中日矛盾中的“聚旗效应”:日本介入台湾问题的特征及影响
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The “Rally Round the Flag” Effect in Sino-Japanese Conflicts: Characteristics and Effects of Japan’s Involvement in the Taiwan Issue

中日矛盾中的“聚旗效应”:日本介入台湾问题的特征及影响

Cai Liang, a researcher focused on regional issues in Asia at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, argues that Japan is no longer maintaining purely unofficial relations with Taiwan that center around trade, investment, and cultural exchange. This is evident, Cai holds, in what he sees as Tokyo’s efforts to internationalize discussion of Taiwan and emphasize shared values. Cai attributes this perceived change largely to the dynamics of rising strategic competition between the United States and China.


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The “rally round the flag” effect, which is derived from political science theory, refers to the political effect where an issue triggers a crisis during a general election, and leads to a significant increase in support for a candidate (especially an incumbent or a candidate in the ruling camp). Generally speaking, issues of this type have three characteristics, i.e. international attention, close connections with national interests, and high levels of public attention. 1 As a concept in international relations, the “rally round the flag” effect focuses on the major impact on the relationship between countries due to their focus on a certain issue, whose impact is even strong enough to threaten each other’s political foundation. 2

“聚旗效应”(the rally-around-the-flag effect)源自政治学理论,意指在大选中因某个议题引发危机,导致候选人(尤其是现任者或执政阵营的参选者)支持率大幅提升的一种政治效应。一般而言,这类议题有三个特征,即国际瞩目、与本国利益息息相关、公众关注度高。而作为国际关系学上的一个概念,“聚旗效应”重点探究的是国家间关系因聚焦某个议题而受到重大影响,其冲击效应甚至会达到足以动摇彼此政治基础的程度。

Taking Sino-Japanese relations as an example, the two countries are entangled in historical and geopolitical conflicts, and their deep-seated strategic structural doubts are interwoven and interlayered with practical interests on the surface. If we compare the conflicts between the two countries to an iceberg in the ocean, the deep structural conflicts are the part below the surface, and the tip of the iceberg floating above is a series of apparent conflicts between the two countries. Looking at Sino-Japanese relations since their normalization of diplomatic relations, the apparent conflicts between the two countries are mainly focused on the three major issues: the Taiwan Issue, how to understand the historical issues, and the Diaoyu Islands dispute. At the present stage, the “rally round the flag” effect of the Taiwan issue in the Sino-Japanese conflict is becoming increasingly prominent and has seriously impacted the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations. This article focuses on the causes of this phenomenon, the characteristics of Japan’s involvement in the Taiwan issue at the present stage, and the impact of the Taiwan issue on Sino-Japanese relations at the present stage.

以中日关系为例,两国历史瓜葛与地缘矛盾纠结缠绕,深层次的战略结构疑虑与表象面的现实利益纠葛交织叠加。若将两国间的矛盾比喻成海洋中的冰山,则深层次的结构性矛盾就在海平面以下部分,浮在海平面以上的冰山一角就是横亘在两国之间的一系列表象矛盾。考察邦交正常化以来的中日关系,两国间的表象矛盾主要聚焦在台湾、历史认识和钓鱼岛这三大议题上。现阶段,台湾问题在中日矛盾中的“聚旗效应”日益凸显,已经严重冲击中日关系的政治基础。本文围绕造成这一现象的原因、现阶段日本介入台湾问题呈现的特征,以及台湾问题对现阶段中日关系带来的影响进行重点探讨。

I. The “Major and Minor Premises” for Japan’s Treatment of the Taiwan Issue Since the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations

一、邦交正常化以来日本处理台湾问题的“大小前提”

The core of the Taiwan issue, from the perspective of Sino-Japanese relations, is whether the Japanese government can abide by the “One China” policy, which is a core interest of China and one of the political foundations of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Taking the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan in 1972 as an opportunity, Japan has developed a basic structure for dealing with the Taiwan issue: while Japan has established official relations with China, it maintains unofficial but practical exchanges with Taiwan, focusing mainly on economics and trade.3 For Japan, maintaining official relations with China is the “major premise” and maintaining non-political contacts with Taiwan is the “minor premise”. From a horizontal perspective, the “major and minor premises” coexist, while from a vertical perspective, the “minor premise” is subordinate to the “major premise”. It needs to be emphasized that this kind of non-official and practical relationship between Japan and Taiwan also has two meanings. First, it means maintaining a political, economic, trade, and cultural interaction as well as exchanges of personnel; second, it means that whenever problems in bilateral relations arise, which need to be resolved by formal diplomatic means, Japan and Taiwan will resolve them appropriately through special communication channels.4

从中日关系的视角来探讨台湾问题,其核心是日本政府能否遵守“一个中国”政策,这是中国的核心利益所在,也是中日能否维系外交关系的政治基础之一。以中日在1972年实现邦交正常化为契机,日本在处理台湾问题时形成了这样的基本架构:日本与中国建立官方关系的同时,与台湾地区维持非官方的以经贸为主的实务性往来。对日本而言,与中国保持官方往来是“大前提”,维持与台湾地区的非政治接触是“小前提”。从横向角度看是“大小前提”并存,从纵向角度看则是“小前提”服从“大前提”。需要强调的是,日台这种非官方实务性关系也有两层含义:第一是指保持政治以外的经贸、文化、人员往来;第二是指每当双边关系出现需要以正式外交手段来解决的问题时,日台会通过特殊的沟通渠道进行妥善解决。

In order to maintain economic and trade relationships, Japan and Taiwan established the “Interchange Association (Japan)” and the “Association for East Asian Relations” (AEAR) in late 1972. Since the Interchange Association and AEAR are private organizations, their staff members enjoy only partial diplomatic treatment, and they are authorized mainly to protect the personal and property safety of their own people located on the other side. Their activities are limited to the promotion of economic, trade, technical, and cultural exchanges and cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.5 In terms of functional characteristics, the private nature of the Interchange Association and the AEAR means that these two organizations perform the functions of official foreign missions only at ceremonial and service levels. When faced with highly sensitive political issues, the AEAR can neither correspond directly with the Japanese government nor negotiate with the Interchange Association as official foreign agencies do, and Japan and Taiwan cannot have direct “political” contacts. In fact, there is another important channel for communication between Japan and Taiwan, namely the Japanese Diet Members’ Council for Japan-ROC Relations (abbreviated as “Japan-ROC Council” or “Nikka-kon”), which was established on March 14, 1973 by 152 “pro-Taiwan” Diet members from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). 6 The members of this organization use the special status of Diet members in Japan and their contacts among the upper echelons in Taiwan to serve as a medium for indirect political contacts between the two sides.7 On the whole, until the end of the Cold War, the Japanese government was still adhering to the principles related to the “major and minor premises” in dealing with the Taiwan issue. After the end of the Cold War, as the rise of China collided with the strategic interests of the United States and the practical interests of Japan, the “China threat theory” repeatedly reared its head in Japan, and Japan increasingly viewed Taiwan as an effective tool for preventing and containing China’s rise. The “major and minor premises” have also taken different degrees of impacts. This change is not only reflected in the increasing tendency for the Interchange Association and the AEAR to become inherently more official in nature, but also in the increasing diversification of “civil” channels between Japan and Taiwan. These “private” organizations tend to function more and more as “official” agents between the two sides. This change is apparent in the following three aspects.

为维系日台之间的经贸往来,双方于1972年底分别成立“财团法人交流协会”(简称“交流协会”)和“亚东关系协会”(简称“亚协”)。“交流协会”和“亚协”在性质上属于民间组织,因此工作人员只享有部分外交待遇,其权限主要是保护己方民众在对方的人身、财产安全,活动内容限于促进日台经贸、技术、文化交流与合作。在功能特征上,“交流协会”和“亚协”的民间属性导致这两个机构仅在礼节性及事务级层次上履行着正式驻外机构的职权,当面临敏感度高的政治议题时,“亚协”不能像正式驻外机构那样与日本政府直接行文,也不能与“交流协会”协商,日台双方不能进行直接“政治”接触等。实际上,日台之间还有一个重要的沟通渠道,即1973年3月14日由152名自民党“亲台派”国会议员成立的“日华关系议员恳谈会”(简称“日华恳”)。该组织成员利用国会议员在日本国内的特殊地位及在台湾上层中积累的人脉关系,穿梭于两地之间充当彼此间接政治接触的媒介。总体而言,到冷战结束,日本政府在处理台湾问题时还是比较恪守“大小前提”的相关原则的。冷战结束后,随着中国崛起与美国的战略利益、日本的现实利益碰撞日益加剧,“中国威胁论”在日本国内反复抬头,日本越来越将台湾视为其防范、遏制中国崛起的有效工具,“大小前提”也在不同程度上遭受冲击。这一变化不仅表现为“交流协会”和“亚协”内在属性的官方倾向愈加浓厚,而且日台“民间”渠道日益多元化,这些“民间”组织在功能上越来越倾向于充当双方“官方”代理者角色,这一特征的变化具体显现在以下三个方面。

First, the political level of the Interchange Association has risen. At the beginning of Association’s establishment, Japan’s basic policy was to keep a low political status, but after the end of the Cold War, its political status rose to a new level. In terms of staffing, the number of staff at the Interchange Association in the beginning was less than the 30 people at the former “embassy” in Taiwan, but by 1992, it had increased to 70.8 In terms of the positions of accredited representatives, those at the Interchange Association had also relatively low rankings during the time of its establishment, but after the end of the Cold War, the political positions of those who serve as Chief of General Affairs at the Taipei Office had risen significantly. In May 1991, for example, for the first time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent Yoshio Nomoto, head of the Second Southeast Asia Division of the Asia Bureau, on “extended leave” to serve as Chief of General Affairs at the Taipei Office of the Interchange Association; and in January 2003, a former major general of the Self-Defense Forces, Yoichi Nagano, was sent to the Taipei Office to take a position similar to that of a defense attaché in a foreign embassy.9 The aforementioned actions show that the nature of the Interchange Association has been upgraded from “unofficial” to “semi-official” level since the end of the Cold War. After Shinzo Abe returned to power, the Interchange Association and the AEAR changed their names to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association and the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association respectively in early 2017. This means that the level of Japan-Taiwan exchange has been upgraded again to the “quasi-official” level.

首先,“交流协会”的政治层级上升。“交流协会”在创立之初,日本的基本方针是竭力压低其政治层级,但是冷战结束后政治层级上升。在人员数量配置上,创立之初,“交流协会”少于原驻台“大使馆”的30人,但是到1992年时增至70人。在派驻代表的职位上,创立之初,“交流协会”也相对较低,但是冷战结束后担任台北事务所总务部长人选的政治职务明显提升。如1991年5月外务省首次派亚洲局东南亚第二课课长野本佳夫以“长期休假”的方式出任“交流协会”台北事务所总务部长;至2003年1月派遣前陆上自卫队将级军官长野阳一至“交流协会”台北事务所担任类似驻外使馆防卫武官的职位。上述举动表明,冷战结束后“交流协会”在性质上已从冷战时的“非官方”升格至“半官方”层级。到安倍晋三再度执政后,“交流协会”和“亚协”于2017年初分别更名为“公益财团法人日本台湾交流协会”和“台湾日本关系协会”,这意味着日台交流的层级又提升至“准官方”了。

Secondly, the “civil” channels between Japan and Taiwan have diversified. This is mainly reflected in two respects: First, the Japan-ROC Council has changed from a single-party “pro-Taiwan” organization of the LDP to a cross-party “pro-Taiwan” organization. With the split of the LDP in 1993, the Japan-ROC Council also split. On February 5, 1997, the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council (still referred to as the Japan-ROC Council) was established with 300 members.10 Until July 10, 2022, before the Diet elections, there were 276 Japan-ROC Council members, still rendering it the largest and most influential cross-party “pro-Taiwan” organization among Japanese Diet members. Second, each party has formed a “pro-Taiwan” organization that emphasizes communications with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Traditionally, the Japan-ROC Council emphasized liaison with the KMT, but with the rise of the DPP, the target of communication has now shifted to developing relations with the DPP. In fact, some of the “pro-Taiwan” organizations that were newly established in the 1990s have emphasized ties with the DPP from the very beginning. Examples include the Japan-ROC Friendship Parliamentarians’ League established on May 28, 1997,11 and the Japan-Taiwan Friendship Parliamentarians’ League established on May 9, 2001.

其次,日台“民间”渠道多元化。这主要体现在两个方面:一是“日华恳”从单一的自民党“亲台”组织转变为跨党派的“亲台”组织。随着1993年自民党的分裂,“日华恳”也随之分裂。直到1997年2月5日,日本成立了跨党派的“日华议员恳谈会”(仍简称“日华恳”),成员多达300人。至2022年7月10日参议院改选前,“日华恳”成员有276人,依旧是日本国会议员中规模最大、影响力最深远的跨党派“亲台”组织。二是各党纷纷组成强调与民进党沟通的“亲台”组织。“日华恳”的传统是重视与国民党的联络,但随着民进党的崛起,如今交流对象也转为与民进党发展关系。实际上,1990年代新成立的一些“亲台”组织从一开始就重视与民进党的联系,如1997年5月28日成立的“日华友好议员联盟”、2001年5月9日成立的“日台友好议员联盟”等。

Finally, Japan has been making a big push to win over of Tsai Ing-wen’s government. As mentioned earlier, Japan has always viewed Taiwan as a strategic tool to counterbalance the power of China, and Shinzo Abe repeatedly emphasized that Taiwan is an important pivot area for Japan to maintain its so-called “Open-Country” strategy from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia.12 Therefore, Abe made great efforts to co-opt Tsai Ing-wen. For example, during Tsai’s pre-election visit to Japan, Abe had a “chance meeting” with her at the Capitol Hotel Tokyu near the prime minister’s official residence. When Tsai Ing-wen was elected as Taiwan’s leader on January 16, 2016, the then-Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida immediately sent a rare written message of congratulations, stating that the two sides “share common values” and that he hoped that they would “continue to maintain practical non-governmental relations and deepen cooperation and exchanges”.13 At the same time, Abe himself and the former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga also expressed their respective “heartfelt congratulations” to Tsai. Subsequently, Japan organized congratulatory delegations to Taiwan for Tsai’s inauguration speech and the Double Tenth Day and other events. Most notably, on March 26, 2017, Prime Minister Abe dispatched Senior Vice Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama to Taiwan for an “official” visit, making Akama the highest-ranking official dispatched by Japan since diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan were severed in 1972.

最后,日本对蔡英文当局进行大加笼络。如前所述,日本一直视台湾为制衡中国的战略性工具,安倍晋三多次强调台湾是日本维持其从东北亚到东南亚一线所谓“开放国家”战略的重要支点地区。因此大力拉拢蔡英文,如蔡在选前访日期间,安倍在首相官邸附近的东急凯彼德大饭店与蔡“偶遇”。2016年1月16日,蔡英文当选台湾地区领导人后,时任外相的岸田文雄随即罕见地以书面形式发出贺词,声称双方“有着共同的价值观”,希望彼此“继续维持非政府间实务关系,并深化合作与交流”。与此同时,安倍本人及时任官房长官的菅义伟还分别向蔡表示“由衷的祝贺”。随后,无论是蔡英文就职演说,还是“双十庆典”等活动,日本均组织祝贺团访台。最令人瞩目的是,2017年3月26日安倍首相派遣总务省副大臣赤间二郎对台湾进行的“公务”访问,赤间成为1972年日台“断交”以来日方派遣的最高层级官员。

Accordingly, it can be seen that, during the Cold War, the Taiwan issue did not trigger the “rally round the flag” effect in two countries’ conflicts. It was because Japan had soundly observed the “major and minor premises” for dealing with the Taiwan issue. However, after the end of the Cold War, the above-mentioned “major and minor premises” have suffered repeated impacts, and unofficial exchanges between Japan and Taiwan have crossed the line at various levels. Evidently, the Japanese government is also aware that the bottom line of the Taiwan issue cannot be crossed at will. For example, the Japanese government clearly stated to the Chinese party in May 2018, that “the Japanese side will only maintain civil contacts with Taiwan in accordance with the provisions of the Japan-China Joint Communiqué”.14

由此可见,在冷战期间因日本较好地遵守处理台湾问题的“大小前提”,台湾问题并未引发两国矛盾的“聚旗效应”。但冷战结束后上述“大小前提”屡受冲击,日台的非官方往来在层级上有所突破。当然,日方也清楚台湾问题的底线不可随便逾越,如日本政府曾于2018年5月向中方明确表态:“日方将按照《日中联合声明》的规定,仅同台湾保持民间往来”。

II. Characteristics of Japan’s Involvement in the Taiwan Issue in the Context of the “Rally Round the Flag” Effect

二、“聚旗效应”视阈下日本介入台湾问题的特征

Overall, Japan’s motives for getting involved in the Taiwan issue are complex and diverse. From the perspective of various aspects, such as economic security and geopolitics, Japan has always considered Taiwan to be closely linked to Japan’s national security and economic interests.15 In terms of favorable feelings toward Taiwan among the Japanese people, both the Japanese public and politicians have always had a highly favorable opinion of Taiwan, especially in contrast to the continuously declining trend in favorable feelings toward mainland China among the Japanese. For this reason, Japan believes that the “major and minor premises” of the Taiwan issue should be adjusted according to the needs of the times. For example, since Taiwan has achieved democratization, any changes concerning Taiwan’s “future” must be consistent with the mainstream public opinion of the Taiwanese people. And even though Japan should not interfere in internal affairs of other parties, from the standpoint of regional stability, it should still make clear that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are of paramount importance to Japan.16 Nevertheless, the Japanese side is also aware that the Taiwan issue is the foundation of Sino-Japanese political relations, and except for repeatedly clashing with the “major and minor premises” at the level of engagement, it has not yet intervened in the Taiwan issue to the extent that the United States has.

总体而言,日本介入台湾问题的动机复杂多元,从经济安全、地缘政治等诸要素来看,日本一直认为台湾与日本的国家安全与经济利益息息相关。从日本人对台湾的好感度看,无论是日本民众还是政治家,对台湾的好感度一直很高,尤其是与日本人对中国大陆的好感度持续低迷的趋势形成鲜明对比。基于此,日本认为对于台湾问题的“大小前提”应该根据时代之需进行调整。如台湾已经实现民主化,任何事关台湾“未来”的变动都必须符合台湾民众的主流民意。又如日本虽然不应干涉内政,但从区域稳定的立场出发,也应明确表明台湾海峡的和平与稳定对日本而言至关重要等态度。当然,日方也清楚台湾问题关乎中日政治关系的基础,除了在交往的层次方面屡屡冲撞“大小前提”外,在介入台湾问题上还未到美国那种激烈的程度。

At this stage, the “rally round the flag” effect of the Taiwan issue in Sino-Japanese conflicts is becoming increasingly apparent, and the most important variable of which is the background of strategic competition between China and the United States. In the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy, China is seen as “the only competitor that can continuously challenge the U.S.-led international order in multiple fields, including economic, diplomatic, military, and technological fields,” and the United States even believes that China is “trying to change the current international order according to its own interests,” in order to “establish a world that is antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”17 For this reason, the United States has long been the biggest international obstacle to China’s eventual reunification, and from the Trump administration to the Biden administration in particular, the United States has frequently played the “Taiwan card” and even the “Taiwan independence card” in its policy toward China. The purpose of “using Taiwan to contain China” is all too clear. At the same time, Taiwan’s DPP authorities are also actively cooperating with the U.S. diplomatic agenda, intending to “seek independence by relying on the United States.”

现阶段,台湾问题在中日矛盾中的“聚旗效应”日益显现,其最重要变量就是中美战略竞争的大背景。在美国的印太战略中,中国被视为“在经济、外交、军事、技术等多领域都可以对美国主导的国际秩序进行持续挑战的唯一竞争对手”,美国甚至认为中国正在“试图根据自身利益改变现行国际秩序”,以“塑造一个与美国价值观和利益相对立的世界”。为此,美国是长期阻挠中国实现最终统一的最大国际障碍,尤其是从特朗普政府到拜登政府,美国在对华政策上更是频频打“台湾牌”,甚至打“台独牌”,其“借台遏华”的目的昭然若揭。与此同时,台湾的民进党当局也积极配合美国的外交布局,意图“依美谋独”。

On the one hand, Japan fully agrees with the U.S. position toward China, and it emphasizes that the only regional security arrangement which provides the public good of regional peace and stability has the Japan-U.S. alliance at its core.18 On the other hand, Japan’s geographical location puts it at the forefront of strategic competition between China and the United States, and its comprehensive national power is the key “third pole” after China and the United States, which increases the United States’ reliance on Japan. This is conducive to Japan’s pursuit of being a major political power and the enhancement of its defense forces. China’s strategic forbearance toward Japan, adopted to reduce the pressure exerted by the United States and to gather support from more countries, has also led to a relatively favorable international security and economic environment for Japan.19 On this basis, Japan is now more inclined to think about issues from the perspective of a “zero-sum game” when dealing with China, especially when it comes to the various conflicts between the two countries, which consequently expands its leeway for “asserting what should be asserted.”20 The common interest of Japan and the United States in “using Taiwan to contain China” is also gaining stronger basis, and Japan’s motivation and ability to intervene in the Taiwan issue are undoubtedly increasing as well.21 Therefore, it is not surprising that the Taiwan issue has triggered a “rally round the flag” effect in Sino-Japanese conflicts. At this stage, Japan’s involvement in the Taiwan issue is characterized by the following three features:

一方面,日本完全认同美国的对华定位,并强调唯有以日美同盟为核心的有关地区秩序安排的架构,才是维护地区和平与稳定的国际安全公共产品。另一方面,日本的地理位置处于中美战略竞争的最前沿,加之其综合国力是仅次于中美的关键“第三极”,因此美国加大了对日本的倚重程度,这有利于日本追求政治大国地位和增强国防力量。而中国为减轻美国方面施加的压力,争取更多国家支持而采取的对日战略隐忍等,也导致日本的国际安全环境和经济环境相对宽松。基于此,现阶段日本在处理对华关系时,尤其对横亘在两国之间的各种矛盾,更倾向于从“零和博弈”的视角来思考问题,因此其“应主张的就主张”的空间正在扩大,日美“借台遏华”的共同利益也在增强,日本干预台湾问题的动机、能力无疑也在增大。因此,台湾问题引发中日矛盾的“聚旗效应”也就不足为奇了。现阶段,日本介入台湾问题主要呈现如下三个特征:

First, Japan is looking to values, trying to seek “righteous justification” for its intervention in the Taiwan issue. In its joint involvement in the Taiwan issue with the United States, Japan has been increasingly emphasizing the importance of values that Taiwan shares with Japan and the United States. The United States has explicitly included Taiwan in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, pointing out that the importance of “building an international system based on shared values to … deter (China’s) military aggression against our own country and our allies and partners … including by supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities—so that we can ensure an environment in which Taiwan’s future is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best interests of Taiwan’s people.”22 Under this context, Japan is using the excuse of “supporting Taiwan” to conceal its ulterior motive of “resisting China”.

首先,从价值观层面入手,寻找介入台湾问题的“大义名分”。日本在联美涉台时越来越趋向强调台湾与日美拥有共同价值观的重要性。美国在“印太战略”中明确将台湾纳入其中,指出“建立一个以共同的价值观为基础的国际体系,阻止(中国)对我们自己国家以及我们的盟友和伙伴的军事侵略———包括支持台湾的自卫能力,以确保台湾的未来能够按照台湾民众的愿望和最佳利益和平决定的环境。”在此背景下,日本用“挺台”的表象掩饰“抗中”的本质。

Specifically, when Japan packages the “free and open international order” as “universal values,” it simultaneously labels China, a country with a different development path from that of the United States and the West, as “heterodox” and in violation of “universal values”. As a result, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Japan’s policy stance toward Taiwan has increasingly deviated from the established framework of Sino-Japanese relations. The latest edition of Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook suggests that “Japan and Taiwan are extremely important partners and friends who have shared values and close economic ties, and (the Japanese government) will continue to promote various practical exchanges with the Taiwan authorities.”23 At present, Japan continues to challenge the bottom line of the “One China” principle, while emphasizing that Japan and Taiwan are “partners with shared values.” Japan has not only turned a blind eye to the DPP authorities’ “de-Sinicization” and its pursuit of “Taiwan independence,” but has also been giving signals to the DPP authorities from time to time that it condones “Taiwan independence,” resulting in volatile and unstable cross-Strait situations. For this reason, Japan and the United States have included the Taiwan issue within the scope of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, viewing China’s principled position on Taiwan, along with its statements and actions, as a challenge to the regional order. In actuality, Japan and the United States have correlated the interference in China’s domestic affairs to the goals of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a “distorted correlation” has been deliberately made between the Taiwan issue and the Ukraine issue. In the 2022 edition of the Defense White Paper, Japan deliberately used the Russia-Ukraine conflict to create regional tension. On the one hand, it deliberately exaggerated the so-called “security threat” to Japan posed by China’s military development and Sino-Russian military cooperation, and emphasized that “China’s rapid improvement of the quality and quantity of its military forces has aroused strong concerns in the international community.” On the other hand, it increased its reference to Taiwan, claiming that the reunification of mainland China with Taiwan would “become a real threat to Japan.”24

具体而言,日本将“自由与开放的国际秩序”包装成“普世价值”的同时,就是给不同于美西方发展道路的中国贴上了违反“普世价值”的“异质性”标签。因此在俄乌冲突爆发后,日本对台政策立场越来越背离中日既定的框架。日本最新版《外交蓝皮书》提出,“日台是拥有共同价值观和紧密经济关系的极其重要的伙伴和友人,(日本政府)会持续推动与台湾当局的各项务实交流”。当前,日本在强调日台是“拥有共同价值观的伙伴”关系的同时,不断挑战“一个中国”的底线。日本不但对民进党当局“去中国化”谋求“台独”的种种行径视而不见,还不时地对民进党当局释放纵容“台独”的信号,致使两岸局势动荡不安。为此,日美将台湾问题纳入到“印太战略”的范围内,将中国在台湾问题上的原则立场和相关言行等视为对地区秩序的挑战,事实上将干涉中国内政与其“印太战略”的目标挂钩,进而在俄乌冲突爆发后又刻意将台湾问题与乌克兰局势“扭曲联结”起来。在2022年版的《防卫白皮书》中,日本借俄乌冲突蓄意制造地区局势紧张,一方面刻意渲染中国军事发展及中俄军事合作对日本造成的所谓“安全威胁”,并强调“中国快速强化军事力量的质量与数量,引发国际社会的强烈担忧”;另一方面增加对台湾的描述,声称中国大陆与台湾统一将“成为对日本的真正威胁”。

Second, Japan has used various international occasions to shape forces of international public opinion, gathering momentum for its deeper involvement in the Taiwan issue. Starting in March 2021, Japan has used several bilateral or multilateral international conferences to reiterate that Taiwan’s values are the same as those of the United States, Japan, Europe, and other Western countries, and that countries should pay attention to “the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” It also played up the notion that Taiwan is facing the “threat” from mainland China. At 2021’s “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” virtual summit, Japan-U.S. “2+2“ talks, Japan-U.S. “Joint Statement,” EU-Japan Summit, and Japan-Australia ”2+2“ talks, and at 2022’s G7 Summit in Cornwall, Japan-Australia Summit Meeting, Japan-U.S. and Japan-France “2+2” talks, Japan-U.S. summit, Japan-U.S.-South Korea foreign ministers’ talks, and EU-Japan Summit, Japan and other countries have repeatedly mentioned the Taiwan issue. Under the leadership and influence of the United States and Japan, one can say that the Taiwan issue is something that “no meeting is without.”

其次,日本利用各种国际场合制造国际舆论,为深度介入台湾问题造势。从2021年3月开始,日本通过多个双边或多边国际会议,强调台湾的价值理念与美日欧等西方国家相同,各国应关注“台湾海峡和平与稳定的重要性”,同时渲染台湾正在遭受中国大陆的“威胁”。2021年的“四方安全对话”线上峰会、日美“2+2”会谈、日美“联合声明”、日欧领导人峰会、日澳“2+2”会谈及七国集团康沃尔峰会,进入2022年的日澳峰会、日美和日法的“2+2”会谈、日美峰会、日美韩外长会谈、日欧领导人峰会,日本等国屡屡提及台湾议题,在美国和日本的主导和牵动下台湾问题可谓是“无会不与”。

In particular, the visit to Taiwan by Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi was a political provocation that seriously violated the “One China” principle, severely infringed on China’s sovereignty, and seriously endangered peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Japan argued that Pelosi’s move was a “completely normal and routine act”25 and reacted extremely vehemently to the various countermeasures taken by China, maligning China for harming peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and threatening Japan’s national security, and dispatching several warplanes to closely observe China’s military exercises in the vicinity. At a breakfast meeting with Pelosi, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated that “China’s recent actions will have a profound impact on peace and stability in the region and the international community,” and called on the Chinese side to immediately stop the military exercises. The two sides exchanged views on strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and striving for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” with Kishida hoping that Pelosi “will continue to play a leading role and support the U.S. Congress in achieving its goals.” Kishida confirmed that “Japan and the United States will continue to work closely together to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”26

尤其是,美国众议院议长佩洛西窜访台湾是严重违背一个中国原则、严重侵犯中国主权、严重危害台湾海峡和平稳定的政治挑衅,日本辩称佩洛西的举动是“完全正常、例行性行为”,并对中国采取的各项反制措施反应异常激烈,污蔑中国破坏台湾海峡和平稳定,威胁日本的国家安全,并出动多架战机在中国实施军演的周边进行密切观察。日本首相岸田文雄在与佩洛西的早餐会上指出,“中方近期的举动将对地区及国际社会的和平与稳定造成深刻影响,呼吁中方立即停止军演”;双方就加强日美同盟和“自由开放的印太”交换意见,岸田希望佩洛西“继续发挥领导作用,并支持美国国会实现目标”;岸田确认“为维护台湾海峡的和平与稳定,日美将继续密切合作”。

Furthermore, Japan again “stirred up” the topic of “Chinese missiles landing in Japan’s exclusive economic zone” as the rationale for it to play up the “China threat theory”. Japan stressed that “this time, five ballistic missiles launched by China landed in Japan’s coastal waters, including the exclusive economic zone,” which was a major issue concerning Japan’s security and the safety of its citizens, and made strong accusations and protests regarding this issue.27

进而,日本又“热炒”所谓“中国导弹落在日本专属经济区”的话题,作为其渲染“中国威胁论”的依据。日本强调,“这次中国发射弹道导弹有五枚落在包括专属经济区在内的日本近海”,这是事关日本安全保障及国民安全的重大问题,对此表示强烈指责和抗议。

Finally, through the powerful “pro-Taiwan” forces in Japanese politics, Japan has been repeatedly challenging the “One China” principle. Although Japanese politicians claim that they will not establish state relations with Taiwan, they actively support Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization and the World Civil Aviation Organization, and oppose China’s so-called “suppression and coercion” of Taiwan and so-called “unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait”.28

最后,通过日本政界强大的“亲台”力量,屡屡挑战“一个中国”原则。日本政治家虽然表示不会与台湾建立国家关系,但积极支持台湾参与世界卫生组织、世界民航组织等,反对中国对台所谓“打压与胁迫”,反对所谓“单方面改变台湾海峡的现状”。

Before his death, Shinzo Abe was the chairman of the Seiwa Policy Research Council (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai, or “Seiwa-kai”), the largest faction of the LDP, and the “Shadow Dancer” influencing Kishida’s chance to become the prime minister. After his resignation as prime minister, he served as an advisor to the “Nikka-kon” and became a representative of the “pro-Taiwan faction” in Japanese politics. Even after Abe’s assassination, his political legacy is inevitably still looming over the Kishida government’s policy toward Taiwan.

安倍晋三生前既是自民党最大派阀———清和政策研究会(简称“清和会”)会长,更是左右岸田能否担任首相的“影舞者”。他辞任首相后出任“日华恳”顾问,成为日本政坛“亲台派”的代表人物。即使安倍遇刺身亡后,其政治遗产亦不可避免地影响着岸田政府的对台政策。

On the one hand, Abe himself and his followers, the pro-Taiwan faction of the LDP, unscrupulously and frequently tested the bottom line of the Taiwan issue, intending to use the tough message of “resisting China and protecting Taiwan” to cater to the interests of the United States, strengthen their power within the party, and thus influence the Kishida government’s policy toward Taiwan. For example, Abe’s political confidant Masahisa Sato has been intent on institutionalizing the so-called “2+2 Dialogue between the ruling parties of Japan and Taiwan,” and has held two meetings on August 27 and December 24, 2021. The two sides believe that the exchange of legislators in charge of their respective ruling parties can effectively enhance Japan and Taiwan’s “exchanges in diplomatic, economic, security, and other areas.” And in particular, as two sides are facing “China’s unilateral changes to the regional status quo in recent years, the Japanese side believes that exchanges with Taiwan should be strengthened.”29 Abe himself even arrogantly claimed that if “Taiwan has a crisis,” it can also mean that “the Japan-U.S. alliance has a crisis.”30

一方面,安倍本人及其追随者自民党亲台派肆无忌惮地在台湾问题上频频触碰底线,意图用“抗中保台”的强硬形象附和美国,壮大他们在党内的声势,进而左右岸田政府的对台政策。如安倍的亲信佐藤正久就意图将所谓“日台执政党2+2对话”朝制度化方向发展,并于2021年8月27日和12月24日举办了两次会议。双方认为,通过各自执政党主管议员的交流,可有效增强日台在“外交、经济、安全保障等各层面的交流”,尤其面对“近年来中国片面改变区域现状,日方认为应与台湾加强交流”。安倍本人更是“妄称”“台湾有事”也可以说是“日美同盟有事”。

Seiwa-kai members make up about 1/4 of the LDP’s upper and lower house members. Their strong stance has a significant impact on the LDP’s basic policy and exerts some pressure on the administrative policies of the government. For example, during the formulation of the 2022 government budget plans, the LDP planned to include the Taiwan issue in the “budget outline.”31 After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Japan-ROC Council not only invited Tsai and Abe to a video conference at their 2022 annual meeting, but also adopted 14 items of Japan-Taiwan cooperation, stating that they would do their utmost to cooperate with Taiwan on defense matters and especially in the area of security, where they firmly opposed “unilateral changes to the status quo by force.” The meeting also stressed that the two parties would jointly maintain “the fundamental values of respect for freedom, democracy, and the rule of law,” and ensure “peace and stability in a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”32

清和会成员占自民党众参两院议员的1/4左右,他们的强硬立场对自民党的基本方针具有重大影响,对政府的施政形成一定的压力。如为编制2022年度政府预算案,自民党就打算在“预算编制大纲”中列入台湾问题。俄乌冲突爆发后,“日华恳”在2022年度大会上不但邀请蔡英文与安倍举行视频会议,还通过了14项合作条目,指出将尽最大努力与台湾进行防务合作,尤其是在安全领域坚决反对“以武力片面改变现状”,共同维持“尊重自由、民主主义、法治的基本价值”,确保“自由开放的印太地区的和平与稳定”。

LDP Diet members outside of the Seiwa-kai also have been unwilling to lag behind. Some even visited Taiwan more intensively in July 2022 after Abe’s assassination, and offered their condolences to Lee Teng-hui. Keisuke Suzuki, the chairman of the Legal Affairs Committee in the lower house and the LDP’s deputy chief of public relations, visited Taiwan from July 25 to 27, 2022, to participate in the “Ketagalan Forum: 2022 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue.” The Taiwan authorities regard Suzuki as a “Taiwan-friendly” force and “star of tomorrow” of LDP. Not only was Suzuki received by Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te, he also took the opportunity to consolidate his so-called “personal friendships” with DPP politicians such as Cheng Wen-tsan and Lin Chia-lung. LDP’s chief of public relations, Taro Kono, emphasized via a video conference that “the United States and like-minded countries are showing strong determination. They will send a signal of deterrence to China.  Japan’s goal is to show its determination to its allies, and to resolutely defend common values.”33 From July 27-30, the “Society for Thinking about Japan’s Security,” co-headed by the former LDP Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba and former Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada, visited Taiwan. In addition to being received by Tsai and Lai, they also exchanged views on security and other issues with Joseph Wu, head of Taiwan’s foreign affairs department, and Su Jia-chyuan, president of the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association.34

清和会之外的自民党国会议员也不甘人后,甚至在安倍遇刺后的2022年7月份,较为密集地窜访台湾,并吊唁李登辉。众议院法务委员长、自民党广报副本部长铃木馨祐于2022年7月25—27日窜访台湾,参加“凯达格兰论坛:2022印太安全对话”。台湾当局视铃木为自民党的“友台”力量和“明日之星”,不但得到蔡英文、赖清德的接待,铃木还借机与民进党政要郑文灿、林佳龙等巩固所谓的“私人情谊”。自民党广报本部长河野太郎通过视频会议强调,“美国与理念相近国家展现强烈决心,将给中国传递吓阻的信号,日本的目标是向盟友展现决心,坚决捍卫共同的价值观”。7月27—30日以自民党前干事长石破茂和前防卫大臣滨田靖一为共同团长的“思考日本安全保障之会”窜访台湾。他们一行除受到蔡、赖二人分别接待外,还与台外事部门的负责人吴钊燮、“台湾日本关系协会”会长苏嘉全等人围绕安全保障等议题交换意见。

It can be said that the above-mentioned public exchanges between Japanese and Taiwanese political personalities are intended to explore how “in the face of China’s increasing military activities and security pressure in the neighborhood, Japan and Taiwan should increase exchanges and cooperation in the field of security, and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”35 But in essence, through face-to-face exchanges, the intention of the two sides is to keep emphasizing that although Japan and Taiwan do not have formal state relations, they are “allies” with the same values. As Japan and Taiwan are working together to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the two sides in fact aim to keep the same pace in the confrontation between “democracy and authoritarianism,” which has characterized the “Indo-Pacific” region, and to demonstrate their determination to jointly maintain a “free and open international order.”

可以说,上述日台政要互动的公开话题是探讨“面对中国在周边日益增强的军事活动与安全压力,日台应在安全保障领域增加交流与合作,共同确保台湾海峡的和平与稳定”,但实质上双方通过面对面的互动,意在不断对外强调日台虽无正式国家关系,却是拥有相同价值观的“盟友”,日台共同确保台湾海峡的和平与稳定,就是要在“印太”地区业已形成的“民主主义与威权主义”对峙的格局中保持步调一致,以彰显共同维护“自由与开放的国际秩序”的决心。

In addition, Abe, through his younger brother, Nobuo Kishi, who served as defense minister in Kishida’s cabinet, directly created momentum in his cabinet to “show friendly signals” toward Taiwan and “tough signals” toward mainland China.36 Nobuo Kishi is the chairman of the Japan-ROC Council, a representative of the “pro-Taiwan” faction in Kishida’s cabinet, and a “megaphone” for Taiwan policy. He has publicly advocated for the establishment of a Japan-U.S.-Taiwan security dialogue and proposed the enactment of a “Japan-Taiwan Relations Act,” emphasizing that Taiwan is an important friend that shares “universal values” with Japan, and that if “Taiwan has a crisis,” Japan will not be able to stay out of it. He has also promoted Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, with the intention of helping Taiwan forge its image as a so-called “sovereign state” in the international community.37 Although Abe has been assassinated, the “pro-Taiwan” forces in the Japanese Diet are still very vocal. For example, thanks to their urging and insistence, Taiwan’s deputy leader Lai Ching-te even went to Japan to offer condolences as a former close friend of Abe’s.

此外,安倍通过胞弟,曾在岸田内阁担任防卫大臣的岸信夫,直接在内阁中营造对台“友好”、对大陆“强硬”的声势。岸信夫本人是“日华恳”干事长,是岸田内阁中“亲台派”的代表人物,是对台政策的“传声筒”。他曾公开主张建立日美台安全对话关系,提出制定“日本与台湾关系法”,强调台湾是与日本共享“普世价值”的重要朋友,若“台湾有事”日本也无法置身事外。他还推动台湾加入世界卫生组织、国际民航组织等,意图在国际社会中帮助台湾树立所谓的“主权国家”的形象。虽然安倍已遇刺身亡,但日本国会的“亲台”势力依旧声势浩大,比如在他们的推动和坚持下台湾当局副领导人赖清德竟以安倍生前密友的私人名义赴日吊唁。

III. Effects of Japan’s Involvement in the Taiwan Issue

三、日本介入台湾问题的影响

The Kishida administration has oriented its relations with China realist diplomacy for the new era, 38and while it also emphasizes the goal of constructive and stable bilateral relations, it does so on the premise that Japan “will advocate what should be advocated” and strongly urges China to act responsibly.39 What, then, are the areas covered by “what should be advocated,” and what are the criteria for the so-called “responsible action”? As to whose rules are to govern these areas and criteria, the answer is obvious: the United States, Japan, and other Western countries have the final say. Thus, the tone of Japan’s involvement in the Taiwan issue has become one of using “universal values” as the finishing touch to justify “using Taiwan to contain China,” intending to force China into making concessions on its principles.

岸田政府将对华关系定位为新时代现实主义的对华外交,虽然也强调以构筑建设性的稳定性的双边关系为目标,但前提是日本“应主张的会主张”,且强烈要求中国采取负责任的行动。那么,上述“应主张”之处涵盖哪些领域,所谓“负责任的行动”的标准是什么,这些领域和标准又以谁的规定为准,答案显而易见,是由美、日等西方国家说了算。于是,日本介入台湾问题的基调也就变成了以“普世价值”作为修饰,为“借台遏华”寻找正当性,意图迫使中国做出原则性让步。

As mentioned earlier, at this stage, as Japan involves itself deeply in the Taiwan issue, it will first emphasize the unique significance of Taiwan at the level of values, and then portray China’s principled position on Taiwan as a challenge to the “free and open international order” in the Indo-Pacific region, and deliberately make a “distorted correlation” between the Taiwan issue and the situation in Ukraine. Japan emphasizes its “homogeneity” with Taiwan on the level of values, implying that mainland China is a “heterodox” country, and defines China’s various statements and actions as specific examples of “threats” to the current international order. Conversely, any Japanese response to China is bolstered with the “righteous justification” of maintaining a “free and open international order”.

如前所述,现阶段日本在深度介入台湾问题时,先从价值观层面强调台湾的特殊意义,进而将中国在台湾问题上的原则立场渲染成为对印太地区“自由与开放的国际秩序”的挑战,并刻意将台湾问题与乌克兰局势“扭曲联结”在一起。日本从价值观层面强调与台湾的“同质性”,言外之意是中国大陆是“异质性”国家,将中国的各种言行界定为“威胁”现行国际秩序的具体实例。反过来说,日本针对中国的任何应对措施就获得了维护“自由与开放的国际秩序”的“大义名分”。

In fact, the differences in history, culture, and social systems have existed since ancient times, and diversity has always been an inherent attribute of human civilization. In the final analysis, the self-proclaimed “universal values” of Japan and the United States are nothing more than an attempt by Western societies to take “native” political experiences and value judgments, originally established in the West, and superimpose them worldwide by virtue of their dominance for the past two centuries in the world’s political, economic, and even ideological and cultural fields, forming the so-called modern “global international society.”40 In essence, the so-called “universal values” are merely rhetorical embellishments with hegemony wrapped inside, and what Japan is doing is merely using values as “packaging” for the purpose of “using Taiwan to contain China,” flagrantly interfering in China’s internal affairs, and obstructing China’s grand mission of reunification.

实际上,各国历史文化和社会制度差异自古就存在,多样性是人类文明的内在属性。而日美自诩的“普世价值”说到底不过是西方社会凭借两百年来在世界政治、经济乃至思想文化领域的优势,试图将原本建立在西方这一“地方性”的政治经验和价值判断等推广至全球,并形成所谓的现代“全球国际社会”。本质上,所谓的“普世价值”不过是包裹在霸权之下的辞藻修饰,而日本所为也不过是以价值观为“包装”,行“借台遏华”之实,冠冕堂皇地干涉中国内政,阻挠中国的统一大业罢了。

Japan uses values as a justifiable excuse for intervening in the Taiwan issue, and even believes that it can take advantage of the tense situation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to make a “distorted correlation” between the Taiwan issue and the situation in Ukraine. Consequently, it will then be able to use the Japan-U.S. alliance as the core, and unite more “partners with the same values” to intervene in the Taiwan issue. Furthermore, after making a “three-sea coordinated strategy” by correlating the Taiwan Strait issue with the issues of East China Sea and South China Sea, and broadly integrating it into the “Indo-Pacific strategy,” China can be made to “act responsibly” according to their wishes. Actually, China’s attitude has long been clearly stated: “No foreign country should expect us to trade away our core interests or to swallow the bitter fruit of damaging our sovereignty, security, or development interests.”41 It is conceivable that if Japan were to really violate the “major and minor premises” for dealing with the Taiwan issue and allow the “rally round the flag” effect of the Taiwan issue to continue to fester, it would only lead to a further deterioration of the mutual trust deficit between the two countries, and a deeper risk of falling into the “pan-securitization trap.”

日本以价值观作为介入台湾问题的正当借口,甚至认为可以凭借价值观的纽带,乘俄乌冲突的紧张局势,将台湾问题与乌克兰局势进行东西“扭曲联结”,便能以日美同盟为核心,联合更多“相同价值观的伙伴”共同插手台湾问题。进而,将之与东海、南海等问题进行“三海联动”,宽泛地纳入到“印太战略”中后,即可促使中国按照其意愿,“采取负责任的行动”。实际上,中国的态度早已明明白白地指出了,“任何外国不要指望我们会拿自己的核心利益做交易,不要指望我们会吞下损害我国主权、安全、发展利益的苦果。”可以想见,如果日本真的突破处理台湾问题的“大小前提”,放任台湾问题的“聚旗效应”持续发酵,那么只会导致两国互信赤字进一步加深,并有深陷“泛安全化陷阱”之虞。

As China rises, it faces an extremely complex and volatile security environment. Given its historical problems and the intensification of strategic competition between China and the United States, one can say that China’s security pressures are ever present and increasing, which undoubtedly greatly increases the difficulty for China to defuse the risks. Because of this, in the face of the “defining security by threats,” brought about by “pan-securitization,” China has given its remedy which “defines security by development.” It upholds the principle that security is indivisible, strives to build a balanced, effective, and sustainable security architecture, and opposes basing one country’s security on the insecurity of other countries. This concept was first embodied in the “Asian Security Concept,” and was later refined and included in the Overall National Security Outlook. Therefore, China advocates a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable Overall National Security Outlook to achieve “desecuritization.”

在中国崛起的过程中,面临着极其复杂多变的安全环境,既有历史遗留的,又有随着中美战略性竞争加剧而来的,可以说安全压力始终存在且与日俱增,这无疑大大增加了中国的应对难度。正因为如此,面对“泛安全化”带来的“以威胁定义安全”,中国给出了“以发展定义安全”的应对药方,秉持安全不可分割原则,努力构建均衡、有效、可持续的安全架构,反对把本国安全建立在他国不安全的基础上。这一理念先是体现在“亚洲安全观”中,之后补充完善为总体国家安全观。因此,中国倡导用共同、综合、合作、可持续的总体国家安全观实现“去安全化”。

With regard to China’s policy toward Japan specifically, the general direction should be oriented at adhering to the “major and minor premises” based on the political consensus between the leaders of China and Japan on “working together to build constructive and stable Sino-Japanese relations that meet the requirements of the new era” and “continuing to strengthen economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges.”42 Adherence to the principles of the four Sino-Japanese political documents is the only guardrail to ensure the foundation of political relations between the two countries. Whether it is “hollowing out” or “deflating” the “One China” principle or deliberately making a “distorted correlation” between the Taiwan issue and the situation in Ukraine, it is a serious provocation to China’s core interests and territorial sovereignty. In response, China should focus on using the existing dialogue platform between China and Japan to control the various security crises that may arise from minor incidents, and thus prevent escalation of the situation.

具体到中国的对日政策,大方向上应以中日两国领导人有关“共同努力构建契合新时代要求的建设性的稳定的中日关系”和“继续加强经济合作和民间交流”的政治共识为基础,坚持台湾问题上的“大小前提”,唯有坚持中日四个政治文件原则才是确保两国政治关系基础的防护栏。无论是对“一个中国”原则的“掏空”或“虚化”,还是刻意将台湾问题与乌克兰局势“扭曲联结”在一起,都是对中国核心利益和领土主权的严重挑衅。对此,中国应注重利用中日之间现有的对话平台,管控各种可能会擦枪走火造成的安全危机,防止事态升级。

In addition, for areas where China and Japan share common interests, cooperation should be actively promoted. For example, China should pay attention to Japan’s various practical operations in areas such as economic fields, regional cooperation, and climate change, do its best to expand practical mutual exchanges, and guide the development of bilateral relations in the right direction.

此外,对于中日之间的共同利益,也应积极推动合作。如中国应关注日本在经济领域、区域合作及气候变化等领域的各种务实性操作,并尽力扩大彼此间的务实交流,为两国关系的正确发展指引方向。

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Cite This Page

蔡亮 (Cai Liang). "The “Rally Round the Flag” Effect in Sino-Japanese Conflicts: Characteristics and Effects of Japan’s Involvement in the Taiwan Issue [中日矛盾中的“聚旗效应”:日本介入台湾问题的特征及影响]". CSIS Interpret: China, original work published in Journal of Northeast Asia Studies [东北亚学刊], November 15, 2022

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