Translation Tag: military
Xi Jinping delivered this speech to the first session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) a few months after receiving a second term as Chinese Communist Party general secretary at the 19th Party Congress.
Sometimes referred to in shorthand as the “History Resolution” or “Resolution on History,” this document is the Party’s official narrative of its history. The CCP has in total issued three such “resolutions” since its founding in 1921. This resolution follows the 1945 Resolution on Certain Historical Issues [关于若干历史问题的决议] and the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China [关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议].
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 19th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 20th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Xi Jinping), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 20th Central Committee).
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 17th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 18th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Hu Jintao), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 18th Central Committee).
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 16th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 17th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Hu Jintao), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 17th Central Committee).
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 15th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 16th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Jiang Zemin), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 16th Central Committee).
A report to the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), more commonly referred to as just the “Party Congress,” is arguably the most authoritative document in the Chinese Party-state ecosystem. It is technically the report of the outgoing Central Committee (here, the 13th Central Committee) at the quinquennial gathering of the Party Congress (here, the 14th Party Congress). Delivered by the General Secretary of the CCP (here, Jiang Zemin), the report not only provides an official summary of the Party’s work over the past five years, but also outlines the official Party stance on all major policy issues and sets policy priorities for the incoming Central Committee (here, the 14th Central Committee).
This piece from the U.S. studies program at Ministry of State Security-linked think tank China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations argues that the Ukraine war heralds the end of the post-Cold War order. The article argues the United States has been the biggest beneficiary of the war so far, leveraging the crisis to strengthen its alliance network and fight a proxy war with Russia. The authors of the report warn countries in Asia to remain vigilant to what they describe as U.S. efforts to preserve and expand its hegemony in ways that might destabilize the region.
In this second installment of a three-part paper on the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Li Shenming highlights the role of the “fifth column”—forces that worked within the USSR and the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to spread Western values and viewpoints. As a prognosis, Li argues that the CCP must prioritize ideological work, maintain absolute control over the military, and be vigilant of what he terms Western efforts to “infiltrate” China, including through cultural and economic exchange.
Zuo Fengrong, an expert in Soviet history, examines trends in Chinese scholarship on the USSR’s collapse across the past thirty years. Zuo argues that while this literature advanced over time with the availability of newly declassified archival sources, it has stagnated more recently. As a prognosis, Zuo encourages renewed attention to the failure of Soviet socialism and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) loss of power, in order to extract lessons for China.