俄乌冲突后的世界:不是“阵营化”,而是“小分流”
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The Post-Russia-Ukraine Conflict World: Not a “Splitting into Camps,” but Rather a “Small Divergence”

俄乌冲突后的世界:不是“阵营化”,而是“小分流”

A prominent Russia scholar at Fudan University disagrees with the projection that the global system will once again fall into a Cold War-style confrontation and theorizes that the Western and non-Western countries will take diverging paths in global supply chains, global trade, and security architecture.


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In the future, the world will not be re-divided into two opposing hostile camps as it was during the Cold War, although there is a risk of camps forming again. Therefore, we can summarize the international trend since the Russia-Ukraine conflict began as that of a “small divergence.” That is: an accelerated disruption and reorganization of the global supply and production chains brought about by the post-Cold War wave of globalization; continuous renewal and reworking of global trade and investment rules; and reform and reshaping of global and regional security architecture. Given the important differences in the strategic positioning of the United States toward China and Russia, the risk of “re-campification” (再阵营化) of the world will be greatly reduced as long as China maintains a clear strategic mind and strategic determination.

未来世界不会重新划分为类似“冷战”的两个相互对立的敌对阵营,但有重新阵营化的风险。因此我们可以把俄乌冲突后的国际趋势概括为“小分流”,即:冷战后全球化浪潮所促成的全球供应链与产业链的加速断裂与重组;全球贸易与投资规则的持续更新与再造;全球与地区安全架构的改革与重塑。鉴于美国对中俄的战略定位有重要区别,只要中国保持清醒的战略头脑和战略定力,世界“再阵营化”的风险就会大大降低。

History always has striking similarities, but one never steps in the same river twice.

历史总是惊人地相似,但人永远不会踏进同一条河流。

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a watershed in the development of the post-Cold War world, and will have a significant and far-reaching influence on the world landscape and international order. Some people exclaim that a “new Cold War” is approaching at an accelerated pace, and the world will be re-divided into two opposing hostile camps. I do not agree with this overly simplistic analogy. While we are looking at the similarities between the current international situation and the tensions of the Cold War period, we need also to see the enormous differences between the two.

俄乌冲突是后冷战时代世界发展的一道分水岭,将对世界格局和国际秩序带来重大而深远的影响。有人惊呼“新冷战”正在加速到来,世界将重新划分为两个相互对立的敌对阵营。笔者不同意这种过于简略的类比,我们在看到当前国际局势与冷战时期的紧张气氛的相似之处的同时,也要看到两者之间的巨大区别。

What was the Cold War? The Cold War was a prolonged period of confrontation between two evenly matched superpowers, a tense standoff between two military blocs, a contention between two rival ideologies, and a non-interaction between two parallel markets. At present, although there is a strategic game going on between China and the United States and a fierce geopolitical conflict between Russia and the United States and Europe, there is no life-and-death ideological conflict, nor is it possible to form two military blocs with clearly demarcated camps, much less two parallel markets that are perpetually estranged from each other. At the same time, however, we cannot help but see the real risk of renewed division into camps. There will always be forces in the world that expect and even push incessantly for armed conflict and confrontation between camps or even for large-scale war, because only then can they maintain or obtain power, money, or psychological satisfaction.

何谓冷战?冷战是势均力敌的两个超级大国的长期对抗,是两大军事集团之间的紧张对峙,是两大意识形态之间的相互交锋,是两个平行市场间的不相往来。当前,尽管存在中美之间的战略博弈、俄罗斯与美欧之间的激烈地缘政治冲突,但既不存在你死和活的意识形态争端,也不可能形成营垒分明的两大军事集团,更不可能形成老死不相往来的两个平行市场。但与此同时,我们又不能不看到重新阵营化的现实风险。世界上总有一些势力期待甚至不断去推动武装冲突和阵营对抗甚至大规模战争,因为只有这样,他们才有可能维系或者获取权力、金钱抑或心理的满足。

So, how should we summarize the international strategic reality and trends at present and over the next decade? I would like to borrow the concept of “Great Divergence” from Kenneth Pomeranz’s definition of the late 18th and early 19th centuries when the East and the West began to gradually take different development paths, with the West taking the lead in transforming into modern industrial societies while China maintained its existing development path, and summarize the post-Russia-Ukraine conflict international trend as a “small divergence.”

那么,如何来概括当下和未来十年的国际战略现实与趋势呢?笔者想借用彭慕兰在界定18世纪末19世纪初东西方之间开始逐渐走上不同发展路径、西方就此率先实现向近代工业社会的转型而中国却保持既有发展道路的“大分流”概念,将俄乌冲突后的国际趋势概括为“小分流”。

The “small divergence” is primarily manifested in three ways.

“小分流”主要体现在三个方面:

First is the accelerated disruption and restructuring of the global production and supply chains that were brought about by the post-Cold War wave of globalization. Following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by a series of countries, international organizations, and multinational companies have accelerated the loosening of production and supply chains linked to Russia, and the “de-Russification” of the world economy has gained obvious momentum. Even in the energy sector, which is so important and which Russia once thought was rock-solid, its position has suffered a huge impact. The United States has imposed an energy embargo on Russia, and the European Union has made the important decision to cut Russian natural gas imports by two-thirds and oil imports by 90% this year, and to largely eliminate its energy dependence on Russia by 2027. This will undoubtedly lead to a “lose-lose” outcome. But in the context of the ongoing war, there is no doubt that high politics concerns have outweighed low politics issues like economic and energy cooperation. While “de-Russification” is currently in the spotlight, the decoupling from China, especially high-tech decoupling, that began with the U.S.-China trade war, has not been effectively curbed, and the COVID-19 pandemic and control measures that have lasted for three years are further alienating China from the world economic system.

一是冷战后全球化浪潮所促成的全球供应链与产业链的加速断裂与重组。俄乌冲突爆发后,一系列国家、国际组织和跨国公司对俄施加的经济制裁使与俄相关的供应链、产业链加速松动,世界经济的“去俄化”势头明显。甚至在如此重要、俄罗斯曾自认为稳如磐石的能源领域,其地位都遭受到了巨大冲击。美国已对俄实施能源禁运,欧盟也做出了今年压缩2/3自俄天然气进口、90%石油自俄进口并且到2027年基本摆脱对俄能源依赖的重要决定,这无疑将带来“双输”的结果。但在战争持续的情况下,对高位政治的关切毫无疑问已经超过了对经济能源合作等低位政治议题。在“去俄化”凸显的同时,自中美贸易战以来开始的对华脱钩、特别是高科技脱钩并未得到有效的遏制,而持续三年的全球新冠疫情及防控措施也在让中国与世界经济体系进一步疏离。

Second is the continuous renewal and reworking of global trade and investment rules. In recent years, the WTO has been subject to many questions, and its regulatory role in international trade and investment has clearly weakened. At the same time, new sets of bilateral and multilateral global trade and investment rules are quietly developing in parallel. CPTPP, the new United States-Canada-Mexico FTA, United States-Japan FTA, and EU-Japan FTA are already up and running, and movement forward on a United States-Europe FTA and an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is accelerating. The Russia-Ukraine conflict will accelerate the global “divergence” trend, and one cannot rule out the possibility of the G7 joining a group of emerging economies and even developing countries in forming a large market with zero tariffs, zero barriers, and zero subsidies in the future, and other “non-market economies” such as Russia basically being excluded from the world’s mainstream economic system.

二是全球贸易与投资规则的持续更新与再造。近年来,WTO已经受到诸多质疑,其在国际贸易和投资领域的调节作用明显弱化。与此同时,新的双边和多边全球贸易和投资新规则正潜移默化地并行发展,CPTPP、美加墨新自贸协定、美日自贸协定、欧盟日本自贸协定已经运行,美欧自贸协定和印太经济框架正在加速推进。而俄乌冲突会加速全球化的“分流”趋势,不排除G7和一批新兴经济体甚至发展中国家在未来形成一个零关税、零壁垒、零补贴的大市场,而俄罗斯等其他“非市场经济国家”基本上被排斥于世界主流经济体系之外的可能。

Third is the reform and reshaping of global and regional security architecture. At the global level, many countries around the world have raised serious questions about the declining effectiveness of the UN Security Council in maintaining global and regional security in recent years. On April 26, the 76th session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution co-sponsored by 83 countries stipulating that if one or more of the five permanent members of the Security Council use their veto in the Security Council, the President of the General Assembly shall convene a plenary session within 10 working days to review the veto, allowing all member countries to review and comment on the act of using the veto. This means that the five permanent members must shoulder more responsibility when using the veto. It is actually a disguised way to limit the power of the five permanent members and give more power to the UN General Assembly, and it would significantly affect the functioning of the UN. In the future, the reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council, may accelerate, which would have a major impact on the global security governance system that formed after World War II with the Security Council as the main framework.

三是全球与地区安全架构的改革与重塑。在全球层面,世界上很多国家对于联合国安理会近年来在维护全球与地区安全中效率下降提出了强烈质疑。4月26日,联合国大会第76届会议通过了一项由83个国家共同提案的决议,规定如果安理会“五常”中的一个或多个在安理会使用“一票否决权”,联大主席应在10个工作日内召开全会,对否决权使用情况进行辩论,所有会员国都可以对行使否决权的行动进行审查和评论。这意味着五常在使用“一票否决”时必须承担更多责任。这实际上等于变相限制了“五常”的权力,把权力更多交给了联合国大会,将对联合国的运作产生重大影响。未来,联合国包括安理会的改革可能会加速进行,这对于二战以后形成的以安理会作为主要框架的全球安全治理体系将带来重大冲击。

In Europe, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has caused a revitalization after years of crises—the sovereign debt crisis, refugee crisis, and Brexit crisis. NATO has also been roused by the war to emerge from its so-called “brain dead” state and play a more important role in European security affairs. The United States’ position in the transatlantic security system has also risen further. This means that the state of Russian-European relations since the end of the Cold War, which despite long-standing discord could be just about maintained, will come to an end, and a new divide is re-emerging in Europe. However, this is not the Cold War period’s “iron curtain” between two evenly matched rival camps, but a barrier by which the vast majority of European countries “isolate” Russia.

在欧洲,俄乌冲突使欧洲在经历了多年来的主权债务危机、难民危机、英国脱欧危机后重新振作起来。北约在战争的刺激下也走出了所谓“脑死亡”状态,在欧洲安全事务中发挥更重要的作用。而美国在跨大西洋安全体系当中的地位也进一步上升。这意味着,在冷战结束后俄欧关系尽管长期不睦但仍可以勉强维持的状态将会结束,一道新的鸿沟正在欧洲重新出现。不过,这不是冷战时期两个势均力敌的敌对阵营之间的“铁幕”,而是绝大多数欧洲国家“隔离”俄罗斯的屏障。

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has also had a spillover effect on Asia-Pacific security, with some countries viewing China and Russia as one and the same, and one-sidedly believing that China is supporting Russia’s so-called military operation against Ukraine. Influenced by such a misreading, the United States has further stepped up its efforts to reshape the Indo-Pacific security system, striving to build a multi-level, multi-format, multi-field, cross-regional Indo-Pacific security mechanism and strengthen its extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region to address the so-called “comprehensive China challenge.”

俄乌冲突对亚太安全也产生了外溢效应,一些国家把中国和俄罗斯视为一体,片面认为中国在支持俄罗斯对乌克兰的所谓军事行动。在这种误读的影响之下,美国进一步加紧重塑印太安全体系,力图构筑多层次、多形式、多领域、跨区域的印太安全机制,加强在印太地区的延伸威慑,来应对所谓“中国的全方位挑战”。

It must be noted, however, that there are still important differences in the strategic positioning of the United States towards China and Russia, and the strengthening of its Indo-Pacific alliance system is more preventive than offensive in nature. At the same time, on a number of recent important diplomatic occasions, China has reiterated its strategic position on Sino-Russian relations as being “non-aligned, non-confrontational and non-targeted.” China has always criticized the “Cold War mentality” and does not want the world to fall back into “confrontation between camps.” In fact, there are many differences between China and Russia in terms of national strength, identity, strategic goals, and relationships with the world system. As long as China maintains a clear strategic mind and strategic determination, the risk of a “re-campification” of the world will be greatly reduced.

但需要看到,美国对中国和俄罗斯的战略定位仍然是有着重要区别的,其印太同盟体系的强化更多是预防性而非进攻性的。与此同时,中方在近期的多个重要外交场合重申了中俄关系“不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方”的战略定位,中国始终批判“冷战思维”,不希望世界重新陷入“阵营对抗”。而实际上,中俄两国在国家实力、身份定位、战略目标以及同世界体系的关系上都有诸多不同。只要中国保持清醒的战略头脑和战略定力,世界“再阵营化”的风险就会大大降低。

The “small divergence” inspired by the Russian-Ukrainian war is an adjustment phase in the post-Cold War era, one which will generate far-reaching impacts on the future international landscape and world order. The development of the world is not determined a priori by the heavens or the “laws of history,” but hinges on human thought and action. We hope that the world’s politicians will show wisdom, conscience, and courage, so that this period of “small divergence” will end as soon as possible, allowing a more vigorous, more balanced, and fairer wave of globalization to take hold, and for a community of human destiny with coexistence and shared prosperity to be collectively built.

俄乌战争激发的“小分流”,是后冷战时代世界发展的一个阶段性调整,它将对未来的国际格局和世界秩序产生深远影响。世界的发展不是上天或者“历史规律”先验决定的,它取决于人类的思想和行动。希望世界的政治家们能展现出智慧、良知和勇气,让这一段“小分流”尽快结束,让更加澎湃、更加均衡、更加公正的全球化浪潮重新汇集,共建一个共生共荣的人类命运共同体。

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冯玉军 (Feng Yujun) (2022). "The Post-Russia-Ukraine Conflict World: Not a “Splitting into Camps,” but Rather a “Small Divergence” [俄乌冲突后的世界:不是“阵营化”,而是“小分流”]". Interpret: China, Original work published July 22, 2022, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-post-russia-ukraine-conflict-world-not-a-splitting-into-camps-but-rather-a-small-divergence/

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