俄罗斯经济的政治社会根源及国家发展前景
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Political and Social Roots of the Russian Economy and Prospects for National Development

俄罗斯经济的政治社会根源及国家发展前景

An in-depth examination of Russian economic development since the collapse of the Soviet Union and an analysis of Russia’s future challenges.


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Putin has been in power in Russia for more than 20 years since 2000. During this period, apart from recovering its growth at a higher rate with the help of high oil prices before 2008, since 2009, the Russian economy has been hovering at a low rate of growth and even fell into recession several times. The economic miracle that Putin has repeatedly promised has failed to materialize, and Russia’s position in the world economic system continues to decline uncontrollably. Thus, an important question naturally arises for the researcher: What causes such a result? There are, of course, different dimensions when studying this issue, and the results may also be a matter of opinion. I will attempt to explore the influence of political system and social ecology on Russia’s economic development from the perspective of the reaction of the superstructure to the economic base.

自2000年以来,普京执掌俄罗斯政权已经20多年的时间。期间,除2008年之前借助高油价实现较高速度的恢复性增长外,俄罗斯经济在2009年之后始终低速徘徊甚至几度陷入衰退,普京多次允诺的经济奇迹未能实现,俄罗斯在世界经济体系中的地位难以遏制地持续下滑。于是,一个重要问题自然而然地出现在研究者面前:是什么原因导致了如此的结果?研究这一问题,当然有不同的维度,结果也可能是见仁见智。笔者试图从上层建筑对经济基础的反作用的角度来探讨政治制度和社会生态对俄罗斯经济发展绩效的影响。

1. Trajectory of Russian Economic Development

一、俄罗斯经济发展轨迹

According to the policy adjustment at the subjective level and the economic performance at the objective level, we can divide the Russian economic development over the past 20 years into four stages.

根据主观层面的政策调整和客观层面的经济绩效,我们可以把20多年来的俄罗斯经济发展划分为四个阶段。

The first phase, from 2000 to 2004, can be called the “reformist” period. During Putin’s first presidential term, the “Gref Program” was formulated and implemented, which the government adopted in 2000 as The Socioeconomic Development Strategy for the Russian Federation until 2010. During this period, the government advanced taxation, progressive pension and civil service reforms, passed the Land Law, vigorously removed administrative barriers to starting a business, and accelerated negotiations for Russia’s accession to the WTO. With these reforms, Russia’s economic growth accelerated, foreign investment inflows increased, and the ruble began to strengthen.

第一阶段是2000年至2004年,可以称为“改良主义”时期。在普京的第一个总统任期内,制定并开始实施“格列夫计划”,也就是政府于2000年通过的《2010年前俄罗斯联邦社会经济发展战略》。在此期间,政府推进了税收、累进养老金和公务员制度改革,通过了《土地法》,大力削除开办企业的行政障碍,俄罗斯加入世贸组织的谈判提速。借助这些改革措施,俄罗斯经济增长提速、外国投资流入、卢布开始走强。

The second phase was from 2004 to the first half of 2008, running through Putin’s second term as president. This stage can be called the “state capitalism” stage, and its most prominent feature was large-scale re-nationalization. Marked by the “Yukos Incident,” the Russian government tried to lead the economic revival by building a large state-owned enterprise behemoth. During this period, most reforms ceased, and major reforms continued only in the macroeconomic and financial spheres. The first phase of reforms, however, undoubtedly brought tangible results: The national debt was almost fully paid off, and a stabilization fund and a key element of a competitive banking system, the deposit insurance system, were established. Falling inflation and the introduction of deposit insurance have created new opportunities for the development of the financial sector and increased corporate and consumer lending. Macroeconomic stability and investment rating upgrades have contributed to a sharp increase in foreign investment. During Putin’s first two presidencies, the economy grew at an average annual rate of about 7 percent. In the decade from 1999 to 2008, Russia’s economy nearly doubled (GDP growth in dollar terms was higher, from $210 billion in 1999 to $1.8 trillion in 2008, a 7.5-fold increase, due to rising oil prices and foreign investment inflows that led to a substantial strengthening of the ruble). This was the most glorious decade in Russia’s modern economic history, with economic growth comparable to the economic recovery during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period and higher than the average annual growth rate of 5% during the Soviet Union’s industrialization under Stalin. Of course, in addition to the follow-up effects of the first-stage reforms, the sharp rise in international oil prices has become an important external factor for the relatively high-speed growth of the Russian economy in this decade. From 1998 to 2008, the average international oil price rose from US$13 per barrel to US$97, an increase of almost 6.5 times. Therefore, some Russian economists believe that high oil prices contributed to 30-50% of the economic growth under Putin’s first two presidential terms.

第二阶段是2004年至2008年上半年,贯穿普京的第二个总统任期。这一阶段可以称为“国家资本主义”阶段,其最突出特征是大规模的重新国有化。以“尤科斯事件”为标志,俄罗斯联邦政府试图以建立大型国有企业航母来引领经济振兴。这一时期,大部分改革都停止了,重大改革只在宏观经济和金融领域继续进行。但第一阶段的改革无疑带来了实实在在的成果:国家债务几乎全部还清,稳定基金和竞争性银行体系的关键要素——存款保险体系得以建立。通胀下降和存款保险的引入,为金融业的发展、企业和消费贷款的增加创造了新的机遇。宏观经济稳定和投资评级提升促使外国投资急剧增加。在普京的前两个总统任期,经济年均增长率约为7%。从1999年到2008的十年间,俄罗斯经济总量几乎翻了一番(由于油价上涨和外国投资流入导致卢布大幅走强,以美元计算的GDP增幅更高,从1999年的2100亿美元增至2008年的1.8万亿美元,增长7.5倍)。这是俄罗斯现代经济史上最辉煌的十年,经济增速堪比新经济政策时期的经济复苏,高于斯大林治下苏联工业化期间年均5%的增长率。当然,除了第一阶段改革的后续效应之外,国际油价的急剧上涨成为这十年俄罗斯经济较高速增长的重要外部因素。从1998年到2008年,国际石油均价从每桶13美元涨到了97美元,几乎上涨了6.5倍。因此有俄罗斯经济学家认为,油价高企对普京前两个总统任期经济增长的贡献率达到了1/3到一半。

The third stage is from the second half of 2008 to 2013, which covers the global economic crisis and Russia’s economic recovery. In fact, the high-speed growth of the Russian economy all but ended in 2008. Although the government formulated The Concept for Long-term Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation 2020 in 2008 and put forward the development ideas of integrating into the global economic system, increasing investment in human resources, and realizing innovative development, however, with the advent of the global financial crisis, the plans proposed by the development concept have come to naught, and no substantial reforms have actually taken place. In the decade after the crisis (2010-2019), the Russian economy grew at an average annual rate of less than 2%. In January 2011, Putin instructed the HSE University and the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics to organize a large number of experts to formulate a new Strategy 2020. To this end, 21 working groups were set up to reformulate a comprehensive reform plan. The main goal of Strategy 2020 was to try to remove barriers to investment in business and human resources and create a “new model of economic growth.” At the same time, in order to participate in the 2012 presidential election, another plan for the development of Russia was released in 2012 and became Putin’s election platform. Its economic section was published in January 30, 2012 issue of Sputnik under the title We Need a New Economy. On May 7, 2012, after being re-elected as president, Putin signed the 12-item May Decree, one of which was a decree on the country’s long-term economic policy. He proposed to promote a fundamental improvement in the investment climate, reduce excessive state intervention in economic life, and predicted that this would increase labor productivity by half within seven years and increase investment to 27% of GDP. In reality, however, the promised reforms have not been implemented and the expected economic outcomes have not been realized. After a brief recovery after the 2010-2011 crisis, economic growth began to decline rapidly again.

第三个阶段是2008年下半年至2013年,这是遭遇全球经济危机和实现经济复苏的阶段。实际上,俄罗斯经济的较高速增长在2008年就已经基本结束。尽管政府在2008年就制定了《2020年前俄罗斯联邦社会经济长期发展构想》,提出了融入全球经济体系、加大人力资源投资和实现创新发展的发展思路,然而随着全球金融危机的到来,发展构想所提出的计划化为泡影,实际上没有进行任何实质性的改革。在危机后的十年(2010~2019年),俄罗斯经济年均增长率不到2%。2011年1月,普京指示高等经济大学和普列汉诺夫国民经济学院组织大批专家制定新的“2020年战略”。为此成立了21个工作组,重新制定了全面的改革计划。“2020年战略”的主要目标是试图消除商业和人力资源投资的障碍,打造“经济增长新模式”。与此同时,为参加2012年总统大选,有关俄罗斯发展的另一个计划也在2012年出炉并成为了普京的竞选纲领,其经济部分以《我们需要一个新经济》为题发表在2012年 1月30日的《导报》上。2012年5月7日,普京在重新当选总统后签署了包括12项内容的“五月法令”,其中一项就是关于国家长期经济政策的法令。他提出要促进投资环境的根本改善、减少国家对于经济生活的过度干预,并预言这将使劳动生产率在七年内提高一半,投资增加到GDP的27%。但实际上,承诺的改革并未落实,预期的经济成果也没有实现。在经历了2010年至2011年危机后的短暂复苏之后,经济增速又开始迅速下降。

The fourth phase, from 2014 to the present, is the period in which Russia has become increasingly isolated and stagnant from the global economy in the wake of the Crimea crisis. In fact, the Russian economy was weak in 2013, when the economic growth rate was only 1.8%. The subsequent drop in oil prices, the Crimean crisis, Western sanctions, and the COVID-19 pandemic have hit the Russian economy hard, with an average annual growth rate of only 0.35% from 2014 to 2020. Russia’s GDP in dollar terms remained at 2008 levels, and its share of the world economy fell from 3% in 2008 to 2% in 2018. Investment did not grow to 27% of GDP, but stayed at 20-22%. Foreign investment declined and capital outflows accelerated, totaling US$320 billion from 2014 to 2018.

第四个阶段是从2014年至今,这是在克里米亚危机之后俄罗斯与全球经济日益隔绝和陷入停滞的阶段。实际上,俄罗斯经济在2013年就呈现疲态,当年经济增速只有1.8%。随后接连出现的油价下跌、克里米亚危机、西方制裁以及新冠疫情,使俄罗斯经济遭受重创,2014年至2020年的年均增速只有0.35%。以美元计算的俄罗斯GDP保持在2008年的水平,在世界经济总量中的占比从2008年的3%降至2018年的2%。投资没有增长到GDP的27%,而是保持在20-22%的水平。外商投资下降、资本加速外流,2014年至2018年,资本外流总数达3200亿美元。

2. Sociopolitical Roots of Economic Downturn

二、经济不振的政治与社会根源

There are undoubtedly many reasons why the growth of the Russian economy has grown from a relatively high speed to a sustained low level, such that it even fell into recession several times in the past 20 years. External factors such as falling oil prices and Western sanctions have indeed limited Russia’s economic development to a certain extent, the most fundamental reason, however, is that the political system, political culture, method of governance, social ecology, and other superstructure factors have made the endogenous power of economic development insufficient.

导致20多年间俄罗斯经济从较高速增长到持续低位运行甚至几度陷入衰退的原因无疑是多方面的,油价下行、西方制裁等外部因素确实在一定程度上限制了俄罗斯经济发展,但最根本的原因还是政治制度、政治文化、治理方式、社会生态等上层建筑因素使经济发展的内生动力不足。

Beginning with the Yukos incident in 2003, the previous institutional environment, which was based on a socialist market economy and the reduction of state intervention, gradually changed and gave way to a new political and economic system centered on political authoritarianism and state capitalism. The increasing vertical power system constantly changes the political atmosphere and social ecology in Russia and has had a significant negative impact on economic development.

以2003年尤科斯事件为肇始,之前以社会市场经济、国家减少干预为要旨的制度环境就逐渐改变,并让位于以政治威权主义和国家资本主义为核心的新政治经济体系。垂直权力体系的日益强化不断改变着俄罗斯国内的政治氛围和社会生态,并对经济发展构成了重大负面影响。

Under the new political and economic system, the state’s intervention in all processes of the political, social, and economic system has increased substantially. Since 2003, government intervention has continued to increase in almost all major macro- and micro-economic links such as investment, pricing, profit distribution, rates of return, imports and exports, procurement and sales, and regulations and policies on taxation, tariffs, and finances. Similarly, adjustments have increasingly restricted business operations. Although the government has not yet controlled all economic resources and has not implemented comprehensive control over the economy, the market allocation of resources and the space for business entities to operate independently have been greatly compressed, making it difficult for business entities to operate fully and freely such that economic efficiency is becoming increasingly low. If the nature and speed of the expansion of administrative regulation remain unchanged, the market space may be further compressed in the next few years which may eventually lead to a full-blown conflict between the market and regulation. Russian economist Sergei Guriyev believes that “the political system of excessive state interference in all areas of social life limits economic growth” and that this “super-centralized management system is not suitable for managing a country as large as Russia.” Another Russian scholar Nikita Maslennikov also stressed that “the fundamental reason why economic problems have not been resolved for many years is excessive power. It is simply impossible to achieve rapid economic development within the existing institutional framework. Furthermore, a future transition of power could have a disproportionate impact on the political and even the economic system.”

在新的政治经济体系下,国家对政治、社会和经济体系所有过程的干预大幅提升。自2003年以来,在投资、价格、利润分配、回报率、进出口、采购和销售等几乎所有主要宏观和微观经济环节,政府干预都在持续增强,税收、关税、财政等方面的法规和政策调整对企业经营的束缚日益增多。尽管政府还没有掌控所有经济资源,尚未对经济实行全面管制,但市场配置资源和企业主体自主经营的空间已经受到了很大程度的压缩,导致经营主体难以充分自由运转、经济效率日趋低下。如果行政监管扩张的性质和速度保持不变,未来几年市场空间可能进一步压缩,并最终导致市场与监管之间的矛盾全面爆发。俄罗斯经济学家谢尔盖·古里耶夫认为,“国家对社会生活各领域过度干预的政治体制限制了经济增长”,而这种“超级集中的管理系统并不适合管理像俄罗斯这样庞大的国家。”另一位俄罗斯学者尼基塔·马斯连尼科夫也强调,“经济问题持续多年得不到解决的根本原因是权力的过于强大,在现有制度框架内实现经济的快速发展是根本不可能的。而未来的权力交接过程可能会对政治乃至经济体系造成过于严重的冲击。”

No political or economic model operates in a vacuum, and the human factor is crucial in real politics. This is especially true in terms of the behavior of power elites which, to a large extent, affects the investment environment, social ecology, human resources, and even changes in popular sentiment. Since 2003, the re-nationalization of Russia has been accompanied by a new round of distribution of interests and power struggles (such as the Ulyukayev incident). During the process of re-nationalization, many senior government officials served as the chairmen of the boards of directors or the boards of supervisors of large state-owned enterprises, while their relatives, friends, and former students seized favorable positions in these state-owned enterprises and enjoyed the dividends of state-owned assets.

任何类型的政治经济模式都不是在真空中运行,人的因素在现实政治中至关重要,特别是权力精英的行为在很大程度上影响着投资环境、社会生态、人力资源甚至民众情绪的变化。自2003年以来,与俄罗斯重新国有化相伴随的,是新的一轮利益分配和权力争斗(如乌柳卡耶夫案)。在重新国有化的过程中,不少政府高官出任大型国有企业董事会主席或监事会主席,而其亲朋好友、门生故旧则纷纷在这些国有企业中抢占有利位置、坐享国资红利。

Compared with S&T progress, innovative development, and optimization of human resources, these people were more concerned with how to divide up natural monopolies and financial resources, leading to the overall low efficiency of state-owned enterprises. State-owned enterprises have occupied market resources and are protected by the government, resulting in a long-term business environment that is not conducive to the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises. More importantly, re-nationalization has led to a loss of confidence among domestic and foreign investors in the willingness and ability of the Russian government to protect reliable private property rights, leading to a long-term large-scale outflow of capital that remains difficult to effectively contain.

相较于科技进步、创新发展、人力资源的优化,这些人更关注如何瓜分自然垄断资源和财政资源,这导致国有企业总体而言效率低下。而国有企业占据市场资源、备受政府保护,让中小企业长期难有良好的营商环境。更为重要的是,重新国有化导致国内外投资者对俄罗斯政府是否有意愿、有能力保护可靠的私有产权丧失信心,进而引发资金长期大规模外流并始终难以得到有效遏制。

After mastering the power to manipulate economic resources, Russian political elites have lacked clear strategic planning and practical actions on how to achieve long-term economic development and deal with the increasingly fierce economic competition between major powers. Despite the increasing concentration of political power in Russia in 2003, electoral politics was still ostensibly practiced. On the one hand, to maintain power stability and even govern over the long term while also gaining the support of voters, under the pressure of the inherent tension of such a goal, buying the votes of the people by providing basic living stability and social welfare has become the basic logic of Russia’s political and economic life. In this context, maintaining macroeconomic stability and controlling inflation have become the core issues of the government’s economic policy. The stability fund and national welfare fund established with petrodollars earned when oil prices are high have become important “airbags” but have not been effectively invested in the strategic development of the economy. Much of the money the Russian banking system has drawn from the oil and gas industry over the past 20 years has ended up in international speculative business rather than domestic real-economy investment. In this regard, Glazyev, the former economic adviser to the Russian president, believes that the main reason for recession in the countries is because, for many years, senior economic officials such as Kudrin, Gref, and Nabiullina have adhered to the Chicago School of monetary policy, restricting the monetary supply to reduce the rate of inflation. Vladimir Kimperson believes that the key to Russia’s economic recession is the gap and contradiction between the current government’s conservative policies and the long-term modernization trends of technology, education, and culture. According to a September 2021 study by the Carnegie Center in Moscow, the authors of the study confirmed in multiple conversations with people who understand the logic of high-level thinking in power that the principle of survival for those in power is “as long as there is enough oil and gas to generate revenue for the federal budget in our years in power, it is enough for us to use budget spending to buy voter loyalty and suppress civil society and media opinion. After that (2036), what happens happens.” It can be said that under the current institutional environment, quite a few Russian power elites are short-sighted and indifferent to the long-term strategic risks facing the country, not only fundamentally rejecting modernization efforts but also losing pragmatic strategic thinking. Many of them are satisfied with the existing management model, are accustomed to living in a comfortable “small world,” ignore the rapid changes in the external environment and unprecedented new challenges, and are increasingly reluctant to listen to the opinions of experts. Not only that, but policymakers are quite conceited that the economic policies they make are ideal. Instead of thinking about economic development in a holistic and systematic way, they self-righteously divide the economy into different parts such as exports, state-owned economy, and social consumption and have even deceived themselves into believe that “everything is fine.” Under the situation of the bureaucratic system, society and the people have lost their political and economic autonomy. They are like diners at a restaurant who can only eat what the chef enjoys because the chef knows better than the diners what he likes to eat best.

在掌握对经济资源的操控权力之后,俄罗斯政治精英对如何实现经济的长远发展、应对日益激烈的大国经济竞争缺乏明确的战略规划与切实行动。尽管2003年俄罗斯政治权力日益集中,但表面上仍实行的是选举政治。一方面要维系权力稳定甚至长期执政,另一方面又要获取选民的支持,在此种存在内在张力的目标的压力下,用基本的生活保障、社会福利购买民众手里的选票就成了俄罗斯政治经济生活的一个基本逻辑。在此背景下,保持宏观经济稳定、控制通胀就成为政府经济政策关心的核心议题,而用油价高企时赚取的石油美元建立的稳定基金和国家福利基金成为重要的“安全气囊”,并未对经济的战略性发展进行有效投资。俄罗斯银行系统在过去20年中从石油和天然气行业汲取的大量资金,最终却流向国际投机性业务,而非用于国内实体经济投资。俄罗斯总统原经济顾问格拉济耶夫就此认为,多年以来,库德林、格列夫、纳比乌琳纳等经济高官固守“芝加哥学派”的货币主义,限制货币供应以减少通胀率,成为导致国家衰退的重要原因之一。弗拉基米尔·金佩尔森则认为,导致俄罗斯经济衰退的关键是当前政府的保守政策与技术、教育、文化长期现代化趋势之间的差距和矛盾。莫斯科卡内基中心2021年9月发布的研究报告称,报告作者在与了解权力高层思维逻辑的人士进行的多次对话中证实,当权者的生存原则是“只要在我们执政的年代有足够的石油和天然气为联邦预算获取收入,并以预算支出来购买选民的忠诚度、压制民间社会和媒体舆论就足够了。在那之后(2036年),哪管洪水滔天。”可以说,在当前的体制环境之下,相当一部分俄罗斯权力精英目光短浅,他们对国家面临的长期战略风险漠不关心,不仅从根本上拒绝现代化努力,而且还丧失了务实的战略思维。他们中的很多人对现有的管理模式感到满意、习惯于在自以为舒适的“小天地”里生存,漠视外部环境的快速变化和前所未有的新挑战,而且越来越听不进专家的意见。不仅如此,决策者们还相当自负,他们认为自己制订的经济政策是理想的。他们不是以整体性和系统性思维来考虑经济发展,而是自以为是地把经济分割成出口、国有经济、社会消费等不同部分,甚至自欺欺人地认为“一切都还不错”。在官僚体制坐大的情况之下,社会和民众已经失去了政治经济自主性,他们似乎是餐厅里没有选择权的消费者,厨师做什么就得吃什么,似乎厨师比客人更了解自己的口味。

Guided by this way of thinking, the power class is more concerned with “dividing the pie” rather than “making it bigger.” As the economist Andrei Movchan said, Russia as a social system does not create value, but extracts value by exporting raw materials and distributes that value domestically. Compared with the diversified economic development premised on competition, this distribution of benefits is easily in the hands of the ruling class, who benefit more in the process. This also leads to a situation wherein “preserving control over the value distribution process presupposes the suppression of independent value-forming centers, resulting in suppression of both entrepreneurial processes and also diversified economic growth.”

在这种思维方式的指导下,权力阶层更多地关注的是“瓜分蛋糕”而不是“做大蛋糕”。正如经济学家安德烈·莫夫昌所说,俄罗斯作为一个社会体系并不创造价值,而是以出口原材料的方式提取价值并在国内分配。相较于以竞争为前提的多元化经济发展,这种利益分配很容易掌握在统治集团手中,他们在这一过程中获益更多。这也导致“保护对价值分配过程的控制以压制独立的价值形成中心为前提,其结果就是压制创业过程和多元化的经济增长。”

This analysis reveals, from another perspective, the political and social roots of the “raw materialization” of Russia’s economic structure, which has long been difficult to reverse.

这一分析,从另外一个侧面揭示了俄罗斯经济结构“原材料化”长期难以扭转的政治社会根源。

Although the vast majority of the profits from resource exports are obtained by the powerful, because they can still receive a share of the profits for the time being and given their fear of being repressed for showing dissatisfaction, thus angering the powerful, the vast majority of Russians choose to accept their fate. The top power core is also staunchly opposed to any change, content with maintaining stability “in the Kremlin way,” attempting to meet challenges by increasing the rigidity of the system.

尽管资源出口所获利润的绝大部分被权力阶层所获取,但由于暂时还可以从中分得一杯羹,再加上对因表现出不满、激怒权力阶层进而遭受压制的恐惧,绝大多数俄罗斯民众选择了得过且过的态度。最高权力核心也坚决反对任何改变,满足于“以克里姆林宫的方式”保持稳定,试图通过增加系统的刚性来应对挑战。

Proponents of vertical power systems argue that concentration of power increases decision-making efficiency. However, more than 20 years of Russian political and economic practice have shown that because the centralization of managers conflicts with the objective trends of social development, the result of the increasingly intensified vertical power system is low administrative efficiency. There is a negative correlation between power concentration and management ability. The concentration of power and resources often causes the internal power of the market to stall, officials in power are unwilling or do not know how to take responsibility, and more and more minority interests are ignored.

垂直权力体系的支持者认为,权力集中会提高决策效率。但20多年的俄罗斯政治经济实践表明,由于管理者的集权化与社会发展的客观趋势相冲突,因而日益强化的垂直权力体系导致的结果是管理效率低下。权力集中与管理能力是负相关关系,权力和资源的集中带来的往往是市场内在动力熄火、是手握大权的官员不愿或不知如何承担责任、是越来越多的少数群体利益被忽视。

In the process of modern economic decision-making, structural policies should be the result of communication and continuous dialog between economic decision-makers and multiple participants in the economic system. However, the growing expansion of Russia’s vertical power system for more than 20 years has disrupted the channels of information exchange between the state and society. Obligations to superiors lead to the lack of a normal and timely information feedback loop in the decision-making process, and authorities at all levels are reluctant to understand the real situation and listen to expert opinions. When officials do their best to avoid angering their superiors, the phenomenon of “reporting good news but not bad news” becomes increasingly common. This completely distorts the normal decision-making process of making real and sober analysis, forecasts, and plans based on comprehensive, objective, and accurate data and assessments. Lack of feedback and communication, including with professionals, hinders sound economic policy development. In the officialdom culture where everyone is at risk, “inaction” has become the consensus of officials at all levels, and even the high-level political elites at the core of power are afraid to lose their official positions and thus stay silent, never daring to discuss issues openly. This phenomenon is very similar to what happened at the end of Brezhnev’s reign. In addition, the authorities widely use modern information technologies such as big data, video surveillance, and facial recognition to collect data and information on ordinary citizens, suppress social dissent, and prevent public protests. Instead of being a tool to help governments and society communicate with each other, new technologies are doing the opposite. Since the existing public administration mechanism operates on the will of the top power elites rather than on social feedback, it does not introduce modern technological solutions for the benefit of the masses, nor does it provide timely corrections to those distorted information used in decision-making.

在现代经济决策过程中,结构性政策应当是经济决策者与经济体系的多元参与主体之间沟通和持续对话的结果。然而,20多年来俄罗斯垂直权力体系的日益膨胀破坏了国家与社会之间的信息交流渠道。对上级的惟命是从导致决策过程缺乏正常、及时的信息反馈机制,各级权力机关都不愿意了解真实情况和听取专家意见,官员们都竭力避免触怒自己的上级,“报喜不报忧”的现象日益普遍。这让在全面、客观、准确的数据和评估基础上做出真实而清醒分析、预测和预案的正常决策程序被完全扭曲。缺乏反馈和沟通,包括与专业人士的沟通,阻碍了经济政策的合理制定。在人人自危的官场文化下,“不作为”成为各级官员的共识,甚至处于权力核心的高层政治精英也都因害怕失去官职而噤若寒蝉,不敢公开谈论问题。这种现象非常类似勃列日涅夫执政末期的情形。此外,当局广泛采用大数据、视频监控、人脸识别等现代信息技术收集普通公民的数据和信息,压制社会异见、阻止公众抗议。新技术不仅没有成为帮助政府与社会相互沟通的工具,反而起的是相反的作用。由于现有公共行政机制运行取决于权力高层的意志而不依赖于社会的反馈,因此它不会为了大多数人的利益而引入现代技术解决方案,也不会对那些扭曲的决策提供及时的修正信息。

Russian academics drawn different interpretations of the reasons for the erosion of the feedback loop in the decision-making process. Sergei Guriev emphasized that “deliberately destroying the feedback system is an active strategy of the authorities, because from the point of view of developing alternatives, the risks involved in the feedback system outweigh the benefits of receiving the feedback for the Russian authorities.” In his view, “Russian authorities are fully aware of all the risks that exist, but their interests are different from those of ordinary citizens, whose interests are contrary to the interests of the country’s development. Their goal is to retain power and be completely content with the status quo. In this sense, it should come as no surprise that their actions are aimed at strengthening repressive institutions, increasing scrutiny, investing in propaganda rather than human resources, and using foreign policy for internal purposes.” Mikhail Krutikhin’s view was relatively moderate, arguing that “it is impossible for the authorities to be unaware of the challenges. Th power elites are more like temporary workers, without a real long-term plan or strategic vision. What they are concerned with is how to allocate and monetize administrative resources.” Another risk, noted by Mikhail Dmitriev, is that “populism among the population may increase under the influence of a crisis, while development needs weaken. This will become an obstacle to the democratization of the political system and will limit the possibility of implementing economic policies aimed at development.”

对于决策过程中反馈机制遭到侵蚀的原因,俄罗斯学界有着不同的解读。谢尔盖·古里耶夫强调,“故意破坏反馈系统是当局的主动策略,因为从发展替代的角度来看,反馈系统包含的风险对俄罗斯当局来说大于收到反馈的好处。”在他看来,“俄罗斯当局完全了解存在的所有风险,但他们的利益不同于普通公民的利益,他们的利益与国家发展的利益相悖。他们的目标就是保住手里的权力,完全满足于现状。从这个意义上说,他们的行动旨在加强镇压机构、加强审查、投资于宣传而非人力资源以及将外交政策用于内部目的,这一点不应令人感到惊讶。”米哈伊尔·克鲁季欣的观点相对温和,他认为“当局不可能没有意识到挑战,但权力精英更像临时工,没有真正的长期计划和战略视野,他们所关注的是如何将行政资源货币化。”米哈伊尔·德米特里耶夫还指出了另外一种风险,那就是“在危机影响下民众中的民粹主义可能增加,同时发展需求减弱。这将成为政治制度民主化的障碍,并限制实施旨在发展的经济政策的可能性。”

Under the existing profit distribution pattern, the energy and military industries are not only important pillars of support for national fiscal revenue but are also core areas for attracting investment. Yet it is precisely the priority of these two industries that perpetuates the deformed structure of the Russian economy, leaving Russia behind in the pace of the new energy revolution and the fourth industrial revolution. As Mikhail Dmitriev put it, “adaptation to the conditions of the global energy transition is hampered by powerful interest groups representing the traditional energy and raw materials sectors, as well as by the increased operating risks of large and medium-sized companies. This will inhibit innovation and the development of new markets in non-resource sectors that need to grow faster to compensate for losses in traditional sectors of the Russian economy.”

在既有的利益分配格局下,能源与军工两个行业既是支撑国家财政收入的重要支柱,也是吸引投资的核心领域。但恰恰是这两个行业的优先地位延续了俄罗斯经济的畸形结构,使俄罗斯落伍于新能源革命和第四次工业革命的步伐。正如米哈伊尔·德米特里耶夫所言,“对全球能源转型条件的适应受到了代表传统能源和原材料部门的强大利益集团的限制,也受到大中型公司经营风险增加的阻碍。这将抑制非资源部门的创新和新市场的开发,而这些部门需要加速增长才能弥补俄罗斯经济中传统部门的损失。”

More importantly, with the advancement of the global decarbonization process, the Russian energy industry will face increasingly severe medium and long-term challenges, which will put enormous pressure on national finances. Russian economic experts predict that even a modest global energy transition and decarbonization scenario will bring growing losses to the Russian economy over the next decade. With the implementation of the EU carbon tax, Russian exporters are losing at least $300 million to $5 billion a year. As the most important fossil energy consumption market shrinks, the Russian energy industry will lose its previous active position. By 2040, the reduction in demand for fossil fuels could cause serious problems for Russian state revenues, and tax incentives to stimulate oil and gas production and exports will not help. What follows will be a deterioration of the state’s fiscal position, and the problem of heavy domestic and foreign debt burdens of the 1990s will inevitably re-emerge.

更为重要的是,随着全球脱碳进程的推进,俄罗斯能源行业将面临日益严峻的中长期挑战,并对国家财政构成巨大压力。俄罗斯经济专家预计,即使按照温和的全球能源转型和脱碳方案,也将给俄罗斯经济在未来十年带来不断增长的损失。随着欧盟碳税的施行,俄罗斯出口商每年至少损失3亿-50亿美元。而由于最重要的化石能源消费市场收缩,俄罗斯能源行业将失去之前的主动地位。到2040年,对化石能源需求的减少可能会给俄罗斯国家收入带来严重问题,通过税收激励刺激油气生产和出口的办法也于事无补。随之而来的,将是国家财政状态的恶化,20世纪90年代的内外债务负担沉重的问题将不可避免地重新出现。

Many experts believe that Russia’s technological backwardness is closely linked to a political system that is immune to innovation and prone to self-isolation. Mikhail Krutikhin believes that “the technological backwardness of protection under the conditions of parasitic natural resources will lead to Russia’s separation from the world economic system by the middle of the 21st century, and the population and economic situation will seriously deteriorate.” Oleg Yolkin emphasized that technological backwardness will also lead to difficulties in maintaining the balance of forces and the development of new weapons, estimating that after 15-20 years, Russia’s possibility of maintaining military-technical autonomy will be limited. “There is a threat of disruption of the military-technical balance between Russia and the United States and even China,” he said, because “the global trend in modern conditions is that the development of weapons is achieved by the transfer of technology from the civilian industry to the defense industry, not from the military to civilian industry as it was decades ago.”

众多专家认为,俄罗斯的技术落后与政治体制关联密切,后者不受创新的影响,而且容易自我孤立。米哈伊尔·克鲁蒂欣认为,“在寄生于自然资源的条件下保护技术落后,将导致俄罗斯到21世纪中叶时脱离世界经济体系、人口和经济状况严重恶化。”奥列格·维尤金强调技术落后也将导致在保持军力平衡和新武器研发方面遭遇困难,他估计,在15年-20年之后,俄罗斯维持军事技术自主的可能性就将受到限制,“俄罗斯同美国甚至中国之间的军事技术平衡存在被破坏的威胁”,因为“现代条件下的全球性趋势在于,武器的发展是通过从民用工业到国防工业的技术转移来实现的,而不是像几十年前那样从军用到民用。”

Some Russian scholars believe that the political line of the existing regime tends to be conservative, which runs counter to the objective trend of global modernization and itself will inhibit development. In addition, it distorts the understanding of domestic and foreign affairs, triggering false or irrational responses to world trends. An important manifestation is the radicalization of Russia’s foreign policy after 2007, which was caused by various factors. In particular, the two wars against Georgia and Ukraine have caused a large-scale deterioration of Russia’s external environment. After the 1998 financial crisis and the 2008 international financial crisis, Russia also ushered in a “sanctions crisis.” In the foreseeable future, in order to boost the presidential election in 2024 and 2030, Russia may make major moves on the issues of the Russia-Belarus Union and Ukraine, so it is difficult to significantly alleviate this sanctions crisis. The closed investment, idea, and technology climate combined with tensions with the United States and the European Union have place Russia in a state of “self-isolation.” Furthermore, self-isolation exacerbates the already existing economic lag – without engaging in international cooperation, without access to advanced ideas and technologies, and without access to the experience and capital of developed countries, Russia is doomed to remain behind. Thus, a vicious cycle ensues — as the economy deteriorates, sanctions restrictions grow, and the threat of inflation returns.

有俄罗斯学者认为,现有政权的政治路线是倾向于保守的,与客观的全球现代化趋势背道而驰,它本身就会抑制发展。此外,它也扭曲了对国内外事务的理解,引发对世界发展趋势的错误或非理性反应。一个重要的表现是多种因素所催生的俄罗斯对外政策在2007年之后的激进化。特别是对格鲁吉亚和乌克兰的两场战争,导致俄罗斯外部环境大面积恶化。在1998年金融危机、2008年国际金融危机之后,俄罗斯不得不迎来“制裁危机”。而在可预见的未来,为抬升2024年和2030年的总统选情,俄罗斯有可能在俄白联盟国家、乌克兰问题上有重大动作,因此这种制裁危机也难以明显缓解。在投资环境和新的思想、技术方面的封闭加之与美国和欧盟的紧张关系,使俄罗斯陷入了某种“自我隔离”的处境。而自我隔离加剧了已经存在的经济滞后——如果不参与国际合作,就无法获得先进的思想和技术、无法获得发达国家的经验和资本,俄罗斯就注定要保持落后。而恶性循环也随之而来——随着经济形势恶化,制裁限制的影响越来越大,通胀威胁卷土重来。

In the social sector, weak economic growth since the 2010s, stagnant real disposable income, and low-skilled jobs have worsened the quality of human resources. In turn, low-quality human resources limit opportunities for economic development and increased labor productivity. In the next 10 to 15 years, the human resource crisis will become a major constraint on the development of Russia. Today, the phenomenon of Russians preferring secondary vocational education to higher education has emerged on a large scale due to low household income and the desire to earn money as soon as possible, which has alarmed and worried many experts. Evgeny Gontmakher called the challenge “a challenge that touches every aspect of Russian life and will lead to the degradation of all institutions, including the state.” Sergei Guriev said with concern, “The important competitive advantages that Russia once had — the education system, the respect for human resources — are constantly being undermined. Educated people are being lost, and universities and schools are falling behind their competitors. In 10 to 15 years, Russia will not have a clear source of economic growth, nor will it close the gap with the developed world.”

在社会领域,2010年代以来的经济增长疲软、实际可支配收入停滞、低技能工作使人力资源质量恶化。反过来,低质量的人力资源又限制了经济发展和提高劳动生产率的机会。未来10年至15年,人力资源危机将成为俄罗斯国家发展的重大掣肘因素。如今,由于家庭收入低和希望尽早赚钱养家,俄罗斯人宁愿选择中等职业教育而拒绝接受高等教育的现象已经大规模出现,这一现象令诸多专家震惊和担心。叶夫根尼·贡特马赫尔称这一挑战“涉及俄罗斯生活的方方面面,将导致包括国家在内的所有机构的退化。”谢尔盖·古里耶夫忧心忡忡地说,“俄罗斯曾经拥有的重要竞争优势——教育体系、对人力资源的尊重——正在不断被破坏。受过教育的人正在流失,大学和学校落后于竞争对手。10年或15年内,俄罗斯将没有明显的经济增长来源,也不会缩小与发达国家的差距。”

An important manifestation of the deterioration of human resources is the accelerated outflow of knowledge and wealth elites. According to a study published in August 2021 by a Russian research agency, more than 10 million Russians currently live outside their home country. Between 2000 and 2020 alone, between 4 million and 5.5 million Russian citizens emigrated abroad. The period from 2016 to 2019 was the highest period of overseas immigration, during which more than 300,000 people moved overseas each year, for a total of 1,186,138 people. The period from 2006 to 2011 saw the lowest numbers over the past 20 years, when only 698,070 Russian citizens left the country. The results of the researchers’ survey of 20- to 70-year-old Russians who immigrated to 65 different countries showed that 55 percent of the migrants were between the ages of 30 and 40, and they were 20 to 40 years old when they left Russia. The level of education of 92% of immigrants is at least tertiary, and 14% have advanced degrees. The main reasons for emigration range from concerns about improving economic conditions and giving future generations a better education, to dissatisfaction with corruption, lack of freedom, and the fear, danger, and despair of living in Russia. The survey showed that 79% of the respondents enjoyed life in their new countries, and they spoke highly of the security of the place of residence, social tolerance, and the stability of the new country. A large-scale and high-quality brain drain will undoubtedly be a huge loss to Russia’s economic and social development.

人力资源恶化的一个重要表现是知识与财富精英的加速外流。俄罗斯研究机构2021年8月发布的一项研究成果显示,当前有超过1000万俄罗斯人居住在母国之外。仅2000年至2020年间,就有400万到550万俄罗斯公民移居海外。2016年至2019年是海外移民潮最为高涨的阶段,期间每年有30多万人移居海外,总数达1186138人。而2006年至2011年是近20年间移民海外人数较少的几年,六年间有698070名俄罗斯公民离开祖国。研究人员对移居世界65个国家的20岁至70岁俄罗斯人群的调查结果表明,55%的移民年龄在30岁至40岁之间,而他们在离开俄罗斯时的年龄为20至40岁。有92%的移民至少都受过高等教育,有14%的人拥有高等级学位。移民的主要原因既有对改善经济条件、给予后代更好教育的考虑,也包括对腐败、缺乏自由的不满以及在俄罗斯生活感到恐惧、危险和绝望等因素。调查显示,有79%的受访者喜欢新移居国家的生活,他们高度评价居住地的安全性、社会容忍度和国家局势的稳定。如果大规模、高素质的人才外流,对俄罗斯经济社会发展而言无疑是巨大的损失。

It is also telling who is willing to adapt to the current political and economic environment and stay at home rather than who leaves. In fact, those who choose to stay are basically those who are under budgetary planning (“eat imperial food”), most of them are people who prefer a low salary but a stable job and do not want to take the risk of starting their own business. This accounts for the millions of various high-level government officials, security employees, military, and police. In the current social environment, most Russians tend to choose stable jobs, mainly in the public sector. The increase in the number of social classes that depend on the state budget for their livelihoods contradicts the expansion of state power, while the increase in personnel under budgetary planning reduces the activity and labor productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises.

较之什么人离开,还有谁愿意适应当前的政治和经济环境而留在国内也很说明问题。实际上,选择留下的基本上是那些拥有预算编制(“吃皇粮”)的人口阶层,他们大多是喜欢薪水少但工作稳定、不想冒险自己创业的人,其主体是数以百万计的各级政府官员、安全部门雇员、军人和警察。在目前的社会环境下,大多数俄罗斯民众倾向于选择稳定的工作,主要是在公共部门工作。依赖国家预算过活的社会阶层的增多反证了国家权力的膨胀,而预算编制人员的增多降低了中小企业的活跃度和劳动生产率。

Due to the peculiarities of the Russian labor market, the younger generation in Russia are more likely to choose to work in relatively stable state institutions or large companies. Although many young people dream of working in the private sector or freelancing, due to the unparalleled dominance of the state sector, it is easier for them to be employed as police officers or property managers, and secondary vocational education is sufficient. This indirectly confirms the underdevelopment of the knowledge economy in Russia, because the existing economic structure and labor market do not require sophisticated knowledge and modern capabilities. In addition to the decline in population quality, the regional imbalance of human resources is also increasingly prominent. In such a vast territory of Russia, the population is mainly concentrated in the Greater Moscow region, the Greater St. Petersburg region, and the Rostov-Krasnodar-Sochi region. In addition, the sharp deterioration in poverty, inequality, property rights, and human rights also poses a strong constraint on the quality of Russian human resources.

由于俄罗斯劳动力市场的特殊性,俄罗斯的年轻一代更多地选择在相对稳定的国家机构或大公司工作。虽然很多年轻人梦想就职于私营部门或者从事自由职业,但由于国有部门无可比拟的主体地位,因此当警察或物业经理对他们而言更容易就业,而这拥有中等职业教育就足够了。这间接证实了知识经济在俄罗斯的发育不足,因为既有的经济结构和劳动力市场不需要复杂的知识和现代能力。除人口质量下降之外,人力资源的区域发展不平衡也日益突出。在国土面积如此广袤的俄罗斯,人口主要集中在大莫斯科地区、大彼得堡地区和罗斯托夫—克拉斯诺达尔—索契地区。此外,贫困、不平等、财产权和人权状况的急剧恶化也对俄罗斯人力资源的质量构成了强有力的约束。

As economist Oleg Yolkin concludes, “Russia’s loss of economic competitiveness on a global scale has political roots, and the main challenge facing the political system is related to weak economic growth. Russian political institutions have become rigid, in a state that does not allow for the creation of investment incentives, attracting foreign capital, protecting property rights, protecting competition, and ensuring equality before the law. Moreover, without this, it is impossible to expect economic growth.”

正如经济学家奥列格·维尤金所总结的,“俄罗斯在全球范围内经济竞争力的丧失有其政治根源,而政治体系面临的主要挑战则与经济增长乏力相关。俄罗斯的政治机构已经变得僵化,它们处于不允许创造投资激励、吸引外国资金、保护产权、保护竞争和确保法律面前平等的状态。而没有这一点,就不可能指望经济增长。”

3. Development Prospects for Russia in the Next 15 Years

三、未来15年俄罗斯的发展前景

The development of any country depends not only on its own strategic planning, inner imagination, and policy declaration, but more importantly on a series of subjective and objective constraints. In the next 10 to 15 years, Russia’s development prospects will be affected by the interaction between the general trend of world development and the situation inside and outside Russia.

任何一个国家的发展都不仅仅取决于自身的战略规划、内心想象和政策宣示,更重要的是取决于一系列主客观的约束条件。未来10年至15年,俄罗斯的发展前景将受到世界发展大势与俄内外形势互动的双重影响。

First, the world economic system is facing a new round of differentiation and reshuffling. On the one hand, with the accelerated development of the new global industrial revolution, whether a country can hop on the express train of this technological revolution and industrial revolution in general will largely determine whether it will be at the center or the edge in the global division of labor of the future. On the other hand, the international economic order is being reshaped. At a time when the WTO is facing many doubts, a variety of new regional trade and investment mechanisms, such as CPTPP, the new US-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, the Japan-EU Free Trade Agreement, and the US-Japan Free Trade Agreement, are being built at an accelerated pace, and it has not even ruled out that they will be integrated in the future to form a new cross-regional trade and investment arrangement of a series of emerging economies participating in a highly free zone centered around developed countries. Although Russia has led the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, its scale and quality cannot be compared with the above-mentioned mechanisms, and the connection between Russia and its dominant Eurasian Economic Union and the global economic system may be further loosened; in addition, the global product chain is also readjusting. However, due to factors such as economic structure, Western sanctions, and self-isolation, Russia cannot occupy a favorable position in the process of resetting the global production chain. To be sure, the above-mentioned changes will have a crucial impact on Russia’s position and role in the world economic system.

首先,世界经济体系正面临新的一轮分化与组合。一方面,世界新工业革命加速发展,能否搭上这科技革命和产业革命的快车,将在很大程度上决定一个国家未来在世界劳动分工体系中处于中心还是边缘的位置;另一方面,国际经济秩序正在重塑,在WTO遭遇诸多质疑之际,CPTPP、美加墨新自贸协定、日本欧盟自贸协定、美日自贸协定等多种新的区域性贸易、投资新机制正在加速构建,甚至不排除未来加以整合从而形成以发达国家为核心、一系列新兴经济体共同参与的内部高度自由区的跨区域贸易投资新安排。尽管俄罗斯主导建立了欧亚经济联盟,但其规模和质量与上述机制无法同日而语,俄罗斯及其主导的欧亚经济联盟同全球经济体系的联系可能进一步松动;此外,全球产业链也正在重新配置调整。但受制于经济结构、西方制裁以及自我孤立等因素,俄罗斯无法在全球产业链重置过程中占据有利位置。可以肯定,上述变化将对俄罗斯在世界经济体系中的地位和作用产生至关重要的影响。

Second, the global energy transition is in full swing, and the traditional energy industry is facing multiple challenges. Traditional oil and gas producing countries and multinational companies are taking the initiative or being forced to transition. Although the “energy shortage” in Europe in the summer and autumn of 2021 has given Russia another strong performance opportunity, “even the greatest of mountains cannot keep rivers from flowing to the sea,” and Russia cannot reverse the general trend of global energy transformation. This will bring major challenges to the development of Russia’s energy industry, the national financial system, and even the stability of the political system.

其次,全球能源转型全面推进,传统能源产业面临多重挑战,传统油气生产国和跨国公司都在主动或被迫转型。尽管2021年夏秋之季欧洲的“能源荒”又让俄罗斯有了一次回光返照式的强势表演机会,但“青山遮不住,毕竟东流去”,俄罗斯无法扭转全球能源转型的大趋势。这对俄罗斯能源行业发展、国家财政体系乃至政治体制稳定都将带来重大挑战。

Third, the international security situation has become tense, which not only brings opportunities for Russia to take advantage of chaos, but also brings many security risks. On the one hand, the situation in the Middle East and Central Asia has brought geostrategic opportunities to Russia. At the same time, Russia and the United States have restarted strategic stability negotiations and have attempted to jointly shape new international arms control rules. On the other hand, security risks have also arisen. For example, Russia faces multiple challenges from Turkey in the Caspian-Mediterranean region. Militarily, while Russia continues to use every opportunity to demonstrate its achievements in equipment modernization, the global military balance is changing at an accelerated rate. U.S. military spending is 10 times that of Russia. In the medium and long term, Russia will be unable to maintain the same strategic balance with the U.S. as during the Cold War. The reason why Russia keeps “showing its muscles” is precisely because it sees the severe challenges it faces in the future, and it is precisely to attract the attention of the United States, forcing the United States to sit down and negotiate with Russia, using the international arms control rules jointly negotiated by Russia and the United States to constrain the great-power military competition of the future.

第三,国际安全局势趋于紧张,既给俄罗斯带来了借乱取势的机会,也带来了诸多安全风险。一方面,中东、中亚的局势给俄罗斯带来地缘战略机遇,同时俄美重启战略稳定谈判,试图共同塑造新的国际军控规则;另一方面,安全风险也如影随形。比如,俄罗斯在里海—地中海地区面临土耳其在多重挑战。在军事上,尽管俄罗斯在不断借各种机会展示其在装备现代化方面取得的成就,但全球军力对比正在加速变化。美国的军费开支是俄罗斯的10倍,中长期看,俄罗斯无力维持冷战时期那样的对美战略平衡。俄罗斯之所以不断地“秀肌肉”,恰恰是因为看到了未来其面临的严峻挑战,恰恰是要引起美国的重视,迫使美国坐下来与俄谈判,以俄美共商的国际军控规则约束未来的大国军力竞争。

Fourth, the strategic competition between major powers has been reactivated, and China and the United States have become the main axis of contradictions in the relationships between major powers. However, the relationship between Russia and the United States and Europe is difficult to improve in an all-round way. Russia also faces many challenges in the “post-Soviet space.” Ukraine, Moldova, and other countries are gradually drifting away from Russia, and other former Soviet Union countries have also grown alienated.

第四,大国战略竞争重新激活,中美成为大国关系矛盾主轴。但俄与美欧的关系难以全面好转,俄在“后苏联空间”也面临诸多挑战,乌克兰、摩尔多瓦等国与其渐行渐远,其他原苏联国家也对其离心离德。

Fifth, Russia faces multiple internal and external pressures and maintaining the current regime in power for the long term is the core concern of the authorities. Creating the image of a “powerful country” is an important means to mobilizing populism and diverting people’s attention from economic recession and political rigidity.

第五,俄罗斯面临多重内外压力,维系现政权长期执政是当局的核心关切。而营造一个“强国”形象是调动民粹主义,转移民众对经济衰退、政治僵化关注的重要手段。

Subject to the constraints of the above factors, Russia is likely to present the following development prospects in the next 10 to 15 years.

受制于上述因素的制约,未来10年至15年俄罗斯大概率可能呈现出以下发展前景。

First, Russia’s deindustrialization process continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while it did not catch up with the fourth industrial revolution. With the global energy transition, the energy industry, an important pillar of economic development, fiscal revenue, and even political stability, is also facing multiple challenges. At the same time, Russia’s S&T potential is generally shrinking, its subsequent development momentum is limited, and its ability to participate in global economic, financial, and climate governance is noticeably insufficient. Russian economist Nikita Maslennikov predicts that, from a medium-term forecast, Russia’s macroeconomic growth rate will lag behind the world average by 50%-100%, which can already be called a “stagnation with signs of a structural crisis.” Coupled with the accelerating transformation of the global economy in areas such as the ESG agenda (ecological, social and governance standards for businesses), energy transition, global corporate minimum tax, new trade and investment agreements, “Russia is still on the world economic train, but rather than still sitting in coach, the country now only stands where the cars are connected.”

首先,俄罗斯在苏联解体以后的去工业化进程仍在延续,与此同时它并未赶上第四次工业革命浪潮。随着全球能源转型,作为经济发展、财政收入甚至政治稳定重要支柱的能源产业也面临多重挑战。与此同时,俄罗斯的科技潜力总体而言不断萎缩,后续发展动力受限,参与全球经济、金融及气候治理的能力明显不足。俄罗斯经济学家尼基塔·马斯连尼科夫预计,从中期预测来看,俄罗斯宏观经济的增长速度将比世界平均增速落后50%-100%,这已经可以称为“具有结构性危机迹象的停滞”了。再加上全球经济正在ESG议程(企业的生态、社会和治理标准)、能源转型、全球企业最低税、新的贸易和投资协定等领域加速转型,“俄罗斯还在世界经济列车上,但已经不可能坐在包厢而只能站在车厢接连处的位置了。”

Second, political governance is showing signs of fatigue, and corruption among officials at all levels is on the rise. As the economic and financial resources tend to be tight, the struggles of various interest groups will show an upward trend. Political participation is more limited, and social apathy has increasingly become diffused. A recent report from the Carnegie Center in Moscow argues that low living standards, persistence of poverty, stagnant or declining real disposable income, and social inequality in a broad sense have contributed to the loss of vitality of Russian society, high levels of social apathy, reluctance to strive to improve ones social status, and insensitivity to the deteriorating external environment is becoming the “new normal” of Russian society, and social indifference will trigger other systemic crises.

其次,政治治理呈现疲态,各层级官员腐败有增无减。而随着经济、财政资源趋于紧张,各利益集团的争斗会呈现出上升趋势。政治参与更加受限,社会冷漠日益弥散。莫斯科卡内基中心最近的报告认为,生活水平低下、贫困的持续存在、实际可支配收入停滞或下降,广泛意义上的社会不平等导致俄罗斯社会失去活力,高度的社会冷漠、不愿努力提高自己的社会地位、对不断恶化的外部环境的麻木不仁正在成为俄罗斯社会的“新常态”,而社会冷漠将引发其他系统性危机。

Third, the human resource situation in Russia will further deteriorate. On the one hand, the trend of population decline has not been effectively controlled. On the other hand, the exodus of knowledge and wealth elites has accelerated. The ethnic and religious composition of the domestic population is also showing a trend that worries the Russian top brass.

第三,俄罗斯的人力资源形势将进一步恶化。一方面,人口数量下降的趋势未得到有效控制。另一方面,知识和财富精英加速外流。国内人口的民族、宗教构成也呈现出令俄罗斯高层担心的趋势。

Fourth, it is difficult to see significant improvement in the external environment. In recent years, although Russia has achieved specific geopolitical goals through military operations such as the Russo-Georgian War, the Crimea crisis, and sending troops to Syria, it has received strong sanctions from the United States and Europe, and most countries in the post-Soviet space are also alienated from Russia. This trend is unlikely to change significantly in the next 15 years.

第四,外部环境难见明显改观。近年来,尽管俄罗斯通过俄格战争、克里米亚危机、出兵叙利亚等军事行动达到了特定的地缘政治目标,但受到了美欧的强力制裁,后苏联空间大多数国家也对俄离心离德。未来15年,这一趋势难以明显改观。

Although Russia faces many challenges, it will remain a variable that cannot be ignored in the international system. In the next 10 to 15 years, there are three issues that deserve attention: First, Russia will actively use hybrid warfare methods to achieve its own specific geopolitical goals with the help of the chaos in the process of international and regional system transformation. The impact it brings is worthy of high attention. Second, although it is difficult to comprehensively improve the US-Russia relationship, Russia will still actively seek to improve its relationship with the United States, and actively mobilize the triangular relationship between China, the United States, and Russia, utilizing the Sino-US conflict to relieve its own pressure. Third, before 2024, Russia may achieve a true Russia-Belarus alliance, while creating an image of a strong country, stimulating the market for the 2024 presidential election. Moreover, before the 2030 presidential election, other “frozen conflicts” in the post-Soviet space are likely to flare up again.

尽管俄面临诸多挑战,但其仍将是国际体系中难以忽视的变量。未来10年至15年,有三个问题值得关注:一是俄罗斯将积极运用混合战争手段,借助国际和地区体系转型过程中的紊乱达成自己特定的地缘政治目标,它所带来的冲击是值得高度关注的;二是尽管美俄关系难以全面改善,但是俄罗斯仍将积极谋求改善对美关系,并积极调动中美俄三角关系,借助中美冲突缓解自身压力;三是在2024年之前,俄有可能做实俄白联盟国家,一面营造强国形象,一面刺激2024年总统大选行情。而在2030年总统大选之前,后苏联空间的其他“被冻结冲突”有可能再次暴燃。

From the perspective of history, the tension between great power ambition and lack of strength is a key factor in determining Russia’s development trajectory. Looking back on the past, great ups and downs are an important feature of Russia’s historical development. Every failure and setback in foreign expansion will trigger a major turning point in Russia’s national development. In the next 15 years, stagnation in the broadest sense — from economic depression to social indifference — is Russia’s most probable development prospect. It is basically certain that in the next 10-15 years, Russia will face multiple challenges from climate change, energy transition, and the new industrial revolution, and Russia’s position in the global supply chain and value chain will further decline. At that time, the reactionary force of the lagging economic development on domestic politics and foreign policy will be revealed. By 2036 or even 2030, crises such as energy transition, economic stagnation, political rigidity, and aging leadership may break out in a concentrated manner, and Russia may usher in major historic changes.

从大历史的角度看,大国雄心与实力不足之间形成的张力是决定俄罗斯发展轨迹的关键因素。回顾以往,大起大落是俄罗斯历史发展的重要特征,每一次对外扩张的失败和受挫都会引发俄罗斯国家发展的重大转折。未来15年,最广泛意义上的停滞——从经济萧条到社会冷漠,是俄罗斯最大概率的发展前景。基本可以确定,未来10-15年,俄罗斯将面临气候变化、能源转型、新工业革命的多重挑战,俄罗斯在全球供应链、价值链中的地位将会进一步下降。届时,经济发展滞后对国内政治和对外政策的反作用力将会显现出来。到2036年甚至在2030年,能源转型、经济停滞、政治僵化、领导老迈等危机可能集中爆发,俄罗斯可能迎来重大的历史性变化。

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冯玉军 (Feng Yujun). "Political and Social Roots of Russian Economy and Prospects for National Development [俄罗斯经济的政治社会根源及国家发展前景]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in Eurasian Economy [欧亚经济], February 14, 2022

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