The “U.S. illegal detention of Maduro” incident fully demonstrates that the United States has abandoned its previously low-politicized approach to Latin America and shifted to a “new Monroe Doctrine” characterized by a policy logic of “domestication” and “securitization,” emphasizing U.S. unilateral coercion, ensuring full-spectrum control over Latin America, and excluding extra-regional competitors. This highly interventionist, predatory, aggressive, and exclusionary policy has had a major impact on the political, economic, and diplomatic landscape of Latin America, exacerbating systemic risks in the region. 

I. Political Risks Are Rising but Vary in Degree 

During his first term (2017–2021), Trump had already adopted a political shaping approach in Latin America characterized by “suppressing the left and supporting the right,” guiding the trajectory of the region’s political landscape. At that time, Trump intensified sanctions and pressure on Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua; strengthened policy coordination and alignment with Brazil’s far-right Bolsonaro government; and strongly supported the “Lima Group,” composed of right-wing governments in Latin America, in diplomatically isolating Venezuela, among other measures. At the same time, through the promotion of the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Latin American countries, the United States strengthened its interaction with far-right conservative groups in the region and cultivated a large number of far-right representatives in Latin America, who have become the backbone of the current rise of the right in the region. 

After Trump returned to office in 2025, Latin America entered a phase of balanced competition between left- and right-wing political forces, creating more favorable conditions for U.S. political intervention. For example, by seeking to overturn the Maduro government in Venezuela, the Trump administration aims to sever the mutual support network among Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, thereby laying the groundwork for subsequent political subversion in Cuba and Nicaragua. At the same time, through multifaceted interference in the judicial proceedings of former Brazilian President Bolsonaro’s “coup case,” it has increased pressure on the left-wing Lula government and boosted the morale of Brazil’s far-right forces. In 2026, at least five Latin American countries, including Brazil (with Venezuela still uncertain), will hold general elections. Trump is highly likely to intensify election interference, further expanding the governing advantage of the right. 

Trump’s interventionist policies have increased political risks across Latin American countries, though to varying degrees. First, high-risk countries include Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Colombia. Following the dramatic upheaval in Venezuela’s political situation, political stability in Cuba and Nicaragua faces extremely high risk. At the same time, Trump has issued multiple warnings to Colombian President Petro, placing the country at relatively high political risk. Second, countries facing medium-to-high risk include Peru, Honduras, and Bolivia. Since 2016, Peru has had seven presidents and experienced two presidential impeachments in 2022 and 2025, with persistent political instability. Coupled with Peru’s particular geographic position, Trump is highly likely to intensify interference in its 2026 elections, further exacerbating political disorder in the country. At the same time, due to Trump’s election interference, controversies surrounding the 2025 elections have created significant latent risks for Honduras’s political stability, which now faces considerable challenges. In addition, the liberalization reforms of Bolivia’s new government may further intensify political struggles and social tensions, leaving the country at similarly high risk of instability. Third, countries facing localized risks include Ecuador and Brazil. In Ecuador, the Noboa government’s proposed constitutional amendment to “reopen foreign military bases” has been opposed by more than 60 percent of the population, placing the government in a dilemma between the conflicting demands of the United States and the Ecuadorian public. In Brazil, potential Trump interference in the 2026 elections may affect the country’s political stability and trajectory, with political risks likely to rise. 

II. Overall Intensification of Downside Economic Risks 

According to statistics from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),¹ from 2016 to 2025 the Latin American economy fell into a “low-growth trap,” with an average annual growth rate of only 1.2 percent for the region as a whole—lower even than the average annual growth rate during the “lost decade” of the 1980s (2.0 percent)—making it one of the most sluggish regions in the global economy. In 2025, economic growth in Latin America was approximately 2.4 percent, remaining below 3 percent for four consecutive years. 

In 2025, Trump’s policy toward Latin America exhibited a clear feature of the “weaponization of economic and trade policy.” First, through multiple rounds of “big stick” tariff threats, the United States has pressured Latin American countries to make concessions to U.S. demands on issues such as illegal immigration and drugs. Second, by imposing high tariffs on products such as steel, aluminum, and automobiles from major Latin American countries, the United States has weakened the competitiveness of key industries in the region, supported its policy agenda of reshoring manufacturing, and increased the difficulty of industrial upgrading in Latin America. Third, the Trump administration is expected to review free trade agreements with Mexico and Central American countries, upgrade “poison pill” clauses, weaken the trade policy sovereignty of its Latin American free trade partners, and restrict their trade space with extra-regional, non–free trade partners such as China and India. Fourth, the new U.S. National Security Strategy emphasizes strengthening full-spectrum control over key resources, critical sea lanes, critical infrastructure, and key assets in Latin America, which will likewise affect the efficiency of Latin American countries’ economic and trade cooperation with extra-regional partners. Overall, Trump aims to reshape Latin America into a resource supply base and a “nearshoring” production hub centered on the North American supply chain, reconstruct the region’s multiple dependencies on the United States, and, by deepening economic integration between the United States and Latin America, limit the influence of extra-regional competitors in the region, thereby restoring and consolidating U.S. absolute economic dominance over Latin America. 

With the rollout of a combination of policies—including military pressure, political intervention, tariff coercion, tightening of remittance policies, and “de-Sinicization”—political and economic risks in Latin America have risen markedly, and trade and investment risks show a tendency toward periodic deterioration. According to projections by ECLAC, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), economic growth in Latin America in 2026 is expected to be around 2.1–2.3 percent, lower than in 2025. If Trump adopts additional extreme policies and measures toward Latin America, the region’s economy may face even greater difficulties. 

III. Significant Rise in Regional Security Risks 

Over the past 15 years, the pace of poverty reduction in Latin America has clearly slowed. According to World Bank projections, from 2025 to 2027, the average annual decline in the poverty rate in the region may fall to 0.3 percentage points. At the same time, income inequality in Latin America remains severe. The region’s overall Gini coefficient stands at 0.452, better only than that of Sub-Saharan Africa and 14 percentage points higher than the OECD average (0.315). As a result, the deterioration of public security has become a prominent risk in Latin America. A World Bank report shows that the homicide rate in the region is eight times the global average.² Public security has even become a key factor affecting political stability in Latin American countries, with weak security governance directly leading to the collapse of regimes or changes of government in some countries (Peru and Suriname) in 2025. 

The Trump administration’s forced deportation of illegal immigrants and unilateral use of force in counternarcotics efforts are stopgap measures that address symptoms rather than root causes. They run counter to the logic of resolving transnational issues and may even generate more uncontrollable risks, potentially pushing Latin America into a period marked by frequent social tensions and public security incidents. In November 2025, the U.S. Niskanen Center projected that if Trump’s military action against Venezuela were to trigger short-term internal unrest, the number of Venezuelan refugees could reach 1.7–3 million within 1–3 years; if it were to trigger prolonged unrest, the number could rise to 4 million.³ On the issue of counternarcotics, Brazil’s Igarapé Institute has pointed out that, because the United States does not control domestic drug demand, the Trump administration’s “war on drugs” is unlikely to be effective. Drug trafficking organizations will readjust their supply chains, making drug governance in Latin America more complex, while Trump’s infringement on other countries’ sovereignty further squeezes the space for transnational counternarcotics cooperation.⁴ In addition, the Trump administration has continued to intensify its crackdown on drugs and transnational organized crime in Latin America. For example, in December 2025, it designated fentanyl as a “weapon of mass destruction” and listed the Colombia-based Clan del Golfo as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which will further increase the likelihood of U.S. cross-border law enforcement (and even military strikes). 

It is worth noting that, in order to support the “Western Hemisphere first” strategic arrangement, the Trump administration has strengthened its military deployments in Latin America. On the issue of key maritime routes, the United States has repeatedly threatened that it does not rule out using military means to “reclaim” control of the Panama Canal, and has increased military monitoring of the Strait of Magellan. On counternarcotics, the Trump administration has repeatedly demanded that Mexico allow U.S. forces to enter its territory and use drones to strike drug trafficking organizations. In terms of illegal immigration management, Trump signed multiple executive orders designating illegal immigration as an “invasion,” declared a state of emergency at the southern border, and deployed tens of thousands of troops to the U.S.–Mexico border. In addition, to improve the U.S. military’s response efficiency in the Western Hemisphere, a U.S. Army Western Hemisphere Command was established through consolidation. The Trump administration has also announced its intention to upgrade Peru to a “Major Non-NATO Ally,” restart military bases in Puerto Rico, and actively seek military access and cooperation in countries such as Ecuador, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Panama, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago, thereby continuously strengthening its military presence in Latin America.⁵  This situation will directly drive up arms procurement by countries in the region and further deteriorate the security situation in Latin America. 

IV. Heightened Polarization of Regional Blocs 

Amid the continued rise of populism and a balance of competition between left- and right-wing forces, political antagonism between left- and right-led governments in Latin America has become increasingly tense. Political divisions among left-wing governments have also grown, with some countries even severing diplomatic relations, and regional integration has suffered a serious setback. The Trump administration’s political interference, military deterrence, and intrusions aimed at “suppressing the left and supporting the right” have further intensified tensions and divisions within the region. 

In April 2025, only one-third of Latin American heads of state attended the Ninth Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and leaders from right-wing governments in the region were entirely absent. In September 2025, in response to the United States increasing its military deployments in the Caribbean and continuing to threaten Venezuela militarily, CELAC issued a joint statement reaffirming Latin America as a “zone of peace.” However, the statement was supported by only 20 countries, including Colombia, Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico, while the remaining 13 countries refused to sign. After the U.S. military intrusion into Venezuela on January 3, 2026, positions among Latin American countries became sharply divided. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Colombia strongly condemned the United States, while Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Guyana supported or acquiesced to U.S. actions. Bolivia, Panama, and Peru adopted a more restrained, middle-ground stance. It can be expected that polarization among regional blocs in Latin America will persist. 

Overall, the Trump administration’s “new Monroe Doctrine” is in serious conflict with the two core interests of Latin American countries: security and development. In terms of security, the Trump administration’s political interference, military intimidation, and illegal intrusions pose the most direct threats to the sovereignty and security of Latin American states. In terms of development, the Trump administration’s “America First” self-interested approach, its drive to control Latin America’s strategic resources and assets, and its use of tariff “big sticks” all create a more challenging external environment for the region’s economic development. In the short term, the lack of unity in Latin America may allow the Trump administration to secure certain gains. In the medium term, the U.S. “new Monroe Doctrine” will fuel anti-American sentiment in the region, thereby promoting a resurgence of left-wing forces in Latin America. In the long term, the colonialist, hegemonic, and imperial tendencies of the U.S. “new Monroe Doctrine” will significantly strengthen Latin American countries’ pursuit and practice of strategic autonomy, ultimately leading to the decline of U.S. hegemony in the region.