examining Sino-Indian relations since 2000 based on the above criteria, we find the security dilemma to be more clearly manifested in this period, especially in the interaction between the two sides surrounding the border dispute issue. As is well known, the Sino-Indian border issue is very complex. Both sides have been negotiating and consulting on the border issue, but have never found an effective solution to the dispute. At the same time, the actions of both countries in the border area, especially those related to defense, have caused varying degrees of concern to the other side. In recent years, moreover, both sides have increased infrastructure construction and resource development activities in border areas, causing speculation about the other side’s underlying true intentions. This kind of uncertainty about the intentions of the other side has in turn generated feelings of suspicion and insecurity on both sides and has even led to a “spiral pattern” of animosity. One can say that the security dilemma has plagued interaction between the two countries around the border issue for many years. It is worth mentioning that, although the border crisis incidents between the two countries in recent years, including the tent standoff in 2013, the Doklam crisis in 2017, and the standoff on the western section of the Sino-Indian border in 2020 (which triggered the Galwan Valley conflict) were not entirely caused by the security dilemma, it was undoubtedly one of the most important contributing factors. The two countries also have different interpretations of this, with the Indian side preferring to pin the blame on the Chinese side. For example, some Indian scholars have said that China’s rise and its growing military might have exacerbated the Sino-Indian security dilemma. As the scholars note, a long time after the 1962 war, India’s military posture along the India-China border was essentially defensive and could be described as exerting ‘denial and deterrence.’ Over the past decade, however, China’s trajectory, coupled with the rapid modernization of its military, has made people question the validity of this approach. India now feels more vulnerable in the face of China’s growing military power on land and at sea. This intensification of the security dilemma has led to a corresponding transformation of India’s military strategy toward China into one of “punitive deterrence.” ¹⁵ Admittedly, the Chinese side believes that the current dilemma has been caused to a large extent by the actions of the Indian side. For example, some Chinese experts have pointed out that the Doklam standoff was actually triggered by India’s serious misinterpretation of normal production and livelihood activities in China’s border areas.¹⁶ The interpretations mentioned above, in which each side holds the other responsible for the deterioration of bilateral relations, also precisely illustrate the existence of the Sino-Indian security dilemma. Moreover, the Sino-Indian security dilemma has taken a new turn and has taken on new characteristics since the start of the new century.

First of all, the Sino-Indian security dilemma shows a spillover character. A spillover character mainly refers to where a security dilemma is no longer limited to specific areas, such as border issues, but has begun to spread to more areas, such as maritime security, nuclear security, space security, and even many non-traditional security areas.

The maritime security dilemma between China and India, which has gradually come to the fore since 2000, is undoubtedly the most illustrative case of the spillover character of the security dilemma between the two countries. Although there are different assessments in academic circles of the intensity of the Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma, the fact that it has become increasingly evident in the course of maritime interaction between the two countries is indisputable. India’s perception of the threat from China is growing, and domestic rhetoric about the “Chinese maritime threat” has begun to increase, including the strategic community’s hype in recent years concerning China’s “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. India has also begun to ramp up investment in its maritime forces, including upgrading its naval, coast guard, and air forces, especially in the Lakshadweep Islands off India’s west coast and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the east, to better monitor and project power far from the coast.¹⁷ In addition, India has taken a number of actions to strengthen its military presence in the Indian Ocean, including the deployment of facilities with military intent in the relevant littoral nations. For example, India has reached an agreement with Seychelles to establish a naval base on Assumption Island (Assumption Island Naval Base), constructed a new coastal surveillance radar network in the Indian Ocean (the New Coastal Surveillance Radar Network CSRS) ¹⁸, and reached reciprocal military logistical support agreements with the United States, France, Australia, and Japan.¹⁹ Although these actions are not exclusively directed at China, their intent to address the Chinese threat is clear. Similarly, China’s strategic suspicions and threat perceptions of India have grown along with India’s accelerated naval modernization, increased maritime defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia, and its emphasis on “eastward operations” into the Western Pacific, as well as its activities in the South China Sea. Indeed, both countries have been adjusting their maritime security strategies and maritime security roles since the turn of the century, and this kind of adjustment has made it difficult for them to be sure of each other’s strategic intentions. Although their respective maritime power commitments and naval buildups are not exclusively directed at each other, China and India’s perceptions of security threats from each other have increased as their maritime power has grown and as their maritime operations have increased. This also makes them somewhat prone to the mistaken belief that their maritime security interests are incompatible, particularly in the Indian Ocean.

In addition, it is worth noting that apart from the traditional security dilemma characterized by its military nature, a resource security dilemma between India and China characterized by its “non-military nature” has also begun to emerge. Non-traditional security threats are security challenges that transcend national boundaries and sovereignty, and are characterized by resource-based tensions and conflicts, the fundamental feature of which is their “non-force-based nature.”²⁰ Therefore, non-traditional security threats often lead to “resource-based” security dilemmas, i.e., where the growth of resource use and protection in one country leads to shortages of resources in another country.²¹ Such non-military security dilemmas between the two countries have begun to increase as large numbers of complex and volatile non-traditional security issues enter into the China-India interaction. Moreover, the complexity of the interaction between the two countries is heightened by the fact that some non-traditional security issues are intertwined with traditional security issues. Take the water security dilemma, for example. Global water resources are under increasing pressure due to climate change and growing consumption, and China and India are no exceptions. In India’s view, given China’s location at the headwaters of India’s major rivers, China could use water as a weapon to threaten India’s security in the future. In recent years, India has been very concerned about China’s upstream river water development. India’s fears have not been allayed, although the two countries have signed a memorandum of understanding for bilateral sharing of hydrological information on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, ²² and they have also established an expert-level mechanism to cooperate on cross-border river hydrological flood reporting and emergency incident management and to exchange views on other issues of mutual concern.²³ In addition, the fact that water resource issues are also intertwined with the border issue between the two countries increases the complexity of issues, so the development of water resources in disputed areas, for example, is more likely to trigger a security dilemma. In recent years, India’s water resource development activities in the disputed areas have given rise to concerns and worries on China’s part. Some scholars have noted that India’s water resource development initiatives in areas disputed by China and India have a huge negative impact on China’s peripheral security.²⁴

Secondly, the security dilemma is characterized by dynamic disequilibrium. That is, the intensity of the security dilemma in the development process of Sino-Indian relations changes dynamically and is even characterized by disequilibrium in the same period, showing different intensities in different areas. At present, the Sino-Indian security dilemma is most apparent in the area of border interaction, where the intensity is highest and a trend toward spiraling escalation is evident. The frequency of border frictions between the two countries has increased significantly in recent years. This is also influenced to some extent by the growing security dilemma. Although the two countries have adopted a series of new measures for border crisis management, including the establishment of various new mechanisms for dialogue and consultation, such as the Sino-Indian border affairs consultation and coordination mechanism added in 2012, the security dilemma between the two countries has not really been alleviated. With the strengthening by both countries of defense and infrastructure construction in border areas, together with increased uncertainty in the domestic and international environments facing both countries, the Sino-Indian border security dilemma is developing in a serious direction.

Similarly, the Sino-Indian maritime security dilemma is also characterized by dynamic change. At the beginning of the new century, the maritime security dilemma between the two countries was at a relatively low intensity. Their two navies conducted a series of joint maritime search and rescue exercises, such as the “Dolphin 0311” exercise in 2003 and the “China-India Friendship 2005” exercise in 2005, but the dilemma has intensified in the past decade. Overall, however, it is still at a low-to-moderate intensity and has not entered a serious spiral of hostility. The security dilemma has nonetheless affected maritime engagement between the two countries and hindered bilateral cooperation, including non-traditional security cooperation at sea on counter-terrorism and anti-piracy. It is worth noting that there is a risk that the maritime security dilemma between the two countries will develop in a serious direction in the future. As some scholars believe, although the outbreak of war is still far away, the Sino-Indian maritime rivalry seems to be continuing.²⁵ Admittedly, if both sides can take appropriate measures, the security dilemma may also ease somewhat in the future.

Changes have also begun to appear in security dilemmas in many other areas, with varying directions and processes of change. Overall, the intensity of Sino-Indian dilemmas in non-traditional security areas is weaker than in traditional security areas, and it is also easier for the two countries to take some steps to alleviate the corresponding dilemmas in those areas. In addition, Sino-Indian dilemmas in some new areas, such as space security, are also still only at low-to-medium intensity. As Ajay Lele points out in his assessment of the Sino-Indian space security dilemma, both countries have invested in space over the past few decades for social, scientific, commercial, and military reasons. Both countries are pursuing programs such as navigation network development and missions to the Moon and Mars. But India and China’s space security dilemma is currently seen as suggestive rather than certain.²⁶ It is worth noting that although security dilemmas manifest themselves with varying intensity in different areas, they are in fact intertwined and influence each other. For example, the intensification of the Sino-Indian border security dilemma will, to a certain extent, trigger an intensification of the maritime security dilemma.

Finally, the security dilemma is characterized by asymmetry. This characteristic is manifested mainly in asymmetry in the threat perception intensity and sensitivity of the two sides to mutual threats within the same security dilemma. Overall, India’s perception of threats from China is stronger in intensity and sensitivity than China’s perception of threats from India. This asymmetry is reflected in the official reports and other documents published by the two sides involving their respective defense and national security strategies. Since 2000, the need to guard against threats from China has been clearly expressed in the annual reports of the Indian Ministry of Defense and in a number of official documents dealing with maritime military and maritime security strategy issues. For example, the Indian Defense Ministry’s 2008-2009 annual report suggests that China’s military modernization process must be “carefully monitored” because it involves India’s defense and security.²⁷ China’s defense white papers, however, rarely explicitly state the need to address India’s military threats. While the 2019 white paper China’s National Defense in the New Era mentioned that “China’s homeland security still faces threats and land border disputes have not yet been completely resolved,”²⁸ which addresses the Indian factor, the report did not explicitly discuss the Indian threat. The asymmetry is also reflected to some extent in relevant public opinion surveys. A 2016 Pew survey, for example, showed that 69 percent of Indian respondents believed that China’s growing military power posed a threat to India, with 46 percent of them considering it a serious threat.²⁹ In contrast, a recent Chinese domestic public opinion poll on India-China relations showed that only 30.9 percent of respondents agreed that India’s military power posed a threat to China, and nearly 60 percent disagreed.³⁰ Of course, this may be the overall security threat perceptions of the two sides and does not say much about the actual situation in specific areas. Nonetheless, studies reveal that an asymmetry in threat perceptions between India and China does indeed exist in various areas, although the asymmetric difference varies by area. In the border security area, for example, the asymmetric difference may be relatively small compared to those in the maritime security and nuclear security fields.

Moreover, asymmetric threat perceptions between India and China are plainly evident in many non-traditional security areas as well, including the water security area mentioned above. It is also worth noting that India’s sense of insecurity is currently stronger than China’s in terms of the false sense of incompatibility between the two countries’ security strategies that stems from economic competition. China’s “Belt and Road” initiative is seen by India as eroding its regional influence, while China’s cooperation with Indian Ocean littoral states on infrastructure construction is viewed by India as a “string of pearls” operation to contain India. Former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran has said, “I have no doubt that the biggest challenge to India comes from the rise of China. China will seek to reduce India’s strategic space by infiltrating India’s neighborhoods, and that is what we’re seeing with all of the subcontinent’s neighbors.”³¹ India has taken many initiatives in recent years to increase its regional influence, including upgrading its “eastward” policy to “eastward action,” participating in Iran’s Chabahar project to develop India’s Central Asian trade routes³², jointly sponsoring the “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC) with Japan, and attaching importance to cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region. China has also begun to pay attention to projects initiated by India and tends to believe that the joint initiatives by India and Japan (such as the India-Japan “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,” and the India-Japan-Australia “production chain alliance” idea in preparation recently) have some offsetting effect on China. Overall though, China’s threat perception and sensitivity toward India is lower than India’s threat perception toward China. China even calls for China and India to link up on relevant projects, and advocates “China-India plus” cooperation.

II. New Factors Affecting the Sino-Indian Security Dilemma

The root cause behind the formation of the Sino-Indian security dilemma was structural, namely, the anarchic state of the international community. As mentioned above, however, the security dilemma has not been constant in intensity over the course of development of Sino-Indian relations, and has shown a dynamic nature. The academic community does not have a uniform indicator of the variables that affect the intensity of security dilemmas. Some scholars have focused on five different variables: power (relative military capability), offensive-defensive balance, offensive-defensive distinction, the motivations of states themselves, and perceptions of the motivations of others.³³ The above variable factors have undoubtedly also had their effects on the changes in intensity seen in the Sino-Indian security dilemma since 2000, but they will not be detailed here. This study focuses on several new contributing factors, including external actors, i.e., third-party factors and new domestic factors.

First, there are factors involving external actors. As some scholars have mentioned, the influence of external actors on interstate relationships of trust is often overlooked in security dilemma theory. In fact, alliance and coalition relationships can play an important role in security dilemmas.³⁴ According to Barry Posen, support from allies or potential allies can significantly worsen security dilemmas or even trigger spirals.³⁵ Facts have also shown that China and India’s threat perceptions of each other are often linked to third-party factors. As the two countries’ interaction in regional and global security networks has grown, Sino-Indian relations have long gone beyond bilateral relations and are increasingly influenced by other actors, i.e., third-party factors. At present, the United States is undoubtedly the most important third-party factor influencing the Sino-Indian security relationship. Since 2000, the United States and India have taken a number of initiatives to improve bilateral relations, especially defense relations, including the signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement. The two sides are also reportedly on track to sign a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence (BECA). Although India has many interests to consider in developing relations with the United States and has not positioned itself as a U.S. ally, the many U.S. initiatives to use India to contain China, the continuously growing “quasi-allied” defense cooperation between India and the United States, and the increasing number of joint naval exercises, have indeed raised Chinese security concerns and increased China’s threat perception toward India. Similarly, U.S.-China interaction has also affected India’s security perceptions to some extent. China’s actions to increase its defense forces in response to U.S. threats have also proven to increase India’s insecurity to varying degrees, leading it to adopt countermeasures. This has been the case, for example, with the two countries’ interaction in the nuclear security area.

In addition to the U.S. factor, countries such as Japan and Australia are also becoming important third parties influencing Sino-Indian security interaction. It is worth noting that in South Asia, in addition to Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh are also beginning to become third-party factors influencing Sino-Indian relations. At present, third-party factors have rather complex effects on the interaction between the two countries, with both positive and negative aspects, but some such factors play a new role in promoting security dilemmas as well as influencing the intensity of security dilemmas. As some scholars have commented, the geopolitical game with third-party factors at its core is a serious disruption to the bilateral relationship. On one hand, any progress in the development of relations between India’s neighbors and China will irritate India’s geo-sensitive nerves to varying degrees. On the other hand, any moves by forces outside the region to draw India into containing China will also trigger China’s suspicions as to India’s “strategic autonomy.”³⁶ Indeed, given the current international security landscape, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, which is undergoing new adjustments and changes, as well as the instability of Sino-Indian relations, third-party factors may increase uncertainty in the bilateral relationship. This in turn raises the risk of misperceptions and miscalculations, thereby inducing new security dilemmas or contributing to the original security dilemma’s development in a serious direction.

Second, there are new domestic factors. Some new developments in current domestic politics in India and China are also emerging as new factors affecting the security dilemma. For example, while it is not yet possible to precisely assess the extent to which rising domestic nationalist sentiment in both countries is affecting the security dilemma, this kind of influence should be considered certain, especially in the area of border security interactions. For example, because reconciliation and concessions can easily be perceived as acts of weakness, both sides find it more difficult to initiate conciliatory concessions after a border crisis arises. Moreover, it seems that nationalist sentiments are now starting to spread to the economic sphere, which not only affects economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, but also may easily induce a false sense of incompatibility between the two sides in the security arena. India has recently taken security protection-oriented measures against relevant Chinese companies, including an announcement by India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology banning several Chinese apps on national security grounds. Although China has not introduced reciprocal countermeasures, and according to relevant research data, 46.1 percent of Chinese respondents support future cooperation between India and China in the economic sphere despite India’s unfriendly initiatives,³⁷ these measures have aroused varying degrees of concern and apprehension on the Chinese side. It is worth mentioning that economic and trade cooperation has been considered a stable cornerstone of Sino-Indian relations for many years, and although the scale of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries is not as large as that between China and the United States and Japan, both China and India are important emerging economies and are also thought to have broad prospects for cooperation. In fact, total bilateral trade between China and India is growing year by year. The total value of trade between China and India in 2019 was RMB 639.52 billion, up 1.6 percent year-on-year.³⁸ However, the competitive aspect of the current economic relationship between China and India is also increasingly prominent and has even been exaggerated. As some scholars have commented, there are increasing calls within India to catch up with and surpass China. This has led to fierce competition with China over economic growth rates, which is manifested in many areas such as international commodity markets, international investment markets, and international labor markets.³⁹ Indeed, studies have shown that competition in the economic sphere is liable to generate hostile projections of negative images of ethnic exclusivity, and creates a spiral of illusory incompatibility and imagined hostility based on the pursuit of prestige and honor.⁴⁰

In addition, the media, think tanks, and academic communities of both countries have also increased their focus on Sino-Indian relations in recent years. With the development of the internet and new media, moreover, these actors have more channels for influencing interactions between the two countries, including shaping security discourse and influencing public opinion. At present, the impact of these actors on the Sino-Indian security dilemma can be twofold. That is, they can play a positive role in alleviating the security dilemma, and can also become catalysts promoting it. What is of concern, however, is that the chances of the latter occurring have increased in recent years. Take the media, for example: Both Chinese and Indian media have increased their attention to many security issues, including border issues, but sometimes the impact of specific incidents and the resulting security threats are exaggerated due to fragmented interpretations and even disinformation and inaccurate reporting, which can easily induce a so-called “imaginary security dilemma” on both sides. Similarly, the think tank and academic communities in both countries can influence bilateral security interactions in their own unique ways. At present, there is no way to accurately assess the extent to which they have played a role in alleviating or promoting the security dilemma. However, the author’s review of Chinese and Indian statements on the Sino-Indian strategic relationship since 2000 reveals that while the diplomatic levels of both countries favor positive language to describe and build the bilateral relationship, at the strategic and academic levels, there has been an increase in the use of competitive and even confrontational terms in recent years in both Indian and Chinese statements. In Indian strategic circles in particular, the “Chinese security threat theory” has long existed, and has even become a rhetorical habit. This sort of rhetorical habit no doubt tends to make the other actor feel insecure and take measures to counter it, ultimately leading to a deterioration of its own security⁴¹, which may induce a security dilemma.

III. Future Ways Out of the Sino-Indian Security Dilemma

The security relationship between India and China has changed considerably since 2000, and many factors have affected this security relationship, including the “security dilemma.” Although security dilemmas do not necessarily generate conflict, and as Robert Jervis and other scholars have pointed out, they are not at the core of all conflicts, their negative impact on bilateral interaction is nonetheless clear. As of now, the Sino-Indian security dilemma remains at a low-to-moderate intensity in many areas and has not entered a serious spiral of hostility, but it still runs the risk of moving in a serious direction, especially over the border issue. If left unchecked and unmanaged, it could enter a hostile spiral scenario that could lead to tragic consequences. Both countries need to continue working hard on alleviating the security dilemma. In light of the new changes in the Sino-Indian security dilemma, both countries should contemplate and explore new ways and paths to alleviate the security dilemma.

The severity of the security dilemma can indeed be moderated by physical and material factors (e.g., technology, geography) and psychological and perceptual factors (e.g., misunderstandings),⁴² but alleviating the security dilemma is no easy task. In fact, China and India have taken a number of steps in the new century to try and mitigate the security dilemma, including through the signing of confidence-building measures and memoranda of understanding to reduce mutual tensions. China and India have also established many security interaction mechanisms of different forms and natures, ranging from comprehensive dialogue mechanisms, such as the defense consultation mechanism and the strategic dialogue mechanism, to mechanisms for addressing specific issues, such as the mechanism for meetings of special representatives on the Sino-Indian border issue, the working mechanism for consultation and coordination on border affairs, and the mechanism for joint counterterrorism exercises.⁴³ In addition, China and India have begun to actively use multilateral mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for bilateral interaction. Such security interaction mechanisms, especially the mechanism established after the Doklam crisis for informal meetings between the leaders of the two countries, have provided a dialogue platform for strategic communication between China and India, and have played a positive role in alleviating the security dilemma. Overall, however, although the relevant measures have achieved certain results, the existing measures are still insufficient for addressing the current new situation and new changes, and the two countries still need to explore new ways to deal with the security dilemma. For now, the two sides can consider focusing on the following areas:

First, actively exploring new paths and measures for mitigating the border security dilemma remains a priority. The standoff between the two sides in the western section of the Sino-Indian border has continued for several months since early May 2020. Although neither country wants the situation to get out of hand, the crisis occurred during the COVID-19 epidemic, which added new uncertainties to managing the crisis, including the psychology of fear brought about by the epidemic, the blockage of many regular communication channels, and the interference of third factors. The border crisis has also reignited nationalist sentiments in both countries, which is not only detrimental to the resolution of the current crisis but may even induce the security dilemma between the two sides to enter a serious spiral of hostility, increasing the risk that policymakers will misjudge the situation. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency to continue to strengthen border security dialogues, carry out new confidence-building measures, and improve crisis management. Considering the impact of the epidemic, both sides need to consider creating some new mechanisms for communication and dialogue, such as the Cloud Security Strategic Dialogue meetings. Moreover, these kinds of communication and dialogues should not be limited to the official level, but should also include Track 1.5 dialogues, as well as Track 2 exchanges such as academic community and think tank community exchanges. For example, the academic and think tank communities can conduct exchanges and dialogues on how the two sides should carry out new confidence-building measures, how to optimize crisis management, and other topics, and contribute new solutions.

Second, the two countries should attach importance to the current security dilemma’s new features, especially its spillover character, and to the security dilemmas that exist in other areas outside the border security field, and should pay attention to their new dynamics, especially in the case of the maritime security dilemma. Although at present the maritime security dilemma between the two countries does not appear to be of high intensity, there is still a risk that it will develop in a serious direction in the future as the modernization of their navies and the construction of their maritime forces continue to advance. Furthermore, in recent years, both countries have attempted to play the “leading role” in the field of maritime connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, and this great power competition over interests and prestige may further strengthen each other’s security strategy concerns. The two countries should strengthen their maritime security dialogue and try their best to avoid actions that over-irritate each other, especially on sensitive issues. Although the two countries have established a dialogue mechanism for maritime cooperation, at present it mostly involves diplomatic officials from the two sides, and in the future, it could be suggested that naval officers from both countries also participate in it. In addition, it is also very important for China and India to conduct more exchanges and dialogues in areas such as nuclear security, space security, and cybersecurity. Given the asymmetry in threat perception between the two sides in these areas, bilateral or multilateral exchanges and dialogues could allow each side to better understand the other’s security concerns and avoid unhealthy competition.

Third, both sides should pay a high level of attention to various new factors that induce security dilemmas, and be particularly vigilant against third-party interference factors. As of now, third-party involvement increases uncertainty in Sino-Indian relations and undermines the integrity of the information each side possesses, reducing the predictability of the bilateral relationship. In addition to promptly strengthening information exchanges and communication in order to reduce mutual misunderstanding and suspicion due to third-party factors, both sides need to guard against active third-party interference in their bilateral relations as much as possible. Both countries can also take appropriate measures to turn unfavorable factors into favorable ones, such as expanding more “China-India plus” cooperation. New domestic triggers likewise deserve the attention of both sides, especially the growing nationalist sentiment in their respective countries. In addition to assessing bilateral relations rationally, both sides should take a more tolerant view of the fact that the other side is rising, and refrain as much as possible from challenging each other’s strategic bottom lines and core security interests. Given that actors such as the media, think tanks, and academic communities have become important players influencing bilateral relations, it is important for both countries to continue to resume and promote relevant exchange programs, including media exchanges, think tank dialogues, and academic exchanges, so as to enhance mutual understanding. Although it would be difficult for these people-to-people exchange programs to achieve the goal of mitigating the security dilemma directly, they can play a positive role in dispelling negative emotions and easing the tense atmosphere in the bilateral relationship.

Fourth, it is also very important for the two countries to update their security concepts. That is, to abandon the old zero-sum game security concept as much as possible and embrace cooperative security concepts that place greater emphasis on mutual trust, mutual benefit, and equality. In fact, in addition to security dilemmas, the two countries also face many existential problems that plague not only individual countries but all of humanity, including ecological degradation, climate warming, water resource shortages, and epidemic diseases. For example, in the era of globalization, geographic borders between countries are ill-suited to completely stop the spread of viruses like COVID-19, H1N1, Ebola, and SARS. In the face of these challenges, if the traditional security perspective, or zero-sum game thinking, is still adopted to view and deal with problems, it will not only lead to the obstruction of relevant cooperation but may even lead to so-called non-traditional security dilemmas. Therefore, if both sides can update their concepts and use cooperative security concepts to manage and conduct security interaction between the two countries, it may be easier for both countries to extricate themselves from the current security dilemma and achieve the transformation of Sino-Indian security relations from the security dilemma mode to the cooperative security mode of interaction.

Conclusion

Although the “security dilemma” has had different manifestations at different stages in the Sino-Indian relationship, it has always accompanied the development of relations between the two countries, and its proper understanding and handling by both sides is directly related to the development of Sino-Indian relations. At present, the Sino-Indian security dilemma in the new era presents new features, including a spillover character, dynamic disequilibrium, and asymmetry. To some extent, the two countries are facing a compound security dilemma that has both traditional military security dilemmas and non-military, non-traditional security dilemmas. They face real security dilemmas and are also confined by imagined security dilemmas. The root cause behind the formation of the Sino-Indian security dilemma was structural, namely, the anarchic state of the international community. However, it has not been constant in intensity over the course of development in Sino-Indian relations and has shown dynamic variation under multiple influencing factors. Although there are no indicators at present to accurately estimate the severity of the security dilemma, the bilateral interaction process, and its results show that while the severity of the Sino-Indian security dilemma has not yet reached a high intensity in many areas, the border security dilemma is developing in a serious direction. Both countries need to pay attention to the new changes in the security dilemma and explore new ways to alleviate it, including actively alleviating the border security dilemma, such as by optimizing border crisis management, launching new confidence-building measures, and trying to create some cloud-based dialogue mechanisms suitable for the epidemic period. Both countries should also actively pay attention to the changes in the security dilemma in other security areas and rationally control the new contributing factors affecting the security dilemma, especially third-party factors. Currently, third-party factors are changing the equation of Sino-Indian interaction, and this will make it more difficult to alleviate the dilemma. Both sides need to make good use of positive factors and prevent negative ones. Finally, it is important for both sides to update their security concepts. If both sides can make greater use of cooperative security concepts to manage and conduct security interaction between the two countries, it may be easier for them to get out of the current security dilemma.