On January 3, 2026, the U.S. military launched Operation Absolute Resolve against Venezuela, abducted President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, and brought them to New York for trial. This move by the Trump administration almost entirely aligns with the new National Security Strategy report released in December 2025, and can be seen as the first step in implementing the objectives of the new strategy. Does this adjustment in U.S. foreign strategy mean that the strategic focus is returning to the Western Hemisphere? Does such an adjustment indicate that the United States will no longer emphasize great power strategic competition? What far-reaching impacts will this adjustment in U.S. foreign strategy produce? 

I.       U.S. “Retreat and Consolidation” in the Western Hemisphere 

The section on the Western Hemisphere in the Trump administration’s new report has attracted the most attention. In U.S. National Security Strategy reports, region-related content typically includes the Asia-Pacific region (or the “Indo-Pacific”), Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. The Asia-Pacific and Europe are usually the strategic priorities, while the Western Hemisphere is ranked relatively lower. The Obama administration’s report released in February 2015 placed the Western Hemisphere last; the report released in December 2017 during Trump’s first term placed it second to last; the Biden administration’s report released in October 2022 placed it third. In contrast, the current Trump administration has elevated the Western Hemisphere to the top position. 

The new report states at the outset that it emphasizes the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, highlighting the restoration of U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, safeguarding access to the U.S. homeland and key regional geographic transit routes, and preventing non–Western Hemisphere competitors from deploying military forces or other threat capabilities in “our hemisphere,” or from owning or controlling strategically critical assets.¹ The “Trump Corollary” represents Donald Trump’s version of the Monroe Doctrine, and is therefore also referred to as the “Donroe Doctrine.” It constitutes an update and continuation of the United States’ historical tradition of dominance in the Americas. In his 1823 annual message to Congress, President Monroe defined the Americas as a U.S. sphere of influence, warning European powers not to interfere in the affairs of the Americas or establish colonies there. This “Monroe Doctrine” provided the theoretical foundation for the United States’ continued expansion across the American continents. In December 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt advanced the “Roosevelt Corollary,” asserting that the United States had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in the Western Hemisphere. From that point, the United States began to assume the role of a regional “policeman” in the Americas. 

The “Donroe Doctrine” represents an important shift in U.S. foreign strategy, namely that the United States is preparing to “retreat and consolidate” from the global stage: retreating from the Middle East and Europe while consolidating its position in the Americas. U.S. efforts to withdraw from the Middle East began during the Obama administration. Obama announced plans to end the war on terrorism and shift the strategic focus eastward to the Asia-Pacific region, but the withdrawal process proved extremely slow, and the pivot to Asia remained far from complete. During his first term, Trump initiated negotiations with the Taliban and signed an agreement in Doha on February 29, 2020, bringing the war in Afghanistan to an end. After taking office, the Biden administration implemented the agreement signed by the Trump administration and fully withdrew from Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, marking the conclusion of the United States’ long-standing strategic focus on the Middle East and counterterrorism. 

The U.S. process of withdrawing from Europe has likewise been fraught with setbacks. During his first term, Trump pressured European countries to increase defense spending and even threatened to withdraw from NATO.² Trump has long been deeply resentful of what he sees as “free riding” by U.S. allies. On September 2, 1987, he spent more than $90,000 of his own money to purchase full-page advertisements in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe, publishing an open letter “to the American people” in which he criticized allies for “taking advantage of the United States,” and mocked U.S. politicians for allowing the U.S. military to “protect ships that the United States does not own, carrying oil that the United States does not need, to allies who will not provide help.”³ Although Trump sought to withdraw from NATO and disengage from Europe, the foreign and security team during his first term was essentially composed of establishment figures, which constrained his room for maneuver, and the effort to withdraw from Europe did not proceed smoothly. After taking office, the Biden administration considered having European countries support its Asia-Pacific strategy. However, the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022 meant that not only were European countries unable to devote attention to Asia-Pacific affairs, but the United States also had to maintain sustained engagement in Europe. After being re-elected, Trump moved with greater determination and a tougher stance to reduce U.S. defense commitments in Europe and scale back support for Ukraine, while launching unreserved criticism and attacks against European countries. In February 2025, Vice President Vance delivered a speech at the Munich Security Conference sharply criticizing European countries; the new National Security Strategy report was similarly unsparing toward Europe; and in January 2026, President Trump’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos was replete with biting sarcasm directed at European countries. ⁴

The U.S. “retreat” from the Middle East and Europe has, in turn, reinforced its “consolidation” in the Americas. At the outset of his second term, Trump designated issues such as drugs, illegal immigration, and territorial expansion in the Americas as policy priorities, and linked all of these issues to so-called non–Western Hemisphere countries. He argued that the political, economic, and military activities of other countries in the region undermine U.S. security, and that the United States must restore its dominant position in the Western Hemisphere. Venezuela has become the focal point where all of these domestic political agendas intersect. The Trump administration’s military action against Venezuela fully aligns with its domestic agenda and serves as a key practical manifestation of the “Donroe Doctrine.” 

II.       Focusing on Great Power Strategic Competition 

Across his two terms in office, Trump released two National Security Strategy reports, which brought about an extremely thoroughgoing adjustment to U.S. foreign strategy. The 2017 report shifted the U.S. strategic focus from counterterrorism to great power strategic competition, declaring that China and Russia “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity,” that “China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests,” and that “great power competition has returned.”⁵ Since then, China–U.S. strategic competition has gradually become a consensus in the United States that transcends party lines and political cycles. Trade wars, technology wars, and public opinion battles have followed in succession; competition has replaced coordination and cooperation, and China–U.S. rivalry has unfolded at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. 

The 2025 report does not indicate that great power strategic competition has become any less important in U.S. foreign strategy. The United States’ “retreat and consolidation” in the Western Hemisphere is itself intended to serve the purpose of great power strategic competition, by excluding the political, economic, and military presence of so-called non–Western Hemisphere countries in the Americas. 

President Trump’s focus on China’s influence in the Western Hemisphere dates back to his first term in office. The 2017 report noted that “competitors have found opportunities to operate in the Western Hemisphere,” that “China seeks to pull the region into its orbit through state-directed investment and loans,” that “Russia continues its failed politics of the Cold War by bolstering its radical Cuban allies,” and that “both China and Russia support Venezuela and are seeking to expand military linkages and arms sales across the region.”⁶ In August 2020, the Trump administration released the Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, which stated that the United States’ deep geographic, economic, and cultural ties to the Western Hemisphere make the region vital to U.S. national security, peace, and prosperity. It also warned that external forces are attempting to align with regional regimes, exploit the region’s abundant resources for profit, and expand their political and economic influence through investment and donations, thereby fueling corruption and the systemic deterioration of the rule of law in the region. To address these challenges, the United States must safeguard homeland security, promote economic growth, advance regional democracy and the rule of law, and respond to “economic aggression and malign political influence,” among other threats.⁷  

After returning to office, Trump placed greater emphasis on the national security rationale for purchasing Greenland, accusing Russia and China of harboring ambitions in the Arctic and citing the presence of Chinese and Russian vessels around Greenland.⁸ The United States’ concern over the Panama Canal stems from fears about China’s growing influence in the region and the possibility that Chinese companies’ involvement in managing the canal could undermine U.S. efforts to reconfigure supply chains and project military force, thereby affecting U.S. access to critical regional transit routes. The United States also interprets China’s activities in other Latin American countries through a national security lens, viewing them as a challenge to U.S. hegemony. The Belt and Road Initiative has driven Chinese investment in infrastructure in Latin America, which has likewise attracted U.S. attention. Following the Trump administration’s military action in Venezuela, other Latin American countries with close ties to China are now also facing pressure from the United States. The new report emphasizes that the U.S. objective in the Western Hemisphere is to prevent external forces from entering the region or controlling critical assets, and that countries in the Western Hemisphere must also support key supply chains.⁹

The United States’ “retreat and consolidation” in the Western Hemisphere has not diminished its focus on China. In fact, the Asia section of the new report is even more extensive than the section on the Western Hemisphere. It emphasizes that the Asia-Pacific region will be a key arena for economic and geopolitical competition in the next century, and that the United States will lead the region from a position of strength, reshape China–U.S. economic relations, maintain military superiority, deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and ensure the free flow of navigation in the South China Sea, among other objectives.¹⁰

The U.S. military action against Venezuela indicates that China–U.S. strategic competition will extend to third-party countries. The U.S. surprise operation against Venezuela is directed not only at President Maduro, but also at undermining China–Venezuela political, economic, and security cooperation, thereby negatively affecting China’s national interests in the region. In fact, China–U.S. competition in third-party countries is already underway. The United States reopened its consulate in Greenland in 2020 and restored its embassy in the Solomon Islands in 2023, with the primary aim of monitoring the activities of Chinese enterprises and Chinese nationals in those locations. China’s infrastructure development, trade exchanges, people-to-people interactions, official dialogues, and military cooperation in other Latin American countries, as well as in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, have all been imbued with the significance of great power competition. Against the backdrop of China–U.S. strategic competition, U.S. intelligence agencies have accordingly adjusted their operational approaches and budgets, shifting resources toward China-related priorities, while the State Department has added personnel responsible for China affairs at U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. 

III.       Implications of the Adjustment in U.S. Foreign Strategy 

The “Donroe Doctrine” is a hybrid of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary. It seeks both to prevent non–Western Hemisphere countries from entering the region and to preserve the United States’ freedom to intervene in the internal affairs of countries in the Americas. Its essence is control over the Western Hemisphere. After the U.S. military abducted President Maduro and his wife, Secretary of State Rubio declared in a media interview that the Western Hemisphere is “America’s hemisphere,” and that “the United States will not allow the Western Hemisphere to become a base of operations for its adversaries, competitors, or hostile forces.”¹¹ The United States has also issued warnings and threat signals to countries such as Cuba and Colombia. It can therefore be inferred that U.S. intervention in the domestic and foreign affairs of countries in the Americas is likely to increase in the future and become more unrestrained. Independent Senator Sanders criticized the Trump administration’s actions against Venezuela as “a blatant violation of international law” and “a naked act of imperialism.”¹²

First, U.S. interference in the internal affairs of other countries sets an extremely bad precedent. Countries in the Americas have the right to carry out normal political, economic, military, and cultural and educational exchanges with any country. The United States has neither justification nor authority to interfere in the policies and actions of these countries. China’s political, economic, and military cooperation with countries in the Americas has achieved mutual benefit and win-win outcomes, and China’s economic development has benefited countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States should not view such cooperation as a challenge to itself, nor should it attempt to influence the choices of countries in the Americas. 

Second, the adjustment in U.S. foreign strategy carries the risk of reviving “spheres of influence.” The new report emphasizes that major powers, wealthy countries, and strong states possess greater influence—an eternal truth of international relations. The underlying logic of the report is likewise imbued with the notion of dividing up “spheres of influence”: because the United States is in the Americas, the region would become its exclusive preserve, off limits to other great powers. This also reflects a common hypocrisy in U.S. diplomacy—that the United States may delineate spheres of influence in the Americas, while insisting on unrestricted access to the surrounding regions of other countries. 

Third, U.S. actions to expand its territory and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries will affect not only weaker states with strained relations with the United States, but also NATO allies such as Canada and Denmark. The adjustment and implementation of U.S. foreign strategy during Trump’s second term exhibit traits of impulsiveness, carelessness, and recklessness. This poses a major shock to its allies: the United States can provide neither security nor stability. In a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Carney noted that interdependence has become a tool of coercion, tariffs have become leverage, financial infrastructure has become an instrument, and supply chains have been weaponized. In an era of great power competition, the strong act with impunity while the weak can only endure, and the so-called “rules-based order” is disintegrating, requiring all countries to adapt to a new reality.¹³

During his first term, Trump shifted U.S. foreign strategy toward great power strategic competition. Decoupling and supply chain fragmentation in the economic and technological spheres, along with the erection of barriers and divisions, dealt a heavy blow to economic globalization. In his second term, he has contracted the strategic front and returned to the Americas with an aggressive posture, seeking to define relations among all countries through the lens of great power strategic competition, overturn the fundamental principles of international relations, and dismantle the existing international order. If this trajectory continues, by the end of his second term, the world may resemble what the Irish poet William Butler Yeats described in The Second Coming: things fall apart, the center cannot hold, mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.¹⁴